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Foreword
This doctoral thesis is the culmination of extensive research and writing on
the “war on terror” and the framework of international law applicable to it.
The research has taken various forms and stretched back a number of years.
In addition to academic study and publication, I have been involved in the
application of the legal framework as a practising lawyer engaged in counter-
terrorism related cases, and have sought to reflect this experience and perspect-
ive in the thesis.
My research in this field had its inception in a short paper prepared in
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001. The paper set
out in skeletal form the framework of international law that appeared to govern
potential responses to those attacks. It was motivated by the relative dearth
of such analysis at that time, as well as confusion regarding international law
and its relevance. Over time this paper was developed into the first edition
of a book, published by Cambridge University Press in 2005, entitled The ‘war
on terror’ and the framework of international law. The book was widely used and
favourably reviewed, and it was suggested that I consider the presentation
of a modified version of the book as a doctoral thesis. I began to reflect on
the possibility of deepening and expanding the study, wherein the idea for
this thesis was born.
Much had changed since the 2004 date when the first edition was com-
pleted. Responses (by states, international or regional organisations and others)
had proliferated, impelling normative and policy changes on the national,
regional and international levels. Some practices that had sprung up around
the globe in the name of counter-terrorism constituted clear violations of
international law; in other situations, the practice raised complex and novel
legal questions or exposed apparent gaps or tensions in the framework itself.
Likewise, just as counter-terrorism responses had burgeoned, so in turn had
reactions to them, of potentially critical significance to the long-term implica-
tions of the war on terror. Many years into post 9/11 counter-terrorism
practice, it was necessary to take into account the extent to which, in a parti-
cularly dynamic field of practice, the legal framework may have been shaped
or influenced by post 9/11 practice. In short, it became clear that to do it
justice, what was required was more than substantial updating.
This thesis therefore builds upon, but varies from, the first edition in
significant respects. In keeping with the nature of the enterprise, the thesis
seeks to provide a more academic framework for the work, with a section on
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methodology and a more detailed discussion of sources than the original book,
through an expanded introduction and conclusion. It maintains as its key
objective the identification and exploration of the current legal framework
governing terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. The thesis examines
developments in that framework that have taken myriad forms in recent years:
standard setting initiatives by regional and international organisations, inter-
national agreements, judicial decisions (at domestic and international levels)
and of course potential developments in customary international law.
Where the thesis provides much more research and analysis than the
original book is in relation to the state practice that has developed in response
to international terrorism. While the emphasis in the first edition was heavily
on the framework that would govern future responses, the thesis necessarily
focuses more attention on illustrating how those responses have in fact
unfolded during the twelve years of practice since 9/11 (and the nine years
since the book was completed), and how the legal framework speaks to that
practice. The lethal use of force by ‘drones’, the systematic and coordinated
‘extraordinary rendition’ programme, the regimes of listing of individuals and
groups, and in particular contorted attempts to address procedures for ‘de-
listing,’ are among the most notorious of these measures. Other practices have
swept the globe further beneath the radar but raising just as important inter-
national legal issues. These include for example developments in the use of
criminal law and practice to punish an expanding group of persons ‘associated’
with or deemed to ‘support’ broadly defined terrorism, or the use of private
actors (such as private security companies) in counter-terrorism. In all of the
chapters, much of the consideration of new or amended legislation, policies
and practices is new to the thesis.
Building on this core, the thesis also contains several new chapters. Two
new case studies’ address the practices of extraordinary rendition and the
killing of Osama bin Laden, complementing an updated case study on Guanta-
namo Bay. Each of these explore factual scenarios in more depth than would
be possible within the main chapters, and consider the multiple overlapping
norms applicable to them as well as the intersections between the relevant
areas of international law.
As noted above, a critical dimension of unfolding practice at this stage
consists of second tier responses to anti-terrorism practices that may have
strained or been inconsistent with the legal framework. A major component
of this ‘reaction’ to the war on terror over time has been judicial, as challenges
to the counter-terrorism practice have been adjudicated. An additional new
chapter therefore considers the role of the judiciary in responding to human
rights violations in the war on terror. This forms part of, and feeds into,
consideration of the ultimate impact of counter-terrorism practice.
The importance of a holistic approach to international law as highlighted
in the first edition of the book, by understanding rules not in isolation but
as part of the framework as a whole, has been borne out by practice. This thesis
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explores in more detail the overlapping layers of legal obligations, and inter-
sections between them, to determine applicable law in particular situations.
It also highlights the manipulation and selectivity in the approach to that
framework in practice and tensions arising. Much of the uncertainty around
international law in the counter-terrorism context may relate more to a refusal
to be bound by law (or by particular areas of law or specific norms), or to
accept the implications of law’s constraint. Areas of genuine complexity in
relation to the interplay of norms (such as under IHL and international human
rights law or human rights and UN Security Council obligations) have, how-
ever, been acknowledged and explored in more detail than in the original book.
While the focus remains on identifying the applicable legal framework,
the thesis is necessarily more reflective throughout, and in particular in the
concluding chapter, as to the nature and impact of post 9/11 counter-terrorism
practices that have now unfolded for over a decade, the challenges they pose
and their potential longer term implications for international legality.
The research for the thesis was completed on 31 August 2013. A slightly
modified version of this thesis will in due course be published as a second
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Acts of international terrorism, such as the atrocities committed on 11 Septem-
ber 2001 (‘9/11’) and others since then highlight the critical importance of the
international rule of law and the terrible consequences of its disregard.1 Ulti-
mately, however, the impact of such attacks depends on the responses to them,
and in turn on the reaction to those responses. To the extent that the lawless-
ness of terrorism is met with unlawfulness, unlawfulness with impunity, the
long-term implications for the rule of law, and the peace, stability and justice
it serves, will be grave. Undermining the authority of law can only lay the
foundation for future violations, whether by terrorists or by states committing
abuses in the name of counter-terrorism. Conversely, so far as states operate
within the law, and bring it to bear on those responsible for terrorism and
crimes committed in the name of counter-terrorism, the authority of law can
ultimately be reasserted and the system of law strengthened.
An underlying premise of this study is that the legitimacy of measures
taken in the name of the fight against international terrorism depends on their
consistency with international law. It is essentially this reference to objectively
verifiable standards and processes – rather than subjective assertions as to
good and evil or those believe in freedom and those that seek its destruction2
– that enable credible distinctions to be drawn between those who abide by
the rules of the international community and those who conspire against them.
In an intensely politicized area, the law can provide us with meaningful
parameters within which to assess what is loosely and invariably pejoratively
labelled ‘terrorism’ and states’ responses to such acts.
1 The number of people killed by the terrorist attacks on September 11 was officially estimated
by US authorities at 2,819. See ‘Names of September 11 Victims Published’, Associated Press,
20 August 2002. Shortly after the attacks, al-Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist network or
organization, was identified as being responsible for the attacks; see ‘Al Qaeda Claims
Responsibility for September 11’, CNN News, 15 April 2002. Since 9/11, like prior to it,
attacks of international terrorism have occurred around the globe with notable attacks
including those in Madrid, London, Bali, Mumbai, Libya, Iraq and beyond.
2 Such references peppered political discourse post-9/11; see e.g. former US President Bush’s
renowned speech concerning the ‘axis of evil’ threatening the world, State of the Union
Address, 29 January 2002, available at: http://archive.org/details/SOTU_2002.
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International terrorism and measures of counter-terrorism, and many of
the challenges they pose, are not new phenomena but existed long before 2001.
In counter-terrorism practice since 9/11, famously framed as a ‘war on terror,’3
persistent emphasis has been placed on the exceptional nature of threats, on
the unprecedented challenges posed by ‘modern’ international terrorism and
on a ‘novel’ kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy.4 Whether the
nature of any terrorist threat, or indeed states’ responses to it, are in fact so
unprecedented, novel or exceptional has been questioned over time.5
Emphasising the novelty of threats, responses and challenges6 and adopting
an ‘exceptionalist’ approach to international terrorism7 may blind us to the
relevance of lessons of the past,8 and the extent to which international law
and practice provide tested – albeit fluid and evolving – parameters to address
many of the challenges posed by international terrorism.
It is indisputable however that counter-terrorism practice has proliferated
on many dimensions and in many forms post 9/11 and the heralding of a
‘global war on terror’ has had global manifestations and repercussions. It is
the practice of terrorism and counter-terrorism in this post 9/11 environment,
3 The US President George W. Bush coined the ‘war on terror’ epithet on 20 September 2001,
when he declared that ‘[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated’. See Address of the US President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, 20 September 2001, available at: http://archive.org/details/
gwb2001-09-20.flac16. As discussed below in Chapter 6, the phrase ‘war on terror’ was
dropped by the Obama administration, but it retains the position that there is a conflict
with al-Qaeda and associated groups. The fact that this is not a conflict in any legal sense
is addressed in Chapter 6.
4 See, e.g., ‘State of the Union Address’, 29 January 2002, supra note 2; Statement by Ambassa-
dor at Large, Pierre Prosper, Address at Chatham House, 20 February 2002 cited in E.
Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), p. 2; Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer, Aboard Air Force One, 5 November 2002,
available at: www.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021105-2.html. See
Chapter 6 for discussion of the ‘new’ war theory.
5 See, e.g., G. Abi-Saab, ‘Introduction’, Bianchi (ed.), Enforcing International Law Norms against
Terrorism, Hart (2004). See International Commission of Jurists Eminent Jurists Panel Report
(Eminent Jurists Report), 2009. On the nature and scale of the threat posed by al-Qaeda,
see Chapter 5, 6 and 12 (conclusions). See also Van den Herik and Schrijver, ‘Introduction’,
in Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal order. Meeting the Challenges
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)..
6 The shifting nature of threats over time is recognised in e.g. President Obama’s speech
at National Defense University, 23 May, 2013. For an example of a broad-reaching approach
to threats in US policy however discussion of on the law of self defence in Chapter 5.
7 For discussion of why there can be no ‘global emergency,’ legally speaking, see Chapter 7.
The exceptionalist approach is evident in all areas of law, such as broad reaching approaches
to the use of force (Chapter 5), criminal law (Chapter 4), the invocation of a ‘war’ paradigm
(Chapter 6) and in justifications for violations of human rights (Chapter 7). See Chapter
12 Conclusions on ‘exceptionlism and its creeping reach’.
8 See ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel, 2009 (herein-
after ‘Eminent Jurists Report’), 2009.
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and the legal framework applicable to it, that is the focus of this thesis. The
thesis locates this phenomenon of post 9/11 international terrorism and
counter-terrorism, not in a normative void, however, but against a backdrop
of international law and developing international practice.
The principal purpose is to identify the current state of international law
concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism, which provides the framework
for the assessment of acts of terrorism and the lawfulness of measures taken
in the name of counter-terrorism. The UN Secretary General has noted that
the ‘war on terror’ affects all areas of the UN agenda.9 The legal framework
in turn is derived from diverse branches of international law none of which
can or should be seen in isolation. This study will seek to set out in an access-
ible fashion multiple areas of law, and myriad sources of law, that together
form the international legal framework, and explore the connections and
interplay between them. While the framework is multi-dimensional and may
at times raise complex issues, it is also underpinned by basic legal principles
that provide, for example, for basic levels of protection, process and
accountability in all situations.
Assertions regarding the nature and role of the international legal frame-
work have abounded in the post 9/11 era. Allegations have been levelled of
perceived ‘gaps’ in the legal framework or of a framework that is inadequate,
‘outmoded,’ ‘quaint,’ or too ‘inflexible’ to address the realities of modern
terrorism and state reactions to it. Some have foreseen transformative shifts
in the legal framework to embrace the nature of counter-terrorist practice –
heralding ‘turning points’ or ‘Grotian moments’ in the legal order.10 Others
have questioned the very relevance and authority of international law in the
face of security challenges embodied in the 9/11 attacks and the threat of their
recurrence.11
By setting out the key parts of the legal framework, this book will question
whether there are genuine normative gaps in the legal framework, or, as one
commentator noted, more perceived ‘interpretative’ or ‘policy-created’ gaps.12
It will also question whether there has been a seismic shift in the legal order,
while exploring areas of potential legal development post-9/11 and their effect.
It will highlight the nature of the legal framework, including the extent (and
9 Statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council, 4 October 2002,
Press Release SG/SM/8417, SC/7523, and subsequent General Assembly resolution A/RES/
67/97. See also the background report by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, Delivering
Justice: Programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international
levels, UN doc. A/66/749, 16 March 2012.
10 Examples of such claims appear throughout relevant chapters, and conclusions in this
respect are drawn in Chapter 12.
11 Chapter 7.B.1.
12 K. Samuel, ‘The Rule of Law Framework and Its Lacunae: Normative, Interpretative, and/or
Policy Created?’ in Salinas de Frias, Samuel and White, Counter-terrorism International Law
and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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the limits) its flexibility to adjust to terrorism and counterterrorism in the 21st
century, tensions and challenges that arise, and areas where the law may
indeed be unsettled or weak, in flux, or likely to develop in the future.13 In
short, it seeks to grapple through the fog created by a ‘war on terror’, in which
international law has at times been notably absent, at others distorted, and
often presented as hopelessly confused or ill equipped to address ‘new chal-
lenges’.
While the primary focus of this book is on identifying the legal framework,
a secondary and inter-related focus is on highlighting and assessing how states
have responded in practice to the challenges of counter-terrorism post-9/11.
While terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the international legal framework
governing them existed long before 9/11, a particular flurry – and perhaps
at time frenzy – of normative, political and institutional development and
activity have ensued since the introduction of the so-called global war on
terror. This activity has often fallen foul of the rule of law framework, as well
as in some situations contributed to and shaped that framework for the
future.14 This study considers examples of practice in the fight against terror-
ism alongside the legal framework, to identify issues that have arisen regarding
its interpretation and application, the extent of compliance with it and areas
of possible legal development.
The post-9/11 practice explored in subsequent chapters has unfolded on
multiple levels (international, regional and national). It has involved a plurality
of actors (legislature, judiciary, executive, intelligence agencies, private actors
and others). It has taken a multiplicity of forms including the passage of laws
and implementation of policies and practices, through the conduct, direction
or control of states, or their complicity and support, and through acts and
omissions. Although in some areas the extent, nature and influence of US
practice have justified greater emphasis on that state than on others, terrorism,
counter terrorism and the challenges they pose in the post-9/11 era are global
phenomena. The focus of the study is accordingly global. It draws on universal
norms and practice but also regional and sub-regional standards, and examples
of counter-terrorism practice not only from the state leading the war on terror
but from a range of states around the globe, from Afghanistan to Algeria,
Bahrain to Bali, Colombia to Chechnya, and beyond, where diverse practices
in the name of terrorism raise persistent questions regarding respect for the
legal framework.
It is a feature of the broad reaching approach to the ‘war on terror’ and
counter-terrorism, that some of the practice illustrated may be viewed as not
in fact relating to international terrorism at all. One example might be the Iraq
13 A thorough analysis of how the law may have changed since 9/11 is not, however, the
objective of this study.
14 GA Res. 67/97 ‘The rule of law at the national and international levels’, UN Doc. A/RES/
67/97, 14 January 2013.
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invasion and related developments, which may have had little real link with
counter-terrorism agenda but which occurred in the broad context of, and were
justified in large part by reference to, the fear of international terrorism.15
Many counter-terrorist measures taken in states around the world, where
terrorism (and counter-terrorism) have been matters of concern long before
2001, are not a post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ phenomenon. Many of them, however,
have found justification by reference to a new global imperative around the
fight against terrorism since then. The practice explored in subsequent chapters
illustrates how the long shadow of 9/11 has been a pretext for action against
individuals and entities not linked to those events an din some cases not linked
to terrorism at all.16 Elasticity in the exceptional approaches to terrorism and
the creeping reach of terrorism related justifications is one of the features of
the war on terror to which we will return in the concluding observations.
The focus is on identifying the obligations of states under international
law, reflecting the fact that international law does not, generally, impose
obligations on private actors or groups as such (unless their acts are attribut-
able to the state which is then responsible). This state-centricity of the inter-
national legal order has been described as a limiting factor for the relevance
of international law in this area. It is also increasingly subject to question as
the thesis shows for example, in light of developments of individual criminal
responsibility, explored in Chapter 4, the effective ‘individualization’ of inter-
national law through sanctions regimes that effectively impose international
legal obligations directly on individuals, discussed in Chapter 7,17 and the
growing momentum towards recognition of non-state actor responsibility more
generally, noted in Chapter 3. While focusing on the international legal obliga-
tions and practice of states, the study therefore also reflects the plurality of
actors, involved in terrorism and counter-terrorism, and international legal
issues arising.
This book does not and could not present a comprehensive factual report
on the plethora of state practice in response to terrorism since 9/11. It seeks,
however, to highlight through examples specific issues of law that the ‘war
on terror’ has thrown up, of relevance to an assessment of the role and rel-
evance of international law in light of the global security threat that has beset
the start of the 21st century.
15 President Bush is reported as having stated that ‘one of the hardest parts of my job is to
connect Iraq to the war on terror’ and the controversy around the existence of any plausible
link supports that proposition. See further Chapter 5B.3 on the use of force in Iraq.
16 Chapters 7 and 11 contain examples of the creeping reach of terrorism justifications, and
Chapter 12 ‘Conclusions’.
17 The ‘individualisation’ of international law notably occurs through e.g. security council
sanctions that directly address and impose sanctions on individuals and not , as was
traditionally the case, on states; see Chapters 7B.8 and 11 and Van den Herik and Schrijver,
Terrorism Law and Practice, supra note 5.
6 Chapter 1
1.2 THESIS AND SCOPE OF ENQUIRY
As foreshadowed above, this thesis addresses several overarching groups of
questions. The first group relates to the nature of the legal framework. To what
extent can and does the existing legal framework speak to and govern ‘inter-
national terrorism’ and states responses thereto? How should we understand
that framework, considering its key provisions and its structure as a whole?
Does the framework equip the international community of states to meet the
challenges associated with international terrorism, or is it, as some have
suggested, inadequate or inappropriate to govern in the post-9/11 era?
The study will therefore seek to set out the parameters of the international
legal framework applicable to international terrorism and responses thereto.
It will explore areas of uncertainty, areas where the law may be in flux, while
demonstrating that there are no gaping holes in the international legal order.
A secondary question that flows from the first is to what extent have the
norms and mechanisms of the international legal system been respected,
upheld, distorted or undermined in the practice of counter-terrorism in this
post 9/11 environment. It will approach this question by exploring examples
of practice on the various levels and types referred to above, international and
national, executive, legislative and judicial. It will address, principally, state
practice that is carried out (or purports to be carried out) in response to
international terrorism, but also practice in responding to wrongs arising in
the course of counter-terrorism.
A third group of underlying questions that emerge from the consideration
of the law and the practice relate to the longer implications of the ‘war on
terror’. The thesis does not purport to provide an in-depth study of the poten-
tial movement in customary law through state practice and opinio juris. It does,
however, highlight the possibility, by reference to examples, of how the frame-
work may itself have been influenced by the practice explored. It therefore
highlights the implications of the war on terror for the legal framework. In
the final chapter, drawing conclusions from the research, it reflects on the
broader implications for the rule of law and outstanding challenges. Terror
attacks in recent years render beyond a doubt the challenge facing the inter-
national community, to address effectively the scourge of international terror-
ism. The war on terror highlights the countless challenges for the international
community to ensure that this is done within a rule of law framework.18
18 See Chapter 12 which reflects on these challenges.
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1.3 SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM
It is perhaps a unique – certainly an unusual – feature of the present area of
study that one phenomenon, international terrorism, is addressed through
such a plurality of areas of international law and fed by such a multiplicity
of sources of law. The identification of the legal framework set out in this book
has therefore been drawn from a diverse range of overlapping and mutually
reinforcing sources of law relevant to an understanding of terrorism and
counter-terrorism.
The norms addressed include primary norms that impose obligations on
states in respect of the prevention and response to terrorism, or constrain the
manner in which that counter-terrorism unfolds. Secondary norms that address
the consequences of breach and rules of state responsibility are also central
to this study.
The traditional starting point of every discussion of sources of law is Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,19 which lists ‘sources’
of international law.20 In setting out the legal framework applicable to inter-
national terrorism, this study focuses on treaty law and customary international
law as the most important sources of international law. However, the study
also relies on many other subsidiary sources which have differed greatly in
the nature and their weight, but each has their place in a proper understanding
of the legal infrastructure of counter-terrorism related law.
1.3.1 International treaties
Most of the rules of the international legal system derive from agreements
between States,21 which in turn give rise to obligations that become binding
on states parties to them. While there is no one comprehensive global terrorism
treaty, as discussed in Chapter 2, a complex network of international treaties
exists, enshrining a broad range of international obligations, of relevance to
19 Although Article 38 is formally only binding on to the International Court of Justice (and
previously, to the Permanent Court of International Justice) as to the law applicable to cases
before it, it is generally considered as the ‘authoritative’ list of the sources of international
law’. See R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), ninth edition, p. 24.
20 The sources according to Art. 38 include a) international conventions; (b) customary
international law; (c) general principles of law ‘as recognized by civilized nations.’
21 The rules relating to the formation, modification, suspension and termination of international
agreements are contained in two multilateral conventions, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties of 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 1980 (hereinafter
VCLT 1969) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Inter-
national Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986. Most of
the provisions of the Vienna Conventions are considered to reflect customary international
law.
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terrorism and counter-terrorism. Some are general in nature, others address
specific conduct or issues; some are universal or international and others
regional or bilateral.
It is a basic rule that only States which are parties to a treaty are bound
by it, and an international agreement cannot in itself produce obligations on
third party States.22 For major international treaties such as those addressed
in this study, states generally become bound through ratification or acces-
sion.23 Among the fundamental rules governing international agreements
is that once a State is bound by a treaty, it must fulfil the obligations deriving
from it in good faith,24 and may not for example ‘invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.25 A state
that has signed but not ratified a treaty ‘is obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty’.26
While the vast majority of treaties, including the terrorism conventions
or extradition treaties referred to in this book, aim at exchanging rights and
obligations between the parties, some multilateral treaties covered by this study
lay down general rules that appear to be directed at, and which affect, all states
of the international community. The category of so-called ‘law-making
treaties’,27 which includes for example certain multilateral conventions on
the protection of human rights discussed at Chapter 7, or the Geneva Conven-
tions and other multilateral treaties on international humanitarian law dis-
cussed at Chapter 6, may either set standards for the international community
as a whole, or codify customary law (see below). Moreover, the UN Charter
is a key source in this area, which stands apart from other treaties given its
quasi-constitutional status, and its universal coverage.28 This is also reflected
22 This fundamental rule is referred to as the rule pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. See Section
IV (Articles 34-8), VCLT 1969.
23 See Article 11 VCLT 1969: ‘[T]he consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed
by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.’ Note however that signature does not
generally bind the state, see Article 12, VCLT 1969.
24 This is commonly expressed with the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda. See Article 26, VCLT
1969: ‘Every treaty in force is binding on the parties and must be performed by them in
good faith.’
25 Article 27, VCLT 1969.
26 See Article 18, VCLT 1969.
27 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (Oxford, 2008), p13 ‘Law-making
treaties create general norms for the future conduct of the parties in terms of legal proposi-
tions, and the obligations are generally the same for all parties ... Such treaties are in
principle binding only on parties, but the number of parties, the explicit acceptance of rules
of law, and in some cases, the declaratory nature of the provisions produce a strong law-
creating effect at least as great as the general practice considered necessary to support a
customary rule.’
28 See in particular Chapter 4 on the use of force and Chapter 7 on human rights.
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in Article 103 of the Charter itself, noting the prevalence of Charter obligations
over other international agreements.29
The result of the widespread ratification of universal treaties,30 and the
multiplicity of overlapping regional and specific treaties, is that many of the
core obligations referred to in this study derive from binding treaty obligations
incumbent on all states. Treaties may in turn influence the development of
customary international law in particular areas; in particular, the fact that a
large number of States have ratified a number of the conventions referred to
in this study may constitute a strong indication that the rules embodied in
them correspond to rules of customary international law.31 The study con-
ducted by the ICRC on customary international humanitarian law, for example,
supports the view that many of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols now reflect customary law.32
1.2.2 Customary international law
In the absence of a legislative body with the power to create rules binding
on all the subjects of the international legal system,33 the only source of ‘gen-
eral’ rules of international law is customary international law (CIL). CIL derives
from the practice of States34 where this practice is more or less uniform, gen-
erally consistent and widespread, and considered to be legally necessary or
29 Art. 103 provides: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’
30 Extremely high levels of ratification of certain treaties make their claim to represent global
standards compelling. See e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child with 193 state
parties; the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women with 187 state
parties; the Convention against Torture with 153 parties; the ICESCR with 160 state parties;
or from IHL, the Geneva Conventions which have 194 parties.
31 See, in general, M. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, 47 (1974-75) BYIL
1. The treaty would provide strong evidence of the opinio juris, one of the key elements
of customary international law.
32 See J. Henckaerts and L. Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005 (hereinafter ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’).
33 The UN Charter confers to the Security Council the power to adopt decisions which are
binding on all UN Member States (and therefore on virtually every State of the international
community) by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter (see Chapter 5, section A). This does
not however imply that the Security Council should be considered as an ‘international
legislative body’.
34 ‘State practice means any act or statement by a State from which views about customary
law can be inferred; it includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto (such as
General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and omissions. Customary
international law can also be created by the practice of international organizations and (at
least in theory) by the practice of individuals’. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of Inter-
national Law’, supra note 31, p. 53.
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obligatory.35 Generality of practice does not mean uniformity or universal-
ity.36 The fact that a number of States follow a certain course of conduct, and
other States do not protest, may be sufficient to affirm the generality of the
practice; conversely the fact that some states violate norms or disagree with
their content does not necessarily undermine the legal standards themselves.
The second prong of the test – the attitude to the practice as obligatory or
‘necessary’, referred to as opinio juris – is crucial in distinguishing State practice
relevant for the purpose of identifying a customary rule from practice, which
denotes mere international usage.37
While the ‘practice’ of states referred to in this study is intended to
illustrate how the war on terror has unfolded, and does not purport to be
representative, it is worthy of note that this practice may also be relevant to
the evolution of the customary legal framework, as discussed further below.38
As reflected in the sources relied upon in this study, state practice, and
opinio juris, may take many forms. State practice may comprise both ‘physical
and verbal acts of states’,39 embracing executive, legislative and judicial
practice on the domestic level, as well as statements manifest through the
functioning of international entities, such as the General Assembly, Security
Council, or regional bodies. The plethora of activity by inter-state entities in
the field of counter-terrorism since 9/11, and in particular the many statements
by states in these fora, provide fertile ground for identifying opinio juris.40
Many of the treaties, judicial decisions or subsidiary sources examined in the
study may themselves be indicators relevant to identifying customary law.
35 C.d. opinio iuris sive necessitates. As noted by the ICJ: ‘Not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such or be carried out in a certain way
as to be evidence of the belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a certain rule requiring it.’ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 77.
See Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, supra note 31, pp. 16-18.
36 ICJ judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case Military and Paramilitary Activities of the United
States in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ Reports 1986, para. 186.
37 On the distinction between custom and usage – ‘a general practice which does not reflect
a legal obligation’ – see Brownlie, Principles, supra note 27, p. 6.
38 See part 1.2.2 ‘How International Law Changes’ below.
39 See generally J.M. Jenchaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law, (ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009).
40 On the other hand in particularly sensitive areas related to national security, practice is
predictably opaque, and states may refrain from commenting publicly on the conduct of
other states for a host of political reasons. On some areas discussed in the study, political
and security sensitivities may therefore pose particular difficulties in discerning the views
of states.
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While some states will be more active on the international plane, thus more
influential on the evolution of customary law, once a customary rule of inter-
national law has come into being, all States are bound by it.41
1.3.3 Other sources
Next to treaty law and customary international law, Article 38 ICJ Statute also
refers to general principles, judicial decisions and teachings/doctrine of inter-
national law as supplementary sources.
i) General principles of Law
‘General principles of law’ is enshrined in article 38 of the ICJ Statute as a
source of international law.42 Identifying such ‘general’ principles can be a
contentious process, and the content of such principles is ripe for considerable
dispute. There are, however, core legal principles that prevail across most if
not all domestic legal systems, and are reflected at international level and
should inform a holistic approach to the legal framework.43
Those of relevance in the present field would include basic principles of
criminal law such as nemo iudex in sua causa, the presumption of innocence,
ne bis in idem, nullum crimen sine lege or nullum pone sine lege. Other core prin-
ciples may include the principles of humanity, the concept of procedural
fairness and the right to a remedy, or the principle of ‘good faith’ recognized
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as touching every aspect of inter-
national law’.44
In practice, these ‘general principles’ are particularly important where there
may be gaps or weaknesses in the other sources of law, or in novel areas of
practice wherein reference to national approaches to the legal principles at
stake may assist the interpretation of international law. As noted above,
41 States may, however, in certain circumstances, avoid obligation through persistent objection
to the rule, provided that the rule is not a jus cogens rule (see further below). For a dis-
cussion of custom and the role of ‘bigger states’, relevant to an assessment of the ‘war on
terror’, see V. Lowe, ‘The Iraq Crisis: What Now?’, 52 (2003) ICLQ 859, p. 863. See also
Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legad Order,
Cambridge, 2004.
42 Article 38 (1) ICJ Statute.
43 ‘The phrase embraces such general principles as pervade domestic jurisprudence and can
be applied to international legal questions’. G. von Glen, Law Among Nations, 6th ed. (New
York, 1986), p. 22. See also F. Raitonod, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Martinis Nijhoff, 2008.
44 Art 2(2) UN Charter; Declaration on Freandly Relations; Border and Transborder Armed
Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 1988, p. 105. The ICJ found good faith one of basic
principles governing creation and performance of legal obligations. See also Oppenheim’s,
International Law 9/11, Ed. (Oxford 2008) p. 39-40.
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allegations of gaps and uncertainties have been a defining feature of political
discourse post-9/11.
ii) Judicial Decisions, Jurisprudence and Jurists
Significant emphasis is placed in this study on judicial responses to terrorism.
Judicial decision are often said not to be sources of law in a strict sense,
particularly as there is no system of ‘precedent’ in the international system,45
thus formally they apply rather than create law. Yet this may fail to reflect
the true extent to which international law develops through judicial interpreta-
tion, clarification or application.
This study will include judicial determinations from courts and bodies on
various levels: international, regional and national. It will include decisions
of the particularly influential International Court of Justice (ICJ), or international
human rights bodies, on the international level. It will refer also to significant
decisions of regional courts and bodies such as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or of the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR) or the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights (IACHR). On the national level, a plethora of juris-
prudence has emerged, from the criminal court practice considered in Chapter
4 to various courts addressing a broad range of issues with human rights
implications, discussed in Chapter 11.
These decisions serve multiple functions in the present study. National
courts are organs of the state, and judicial decisions may bring the state into
conflict with its international obligations. They provide examples of state
practice. International and regional courts also have an important role in
shaping the legal framework in various ways. On one very direct level, some
decisions are themselves binding, albeit only on parties to the case. They may
directly impel national legal change as states and governments implement
decisions and judgments, bringing laws as well as practices into line with
international legal obligations. They may also shape and clarify through
practice the nature of international legal standards and may contribute to
customary international law. It is therefore one of the peculiar features of
national court decisions that they may both contribute as a source of law and
give rise to violations of it.
The study illustrates the ways in which legal standards in this field have
developed through judicial decision-making. Decisions of the ICJ and other
international courts and tribunals provide authoritative interpretations of the
law and are in practice often followed as authority in later cases. The influence
of the judgments and decisions of at least some of the international courts and
bodies on legal standards is inevitably more relevant to some areas than to
others. In the field of human rights, jurisprudence plays a particular role in
45 Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.
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the establishment of legal standards, as amply illustrated by the law set out
in the present study. Many relevant areas of the legal framework explored
– such as positive obligations, the extra-territorial scope of human rights obliga-
tions or state responsibility for human rights violations – reveal what is es-
sentially judge-made law, developed wholly or in large part through judicial
interpretation and application of the sometimes relatively skeletal treaty
provisions. Judicial decisions in the human rights field and beyond contribute
to the elaboration and understanding of the ‘principles’ and interpretative
approaches of human rights law that are key to the holistic and effective
application of that body of law within a broader legal system.46
In the field of IHL, this is the case to a lesser extent, given the dearth of
international bodies specifically charged with applying that body of law.
Particularly in the post-9/11 era, however, principles and rules of IHL have
been applied by courts in multiple cases, as the study will demonstrate.47
In other areas, such as the use of force, there is much less international ad-
judication in practice, though ICJ decisions remain authoritative.
In turn, the jurisprudence emerging from these judicial decisions feeds
back into the treaty law of the future, as seen in the specific provisions of
conventions on issues such as torture or enforced disappearance or aimed at
protecting particular groups, which built on human rights jurisprudence.48
On another level, judicial decisions – national or international – may contribute
to the formation of customary international law, or provide evidence of the
‘general principles’ of law referred to in Article 38.
As for the legal analyses of jurists, while they do not create law as such,
they may ‘ease or impede the passage of new doctrines into legal rules.’49
Article 38 specifically provides that, in order to determine the content of these
(treaty-based or customary) rules of international law, recourse may be had
to the writings of legal scholars.50 These are referred to in the book as they
46 These principles include an evolutive approach to law as a living instrument, the principle
of effectiveness, a purposive and contextual interpretation, and finally a holistic approach
in line with broader international law. See Chapter 7A.6.
47 See eg the deliberations of criminal courts such as in the case of Hamdan where US courts
had to determine whether material support for terrorism was a crime under IHL at the
relevant time, in Chapter 4, or in the processes surrounding the Guantanamo habeas corpus
or criminal cases in Chapter 8.
48 The more recent provisions of human rights treaties e.g. the Torture convention or the
Convention on Forced Dsiappearance, discussed at Chapter 7, are more elaborate than earlier
general convention and adopted the detailed rules developed through human rights
jurisprudence.
49 V. Lowe, ‘The Iraq Crisis’, p. 860.
50 Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute specifies that the Court may have recourse to ‘judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’.
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may provide evidence of the content of customary or treaty law,51 or illumin-
ate the direction in which the law may be developing
The study looks beyond the primary sources of international law in the
form of treaties and customary law, or the supplementary sources referred
to in Article 38, to other potential sources. The prolific development in the
field of terrorism and counter-terrorism in recent years has been characterized
by the engagement of a particularly diverse group of standard setters. In this
field in particular it is therefore critical to consider the role of other actors,
and the relevance of other sources, mindful of the fact that these inevitably
carry varying weights. While these include the national and international
judiciaries emphasised above, close regard must also be paid to the role of
the Security Council, and even the different role of non-state actors, in the
development of the legal framework.
iii) Security Council and General Assembly
The principle political organs of the UN have played active roles in the develop-
ment and implementation of the legal framework surrounding terrorism and
counter-terrorism in recent years.52 Security Council resolutions in the field
of terrorism have assumed a perhaps unusually significant role, in light of
the use of Chapter VII binding powers to set down elaborate measures that
states are legally bound to take in relation to terrorism, which the Council
found to constitute a threat to peace and security. This has been described
the Security entering its ‘legislative phase’,53 which it did most notably in
Security Council Resolution 1373.
There is academic discussion over whether Security Council resolutions,
which are of course not included in Article 38, should be treated as separate
sources of law at all. Objections are various, but understandably include the
‘unrepresentative and undemocratic’ nature of the body, rendering the Council
arguably unsuitable for international law making.54 The fact remains, however,
that under the Charter, the Council does have a unique role in issuing binding
decisions, and in light of post 9/11 practice explored in this study, the signi-
ficance of that exercise of power can hardly be doubted.55
51 Note that these are not themselves ‘sources’ of law stricto sensu, but provide evidence of
the content of treaty or customary norms. See Brownlie, Principles, supra note 28, p.23.
52 While other bodies may also influence legal development the focus here is on the Security
Council and General Assembly, which have particular roles and influence. See e.g. World
Summit Outcome document, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, para. 80, and in relation to
terrorism, paras. 81-90.
53 Paul C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’, 96 A.J.I.L. 901 (2001). José E. Alvarez,
‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, 97 AJIL 873, 874 (2003); S. Talmon, ‘The Security
Council as World Legislator’, AJIL, Vol. 99:175 (2005).
54 Talmon, ‘The Security Council’, supra note 53, p. 179.
55 See eg Chapter 7B.1 on the wide-reaching impact of SCRes 1373.
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Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, just as Council activity is relevant to
an assessment of emerging obligations, it is also in the frame as regards
emerging violations. As noted in Chapter 7, the question of whether the
Council is obliged to respect the international legal framework, and whether
it has done so, is a matter of controversy post-9/11. It may be argued that
key resolutions such as SC Resolution 1373 simultaneously created one set
of legal obligations, while effectively violating others, creating difficult issues
for states as regards conflicting obligations.56
General Assembly resolutions have quite a different role in the legal
architecture. Such resolutions are not mandatory in the same way as Council
Chapter VII decision, but they may nonetheless, in certain case, have significant
normative value, as the ICJ and others have recognized.57 Assembly resolutions
have particular authority and universality, as the Assembly represents the
entire community of states and as such may reflect the communis opinio of the
international community and give expression to the prevailing international
ideology in a manner that no other international body does. As such, despite
an overshadowing by the Council’s activism in this field post 9/11,58 the
General Assembly is generally considered to be the principal UN organ engaged
in standard setting and its resolutions make a potentially significant contribu-
tion to the body of general international law.59
iv) Other ‘softer’ sources?
A ‘subsidiary role’ in the determination of the content of international law
may also be attributed to the corpus of resolutions of other international
organisations, declarations and non-binding international instruments common-
ly referred to as ‘soft law.’ While they are not binding per se, and have not
been relied upon as definitive statements of the law, they may give more
detailed expression to some of the binding prescriptions and prohibitions of
international law and provide evidence of customary law.
56 See Chapter 7.B.1 on the controversies around whether the Council can be said to have
any such obligations, as well as potentially conflicting states’obligations and litigationin
Chapter 11.
57 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States) (ICJ Reports 1986, 99-100 and 102) noting the relevance of the attitude of states
towards certain General Assembly resolutions as acceptance of the validity of the rule or
set of rules declared by the resolution themselves. Where there is broad consensus they
may provide a strong indication of custom: see ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ICJ reports 1996, 70-71).
58 See e.g. Chapter 7B.1
59 First among noteworthy examples in this field might be the GA Resolution adopting the
2006 UN Global Strategy: see World Summit Outcome Document, 24 October 2005, UN
Doc. A/Res/60/1; UN General Assembly Resolution on Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
UN Doc. A/Res/64/297.
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Care is due in this respect, not least given the plethora of activity in this
field in recent years, and the broad range of ‘Principles,’ ‘declarations’ or
‘standards’ of differing degrees of authority and weight that are increasingly
relied on as ‘soft law’ standards. Those given emphasis in this study include
work of UN entities and experts such as special rapporteurs, working groups
and other UN mechanisms, and selected expert groups. In this fast moving
and at times challenging field of law and practice, reports such as those of
the UN special mechanisms, have had a leading role in identifying practices,
but also in impelling legal debate by states, and influencing other standard
setting. The authoritative non-binding work of the International Law Commis-
sion on state responsibility provides another example that has been drawn
on, and in turn has been closely relied upon by judicial organs in recent
years.60
In the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, the sources of law con-
sidered are, like the various branches or areas of law, inter-connected, fluid
and often mutually reinforcing. Primary sources evolve not only at diplomatic
conferences but also through practice and interpretation, with subsidiary
sources contributing to the development and formation of customary inter-
national law or the interpretation of treaties. Soft law sources may firm up
through the practice of judicial decision making, which in turn may influence
future treaty development. Security Council resolutions may be based on
treaties – for example SC 1373 built on the Financing Convention – and vice
versa. Together this varied and complex arrangement of sources, while differ-
ent in nature, source and legal weight, forms a detailed international normative
system on terrorism and counter-terrorism, which is not cast in stone but
constantly evolving.
1.4 HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CHANGES
International law is not static, and the international law governing terrorism
has been a particularly dynamic field in recent years. Every legal system needs
to be able to develop its rules to take into account the evolution and changing
exigencies of the society it regulates.61 The international legal system is
60 See generally J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibil-
ity: Oxford Commentaries on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See
also Chapter 4 discussion on how such rules have been relied on domestically (e.g. in the
Ahmed case, abuse of process) or in Chapters 7 and 11 (the A and Others, admissibility of
evidence) or in Chapter 10 on state responsibility for receipt of intelligence. This reflects
what may a trend on the part of judges national and international levels to have regard
to broader non-binding but authoritative comparative and soft law standards, as well as
the ‘transjudicial’ reference todecisions of different systems.
61 Within domestic legal systems, the task of keeping the law ‘up to date’ is generally carried
out by the legislative power and, in varying ways, by the judiciary.
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characterised by the absence of a body entitled to create (and to modify) legal
rules binding on all its subjects. Just as international law is mainly created
by States, as set out above, so is it generally changed by them. Thus while
the core part of this book (Part Two) has chapters that deal first with the
framework and subsequently with its application in practice, it is recognised
that it is impossible to entirely dissociate the legal framework from its applica-
tion through ‘practice’, as the relationship between the two is symbiotic.
The process through which treaty-based rules of international law change
is quite straightforward62 (even if securing the necessary political consensus
may be anything but).63 By contrast the process relating to the modification
or ‘abrogation’ of rules of customary international law is somewhat more
complicated. Just as customary international law comes into existence when
most States of the international community follow a certain course of action
believing that it is required by a legal norm, so may customary rules lose their
binding force, and change, where the consistent and general practice of states,
and the opinio juris supporting them, ceases. In this respect, the peculiarity
of the international legal system lies in the fact that ‘violations of the law can
lead to the formation of new law’.64 Discussion of the practice of states in
responding to 9/11, and reactions to those responses, assumes particular
significance in a system where departure from existing legal standards, and
responses to the same, may ultimately impact those standards.65 The book
highlights areas where it may be that the law has shifted as a result of states
practice post-9/11.
However, several points of caution are worthy of emphasis in this respect.
The first is that, of course, not every violation of an international rule leads
to a change in the law.66 Likewise, the fact that particular states may reject
or argue against the existence of an established customary law rule should
not be considered as unravelling the rule itself. In most cases, not even consist-
ent patterns of violations by a number of States imply that a rule has been
62 A treaty, or some of its provisions, may be subsequently amended by the parties through
the adoption of another international agreement. See Article 31, VCLT 1969.
63 See, e.g., the global terrorism convention negotiations which have been a long fraught and
inconclusive process, by contrast to the specific conventions that have been concluded and
ratified relatively speedily.
64 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and how We Use it (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995) p. 19.
65 While not purporting to provide an in-depth analysis of potential changes in the law, which
will undoubtedly engage international scholars for years to come, this book highlights areas
where early indications are that the law may change, or be clarified, through recent events,
and other areas where, despite disregard for the law, legal change is unlikely.
66 The factors include the nature of the rule, the number of states ‘violating’ and the reactions
of other states. In respect of certain rules, such as those relating to the use of force for
example, the ICJ has noted that the fact that states do not express opposition to the practice
should not, generally, be taken to confirm its lawfulness. However, expressions of opposition
can help to clarify the lack of opinio juris, and avoid the perception of acquiescence in the
breach. See J. Charney, ‘Universal International Law’, 87 (1993) AJIL 529 at 543-5.
18 Chapter 1
superseded. The ‘obligatory quality’ of a rule of customary law is lost only
if the behaviour of those States which refuse to comply with the rule, and the
consistent reactions of other States, are supported by the belief that the rule
is no longer binding.67
Second, some customary rules of international law are particularly difficult
to modify. This is due to their status as peremptory norms of international
law or jus cogens norms, which have been defined as ‘substantive rules of
conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the
threat it presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic
human values’.68 As rules which aim to protect values considered funda-
mental by the international community as a whole, jus cogens rules have the
additional characteristic of creating obligations erga omnes, i.e. ‘obligations
owed by a State towards the international community as a whole’.69
Examples of the norms considered in this book that would clearly enjoy
jus cogens status include the prohibition on torture or the waging of aggressive
war, and arguably many more of the norms at the core of the study and
illustrated through the case studies, such as basic principles of human rights
or humanitarian law.70 Another norm which conflicts with a jus cogens norm
is invalid. The significance of jus cogens in practice in this area is clear from,
for example, judgments of various bodies in recent years which have looked
closely at the compatibility of Security Council resolutions mandating sanctions
against individuals with jus cogens norms.71
Another consequence of a norm having jus cogens status72 is the fact that
it can be modified ‘only by a subsequent norm of general international law
67 The ICJ, determining the content of the customary rules prohibiting the use of force and
intervention in the internal affairs of another State, has stated that the fact that the prohi-
bition was frequently breached was not sufficient to deny its customary character. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ
Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186. On reactions to the war on terror, see Chapter 12.
68 See ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Article 40(3).
See also the definition set out in Article 53, VCLT 1969. While commentators differ on the
content of such rules, the ILC’s Commentaries to the 1969 Vienna Convention (Yearbook
ILC 1966, vol. II, pp. 248 ff.) and to the Articles on State Responsibility, suggest that norms
such as those prohibiting the use of force contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and
those that protect core human rights, including the prohibition of torture or slavery, are
generally considered peremptory norms of international law.
69 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3,
at para. 33.
70 See e.g. discussion of these norms in Chapters 5 and 7.
71 Jus cogens has had real implications in the war on terror. See, e.g., A. Bianchi, ‘Human Rights
and the Magic of Jus Cogens’, 19 Eur. J. Int’l Law 3 (2008), pp. 491-508; see also Kadi decision,
where the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) indirectly reviewed
the legality of Security Council anti-terror resolutions against the background of human
rights peremptory norms, discussed in Chapter 7.
72 The fact that the international community as a whole recognises a rule of general inter-
national law as a peremptory rule has important consequences for international responsibil-
ity; see Chapter 3.1.
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having the same character’.73 In practice, determining that a jus cogens rule
no longer exists, or that its content has changed, would require near ‘universal’
state practice and strong evidence indicating that the value it protects is no
longer considered a fundamental one by the international community.
1.5 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AS AN INTERCONNECTED WHOLE
Finally, it bears emphasis that while each of the following chapters explores
a different aspect of the legal framework, they are inherently interconnected.
This book demonstrates the extent to which an understanding of the inter-
national system of law requires that it be seen as a whole, with each of the
branches of international law understood by reference to the core principles
from which they derive and to one another. The complex dynamic relationship
between areas of law and sources has practical consequences, as this book
will illustrate. It requires, in relation to any particular set of facts that we look
beyond the simple identification of an applicable rule to consider a diverse
range of different sources and potentially applicable norms, and their inter-
relationship.
These inter-connections between norms will be highlighted throughout
this book – at times requiring that the law set out in a subsequent chapter be
pre-empted and at others that aspects of foregoing chapters be revisited. It
will highlight tensions that arise, such as between IHRL on the one hand and
IHL or peace and security law on te other. The intersection of different areas
will be highlighted throughout the chapters, explored in more detail in relation
to particular scenarios in the case studies, and returned to in the concluding
chapter.74
As will be illustrated more fully in the body of the study, it has been the
selective application of particular branches or norms of the legal framework
(notably from the law applicable in armed conflict), while ignoring other
applicable norms (notably core human rights law) as well as underlying
principles from IHL itself, which has characterized war on terror. The frag-
mented approach has fed the notorious claim that some people lie beyond
laws protection, caught in legal protection gaps that do not in fact exist.75
73 Article 53, VCLT 1969. Nor can they be modified or derogated from by agreement between
States: Articles 53 and 64, VCLT 1969 make clear that a treaty which conflicts with a
peremptory norm is void.
74 These interconnections are drawn out further in the concluding chapter.
75 See eg as Chapter 8 Guantanamo.
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis consists of three parts. The first sketches out preliminary issues
of law relating to ‘international terrorism’ and ‘international responsibility’
for terrorism. The second, more substantial, part explores the lawfulness of
certain responses to international terrorism. It considers the criminal law
response, and the law governing resort to armed force between states, as well
as the law governing how responses may be executed, with chapters on human
rights law and international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.
While the focus is on the legal framework pertinent to the particular area
of law, in these chapters of Part Two76 the ‘legal framework’ section of each
chapter (Part A) is followed by an ‘application’ section (Part B), which high-
lights key issues regarding the treatment of that framework in the ‘war on
terror.’ These sections explore practices post-9/11 that illustrate certain char-
acteristics of the ‘war on terror’ and its relationship to international law. While
the practice highlighted is necessarily a selective illustration of issues arising,
the framework sections, by contrast, provide the law by which new measures
may be assessed as they emerge, as they do almost daily, in this rapidly
unfolding area. Chapters 2-7 therefore set out the legal infrastructure of terror-
ism and counter terrorism, identifying norms, mechanisms and principles from
numerous areas of law that are engaged in the fight against ‘international
terrorism’.
In Part 3, case studies look across the areas of law, illustrating how they
co-apply, intersect and take effect in practice in relation to particular contro-
versial factual scenarios. The case studies illustrate also the extent of non-
compliance with and obfuscation of the legal framework, as well as on occasion
highlighting tensions or controversies within the framework itself.77 Chapters
8-10 focus on detentions at Guantanamo Bay, the killing of Osama bin Laden
and extraordinary rendition respectively. A further chapter explores judicial
responses to the war on terror, and explores the role of the courts in adjudicat-
ing the human rights challenges that ‘war on terror’ has given rise to. The
final chapter set out conclusions of the research as regards the legal framework,
explores overarching characteristics of the practice of the war on terror, and
questions its longer term implications.
76 The most central, and the lengthiest, chapters setting out the law and illustrating its applica-
tion or disregard follow this bifurcated structure – in relation to criminal justice, the use
of force, humanitarian law and human rights law.
77 See, e.g., Chapters 3 Responsibility and 10 Extraordinary Redition on complicity in inter-
national law.
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1.7 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
The political significance of the “terrorism” label since 9/11 is beyond dispute,
and is explored throughout the study. Chapter 2, Part One begins however
by addressing the legal significance of ‘terrorism’ as a concept in international
law. It considers the renowned lack of a global convention defining ‘terrorism’,
while sketching out international and regional developments (before and after
September 11) towards a generic definition of terrorism, and the proliferation
of conventions addressing specific forms of terrorism. While it is doubtful that
there is an accepted definition of terrorism under treaty or customary inter-
national law at the present time, the chapter introduces other international
legal norms that do, however, address the prohibition on terrorism and obliga-
tions in respect of it.
Chapter 3 addresses responsibility under international law. It assesses first
the responsibility of states for acts of international terrorism, and the basis
on which acts perpetrated by private individuals, networks or organisations
(such as al-Qaeda or ‘associated groups’78) may be attributed to a state (such
as Afghanistan post-9/11). It distinguishes attribution of responsibility for
terrorist attacks themselves from responsibility for other wrongs, and considers
the consequences of each, under international law. It also assesses the extent
to which private individuals or organisations – so-called ‘non state actors’,
such as al-Qaeda or individual members or associates thereof – may incur
responsibility under international law. The final section considers issues of
state responsibility arising in relation to responses to international terrorism.
Specifically, it explores how the multi-actored, transnational complexity of
the ‘war on terror’ has sharpened focus on the significance of shared state
responsibility where a state acts through or in cooperation with other states.
It explores also state responsibility where the state acts. through private con-
tractors, on the other. It considers the right, or in exceptional circumstances
the responsibility, of other states to take measures in response to international
wrongs carried out in the course of terrorism, or indeed in the name of
counter-terrorism.79
In Part Two, Chapter 4 considers international terrorism and responses
thereto through the prism of criminal law. Part A first describes the crimes
that may be committed through acts of international terrorism, outlines relevant
principles of criminal law that determine who may be held responsible and
considers which courts or tribunals can exercise jurisdiction and in what
circumstances. Second, it considers the implementation and enforcement of
78 See Chapter 6 IHL.
79 Many wrongs committed in the name of counter-terrorism, such as the unlawful use of
force, arbitrary detention, torture or extraoprdinary rendition, are highlighted in subsequent
chapters.
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criminal law, in particular law and practice in respect of international coopera-
tion in criminal matters.
Chapter 4 Part B considers the application of the criminal law model in
practice since September 2001. It notes the apparent dearth of criminal law
responses in the wake of 9/11, and the transformation of laws and practice
over time. It explores normative developments, revealing a trend towards the
‘preventive’ role of criminal law, and an exceptionalist approach to criminal
law and procedure in the field of terrorism in recent years. Examples include
expanded terrorism related offences and modes of liability, modified principles
and procedures in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism, and innova-
tions in international cooperation. It considers the relationship between those
developments and other legal obligations, notably in the field of human rights
law, and the implications for the criminal process itself. Finally, while the focus
is on international terrorism, it also notes that the international criminal law
paradigm is relevant also crimes under international law committed in the
name of countering terrorism, and the dearth of practice to date in holding
individuals criminal responsible for ‘war on terror’ crimes.
Chapter 5 considers the exceptional circumstances in which the use of force
may be lawful in response to international terrorism. These concern self-defence
or pursuant to Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. While discussing whether there are other possible justifications the
focus is on those justifications that have been advanced in practice. In various
contexts since September 11 where reliance on an expansive approach to self-
defence against terrorism has dominated. The Chapter therefore explores in
most detail the scope of, and limits on, the right to self-defence in response
to international terrorism. Chapter 5, section B considers this legal framework
in light of the use of force post-9/11. The lawfulness of the use of force in the
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq post-9/11 is considered, and the on-
going assertion of the right to use force across borders, particularly in targeted
killings of alleged members of al-Qaeda and associated groups around the
globe.
Chapter 6 considers the relevance, scope and nature of international human-
itarian law (IHL) applicable during armed conflict to the international fight
against terrorism. It assesses the legal nature of ‘armed conflict’ and key norms
of IHL that apply in it, notably those that govern legitimate targeting, permiss-
ible methods and means of warfare, humanitarian protections and the respons-
ibility of states party to the Geneva Conventions to ensure compliance with
IHL standards.
In light of this legal framework, Chapter 6, section B explores the issue
that has dominated, and stymied, legal discourse since the launching of the
so-called ‘war on terror’: to what extent is there or can there be a global a war
with al-Qaeda and associated groups? It also addresses, secondarily, the nature
of those armed conflicts that have arisen post 9/11, and particular issues of
IHL arising. The compatibility of practices arising in the purported global
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‘armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated groups,’ including in relation
to the treatment of “enemy combatants,” detentions and drone attacks on
alleged members of al-Qaeda and associates worldwide are also considered.
Chapter 7 considers the international human rights law (IHRL) framework
of relevance to the ‘war on terror’. It discusses where, when and to whom
the human rights framework applies. It highlights the inherent flexibility of
IHRL and the ways in which it accommodates and is responsive to security
imperatives and the challenges of international terrorism. Specific rights
implicated by terrorism and counter terrorism are then addressed.
Chapter 7, section B seeks to illustrate some of the many overarching and
specific questions that arise in relation to the application of this legal frame-
work post-9/11. Three broad groups of issues that go to the relevance and
applicability of the framework, as well as challenging issues regarding inter-
play of legal regimes, are addressed. These are the relationship between
security and human rights; the applicability of human rights obligations to
states acting abroad, and the applicability of human rights in the ‘war’ on al-
Qaeda (and its interplay, where appropriate, with IHL). The chapter also
highlights specific post-9/11 practices that violate or strain the human rights
framework. Among the many issues highlighted are: broad anti-terrorist
legislation and the implications for the principle of legality, profiling practices
in light of equality norms, the implications of listing and delisting of terrorist
suspects, the erosion of the right to privacy and the multifaceted attacks on
the protection against torture and inhuman treatment. More general questions
relate to the marginalisation of human rights law and mechanisms in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, and whether there is a discernible trend back
towards a more central role for human rights protection in the on-going ‘war
on terror’.
Part III consists of three case studies that ‘apply’ the legal framework
discussed in preceding chapters. Chapter 8 relates to the detentions in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba, which came to symbolise the arbitrariness of the ‘war on
terror,’ as a vehicle to consider some of the legal issues highlighted in Chapters
6 and 7 and the interconnections between them. It considers the lawful bases
for prisoners’ detention and the basic procedural rights to which they are
entitled under IHRL and IHL, as well as issues arising from their trial by military
commission. The chapter concludes by questioning the implications of the
Guantanamo Bay anomaly – for the US, for other states, and for the rule of
law more generally.
Chapter 9 presents the second case study, focusing on the killing of Osama
bin Laden, and the appropriateness, from a legal standpoint, of the prompt
assertion in its wake that ‘justice ha[d] been done’. It considers the lawfulness
of his killing, on available facts, with regard to the various areas of inter-
national law at stake, including the jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the nature
of the right to life under human rights law. International legal issues arising
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in relation to the subsequent disposal of bin Laden’s corpse in the Arabian
sea are also raised.
Chapter 10 considers the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’, led by the
CIA but made possible by a complex network of other states and private actors.
More than any other practice, it highlights issues regarding multiple actor
responsibility. The chapter explores the potential implications of many areas
of law, and which states may be responsible in respect of which forms of
participation in the programme, and areas of tension or uncertainty in this
respect. It considers efforts to secure justice and accountability for rendition,
and the implications of the rendition programme and the impunity that has
surrounded it to date.
Chapter 11 explores the role of the courts, with a focus on the adjudication
of human rights claims in respect of which litigation has been most volumi-
nous.80 It highlights limitations placed on the judicial role in various guises
since 9/11. Despite this, it assesses judicial responses to have emerged from
the war on terror by reference to significant cases. It analyses the role and
potential impact of that human rights litigation in an area where transparency,
accountability and reparation for victims of the war on terror has proved
elusive.
The concluding chapter 12 looks across the array of law and practice that
has been highlighted in preceding chapters. Considering the legal framework
as a whole, it reflects on the nature of the normative order governing terrorism
and counterterrorism. It will suggest that it reveals no gaping holes in the legal
framework, nor the transformative shifts post-9/11 that some heralded at the
outset of the ‘war on terror’, while acknowledging areas of tension and un-
certainty that have emerged, and pockets of legal development. It identifies
certain overarching characteristics of the ‘war on terror’, which it will suggest
are the antithesis of the principles that underlie a rule of law approach to
counter-terrorism. By exploring the legal framework, and state practice in
respect of it post-9/11, the book finally questions the – as yet uncertain – long-
term implications of the war on terror for international legality. It ends by
highlighting some of the challenges that face the international community if
we are to meet the commitment that has now been made on paper to move
from a ‘war on terror’ blighted by illegality to an effective, rule of law
approach to counter-terrorism.81
80 Chapter 4 deals seperately with the practice of criminal trials.
81 See e.g. UN Global Strategy supra note 59.
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2 ‘Terrorism’ in International Law
Terrorism is a term invoked prolifically in international practice. The events
of 11 September 2001 were ubiquitously and uncontroversially characterised,
and internationally condemned, as acts of ‘international terrorism’. Their wake
brought unprecedented unity of purpose on the international level as to the
need to prevent, punish and otherwise combat international terrorism. Various
subsequent attacks strengthened that resolve.1 Legally binding measures
directed against terrorism ensued, with broad-reaching political and legal
effect, including Security Council resolutions that imposed a wide range of
obligations on states to prevent and suppress terrorism and ensure ‘terrorist
acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regula-
tions and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts.’2 Around the globe, laws have been rewritten, policies changed, ‘ex-
ceptional’ measures imposed, and an enormous (and some say excessive3)
international counter-terrorist effort brought to bear on the suppression and
prevention of international terrorism.
One could be forgiven for assuming that international terrorism is a readily
accessible legal concept. But is the universal condemnation of terrorism
matched by a universal understanding of what we mean by the term? Are
the obligations to suppress and punish terrorism matched by an internationally
accepted definition of what precisely it is that is to be penalised? In 2001, when
questioned on the definition of terrorism, then UK Permanent Representative
to the UN Sir Jeremy Greenstock suggested ‘What looks, smells, and kills like
terrorism is terrorism.’4 If so, to paraphrase the famous dictum of a US judge
1 Attacks attributed to international terrorism have occurred around the globe since 9/11,
including in Madrid, London, Bali, Mumbai, Moscow, Libya, Iraq, the united States and
far beyond.
2 SC Res. 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). This resolution also
established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of the resolution.
SC Res. 1377 (2001), 28 November 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), sets out the tasks
for the Committee.
3 M. Koskinniemi, ‘What is International Law For?” in M. Evans, International Law, 3rd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
4 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN when questioned
in October 2001 about the lack of a definition of terrorism, stated: ‘There is common ground
amongst all of us on what constitutes terrorism. What looks, smells and kills like terrorism
is terrorism’. UN Doc. A/56/PV.12, 1 October 2001, p. 18.
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that drives in the same direction, do we simply know terrorism when we see
it,5 and is that a sufficient legal basis to give rise to obligations of states and
criminal responsibility of individuals?
The search for an accepted definition of terrorism in international law has
been described as ‘resembl[ing] the Quest for the Holy Grail’.6 By the time
of 9/11, scholars and practitioners had already put forward at least 109 poss-
ible definitions, and several more have been ventured since.7 In the wake of
9/11, there appeared to be renewed impetus to settle on an internationally
agreed definition. Yet, as discussed below, diplomatic attempts to draft a global
terrorism convention continued to fail, as consensus around a single definition
of international terrorism proved elusive. Alongside the stagnant treaty process
is an increasingly tumultuous debate as to whether customary law already
provides for a definition of terrorism.8
While the status of terrorism per se in international law may remain subject
to debate, what is clear is that legal developments relating to terrorism have
not been paralysed by the impasse in achieving a global definition. Specific
conventions addressing particular types of terrorism, developments by regional
organisations for their regional purposes, and advances in other areas of
international law have provided legal tools to address conduct that we com-
monly refer to as acts of terrorism.
This chapter will sketch out international and regional developments
towards the adoption of a general definition of terrorism as part of a compre-
hensive convention, as well as the proliferation of specific terrorism conven-
tions. Exploring the various definitions put forward in international practice,
it will ask to what extent it can be said that there is an internationally accepted
definition of terrorism under customary international law. If there is no such
generic international definition, it will ask whether this leaves a gap in the
international legal order as regards the phenomenon commonly referred to
as terrorism. In this respect, this chapter assesses the extent to which the
prohibition of terrorism and obligations in respect of it are addressed by other
international legal norms. It concludes by enquiring as to the consequences
of the use of the ‘terrorism’ label absent a definition provided in law. Related
questions, such as the implications for international cooperation to combat
terrorism or for human rights protection, will be explored in more detail in
5 Jocabilis v. Ohio US 378: 184, 197, Justice Stewart ‘I know terrorism when I see it’, as cited
in A. Arend and R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter
Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 140.
6 G. Levitt, ‘Is “Terrorism” Worth Defining?’, 13 (1986) Ohio N. Univ. Law Rev. 97.
7 The UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights at the time of the 9/11 attacks,
noted that 109 definitions were put forward since 1936. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31,
27 June 2001, p. 8.
8 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism,
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (Interlocutory Decision), STL-11-
01-I, 16 February 2011. See further below.
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later chapters which focus on the legal framework governing states responses
to terrorism.
‘Terrorist’ is a label used loosely, selectively and invariably pejoratively.
Since long before 9/11, but increasingly since then, ‘terrorism’ has been
invoked to justify the application of ‘exceptional’ laws, legal regimes or prac-
tices, often with serious consequences. In this murky area, where the defining
elements of terrorism are often confused with value judgements about those
accused of it, the principal goal of this chapter is to unravel the terminology
and identify the extent to which there are objectively applicable legal standards.
2.1 DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM
2.1.1 Pre-9/11: historical developments
As early as the 1930s, serious efforts were underway to achieve consensus on
a general definition of terrorism. The 1937 Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism defines terrorism as ‘[a]ll criminal acts directed
against a State and intended or calculated to create state of terror in the minds
of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public’.9 The diffi-
culties in achieving consensus around this definition were such that the 1937
Convention never came into force and the search for an international consensus
was temporarily abandoned.
In the early seventies, the United Nations stepped into the fray and in 1972
an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly was mandated to consider a
Draft Comprehensive Convention and produce a definition.10 The Committee
ultimately produced a report that falls short of that objective, but rather serves
to underline the problems associated with the definitional quandary. Speci-
fically, fuelled by the recent experience of wars of national liberation fought
against former colonial powers, the report reveals persistent division regarding
the inclusion or exclusion of ‘national liberation movements’ within the defini-
tion.11 Thus attempts to derive a generic definition again fell by the wayside
(in preference for the framework of conventions identifying specific forms of
9 Article 2(1), Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, 1937,
never entered into force), League of Nations Doc. C.546M.383 1937.
10 During the 1960s, conventions were adopted addressing specific facets of terrorism, as
discussed at 1.1.3 below but the killing of 28 persons by a Japanese suicide squad at Lod
airport, and of 17 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in the seventies have been
described as the impetus for this renewed initiative. See J. Dugard, ‘The Problem of the
Definition of Terrorism in International Law’, (hereinafter ‘Definition of Terrorism’) confer-
ence paper, Sussex University, 21 March 2003, p. 4.
11 Obote-Odora, A., ‘Defining International Terrorism’, 6.1 (1999) E Law – Murdoch University
Electronic Journal of Law.
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terrorism, on which international consensus could be achieved, as discussed
below).12
By the 1990s, shifting global politics – the end of the cold war and of
apartheid, the achievement of independence from colonialism for several
African countries and apparent progress towards peace in the Middle East –
gave those in favour of a global convention fresh hope that consensus on a
generic definition of terrorism might finally be achievable.13 In 1994, there
was something of a breakthrough in the form of the ‘Declaration on Measures
to Eliminate International Terrorism’, which although non-binding, was
subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.14 It defined
terrorism as ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes’. Notably, it condemned terrorism as ‘in any circumstances unjustifi-
able whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other nature’.15 Thus, there was an attempt to divorce
the condemnation of terrorism from the value judgements about the causes
or reasons that may underpin it.
Building on this development, General Assembly Resolution 51/210 estab-
lished an ad hoc committee in 1996, inter alia to streamline efforts to arrive at
a Draft Comprehensive Convention. The first draft of the Comprehensive
Convention was presented by India in the Working Group in 1996.16 In the
debate that followed in the ad hoc Committee the extent of controversy sur-
rounding a generally accepted definition of terrorism was quickly apparent.
Nonetheless, an indirect development came in the definition in the 1999
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.17 Despite this,
controversy around the generic definition within the context of the global
convention continued. The Committee’s work was ongoing when terrorism
12 See this Chapter, para. 1.3.
13 Dugard, ‘Definition of Terrorism’, supra note 10, p. 6.
14 GA Res. 50/53, 11 December 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/50/53 (1995) and GA Res. 51/210,
17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996).
15 This definition was reiterated in subsequent General Assembly resolutions. See, e.g., GA
Res. 51/210; GA Res. 52/165, 15 December 1997, UN Doc. A/RES/52/165 (1997); GA Res.
53/108, 8 December 1998, UN Doc. A/RES/53/108 (1998); GA Res. 54/110, 9 December
1999, UN Doc. A/RES/54/110 (1999) and GA Res. 55/158, 12 December 2000, UN Doc.
A/RES/55/158 (2000).
16 Doc A/C.6/51/6 of 11 November 1996. In 2000, India presented an amended version: see
Doc A/C.6/55/1 of 28 August 2000, also reproduced in 42 Indian J Int’l L (2002) 219.
17 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999, Art.
2(1)(b): “…any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act”. It does not define the conduct as such but refers to conduct covered by conventions
addressing particular forms of terrorism – see this chapter, para. 2.1.3 below.
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shot to the top of the international agenda on 11 September 2001, and its quest
continues to the present day.
2.1.2 Post 9/11 developments: a global convention to meet a global concern?
Following 11 September 2001, international statements demonstrated un-
paralleled unity in the condemnation of international terrorism. The Security
Council for its part, without defining terrorism, called on states to adopt wide-
ranging measures on the domestic level including the criminalisation of terror-
ist acts and their financing. It also urged states to ratify existing conventions
and adopt pending conventions, in an apparent reference to the Draft Compre-
hensive Convention.18
As the working group of the ad hoc committee hurried to re-commence
its work in this new context, all delegations were unequivocal in their condem-
nation of terrorism in all forms and manifestations.19 The momentum towards
the global convention may, at that point, have seemed irresistible. However,
beyond the rhetoric, many additional years of negotiating time and efforts
at various junctures to instill a sense of urgency in the process,20 strikingly
little progress has been made.21 Old divisions have continued to characterise
the negotiations, as explained below. Indeed while the ‘outstanding’ issues
on which agreement could not be reached had not and have not changed
considerably with years of negotiations, new controversies have emerged in
18 In para. 3 of SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 2, the Security Council called upon all States
to ‘(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368
(2001).’ See also SC Res. 1269 (1999), 15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999). See the
Security Council’s approach to terrorism and growing clarity in SC Res. 1566 infra.
19 UN Doc A/C.6/56/L.6, para. 1 of Annex IV, Part A, Report of the Working Group of the
Sixth Committee on ‘measures to eliminate international terrorism’ (29 October 2001); see
http://www.un.org/law/terrorism.
20 On 10 March 2005, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan insisted that ‘[T]he time has come
to complete a comprehensive convention outlawing terrorism in all its forms’. Secretary-
General’s keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism and Security – ‘A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism’, Madrid, Spain, 10
March 2005, available at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1345. See also ‘UN seeks
definition of terrorism’, BBC News, 26 July 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4716957.stm; see also Secretary-General’s press encounter after meeting with
Jordanian Foreign Minister Farouk Kasrawi, 11 November 2005, available at http://www.un.
org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=794.
21 See UN Docs A/58/37, A/C.6/58/L.10, A/59/37, A/C.6/60/L.6, A/61/37, A/C.6/61/SR.21,
and A/62/37. For an account of negotiations, see M. Hmoud, ‘Negotiating the Draft Compre-
hensive Convention on International Terrorism. Major Bones of Contention’, 4 J Int’l Crim.
Just. (2006) 1031.
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response to new proposed solutions (with even the title of the draft emerging
as the subject of debate).22
The current informal definition of terrorism for the purposes of the Draft
Comprehensive Convention (Article 2), prepared by the Coordinator for
negotiating purposes, defines terrorism as unlawfully and intentionally causing
(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; (b) serious damage to public
and private property, including a State, government or public facility;23 or
(c) other such damage where it is likely to result in major economic loss.24
The definition further requires that ‘the purpose of the conduct, by its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act’.25
While various aspects of this definition have been subject to criticism over
the years on the basis of the breadth and vagueness of terms,26 the heart of
the outstanding controversy might be classed in three inter-related groups.
Two relate to the potential authors of terrorism under the Convention’s defini-
tion, namely whether states on the one hand and ‘national liberation move-
ments’ on the other, should fall within the purview of the Convention.27 The
third is whether conduct in armed conflict should be excluded, and if so,
whether such exclusion applies to both ‘parties’ to the conflict.28
Some negotiators sought (unsuccessfully, it would seem) to depart from
the age-old debate around the qualification or not of oppressive states versus
liberation movements as terrorists by treating the question not as part of the
definition of terrorism as such, but as a limitation on the scope of the Conven-
tion. Thus Article 18 of the Draft Comprehensive Convention excludes from
the scope of the Article 2 definition acts carried out during armed conflict,
on the basis that another body of international legal rules, namely international
22 In 2008, debate emerged over removing the word ‘comprehensive’. Sixty-third session of
the Sixth Committee, Agenda item 99, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Oral
Report of the Chairman of the Working Group, 24 October 2008, para. 27. Negotiations
are ongoing at time of writing, despite some delegates suggesting a pause in negotiations:
UN Press Office L3209 (8 April 2013) and L3210 (12 April 2013).
23 The text provides ‘including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public
transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment’. Informal text of Article
2, Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN
Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9, Annex I.B.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 See e.g. F. A. Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights No. 1 and Terrorism and Human Rights
No. 2 (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2002/3).
27 See proposals regarding Article 18 of the Convention, infra. UN Doc A/C.6/56/L.6, supra
note 19, para. 7. See also Marcello Di Filippo, ‘Terrorist crimes and international co-operation:
critical remarks on the definition and inclusion of terrorism in the category of international
crimes’, E.J.I.L. 2008, 19(3), 533-70; Lucia Aleni, ‘Distinguishing Terrorism from Wars of
National Liberation in the Light of International Law: A View from Italian Courts’, J. of
Int’l. Crim. Just. 2008 6(3): 525-39.
28 Proposals regarding draft Article 18 below.
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humanitarian law, already governs armed conflict, including wars of national
liberation.29
However, the current draft excludes only ‘armed forces’, thereby exempting
only state forces and not others whose conduct would also be governed by
IHL, such as non-state parties to non-international armed conflicts, or liberation
movements in the context of wars of national liberation.30 The proposed exclu-
sion notes that ‘the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those
terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are gov-
erned by that law, are not governed by this Convention’.31 This encounters
stringent resistance from delegations intent to ensure that those national
liberation movements fighting against such state forces are likewise excluded.
One counter-proposal therefore seeks to exclude both ‘parties to a conflict’,
and to ensure that those fighting ‘foreign domination’ are considered within
the purview of any such exclusion.32
The Article 18 proposal excluding conduct already covered by IHL is
supported by those, including the ICRC, concerned that conduct permissible
under IHL should not be covered by ‘terrorism’, potentially jeopardizing the
applicable framework of IHL.33 It is argued that conduct that violates IHL is
adequately governed by the framework of IHL, and that conduct that may be
permissible under IHL should not be labeled ‘international terrorism.’ Doing
so may preclude the application of amnesties at the end of the conflict (which
IHL contemplates for offences not amounting to violations of IHL and which
29 Such wars are considered international conflicts under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions. Some other conventions, such as the The International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 15 December 1997, UN
Doc. A/RES/52/164, in force 23 May 2001) took the same approach: see Preamble and
Article 19. See by contrast the example of the Financing Convention at 2.1.4 below.
30 Informal text of Article 2, Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate Inter-
national Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9, Annex I.B.
31 Ibid.
32 An alternative draft by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference excludes ‘[t]he activities
of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation’. United
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General
Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Sixth session (28 January-1 February
2002), Annex IV, art. 18. ref; See Dugard, ‘Definition of Terrorism’, supra note 10, p. 9. See
also Mahmoud Hmoud, ‘Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism’, ICJ (2006) 4 5 (1031). However, in order to provide further clarity, a new
paragraph 5, framed as a ‘without prejudice clause’, was added during the 2007 session
of the Ad Hoc Committee.
33 See for example, ICRC, 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,
‘International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’,




is said to provide an important incentive to compliance with IHL).34 Unfor-
tunately, existing international conventions take divergent and at times unclear
approaches to application in armed conflict, causing potential confusion as
to the interplay of these regimes.35 It remains to be seen, if a comprehensive
convention comes to pass, what approach it will adopt on these issues and
to what overall effect on the coherence of the broader international legal
framework.
In conclusion, if any shift in negotiations could be discerned post-September
11, beyond a strengthened condemnation of acts such as those executed that
day, it was in the expressions of support, in principle, for a global convention.
Commentators have long disagreed on the desirability of a comprehensive
Convention36 as much as on its content, yet reports of UN negotiations post-
September 11 recorded that States ‘reiterated the urgency of adopting a com-
prehensive convention on international terrorism’.37 At least immediately
following September 11, then, the quest for a global terrorism convention
appeared to become accepted as a political reality. Yet the feasibility of achiev-
ing such a Convention, its precise content or scope, and of course the support
that it might eventually muster, remain shrouded in uncertainty to the present
day.
While some continue to seek to propel the process forward, with the
passage of the years, there may be a loss of momentum and confidence in the
inevitability, or indeed the value, of a global convention.38 Some commenta-
tors have reverted to suggesting that ‘a less ambitious approach’ should be
pursued which concentrates on further elaborating functional legal definitions
of terrorism for specific purposes; this certainly reflects the reality that the
greatest normative activity before and after 9/11 can be found in conventions
related to specific forms of terrorist-related activity, addressed below.39 On
the other hand, experience post 9/11 explored in this book testifies to the
importance of a clear and precise definition of terrorism and the abuse that
34 See Claudia Martin, in van den Herik and Schrijver (eds.), Counter-terrorism Strategies in
a Fragmented Legal Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Such amnesties
are distinct from amnesties for serious violations of human rights, which are impermissible
under international law, as discussed at Chapter 7.
35 Ibid.
36 See for example, Dugard, ‘Definition of Terrorism’, supra note 10, pp. 12-14, and J. Murphy,
‘International Law and the War on Terrorism: The Road Ahead’, 32 (2002) Israel Yearbook
on Human Rights 117.
37 UN Doc A/C.6/56/L.6, supra note 19, Annex IV, para. 4, ‘Informal summary of the general
discussion in the working group, prepared by the Chairman’.
38 Kim Prost, in van den Herik and Scrijver, Count-terrorism Strategies, supra note 35, arguing
that even from the point of view of facilitating international cooperation, a global convention
is unnecessary.
39 See Di Filippo, supra note 27, p. 533-70.
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results in practice from its absence.40 The vastly divergent definitions of terror-
ism in national law and their application in the years following 9/11 may thus
lend weight to the arguments in favour of pursuing a global definition.
Whether this can ever be achieved, and the fate of the global convention,
remain to be seen.41
2.1.2.1 Other UN developments: providing a ‘description’ or ‘framework’ but not a
‘definition’ of terrorism
In 2004, a couple of developments at the UN level contributed to the debate
around definitions. Most significantly, following the notorious Beslan school
siege in the Russian Federation, the Security Council for the first time passed
a resolution that does provide a definition of sorts:
3. Recall[ing] that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose
to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an inter-
national organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts
which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifi-
able by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and,
if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with
their grave nature.42
Security Resolution 1566 is broad reaching in its scope: the material element,
or actus reus comprises any criminal acts, while the victim group is exemplified
rather than defined as ‘including’ but not being limited to civilians. It could
therefore be criticised for lack of clarity, but this may overlook the purpose
of resolution 1566 which does not purport to provide a binding definition,
but to provide a framework to assist states to provide for appropriate defini-
40 On the definitional issues, see e.g. Chapters 4 and 7 below and Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism,
E/CN.4/2006/98 (paras. 26-50, 72), and B. Saul, ‘Defining ’Terrorism’ to Protect Human
Rights’ (October, 29 2008) in Interrogating the War on Terror: Interdisciplinary Perpsective, D.
Staines, ed., pp. 190-210, (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007).
41 Providing a definition many years after states have changed their laws to comport with
Security Council Resolution 1373 may be too late to avoid inconsistent legislation, unless
by contrast to that in Security Council Resolution 1566, it obliged states to bring their law
and practice into line.
42 Security Council Resolution 1566, s/RES/1566 (2004), para. 3, available at http://www.un.
org/ Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions04.html. For background and debate, see ‘Security Council
Acts Unanimously to Adopt Resolution Strongly Condemning Terrorism as One of the
Most Serious Threats to Peace’, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/
sc8214.doc.htm.
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tions in domestic law. In principle states should provide greater clarity and
specificity themselves in domestic law, though in practice it is the tendency
to do just the opposite that lends support to the need for a clearer international
framework.
The UN-sponsored high-level independent panel, reporting at the end of
2004,43 advanced a ‘description of terrorism’44 which it found not to cover
State violence (which was adequately covered by other norms of international
law) and that no justification existed for terrorism by non-state actors.45 It
thus sought to contribute to drawing a line under the on-going state versus
liberation movement debate and move the Comprehensive Convention nego-
tiations forward.46 This description, like the Security Council framework, is
clearly not binding but intended to provide guidance to states seeking to
implement their obligations in good faith. As noted, it has done surprisingly
little to dampen controversy at the negotiating table of the global Convention.
2.1.3 Specific international conventions
As attempts to arrive at a comprehensive terrorism convention floundered
at various stages, the search for a generic definition was replaced by the
elaboration of a framework of conventions that identify specific forms of
terrorism. Currently, there are 14 primary universal instruments pertaining
to the subject of international terrorism.47 A notable area of steady progress
43 U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility’, U.N. Doc. No. A/59/565 (2 December 2004). This document was
drafted by a panel of independent experts created by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan
in order to provide a shared, comprehensive view about the way forward on critical issues
regarding UN reform and collective security.
44 ‘[A]ny action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects
of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that
is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel
a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’
U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ibid, para. 164.
45 Ibid., at para. 160, identifying these two issues as the stumbling blocks for an agreed
definition.
46 Kofi Annan urged that the Comprehensive Convention integrate this description of terror-
ism. See Report of the Secretary-General ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security
and human rights for all’, para. 91, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/29/2005 (21 March 2005).
47 Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc.
A/64/161, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/64/Terrorism_Table_64th.pdf.
The instruments are: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 September 1963, 1248 U.N.T.S. 451, in force 4 December 1969; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 December 1970, 860
U.N.T.S. 12325, in force 14 October 1971; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 23 September 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 14118, in
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since 2001, when the Security Council called on states to ‘work together
urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased
cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions
relating to terrorism’,48 has been in the increased number of ratifications of
these specific or sectoral conventions, as well as an increased emphasis placed
on implementation.49 These conventions do not generally attempt to define
terrorism, with the notable exception of the 1999 Convention for the Sup-
pression of Financing of Terrorism which addresses only one aspect of terror-
ism, but contains a generic definition of sorts by describing terrorism as:
any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.50
More commonly, the specific conventions do not provide a general definition,
but rather address specific types of conduct and set forth a framework of
force 26 January 1973; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 24 February 1988, 974 U.N.T.S. 14118, in
force 6 August 1989; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 15410, in force 20 February 1977; International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 December 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 21931, in force 3 June
1983; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 3 March 1980,
1456 U.N.T.S. 24631, in force 8 February 1987; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1988, IMO Doc. SUA/
CONF/15/Rev.1, in force 1 March 1992; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Rome, 10 March
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 29004, in force 1 March 1992; Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Montreal, 1 March 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22393, in
force 21 June 1998; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
New York, 15 December 1997, UN Doc. A/52/653, in force 23 May 2001; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999,
UN Doc. A/Res/54/109, in force 10 April 2002 (‘Financing Convention’); International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, New York, 13 April 2005,
UN Doc. A/Res/59/290, in force 7 July 2007; Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, Beijing, 10 September 2010, DCAS Doc No.
21 (not yet in force); and the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, both signed in Beijing 2010, not yet in force as of early
2013.
48 SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 2.
49 K. Prost, supra 38, in v.d. Herik and Schrijver.
50 In the Financing Convention, Art. 2(1)(b) the terrorist conduct is question is not specificed
other than by reference to specific terrorist conventions addressing particular forms of
terrorism. Art 2 provides a definition of ‘financing’ which is also contentious: see for e.g.
A Gardella, The Fight against the Financing of Terrorism between judicial and Regulatory
Control, in A Bianchi (ed), Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, (Oxford, UK:
Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 415.
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obligations on states parties, including measures to prevent criminal activity
and cooperate in its prosecution. They often oblige states to either extradite
or submit for prosecution persons suspected of the offences covered, subject
to limited exceptions,51 and to cooperate in, for example, intelligence and
evidence gathering. Unlike certain other international treaties, they do not
themselves purport to criminalise conduct, but to impose obligations on states
to do so in domestic law.52
This alternative ‘piecemeal’ approach to terrorism was consolidated during
the 1970s, with conventions addressing offences onboard aircraft or at air-
ports,53 crimes against internationally protected persons,54 hostage taking55
and acts aboard ships and at sea.56 It continued to develop in the post cold
war period, alongside the frustrated quest by the 1996 ad hoc Committee to
find a global definition. During the nineties, this resulted in two noteworthy
conventions relating to ‘terrorist bombings’57 and the financing of terrorism.58
The Terrorist Bombings convention provides as comprehensive a terrorism
convention as has been approved to date, covering the use of ‘explosive or
other lethal devices’ in a public or state facility with intent to cause death or
destruction, in particular where there is intent to cause terror in the public
or particular individuals.59 The Financing Convention prohibits provision
of financial support for any of the acts covered by other ad hoc terrorist conven-
51 See exception in certain conventions e.g.the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, where
there are substantial grounds for believing that extradition would lead to serious human
rights violations or is motivated by discrimination. The traditional exception for ‘political
offences’ has been removed in certain treaties eg. the Terrorist Bombings or Financing
Conventions. See Chapter 4.
52 See for e.g. Convention against Torture, Convention against Genocide or the Geneva Con-
ventions and Protocols thereto; for a discussion of ‘terrorism’ as a crime under international
law, see below, Chapter 4A.1.1.4 and terrorism in armed conflicts, this chapter 1.1.
53 The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
1963, supra note 48; the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft 1970, supra note 48; the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 and its Supplementary Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 1988, supra
note 48.
54 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973, supra note 48.
55 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979, supra note 48; Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf 1988, supra note 48.
56 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
1988, supra note 48.
57 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, supra note 48.
58 Financing Convention, supra note 48.
59 Article 2, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, supra
note 48.
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tions. Notably, both of these conventions apply irrespective of the political,
ideological, racial or religious reasons that may underpin the acts.60
A further convention addressing ‘nuclear terrorism’ was adopted and
entered into force on 7 July 2007.61 A person who unlawfully and intentionally
possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses any nuclear or radioactive
explosive or dispersal device (or attempts to do so) with the intent to cause
(1) death or serious bodily injury, or (2) substantial damage to property or
the environment, commits an offence under the Convention.62 The Convention
requires States Parties to establish these offences as criminal acts under national
law and to make them punishable by appropriate penalties that take into
account their grave nature.63
2.1.4 Terrorism in armed conflict
International law also provides a definition of terrorism for the specific context
of armed conflict. ‘Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population’, are prohibited in inter-
national and non-international armed conflict under treaty64 and customary
IHL.65 Serious violations of this and other IHL prohibitions may also amount
to a war crime for which individuals may be held to account, as affirmed, for
example, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)66 or the Special Court for Sierra Leone.67 As such, terror inflicted on
60 Ibid., Article 6. Note the far-reaching provisions on cooperation, such as the exclusion of
political offences, in these conventions.
61 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, New York,
13 April 2005, UN Doc. A/Res/59/290, in force 7 July 2007 (‘Nuclear Terrorism Conven-
tion’).
62 Article 2 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, ibid.
63 Ibid., Article 5.
64 Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II. See also Article
33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that ‘terrorism is prohibited’ without
defining the phenomenon.
65 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
Vol. 1: Rules, ICRC (2005), pp. 8-10. See also the STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note
8 and Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 5 December 2003; Prosecutor v.
Galic, Case No. IT-98-29A, Appeal Decision, 30 November 2006.
66 The ICTY adjudicated the first case concerning the offence of inflicting terror on the civilian
population during armed conflict, which it found amounted to a crime under treaty law:
Galić, Trial and Appeal Judgments, supra note 68. See also Prosecutor v. Milosevic Case No.
IT-98-29/1, Trial Judgment, 12 December 2007, and Appeals Decision, 12 November 2009.
67 E.g. the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s first judgment including the crime of terrorism,
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-04-16-T,
20 June 2007; and Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, 18
May 2012. See K. Keith, Deconstructing Terrorism as aWar Crime: The Charles Taylor Case,
J.I.C.J. 11 (2013), 813. See also the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Interlocutory Decision, supra
note 8.
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the civilian population in armed conflict is a special case, providing an ex-
ception to the rule that ‘terrorism’ as such is not defined in, and does not
constitute a crime under, international treaty law.68
As acts of terror in armed conflict are covered by IHL, by this specific
provision or others addressing for example attacks against civilians, some of
the ‘Terrorism Conventions’ purport not to apply in times of armed conflict,
although as noted above the approach is irregular, and the issue remains
controversial in the context of the Draft Comprehensive Convention. It current-
ly excludes from the scope of application only the actions of ‘armed forces’
of the state during conflict, leaving non-state parties whose acts may respect
IHL vulnerable to prosecution for terrorism.69 By contrast, the Financing Con-
vention includes within its scope terrorism in the context of armed conflict,
and provides a specific definition for this purpose.70 Unfortunately, it does
not reflect precisely the definition of terrorism in IHL, causing potential con-
fusion as to the interplay of norms.71
2.1.5 Regional conventions
Regional organisations have, to varying degrees, assumed responsibility for
addressing terrorism, giving rise to at least nine regional conventions.72 At
68 For the customary status of terrorism generally, see this Chapter, para. 1.2. On the customary
status of the terror crime under IHL, see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck.
69 E.g. Article 12 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979 excludes
hostage-taking in armed conflicts; Article 19 and Preamble, Terrorist Bombings Convention
excludes only ‘activities of armed forces during an armed conflict’, as does the current draft
of the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention, Article 18. Some treaties also exclude from
their scope of application military vehicles and aircraft (e.g. see Article 1(4) of the Tokyo
Convention 1963, Article 3(2) of the Hague Convention 1970, Article 4(1) of the Montreal
Convention 1971 and Article 2 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988). By contrast, while the OAU Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999, provides in Article 22 that ’nothing
in this Convention shall be interpreted as derogating from … the principles of international
humanitarian law’, while the specific exclusion at Article 3 appears to relate only to ‘the
struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their
liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle’.
70 Article 2(1) refers to ‘[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation
of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act’.
71 The definition differs slightly from the war crimes definition above, for example by omitting
the critical ‘primary purpose’ to spread terror. See Galić judgment, supra note 68.
72 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (‘Arab Convention’), Cairo, 22 April
1998, in force 7 May 1999; Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on
Combating International Terrorism, Ouagadougou, 1 July 1999, in force 7 November 2002;
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977, in
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the regional – as at the international – level, two broad approaches emerge.
On the one hand, the European Union and the League of Arab States have
produced generic definitions of terrorism for their regional purposes. By
contrast, others, such as the Council of Europe or Organization of American
States, do not define terrorism but refer to the existing conventions that address
specific forms of terrorism.
2.1.5.1 Generic definition
Generic definitions of terrorism promulgated by regional organisations gen-
erally apply only to the member States of those organisations. To the extent
that they reveal common or different understandings of the nature of inter-
national terrorism, however, they are relevant to a discussion of the definition
of terrorism in customary law, as discussed below.
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by
the League of Arab States in 1998.73 Article 1(2) of the Convention defines
terrorism as:
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the
advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow
panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty
or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public
or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking
to jeopardize national resources.
This definition of terrorism has been criticised for its breadth, vagueness and
consequent susceptibility to abuse.74 In particular, the unqualified reference
force 4 August 1978; OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking
the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Signific-
ance, Washington, D.C., 2 February 1971, in force 16 October 1973; OAU Convention on
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, 14 July 1999, in force 6 December
2002; SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Kathmandu, 4 November
1987, in force 22 August 1988; Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism
and Extremism, Shanghai, 15 June 2001, in force 29 March 2003; Treaty on Cooperation
among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terror-
ism, Minsk, 4 June 1999, in force dates vary; Inter-American Convention against Terrorism,
Bridgetown, 3 June 2002, in force on 10 July 2003; Council of Europe Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16 May 2005, in force 1 June 2007; Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
and on the Financing of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16 May 2005, in force 1 May 2008.
73 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 75 (unofficial translation
from Arabic by the UN translation service available at http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/
video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_27.html).
74 See Amnesty International’s concerns with the scope of such ‘threats’ as potentially including
legitimate political opponents: ‘The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism:
a serious threat to human rights’, AI Index: IOR 51/001/2002, 9 January 2002.
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to ‘violence’ or the ‘threat’ of violence – irrespective of whether it achieves
any actual result, or of the gravity of the violence caused or threatened75 –
allows for a potentially very broad range of conduct to be brought under the
rubric of this Convention.
Only eight days after September 11, the Commission of the European Union
presented a proposal to the European Council for a Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism, intended to arrive at a common European definition
of terrorism.76 The Framework Decision, adopted by the Council on 13 June
2002, states that:
terrorist offences include the following list of intentional acts which, given their
nature or their context, may seriously damage a country or international
organisation where committed with the aim of:
(i) seriously intimidating a population, or
(ii) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act, or
(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures of a country or international organisation.77
Article 1 then goes on to outline the offences to which terrorism relates, in-
cluding attacks on persons, damage to property, seizure of means of transport,
‘endangering’ people or the environment, weapons offences and threatening
to commit any of those acts,78 while Articles 3 and 4 bring within its scope
‘offences relating to a terrorist group’ and ‘offences linked to terrorist
offences’.79 This Council statement was adopted as a ‘common position’,80
requiring member states to take the legislative steps required to implement
its terms in national law. It has been criticised for the use of ‘unclear, vague
and uncertain concepts.’81 In 2008 this was compounded by a further Frame-
75 E.g. the Financing Convention, supra note 48, and the Draft Comprehensive Convention
both refer to a requisite level of violence to be achieved, i.e. serious injury.
76 See Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 19
September 2001, COM (2001) 521 final.
77 Article 1, Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/475/
JHA), OJ L164/3 of 22 June 2002 (hereinafter ‘European Council Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism’). Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008
obliging states to criminalise ‘public provocation’, ‘recruitment’ and ‘training,’ ‘aiding and
abetting, inciting and attempting’ terrorism. See further Chapter 4.
78 Article 1, European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism contains the
definition of terrorism; see also ‘preventative offences’, ibid.
79 Ibid., Articles 2-4 requiring that these forms of association and liability be criminalised in
domestic law.
80 A Council Statement is a declaration of political intent, having no legal force. But under
Article 15 of the Treaty on the European Union Member States are under an obligation
to ensure that their national policies conform to the ‘common positions’ adopted by the
Council.
81 See Guzman, supra note 27 and Chapter 4.2.2.
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work Decision required states to ensure that ‘provocation’ to commit such
terrorist offences is also criminalised, as well as ‘aiding and abetting, inciting
and attempting’ such crimes are also criminalised.82
2.1.5.2 Definitions by reference
The more common approach, adopted in the terrorism conventions of other
regional organizations, is not to define terrorism as such but terrorist activities
are identified by reference to existing UN treaties which have addressed specific
forms of terrorism.83 Regional organisations to have addressed terrorism in
this way include the Organisation of American States,84 the African Union,85
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,86 The Council of
Europe87 and, moret recently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).88 While these regional arrangements act as a framework for extra-
dition or prosecution of acts which have already been deemed ‘terrorist’ at
international law, they do not therefore make any attempt to elucidate a
generic definition of terrorism.89 One alteration to this approach is the 2006
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism which is more
specific and adds offences, or additional modes of liability, which must be
reflected in member states’ domestic laws, namely (1) ‘public provocation to
commit a terrorist offense’; (2) ‘recruitment for terrorism’; and (3) ‘training
for terrorism’,90 as well as ancillary offences.91 But this regional Convention,
82 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 77.
83 See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977,
ETS. No. 90, in force 4 August 1978. Note also that the Arab Convention, while offering
a generic definition of terrorism, complements it by referring to ‘terrorist offences’ prohibited
by pre-existing conventions (Article 3).
84 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Washington,
D.C., 2 February 1971, in force 16 October 1973, OAS Treaty Series No. 37.
85 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, 14 July 1999,
in force 6 December 2002, text available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-
english.pdf.
86 SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Kathmandu, 4 November
1987, in force 22 August 1988, text available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/
Conv18-english.pdf.
87 Council of Europe, Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16 May 2005, in
force 1 June 2007, text available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/196.
htm. Unlike the EU position, the Council of Europe both in the earlier 1977 European
Convention on the Supression of Terrorism and the 2005 Convention on the Prevention
of Terrorism deal with terrorist offences by reference to crimes listed in other conventions.
88 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 2007, Cebu, 13 January 2007, available at http://
www.aseansec.org/19250.htm
89 Despite not offering a definition, some of them nevertheless note the exclusion from the
concept of terrorism of struggles against self-determination.
90 Article 5, Council of Europe Convention 2005.
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like most others, shies away from adopting, still less advancing, any generic
definition of terrorism as such.
2.2 DO WE KNOW IT WHEN WE SEE IT? DEFINING TERRORISM AND CUSTOMARY
LAW
As has been seen, there is no global convention that can be said to establish
a general definition of ‘terrorism’ that might be binding on state parties under
international treaty law. The question then is whether there might nonetheless
be sufficient international state practice and opinio juris to point to the general
acceptance of an international legal definition of terrorism as a matter of
customary international law.92 The issue had long been a matter of academic
discussion, with perhaps a majority of commentators taking the view that no
customary definition could be said to have crystallized.93 The other view,
however, was given voice by, among others, Professor Cassese, who had long
sustained that terrorism was indeed a crime under customary law.94 The issue
came into sharp international focus when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
under the chairmanship of (by then) Judge Cassese, decided in February 2001
that terrorism was defined as a crime in customary law.95
A brief comparative analysis of the various generic definitions of terrorism
that have emerged in international instruments thus far, as described above,
may be instructive in determining whether there is consensus on the essential
elements of a definition of terrorism. In assessing comparative practice, a few
distinctions are worthy of emphasis. First, the questions whether there is
uniform condemnation of terrorism, and whether states have obligations in
respect of it, are of course distinct from the question whether there is a clear
legal definition of terrorism in international law. Second, definitions are
elaborated for different purposes, such that definitions of terrorism for immi-
gration, administrative or other purpose will often be distinct from definitions
of terrorism for criminal law purposes; just as the definitions may well be
different, so are the requirements of international law in terms of the particular
rigorous requirements of certainty and clarity in criminal law. Third, whether
91 Ibid., Article 9 requires parties to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish
as a criminal offence under its domestic law of ‘participating as an accomplice’, ‘organising
or directing’ ‘contributing to the commission of’ or ‘attempt’ to commit an offence covered
by the Convention.
92 See Chapter 1.2
93 See for e.g. B. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), at 270; Y. Dinstein, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 19 Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights 1971 (1989), at 55; A. Schmid, ‘Terrorism-The Definitional Problem’, 36 Case W. Res.
J. Int’l. L. 375 (2004)
94 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 103.
95 See ‘International Criminal Tribunals’ below, 2.2.3.
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there is broad agreement on certain ‘core concepts’ around the meaning of
terrorism is different from the question whether there is a binding legal defini-
tion. There need not be absolute homogeneity of practice for customary law
to emerge, and genuinely ‘peripheral variations’96 may not affect the emerg-
ence of the norm, but the content or substance of the norm – the particular
elements of the definition – must be clear if a rule is to lay claim to govern
as a binding legal norm.
Even a brief survey of first, international instruments and practice, and
second, national laws, casts doubt on the proposition that there is sufficient
clarity around the definition of terrorism for the term to be defined (still less
criminalized) in international law, with significant differences remaining on
most if not all of the key elements of such a definition.
2.2.1 Identifying elements of a definition of terrorism from international
instruments and practice
2.2.1.1 Conduct
The conduct (or in criminal law terms, the actus reus or material element of
the offence) varies between definitions. The more restrictive approach is found,
for example, in the Draft Comprehensive Convention and the Financing
Convention which covers essentially causing death, serious injury and in some
cases damage to property.97 By contrast, a broader reaching and less precise
approach is adopted in the Arab Convention which covers any ‘violence or
threats of violence’. The 1994 Declaration and 2004 Security Council definitions
refer to undefined ‘criminal acts’ committed pursuant to a particular purpose,
thus not really defining the material element of terrorism at all.98 Likewise,
the definition put forward by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, while going
a little further, does not contain an exhaustive list of acts, but refers to ‘the
perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking,
arson, and so on), or threatening such an act’.99 Whereas some formulations
96 STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 8, p. 62, para. 97.
97 The Financing Convention, supra note 48, refers only to causing ‘death or serious bodily
injury’.
98 E.g. SC Res. 1566, para 3 above.
99 STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 8, p. 49-50, para. 85. ‘[A] number of treaties, UN
resolutions, and the legislative and judicial practice of States evince the formation of a
general opinio juris in the international community, accompanied by a practice consistent
with such opinio, to the effect that a customary rule of international law regarding the
international crime of terrorism, at least in time of peace, has indeed emerged. This custom-
ary rule requires the following three key elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act
(such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an
act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the
creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority
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cover ‘inchoate’ offences, where no result occurs, others depend on certain
types of injury, damage or loss having actually occurred.100
2.2.1.2 Purpose, Motive and ‘Justification’?
Terrorism tends to involve two or more subjective layers. The acts are rarely
an end in themselves but rather a vehicle to achieving particular gains, which
are usually ideological rather than private. Beyond the normal requirement
of intent in respect of the conduct (e.g., the bombing, murder, other act etc.),
the person responsible will usually intend his or her acts to produce broader
effects, namely spreading a state of terror and/or compelling a government
or organisation to take certain steps towards an ultimate goal. In criminal law
terms, the existence of this double subjective layer in many of the definitions
appears to indicate that if there is a crime of terrorism, like certain other
international offences, it is a dolus specialis crime, i.e. a crime that requires,
in addition to the criminal intent corresponding to the underlying criminal
act, the existence of an ultimate goal or design at which the conduct is
aimed.101
The need for such a broader design or purpose is often described as the
essential element differentiating terrorism from other forms of violence or
illegality. However, deep controversy and divergence of approaches surround
the purposive element. Definitions are not consistent in including a require-
ment of ‘terrorisation’ as such and those that do generally do not define it,
with some envisaging a generalised terror e.g. provoking ‘terror in the general
public’,102 and others including the much narrower terrorization of ‘particular
individuals.’103 ‘Terror’ is not a necessary element in numerous definitions
that contemplate a broader range of possible objectives. The EU definition, for
example, includes ‘seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or inter-
national organisation’ as a possible purpose.104 The Arab Convention105
to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational
element.’
100 E.g. in both the European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and Arab
Convention, ‘threats’ to commit specified acts suffice.
101 Persecution and genocide, for example. For a discussion on the category of dolus specialis
in the context of genocide, see Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 97, p. 103.
102 UN GA Res. 51/210, supra note 14. On the IHL prohibition of ‘acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population’ in inter-
national or non-international armed conflict, see this chapter, para. 1.4.1
103 SC Res. 1566, supra 2.1.2.1.
104 Article 1, European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.
105 Article 1(2) of the Arab Convention refers to ‘seeking to sow panic among people, causing
fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to
cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to
occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources’.
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and the OAU Convention106 are broader still in the range of possible object-
ives. Commonly, but not invariably, definitions also refer to another subjective
layer by requiring that the terror, destabilisation or other objective is in turn
pursued with a view to compelling a response from another (but while this
is usually from the government or state, in some definitions it may also be
from an international organisation).107
Some definitions on the international level also include an underlying
political or ideological motivation as an additional layer to the definition of
terrorism, but such inclusion has uneven support and remains a matter of very
considerable controversy.108 For some, the political or ideological motive is
at the heart of the definition of terrorism, while for others it is irrelevant, or
indeed precluded by principles of human rights or criminal law.109
A further issue, highlighted in relation to the ‘authors’ of terrorism, relates
to whether considerations of a political, philosophical or other nature might
constitute a ‘justification’ for terrorism. There has been a tendancy over time
to move away from the language of ‘justification’, with this explicitly ruled
out in certain definitions, such as the Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004,
but not in others.110 Linked to this are different approaches to whether acts
106 A ‘terrorist act’ under the OAU Convention is one which is (i) intended to ‘intimidate, put
in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or
any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a parti-
cular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service,
the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii)
create general insurrection in a State’, Article 1(3).
107 ‘[T]he purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any
act.’ Draft Comprehensive Convention, Article 2. While the Arab Convention refers only
to compelling the state, in the European common definition, terrorist acts may be directed
at a state or an international organisation.
108 E.g.. SC Res. 1566 has no motive requirement. The STL judgment found no convergence
of state practice on the existence of an ideological or political motive, but considered it
an important element in understanding the nature of terrorism and one that may eventually
‘emerge as an additional element of the international crime of terrorism’. STL Interlocutory
Decision, p. 68-69, para. 106.
109 Under general principles of criminal law, personal motive is irrelevant, although this is
not always clear in definitions of terrorism. Some consider the human rights to thought,
conscience and religion, and limits on ‘profiling,’ to preclude such a motive requirement
in criminal law while others consider it integral to notions of terrorism. See debate between
Kent Roach and Ben Saul: Roach, ‘The Case for Defining Terrorism With Restraint and
Without Reference to Political or Religious Motive’, and Saul, ‘The Curious Element of
Motive in Definitions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient or Criminalising Thought’, in Law
and Liberty in the War and Terror, A. Lynch, G.Williams, and E. MacDonald (eds.), (Annan-
dale: The Federation Press, 2007), p. 45. See also STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note
8, p. 63-69, para. 98-106.
110 SC Res. 1566, supra note 43, notes that acts referred to in the resolution ‘are under no
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other similar nature’. See also Article 5, Terrorist Bombings and Financing
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of terrorism can constitute ‘political offences’ and whether the political nature
of an offence can constitute an exception to the duty to prosecute for terror-
ism.111
2.2.1.3 Who or what is protected
A further criterion on which definitions differ is the scope of potential ‘victims’
of terrorist acts. The 1937 definition, for example, is unusual in covering only
acts directed against the state.112 Other conventions, such as the 1999 Financ-
ing Convention, by contrast protect ‘civilians’ or other persons not taking a
direct part in hostilities in armed conflict.113 More recent examples, such as
the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention, include a broader range of targets,
applying to injury or damage to ‘any person’ and to property whether ‘public’
or ‘private’.114 Varying approaches to the target group that may ‘terrorised’
– whether a ‘people’ or ‘population’ en masse as opposed to individuals – has
been noted above.115
2.2.1.4 International element
Generally, conventions addressing ‘international terrorism’ explicitly restrict
their application to terrorism with a cross-border element. With the exception
of terrorism committed in the context of non-international conflict (which as
noted may be a war crime under international law), international conventions
and declarations do not apply to domestic terrorism where the conduct,
perpetrators and victims arise within one state. However, the regional terrorism
instruments referred to express no such limitation.116
Conventions which, like the 1994 Declaration, preclude any such justification. Earlier specific
conventions and certain regional ones contain no such provision.
111 The ‘political offences’ exception is increasingly being eliminated, especially in relation
to terrorism post September 11. See below Chapter 4B.2.3 and this chapter, para. 2.1.4
regarding the human rights implications of this trend. Regarding specific terrorist conven-
tions, see, for e.g., Article 11, Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Financing Convention,
supra note 48.
112 Article 2(1), Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, 1937,
never entered into force), League of Nations Doc. C.546M.383 1937.
113 Financing Convention, Art. 2(1)(b), supra note 48.
114 Informal text of Article 2, Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate Inter-
national Terrorism; UN Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9, Annex I.B.
115 Chapter 2.2.1.2.
116 See, for e.g., the European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and Arab
Convention.
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2.2.1.5 The authors: state actors and national liberation movements
Back in 2001, then Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights, Ms
Kalliopi K. Koufa, found the ‘degree of consensus’ around the definition of
terrorism not to extend to the thorny issue of ‘who can be a potential author
of terrorism’.117 Despite the passage of time, the international community
has not definitively answered questions highlighted as controversial (relating
to whether, in turn, states and national liberation movements can be respons-
ible for ‘international terrorism’).
As regards the first question whether state conduct may constitute inter-
national terrorism, international instruments take different approaches.118
While the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind included international terrorism within the scope of crimes that can be
committed by the State,119 terrorism was dropped from the list of offences
covered by the 1996 version of the Draft Code.120 Most subsequent provisions,
while often not explicitly excluding the possibility of states falling within their
purview, do exclude many guises of direct state terrorism by implication, either
because the terror is inflicted against a state’s own people (and is thus excluded
by the broadly accepted ‘international element’ criterion referred to above),
or because it takes place in armed conflict (and is explicitly excluded as already
governed by IHL).121 While it remains sensitive – as seen for example from
the fact that negotiations towards the nuclear terrorism convention were long
stymied by differences of view on this critical point, which are also manifest
in the Draft Comprehensive Convention discussed above – the majority of
‘international terrorism’ provisions do not address state terrorism as such.122
In this respect, two points are worth clarifying. The first is that one justifica-
tion for excluding ‘state’ terrorism from definitions of international terrorism
is that the state is, or should be, accountable through other branches of law,
117 Koufa, ‘Progress Report’, supra note 7. See also U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, supra note 44, and Di Filippo, supra note 28.
118 See Dugard, ‘Definition of Terrorism’, supra note 10, p. 5. See also Report of the International
Law Commission 43rd session, UNGAOR, 46 Session, supp. no. 10 A/46/10 (1991), Article
24. However, many implicitly exclude state terrorism, as discussed below.
119 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its forty-third session, 29 April-19 July 1991, UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991.
120 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf.
121 See this Chapter, para. 1.2. See also the view of the U.N. High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, supra note 51, that state terrorism is adequately covered by other
international norms.
122 Controversial questions regarding state terrorism, and whether state action may itself
constitute international terrorism – addressed here – should be distinguished from state
responsibility for international terrorism by private actors: see Chapter 3.1.
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such as human rights,123 humanitarian law or the law on the use of force,
whereas the responsibility of non-state actors is more limited.124 On this basis
the Secretary General’s Report of 2004 found the objections that ‘state terrorism’
should be included in a global definition of terrorism ‘uncompelling’ given
that it is covered by other international norms. Secondly, the exclusion of ‘state
terrorism’ should be distinguished from (a) state responsibility for terrorism
carried out by private actors, which are attributable to the state according to
the general rules of state responsibility, and (b) state responsibility for viola-
tions of other obligations, which may include refriaing from sponsoring or
supporting terrorism for example.125
Stark differences of approach are seen also in relation to the yet more
intractable question of the distinction between ‘terrorism’ and acts undertaken
pursuant to ‘the inalienable right to self determination and independence’.126
The determination on the part of many states, particularly but not exclusively
from the developing world, to exclude national liberation movements from
any definition of terrorism has characterised almost all negotiations towards
a definition in international practice.
As noted, the 1994 Declaration was thought to be a milestone in stating
that the ‘criminal acts’ covered by it are ‘in any circumstances unjustifiable
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other nature’, without reference to national liberation
movements (NLM)s. The Security Council Resolution 1566 and numerous other
instruments follow this approach. However, the Arab and African regional
conventions expressly exempt from the terrorist definition peoples struggling
for self-determination or national liberation in accordance with international
law, ‘including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression
and domination by foreign forces’.127 Under the Arab Convention, it has been
noted that, while on the one hand relatively banal acts could be covered by
the terrorism definition (due to the broad-reaching conduct covering by the
definition), on the other, the most serious indiscriminate attacks against
civilians could be excluded ‘as long as [they were] perpetrated in the name
of the right to self determination’.128 A slightly different manifestation of
the same phenomenon could be seen in a European Union note accompanying
123 Chapter 7 on responsibility and the extra-territorial application of human rights obligations.
124 U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 44.
125 See Chapter 3 for discussion of responsibility and 2.3 below.
126 GA Res. 3034 (XXVII), ‘Measures to Prevent International Terrorism’, 18 December 1972,
UN Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII).
127 OAU Convention, Article 3(1); Arab Convention, Preamble and Article 2(a). See also
Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism which couples this exclusion with a provision stating that ‘political, philosophical
... or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence’.
128 E. David, Eléments de droit pénal international – Titre II, le contenu des infractions internationales,
8th ed. (Brussels, 1999), p. 539. See further Guzman, supra note 27.
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the draft European Framework decision circulated after 11 September 2001,
which noted that the definition of terrorism does not include ‘those who have
acted in the interests of preserving or restoring democratic values’.129
This issue continues to dog the negotiation of the UN Convention, as noted
above, with dispute remaining as to whether there should be an exception
for all types of conflict – international or non-international, and including wars
of national liberation and situations of ‘foreign occupation’.130
A holistic approach to the legal framework would suggest that the defi-
nition of terrorism take into account other norms of international law. There
is force therefore in the argument that it is less essential to include state
terrorism as states are bound by other international legal obligations. This
argument is weakened in practice in the war on terror context in which, as
will be seen, states seek to deny the applicability of relevant norms or branches
of law131 and to evade responsibility and accountability under them.132 On
the other hand, as regards liberation movements, it has been suggested with
some force that ‘if international law takes self-determination seriously,’ defi-
nitions of terrorism must exclude legitimate liberation movements that forcibly
resist its denial, and states should not be allowed to criminalize – as terrorists
– those who do so.133 Whatever the merits or demerits of such inclusions
or exclusions, in practice there is insufficient consensus to allow passage out
of the quagmire on this most intransigent of issues.
In brief, this short survey reveals numerous commonalities but also sub-
stantial points of divergence in the approach to the definition of terrorism to
date. It is undoubtedly possible to discern, in a general way, key features of
terrorism, such as certain unlawful acts carried out for ideological ends. It is
rather more difficult to identify, from the survey of international instruments,
clear and precise elements of a definition that can be said to have garnered
international support.
129 The note circulated with the draft decision continues: ‘Nor can it be construed so as to
incriminate on terrorist grounds persons exercising their legitimate right to manifest their
opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of such right they commit offences.’ See
Statewatch, ‘Critique of the Council’s Agreed Decision on the definition of terrorism’,
Statewatch bulletin, November-December 2001, available at http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2002/feb/06Aep.htm. But see SC Res. 1566, supra note 43.
130 Article 18 Draft Comprehensive Convention; see discussion of UN negotiations para. 2.1.2.
131 See e.g. Chapter 7B2 and 7B3 denying the scope of application of human rights law extra-
territorially or in armed conflict as an example of states seeking to avoid their obligations
and accountability.
132 E.g. Chapter 7B14.
133 Ben Saul, ‘Defending ’Terrorism’: Justifications and Excuses for Terrorism in International
Criminal Law’, (2006) Australian Yearbook of International Law 25, pp. 177-226 available as
Sydney Law School Research Paper No 08/122, p. 13. Saul suggests self determination
should be excluded ‘by the full application of Protocol I’, and human rights law should
impede States from criminalising on this basis.
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2.2.2 Other international practice: United Nations General Assembly and
Security Councils
Various resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council have
referred to the duties of states in respect of terrorism, from the duty to refrain
from support134 to the more proactive duty to suppress.135 While many
are non-binding,136 these resolutions may reflect or contribute to the develop-
ment of customary law regarding the obligations in question.137 As discussed
above, post September 11, the Security Council went further and called on
states to take broad-reaching measures against ‘international terrorism’, in-
cluding criminalising such conduct.
For the most part, these UN initiatives do not provide a definition of terror-
ism and hence, one could argue, fail to give precise content or meaning to
the obligations to which they refer and, in any event, to contribute to our
understanding of a definition of international terrorism in customary inter-
national law. It has been argued that these resolutions, particularly those that
refer to criminal law, presuppose sufficient understanding of the phenomenon
referred to in international law.138 But then, the current state of negotiations
on a global convention, and the Security Council’s call to states, in the context
of resolution 1373, to advance these negotiations belie such a view.
It remains doubtful to what extent the UN initiatives directed at providing
content to the meaning of ‘international terrorism’ highlight the existence of
sufficiently widespread agreement on the elements of a legal definition. In
providing its ‘description’ of terrorism, the High-level Panel of the General
134 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations’, 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), which has been cited as declaratory
of customary law with regard to the non-use of force, provides that ‘[e]very state has the
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife
and terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts’. See also preamble of SC Res. 748 of 31 March
1992, UN Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
135 GA Res. 51/210, ‘Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism’, 17 December 1996, UN Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1999) refers in the
preamble that ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circum-
stance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them’.
136 Cf Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII. Other resolutions, including
those of the GA, are not strictly binding under the Charter but may play a significant role
in the formation of customary norms: see Chapter 1 and M. Wood, “The interpretation of
Security Council resolutions”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 2, 1998, p. 74.
137 On UN declarations and resolutions and the development of custom, see the arbitration
award in Texaco Overseas Petro. Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Rep., para. 83,
reprinted in 17 ILM 1. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 ICJ Reports, p. 14, paras. 188 and 198.
138 See Cassese, supra note 97.
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Assembly indicated in 2004 that there was a lack of agreement on a clear
definition of terrorism, which it considered to undermine the normative
regulation and moral stance against terrorism.139 Subsequent pleas by then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan for states to provide ‘clarity’ around the defini-
tion of terrorism reinforce the perceived gap. While the 2004 Security Council
resolution was significant in providing a ‘definition,’ it was clearly non-binding
and aimed at providing a helpful framework for national definitions rather
than itself embodying a legal definition. Consistent with its nature as a refer-
ence point to assist states in providing the necessary specific definitions in
domestic law, it provides a broad approach rather than a detailed specific
definition, and, as noted in the brief survey above, it both reflects and differs
from approaches found elsewhere.
2.2.3 The practice of International Criminal Tribunals
The practice of international criminal tribunals is also relevant to the debate
regarding whether there is in fact an international legal definition of terrorism,
and specifically whether terrorism is a crime under international law (defined
with sufficient clarity to provide a basis for criminal prosecution).
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone include terrorism as one of the crimes
within their respective jurisdictions,140 and as noted above there have been
convictions.141 These have been cited as creating a strong assumption that
the drafters considered that there was in fact a crime of terrorism under inter-
national law at the time when the crimes within the jurisdiction of those
tribunals were committed,142 However, it is clear from the context of these
provisions, that they cover the specific prohibition on terrorism in armed
conflict. As discussed above, this is a special sub-category of terrorism which
is defined in IHL – and amounts to an international crime that the ICTY has
139 ‘The Panel calls for a definition of terrorism which would make it clear that any action
constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and
non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government
or an international organization to do or abstain from any act. I believe this proposal has
clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it.’ Secretary-General’s
Kofi Annan’s keynote address, supra note 20.
140 For the first judgment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone including the crime of terrorism,
see Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, supra note 70.
141 See for e.g. Galic, supra note 68, Simma, supra note 70, and Taylor, supra note 70, referred
to above.
142 Cassese, supra note 97, pp. 120-21, asserting that a definition of terrorism does exist and
citing in support Article 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).
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also prosecuted – rather than purporting to confer jurisdiction over a broader
generic offence of terrorism in international law.143
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established in 2007, is the first inter-
national tribunal that focuses its jurisdiction on what is plainly a terrorist
act,144 although its competence as described in its statute is to apply ‘the
provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and
punishment of acts of terrorism….’.145 In a significant interlocutory decision
of February 2011, the Appeals chamber decided that it should interpret
Lebanese law in light of international law, and went on to conclude, contro-
versially, that terrorism was already a crime under customary law. The Tri-
bunal found as follows:
On the basis of treaties, UN resolutions and the legislative and judicial practice
of States, there is convincing evidence that a customary rule of international
law has evolved on terrorism in time of peace, requiring the following elements:
(i) the intent (dolus) of the underlying crime and (ii) the special intent (dolus
specialis) to spread fear or coerce authority; (iii) the commission of a criminal
act, and (iv) that the terrorist act be transnational. The very few States still
insisting on an exception to the definition of terrorism can, at most, be con-
sidered persistent objectors. A comparison between the crime of terrorism as
defined under the Lebanese Criminal Code and that envisaged in customary
international law shows that the latter notion is broader with regard to the
means of carrying out the terrorist act, which are not limited under inter-
national law, and narrower in that (i) it only deals with terrorist acts in time
of peace, (ii) it requires both an underlying criminal act and an intent to
commit that act and (iii) it involves a transnational element.”146
While the views of Tribunal President Cassese were well known from his
prior academic work, the judicial decision was surprising, given ongoing
controversy as to the failure to reach international agreement on a definition
of terrorism, and differing elements emerging from national and international
143 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (annex to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone (Freetown, 16 January 2002), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html)
and the Statute of the ICTR, in both cases in Article 3 (‘Violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II’) at (d) cover ‘acts of terrorism’.
144 On 13 December 2005, the Government of the Republic of Lebanon requested the United
Nations to establish a tribunal to try those allegedly responsible for the 14 February 2005
attack in Beirut that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1664 (2006), the United Nations and the Lebanese
Republic negotiated an agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Further to Security Council resolution 1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007, the Statute of the Special
Tribunal entered into force on 10 June 2007. See http://www.stl-tsl.org/.
145 STL Statute, ibid, Article 2 ‘Applicable criminal law’referring inter alia to “the provisions
of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of
terrorism, …”
146 STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 8, p. 3, emphasis in original.
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practice. Where the question is whether terrorism is defined as a crime under
international law, the controversy can only be more pronounced, and the
requisite degree of clarity and specificity stricter.147 In the context of this
particular case, prosecution, defence and interveners all agreed that there was
no crime of terrorism under customary law, yet the tribunal propio motu took
a different view.148
The decision has been promptly and stridently critiqued, with serious
questions arising regarding the sources on which the tribunal based its assess-
ment as to state practice and opinion juris.149 Despite this, it is likely that
this decision will be interpreted as lending some weight to the argument in
support of the cystallisation of a customary norm. While it remains unclear
whether the decision of the Special Tribunal will stand the test of time or be
challenged before that Tribunal itself, it is clear that one decision of an inter-
national body is, in any event, far from conclusive on the question.
The ICC experience, for its part, points in a different direction. The 160 states
participating in the Rome conference on the establishment of the International
Criminal Court noted that no definition of the crime of terrorism could be
agreed upon for inclusion in the Statute, apparently indicative of the lack of
any such definition under international law at the time of the ICC Statute’s
adoption.150 Attempts to include a crime of terrorism in the Court’s juris-
diction have thus far gained relatively little traction.151
International criminal law practice is therefore divided. Beyond the Lebanon
tribunal decision, which stands apart in its endorsement of a crime of terrorism
in peacetime, international criminal practice does not appear to support the
existence of a definition of terrorism in customary international law (other
147 It has been noted that the national practice cited in support of the conclusions does not
distinguish between definitions of terrorism in criminal law and definitions for any other
purposes in domestic law.
148 STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 8, para. 83 of the judgement describes as ‘forceful’
the position of both parties in this respect. Their pleadings and interventions are available
at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/filings.
149 Ben Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for
Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’, 24 Leiden J. of Int’l
L. 677 (2011), 677-700; K. Ambos, ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon:
Is there a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?”, 24 Leiden Journal of Int. Law 655
(2011).
150 See e.g. Resolution E adopted by the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court
as part of its Final Act (UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10): ‘Regretting that no generally acceptable
definition of the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes could be agreed upon for the inclusion
within the jurisdiction of the Court’.
151 For the Dutch formal proposal to include terrorism within the Court’s jurisdiction at the
Kampala review conference, see Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Eighth Session, The Hague, November 18-26, 2009, U.N. Doc.
ICC-ASP/8/20, Appendix III at 65-66.
56 Chapter 2
than perhaps in respect to the war crime of inflicting terror on the civilian
population).152
2.2.4 National definitions
In considering whether a customary definition has emerged, it is also relevant
to look at state practice on the national level. However, here still less
definitional convergence emerges. The way national laws approach key
elements of a definition of terrorism can be discerned from international
reporting obligations, notably to the Security Council as regards implementa-
tion of obligations153 as well as from surveys of state practice on the national
level.154
Many states had specific counter-terrorism legislation in place long before
the ‘war on terror’, which, unsurprisingly, present differing definitions of
terrorism reflecting diverse historical and political national contexts.155 Post-
September 11, a plethora of new anti-terrorist measures were grafted onto the
canvas of existing laws; while many states introduced entirely new terrorism
legislation in the years following, others with long histories of counter terror-
ism but renewed resolve in the different geopolitical landscape, introduced
152 See Statutes of the ICTR and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 143; Prosecutor
v. Galić, supra note 68; Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome, 17 July
1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, hereinafter ‘ICC Statute’.
153 A broad range of national practice can be seen from state reports to the Security Council
Counter-Terrorism Committee on the criminalization of terrorist acts under SC Res. 1373,
para 2(e): www.un.org/Docs/ sc/committees/1373/reports.html.
154 See Ben Saul, ‘Defining Terrorism’, supra note 96 (or did you mean his article at note 41?).
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon also selects examples of state practice in support, and
for examples of practice in country reports of human rights monitoring bodies see Chapter
7. See also Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent
Roach (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), particularly Chapters 14,
18, 22-24 and 26. The International Commission of Jurists Bulletin on Terrorism provides
examples of legislative and other developments as they unfold.
155 E.g. Article 270 of the Italian Criminal Code has no requirement for religious or political
motivation or spreading fear or intimidation among the population, as the law was focused
on organised crime and the activities of the mafia. Post-September 11, the law has been
extended to cover acts with an international dimension. See K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Country
Report on Italy’, Conference on ‘Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International
Law’, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, 24-25
January 2003, at www.edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/country.cfm. In Japan, Article
17(1) of the National Police Agency Organisation Act of 1954 limits terrorism to a particular
political view, covering ‘[v]iolent or subversive activities on the basis of ultra-left ideology
and other assertions with the intention of achieving their purpose by spreading fear and
apprehension’. Ibid., N. Hirai-Braun, ‘Country Report on Japan’, Conference on ‘Terrorism
as a Challenge for National and International Law’, at www.edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-
terrorism/country.cfm.
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significant legislative changes.156 Many of these laws were enacted according
to expedited national procedures.157 Not infrequently, such counter-terrorism
legislation has been the subject of criticism from human rights courts and
bodies for its breadth and/or ambiguity, as discussed further in Chapter 7.
The enactment of new laws is in part a response to Security Council resolu-
tions passed in response to September 11,158 in particular Resolution 1373
passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (thereby imposing a legal obliga-
tion on member states of the UN), which specifically requires states to ensure
that ‘terrorist acts’ are criminalised in domestic law.159 Security Council
resolutions referring to obligations in respect of terrorism either make no
attempt to define the phenomenon however (SC Resolution 1373 (2001)) or
provide a non-binding framework (SC Resolution 1566 (2004)).160 Despite
the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Committee with a limited mandate
to monitor the implementation of the resolution,161 in practice the Security
Council has left unfettered flexibility for the state to define terrorism as it sees
fit.162 The fact that so many of the definitions in anti-terrorism legislation
post September 11 have given rise to serious concerns regarding compatibility
with international human rights standards may itself undermine the claim
that they represent an emerging international legal definition.163 But it is
the diversity of approach on key elements that makes such a claim most
difficult to sustain.
156 E.g. Singapore and Malaysia made fewer amendments to their existing anti-terrorism
regimes, whereas newly democratic Indonesia resisted the imposition of harsher new laws:
see for example, Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, supra note 160, Chapters 13 and 14.
157 Less than two months after 9/11 the 342-page US Patriot Act 2001, which amends over
fifteen statutes, passed into law. The UK government rushed through the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 within a month of submitting its draft to Parliament, thereby
only allowing parliamentary debate and not the normal customary committee scrutiny.
Both pieces of legislation afforded domestic law enforcement agencies and international
intelligence agencies wide-ranging powers and restricted human rights protections.
158 SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001), called on member
states to work together to stop terrorism and punish those responsible.
159 SC Res. 1373, supra note 2.
160 SC Res. 1566, supra note 43.
161 The Committee originally made clear that it was not interested in monitoring the human
rights implications: “The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor the imple-
mentation of Resolution 1373 (2001). Monitoring performance against other international
conventions, including human rights law, is outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee’s mandate.” A briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2002, available
at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html. It now embraces a rights dimension to its
work; see Chapter 7B1.
162 Resolution 1373 (2001) established the Committee and SC Res. 1377 (2001), supra note 2,
clarified its tasks including to promote best practices, including the preparation of model
laws as appropriate; and to disseminate the availability of existing technical, financial,
legislative and other assistance programmes to assist the implementation of Resolution
1373.
163 See Chapter 7B.5.
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It has been noted that some national terrorism laws have had considerable
impact on definitions adopted in other states, as have international or regional
initiatives of course, leading to some similarity of approaches and language
appearing across different states.164 Despite this, for the most part definitions
vary considerably in their approaches – from adopting definitions by reference
to existing specific conventions, to the establishment of newly drawn up
offences, that sometimes bear scant resemblance to international, regional or
other national definitions.165 Even within regions and among states imple-
menting the same regional standards, such as the 27 European countries who
are obliged to implement the EU’s Framework Decision on Combatting Terror-
ism, divergent approaches are apparent.166
In many states, terrorism is not defined in national legislation at all.167
Where it is, the definitions cover a strikingly diverse range of conduct. While
many involve some (often varied) forms of violence,168 laws not infrequently
cover a broader range of conduct including any ‘any intentional act’,169 or
any ‘explosion, arson or other action’170 that meets the other elements of the
definition (generally relating to the purpose behind the conduct). Some states
have no purpose element, simply defining terrorism as violence calculated
to cause death or injury, and where there is such an element, it takes broad
ranging forms. In some cases it covers terrorizing, intimidating or inducing
fear in the population,171 while in others terrorism is defined as intent to
damage, weaken or oppose the state or public order, or to jeopardize essential
values.172
164 Definitions of terrorism in Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South African laws are
said to have been inspired by the definition in UK legislation; see Ramraj, Hor and Roach,
Global Anti-Terror Law and Policy, supra note 160, p. 630.
165 See e.g., ‘creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic’ in Phillipines
Human Security Act 2007. Further examples of broad appraoches are discussed in Chapter
7B5.
166 Stephanie Schmahl, ‘Specific Methods of Prosecuting Terrorists in National Law’, in Terror-
ism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty?, Walter,
Schorkopf, et al. (eds.), (Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellshaft, 2004), p. 81.
167 Saul notes that the dominant approach in states’ criminal laws is to address terrorism
through ordinary offences under criminal law; this was more striking prior to 9/11 but
remains true despite an increase in national level definitions since 2001. Saul, supra note
91, pp 264, 268.
168 Ibid.
169 For example, Jordanian Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 of 2006, Official Gazette No. 4790, at
4264, 1 November 2006, defines the material element of terrorism as ‘every intentional act,
committed by any means and causing death or physical harm to a person or damage to
public or private properties, or to means of transport, infrastructure, international facilities
or diplomatic missions’.
170 For example, the Russian Federation: Article 3 of the Federal Law no. 35-FZ of 6 March
2006 on ‘Countering Terrorism’.
171 Saul refers to 15 states including simple generic definitions of terrorism of this type, supra
note 96, p. 266.
172 Ibid., p.268.
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Divergence between states is also noteworthy as regards the inclusion or
omission of a political or religious motive requirement. The rejection of such
a requirement by the Security Council’s 2004 definition173 is not necessarily
reflected in practice on the national level.174 The extent of the controversy
on this element is apparent from the Canadian judiciary’s rejection of such
a requirement in Canadian legislation as violative of human rights.175
In practice, uncertainty flows from particular elements and from the totality
of definitions which combine a range of subjective and objective elements with
unclear results. This is exemplified in the Russian anti-terror law, which defines
terrorism as “the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the
decision making of state bodies, local municipal bodies or international organ-
izations, involving intimidation of the population and/or other forms of illegal
violent action.”176
Unfolding practice on the national level should be closely observed as
potentially constituting the most important development in this field, as a
matter of practical significance and as a source of state practice that could,
with time, contribute to the development of customary law (discussed below),
but there is little indication of uniformity of practice around a legal definition
having emerged at this stage or of this changing in the forseeable future.
2.2.5 Meeting the legality threshold: preliminary conclusions on customary
international law?
The question whether terrorism is defined in international law is therefore
controversial. While a thorough review of the practice of states in defining
terrorism goes beyond the scope of this study, the differences of approach
highlighted belie the notion of consensus around a definition of terrorism.
173 See SC Res. 1566, supra note 43, but see STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 8.
174 See e.g., K. Roach, ‘The Case for Defining Terrorism With Restraint and Without Reference
to Political or Religious Motive’, supra note 114, p. 45, on Australian, Canadian and UK
definitions reference to political or religious motivation. New Zealand and Hong Kong
have also adopted the inclusion of religious or political motives, whereas the US, some
Middle Eastern and some European countries use harm as a primary definer. See also Global
Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, supra note 160, particularly Chapters 14, 18, 22-24 and 26.
175 A Canadian Court in R v. Kawaja [OJ] 4245 [73] found that the Canadian requirement of
religious or political motivation in the commission of the crime of terrorism violated
fundamental freedoms. See Roach, ‘The Case for Defining Terrorism with Restraint and
Without Reference to Political or Religious Motive’, supra note 114, p. 45. For an interesting
academic debate, see Roach, supra and Ben Saul, ‘The Curious Element of Motive in Defini-
tions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient or Criminalising Thought?’, supra note 114, p. 28.
176 Russian Countering Terrorism Law 2006, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiisskoi Federatsii
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 35-FZ, available at http://
www.garant.ru/law/12045408-000.htm, discussed in S. T. Bridge ‘Russia’s New Counter-
acting Terrorism Law: The Legal Implications of Pursuing Terrorists Beyond the Borders
of the Russian Federation’, 3 (2009) Colum. J. E. Eur. L. 1.
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While the heart of the definitional dispute undoubtedly relates to the potential
authors of terrorism, there is divergent practice in respect of most, if not all,
elements of the definition.
Commentators differ as to whether there is sufficient clarity around a
definition of terrorism under customary law.177 The heart of the issue is
whether there is a sufficiently solid core of a definition to hold that there is
a clear prohibition in law and, in particular, that there is an international crime
carrying individual responsibility.
In making this assessment, the requirements of legality must be kept centre
stage.178 The legitimacy of the law’s restriction of rights and freedoms
depends on it being sufficiently clear and accessible that individuals are able
to conform their behaviour to the limits of the law. As human rights courts
frequently remind us, genuine uncertainty as to the content and scope of law
renders that law void for vagueness, and where the question is the existence
of a definition under criminal law, particularly stringent requirements of legal
certainty arise. It is questionable whether many of the definitions advanced
above, applicable in particular regional or other contexts, themselves meet
the requirements of nullum crimen sine lege, and more doubtful yet whether
the common core that might be distilled from them would meet such a test.
Counter-terrorism laws continue to emerge and a rule of customary law
could, at least conceivably, evolve as international practice develops. National
practice is being generated constantly, as states introduce new legislation or
reinforce existing laws and practices. The definitions in domestic legislation
reveal both some consistency and much divergence of approach. As noted
above, several states have followed one another’s approach to the definitions
of terrorism, leading to some key examples of parallel provisions in mostly
similar but sometimes quite different legal systems.179 Differences of approach
are, however, at least as striking as the similarities.180 The examples of the
vastly divergent approaches to conduct, purpose and the motivation require-
ment on both the international and national levels, discussed above, illustrate
177 Cassese, supra note 94, p. 120, suggests that there is consensus on the ‘general notion’ of
terrorism and that disputes relate only to the question of National Liberation Movements,
which he describes as a dispute not as to an element of the definition but as to the ‘ex-
ceptions’ that apply thereto. See also J. Paust, ‘Addendum: Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden
et al. for Violations of International Law and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims’, ASIL
Insights No. 77, 21 September 2001, at www.asil.org. Cf. See R. Higgins, ‘The General
International Law of Terrorism’, in International Law and Terrorism, R. Higgins and M. Flory
(eds.) (London: Routledge, 1997); B. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law note 96,
at 270; Y. Dinstein, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
1971 (1989), at 55; A. Schmid, ‘Terrorism-The Definitional Problem’, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l.
L. 375 (2004).
178 See Chapter 7.
179 Note similar approaches across the commonwealth and beyond, inspired by the definition
in UK legislation, Global Anti Terror Law and Policy, supra note 160, p. 630.
180 See, for example, discussion of the European states’ approaches in Schmahl, supra note 172.
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this. Such divergence should be no surprise, given not only the inevitable
peculiarities of the particular historical and geo-political concerns of the
individual state, but also the lack of homogeneity in the international and
regional levels and the controversy that underpins the difficulties in arriving
at an internationally accepted definition.181
Consensus may be consolidating around many of the elements of a defini-
tion in the context of the negotiations around a global draft Convention, with
the notable exception of the National Liberation Movement issue. However,
as the Draft Comprehensive Convention has not been completed or adopted,
still less signed and ratified, it would appear premature to rely on the current
state of these negotiations alone as indicative of customary international law
at the present time. The adoption of new terrorism legislation which took a
growth spurt post September 11 may have slowed down, such that the ‘soft-
law guideposts’ provided by Resolution 1566 in 2004 have had less obvious
restraining influence than it might otherwise have had.182 The evolution of
national legislation will however continue, including through on-going
attempts at model legislation, such as that adopted in 2011 by the African
Union, which may over time lead to a greater consistency of approach than
has been evident in practice to date.183
Attempts to guide and to exercise more effective oversight over states for
the definitions adopted and their application may gain pace. It remains just
conceivable that evolving national practice will move closer together and lead
to future changes in customary international law, to which the potential
adoption and acceptance of a generic definition in a global convention would
undoubtedly contribute, but this remains some way off.
For the time being, it may be tentatively concluded that international law
cannot be said to prohibit or indeed penalise terrorism, according to an under-
stood definition of the term under customary international law. So far as there
remain such uncertainties and ambiguities around the existence of a definition
or its scope, it must be highly doubtful whether criminal prosecution on this
basis would be consistent with the cardinal principles of legality and certainty
in criminal matters.
2.3 FILLING THE GAP? TERRORISM AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS
If there is no generic definition of terrorism in international law, does this leave
a gap in the international legal order? Two groups of issues are worth high-
lighting.
181 See Chapter 2.1 above.
182 Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague’, supra note 155, p. 9.
183 E.g. ‘African Model Law on Counter Terrorism’ at the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assem-
bly of the Union, held in Malabo, in July 2011: see Assembly/AU/Dec.369 (XVII).
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First, the absence of a definition of terrorism does not mean that serious
acts of violence, such as those carried out on September 11, are not addressed
by international (and of course domestic) law. As noted above, acts of ‘terror-
ism’ are covered by multiple specific conventions addressing particular types
or aspects of terrorism, including hijacking, hostage taking, violence against
internationally protected persons, terrorist bombing and financing terrorism.
Indeed it has been described as ‘difficult to imagine a form of terrorism not
covered by these Conventions’.184
As treaty law, they are binding only on states parties to them, and the
prosecution of associated offences depends on their incorporation into domestic
law. Calls for the ratification and implementation of these conventions have,
however, been made repeatedly by the Security and others post 9/11.185 As
a result, the enhanced ratification, and implementation, of these sectoral
conventions has been a major area of positive development post 9/11.
Specific pockets of normative growth have arisen in recent years, bolstering
this sectoral framework. For example in relation to the challenging issue of
terrorist financing,186 there has been a proliferation of developments from
Security Council resolutions,187 to regional conventions and regulations,188
as well as softer law standards and recommendations.189 Coupled with
enhanced ratification and implementation of existing provisions, these measures
have facilitated the rapid tracing, freezing and ultimately confiscation of
184 Dugard, ‘Definition of Terrorism’, supra note 10, p. 12. On this basis, Dugard, like others,
does not consider it essential or desirable to conclude a generic definition in a global
convention.
185 See e.g. SC Res 1373, 1566 and others. See also Prost, supra note 39.
186 A Gardella, ‘The Fight against the Financing of Terrorism between judicial and Regulatory
Control’, in A Bianchi (ed), Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 415. Particular challenges are said to arise from poor international
regulation of the financial system or its unsatisfactory implementation.
187 See e.g. SC Res 1373 and subsequent resolutions, which have referred to obligations in
respect of terrorist financicng, including calls to ratify the 1999 convention. The Security
Council has addressed terrorist financing and monitored implementation through its
Counter-terrorism committee.
188 See e.g. European Union Council decision 2002/996/KHA 28 Nov 2002; Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
and on the Financing of Terrorism, which entered into force on 1 May 2008. On issues raised
in the Southern African context, see Annette Hübschle, ‘Terrorist financing in Southern
Africa’, ISS paper 132, 2007.
189 E.g. the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in
1989 to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and related
threats. FATF has issued numerous Special Recommendations in this field post 9/11: see
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/. See other expert groups in Gardella,
supra note 195.
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property or assets in suspected cases of money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing, and the exchange of information.190
In addition, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, acts commonly
referred to as ‘terrorist’ may amount to other crimes under international
criminal law, including customary law of general application. Notably they
may amount to war crimes (if carried out in armed conflict) and crimes against
humanity (whether or not there is an armed conflict), provided the necessary
elements of those crimes are met, including that they be committed against
the ‘civilian population’.191
The crimes mentioned above do not provide comprehensive coverage of
the range of possible terrorist acts: for example, attacks aimed at terrorising
the civilian population in time of peace, which do not meet the widespread
or systematic threshold requirement of crimes against humanity, and in a state
that has not ratified the specific conventions, would probably not be proscribed
under international law.192 But the number of states to which this applies
is narrowing as ratifications grow. Moreover, even in such circumstances, acts
of international terrorism will be covered by ordinary domestic law. Whether
or not domestic law criminalises terrorism as such, it will inevitably prohibit
murder or attacks on the physical integrity of persons or on property.
The second point to note is that the lack of a definition of terrorism does
not signify a lack of obligations to refrain from participating in or supporting
terrorism and to take certain proactive counter-terrorist measures. Under the
general rules governing relations between states, a state must for example ‘not
knowingly allow its territory to be used in a manner contrary to the rights
of other states’,193 and to refrain from the threat or use of force, direct or
indirect, against another state.194 As regards the treatment of persons subject
to a state’s ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘control’, the state is also obliged under international
human rights law not only to refrain from acts that jeopardise human security,
but also to exercise due diligence to prevent and punish them.195 States also
190 Ibid. The 2008 Council of Europe Convention also addresses the institutional dimension
that often proves critical in practice; eg the need for financial intelligence units in each State
Party.
191 These requires that the civilian population, not state targets, be the object of the terror or
the prohibited acts amounting to crime against humanity. See, e.g., ICC Statute definitions.
192 It has been suggested that what is needed is this definition of war crimes of terror, but
applicable in time of peace, although this is, like other proposals, controversial. See website
of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(http://undcp.org/terrorism_definitions.html) and concern expressed in Guzman, Terrorism
and Human Rights No. 1, supra note 27, p. 191.
193 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22.
194 See state responsibility in international law and obligations to refrain from force, Chapters
3 and 5.
195 On extra-territoriality of human rights obligations see Chapter 7A.2.1. As noted above, terror
within a state is not generally thought to be covered by the concept of ‘international
terrorism’ for the purpose of the specific terrorism conventions, or the Draft Comprehensive
Convention.
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have specific obligations in respect of the repression of ‘terrorism’ as such.196
These include, for state parties to them, the obligations arising out of the
specific terrorism conventions discussed above. But obligations may also arise
from, or be reflected in, UN resolutions, such as the far reaching Security
Council resolutions post September 11.197
The importance of the existing, and proposed, terrorism conventions lies
in the provision of a framework for the obligations regarding international
cooperation,198 ensuring, for example, that states are obliged to ‘extradite
or prosecute’ persons suspected of the offences covered by them.199 While
the obligation to investigate and prosecute is not new or limited to these
conventions, they seek to facilitate the effective discharge of the cooperation
obligation and to remove obstacles to extradition.200 Particular ‘modalities’
of cooperation aimed at discharging the general obligation to cooperate, such
as intelligence and evidence sharing, transfer of criminal proceedings, freezing
and seizure of assets, execution and recognition of foreign judgments, or indeed
extradition provisions, such as ‘conditional extradition,’201 have been
addressed selectively in particular treaties.202 It has been suggested that if
there is a gap that the potential Draft Comprehensive Convention might fill,
it may not relate so much to the definition, but to the lack of a comprehensive
framework for international cooperation, covering all such modalities, including
196 As discussed below, the force of those obligations may be weakened or undermined by
divergent interpretations of what is covered, and excluded, by the term.
197 SC Res. 1368, supra note 164, states that ‘those responsible for aiding, supporting or har-
bouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable’.
Unlike SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 2, this is not a Chapter VII resolution. SC Res. 1373
paras. 1 and 2 obliges states to adopt wide ranging measures including criminalisation,
freezing of assets and denial of safe haven, as discussed at Chapter 3.1.2. See also e.g. SC
Res. 1624 (2005) which includes an array of preventive measures including asset freezing
and confiscation.
198 Cooperation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 4A.2 and the human rights issues
raised are highlighted in Chapter 7A.4.3.8. Strengthening obligations of cooperation has
been the main import of the sectoral conventions; see M. Lehto, ‘Indirect Responsibility
for Terrorist Acts’ p.383 and Prost, supra note 39, in Van de Herik and Schrijver, supra note
35.
199 On the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) war crimes, crimes against
humanity genocide e.g., see also Chapter 4. See ‘International Terrorism: Challenges and
Responses’, Report from the International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism,
2003 and Chapter 7A4 on positive human rights obligations.
200 The usual requirements of extradition law (such as in some cases the ‘double criminality’
requirement), do not operate as a bar to extradition while other developments seeking to
further remove obstacles to extradition, or to streamline the extradition process, have been
initiated, or advanced with renewed impetus, post September 11, some with troubling
human rights implications. See Chapter 4B.2.2 and para. 7A.8.
201 Article 8(2), International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1998, supra
note 48.
202 See IBA Task Force, ‘International Terrorism’, Ch. 7.
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clarifying the hitherto irregular, and at times confusing, rules regarding extra-
dition.203
The focus on and overuse of the terrorism terminology may, therefore,
obscure the extent to which the sort of serious acts and threats we commonly
associate with ‘terrorism’ are already regulated by other areas of international
law. As is often the case, the problem lies more with the poor enforcement
of existing norms, including but going beyond specific terrorism norms, than
with the lack of a generic definition. In this respect it is noted that the Security
Council’s call to states to ratify existing terrorism conventions appears to have
borne some fruit although the crucial challenge in that respect remains imple-
mentation.204 While a generic definition in a global convention, if it could
be achieved and could garner near universal support, may serve the interests
of legal certainty and improve the efficiency of inter-state cooperation, what
is clear is that its absence does not mean a legal void or necessitate legal
paralysis.
2.4 CONCLUSION
Given the outstanding differences of view on its key elements, it is difficult
to sustain that international terrorism is, per se, defined and clearly regulated
in international law. The absence of a generic definition of terrorism leaves
no gaping hole in the international legal order. Rather it would appear to be
the case that what we commonly refer to as terrorism, although perhaps not
defined as such, would most likely be prohibited by other international legal
norms. In one view then, the lack of a definition of terrorism is just not that
significant. As one commentator noted: ‘Terrorism is a term without legal
significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether
of states or individuals, widely disapproved of and in which the methods used
are either unlawful, or the targets protected or both.’205
On the other hand, there can be little doubt of the political currency of
the language of terrorism, particularly in the post September 11 world.206
The stakes were raised considerably by Security Council Resolution 1373,
which, in what has been described as a new ‘legislative’ role for the Security
203 Ibid. Prost, supra note 39.
204 Many of the existing specific conventions are already widely ratified, though not necessarily
implemented. See Chapter 4, section B. On the challenges, see generally Schrijver and van
den Herik, supra note 35.
205 Higgins, ‘General International Law’, supra note 186.
206 See, e.g. the State of the Union Speech by the United States’ President, 20 September 2001:
‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation
that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a
hostile Regime’, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ 09/
20010920-8.html.
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Council,207 imposes binding obligations on states to take extensive counter-
terrorist measures. These include criminalising ‘terrorism’ and support for
it, imposing serious penalties, freezing assets and excluding ‘terrorists’ from
asylum and refugee protection. Broad-reaching obligations in respect of terror-
ism have been established without providing a clear definition of the conduct
towards which such measures should be directed, and, by contrast to earlier
binding decisions taken by the Council, without limitation as to the situation
or broad time frame in which it should apply.208
Imposing far-reaching obligations on the basis of an ambiguous concept
– described by a senior French law enforcement official as having ‘opened
the universal hunting season on terrorism without defining it’209 – may reap
unfortunate consequences. First, it may generate uncertainty as to the precise
nature of states’ obligations towards the Council, and undermine those obliga-
tions. As has been noted: ‘without reaching an acceptable international defini-
tion of the term “terrorism” one can sign any declaration or agreement against
terrorism without having to fulfil one’s obligations as per the agreement. For
every country participatory to the agreement will define the phenomenon of
terrorism differently from every other country.’210 Second, as discussed in
other chapters, it raises fundamental concerns in respect of criminal law
enforcement and human rights.211 The lack of a binding definition, and ‘too
little too late’ in terms of effective supervision of the human rights implications
of national definitions and their implementation,212 has meant that a sub-
stantial amount of effort purportedly dedicated to combating ‘terrorism’ has
been misapplied for purposes that do not contribute to but rather subvert the
international rule of law.
Despite the centrality of ‘terrorism’ in international law and practice,
controversy surrounds most aspects of the concept of terrorism in international
law. Absent a clear and accessible meaning to be attributed to the term, and
consensus around the same, its susceptibility to abuse renders it an unhelpful
basis for a legal, rather than political, analysis of events such as 9/11 or
207 P. Szasz, ‘Note and Comment: The Security Council starts Legislating’, 96 AJIL 901, October
2002.
208 While the September 11 attacks to which the resolution was responding would fall within
any definition of terrorism, and of other crimes under international law, Resolution 1373
is not in any way limited to that situation.
209 Statement of Mr Jean-François Gayraud, Chief Commissioner of the French National Police,
and of the French judge David Sénat, reported in Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights
No. 2, supra note 26, p. 26.
210 B. Ganor, ‘Security Council Resolution 1269: What it Leaves Out’, 25 October 1999, available
at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=93. The reflection in relation to
SC Res. 1269 is equally applicable to subsequent resolutions including SC Res. 1373, supra
note 2.
211 Chapters 4 and 7.
212 See Chapter 7B.1 ‘Security v Human Rights and on the role of the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee; see also http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/fact_sheet_3.pdf.
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responses thereto. Subsequent chapters will therefore address those events
and responses based on other norms of international law.

3 International responsibility, terrorism and
counter-terrorism
The question of responsibility for acts of international terrorism, or in response
to international terrorism, has permeated discussion since 9/11. Was a state
responsible for the September 11 attacks, or for acts of international terrorism
since then, and what are the implications? To what extent do the permissible
responses, including the resort to armed force, depend on responsibility?
Questions regarding state responsibility for terrorism have arisen to similar
effect in many other contexts, before and after 9/11, such as in relation to the
killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Harari,1 the Lockerbie bombing2
or more recently in the context of allegations of Iranian involvement in
attempts on US territory and beyond.3
In addition to questions of state responsibility for terrorism itself are others
concerning acts carried out in the ‘global war on terror:’ in what circumstances
are states responsible in connection with wrongs by other states, or by private
security companies carrying out security or counter-terrorism measures for
example? While the focus is on state responsibility, fundamental questions
also arise regarding those individuals and entities accused of being engaged
in terrorism: to what extent can al-Qaeda, or associated entities or individuals,
be considered responsible under international law?
The international responsibility of a state arises from the commission of
an internationally wrongful act, consisting of conduct that (a) is attributable
to a state under international law and (b) constitutes a breach of an inter-
national obligation of the state.4 States may also be responsible in connection
1 See UN International Independent Investigation Commission report, UN Doc. S/2005/662,
31, paras. 123-24; see also Security Council, in its Chapter VII Resolution 1636 (2005), UN
Doc. S/Res/1636. See K.N. Trapp, ‘Holding States Responsible for Terrorism before the
International Court of Justice’, 3(2) (2012) J Int. Disp. Settlement 279.
2 See, e.g., Statement made on behalf of the Security Council, 9 July 1999, UN Doc. S/PRST/
1999/22; Trapp, ibid.
3 ‘US to pressure Iran over “plot” to kill Saudi envoy’, BBC, 12 October 2011, available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15269348; ‘Bangkok blast suspects “targeting
Israeli diplomats”’, BBC, 16 February 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-17055367.
4 Article 2 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001. See Report of the ILC on the work
of its 53rd session, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), Chapter IV, pp. 59-365. For text of the ILC’s
Articles on State Responsibility and the authoritative Commentaries, see J. Crawford, The
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with wrongs by other states.5 Subsequent chapters will address the inter-
national obligations of the state (sometimes referred to as ‘primary rules’ of
international law)6 – including in relation to criminal law, force, human rights
and humanitarian law. This chapter deals with the ‘secondary’ rules that deter-
mine when a state will be responsible for those wrongs.
As will be apparent from the chapters that follow, questions of responsibil-
ity are of cross-cutting relevance to the areas of law and practice discussed
in this book. Their relevance has always been more apparent in relation to
some aspects of the framework of responses to terrorism than others. For
example, state responsibility is not generally required for crimes under inter-
national criminal law engaging individual responsibility to arise. However,
even there are connections; for example in certain circumstances state respons-
ibility may be relevant to whether terrorist attacks amount to specific crimes
(notably war crimes and the crime of aggression).7 By contrast, the question
of state responsibility has traditionally been considered closely interlinked
with the lawfulness of the use of force,8 as will be explored in Chapter 5; while
doubt is increasingly cast on the view that state responsibility for an armed
attack is a prerequisite to self-defence, the extent of the state’s responsibility
may remain relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness (i.e., the necessity and
proportionality) of attacking particular state targets.9 On these and other issues
arising in practice, explored in each subsequent chapter of this book and in
particular in the case studies, the ‘secondary’ rules of responsibility set out
in this chapter must be considered alongside the ‘primary’ obligations under
international law discussed in others.10
As we will see, some of the rules on state responsibility in respect of
terrorism and counter-terrorism have proved legally controversial, and this
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Comment-
aries (Cambridge, 2002).
5 Chapter IV, Articles 16-19, ILC Articles ibid.
6 On the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules, see generally, J. Combacau and
D. Alland, ‘“Primary” and “Secondary” Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categoriz-
ing International Obligations’, 16 (1985) NYIL 81.
7 Chapter 4A1.1 on the elements of war crimes and aggression and controversies around
a policy element for crimes against humanity ‘on the interconnections, and the consequences
of the individualisation of international responsibility’ for state responsibility, see A.
Nollkaemper, Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in
International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2003, 52, pp. 615-640.
8 See discussion of self-defence in Chapter 5A.2.1.
9 As discussed at Chapter 5, the view that self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter
only arises in response to attacks by states is increasingly doubtful. Measures involving
the use of force in self-defence must though be ‘necessary’ to avert an attack, suggesting
that for such measures to be directed against the organs of a state, that state must exercise
a degree of control over the attack in question.
10 Responsibility is addressed first on account of its cross-cutting relevance to the issues of
practice discussed in subsequent chapters (Part B of Chapters 4-7, and Chapters 8 and 10
in particular). See Chapter 2.3 and Part A of Chapters 4-10 for the primary obligations.
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is an area of law which some claim has shifted, or may be in particular flux,
influenced in part by state practice since 2001. What is clear is that if issues
of responsibility in international law were once perhaps considered principally
of academic interest, they have assumed greater prominence in legal and
political discourse, the practice of states and the jurisprudence of courts and
adjudicatory bodies in this field in recent years.11 State responsibility for acts
of terrorism or counter-terrorism carries a range of implications, both legal
and political.12 Understanding this area of law is critical to assessing the
responsibility of the multiplicity of state and non-state actors currently engaged
in or associated with international terrorism or the ‘war on terror’, and to
ensuring accountability, reparation and effective prevention in the long-term.
Part 1 of this chapter assesses the responsibility of states for international
terrorism in the light of the rules on international responsibility. It considers
the basis on which acts of international terrorism, perpetrated by private
individuals or organisations, may be attributed to a state such that the state
incurs legal responsibility for those acts, and the consequences of such respons-
ibility. Part 2 considers the extent to which so-called ‘non-state actors’ – private
individuals, organisations or entities, such as al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups
or entities – may themselves incur ‘responsibility’ under international law.
The relevance of the law of ‘state responsibility’ to assessing the unfolding
responses to international terrorism is then addressed at Part 3. In recent years,
the multi-actored, transnational complexity of the ‘war on terror’ has sharpened
focus on the significance of understanding the nature of a state’s responsibility
where it acts through or in cooperation with other states, or where violations
arise at the hand of private contractors, addressed at sections 3.1 and 3.2
respectively.13 The ‘war on terror’ has also raised questions concerning the
right, or in exceptional circumstances the obligation of other states to take
measures to end serious international wrongs addressed at section 3.3.14
11 See, e.g., rendition in Chapter 10, and judicial practice in Chapters 4, 7 and 11.
12 For a fuller discussion of the implications of determining whether a state is responsible
for terrorism as such, rather than the ‘separate delict’ of failing to meet other obligations
in respect of terrorism, see T. Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State
Responsibility (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 156 et seq.
13 See, e.g., Chapter 10 on the responsibility of multiple states for the extraordinary rendition
programme.
14 The obligations owed to the international community as a whole, and the obligation to
cooperate in order to end serious breaches of jus cogens norms are discussed below.
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3.1 STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.1.1 State Responsibility for Terrorism: Legal Standards of Attribution?
As a starting point, a state on whose territory crimes are orchestrated is not
automatically responsible for them.15 As the ICJ noted in 1949 in the Corfu
Channel case, it is impossible to conclude ‘from the mere fact of the control
exercised by a state over its territory and waters that that State necessarily
knew or ought to have known of any unlawful act perpetrated therein nor
that it should have known the authors’.16 It would be anomalous to suggest
a strict liability test in the context of international terrorism, potentially im-
plicating the responsibility of the US, Germany or others in respect of those
who trained and organised the 9/11 attacks from their territories.17
Instead, as noted above, the international responsibility of a state arises
where a breach of an internationally wrongful act is ‘attributable’ to it under
international law.18 As regards acts committed by individuals or groups not
formally linked to the state, the question of the standard for attribution of
conduct to the state, and whether it has been met on the facts, is critical.19
This question of attribution, whereby the state becomes responsible for the
acts themselves, must be distinguished from the question whether the state
has breached any obligations in respect of the prevention of or response to
international terrorism.20,21
The question of state responsibility is relatively straightforward where
conduct occurs at the hand of state officials or organs of the state.22 States
are directly responsible for the conduct of organs of the state, which amounts
to an ‘act of state’23 even if the official exceeded or acted outside his or her
authority.24 Likewise, where individuals or entities exercise elements of
‘governmental authority,’ in accordance with national law, these are also
deemed acts of state for which the state has responsibility, even where the
15 See 1.1.3. See also Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), pp. 502-03.
16 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4.
17 Likewise, simple knowledge of suspected terrorist activities could potentially implicate
many states, and would clearly not itself be enough.
18 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 2.
19 If the events of September 11 could be attributable to the state, this second prong of the
test would clearly be satisfied as violence against another state would violate the rules on
the use of force, set out at Chapter 5.
20 For obligations of ‘due diligence’ to prevent, see below and Chapters 2 and 7. See, e.g.,
Becker, supra note 12, suggesting that this distinction is valid but not rigid.
21 Controversies are explored further below.
22 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 4, p. 94 et seq.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. at Article 7 and Commentaries, p. 106 et seq.
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actors go beyond the scope of their authority.25 Although these rules will
rarely be relevant to terrorist organisations, it is at least remotely conceivable
that in a ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state, where state authorities are absent, an
organisation could assume elements of governmental responsibility, rendering
the acts of the organisation (carried out pursuant to this exercise of govern-
mental authority) to acts of state.26 Generally speaking, however, the relevant
and controversial question is the standard for attribution where those directly
responsible for conduct are private individuals or groups with no formal or
legal relationship with the state.
States are responsible for private actors’ conduct which they directed or
over which they exercised effective control.27 Controversy and uncertainty
arises (heightened in recent years) as to the meaning of such ‘effective control,’
and whether lesser forms of involvement, such as supporting, ‘harbouring’,
encouraging or even passively acquiescing in wrongs, or some other causal
relationship short of ‘control’ is sufficient to render acts of terrorism attribut-
able to the state. Controversy as to the applicable legal standards is coupled
with challenges in evidentiary terms as ‘a transparent relationship between
terrorist actors and the state is predictably uncommon’.28
3.1.1.1 Effective or overall control?
International jurisprudence and the work of the International Law Commission
support the view that the acts of private individuals may be attributed to a
state which exercises sufficient control over the conduct in question. According
to the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, the test is whether
the state or states in question exercised ‘effective control’.29 Although the
Court found the US to have helped finance, organise, equip, and train the
Nicaraguan Contras, this was not deemed sufficient to render the Contras’
activities attributable to the US. Such a level of support and assistance did not
‘warrant the conclusion that these forces [were] subject to the United States
to such an extent that any acts they have committed are imputable to that
25 Ibid. at Article 5, p. 100 et seq. See more complex discussion on the application of this rule
to private contractors in Part 3 below.
26 Ibid. at Article 9, on “Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities”
and Commentaries, p. 100 et seq. On the law governing failing states, see, e.g., Advisory
Council on International Affairs, Failing States: A Global Responsibility, Advisory Report No.
35, May 2004, p. 59 (hereinafter Dutch AIV Report 2004) and Chapter 5.
27 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 15 at p. 501; ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article
8.
28 See S. Schiedeman, ‘Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism’, 50 (2000)
Syracuse Law Rev. 249.
29 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua case’), paras. 86-93.
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State’.30 Despite years of outspoken criticism of this decision, generated by
those who consider it to impose too rigorous a threshold for establishing
responsibility,31 the Nicaragua ‘effective control’ test was approved by the
ICJ in the 2007 Genocide case, and remains the authoritative legal standard. It
demonstrates that attribution must then be established vis-à-vis particular
conduct (rather than over the group’s actions more generally),32 and that the
threshold for attribution is high.33
The ILC’s Articles in turn confirm the high threshold for attributing acts
of private individuals to the state, providing that such acts may be attributed
to the state if the person is acting on ‘instructions’ of the state, or under the
state’s ‘direction or control’.34 This standard has been described by the ICJ
as ‘substantially coinciding’ with the effective control test endorsed by the
Court.35
The jurisprudence of the ICTY has developed in a slightly different
direction.36 Reflecting Nicaragua, the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case noted
that the relationship between the groups and the state must be more than one
of ‘great dependency’, amounting instead to ‘a relationship of control’.37 The
Appeals Chamber, while endorsing this, found that different tests applied in
respect of private individuals who are not militarily organised and paramilitary
or similar groups.38 In respect of the latter the test was whether the state
30 Ibid. The United States was found liable for specific activities, which were the result of direct
action on the part of its military or foreign nationals in its pay.
31 See dissenting judgments (of Judges Jennings and Schwebel) in Nicaragua, opining that
‘substantial involvement’ in the form of financial or military assistance could suffice, and
discussion in G.M. Travalio, ‘Terrorism, International Law and the Use of Military Force’,
18 (2000) Wisc. Int’l. L. J. 145 at 265; see also C. Stahn, ‘Nicaragua is dead, long live Nica-
ragua’, in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty
(C. Walter, S. Vöneky, V. Röben, F. Schorkopf eds., 2004), 827-77.
32 See ILC’s Commentary to Article 8(3), supra note 4, confirming that state responsibility under
the ILC’s Articles was considered to arise in relation to particular conduct.
33 See Nicaragua case, supra note 29, paras. 86-93. Nicaragua demonstrated also the evidentiary
difficulty of proving state responsibility for acts of non-state actors.
34 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 8 and Commentary.
35 ICJ Genocide case. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (hereinafter ‘ICJ Genocide case’),
2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26).
36 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999
(hereinafter ‘Tadić Appeal Judgment’). The question was whether the acts of the VRS
(Bosnian Serb forces) could be imputed to the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), such that an international conflict had arisen between
that state and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Note that the question arose for the purpose of determin-
ing individual responsibility for IHL violations, whereas Nicaragua addressed state respons-
ibility directly.
37 Ibid.
38 Acts of individuals to be attributed to the state generally requires ‘specific instructions’,
or they may be ‘publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at issue’. See ibid.
at para. 137.
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exercised ‘overall control’ over the activities of the group, rather than effective
control of particular conduct. The Tribunal reflected the Nicaragua judgment
by emphasising that the ‘mere provision of financial assistance or military
equipment or training’ was insufficient, requiring instead that the state have
‘a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions’.39 More-
over, the ICTY noted that where the ‘controlling State’ is not the state where
the armed clashes occur, ‘more extensive and compelling evidence is required
to show that the state is genuinely in control of the units or groups, not merely
by financing and equipping them, but also by generally directing or helping
plan their actions’.40
The ICTY thus suggested a more ‘flexible’ standard for attribution, based
on the ongoing relationship with the armed groups rather than control over
particular conduct, that has been favoured by some as a more realistic vehicle
for holding states accountable for violations by private actors through state
support.41 However, despite sometimes persuasive arguments as to the merits
of this standard or why it may lead in some circumstances to preferred results,
as a statement of the current law on state responsibility in international law,
it is doubtful.42 The ILC Commentaries suggest that while the ICTY standard
may be relevant in the context of international criminal law, and to determining
the threshold of international armed conflict for IHL purposes, the ‘effective
control’ of conduct test remains the relevant one for state responsibility.43
This is supported by the reassertion by the ICJ of the effective control test in
the Genocide case, as noted above.
3.1.1.2 Ex post facto assumption of responsibility
Where the state does not exercise the necessary control at the time of the
conduct in question, it may nonetheless assume responsibility for the wrong
ex post facto, where it subsequently ‘acknowledges or accepts’ the conduct as
its own.
In the Tehran Hostages case, the ICJ held that while the ‘direct’ responsibility
of Iran for the original takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 was not
40 Ibid. at para. 138.
41 See, e.g., 3.3.2 Privatising Counter-terrorism and Responsibility where the overall control
test would also fit more readily with the sort of ongoing relationship between the state
and the groups with whom it contracts.
42 See also ICJ Genocide case, supra note 35.
43 See ILC Commentaries in ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
its Fifty-Third Session’, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p. 111. This is the standard espoused
by the ICJ and the ILC Articles.
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proved,44 subsequent statements in the face of incidents involving hostage
taking by students created liability on the part of the state.45 To the extent
that the judgment indicates that the Iranian State was considered capable of
putting a stop to an ongoing situation and instead chose to endorse and to
‘perpetuate’ it, the Court’s finding against Iran is consistent with the applica-
tion of the ‘effective control’ test. But the judgment also makes clear that even
if such a test were not met, the state may become responsible through its
subsequent ‘approval’ or ‘endorsement’ of wrongful acts. This approach has
been followed by the ICTY46 and, as noted above, the ILC’s Articles.47
One commentator has sought to rely on this test as a basis for finding
Afghanistan responsible for 9/11, in light of the Taleban ‘blatantly and
adamantly refusing to take any action against al Qaeda and Bin Laden, and
in offering them sanctuary’, by virtue of which it was suggested that the
government ‘espoused the armed attack against the US’.48 There is little auth-
ority, however, for treating refusal to react itself as sufficient for the purposes
of ex post facto assumption of responsibility.49 Rather, what is required goes
beyond mere approval of the conduct of others, to a degree of endorsement
whereby the state can be said to have identified the conduct ‘as its own’.50
3.1.1.3 A grey area? ‘Harbouring’, ‘supporting’ or ‘causing’ terrorism (and the case
of Afghanistan) post-9/11
States are not then strictly responsible for international wrongs emanating from
their territory, but they are responsible for acts of individuals or groups over
whom they exercise ‘effective control’, or where they subsequently endorse
the conduct as their own. Before September 11, it had been suggested that there
was also a difficult ‘grey area’,51 wherein ‘the issue becomes more difficult
44 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States v. Iran), ICJ Reports
1980, p. 3 (hereinafter ‘Teheran Hostages’ case). During the first phase of the occupation of
the American Embassy, the international responsibility of Iran arose from a breach of the
different primary obligations of due diligence. See ibid. at pp. 31-33, paras. 63-68 and below
chapter 3 1.2.
45 Ibid., p. 35, para. 74.
46 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, para. 137.
47 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 11.
48 Dinstein, ‘Comments on the Presentation by Nico Krisch and Carsten Stahn’, in Becker,
supra note 12, p. 225.
49 It would however breach other obligations required in response to serious criminal acts.
See para. 3.2 below.
50 ‘[A]s a general matter, conduct will not be attributable to a State under Article 11 where
a State merely acknowledges or expresses its verbal approval of it’. ILC’s Commentary
to Article 11, supra note 4.
51 See A. Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 38 (1989)
ICLQ 589 at 599. Cassese sets out six levels of involvement that a state may have in terrorist
activity. The three grey areas in the middle involve the supply of financial aid or weapons,
logistical or other support and acquiescence, respectively.
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when a state, which has the ability to control terrorist activity, nonetheless
tolerates, and even encourages it’.52 Since September 11, this grey area has
become both increasingly significant and increasingly murky.
In part, this reflects perceptions concerning the shifting nature of terrorist
organisations’ capacities, and in particular the evolution in their inter-relation-
ship with states. Changing realities whereby organisations may be as powerful
as states, influenced by the growing number of failed and failing states, fre-
quently challenge traditional assumptions regarding this relationship. The
controversy is also fed however by state practice post-9/11, and specifically
the Afghanistan intervention and the nature of the international reaction to
it.
Immediately following the events of September 11, then US President Bush
asserted that in the search for those ‘responsible’, no distinction would be made
‘between the terrorists ... and those who harbor them’.53 The harbouring and
support language has reappeared elsewhere, including in international state-
ments and national laws.54 The case against Afghanistan, so far as made out
by the US, amounted to the September 11 attacks having been ‘made possible
by the decision of the Taleban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that
it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation’.55 Alternative
formulations as to the link between the Taleban and al-Qaeda at the time
included allegations that the Taleban ‘protected’ the al-Qaeda network,56 while
52 Travalio, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 31 at p. 154.
53 ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them.’ ‘Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation’, 11 September
2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/09/20010911-16.html
last visited 12 November 2012.
54 See, e.g., SC Res. 1368, UN Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001); Council of the European Union state-
ments of 14 Sept 2001 and 21 September: ‘Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordin-
ary European Council Meeting, 21 September 2001, sec. 1, para. 1, circulated as UN Doc.
A/56/407-S/2001/909; Report of EU-US Ministerial meeting 20 September 2001. For an
example of this language as a basis to criminalise conduct under domestic law in response
to SC Res. 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), see Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Act 2001, Section 83.23, entered into force on 24 December 2001, creating the
crime of ‘harbouring or concealing’ persons known or likely to carry out terrorist activity.
I. Cotler, ‘Does the Anti-Terror Bill go too far? No: We need powerful new legal tools to
fight the new global terror threat’, Globe and Mail, 20 November 2001. See also, M. Lehto,
Indirect Responsibility for Terrorism Acts: Redefinition of the Concept of Terrorism Beyond Violent
Acts (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), p. 393 et seq.
55 ‘Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 7 October
2001, UN Doc. S/2001/946. See further below and Chapter 5B.1.1.1 on the failure to make
out a case of legal responsibility of Afghanistan for 9/11.
56 ‘We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the worldwide
terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants and
protected by the Taleban.’ Statement by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, 2 October
2001, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm last visited on
5 May 2013 (emphasis added).
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broader statements have been made as to the need for accountability of those
nations ‘compromised by terror,’57 or ‘allies of terror.’58
On 7 October 2001, the US and its allies launched military operations against
Afghanistan in response to the events of 9/11, triggering questions on the
compatibility with, or impact on, the law of state responsibility. The first
question is whether the legal standard was met for attributing the conduct
of private ‘terrorist’ organisations to the state in relation to Afghanistan and
the 9/11 attacks. Did the relationship between the Taleban and al-Qaeda
surpass association or inter-dependency and reach the requisite control by
the former over the conduct of the latter?59
Whether the Taleban exercised effective control over the conduct of al-
Qaeda (or indeed – if one were to accept the ICTY test – overall control of the
entity itself), to be responsible for the attacks was the subject of doubtful
speculation at the time.60 Information emerging in the years following 9/11
– including from an official commission conducted in the United States – casts
far greater doubt on the proposition.61 There is evidence of a close and
mutually beneficial association between the two, with al Qaeda providing
troops, weapons and resources to the Taleban (not vice versa) and the Taleban
providing ‘sanctuary’ in return.62 Notably, states involved in the military
operations, while making numerous allegations of support for terrorists, did
57 ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’ (hereinafter ‘US National Security Strategy’),
September 2002, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
58 The ‘allies of terror are equally guilty of murder and equally accountable to justice’, Press
Release, ‘President Bush Speaks to UN’, 10 November 2001, cited in D. Jinks, ‘State Respons-
ibility for Acts of Private Armed Groups’, 4 (2003) Chicago Journal of Int’l Law 83, 85.
59 The test is effective control over specific conduct, or overall control over activities of the
group, if it is militarily organised. See Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36.
60 Many commentators denied the legal responsibility of Afghanistan for the September 11
attacks. See, e.g., Jinks, ‘State Responsibility’, supra note 58, p. 83, 93-99; and M. Sassòli,
‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, 84 (2002) IRRC
01. Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), p. 261 suggests: ‘The original outrage of 9/11 could not be imputed to Afghanistan
ex post facto. But, even though the Taliban were not accomplices to the 9/11 events before
and during the act, they became accessories after-the-fact. By brazenly refusing to take any
measures against Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden – and continuing to offer them shelter within
its territory – Afghanistan endorsed the armed attack against the United States.’ On ex post
facto assumption of responsibility, see section 3.1.1.
61 The findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
released on 22 July 2004 (the ‘9/11 Commission Report’), cast renewed doubt on the degree
of control exercised by the Taleban over al-Qaeda, including the opposition of senior
government officials to 9/11. Less surprisingly, the report rejects any suggestion of a link
between the September 11 attacks and Iraq. See ‘Qaeda had targeted Congress and CIA,
panel finds’, International Herald Tribune, 17 June 2004. The reports of the Commission are
available at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. See also Becker, supra
note 12 at p. 217.
62 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 61, p. 66. See also Chapter 6 on the evolving nature
of ‘al Qaeda and associates’.
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not seek to make the case as to the exercise of effective or overall control by
the Taleban.63 Legal responsibility of Afghanistan was not asserted in terms
by the states driving the Afghan prong of the ‘war on terror’, and was therefore
not subject to the full debate and analysis that one might expect, given the
severity of impending consequences for Afghanistan. It would certainly have
been a difficult case to make on the facts and in accordance with all applicable
legal standards.64
The second question that follows is whether, as some have suggested, the
standard for the attribution of acts of private actors to states has changed as
a result of the Afghan intervention and the overwhelming state support for
the Afghan intervention, despite the effective control test not having been
met.65 For some, this suggests that ‘harboring and supporting’ terrorist groups
may now be sufficient for state responsibility, reflecting the language of the
Bush Administration and official documents prior to the intervention.66
Another approach suggests that the response demonstrates an appetite for
a new ‘causation based’ approach by which conduct is attributed to a state
if the state fails in its legal obligations (e.g., due diligence to prevent67) and
this ‘causes’ a terrorist act.68
The view that the Afghanistan intervention reveals a shift in state practice
or opinion appears to be based on the assumption that the decision to attack
Afghanistan was premised on the attribution of al-Qaeda’s actions to Afghan-
istan (according to a lower threshold than accepted previously).69 However,
this is unclear for various reasons. First, it is unclear to what extent the allega-
tions levelled against the Taleban of harbouring and supporting terrorists were
63 See letters from the permanent Representative of the United States, S/2001/946, supra note
55, and the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/947, available
at:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/567/91/PDF/N0156791.pdf.
See C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the “War against Terrorism”’, 78 (2002) Int’l
Affairs 301 at 311-12, noting that while the letters from the US and the UK to the Security
Council accused Afghanistan of harbouring the terrorists, ‘they stopped short of alleging
that Afghanistan was, as a matter of international law, responsible for the attacks them-
selves’. See also discussion in Chapter 5, para. 5B.1.1.3.
64 According to Tal Becker, there is ‘simply no evidence’ of a relationship of control by the
Taleban over al Qaeda. See Becker, supra note 12 at p. 217.
65 The extent of international support for the intervention is discussed in Chapter 5B.1. Becker,
supra note 12, considers the state response to the Afghan intervention as evidence that states
did not accept the classic agency test for attribution set out above. This is been questioned;
see below and Lehto, supra note 54, Chapter 9.
66 See, e.g., Jinks, ‘State Responsibility’, supra note 58 at p. 91. This language is not endorsed
by a wide number of commentators despite its use by the allied forces to justify intervening
in Afghanistan.
67 See the following section for more details.
68 Becker’s theory seeks to hold the state responsible for harm it causes through wrongful
activity (such as failing in its due diligence obligations) even where it does not ‘control’
acts of powerful networks such as al Qaeda.
69 Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility’, supra note 60, p. 409; Jinks, ‘State Responsibility’, supra note
58, pp. 85-88.
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legal (as opposed to political) claims at all.70 To the extent that they were,
it is unclear whether the claim is that 9/11 was attributable to the state, or
rather that providing support for terrorists in itself constitutes another inter-
nationally wrongful act. It may well be, in addition, that such attribution was
not considered a prerequisite to the lawfulness of the use of force in self-
defence (or indeed that in certain quarters lawfulness was not considered an
essential prerequisite for military action to proceed), rather than that the
standards of attribution were considered to have been met.71 Growing recogni-
tion of the possibility of lawful self-defence absent state responsibility (dis-
cussed in Chapter 5) is consistent with the possibility that, to the extent that
practice reveals a shift in the law, the shift relates to the primary rules on the
use of force rather than to the secondary rules on state responsibility.
The failure of states to articulate their approach to state responsibility
makes it difficult to identify whether they were acting out of an assessment
that the Taleban was legally responsible and, if so, what the parameters might
be for any accepted new standard.72
There may however be growing concern about the appropriateness of the
‘effective control’ standard, which, compounded by evidentiary obstacles, has
been described as making attribution in terrorist cases only a ‘theoretical
possibility.’73 However, despite disquiet and a myriad of apparent ‘standards’
being referred to or proposed by commentators, states and international
institutions, it is doubtful whether any other standard lays reasonable claim
to reflect the law as it currently stands.74 While likely to stimulate further
debate on the need for legal development in the future, and the law may well
shift over time, it is highly doubtful whether a new standard for attribution
has emerged and acquired sufficient support to displace the established rules
on attribution in international law. Despite the post-9/11 muddying of legal
waters, it appears likely that the high threshold of requiring that the state
‘directs’ or exercises ‘effective control’ over the conduct in question, and ‘the
traditional view ... that state toleration or encouragement is an insufficient
state connection’ for attribution of responsibility, remain valid statements of
the law.75
70 See, e.g., statements regarding the accountability of the ‘allies of terror’ and ‘nations compro-
mised by terror’ above.
71 See Chapter 5, para. 5B.2.1.1.
72 See statements to the Security Council by the US and UK, supra note 63.
73 Becker, supra note 12 at p. 7. As noted above, factual assumptions of a model in which
a powerful state controlling a dependent non-state actor rather than an equal or inverted
power relationship are now being questioned.
74 Becker’s approach may constitute a proposal as to how the law might develop rather than
an assessment of where it stands currently. As regards harbouring, it remains doubtful
that there is sufficient clarity around the term to provide the quality and certainty required
of law at this stage.
75 R.J. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-sponsored International Terrorism
(Maxwell Air Force Base, 1989), cited in Travalio, supra note 31, at fn. 12.
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In conclusion, while formulae vary slightly, it remains the case that state
responsibility for terrorism ultimately depends on ‘effective control’ of conduct.
The evaluations of whether the test of responsibility of any state for al Qaeda
affiliates at any point in time,76 or for the many other ‘allies’ and ‘associates’
of al Qaeda worldwide against whom the US claims to be in armed conflict,77
have to be made against this test. It is a question of degree (and an issue of
fact to be established by those alleging responsibility) ‘whether the individuals
concerned were sufficiently closely associated with the state for their acts to
be regarded as acts of the state rather than as acts of private individuals’.78
The various standards advocated before and especially after 9/11 make a
useful contribution to the debate as to lex ferenda, but have not reached the
point where one could confidently identify a change in international legal
standards. The debate does however remind us that existing rules need to be
interpreted with sufficient flexibility, and mindful of realities, to be capable
of practical application.
3.1.2 Responsibility for failure to prevent and protect against terrorism
It should be emphasised that the fact that the acts of al-Qaeda may not have
been attributable to Afghanistan (and the Taleban as de facto government
thereof) does not, however, mean that the latter did not breach international
obligations and incur international responsibility in respect of its relationship
with the al-Qaeda network.
States have obligations to take a range of measures in respect of terrorism,
which existed before 9/11 but have been supplemented and strengthened since.
At the very heart of the international legal order is the long-standing obligation
that a state must not allow its territory to be used to commit harmful acts
against other states, which plainly includes the obligation not to allow inter-
national terrorist groups to operate out of its territory.79 With respect to inter-
national terrorism specifically, numerous conventions on particular forms of
terrorism enshrine various specific duties directed at ensuring that states
76 See Chapter 6 B11 on the changing form and capabilities of al Qaeda since 9/11, with the
‘franchise’ model and role of random individuals making state responsibility more challeng-
ing.
77 See, e.g., the 2010 US National Security Strategy: ‘Al Qa’ida’s core in Pakistan remains the
most dangerous component of the larger network, but we also face a growing threat from
the group’s allies worldwide.’ Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
78 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 15, p. 550.
79 See ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’, GA Res.
2625 (XXV), adopted by consensus on 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/Res/25/2625, Prin-
ciple 1, para. 9; see also Chapter 2.2.2; Corfu Channel Case, supra note 16; SS Lotus (France
v. Turkey), 127 PCIJ, (ser A) no. 10.
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abstain from and take measures to prevent acts of terrorism emanating from
the state’s territory, as reflected in several Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions before 2001. After 9/11, these obligations were reiterated
and expanded by the Security Council obliging all states, inter alia, to ‘refrain
from providing support, active or passive’, ‘deny safe haven’ to persons
involved in terrorism,80 ‘freeze without delay terrorist assets’, criminalise
terrorism and cooperate fully with other states in criminal matters, while
stressing that ‘those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the
perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable’.81
Additional resolutions reflect specific obligations such as not providing arms
or resources to al Qaeda.82 Reflecting existing legal obligations, these resolu-
tions have been described as ‘redefining and enlarging the requirements of
due diligence to suppress and punish terrorism’.83
If it can be established that a state has ‘harboured or supported’ terrorist
groups, this may well represent a breach of a range of the obligations of the
state. A critical distinction exists, however, between a state being responsible
for failing to meet its obligations vis-à-vis terrorism on its territory, and the
acts of terrorists being ‘attributable’ or ‘imputable’ to the state, such that the
state itself becomes responsible for the terrorists’ wrongs.84 Not only is the
latter a very different international wrong, it may have very different conse-
quences in legal and political terms.85
As noted above, to establish state responsibility for acts of terrorism the
critical issue is often not whether a wrong has occurred but whether the test
for attribution has been satisfied. By contrast, for breach of certain other
obligations incumbent on a state relating to terrorism (for instance the obliga-
tion not to allow terrorists to operate from a state’s territory or to freeze funds
of terrorist organisations), the problem may rather be one of proving that a
breach has occurred.
In part, this is because these obligations do not give rise to strict liability
but rather tend to embody a ‘due diligence’ test requiring reasonable measures
80 See SC Res. 1373, supra note 54 at para. 2 and Chapter 2. See also SC Res. 1624 (2005), UN.
Doc. S/Res/1624, which also focuses on preventative measures.
81 SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). The harbouring and
support language goes further than earlier UN language (see GA Res. 2625, supra note 79).
See SC Res. 1566 (2004), UN Doc. A/Res/1566 on the definition of terrorism, and the
emphasis on the obligations in respect of cooperation.
82 SC Res. 2083 (2012). On the unlawfulness of supplying arms to armed groups, see ‘A Shared
Responsibility Trap: Supplying Weapons to the Syrian Opposition’, André Nollkaemper,
EJIL Chat 17 June 2013.
83 Lehto, supra note 54, p. 383
84 Similarly, in Nicaragua for example, whilst the ICJ determined that the acts of Contras were
not attributable to the United States this did not ‘suffice to resolve the entire question of
the responsibility incurred by the United States through its assistance to the contras’.
Nicaragua case, supra note 29, paras. 110 and 115.
85 See para. 3.1.3 below.
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of prevention.86 If, for instance, the state did not know, and took the reason-
able steps to ascertain whether terrorists were operating out of its territory,
or whether an apparently innocent bank account held in its territory was in
fact being used for money laundering by a terrorist group, there may be no
breach of its obligations. Our understanding of the ‘due diligence’ obligation
on states to prevent acts of international terrorism can be informed by various
other areas of international law, notably the human rights field, where the
notion of the state’s positive obligations to exercise due diligence to prevent
violations by private actors (in contexts ranging from public riots to domestic
violence) is well-established and reflected in abundant jurisprudence.87
As noted in Chapter 2, a series of resolutions adopted by the Security
Council after 9/11 have contributed to clarifying the content of the obligations
to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorism; these supplement the
extensive provisions of treaties dedicated to particular forms of terrorism.88
The lack of clarity as to the nature and limits of ‘terrorism’ to which these
obligations are directed has been discussed in that chapter. Confusion regard-
ing the definition is compounded by the lack of clarity surrounding standards
of attribution, and the meaning and relevance of terms such as ‘harbouring
and supporting’ terrorism. Such ambiguity runs the risk of creating increased
vulnerability for states, while seriously undermining the force of any such
obligations. The suggestion that there is no legal difference between respons-
ibility for acts of terrorism and for failure to meet all obligations in respect
of preventing and combatting terrorism, may further contribute to uncertainty
around the nature, and the implications, of state responsibility for international
wrongs in this field.
3.1.3 Consequences of international responsibility for terrorism or breach
of obligations relating to the prevention of terrorism
Legal consequences flow from state responsibility for an internationally wrong-
ful act.89 The extent to which practical consequences also ensue depends, at
least in considerable degree, on the question of enforcement, the Achilles heel
of the international legal system. A state that is responsible for an international-
86 Under a ‘due diligence’ standard, it is the act or omission on the part of the state, not the
injurious act by the private actor, which constitutes the internationally wrongful act for
which the state may be responsible.
87 See Chapter 7, Parts A.2 and A.4. Although some caution is due as the standards and
contexts are not identical, e.g., international terrorism takes effect abroad, and different
questions of fact and proof, and different expectations as to the state’s knowledge of this
activity, may arise.
88 For a discussion of the regional and global conventions dealing with international terrorism,
see Chapter 2, para. 2.1 above.
89 See generally, Part II, ILC Articles, supra note 4.
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ly wrongful act is obliged to cease the act (if it is ongoing), offer assurances
of non-repetition and make full reparation for material or moral injury
suffered.90 If the state denies cessation of the wrongful act or refuses to com-
ply with its secondary obligation to make full reparation, the injured state for
its part may take ‘countermeasures’ against the responsible state to induce
it to comply with these obligations.91
In practice, the breach of an international obligation by a state may trigger
various responses. States will often resort to diplomacy to persuade states to
desist from or cease internationally wrongful conducts. In addition, they may
take lawful but ‘unfriendly’ acts, which may include, for example the breaking
of diplomatic relations, limitations on trade with the wrongdoing state or the
withdrawal of voluntary aid programmes. Resort to the International Court
of Justice92 or to the organs of the United Nations to determine breaches or
enforce obligations,93 is another means to seek to induce the responsible state
to comply with the obligations arising from the breach.
Such measures, which are clearly permissible, are distinct from counter-
measures, however, which are measures that would normally be unlawful,
but for the fact that they are taken in response to an internationally wrongful
act.94 Countermeasures may consist, for example, in the suspension of the
performance of trade agreements in force between the injured state and the
offending state,95 in the suspension of air services agreements or in the freez-
ing of the assets of the offending state or its nationals by the injured state.
Countermeasures are however subject to limits: they must, as far as
possible, be reversible, they can only target the responsible state,96 they must
not be disproportionate to the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act,97 and they cannot involve the violation of fundamental human rights,
humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law.98 Given these
limits, the lawfulness of certain countermeasures commonly resorted to by
90 Ibid. at Articles 30 and 31.
91 Ibid. at Article 49.
92 See generally, C. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
93 In practice, the General Assembly or Security Council may determine a breach, although
the Council has a unique role in determining the existence of acts of aggression under the
Charter, and is uniquely empowered to authorise the use of force in response to a threat
to international peace and security; see Chapter 5.2.2.
94 See ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Introductory Commentary to Part Three, Chapter II, para.
1.
95 See, e.g., the collective measures adopted in 1982 by EC states, New Zealand, Australia and
Canada against Argentina during the Falklands war. Those measures consisted, inter alia,
of a temporary prohibition on all imports of Argentine goods (a course of conduct prohibited
under Article XII(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
96 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 49, paras. 2 and 3.
97 Ibid. at Article 51.
98 Ibid. at Article 50.
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states, such as economic sanctions, is controversial.99 While some would argue
that economic sanctions constitute lawful countermeasures, others would
question their compatibility with ‘obligations for the protection of fundamental
human rights’.100
Notably, the use of force is not a permissible countermeasure.101 The ILC’s
Articles do not, however, affect the right of every state to act in self-defence,
nor to take measures authorised pursuant to a Security Council resolution
under Chapter VII of the Charter.102 Questions that are often raised in this
context, relating to whether self-defence requires state responsibility for an
‘armed attack,’ are not questions related to the rules of state responsibility
themselves but to the law on the use of force. Lawfulness of the use of force
in self-defence will therefore depend principally on the primary rules on the
use of force discussed in the next chapter.
In general, it is the state which is directly injured by an internationally
wrongful act that may invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state,
although it is important to note that in certain circumstances other states may,
or must, respond to the wrongful act. This arises in cases where ‘the obligation
breached is owed to a group of States ... and is established for the protection
of a collective interest of the group’ or where ‘the obligation breached is owed
to the international community as a whole’.103 At a minimum, non-directly
injured states can ask for cessation of the wrongful conduct, for assurances
of non-repetition and for performance of the obligation of reparation (in the
99 Ibid. at Article 50(1)(a). However, sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be,
and often have been, imposed by the Security Council – such as those imposed on Iraq,
Libya and Sudan for refusing to cooperate or to extradite suspected terrorists. See D.
Cortright and G.A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); M. Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter
Sanctions’, 13 (2002) EJIL 43; M.E. O’Connell, ‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’, 13 (2002)
EJIL 63; K. Bennoune, ‘“Sovereignty vs. Suffering?” Re-Examining Sovereignty and Human
Rights through the Lens of Iraq’, 13 (2002) EJIL 243; J. Murphy, ‘International Law and
the War on Terrorism: the Road Ahead’, 32 (2002) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 117.
100 Sanctions should, at a minimum, be conceived and enforced so as to ‘take full account of
the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’,
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, 5 December
1997, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8, para. 1. See also ILC’s Commentary to Article 50, supra note
4 at para. 7.
101 The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility specify that countermeasures shall not affect the
‘obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations’. ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 50, para. 1(a).
102 Ibid. Article 59 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility recognises that the law of the
UN Charter constitutes a lex specialis as regards the general rules set out in the Articles.
Article 21 expressly states that ‘[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the
act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations’.
103 The powers of the ‘non-directly injured States’ are more limited than those of the states
directly injured by the breach.
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interest of the injured state or of the beneficiaries of the obligation
breached).104
Moreover, the ILC Articles make clear that if the internationally wrongful
act amounts to a gross or systematic breach of obligations under peremptory
norms – such as serious violations of human rights or of basic rules of IHL
or the unlawful use of force – states are not only entitled, but may be obliged,
not to recognise the situation of unlawfulness and to act together to end it.105
This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion concerning the
implications for other states of South Africa’s presence in Namibia notwith-
standing a Security Council resolution deciding that the situation was
illegal,106 and more recently in the The Wall advisory opinion concerning
the Israeli construction of the so-called ‘security fence’ that was found by the
Court to be unlawful.107 States’ obligations to respond in the face of a breach
by another state of ‘erga omnes’ obligations108 – such as respecting the right
to self-determination and certain core aspects of international humanitarian
law – was described in the following terms:
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the
Court is of the view that all states are under an obligation not to recognise the
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under
an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created
by such construction. It is also for all states, while respecting the United Nations
Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the
construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to
self-determination is brought to an end.109
This notion of collective responsibility to act in face of egregious violations,
which was described by the ILC in 2001 as representing the ‘progressive devel-
opment of the law’, has gained ground since then. This may be reflected, albeit
indirectly, in the political doctrine concerning ‘responsibility to protect’ from
104 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 48(2)(a) and (b).
105 Ibid. at Articles 40 and 41. The ILC’s Commentary to Article 41 recognises that Article 41(1)
‘may reflect the progressive development of international law’ (para. 3). The ILC Articles
also specify that states must not recognise or facilitate the situation that has given rise to
the wrong.
106 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971.
107 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 9 July 2004.
108 Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase) 1970 ICJ Rep 3, para. 33.
109 The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 107, para. 159.
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serious violations of their rights.110 Serious breaches may therefore in prin-
ciple incur serious consequences for states, from a range of states or from the
international community more broadly.
3.2 RESPONSIBILITY OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
This chapter has thus far focused on state responsibility for terrorism, but does
international law also recognise the responsibility of those individuals and
organisations believed to have been directly responsible for 9/11 or other acts
of terrorism? This raises the troublesome issue of the responsibility of ‘non-state
actors’ in international law.
International law is state-centric, with the traditional rule that it is made
by states for states. As a basic governing principle, while states are the subjects
of international law, ‘non-state actors’ are governed instead by national law.
In respect of ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorist organisations,’ the principal source of
applicable law is national law. International law for its part focuses on ensuring
that the state meets its obligation to provide a national legal system that
effectively prevents, represses and punishes acts of terrorism, within the
framework of the rule of law.111
The sharpness of this dichotomy between states and non-state actors has
been somewhat eroded through developments in international law. The follow-
ing text highlights ways in which international law currently provides for the
responsibility of non-state actors, including potentially those engaged in
international terrorism,112 and signals the prospect of future legal develop-
ment in this area.
110 The responsibility to protect is enshrined in several UN documents including, the Report
of the High Level UN Panel, UN Doc. A/59/565, available at: http://www.un.org/
secureworld/report.pdf. The Resolutions and statements adopted at the time of the Libyan
intervention in early 2011 were cited as providing significant weight behind this concept
(see SC Res.1973 (2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1973), yet this has not been apparent in the Syrian
context in 2012/13.
111 See Chapter 7A4. and on terrorism obligations specifically in e.g. Security Council resolutions
para. 3.1 above and Chapter 2.
112 This discussion is relevant to the responsibility of non-state actors engaged in counter-
terrorism also. See 3.2 below.
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3.2.1 The ‘individualisation’113 of International Law
The Nuremberg judgment famously reminded us that as crimes are committed
by human beings not by ‘abstract entities’,114 only by holding individuals
to account could crimes be prevented. Since Nuremberg, it has become well
established that non-state actors may be criminally responsible not only under
national but also under international law, as discussed at Chapter 4.
The responsibility of individuals for established crimes under international
law – such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – arises
irrespective of whether the perpetrator was a state official or a non-state actor.
This is true of all crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court for example,115 and is made explicit in the definition of crimes against
humanity, which must be committed pursuant to a ‘state or organisational
plan or policy’.116 By contrast, aggression requires state involvement, though
the individual accused may or may not be a state official.117 As discussed,
specific terrorism treaties generally cover only acts committed by non-state
actors.118 However, these treaties do not themselves impose responsibility
directly on individuals, but on states, and the ability to hold the individual
to account under them depends on incorporation into domestic law.119 It
remains highly doubtful that terrorism constitutes a crime under international
criminal law, as explored in Chapter 2, but it is beyond reasonable dispute
that certain serious terrorist attacks may constitute core crimes under inter-
national law, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.120
While criminal law usually focuses on the individual responsibility of
natural persons, Nuremberg also provides a precedent for holding legal
persons – such as corporations, political parties or government departments
– criminally liable. A similar proposal contemplated in the context of the ICC
Statute was rejected, albeit for practical reasons related to the functioning of
113 L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented Inter-
national Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),
at Ch. 1.
114 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals:
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22
(London, 1950), p. 447.
115 For example. genocide requires no link whatsoever to a state or organisation, and war crimes
must be committed in association with a non-international armed conflict between rebel
groups.
116 ICC, Finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 and Chapter
4A.1.1.3.
117 See Chapter 4A.1.1.3.
118 See Chapter 2, parts 2.1.3 and 2.1.5.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. Chapter 4A.1.1.3.
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that court, rather than on principled legal grounds.121 While it is conceivable
that a criminal process could be launched against legal persons such as political
parties or corporations involved in terrorism, this is unlikely to be true of loose
networks such as al-Qaeda which would presumably lack legal personality
in any legal system, national or international. Persons forming even loose
networks for a criminal purpose may, however, be individually criminally
responsible under forms of liability such as ‘conspiracy’, ‘acting in common
purpose’, or ‘joint criminal enterprise’.122
In the terrorism context specifically, targeted sanctions raise the question
of the role of the individual or organisation under international law. A growing
feature of counter-terrorism practice post-9/11 has been the imposition of
sanctions, by for example Security Council in Resolution 1267, with the effect
of freezing assets and imposing travel bans and other restrictions on indi-
viduals designated by the UN Sanctions Committee as linked to al-Qaeda (or
formerly the Taleban).123 Making individuals directly subject to international
legal regulation in this very direct way upsets traditional assumptions about
the subjects of international law, as well as about the relationship between
the state and the individual. The implications of, and challenges to, these
sanctions lists are discussed in later chapters,124 but their existence marks
a further step in the journey towards the individualisation of international
law.
3.2.2 International humanitarian law
International humanitarian law, perhaps more than any other area of inter-
national law, has long been familiar with applying legal rules to non-state
121 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, Working Group On Procedural
Matters, Consideration of Part 6 of the draft Statute (UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 and
Corr.1). K. Ambos, ‘Article 25. Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triffterer (ed.),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, 1999), p.
475 ff, at p. 478, suggests that the exclusion reflected concerns related to the Court’s parti-
cular focus and evidence, as well as operational aspects of ‘complementarity’, given that
corporate responsibility was not recognised in the criminal law of certain legal systems.
122 See Chapter 4, part 4A.1.2.1.
123 The sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and the Taleban was a pre-9/11 invention (SC Res.
1267 (1999)), and was modified and expanded post-9/11 by SC Res. 1390 (2002), 16 January
2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002), which creates an open-ended sanctions regime of a
potentially global nature. Resolution 1267 established a Security Council committee, known
as ‘the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’ (hereinafter, ‘the Committee’). Resolution
1267 has been modified and extended by numerous subsequent resolutions.
124 See 7B3 on the Council’s ‘judicial role’, 7B8 on the listing process and human rights and
Chapter 11 for the litigation that challenged it.
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entities.125 Since 1949, specific rules have been in place governing the conduct
of non-international armed conflicts, binding on both the state party to the
conflict and armed groups.126
As discussed in Chapter 6, IHL applies only where the ‘armed conflict’
threshold is met, as opposed to in ‘situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature’.127 Most acts commonly referred to as ‘terrorist’ are
precisely those that delegates sought to exclude from the definition of armed
conflict. Moreover, as discussed at Chapter 6, section B, it is highly doubtful
whether an entity such as al-Qaeda could constitute a party to a non-inter-
national armed conflict.128 If however the conduct of a non-state entity,
properly understood, is conduct carried out as a party to a non-international
armed conflict, that party will be bound by the body of IHL applicable to such
conflicts.129 Among the prohibitions of IHL, as noted in Chapter 6, is a specific
prohibition on spreading terror among the civilian population, although
numerous acts commonly referred to as terrorism will fall within other cat-
egories of IHL violation for which the armed group may be responsible as a
matter of international humanitarian law.
One of the weaknesses in the current system of IHL is however the lack
of effective mechanisms for enforcing responsibility.130 As regards the state,
human rights bodies provide one mechanism for reviewing IHL compliance,
albeit indirectly, and diplomatic channels may prove particularly effective.131
For the non-state party diplomatic avenues are less readily available or effective
and there is no meaningful mechanism for holding it to account as a party,
except so far as serious violations of IHL amount to war crimes and inter-
national criminal law provides such mechanisms in respect of the individuals
who comprise the group.
125 See ‘Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors’, 27 (Spring 2003)
Bruges Collegium, available at: http://www.coleurope.eu/content/publications/pdf/
Collegium27.pdf last visited 5 May 2013.
126 See Chapter 6.
127 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Convention, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, UN
Doc. 32/144 Annex 2 [hereinafter “AP II”] at Article 2.
128 On these requirements, which relate principally to the definition or identification, and level
of organisation, of the entity, see Chapter 6.
129 See Chapter 6, in particular part 6B.1.1.4. See also J.M. Henckaerts, ‘Binding Armed Oppo-
sition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law’, 27 (Spring 2003)
Bruges Collegium 123.
130 See Chapter 6 and Chapter 7B3
131 Chapter 7A.3.4 on interplay and 7B3 on interplay in practice post-9/11.
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3.2.3 International human rights law?
The development of human rights law in the aftermath of the Second World
War revolutionised international law by establishing the prime exception to
the rule that states are the subjects of international law. However, at least as
originally conceptualised, while individuals could possess rights, only states
bore obligations under human rights law. Several developments in human
rights law have sought to ensure that the general rule against non-state actor
responsibility under human rights law does not represent a legal void, whereby
rights can be violated with impunity.
Human rights bodies have adopted a progressive approach to the obliga-
tions of states to ‘respect and ensure’ the rights within the human rights
conventions, interpreting them as enshrining ‘due diligence’ obligations to
take measures to prevent violations and to provide redress for them – whether
committed by state entities or non-state actors.132 Therefore, the conduct of
non-state actors is regulated by human rights law indirectly, in that where
‘private persons [violate rights] freely and with impunity’133 the state itself
becomes responsible under human rights law.
Moreover, the lack of direct responsibility of non-state actors under inter-
national law is increasingly open to question, particularly as entities such as
transnational corporations, armed groups or indeed arguably terrorist
organisations, assume powers and exercise authority traditionally within the
exclusive sphere of state control, through which they do, in practice, violate
human rights.134 Arguably, support in principle for recognising the respons-
ibility of non-state actors in human rights law can be found even in early
human rights instruments. One commentator has noted for example that the
long established Universal Declaration of Human Rights, covers:
[e]very individual includ[ing] juridical persons. Every individual and every organ
of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal
Declaration applies to them all.135
Subsequent regional developments in Africa and the Americas, unlike the
traditional Western-European approach to human rights, reflect the notion
of individuals and entities as not only holders of rights but bearers of respons-
132 See e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, IACtHR, Series
C, No. 4, or the ‘due diligence’ test set down by the Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 31: [2004], UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6, para. 8. See Chapter 7A.4.2.
133 Velasquez Rodriguez, ibid. at para. 176.
134 They commit acts which, if carried out by the state, would amount to rights violations.
135 L. Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’, 25 (1999)
Brooklyn Journal of Int’l Law 25, 25.
92 Chapter 3
ibility.136 The intensified focus on the realisation of economic social and
cultural rights in recent years has contributed to the ‘softening’ of the position
that only states are subject to international law.137
A number of specific developments may suggest that there are circum-
stances in which a non-state actor may currently find itself directly responsible
under human rights law, and/or that further developments in this field are
to be expected. First, in exceptional circumstances, a non-state entity may
exercise the functions of a state, and may, arguably, thus be deemed respons-
ible as a state under international human rights law.138 If an entity such as
a political party, corporation, or for that matter an unlawful organisation,
assumes control over part of a territory of a state, it may be considered to have
assumed the obligations that correspond to this de facto exercise of authority
or control. As the Committee against Torture noted, factions [that] exercise
certain prerogatives that are normally exercised by legitimate governments
may be equated to state officials for the purposes of certain human rights
obligations.139
Second, there are important on-going developments towards a broader
recognition of direct responsibility of non-state actors that may herald further
innovations in this respect.140 Perhaps most advanced are developments
towards recognising the responsibility of transnational corporations, as
‘hav[ing] the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure
respect of and protect human rights recognised in international as well as
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other
136 For example, the preambles of the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
and of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Note that human rights
as a corollary of human duties does not equate with respect for rights being conditional
on observance of duties.
137 Report of the International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Beyond Voluntarism: Human
Rights and the Developing International Legal Obligations of Companies’, 2002, p. 64,
available at: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_report_en.pdf. These developments
are described as having ‘plac[ed] some level of responsibility on private entities such as
companies’.
138 This reflects the rules on state responsibility which recognise the exercise of elements of
governmental authority as acts of state. See part 3.1.1, above; ILC Articles, supra note 4 at
Article 5.
139 Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, UN Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998
(1999), para. 6.5. In respect of warring factions in Mogadishu, the Committee against Torture
found that: ‘de facto, those factions exercise certain prerogatives that are comparable to those
normally exercised by legitimate governments. Accordingly, the members of those factions
can fall, for the purposes of the application of the Convention, within the phrase “public
officials or other persons acting in an officials capacity” contained in article 1 [of the
Convention against Torture]’.
140 For a discussion of these developments see, A. Palmer, ‘Community Redress and Multi-
national Enterprises’, November 2003, p. 17, available at: http://www.field.org.uk/files/
Community_redress.pdf.
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vulnerable groups’.141 Alongside developments in standards is increased
monitoring of the impact of corporations on human rights, as reflected in the
work of non-governmental organisations as well as the establishment of a
Special Representative to the Secretary General on business and human
rights.142
But recent practice indicates the use of the language of ‘human rights’
obligations as applicable to a wider range of non-state actors. This can be seen
from condemnations of violence against women, including domestic violence,
as a ‘violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women’.143 There
are numerous examples, including the reports of the Sierra Leone and
Guatemalan truth and reconciliation commissions, as well as decisions of
international human rights bodies, on which armed groups have been referred
to as responsible not only for violations of humanitarian law but also for
violations of ‘human rights’.144
A similar phenomenon is increasingly apparent in the context of an inter-
national debate, particularly since September 11 2001, in which terrorism is
frequently referred to as a violation of human rights. The Security Council
for example has noted that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism ... and
... knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are ... contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations, perhaps highlighting
recognition of a degree of non-state actor responsibility under the UN Char-
ter.145 Another example is the proposal denouncing the ‘gross violations of
human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups,’ adopted at the UN Human
Rights Commission.146 However, the unsettled nature of the issue is clear
from the fact that the United States and the EU opposed the proposal on the
basis that:
141 Many of these have occurred on the national level, but they are also apparent through the
UN Global Compact on Corporations and the work of the Commission on Human Rights
for example. See ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(2003)), approved by the UN Sub-Committee on the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights in August 2003. See also, A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 195-270.
142 In August 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution E/CN.4/RES/
2005/69 establishing the post of Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on
business and human rights. See e.g. ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ A/HRC/17/31 (2011).
143 See M.J. Dennis, ‘Current Developments: The Fifty-Seventh Session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights’, 96 (2002) AJIL 181.
144 See Clapham, supra note 141 at p. 38; See also, ‘Witness to Truth’, Report of the Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Accra: GPL Press, 2004), and ‘Guatemala: Memory
of Silence’, Report of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions
and Recommendations, February 1999.
145 SC Res. 1373, supra note 54. The UN ‘purposes and principles’ include the protection of
human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security. See Chapter 5A.1.
146 See Dennis, ‘Current Developments’, supra note 143 at p. 183.
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a clear distinction must be made between acts which are attributable to States, and
criminal acts which are not, so as to avoid conferring on terrorists any status under
international law.147
Among academics, opinion on the human rights responsibility of non-state
actors varies. One point of view suggests responsibility should depend on the
capacity of an actor to bear obligations, rather than of its ‘subject’ status.148
Questions on this remain, including to what extent entities such as terrorist
organisations could meet this criteria, as well as broader legal and policy
implications of the lack of international enforcement against non-state actors,
or the risk of conferring legitimacy on certain non-states actors or detracting
from the responsibilities of states.149
Finally, it is recalled that as human rights law is closely interlinked with
international criminal law and IHL – with certain violations of human rights
amounting to, for example, crimes against humanity, and humanitarian law
obligations being interpreted in light of human rights law (and vice versa) –
responsibility may arise in respect of human rights violations indirectly,
through responsibility under criminal law or IHL.150
In conclusion, the question of the direct responsibility of non-state actors
is a troublesome one, given the theoretical underpinnings of the international
legal system as essentially inter-state, but also given issues of enforcement.
One commentator noted post-9/11 that this has left international law at a
‘rhetorical disadvantage’ in the struggle against terrorism.151
It may be that the growing use of language apparently attributing human
rights responsibility to non-state actors such as terrorist groups is no more
than a rhetorical attempt to redress this perceived disadvantage, or it may
be indicative of a more substantive shift towards responsibility and
accountability of non-state actors. While far from settled in law, the increased
evidence of the willingness of states and others to embrace the idea of ‘human
rights violations’ by non-state actors may lead to further legal development
in coming years.
147 Ibid. The US and EU noted however that states’ ‘fight against terrorism must be carried
out in accordance with international human rights law’. At the 2002 meeting of the Commis-
sion, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 33-14-6. See also the positions of states in
Clapham, supra note 141 at pp. 25-58.
148 Clapham, supra note 141 at pp. 70-75.
149 See, e.g., N. S. Rodley, ‘Detention as a Response to Terrorism’, in Salinas de Frias, White
and Samuel (eds.), Counter-terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012). Clapham notes that this is conceptually distinct from the question of whether
non-state actors can carry legal responsibility under international law. Clapham, supra note
141 at pp. 70-75.
150 W. A. Schabas, ‘Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict’,
26 (2003) Fordham Int’l Law Journal 907 at 932-3.
151 J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’,
14 (2003) EJIL 241.
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What is clearer is that international law does speak to the responsibility
of ‘terrorists’ and ‘terror networks’, including for acts such as 9/11, and
international law may be enforced against individuals most notably through
international criminal law but also through targeted sanctions. Beyond that,
individuals and groups are unquestionably responsible under national law
and provided there are effective functioning national systems, with states
determined to counter terrorism within the framework of law, there is not
so much a gap in the legal order as there are different spheres of regulation.
As such, it may be that strengthening national systems, through focusing on
the obligations of states under international law and their effective implementa-
tion152 is the most effective way of promoting the protection of the individual
from terrorist acts. But the discussion of the importance of responsibilities of
non-state actors under international law will undoubtedly continue, impelled
by the desire to ensure protection from international terrorism. Whether the
aforementioned developments, and indications of increased openness to the
idea of non-state actor responsibility, eventually crystallise into legal obliga-
tions, and have an impact on enforcement, remains to be seen.
3.3 RESPONSIBILITY ARISING FROM COUNTER-TERRORISM
The focus of this chapter has been on responsibility for terrorism, with the
lawfulness of state responses to terrorism being addressed in subsequent
chapters. It is however worth noting here certain aspects of the law of state
responsibility that are relevant to the assessment of responsibility for violations
committed in the ‘war on terror’, addressed in subsequent chapters.
3.3.1 Responsibility of the State for its Own and Other States’ Wrongful
conduct
While a state is generally responsible for its own international wrongs, carried
out by its agents or attributable to it, the ILC Articles make clear that in certain
circumstances, the state will also be responsible in connection with the wrongs
of other states.153 For example, where the state exercises ‘direction or control’
over the actions of another state, just as when it exercises such control over
private entities,154 or when it ‘coerces’ another state into international
152 See obligations in relation to terrorism, such as those enshrined in the ‘specific conventions’,
set out at Chapter 2, para. 2.1.3, and the positive obligations in respect of human security
under human rights law, set out at Chapter 7, part 7A.4.1.
153 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Chapter IV.
154 See Ibid. at Article 17 and Commentary; see also Article 8 relating to direction and control
over acts of private entities.
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wrongs,155 the former state will become responsible for the acts themselves.
The state does not evade legal responsibility therefore by acting through
‘proxy’ states, as discussed in relation to the torture in Chapter 7 for example.
States may also contribute to wrongs through ‘aiding and assisting’ other
states in connection with a wrongful act.156 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has recognised that the rules concerning aiding and assisting in the
commission of a wrongful act, as enshrined in Article 16 of the ILC Articles,
form part of customary international law.157
A number of factors qualify the circumstances in which a state’s support
or facilitation of wrongs by another state amount to aiding and assisting. A
state may aid or assist another state in breach of its international obligations
only if it does so with ‘knowledge’ of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act of that state.158 A ‘close connection’ is required between the
actions of the states, and a causal link must exist between the states actions
and the wrong.159 As explored further in Chapter 10, the knowledge and
causality requirements impose a significant threshold that may be difficult
to satisfy as a matter of proof in many situations.160 The act must be such
that it would be internationally wrongful if committed by the accessory state,
so depends on shared obligations.161
These rules are particularly relevant to ensuring that a full range of states
can be held to account for wrongs that, in an increasingly interconnected
world, involve cooperation between a multiplicity of states. The war on terror
has been characterised by massive inter-state intelligence sharing, the use of
military force by multiple states cooperating in the detention and interrogation
of detainees, law enforcement coordination and evidence sharing, including
with irregular criminal processes, vast international surveillance programmes,
transnational targeted killing operations, among many others. Widespread
international ‘cooperation’ and massive inter-state sharing in relation to many
of the issues explored in subsequent chapters will therefore give rise to ques-
tions regarding shared responsibility, in accordance with the legal framework
set down in this chapter. Particular issues of shared responsibility in relation
to the most notable example, the global ‘extraordinary rendition’ programme
155 Ibid. at Article 18.
156 Ibid. at Article 16.
157 See ICJ Genocide case, supra note 35 at para. 420.
158 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 16. Commentaries, supra note 4 at p. 149 notes that the
aid or assistance is rendered ‘with a view to facilitating the commission of the act…’ It
is debatable to what extent such knowledge can be constructive, but some support for the
proposition that at least willful blindness would suffice may be provided by aiding and
abetting under international criminal law discussed in Chapter 4.
159 Ibid.
160 See Chapter 10.
161 Ibid.
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which implicates the responsibility of a broad range of states (and private
entities and individuals), are addressed in more detail at Chapter 10.162
3.3.2 Privatising Counter-terrorism and issues of Responsibility
In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in resort to private
actors to fulfil what were previously considered essentially state functions,
including in the international counter-terrorism, security and armed conflict
contexts.163 The extent and scale of private contractor involvement in the
‘war on terror’ was made clear in, for example, a report describing 1,931
private companies at work in counter-terrorism, security and intelligence
functions in the US in 2010.164 The import and implications of this have been
brought into sharp focus by reports of violations by private contractors, inclu-
ding hundreds of cases of unlawful use of force by private security companies
in Iraq, ‘private’ prisons operational in Afghanistan, and interrogations by
contractors resulting in torture and loss of life.165
Questions arise regarding legal responsibility for such conduct. Individual
contractors may of course be responsible for crimes committed under applic-
able national or international law, and commanders or high level officials may
also be responsible for ordering or instigating such crimes, or for failing to
take reasonable measures to prevent de facto ‘subordinates’ from committing
162 Questions arise as to various forms of ‘complicity’ including through providing information,
presence during violations, and benefiting from wrongs. See Chapter 10 and UN Joint Study
on Secret Detention, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (2010), pages 4-5 on complicity in international
law.
163 Well-known examples from before the ‘war on terror’ include the involvement of military
security company Executive Outcomes during the conflict in Sierra Leone in 1995, as well
as Military Professional Resources Inc.’s involvement in Croatia in the early and mid 90s.
164 D. Priest and W. Arkin, ‘National Security Inc.’, in ‘Top Secret America: A Washington
Post Investigation’, Washington Post, 20 July 2010, available at: http://projects.washington
post.com/top-secret-america/articles/national-security-inc; O. Jones, ‘Implausible Deniability:
State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Military Firms’, 24 (2009) Connecticut J. of Int’l
Law 239.
165 Civilian contractors are accused of rape and abuse of prisoners as they provided ‘intelli-
gence’ related services at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See the Complaint filed by Iraqi
victims against L-3 Communications of San Diego, CACI International Inc. of Arlington,
Virginia, its subsidiaries and three individuals. Available at: http://www.ccrjustice.org/
files/Al%20Shimari%20Complaint.pdf. On its website, CACI states: ‘CACI has been a strong
and vital partner to the U.S. government in combating terrorist attacks and saving American
lives. CACI’s technological advances and skilled workforce have played a key role in
thwarting terrorism and defending our homeland.’ CACI, available at: http://www.caci.
com/about/news/news2007/12_20_07_NR.html. See also, J. Borger, ‘US military in torture
scandal: Use of private contractors in Iraqi jail interrogations highlighted by inquiry into
abuse of prisoners’, The Guardian, 30 April 2004, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2004/apr/30/television.internationalnews.
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crimes.166 In a few cases, individual contractors have in fact been held to
account,167 but in the majority of cases they have either enjoyed de facto
impunity, or been protected by ‘immunities’ which the state has negotiated
to protect its own personnel and extended to cover private actors.168 To a
large extent, the obstacles to individual accountability are similar to those
arising in relation to war on terror crimes committed by regular state
agents,169 but the challenges are heightened by for example less monitoring,
oversight or formal disciplinary or prosecutorial structures.
A key difference arises in the relationship between these individuals and
the state, raising questions as to the extent of state responsibility and
accountability for these private actors. The question of state responsibility is
particularly germane in light of allegations of ‘tactical’ privatisation specifically
to avoid accountability, evade monitoring responsibilities and other legislative
or congressional restrictions or oversight.170 Numerous commentators have
questioned whether the current legal framework governing state responsibility
covers such actors, leading to far-reaching assertions of a ‘legal void’ and
‘regulatory gaps’.171 This section considers briefly key provisions of the legal
framework and flags some of the challenges raised.
i) De Facto Agency: Scope and Limits of Attribution?
The starting point for assessing the state’s responsibility for private security
operations are the rules on attribution, enshrined in Article 8 of the ILC Articles.
Referred to above in the context of state responsibility for international terror-
ism, Article 8 provides that acts of private persons or entities are attributable
166 See Chapter 4A.12.
167 One such case concerns the CIA contractor who beat an Afghan detainee to death during
interrogation at the Asadabad base in Afghanistan. Jones, ‘Implausible Deniability’, supra
note 164 at p.18.
168 For example, on September 2007, Blackwater Worldwide killed 17 Iraqi citizens at an
intersection in Baghdad. In accordance with the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
and Iraqi law Order 17, that, at the time, gave immunity to all US forces and contractors,
Blackwater was immune from local prosecution. The Iraqi government later refused immun-
ity for US forces or contractors in the 2008 SOFA, contributing to the removal of troops
from Iraq in 2011. Contractors working with the Department of State or the CIA (Black-
water’s now largest contractor) reportedly would still have immunity. See J. Denselow,
‘The US departure from Iraq is an illusion’, The Guardian, 25 October 2011, available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/oct/25/us-departure-iraq-
illusion. See also, T. Williams, ‘Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Dropped’, New York
Times, 1 January 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/
02blackwater.html; ‘Iraq to end contractor “immunity”’, BBC News, 25 September 2007,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7012853.stm.
169 See Chapter 4 on criminal law, and the accountability discussion in Chapter 7B14 on human
rights below.
170 See generally, ibid.; F. de Londras, ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the “Gap”
between Security and Human Rights?’, 38 (2011) Journal of Law and Society 96, at p. 97.
171 See Jones, ‘Implausible Deniability’, supra note 164; ibid.; C. Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck: State
Responsibility for Private Military Companies’, 19 (2008) E.J.I.L. 989.
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to the state when the former are ‘in fact acting on the instructions of, or under
the direction or control of, the State in carrying out the conduct’.
A difficult question is how much control constitutes ‘effective control’ over
conduct in this particular context. Some commentators that lament the ‘juridical
gap’ in this field have suggested that as private security contractors (PSCs)
generally act with considerable autonomy, and operations are not controlled
in detail by the state, the state will not therefore generally be responsible for
the conduct of PSCs under the effective control test.172 While this may be so,
it is recalled that the disjunctive test in Article 8 means that the state may give
specific instructions or direction or it may, more generally, exercise ‘control’
over the conduct in question.173 If it does so, the state will be responsible
even where individuals go beyond or ignore specific instructions.174 The state
must exercise a considerable degree of control over the operation or activities
in question,175 though there is no apparent authority for requiring that it
conducts the detailed planning of every stage of the process.176 While the
ICJ’s finding that arming and supporting armed groups was insufficient for
attribution in the Nicaragua case,177 PSCs are not only armed and supported
by the state, but operational and on-site specifically and exclusively by virtue
of the state’s authorisation and for that state’s purposes. While the test is not
an ‘overall control’ but an effective control of conduct test, the closeness and
directness of the association may make it more likely that the conduct of the
group would fall under the control of the state.
Particularly difficult questions arise in relation to responsibility for conduct
that was not authorised by the state. According to the ILC Commentaries, if
the wrongdoing was ‘incidental’ to the authorised conduct the state will still
be responsible for it; by contrast if it was ‘clearly beyond’ the scope of the
instructions or direction of the state, the state will not be responsible. It is
ultimately a challenging question of fact and evidence – as explicit contracts
permitting wrongdoing are as unlikely as a transparent relationship between
a state and a terrorist organisation – as to the true relationship between the
172 See generally Jones, ‘Implausible Deniability’, supra note 164; de Londras, ‘Privatized Sover-
eign Performance’, supra note 170, p. 97; and Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck’, supra note 171.
173 As noted above, the ICJ has held that this test is substantially the same as the ‘effective
control’ test which renders the state responsible for the conduct of persons or entities
irrespective of any formal link.
174 J. Crawford, Commentaries (2002), note14, p. 113.
175 Undoubtedly under the effective control test, the ‘instructions, direction or control must
relate to the conduct which is said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act’.
ILC Articles, supra note 4. Compare this with ‘overall control test’ below.
176 For example, the ICTY in Tadić suggested that the state must have ‘a role in organising,
coordinating or planning the military actions’. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 36.
177 Ibid. As discussed above in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that arming and supporting
the contras did not meet the very high ‘effective control’ threshold for attribution set down
by the Court.
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state and private entity, and the true nature of the instructions given, explicitly
and implicitly.
The rationale for not making states responsible for all of the actions of its
contractors is that ‘in general the state giving lawful orders… does not assume
the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an internationally unlawful
way.’ The state cannot then be made responsible for conduct it could not
reasonably have foreseen and been expected to address. Conversely, there may
be circumstances – depending on the nature of the activities or the individuals
charged with carrying them out – in which a state may well have assumed
such a risk of international unlawful activity arising in the course of the
execution of the contract. The extent to which the state took appropriate
measures to monitor, control and prevent abuses by private groups active at
its behest may be relevant to determining whether the state assumed such
a risk.
In conclusion, the limited responsibility of states for unlawful measures
beyond the authority of the PCSs are compounded by the fact that contracts
will rarely if ever explicitly authorise unlawful activity. It could be expected,
consistent with the principle of effectiveness in international law, that Article
8 would not be interpreted to allow states to hide behind the façade of a ‘clean’
contract with an independent contractor to commit violations and escape
accountability.178 How those rules are applied will depend, however, on
particular situations. Actions closely associated with the authorised activity
of contractors could be considered part of the conduct over which the state
exercises ‘effective control’. There must for example be a distinction between
certain types of purely common crimes committed by PSCs in Iraq, outside
the scope of, and not incidental to, their authority, and the excessive use of
force against civilians closely associated with their security functions, or the
abuse of their intelligence role during interrogation.179
ii) ‘Exercising elements of governmental authority’
Although less immediately apparent, Article 5 of the ILC Commentary is also
potentially relevant to responsibility for private contractors charged with state
functions. It provides that ‘the conduct of a person or an entity that is not an
organ of the State under Article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that
State to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an
act of the State under international law, provided the persons or entity is acting
in that capacity in the particular instance’.180 So far as the functions that have
been ‘contracted out’ involve for example the use of force, establishing or
178 On principles of interpretation of IHRL that may be relevant, including a purposive inter-
pretation and one that avoids a vacuum of protection, see Chapter 7A Conclusion.
179 See Chapter 7B6.
180 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 5.
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maintaining law and order, interrogation or intelligence gathering, these would
constitute the exercise of ‘elements of governmental authority’.181
A second requirement enshrined in Article 5, however, is that the private
actors are ‘empowered by law’ to exercise such functions.182 While specific
legislation authorising companies to exercise such authority will be rare, there
is little clear authority, and some scope for interpretation, as to what form
this legal empowerment might take. The ILC Commentaries suggest that specific
legislation is not required where there is ‘delegation or authorization by or
under the law of the State’.183 One question is whether authorisation via a
contract, entered into under the law of the State, may suffice for this purpose.
If that is so, and if the exercise of such official functions by private actors or
contractors are covered by Article 5, then the state is responsible for their
conduct whether or not it authorised or controlled such conduct: as the Com-
mentaries note, for Article 5 ‘there is no need to show that the conduct was
in fact carried out under the control of the state’.184 Although the comment-
aries also caution that Article 5 is a ‘narrow category,’ this may provide an
appropriate framework to consider state responsibility for private contractors
to whom the state transfers key functions from state organs to private con-
tractors, such as use of force or interrogation, despite the attendant risks
involved.
In conclusion, increasing resort to private actors to carry out certain func-
tions poses challenges for the framework of state responsibility. Resort to
private actors that may lack training, expertise, monitoring and disciplinary
structures increases the incidence of violations, and renders less transparent
the already opaque world of counter-terrorism abroad.
Nonetheless, the regulatory gap may be less glaring than has been sug-
gested. The state clearly has responsibility for the conduct of de facto agents
of the state, and for those to whom it transfers elements of its governmental
authority. Whether this criteria has been met depends on an evaluation of the
facts of each situation, and there is scope for debate as to the correct interpreta-
tion of the law. If the rules are interpreted purposively, in line with the prin-
ciple of effectiveness, potential gaps may be narrower than might at first
appear, removing the incentive to use private companies to commit wrongs
or to avoid oversight and accountability. Where conduct exceeds authority,
which predictably happens not infrequently in certain contexts, the assessment
of what is ‘incidental to’ or ‘closely associated’ with the exercise of the func-
tions conferred or authorised by the state would take into account what was
181 The example in the commentary is of ‘private security firms may be contracted to act as
prison guards’. ILC Articles, supra note 4, Commentary at, p. 92. The ICSID tribunal has
considered in what situations companies are used as ‘instrument of state action’. See
discussion of cases in Jones, ‘Implausible Deniability’, supra note 164 at p. 43.
182 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 5.
183 Commentaries to the ILC Articles, supra note 4.
184 ILC Articles, supra note 4 at Article 5.
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reasonably foreseeable for the state, in all the circumstances. The relationship
may also be covered by Article 5 where public functions, such as the use of
force or interrogation, are transferred to private hands through legal agree-
ments.
3.4 CONCLUSION
A state is responsible for an act of terrorism by private actors where it exercises
effective control over the act, or subsequently endorses it as its own. States
may also be responsible for other internationally wrongful acts related to acts
of terrorism, such as failing to take reasonable measures to prevent their
territories being used by terrorists. As a matter of law, state responsibility has
serious implications for the wrong-doing state and, potentially, for the rights
and obligations of other states.
Yet there has been little clarity as regards assessments of state responsibility
for 9/11 and the significance thereof.185 Was Afghanistan alleged to have
been responsible for 9/11 or for a different wrong and was it thought to
matter? What were the lawful consequences of its wrong-doing? In practice,
while little clarity has attended allegations of responsibility post-9/11, vague
suggestions have emerged that the attacks on Afghanistan, and to some degree
Iraq,186 were justified at least in some part due to the relationship between
those states and terrorism. The dramatic consequences for those states may
illustrate the importance of greater clarity in the future around the nature and
scope of states’ obligations in respect of terrorism, the consequences of breach
thereof, and permissible responses on the part of other states.
Understanding responsibility for the September 11 attacks and other acts
of international terrorism is an important process in itself. If the law is to be
taken seriously, responsibility must have at least potential consequences for
the wrongdoing state. Confusion as to whether there is responsibility, what
the standard of attribution is, and whether it matters at all, therefore has
185 Uncertainties as to the law include the issues related to ‘terrorism’ discussed in Chapter 2,
and those relating to the status and content of different formulations relating to obligations
in respect of terrorism, such as those relating to ‘harbouring and support’ highlighted above.
186 On 31 January 2003, President Bush, asked about proof of ‘Iraq’s guilt’, stated: ‘Secretary
Powell will make a strong case about the danger of an armed Saddam Hussein ... He will
also talk about al Qaeda links, links that really do portend a danger for America and for
Great Britain, and anybody else who loves freedom’. ‘President Bush Meets with Prime
Minister Blair. Remarks by the President and British Prime Minister Tony Blair’, White
House Press Release, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2003/01/20030131-23.html. On 8 September 2003, US National Security Advisor,
Condoleezza Rice, during an interview on NBC, argued that US involvement in Iraq ‘is
going to be the death knell for terrorism’. See G. Miller, ‘Iraq-Terrorism Link Continues
to Be Problematic’, Los Angeles Times, 9 September 2003. On lack of evidence of any such
link, see 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 61.
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broader, serious implications for international law enforcement. The same
principle applies to state responsibility resulting from wrongs committed
through terrorism or counter-terrorism, whether committed directly by organs
of the state or through other states or private actors.
Claims or proposals have sprung up around the emergence of new or
different legal standards for attributing conduct to states. Although some claim
the nature of post-9/11 practice – whether through ‘instant custom’ or other-
wise – has given rise to new binding law, for the most part commentators
provide a skeptical assessment of current law and proposals for more ‘flexible’
rules for the future (lex ferenda). While other standards, including notably the
‘overall control’ test, or perhaps a broader causation based model, may provide
a framework which more readily allows for the attribution of conduct of
terrorist groups, and indeed of PSCs, to a state, they remain doubtful as state-
ments of the law as it currently stands. The challenges to state responsibility
in the particular contexts of international terrorism, or of the responsibility
of private contractors, are however relevant to the interpretation and applica-
tion of the legal framework to the particular facts. Caution is doubtless due
before discarding the law of state responsibility developed over many decades,
and claims of new standards having emerged may be overstated. Legal
standards should certainly be applied in a manner that is mindful of the reality
in which the law operates and the need to ensure that the law can be effective
and meet its purpose, particularly where the result would otherwise be a
juridical gap.187
The law of responsibility is controversial, and arguably in flux, but it does
provide important parameters for assessing and responding to international
wrongs. The greatest challenge to injured states – and to others that, as the
above framework reflects, share responsibility to act in the face of serious
wrongs188 – is to ensure that international law is upheld and enforced against
those responsible for ‘terrorism’ or for unlawful responses thereto.
187 For states obligations extra-territorially under IHRL, which usually involve control of
territory or acting through agents, see Chapter 7A2. See however the progressive approach
of the Human Rights Committee in the Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report
of Germany, 2 November 2012, para. 16 on the possibility of German responsibility for
companies domiciled on its territory but active abroad.
188 As discussed above, depending on the status of the norm infringed (i.e., on whether the
norm is a ‘peremptory norm of international law’) and on the seriousness of the breach,
the commission of an internationally wrongful act may give rise to an obligation of every
state of the international community to react to the wrongful conduct. As will be seen, this
is relevant to various aspects of the framework of international law relevant to responses
to 9/11, from the use of force to violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law.

P A R T II

4 Criminal justice
‘We will direct every resource at our command ... every instrument of
law enforcement ... to the disruption and defeat of the global terror
network.’
(President Bush, September 2001)1
‘In undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment,
the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law ....’
(US Supreme Court, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld)2
To the extent that acts of international terrorism constitute crimes under
international – or relevant national – law, those responsible, directly or indirect-
ly, are susceptible to international and/or domestic investigation and prosecu-
tion.3 States not only have the right under international law, but also the
duty,4 to bring criminal law to bear on individuals who commit serious
crimes.5 This corresponds to the right of victims of terrorism to have the
violations of their rights investigated and those responsible held to account.6
Criminal law enforcement may serve multiple additional goals, ranging
from those embraced by traditional theories of retribution, deterrence or
redress,7 to providing historical narratives of wrongdoing and ‘debunking
1 Former U.S. President George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People’, 20 September 2001, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
3 Only individual criminal responsibility is addressed here. On state responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts, see Chapter 3. On the controversial idea of ‘state crimes’,
international law remains unsettled. See generally, Oppenheim’s International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 9th ed., pp. 534-35. See also J. Dugard, ‘Criminal Responsibil-
ity of States’, in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law (New York, 1999), vol. I,
2nd ed., p. 239-53.
4 See, e.g., Preamble to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (hereinafter ‘ICC Statute’); Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Judgment, 20 Jul. 2012; SC Res. 1373 (2001).
5 See Chapter 7.A.42 ‘Positive Human Rights Obligations’ and Chapter 7B.14.
6 Ibid.
7 Some query whether e.g. the ‘rational actor cost-benefit analysis’ of deterrence is apposite
to international terrorism. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States notes
that ‘the hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed’. See also M. A. Drumbl,
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the glorification of violence’.8 Directly and indirectly, the criminal process
may contribute to the prevention of terrorism.9 Critically, while criminal law
is only one of the international legal tools against terrorism, the expressive
function of criminal trials can play a role in restoring or strengthening the
rule of law.10 Conversely, the neglect of criminal law enforcement may itself
have an expressive function in suggesting that counter-terrorism is less about
‘justice’ than it is about other goals.11
The ability of criminal law to deliver on its ‘rule of law promise’ depends
on it meeting certain conditions, a number of which have proved challenging
in the counter-terrorism context post-9/11.12 These include the challenge of
effective criminal investigation and prosecution, including ensuring inter-
national cooperation and enforcement, in respect of international crimes. It
depends also on criminal law being crafted, and implemented, within a rule
of law framework that respects fundamental principles – legality, individual
responsibility, the presumption of innocence and due process – upon which
the legitimacy of criminal law enforcement depends.13
Individual criminal responsibility under international law, like terrorism
itself, is not a new phenomenon.14 In recent decades, however, a system of
international justice, with national and international components, has
crystallised from the experience of addressing atrocities on the domestic and
‘The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva
Conventions, and International Criminal Law’, 75 (2007) G.W.L.R. 1165.
8 For analyses of the range of functions performed by criminal justice systems, see Drumbl,
ibid. See also A. du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot of International Criminal Justice Cooperation in
the Fight against Terrorism,’ pp. 111-14, in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.),
Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
9 It has also long been recognised that criminal law can be used to disrupt networks before
they complete their crimes e.g. by prosecuting conspiracy. See the stretching of these
concepts and preventive role of criminal law post-9/11, discussed in Part B.
10 See Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value’, supra note 7; see also du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra
note 8.
11 The implications of the neglect of criminal law in the aftermath of 9/11 are noted in Part B,
below.
12 See B. Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White
(eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), Ch. 6.
13 On challenges to a rule of law approach post-9/11, see Part B.
14 In 1945, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal observed: ‘That international law imposes duties
and liabilities on individuals as well as upon states has long been recognised ... crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced.’ Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial of German Major
War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany,
Part 22 (London, 1950), p. 447.
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international planes. The work of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’)15
and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’)
and Rwanda (‘ICTR’),16 or hybrid national-international courts and bodies
including the Special Court for Sierra Leone have been the principal contri-
butors.17 These have been accompanied by innovations in domestic law18
and burgeoning practice.19 The experience of national and international justice
in prosecuting apparently impenetrable networks engaged in organised crime
as well as a growing body of practice on terrorism prosecutions specifically,
leaves little doubt as to the viability (as well as the challenges) of prosecutions
in the context of large scale international offences.20 More recently, attention
15 The ICC Statute provides more elaboration on crimes, legal principles and procedures than
ever before on the international level. See also Report of the Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part I, Finalized draft text of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (‘Rules of Evidence and Procedure’), 2 November 2000, UN Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1; and Part II, Finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes
(‘Elements document’). As of May 2013, 122 states are party to the ICC Statute.
16 ICTY, established by SC Res. 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTR,
established by SC Res. 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Also
known as ‘the ad hoc tribunals’, the jurisprudence of which has made a detailed contribution
to the codification and development of law in this area.
17 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (annex to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002), available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html.
18 Law reform efforts in national systems have been impelled in large part by ratification of
the ICC Statute, supra note 4; see e.g. C. Kreß and F. Lattanzi (eds.), The Rome Statute and
Domestic Legal Orders: Volume 1 (Baden-Baden, 2000).
19 There is an increasingly active role of national courts in the prosecution of international
crimes based various forms of jurisdiction. Among many examples see, e.g., ‘The Spanish
Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials’, (2008) 6(5) Journal of International Criminal
Justice 1003; Ugandan International Crimes Division of the High Court’s prosecution of
Thomas Kwoyelo, a member of the Lord’s Resistance Army (Human Rights Watch, Justice
for Serious Crimes before National Courts: Uganda’s International Crimes Division (2012); the
Argentinian officer convicted for crimes against humanity in Spain (A.G. Gil, ‘The Flaws
of the Scilingo Judgment’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1082); Belgian
prosecutions for the Rwandan genocide (L. Reydams, ‘Prosecuting Crimes Under Inter-
national Law on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction: The Experience of Belgium’, in H.
Fischer, C. Kreß and S.R. Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under
International Law: Current Developments (Berlin, 2001), pp. 799 ff. See generally W. Ferdinan-
dusse, ‘The Prosecution of Grave Breaches in National Courts’ (2009) 7(4) Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 723; S. Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (Philadelphia, 2006). There are also
recent examples, including in Argentina and Guatemala, of trials within the state for
atrocities committed many decades before. These developments have contributed to the
body of international criminal law.
20 Many international trials have ended in conviction for large-scale crimes in recent years.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),
18 May 2012; ICTY judgments include in respect of the Srebrenica massacre and genocide
in the former Yugoslavia (Prosecutor v. Kristić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Cham-
ber), 2 August 2001). A former member of the Presidency of the Republica Srpska, Biljana
Plavšić was convicted in 2003 following a guilty plea (Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39
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dedicated to enhancing cooperation has improved the prospect of meeting
the international enforcement challenge.21 This is complemented by the human
rights framework discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 which provides considerable
experience in addressing rights applicable in the criminal process.
Part A of this chapter sets out the relevant legal framework that provides
the basis for criminal law responses to terrorism. It sketches out crimes under
international and national law that may be committed in the course of what
we commonly refer to as acts of ‘terrorism’, relevant principles of criminal
law, and where jurisdiction over such offences can be exercised. It will explore
the extent to which the international community is armed with a substantial
body of substantive and procedural international criminal law, and a range
of jurisdictional options to implement it, as well as a framework for inter-
national cooperation in respect of domestic criminal laws, that provide an
adequate framework for criminal law enforcement responses to the challenges
of international terrorism.
Part B, as in other chapters that follow, explores the application of the legal
framework in practice post-9/11. Despite the launch in 2001 of what was billed
as the most significant law enforcement operation in history,22 resort to the
criminal law framework in the wake of the September 11 attacks has taken
a curious and circuitous path. As will be noted, criminal law was de-
emphasised in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but this neglect has gradually
given way to an invigorated approach to using criminal law, not only as a
tool to respond to but (increasingly) to prevent acts of international terrorism.
Examples of practice and development are highlighted in three main areas:
expanded terrorism related offences and modes of liability, modified principles
and procedures in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism, and innova-
tions in international cooperation. It will explore trends in the use of criminal
law in the terrorism context, notably towards the preventive use of criminal
law and exceptionalist approaches to law and process, and their implications
for effective law enforcement and the rule of law.
Finally, the criminal law paradigm is, of course, relevant not only to acts
of terrorism but also to responses to them, so far as they constitute crimes
& 40/1, Sentencing Judgment (Trial Chamber), 27 February 2003), while former Bosnian
Serb politician Momčilo Krajišnik is currently serving a twenty year sentence for crimes
against humanity (Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber),
17 March 2009). Trials of fomer military and political leaders Mladić and Karad_ić continue
at time of writing in 2013. See also the ICTR judgment in the case of the former Prime
Minister of Rwanda for genocide in that country (Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No.
ICTR-97-23, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 4 September 1998). The first ICC judgment was
handed down in 2012: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Judgment, ICC, 14 March 2012.
21 Addressed below, Section 4B3.
22 J. Harris, ‘President Outlines War on Terrorism, Demands Bin Laden be Turned Over’,
Washington Post, 21 September 2001.
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under international law for which individuals may be held to account.23 The
chapter concludes by highlighting the scant practice in the application of the
criminal law framework to counter-terrorism, and the implications of the stark
contrast to its application vis-à-vis terrorism itself.
4A THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
4A.1 CRIMES, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW AND JURISDICTION
4A.1.1 Crimes under international and national law
Crimes under international law are particularly serious violations of norms
that are not only prohibited by international law but also entail individual
criminal responsibility.24 Crimes can be established under customary or treaty
law. Customary law is binding on all states and, so far as criminal responsibil-
ity is concerned, on all individuals.25 Among the sources that can be looked
to for the purposes of identifying the content of customary law in this field
are the jurisprudence of international ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Statute and
supplementary documents26 and national court practice. Treaties by contrast
are only binding on those states party to them.27 Although treaties bind states,
they may also, as in the case of treaties governing international criminal law,
affect individuals. Although international tribunals usually prosecute for crimes
considered prohibited by customary law, the ICTY has indicated that individuals
may be convicted on the basis of treaty law.28 The principles of legality and
23 See the many allegations of serious violations during the ‘war on terror’ that may amount
to international crimes at Chapters 6-10; see specifically Chapter 7B14.
24 Only certain serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law carry individual
criminal responsibility. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October
1995 (hereinafter ‘Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal Decision’), paras. 94-5.
25 See Chapter 1 on customary law as general and consistent practice of states accompanied
by a sense of legal obligation; Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
26 ICC Statute (1998), entered into force 1 July 2002. The ICC does not have jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes committed before its entry into force (Article 11) but it may concerning
terrorist attacks or crimes committed in response that fall within its jurisdiction. Negotiated
over more than five years by some 160 states, the Statute may also provide guidance on
customary law, although the negotiating process that gave rise to the Statute means that
the instrument may in several respects be more restrictive than customary law. The Statute
itself notes, at Article 10, that ‘nothing in this part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other
than this Statute’.
27 ‘Treaty crimes’ include terrorism and hijacking.
28 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has said that ‘the International Tribunal is authorised
to apply, in addition to customary international law, any treaty which: (i) was unquestion-
ably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged offence; and (ii) was not in conflict
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non-retroactivity require that the accused’s conduct was clearly proscribed,
under international or national law, at the time of its commission.29
This part of the chapter will focus on crimes under international law that
may, in certain circumstances, be committed when acts of terrorism occur.
It focuses on core international crimes, notably crimes against humanity, war
crimes and aggression, before returning to the question of ‘terrorism’ and its
doubtful status as per se a crime under international law, discussed in Chap-
ter 2, and concluding by reference to the most obvious basis for criminal
responsibility, domestic crimes.30
4A.1.1.1 Crimes against humanity
One question that arises is whether acts that we commonly refer to as terrorism
can constitute crimes against humanity and if so in what circumstances.
‘Crimes against humanity’ consist of certain acts – such as murder, torture
or inhumane acts – directed against the civilian population as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack. Although the first legal instrument referring to
‘crimes against humanity’ is the Nuremberg Charter of 1945, their prohibition
in international law long predates the Second World War.31 It is now well
established that crimes against humanity are crimes under customary inter-
national law, hence prohibited irrespective of the suspect’s nationality or of
national laws.32
Unlike many other international crimes, such as war crimes or specific
forms of terrorism, this group of crimes has never been the subject of a binding
convention to which reference can be made to determine their specific content.
with or derogating from peremptory norms of international law, as are most customary
rules of international humanitarian law’. Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, supra note
24, paras. 94-5. The ICTY affirmed in the Galić Judgment and Appeal decision that inter-
national criminal conviction may be based solely on the commission of treaty crimes,
although see the dissenting judgment of Judge Nieto: Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgment (Trial Chamber), 5 December 2003, paras. 97-105; Prosecutor v. Galić, IT-98-29-A,
Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 30 November 2006, paras. 79 and 85. Complex questions
as to how treaties become ‘binding’ on individuals provided one of the reasons why treaty
crimes were ultimately excluded from ICC jurisdiction.
29 While jurisdiction over the crime can be conferred or established after the fact (see this
Chapter 4A.1.3 below), ex post facto criminalisation would amount to a violation of the basic
principle of legality – nullum crimen sine lege – enshrined in systems of criminal law and
Article 15 of the ICCPR. See para. 4A.1.2 below and Chapter 7A.5.5.
30 The Chapter does not purport to address the full range of national and international crimes
that may be committed in the course of terrorist attacks, still less in the responses thereto.
31 Bassiouni, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 3 at pp. 522 ff. See also D. Robinson ‘Crimes
against Humanity’ in R. Cryer, H. Friman, et al., An Introduction to International Criminal
Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Robinson
describes it as ‘controversial’ whether the Charter created new law in this respect.
32 Ibid.; see also, S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in
International Law (3rd ed. Oxford, 2010), Ch 3.
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However, regard can be had to the ICC Statute, the first treaty to set out
comprehensive definitions of these crimes33 and to earlier international instru-
ments.34 There is also ample jurisprudence emanating from prosecutions for
these crimes35 that identifies key elements of the definition of crimes against
humanity relevant to determining whether particular acts labelled international
terrorism might amount to such crimes.
a) Underlying acts: Murder, inhumane acts, persecution
It is uncontroversial that there is a close link between terrorism and a number
of the underlying acts that can, in certain circumstances, give rise to crimes
against humanity. Murder, inhumane acts and persecution are among those
acts.36 Murder is a familiar term in domestic laws,37 and has been held in
an international context to consist of killing with ‘an intention on the part of
the accused to kill or inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human
life’.38 ‘Inhumane acts’, a broad term found in various international instru-
ments and domestic laws,39 covers the infliction of severe bodily harm40
and serious ‘cruel treatment’.41 As the ICTY has noted, the ‘terrorisation’ of
33 The definitions of all ICC crimes are for the purposes of the Statute only. ICC Statute, supra
note 4 at Article 10.
34 See, e.g., the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report
of the ILC on the work of its 48th session, 6 May-26 July 1996, GAOR, 51st session, Supp.
No. 10, 30, UN Doc. A/50/10, p. 97 (hereinafter ‘ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes’).
35 See supra note 20 for examples of recent prosecutions. See also, e.g., the judgment and the
proceedings of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, published in Trials of Major
War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols., (Nuremberg, 1946-50).
36 For a full range of acts that may amount to crimes against humanity, including torture,
enforced disappearance and persecution, see ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 7; Article
5 ICTY Statute and Article 3 ICTR Statute (which enumerate fewer acts than the ICC).
Various such acts, such as torture and deprivations of liberty, are relevant to crimes
committed in the ‘war on terror’; see para. 4.B.5. below.
37 See Report of the ILC on the work of its 48th session, p. 96: ‘Murder is a crime that is clearly
understood and well-defined in the national law of every State’.
38 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 439 and
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, 2 September 1998, paras. 589-90;
Prosecutor v. Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 1 September 2004,
para. 381; Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-01-73-T (Trial Chamber), 18 December
2008, para. 442.
39 Inhuman(e) acts or treatment are referred to in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article
50, GC I; Article 51, GC II; Article 130, GC III; Article 147, GC IV); in the ‘International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid’, 30 November
1973, GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII); in the ICCPR (Article 7); in the ECHR (Article 4); in the
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour, adopted by the ILO on 28 June 1930, in
the Slavery Convention of 25 September 1926; and in the ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article
7.
40 Article 18(k) of the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes mentions severe bodily harm and mutilation.
41 The ICTY has stated that: ‘the notions of cruel treatment within the meaning of Article 3
and of inhumane treatment set out in Article 5 of the Statute have the same legal meaning’.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment, 11 December 1998, para. 52. The Tribunal
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a group may also amount to persecution,42 which consists of fundamental
rights violations on political, national, racial, religious or other grounds.43
b) Widespread or systematic
One of the distinguishing features of crimes against humanity is that they are
widespread or systematic. While this threshold has not always been considered
necessary,44 developments have confirmed and the vast majority of commenta-
tors now accept, that under current international law, crimes against humanity
must take place in the context of a widespread and systematic attack or cam-
paign.45
It should be noted that the conduct of the particular perpetrator need not
be widespread or systematic. Even a single act by a perpetrator may constitute
a crime against humanity, provided it forms part of a broader (widespread
or systematic) attack or campaign.46 Conversely, the acts in question may
themselves constitute the widespread or systematic attack; there is no require-
ment of a separate or pre-existing attack.47 The requirement that the occur-
rence of crimes be widespread or systematic is disjunctive;48 while either
would suffice, ‘in practice, these two criteria will often be difficult to separate,
refers to international standards on human rights, ‘to identify a set of basic rights appertain-
ing to human beings, the infringement of which may amount, depending on the accompany-
ing circumstances, to a crime against humanity’. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-
16, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 566. The underlying act must be ‘of a seriousness
similar to that’ of other crimes against humanity: Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić, Case No.
98-32/1-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 20 July 2009, para. 960.
42 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 June 2010, para.
999; Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 17
January 2005, para. 589.
43 See ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Articles 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g). Discriminatory animus is not
required for crimes against humanity generally, but for persecution only.
44 This requirement was not included in the Nuremberg Charter, or other post Second World
War legal instruments that provided the basis for prosecution of crimes against humanity.
45 The jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR Statute, the ICC Statute and national laws imple-
menting the Statute all confirm this requirement which was uncontroversial at the ICC
conference; see D. Robinson, ‘Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining ‘Crimes
against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference’, 93 (1999) AJIL 43 at 47 and in ICTY and ICTR
jurisprudence: see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 38 at para. 579; Prosecutor v. Kayishema
and Ruzindana, para. 123 and Blaskić, supra note 48 at para. 202.
46 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 April 1996, para. 3; Prosecutor
v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 7 May 1997.
47 Dixon, ‘Article 7. Crimes Against Humanity’, p. 124.
48 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article7 requires attacks to be widespread or systematic. As
does ICTY jurisprudence: see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2,
Judgement (Trial Chamber), 26 Feb. 2001; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16,
Judgment, 14 January 2000; and Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March
2000, para. 71, para. 207 (stating that for ‘inhumane acts to be characterised as crimes against
humanity, it is sufficient that one of the conditions be met’).
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since a widespread attack targeting a large number of victims generally relies
on some form of planning or organisation’.49
There is no one source that identifies a precise definition of these terms
under customary international law, and the ICC ‘Elements document’, although
providing detailed elements of the crimes, does not include a definition of
the terms. However, they have been considered and applied in numerous cases,
particularly by the ICTY and ICTR. As formulations vary somewhat within the
jurisprudence, perhaps reflecting in part the particular factual circumstances
to which they were applied, the key aspects of that jurisprudence are set out
below. What is clear is that both the concepts ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’
are intended to import a considerable element of seriousness,50 and to ‘exclude
isolated or random acts’.51
The ‘widespread’ requirement may be satisfied in a range of ways.52 Most
commonly, the term is understood to refer to the scale of the crime. An earlier
formulation of this criterion referred to ‘large scale’ instead of ‘widespread’,
defining it as ‘meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of
victims’.53 Following this approach, the ICTY has stated that ‘widespread ...
refers to the number of victims’,54 and has defined the term as meaning acts
committed on a ‘large scale’ and ‘directed at a multiplicity of victims’.55 Con-
sistent with this, the term as used in the ICC Statute has been described as
follows: ‘[t]he term widespread requires large-scale action involving a sub-
stantial number of victims’.56
While ‘scale’ will often involve a series of acts, it need not, as ‘widespread’
refers also to the magnitude of the crime. It is noteworthy that the ICC Statute
contains an additional element requiring the commission of ‘multiple acts’
against the civilian population, but it is questionable whether this is a require-
ment of customary law in light of conflicting jurisprudence from the ad hoc
tribunals suggesting that one single egregious act of sufficient scale or magni-
tude may suffice. As the ICTY noted, a crime may be ‘widespread’ by the
‘cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an
49 Blaškić, supra note 48 at para. 207.
50 See, e.g., the Secretary-General’s report, UN doc. S/25704, para. 48 (cited in Prosecutor v.
Tadić, supra note 46, para. 646, n. 141), that crimes against humanity cover ‘inhumane acts
of a very serious nature’.
51 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 46 at para. 646. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No IT-94-2,
Review of Indictment, para 26. See also Robinson, supra note 145 at p. 236. Dixon, ‘Article
7. Crimes against Humanity’, p. 123.
52 See, e.g., the Musema and Akayesu cases of the ICTR which refer to widespread as covering
‘massive, frequent, large-scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness
and directed against a multiplicity of victims’.
53 ILC’s Commentaries to the Draft Code of Crimes, Commentary to Article 18(4).
54 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 46 at para. 648.
55 Blaski, supra note 48, para. 206. Situation in Darfur (Al Bashir arrest warrant case) ICC PTC-I,
4.3.2009, para. 81.
56 Robinson, supra note 45 at p. 47.
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inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude’.57 The ad hoc tribunals’ juris-
prudence therefore also indicates that ‘widespread’ does not necessarily imply
geographic spread. This is supported by a finding in one case that crimes
against humanity had been committed against part of the civilian population
of just one town.58
With regard to the requirement of ‘systematicity’, several cases have held
that this can be satisfied by the repeated, continuous nature of the attack or
campaign,59 a ‘pattern’ in its execution60 or the existence of an underlying
plan or policy.61 The ICTY confirmed in 2010 that the organised, as opposed
to random, nature of an attack will be critical to an assessment of its system-
aticity.62 The ICTY drew these factors together, noting that any of the following
may provide evidence of a systematic attack: (1) the existence of a plan or
political objective; (2) very large scale or repeated and continuous inhumane
acts; (3) the degree of resources employed, military or other; (4) the implication
of high-level authorities in the establishment of the methodical plan.63 Con-
sistent with this, it has been noted that the term ‘systematic’ in the ICC Statute
‘requires a high degree of orchestration and methodical planning.’64 The ICC,
like the ICTR, has in recent years made clear that systematicity relates to the
‘organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence.’65
c) Attack against the civilian population and the controversial ‘Policy Element’
The ICC Statute imposed a different threshold than found elsewhere in inter-
national law, by requiring that (in addition to being either widespread or
systematic) there be an ‘attack’66 against the civilian population, involving
a ‘course of conduct’ and ‘multiple acts’, carried out ‘pursuant to or knowingly
57 Blaškić, supra note 48 at para. 206.
58 In Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 14 December 1999,
the ICTY convicted the accused of crimes against humanity that were committed as part
of ‘the attack by the Serbian forces against the non-Serbian population in Brko’ (para. 57).
59 Tadić, supra note 46 at para. 648 (citing the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes).
60 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 38 at para. 580.
61 Report of the ILC on the work of its 45th session, 51 UNGAOR Supp. (No.10), p. 9, UN
Doc. A/61/10 (1996).
62 Prosecutor v. Popovic, supra note 42 at para. 756.
63 Kordić, supra note 48 at para. 179.
64 Robinson, ‘Developments in International Criminal Law’, supra note 45, p. 67.
65 Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 28 Nov.
2007, para. 920, and Bashir arrest warrant case, supra note 54 at para 81. Robinson suggests
the exclusion of random attacks is more correctly seen as inherent in the concept of attack.
66 The concept of ‘attack’ in relation to crimes against humanity (unlike in relation to the use
of force, see Chapter 5B.2.1.1 below) has no technical meaning. See S. Boelaert-Suominen,
‘Repression of War Crimes through International Tribunals’, International Institute of
Humanitarian Law, 77th Military Course (1999) (on file with author). See, however, the
more restrictive approach taken to the interpretation of ‘attack’ in the ICC context, below.
Robinson, supra note 45 at p. 235.
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in furtherance of a governmental or organisational policy’.67 In so doing, in
practice the widespread or systematic test becomes less firmly disjunctive than
it otherwise would be. As an innovation,68 it is questionable to what extent
this definition should be considered customary international law of relevance
beyond the ICC context.69
Even according to this quite stringent definition of crimes against humanity
in the ICC Statute, there is no requirement that the acts be attributable to a
state, but rather that there be a ‘state or organisational’ policy to commit an
attack.70 The ‘policy’ need not be formalised and may be inferred from all
the circumstances.71 Some controversy surrounds the meaning of
‘organisational policy’ and the key question for present purposes is whether
it may exclude acts of non-state actors, and specifically those of international
terrorist groups.
Significant international authority supports the view that, in principle, non
state actors may be responsible for crimes against humanity. This view is
reflected on the work of the ad hoc international tribunals,72 the ILC Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind73 and more recent-
ly the ICC’s decision to open an investigation into crimes against humanity
67 Article 7(2)(a) ICC Statute defines ‘attack’ as ‘attack directed against any civilian population’
and as ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack’. This was introduced to satisfy certain states
engaged in the ICC negotiating process (that wanted to see a conjunctive not a disjunctive
standard). See Robinson, supra note 45 at p. 67.
68 The term ‘attack’ is not used either in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, nor in Article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter. Although the word appears in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, only
in Article 7 of the ICC Statute, supra note 4, is it defined so as to raise the threshold in the
manner explained in this paragraph.
69 In the Kordić judgment, and the Kunerac Appeal Decision, the ICTY specifically rejects the
idea that there is no ‘policy’ requirement for crimes against humanity, despite the ICC
formulation below. See Kordić, supra note 48 at para. 182; Prosecutor v. Kunerac, ICTY Appeals
Chamber, 12 June 2002. See also G. Mettraux, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’, (2002)
43 Harvard Journal of International Law, at 237-316.
70 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 7.
71 See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum,
Part II, Finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes, 2 November 2000, PCNICC/2000/1/
Add.2.
72 See reference to the position of the prosecutor and defence on terrorism as potentially within
the scope of such crimes in Tadić, supra note 46. For a critical appraisal of the diminishing
importance placed on the criteria this practice, see Kaul Dissenting Decision, below.
73 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of the International
Law Commission (ILC), notes that ‘criminal gangs or groups’ may constitute the collective
entities behind crimes against humanity.
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committed during the eruption of (essentially non-state actor) violence in post
election Kenya.74 The ICC’s Decision in that case states that:
Whereas some have argued that only State-like organizations may qualify, the
Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization
should not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put
forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether the group has the capability
to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.75
The issue remains controversial, however, as seen from the dissenting opinion
on this point,76 and academic commentary,77 whether a loose network like
al Qaeda can have an organisational policy at all. This reflects, in part, a desire
to ensure that crimes against humanity are distinguished from serious crimes
under national law, which should be addressed at the national level.78
What is clear is that, at a minimum, the policy element excludes the
‘random’ outbreak of crime, even on a massive scale; as such the requirement
has been described as imposing a ‘modest threshold that excludes random
action’.79 It is a question of fact whether a terrorist act would meet this thres-
74 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09,
31 March 2010, paras. 115-128. Those primarily responsible for widespread violence in Kenya
in 2007-08 were described as gangs of young men with varied forms of support from leaders
of, and businessmen associated with, the main political parties, ‘quite distinct from state-like
entities with some form of territorial control or at least with the minimal organizational
structure of a party to a non-international conflict’. Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of
Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement:
Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision Leiden Journal of International Law,
23 (2010), pp. 855-873.
75 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ibid., paras. 90 and 93.
76 See dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, noting e.g. that ‘a gradual downscaling of crimes
against humanity towards serious ordinary crimes ... might infringe on State sovereignty
and the action of national courts for crimes which should not be within the ambit of the
Statute’. Ibid., para. 10.
77 In support of the majority approach, see D. Robinson, ‘Essence of Crimes against Humanity
Raised by Challenges at ICC’, EJIL Talk, 27 September 2011, available at: http://www.
ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc. Against the
majority approach, see Kress, supra note 74 at pp. 855-873. Van de Herik and Schrijver,
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8 at p. 70. More generally discussed
in M. Di Fillipo, ‘Terrorist Crimes and International Co-operation: Critical Remarks on the
Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes’, (2008) 19
EJIL, 533, at 564-70; W. Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, 98
J. of Crim. L. and Criminology 3; and W. Schabas, ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger,
and the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes’, 23 (2010) Leiden
Journal of International Law 04, pp. 847-53.
78 The reasons given include that such acts can be, and are more appropriately, addressed
on the national level (e.g., Schabas and Kress, ibid.), or the relationship between crimes
against humanity and human rights law, which non-state actors have no responsibility
(Kress, ibid.).
79 Robinson, supra note 45 at p. 240.
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hold: an organised and coordinated terrorist attack such as 9/11 is the anti-
thesis of a random attack, but many if not most other terrorist acts may not
meet the threshold.80
Finally, while the meaning to be attributed to the term ‘population’ is open
to question,81 it is well-established that crimes against humanity, unlike war
crimes, must be directed against a civilian, as opposed to military, popula-
tion.82 The ICTY has determined that a civilian population must be the ‘pri-
mary’ (as opposed to exclusive) object of the attack.83 It has affirmed that
non-civilians may also be victims of crimes against humanity, provided they
are victimised in the context of an attack that is primarily directed against
the civilian population.84 Thus, while it has been pointed out that different
considerations may therefore arise as between clearly civilian targets (such
as the World Trade Center in New York), and those that may have a military
role (such as the Pentagon), these various targets could be considered part
of one attack, the primary object of which was the civilian population.85
d) No link to armed conflict
Crimes against humanity can be committed in times of armed conflict or in
times of ‘peace’. While crimes against humanity originated as an extension
of war crimes,86 the idea that such crimes can only be committed in times
80 See Chapter 6 on the isolated nature of many terror-related attacks and the lack of apparent
organisational command or control. Those unlikely to meet the ‘attack’ threshold may well
not be widespread or systematic in any event.
81 The ICTY suggests crime against humanity involving attacks against ‘identifiable popula-
tions’, whereas the ICC Statute and Elements do not. Nuremberg treated the term as
indicative of scale.
82 The population must be ‘predominantly’, not exclusively, civilian. See, e.g., Naletilić and
Martinović (Trial Chamber), 31 March 2003, para. 235, and Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case
No. IT-95-16 (Trial Chamber), 14 January 2000, para. 549. For standards applicable to
determining the civilian nature of the population, reference can be made to IHL, see Chapter
6, para. 6A.3.1.
83 Blaškić, supra note 48 at para. 208, ff. 401, and para. 653.
84 Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 8 October 2008,
paras. 30, 313.
85 Questions may arise as to whether these were components of one (predominantly civilian)
attack, or were separate attacks. In either case the ‘means’ of attack – using civilian aircraft
as bombs – itself involved targeting civilians.
86 Bassiouni, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 3 at 524. The Nuremberg Charter (Charter
of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the London Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis of 8 August 1945
(reprinted in 39 (1945) AJIL Supplement 258)) and Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal (Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946) contained such
a link.
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of war has been unequivocally rejected through developments since Nurem-
berg.87
In conclusion, whether acts of terrorism might amount to crimes against
humanity is a question to be determined on the facts in a particular situation.
While a coordinated, systematic attack as devastating in nature as 9/11 would
appear to fit readily with the purpose and definition, many of the more
isolated attacks that have unfolded since then may not meet the high threshold
reserved for these serious crimes under international law.
4A.1.1.2 War crimes
Unlike crimes against humanity, war crimes must (as the name suggests) take
place in association with an armed conflict.88 Once there is an armed conflict,
the basic principles of international humanitarian law, including accountability,
must apply.89 Serious violations of international humanitarian law carrying
individual responsibility include deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against
civilians, the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, and torture
or cruel treatment of persons taking no part in hostilities, as discussed more
fully in Chapter 6.90
The classification of acts of terrorism as war crimes depends on them
constituting the initiation of, or taking place in the context of, an armed con-
flict. If they do, the rules of international humanitarian law apply to those
acts – which has consequences for rules on permissible targeting and the
detention of persons in connection with an armed conflict91 – and serious
violations of those rules may be prosecuted as war crimes. As explained more
fully in Chapter 6, however, acts of international terrorism will only rarely
give rise to armed conflict. Armed conflict is defined by the ICTY as:
87 Neither the ICTR nor the ICC Statute contain this element and although the ICTY Statute
does, as the Appeals Chamber has noted, this is merely a jurisdictional limitation on the
tribunal.
88 See Chapters 6 (IHL) 7 (international human rights law and the interplay between the two
bodies of law).
89 Long-established principles, reflected e.g. in the Martens Clause 1899 (Preamble to the Hague
Convention Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land), provide that certain basic
standards of conduct apply irrespective of the nature of the conflict.
90 For the most comprehensive list of war crimes, see ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 8,
Articles 2 and 3 ICTY Statute.
91 If e.g. 9/11 had been considered to trigger an armed conflict, IHL considers legitimate the
targeting of military objectives. The Pentagon attack is likely to fall into this category of
legitimate target (though note it would still fall foul of the law in respect of the manner
of its execution – see Chapter 6A.3.2 below).
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resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within
a State.92
While this definition was thought to be broad-reaching,93 as explained in
Chapter 6 it cannot be convincingly sustained that there is an ‘armed conflict’
between the United States and ‘al Qaeda and associates’, contrary to the
position maintained by the US administration.94 Had there been state respons-
ibility for 9/11 for example,95 the use of force involved may have given rise
to an international armed conflict.96 However, the structure, organisation and
modus operandi of al Qaeda (and the associated groups or terrorist networks
purportedly also engaged in the conflict with the US), suggest that it lacks the
characteristics of an ‘organised armed group’ capable of itself constituting a
party to a non-international armed conflict.97 Attacks by al-Qaeda such as
that of September 11, and the London, Bali or Madrid bombings that followed,
are therefore not generally considered to have triggered an armed conflict or
to constitute ware crimes as such. While acts of terrorism by al-Qaeda cannot
in general be referred to as acts of war, there is little dispute that armed
conflicts arose for example in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and in Iraq on
20 March 2003. Acts committed in the context of those conflicts, by parties
or others fighting alongside them, falls to be considered against IHL and serious
breaches may constitute war crimes.
To the extent that there is an armed conflict properly so-called, particular
acts within it that exploit ‘terrorist’ tactics or methods may amount to several
92 Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, supra note 24, para. 70.
93 This definition by the ICTY Appeals Chamber was thought innovative and sufficiently broad
to cater for the full range of scenarios (given that the ICTY was addressing a conflict that
had national and international components), thus ensuring the broadest application of
international humanitarian law.
94 See Chapter 6.
95 This would have to be established according to the ‘effective or overall control’ test dis-
cussed at Chapter 31.1.1 – then September 11 may amount to the initiation of international
armed conflict between states. If so, the acts of violence may amount to grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, which consist of certain very serious crimes, including ‘wilful
killing’, committed in international armed conflict against protected persons such as
civilians.
96 The consequences would include that the obligations incumbent on all states in respect
of grave breaches – to seek out those responsible for such breaches – would be triggered.
GC I, Article 49 and Article 50; GC II, Article 50 and Article 51; GC III, Article 129 and
Article 130; GC IV, Article 146 and Article 147. See M. Scharf, ‘Application of Treaty Based
Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States’, 35 (2001) New England Law Review
363. Instead the conflict began with the US intervention in Afghanistan.
97 See Chapter 6 on the nature of parties to a non-international armed conflict. Armed conflict
must also be distinguished from a lesser level of sporadic violence. There is insufficient
support at present in the overwhelming state practice rejecting the global conflict with al-
Qaeda as set out at length in Chapter 6B.1.1.
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war crimes. These may include ‘violence to life or person’,98 ‘willful killing’,
‘willfully causing great suffering’ or ‘serious injury to body or health’, ‘extens-
ive destruction of property’99 or intentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population or civilian objects.100
Most obviously, they may also constitute ‘acts of terrorism’101 or ‘acts
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to inflict terror on the
civilian population’, specifically prohibited by IHL in respect of both inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts, as discussed in Chapter 6.102
The inclusion of this prohibition as a ‘war crime’ in international criminal
instruments has, however, been irregular. It was notably omitted from the
ICC Statute and the Statute of ICTY, yet included in the Statutes of the ICTR and
the Sierra Leone Tribunal for example. Its omission from the ICTY Statute did
not, however, preclude the ICTY from prosecuting this crime (for the first time
in history), leading to the conviction of General Stansilav Galić for inflicting
terror on the civilian population in the context of the siege of Sarajevo.103
The ICTY trial chamber did so based on terrorising the civilian population as
an IHL treaty crime,104 though on appeal, the tribunal held that it constituted
a crime under customary international law, despite strong dissenting opinions
on the issue at both Judgment and Appeal stages.105 This view has been
upheld since, at the ICTY106 and in a series of cases from the Special Tribunal
for Sierra Leone.107 It would seem to now be well-established that the deliber-
ate infliction of terror on the civilian population in armed conflict is a war
crime under treaty or customary law.108
98 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 8(2)(c). Violations of Article 3 in non-international armed
conflict.
99 Ibid. at Article 8(2)(a) on Grave Breaches.
100 Ibid. at Article 8(2)(b) and (e). Other serious violations in international armed conflict and
non-international armed conflict respectively.
101 Art 33(1) GC IV; J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); see also and Chapter 6 Inter-
national Humanitarian Law.
102 Art 51(2) API; Art 13 (2) APII; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, ibid.
103 Prosecutor v. Galić, supra note 28.
104 See Galić, ibid.
105 See dissenting opinion of Judge Nieto Navia to the Judgment, and Judge Schomburg to
the Appeals Chamber decision in Galić, supra note 28. See also critique in A. Bianchi and
Y. Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Hart, 2012), p. 222 et seq.
106 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 12
December 2007, paras. 873 et seq.
107 Prosecutor v. Brima, Alex Tamba et al, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),
20 June 2007, para. 666; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Moinina and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 August 2007, para. 169; Prosecutor v. Seasy Gallon and Gbao,
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 March 2009, para. 112.
108 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 101, p. 8-11. Note this is not true of terrorism
a crime outside armed conflict where greater diversity of opinion and practice remains. See
below part 4A.1.1.4 and Chapter 2.
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As regards the elements of the war crime, inflicting terror is a ‘specific
intent’ crime, requiring that the primary (though not necessarily the exclusive)
purpose was to spread terror among the population.109 While some contro-
versy surrounds the precise meaning of ‘terror’ in this context, it has been
described as ‘extreme fear’ of a certain intensity or duration110 or ‘intentional
deprivation of a sense of security’ from people who have nothing to do with
combat.111 The material element may consist of attacks directed against the
civilian population, or those that are indiscriminate or disproportionate (pro-
vided the mental element is satisfied); it may therefore be identical to the
material element of the other war crimes of direct or indiscriminate attacks
against civilians. Terror in armed conflict has therefore been described as ‘an
aggravated form of unlawful attack on civilians’.112
In conclusion, for the purpose of accountability for terrorist attacks in the
‘war on terror’ context, the war crimes category is likely of very little relevance.
Navigating these controversial waters is, in any event, unnecessary, to the
extent that acts of terrorism amount to other crimes such as crimes against
humanity (defined above) or crimes under domestic law (below). Serious
terrorist attacks may well fall within these definitions, and can be prosecuted
as such in an appropriate forum. By contrast, the commission of war crimes
has been a key issue in the armed conflicts launched following 9/11 as dis-
cussed later in this chapter.113
4A.1.1.3 Aggression
Aggression was defined as a ‘crime against peace’ under the Agreements
establishing the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Far East,114 and described by the Nurem-
berg tribunal as ‘the supreme international crime’.115 The status of aggression
as a crime has been reiterated by the General Assembly116 and the Inter-
109 Galić, supra note 28 at paras. 103 and 104.
110 Ibid. at para 137. The Appeals chamber in that case described ‘extensive trauma and
psychological damage,’ from the acts designed to inflict a state of terror (para. 102).
111 Dragomir Milosević, supra note 106 at para 886.
112 Ibid. at para. 882.
113 See Chapter 6B1 on armed conflicts post-9/11 and serious violations of IHL.
114 See Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and Article 5, Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East.
115 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 30 September 1946, reprinted
in The Trial of German Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 20
(Nuremberg, 1948), p. 411.
116 The ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (GA Res.
2625 (XXV). See also UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), ‘Definition of Aggression’, 14 December 1974,
UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX). The ‘principles of international law recognized by the Charter
of the Nuremburg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal’ were also ‘affirmed’ in Reso-
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national Law Commission.117 More recently, the ICC Statute allowed for ICC
jurisdiction over aggression once an acceptable definition of the crime could
be agreed.118 Such agreement was reached at the 2010 ICC Review Conference
which adopted a new Article 8bis defining the crime of aggression,119
although ICC jurisdiction over the crime is not yet effective.120
For ICC purposes, the proposed definition provides that an act of aggression
is ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State’. The crime of aggression is com-
mitted by the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression’.121
According to the ICC approach, a criminal act of aggression is therefore
an unlawful use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations
which necessarily involves force by or on behalf of a state, as opposed to non-
state actors. As discussed in relation to state responsibility in Chapter 3, states
may act directly, or indirectly through irregulars or others,122 but absent
attribution to a state, terrorist attacks cannot properly be referred to as acts,
or crimes, of aggression.
4A.1.1.4 Terrorism
The thorny issue of terrorism in international law is discussed in Chapter 2.
Of note is the lack of a global terrorism convention and absence of an accepted
lution 95(I), ‘Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal’, 11 December 1946.
117 Article 16 of the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes. See also the ILC’s Commentary to Article 16
of the Draft Code, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th
session, 6 May-26 July 1996, GAOR Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10, at p. 83.
118 ‘The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is
adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such
a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.’ ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 5(2).
119 RC/Res 6., 13th plenary meeting of the ICC Review Conference, 11 June 2010, Annex 1.
on 11 June 2010, the Review Conference of Rome Statute (held in Kampala, Uganda between
31 May and 11 June 2010) adopted by consensus amendments to the Rome Statute which
include a definition of the crime of aggression and a regime establishing how the Court
will exercise its jurisdiction over this crime.
120 The conditions for entry into force decided upon in Kampala provide that the Court will
not be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime until after 1 January 2017 when a
decision is to made by States Parties to activate the jurisdiction. The amendment allows
for a state party to declare that it does not accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression.
121 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 8bis, para. 2.
122 Chapter 3 on International Responsibility. See also UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), Article 3(g).
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generic definition in customary law,123 despite the issue having been the focus
of international attention since long before 9/11 and with far greater intensity
since.124 As the previous section on ‘war crimes’ foreshadows, a distinction
must immediately be drawn between the crime of terrorism in international
law per se, and the war crime of inflicting terror on the civilian population.
Inflicting terror on a civilian population in the context of conflict as a war
crime is well established in IHL treaties, and international practice. Beyond
the specific war crime, there remains relatively little practice in support of
terrorism having attained the status of a crime under customary law.
The Statutes of the ICTR and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone125
include terrorism as one of the crimes within their respective jurisdictions,
but those provisions in fact cover the specific prohibition on terrorism in armed
conflict.126 The ICC negotiators for their part rejected multiple proposals to
include ‘treaty crimes’ such as terrorism within its jurisdiction.127
Indeed, the only international criminal tribunal to have jurisdiction over
terrorist acts is the Lebanon tribunal, established specifically to investigate
and prosecute a particular terrorist incident and with jurisdiction that in large
123 See Chapter 2 on the definition of terrorism and customary international law. See also
Resolution E adopted by the Rome Conference on the ICC: ‘Regretting that no generally
acceptable definition of the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes could be agreed upon for
the inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court’. As noted above, the ICTY and other
tribunals have noted on numerous occasions that individual criminal responsibility under
international law can arise from certain serious violations of customary law or applicable
treaty law.
124 See the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, 1937), League
of Nations Doc. C.546M.383 1937 V. See also M.C. Bassiouni, ‘International Terrorism’, in
Bassiouni supra note 3, pp. 765 ff, and the discussion of recent deliberations towards a global
convention in Chapter 2, para. 1.2 above.
125 For the first judgment of the Sierra Leone tribunal, including on the crime of terrorism,
see Prosecutor v. Brima, Alex Tamba et al, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),
20 June 2007, See also, Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment (Trial
Chamber), 18 May 2012.
126 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (annex to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone (Freetown, 16 January 2002), available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html)
and the Statute of the ICTR, in both cases in Article 3 (‘Violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II’) at (d) cover ‘acts of terrorism’.
To date, there has been no judgment from the Rwandan Tribunal which interprets or further
defines the word terrorism under Article 4(e). However, the Special Court has detainees
awaiting trial charged with acts of terror under Article 3(e).
127 For a proposal by several states for inclusion see, e.g., UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27
(1998) and UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27/Rev.1 (1998), but these were rejected and the
issue deferred for consisderation by a future Assembly of State Parties (see Res. E appended
to the ICC Statute).
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part covers crimes under Lebanese law.128 Likewise, the one example of inter-
national practice where terrorism has been held to constitute a crime under
customary law is a decision of the Lebanon tribunal’s Appeals Chamber.129
However, that decision has been subject to considerable and detailed criticism,
and to continuing challenge before that Tribunal itself.130 Although some
respected academic commentators assert that terrorism is a customary law
crime (of whom Professor Cassese, who was also the President of the Lebanon
Tribunal, stood out as the foremost proponent), others contest such a view.131
The existence of the crime of terrorism under customary law may well
evolve in the future, perhaps impelled by ongoing developments on the
national and international planes.132 So long as significant differences remain
as to key elements of the definition of the crime, as sketched out in Chapter 2,
it is difficult to assert, consistent with the cardinal principles of nullem crimen
sine lege (requiring that crimes be defined with clarity and specificity, referred
to below), that terrorism per se is currently a crime under international law.
As a matter of treaty law, it was noted in Chapter 2 that particular mani-
festations of terrorism or forms of support for it are defined in numerous
specific terrorism conventions. These cover crimes ranging from attacks on
internationally protected persons to terrorist bombings to the financing of
terrorism for example, contain their own definitions of the acts covered by
them and oblige states parties to criminalise the conduct in domestic law and,
in certain circumstances, to exercise jurisdiction.133 However, these treaties
128 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established at the request of the government of the
Republic of Lebanon following attacks in Beirut on 14 February 2005. Its mandate is to
prosecute persons responsible for the attack on 14 February 2005 that killed former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and other connected attacks in Lebanon spanning
1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005. See Security Council Resolutions 1664 (2006) and
1757 (2007).
129 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism,
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (hereinafter ‘STL Interlocutory
Decision’), STL-11-01-I, 16 February 2011; see discussion in Chapter 2.2.3.
130 B. Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’, (2011) 24(3) Leiden J. of Int’l
Law 677.
131 See, e.g., A. Cassese and P. Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd ed., Oxford
University Press 2013) at p. 139, and cf. B. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (New
York City: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague’,
ibid. See also, e.g., J. Paust, ‘Addendum: Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden et al. for Violations
of International Law and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims’, ASIL Insights No. 77, 21
September 2001
132 Since 9/11, and SC Res. 1373 (2001), (28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001)),
there has been intense activity on the national as on the international level – see Chapter 2.
133 See Chapter 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 regarding specific conventions. See also Bassiouni, ‘International
Terrorism’ (referring to 16 Conventions dealing with specific means of terror violence).
The Special Rapporteur on terrorism and human rights, Ms Kalliopi K. Koufa, in her
Progress Report to the Fifty-Third Session Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, 27 June 2001, cites 19 Conventions.
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impose obligations on states party to them, rather than themselves establishing
criminal responsibility. Unless the state has implemented the treaty provisions,
it is subject to question whether individuals could be prosecuted on the sole
basis of such a treaty. Thus, an important distinction is due between such
crimes of international concern or relevance, which the state must criminal-
ise,134 and ‘core crimes’ (or crimina juris gentium) under international law.135
However, where the specific terrorism treaty has been incorporated into
the domestic law of a state with jurisdiction, this issue is avoided. On 28
September 2001 the Security Council called on ‘all States to ... [i]ncrease co-
operation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism’136 and to ensure that ‘terrorist acts are estab-
lished as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations’.137 This
call has led, in practice, to an increase in ratification and implementation of
these conventions.138 Domestic systems often therefore provide the basis for
prosecution of these crimes, though significant gaps remain.139 As noted
above, one additional sub-category of treaties that give rise to criminal respons-
ibility for terrorism under international law are those IHL treaties prohibiting
‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population’, in international and non-international armed
conflict.140
Finally, another offence of relevance to some terrorist attacks, notably
including the 9/11 attacks, which is at times treated as a form of terrorism
and at others as a separate treaty crime, is hijacking. There are a number of
134 Belonging to this category of treaties, for instance, are the conventions relating to the
suppression of terrorism (above), and international instruments related to drug trafficking.
135 See R. Cryer, H. Friman, et al., supra note 31. The core crimes concern conduct considered
to amount to ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,’
embracing the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC Statute, as well as the United
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
and Punishment (New York, 10 December 1984, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984)) (hereinafter
‘Convention Against Torture’) for example.
136 SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 132 at para. 3.
137 SC Res. 1373 (2001), ibid., also requires ‘that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness
of such terrorist acts’. This Resolution also established a Committee to monitor its imple-
mentation. SC Res. 1377 (2001), 28 November 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), sets out
the tasks for the Committee.
138 Chapter 2.
139 See du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra note 8. The non-retroactivity principle inherent in the
nullum crimen sine lege principles precludes prosecution for offences that were not crimes
at the time of commission but may permit conferral of jurisdiction ex post facto, see para.
4A.1.3 below. Regarding new terror legislation, much of it is problematic from the perspect-
ive of the nullum crimen principle and other human rights concerns. See Chapter 7A55 and
7B5.
140 Article 51 AP I and Article 13 AP II. See also Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention
which provides that ‘terrorism is prohibited’ without defining the phenomenon.
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conventions relating to hijacking,141 some of which oblige states parties to
enact legislation criminalising the conduct and to exercise jurisdiction over
suspects in specified circumstances.142 Like the terrorism conventions, certain
of those relating to hijacking have been incorporated into United States
domestic law143 and the US has in the past exercised jurisdiction in a number
of cases on the basis of those treaty provisions as incorporated into domestic
law.144
4A.1.1.5 Common crimes
Finally, it should be noted that murder and the infliction of serious physical
harm are crimes in most if not all domestic jurisdictions. The most straight-
forward approach in relation to these crimes is therefore prosecution in a
domestic court as a common crime.145
The fact that acts of international terrorism might amount to crimes under
international law is however significant not only as an indicator of their
egregious nature, and international character, but also as crimes under inter-
141 See, e.g., the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague,
16 December 1970), 860 UNTS 105, in force 14 October 1971 (‘The Hague Convention’),
and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (Montreal, 23 September 1971), 974 UNTS 178, in force 26 January 1973 (‘The
Montreal Convention’). While these Conventions may be relevant to the hijacking and
subsequent destruction of the four aircraft, as one commentator notes, ‘extending the scope
of these treaties to cover the destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Penta-
gon, as well as the massive loss of life in those buildings and the causing of a state of terror
in the general public, could only be done with difficulty’. A.N. Pronto, ‘Terrorist Attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Comment’, ASIL Insights No. 77, 21 September
2001.
142 The states of nationality of the alleged perpetrator or the victim or the state of territory
have jurisdiction under many of these treaties.
143 Paust, ‘Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden’, supra note 131, notes: ‘Prosecution in US is also
possible under US legislation implementing the Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, (which in Article 7 thereof also
requires all signatories to bring into custody those reasonably accused of international crimes
covered by the treaty and either to initiate prosecution of or to extradite such persons,
without any exception or limitation of such duty whatsoever)’.
144 United States v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (DC Cir. 1991). The Court upheld the US court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, (924 F.2d at 7, 12-13), on the basis that the victim’s state of
nationality may exercise jurisdiction under the Hague Convention and the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The Court held this to be consistent with
customary international law (924 F.2d at 8).
145 Some assert that murder is a crime that attracts universal jurisdiction, and all states should
be able to exercise their jurisdiction over international terrorism simply on this basis. Many
states could exercise jurisdiction over mass murder based on other bases of jurisdiction
set out below.
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national law lay greater claim to be governed by relevant principles of inter-
national law, as highlighted in the following section.146
4A.1.2 Relevant principles of criminal law
4A.1.2.1 Direct and indirect individual criminal responsibility
Criminal responsibility must be individual, based on the culpability of the
particular person accused. That it cannot be ‘collective’, or ‘objective’, is an
essential principle of criminal law in legal systems across the globe, as reflected
in international law.147 Thus, while for example the Nuremberg process
extended responsibility to cover ‘conspiracy’ to commit crimes of peace (reflect-
ing practice in common law states), and introduced the novel notion of ‘mem-
bership’ of a criminal organisation,148 the fact of association with a prohibited
group or organisation may raise concerns as a basis for criminal responsibil-
ity,149 and cannot per se render the individual responsible for the actions of
that group. Certain novel and expanded approaches to crimes and modes of
liability introduced since 9/11, including crimes of ‘association’ or of ‘expres-
sion’150 such as ‘material support’ for or ‘glorification’ of terrorism, discussed
under Part B, may further jeopardise this notion of individual criminal respons-
ibility.
The individual should be punished only in respect of his or her own
conduct, commensurate with his or her culpability. International criminal law
146 The principles will generally be determined by the system in which jurisdiction is exercised.
However, it can be argued that, for example, certain obstacles to jurisdiction must not apply
to international crimesor to serious human rights violations discussed in Chapter 7A4.
147 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, para.
186. This principle of criminal law is reflected in international human rights and human-
itarian law. See ‘Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular Terrorism’,
Additional Progress Report by the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights,
Ms Kalliopi Koufa, 8 August 2003, UN Doc. E/CN/Sub2/2003/WP.1, paras. 68 ff.; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 22 October
2002, OAS/Ser.L/V/ll.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., para. 227. On the prohibition on collective
punishments in IHL, see Article 33 GC IV, Article 75 AP I, Article 6(2) AP II.
148 See M. Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorism Acts: Redefinition of the Concept of Terrorism
Beyond Violent Acts (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), p. 113 et seq.
149 IACHR Report on Terrorism, supra note 147: ‘no one should be convicted of an offense except
on the basis of individual penal responsibility, and the corollary to this principle [is] that
there can be no collective criminal responsibility ... This requirement has received particular
emphasis in the context of post-World War II criminal prosecutions, owing in large part
to international public opposition to convicting persons based solely upon their membership
in a group or organization.’ See also E. David, Eléments de droit pénal international – Titre
II, le contenu des infractions internationales, 8th ed. (Brussels 1999), p. 362. See Chapter
4.B.2.1 below and Chapter 7B.8 on concerns where criminal organisations are ‘listed’
according to procedures that lack transparency and judicial supervision.
150 See Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12.
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and practice reflects the fact that this responsibility may, however, be direct
and indirect, and the participation of individuals in the commission of a crime
may take many forms. Direct responsibility attaches to those who order, plan,
instigate, aid and abet, or otherwise contribute to the commission or attempted
commission of crime by a group acting with a ‘common purpose’. It also
involves the joint commission of the crime by multiple actors forming a ‘joint
criminal enterprise’ and/or acting as co-perpetrators pursuant to a common
plan.151 As regards acts of terrorism, those directly responsible are not only
those who implement the attack (who in cases of suicide missions may ob-
viously no longer be subject to criminal prosecution) but, potentially, also the
full networks of persons involved in various ways in planning, orchestrating
and assisting in their execution.
Through notions such as ‘co-perpetration’ or acting in ‘common purpose’
under the ICC regime,152 or the creative development of the notion of ‘joint
criminal enterprise’ through ICTY jurisprudence,153 international criminal law
has developed to provide a spectrum of forms of responsibility. International
criminal law therefore anticipates a potentially broad range of individuals who
may contribute collectively to international crimes.154 But as treaty and
jurisprudential developments have expanded the net of inchoate crimes and
accomplice liability, they have also limited their reach, by insisting for example
151 See Article 7(1) Statute of the ICTY; Article 6(1) Statute of the ICTR; ICC Statute, supra note
4 at Article 25. Formulations vary somewhat between statutes e.g. joint criminal enterprise
has developed through practice, notably of the ICTY, and common purpose doctrine is
enshrined in Article 25 of the ICC Statute. ICC nascent practice has developed the notion
of co-perpetration (direct and indirect), structured around the elements of ‘common plan’
and ‘joint control over the crime’ (see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra note 20, paras. 976 et seq).
Some modes of liability, i.e. conspiracy or direct and public incitement, apply only in respect
of genocide, see Genocide Convention 1948, Art 111 (c). See Lehto, Indirect Responsibility
for Terrorism Acts, supra note 148 at p. 120.
152 Article 25(3) (d) is akin to complicity and has been used in recent anti-terrorism conventions.
The mental element requires a contribution ‘to the commission or attempted commission’
of a crime, made in knowledge of the criminal objective of the group. The nature of that
potential contribution remains unclear, in particular whether such contribution must be
‘significant’ or whether any contribution made to the group with the requisite intent suffices.
See Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges’, ICC-01/04-01/10 OA4, 30 May 2012, Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia Fer-
nández de Gurmendi.
153 Joint criminal enterprise relates to a group of individuals with ‘some kind of interaction,’
acting pursuant to a joint criminal purpose, which actually results in the commission of
a crime. It requires at a minimum recklessness as to the risk and a substantial contribution
to the commission of an offence which (by contrast to conspiracy, for example) does in
fact take place. See Prosecutor v. Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement (Appeals Chamber),
3 April 2007.
154 For analysis of these developments see B. Goy, ‘Individual criminal responsibility before
the International Criminal Court. A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2012) 12(1)
International Criminal Law Review 1-70.
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that accomplice liability requires a ‘significant causal relationship’ between
the individuals accused’s act and the commission of the crime, and rejecting
the notion that any contribution whatever may draw the individual into the
web of criminality.155
National laws and doctrine vary considerably as to principles of criminal
law and terminology used. There has been little attempt to develop a general
approach to grounds of responsibility and modes of liability, other than for
the purposes of international criminal jurisdictions, such as the codification
of a ‘general part’ through the ICC Statute or through ongoing international
criminal law jurisprudence.156 While there is therefore much diversity on
the national level, criminal law systems do, however, tend to encompass a
range of forms of criminal responsibility. These commonly cover participation
in the commission of a crime as well as planning and preparation, from
common law notions of conspiracy to civil law doctrines of ‘association de
malfaiteurs’ for example.157
As discussed in Part B, since 9/11, new laws have been grafted onto
domestic systems, expanding both crimes and modes of liability, so as to
criminalise membership of terrorist organisations and various forms of asso-
ciation with, or expression for, certain terrorist activities, as well as more
traditional forms of participation. It remains to be seen to what extent these
‘preventive’ criminal laws, the implications of which are discussed in Part B,
may ultimately influence international legal standards.
In the context of international terrorism, and subsequently of allegations
of criminal conduct in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ much attention has
been focused on the need for a criminal law response that reaches behind the
executioners to the architects, including those at the highest levels in the chains
of command. Under international criminal law certain people may be respons-
ible not only for what they do – such as ordering or instigating crimes – but
also in certain circumstances for what they fail to do under the doctrine of
‘superior responsibility’.158 While this doctrine is most readily applied in
the context of clearly established military structures, it applies to military or
155 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 46 at paras. 670-672 rejecting the prosecution’s
arguments that any connection would suffice.
156 Lehto, supra note 148 at p. 109; Kai Ambos, La Parte General de Derecho Penal Internacional,
2010.
157 See, e.g., UNODC Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism 2009, available
at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Handbook_on_Criminal_Justice_
Responses_to_Terrorism_en.pdf (focusing on the use of criminal law ‘preventively’); K.
Ambos, ‘Article 25. Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on
the Rome Statute, pp. 475 ff. Domestic legal orders may also include other forms not included
specifically in the international documents, such as conspiracy (covered as such in ICTY
and ICTR practice, and the ICC Statute, only in respect of genocide.
158 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 28.
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civilian leaders.159 A military commander or a civilian in a position of author-
ity may be liable if he or she knew or should have known that a crime would
be committed by subordinates under his or her effective control, and fails to
take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crime, despite
the material ability to do so.160
This superior responsibility applies not only to those with formal legal
authority, but also to superiors according to informal structures.161 The ICTY
for example has made clear that non-state actors may in principle be liable
as superiors on the basis of de facto authority,162 and ‘effective control’.163
The ICTR has likewise convicted non-state actors on this basis, in the
Musema164 and Nahimana165 ‘media’ cases, and in the Serashago case which
apparently concerned paramilitary leaders.166 The Special Court for Sierra
159 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al (‘Celebici case’), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),
16 November 1998, para. 214; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (‘Celebici Appeal’), Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Judgment (Appeals Chamber), para. 266. The ICTY noted that control, not simply decisive
influence, is required.
160 Celebici case at para. 256; Celebici Appeal at paras. 647, 378.
161 ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocol I), para. 3544, and case law below.
162 Celebici case at paras. 377-78. See also Celebici Appeal at paras. 189-94.
163 Celebici Appeal at paras. 196-98. Several other cases noted the key question of whether a
superior’s de facto is formal authority: see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-05-14/1-T,
Judgement (Trial Chamber), 25 June 1999, paras.75-78; Prosecutor v. Naletelić et al, Case No.
IT-98-34-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 31 March 2003, paras. 65-69; Prosecutor v. Oric, Case
No. IT-03-68-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 30 June 2006 (‘Oric case’), paras. 309-311;
Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 27 January 2000, para.
135; Bagilishema AJ, paras. 50-55; Nahimana et al. AJ, para.605; Kajelijeli AJ, paras. 85-87.
164 Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 27 January 2000 (‘Musema’),
para. 143-44, paras. 936, 950-51 where the Director of Gisovu Tea Factory was guilty of
genocide and crimes against humanity based upon de jure power and de facto control over
his employees (para. 12). These findings were not appealed: Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement (Appeals Chamber), 16 November 2001
165 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement, 3 December 2003 (‘Nahimana
TJ’), paras.973, 1063, 1081-1082, 1106, upheld on appeal. The ICTR Trial Chamber in the
cases of Musema and Nahimana (‘Media case’) convicted the Director of a tea factory,
managers of a Radio Station, and the leader of a political party, as superiors. All three cases
relied upon the post-WWII cases of Roechling and Flick in which non-state civilian industrial
leaders were found criminally liable for failing to prevent and punish their employees for
their crimes, and provide rare examples of convictions of non-state actors pursuant to
superior responsibility.
166 Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentencing Judgment (Trial Chamber),
5 February 1999. Subject to the guilty plea, the accused was convicted of genocide and
crimes against humanity pursuant to superior responsibility. Neither the Trial nor Appeals
Chamber needed to determine whether the Interahamwe was a paramilitary non-state actor,
or a state actor by virtue of its affiliation with the government.
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Leone has also convicted paramilitary commanders of the ousted AFRC
pursuant to superior responsibility.167
Arguably, although the facts of these cases are all quite distinct, the same
principle could potentially apply to persons in positions of authority within
terrorist criminal networks. The requirements of a clear superior-subordinate
relationship, with adequate control over subordinates that made it possible
to prevent and to punish their criminality, may be unlikely to be met by an
entity such as al-Qaeda, described as comprising a loose network of cells and
individuals under a broad shared ideology.168 Where such requirements are
met, however, the experience of international criminal law suggests that this
could become a relevant basis of liability for those who control terrorist
organisations in different circumstances in the future. This may prove par-
ticularly important where access to evidence of high level orders sufficient
to demonstrate the direct responsibility of those in the highest echelons proves
elusive.
Clearly superior responsibility is also relevant to crimes committed in the
context of state responses to terrorism. As noted below the dearth of such
prosecutions to date means the application of the principles in this context
remains unexplored.
4A.1.2.2 Certainty and non-retroactivity in Criminal Law: nullum crimen sine lege
As a fundamental principle of law, persons are protected from prosecution
for conduct that was not criminal at the time of its occurrence. This principle,
reflected in domestic and international criminal law and human rights, is
enshrined in, for example, Article 15 of the ICCPR.169 It explicitly does not,
however, preclude the prosecution of conduct that was criminal under inter-
national but not domestic law at the relevant time.170
The nullum crimen rule also requires that criminal conduct must be defined
according to clear, accessible and unambiguous law. The definition of a crime
must in turn ‘be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy’.171
Any ambiguity should be interpreted in favour of the person being investi-
167 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, 20 June 2007 (‘Brima TJ’), paras.
2114, 2118 and 2122. The Trial Chamber’s findings were upheld on Appeal. As a former
government body, the AFRC had a functioning chain of command and structures to facilitate
effective control. See also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement (Trial
Chamber), 25 February 2009.
168 See Chapter 6 where the idea of al-Qaeda as an organisation that might constitute a party
to a conflict, as claimed by the US administration, is questioned.
169 Article 15(1) of the ICCPR states: ‘No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national
or international law, at the time when it was committed.’ For a detailed discussion of the
guarantees enshrined in Article 15, see below, Chapter 7A.4.3.4.
170 Article 15(2) ICCPR.
171 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 22(2).
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gated, prosecuted or convicted.172 Thus, for example, a person can be pro-
secuted for direct or indirect responsibility for crimes against humanity entailed
in widespread or systematic terrorist attacks, even if there were no specific
offence provisions in place under domestic law at the time of the commission
of the offence. If domestic law requires a legislative base for the crimes or for
jurisdiction, the necessary legislation can also be adopted with retrospective
effect without any infringement of the nullum crimen rule as a matter of inter-
national law. By contrast, prosecution for membership of a terrorist
organisation or rendering material support to terrorists – not themselves crimes
under international law – is likely to fall foul of the nullum crimen rule unless
that crime was proscribed in clear and accessible domestic law at the relevant
time.173
4A.1.2.3 Bars to prosecution: amnesty, immunity and prescription
Domestic legal systems may, and often do, impose obstacles to prosecution,
among them amnesty laws or statutes of limitation that preclude criminal
process. The legitimacy of such national measures depends on their consistency
with international law obligations to effectively investigate and prosecute
serious crimes.174
Human rights bodies have consistently found measures that act as a bar
to investigation or criminal process to be inconsistent with the positive obliga-
tions of the state under human rights treaty law to investigate and, if appro-
priate, prosecute serious rights violations.175 This is reflected for example
in statements of the UN,176 the work of human rights bodies177 and the
172 Ibid. at Article 22(3). The subsidiary principle of nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without
law) demands that more serious penalties should not be imposed than those applicable
at the time of the commission of the offence; see Article 15(2), ICCPR.
173 See, e.g., the US Supreme Court determination in Hamdan.
174 These obligations are found principally in human rights law, but reflected increasingly
in international criminal law. Chapter 7A ‘Positive Obligations’; ICC Statute Preamble,
Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 4.
175 See Chapter 7A.
176 See, e.g., Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations, Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/1999/836, 30 July 1999, para. 7; UN Commission on Human
Rights Resolutions including 2004/72, 21 April 2004, para. 3; 2005/44, 19 April 2005, para.
7; 2004/72, 21 April 2004, para 3; 2004/48, 20 April 2004, para. 6 (adopted without a vote).
177 See, e.g., CCPR General Comment 20, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, p. 30; Human Rights Committee,
General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties
to the Covenant ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004); Bahrain (2005), CAT/
C/CR/34/BHR, para. 6(g). Chile (2004), CAT/C/CR/32/5, paras. 6(b) and 7(b); Peru (2006),
CAT/C/PER/CO/4, para. 16; Spain (2009), CAT/C/ESP/CO/5, para. 21; Chumbipuma
Aguirre et al. v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, IACtHR, Series C, No. 75.
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ICTY.178 Momentum may be gathering behind the position that granting
amnesty for serious crimes is now proscribed by customary law, such a devel-
opment.179 Linked to the inconsistency of broad amnesty laws with particular
human rights obligations, international criminal law authorities increasingly
recognise that, whatever the effect of amnesty or prescription in the home state
as a matter of domestic law, it does not impede prosecution either before
international or foreign courts.180 Likewise statutes of limitations or rules
on prescription that are a common feature of national systems, for common
crimes, cannot however apply to core crimes under international law.181
While domestic laws and constitutions may also provide immunity from
criminal prosecution – for example of heads of state, government officials or
parliamentarians182 – the lawfulness of such measures is again limited by
the international obligations referred to above. The Nuremberg Charter’s recog-
nition that ‘the official position of defendants, whether as heads of state or
responsible officials in government departments, shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment’183 is reflected
in the statutes of subsequent ad hoc tribunals and of the ICC.184 International
law recognises certain immunities from prosecution by foreign courts, for
178 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10 (Trial Chamber), Judgment of 10
December 1998, para. 155: ‘It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account
of the jus cogens value of the prohibition on torture, treaties or customary rules providing
for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State say, taking
national measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through
an amnesty law.’ More recently, the ICTY Appeals Chamber tated that ‘Individuals accused
of such crimes can have no legitimate expectation of immunity from prosecution.’ Prosecutor
v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial
Chamber decision on the alleged Holbrooke Agreement, 12 October 2009, para 50.
179 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 131, pp. 314-15. State practice of granting
amnesty may be becoming more restrictive over time, and accountability norms are
strengthening, indicating a possible shift in customary law in this field. See e.g., Expert
Opinion in Garzon v Spain, ECHR 2011, available at: www.interights.org/Garzon.
180 Article 10, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Article 40, Cambodian Law
for the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea expressly
exclude the possibility of amnesty as a bar to prosecution. National court cases have likewise
clarified that amnesty does not preclude prosecution abroad (see, e.g., references to the
prosecutions of Chile’s Pinochet and Argentina’s Galtieri in Cassese, International Criminal
Law, supra note 131, pp. 314-15) and in many cases at home (e.g., Guatemalan courts rejected
amnesty in the Rios Montt case in 2012/3; see survey of earlier practice in Garzon v. Spain
expert opinion, supra note 179).
181 Furundžija, TC 1998, para 157. Barrios Altos v. Peru, para. 41. See the survey of international
and national sources on Amnesty and Prescription, in Garzon v. Spain, supra note 179.
182 See H. Duffy, ‘National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court’,
11 (2001) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 5.
183 Article 7, London Agreement of 8 August 1945.
184 Articles 6(2) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 27.
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sitting heads of state or foreign ministers for example,185 though the reliance
on immunities to protect persons charged with the most egregious crimes
against the human person is controversial.186
The law relating to amnesty, and immunity may be of limited relevance
to the prosecution of ‘terrorist’ networks such as al Qaeda that are unlikely
to benefit from state-conferred protection from prosecution. It came briefly
into the international frame in the context of purported offers of ‘immunity’
to Saddam Hussein in early 2003, and may revive in the context of for example
state sponsored terrorism in the future.187 Where it is likely to be of greater
relevance is in respect of crimes committed in the name of the ‘war on terror’
where there has yet to be meaningful accountability of state agents, including
high level officials, but where attempts to ensure their ‘de facto’ immunity are
already apparent.188
4A.1.3 Jurisdiction to prosecute
International law and practice point to numerous possible fora for the investi-
gation and prosecution of serious terrorist offence, or responses thereto that
amount to serious offences under international law. This section will explore
these jurisdictional possibilities, and the relationship between them.
185 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002. The case – concerning a Belgian arrest warrant
issued against the incumbent foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
– found that the immunity of a sitting foreign minister from prosecution in domestic courts
is absolute.
186 For a critique see A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights, Sovereignty and Immunity in the Recent
Work of the International Court of Justice’, 14.1 (2002) INTERIGHTS Bulletin 29. The
significance of the case is limited to prosecution before national (as opposed to international)
courts and, most importantly, to sitting (as opposed to former) foreign ministers, providing
at most partial, short-term refuge for persons who abuse high office to commit serious
crimes. The judgment does not suggest that other high-ranking officials, or other ministers
such as Defence Ministers, are similarly protected.
187 The law on amnesty brings into question, e.g., the lawfulness of reported offers of amnesty
to Saddam Hussein made by the American administration prior to the Iraq invasion.
Questions of immunities may also have arisen if a foreign national court had sought to
prosecute him while a sitting head of state, but not once deposed, or if he had been tried
by an an international tribunal.
188 Immunities were argued in the Italian prosecution, in absentia, of several CIA officials in
the Abu Omar case. See B.5 below 7B.14 and Chapter 10. The Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (4) has been described as enshrining ‘de facto immunity’, for U.S. officials’ conduct
that may violate Common Article 3 but that falls short of the MCA definitions of grave
breaches’. For condemnation of a state affording impunity to its officials responsible for
counter terrorism, see, e.g., Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Russian Federation, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/79/RUS (2003).
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4A.1.3.1 National courts and crimes of international concern
International law recognises the right of certain states to exercise criminal
jurisdiction. These are principally the state where the crime occurred, the state
of nationality of suspects, the state of nationality of the victims and, for certain
serious international crimes, all states, based on universal jurisdiction.189 To
take the example of the September 11 crimes, the courts of the United States
provide the natural forum, based on the fundamental principle that jurisdiction
can be exercised by the state on whose territory a crime is committed.
Nationals of several states are suspected of having been involved in the per-
petration of the attacks and many other states lost nationals, in particular in
the World Trade Centre attack, on the basis of which international law allows
them to exercise nationality or passive personality (victim nationality) juris-
diction respectively.190
Under international law, any state may exercise jurisdiction over certain
serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes, on the basis
that they injure not only individual victims but the international community
as a whole.191 Customary international law has long provided for jurisdiction
over such crimes192 and certain international agreements explicitly so pro-
189 As noted below, under universal jurisdiction, a state can prosecute certain serious crimes
irrespective of any link between the state and the offence. The principle aut dedere aut judicare
– the obligation to extradite or prosecute – found in numerous treaties, is a sub-species
of universal jurisdiction conditioned on the presence of the suspect on the state’s territory.
See generally Kress, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de
droit international’, (2006) 4 JICJ 561.
190 Some treaties embrace broad universal jurisdiction while numerous terrorism related treaties
anticipate prosecution by states beyond the territorial state, such as the state of the per-
petrator’s or victim’s nationality: see, e.g., the 1970 Hague Convention; the 1971 Montreal
Convention; the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents; the 1994 Convention on
the Safety of United Nations Peacekeepers, and the 1998 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
191 See C. Hall and H. deRelva, Universal Jurisdiction: Updated preliminary survey, Amnesty
International, (IOR 53/019/2012), available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
IOR53/019/2012/en (providing a thorough survey of universal jurisdiction laws in states
around the world).
192 Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), § 702, includes,
as subject to universal jurisdiction, murder as well as causing the disappearance of indi-
viduals, prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic racial discrimination. O. Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, 1991) (listing ‘slavery, genocide, torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ as falling into this category); see also
Scharf, ‘Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction’, at 363 (including piracy, war
crimes and crimes against humanity). The 1949 Geneva Conventions provisions on universal
jurisdiction are customary. See also Hall and Relva, ibid.
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vide.193 If terrorist attacks amount to crimes that carry universal jurisdiction,
notably crimes against humanity or war crimes, states may exercise universal
jurisdiction in respect of these serious offences. Many states have universal
jurisdiction laws in place,194 to ensure that they can exercise this form of
jurisdiction.195 National courts have relied on this jurisdiction to prosecute
a range of crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes
against humanity.196
Moreover, states that do not yet have such legislation in place197 affording
them jurisdiction when a major attack arises, could enact legislation to confer
universal jurisdiction provided the conduct pursued was criminal at the date
of commission. The cardinal human rights principle of legality and non-retro-
activity in criminal law requires that the conduct be criminal at the date when
it was carried out, not that jurisdiction over the conduct be established at that
time.198 The international criminal tribunals established ex post facto have
themselves addressed this question and found that legality did not necessarily
require that the court was ‘pre-established’ but that it was established ‘in
193 See, e.g., the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions on ‘the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such
grave breaches … and … bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts Convention Against Torture.
194 Through the implementation of the ICC Statute, a number of states have enacted universal
jurisdiction legislation which enables those that could not previously to exercise such
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes:see, e.g., International
Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 (New Zealand), available at: http://
rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/2000/an/026.html ; and Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000 (Canada), available at: www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/
chambus/house/bills/government/C_19_C-19_4/C-19_cover-E.html.
195 See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 191. As a matter of international
law, states can and in some cases must exercise jurisdiction, but domestic law may require
a legislative basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.
196 See, e.g., re Demjanjuk or United States v. Otto, Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann; case
of Ntezimana, Higaniro, Mukangango and Mukabutera, decision of 8 June 2001 of the Court
d’Assise of Bruxelles among others concerning the Rwandan genocide (http://www.asf.be/
AssisesRwanda2/fr/fr_VERDICT_verdict.htm ); Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1999] 2 WLR 272 (H.L.), reprinted in 38 (1999) ILM 430;
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Strengthening this essential tool of international justice’, Amnesty
International, 9 October 2012, IOR 53/020/2012, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/IOR53/020/2012/en ; see also ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of
the Art’, HRW, 2006, available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/06/27/universal-
jurisdiction-europe.
197 Amnesty International indicates that 166 of the 193 UN member states have defined one
or more of four crimes under international law (war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide and torture) as crimes in their national law. In addition, the update notes that
147 out of 193 states have provided for universal jurisdiction over one or more of these
crimes. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 191.
198 See Article 15(2) ICCPR. See also Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (App. Nos. 34044/96,
35532/97 and 44801/98), Judgment of 22 March 2001, ECtHR, Reports 2001-II. See Paust,
‘Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden’, supra note 131.
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keeping with the relevant procedures’ and that it ‘observes the requirements
of procedural fairness’.199 The development of universal jurisdiction has not
been linear, with periods of expansion and recent examples of a more restrict-
ive approach to the circumstances in which this jurisdiction can or should be
exercised by states.200
As reflected perhaps in the fact that universal jurisdiction has not emerged
as a central theme in discussions around the prosecution of terrorism post-
9/11, there is support, in principle, for the priority of the territorial state’s right
and responsibility to exercise jurisdiction. The relevance and utility of universal
jurisdiction, like other jurisdictional bases, is most apparent in circumstances
where the territorial state cannot or will not exercise jurisdiction,201 or argu-
ably where it cannot or will not prosecute according to basic standards of inter-
national justice that justify international support and cooperation.202 As stated
by the OAS ‘[T]he principle of territoriality must prevail in the case of a juris-
dictional conflict, provided that there are adequate, effective remedies in that
state to prosecute such crimes and guarantee the application of rules of due
199 See Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, supra note 24 at para. 45. For an analysis of the
principle of the pre-established or ‘natural’ judge, including its historical development,
see J.B.J. Maier, Derecho Procesal Penal. Tomo I (Buenos Aires, 1996), pp. 763 ff and Article
26(2) American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
200 On the ‘decline of universal jurisdiction’, see R. Cryer, H. Friman, et al., An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note 31 at p. 55-58 (noting the expansive
approach taken by some states, such as Belgium and Spain, in recent years having lead
to attempts to restrict the laws). A relevant factor for the former was the Arrest Warrant
case, supra note 185. In October 2009 the Spanish Senate restricted the country’s extra-
territorial jurisdiction to crimes that have a demonstrated link with Spain and are not
investigated or prosecuted by another competent country or international tribunal. See also
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Strengthening this essential tool of international justice’, Amnesty
International, supra note 191.
201 Note that unlike the ICC, which will only exercise jurisdiction where no national court
is willing or able to do so, there is no established rule of subsidiarity for universal juris-
diction. However, a similar approach is increasingly evident in practice. See, e.g., OAS
Resolution 1/03 notes ‘that the principle of territoriality should prevail over that of national-
ity in the event that the state where the international crimes occurred wishes to bring them
to justice, and that it offers due guarantees of a fair trial to the alleged perpetrators’ (para.
5). See also the decision of the Criminal Decision of the Spanish National Court on genocide,
terrorism and torture allegedly committed in Guatemala during the 1980s, and the comment
by M. Cottier, ‘What Relationship Between the Exercise of Universal and Territorial Juris-
diction? The Decision of 13 December 2000 of the Spanish National Court Shelving the
Proceedings Against Guatemalan Nationals Accused of Genocide’, in Fischer, Kreß and
Lüder (eds.), Prosecution of Crimes, pp. 843 ff.; see also the Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction (Princeton University, 2001), available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/
unive_jur.pdf. On undue deference to US authorities on this basis in the war on terror
context, see below and Chapter 7B14.
202 For discussion of the limits imposed by human rights law on cooperation in criminal matters
see below, Chapter 7A.4.3.8.
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process for the alleged perpetrators, and that there is an effective will to bring
them to justice’.203
As discussed in the context of post-9/11 practice below and in other
chapters, the neglect of criminal law in some contexts as well as the
politicisation and lack of due process in terrorism trials may however serve
as a reminder of the importance of such ‘alternative’ jurisdictions. Where denial
of justice ariese within the territorial state, prosecution of international crimes
may arise before the courts of other states willing to see justice done or, as
discussed in the next section, international alternatives.204
So far as national courts do exercise jurisdiction over international crimes
under international law, it has been suggested that they are normally ‘under
an obligation to interpret the domestic provisions in accordance with the
interpretation of equivalent international provisions, including those made
by international criminal tribunals’.205 What has been described as a ‘bizarre
and unfortunate’ exception to that is the US Military Commissions Act of 2006
which prohibits courts from relying on international legal sources in relation
to war crimes.206
4A.1.3.2 International alternatives
Where national courts do not or cannot assume the investigative and pro-
secutorial role, recent history provides several alternative international, or
quasi-international, models for the investigation or prosecution of international
crimes.
a) The ICC, terrorism and counter-terrorism
The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted
in Rome on 17 July 1998, entering into force on 1 July 2002. The Court does
not have retrospective jurisdiction, and cannot therefore prosecute crimes
committed before the Statute’s entry into force,207 although the Security Coun-
cil could, at least theoretically, confer jurisdiction on the ICC over offences
before entry into force, in accordance with its Chapter VII powers.208
203 Preamble OAS Resolution 1/03 on ‘Trial for International Crimes’, Washington DC, 24
October 2003.
204 See Chapters 10 and 7B14.
205 See Cryer & Friman, supra note 31 at p. 77 (citing the Jorgic case at the German constitutional
court, 12.12.2000).
206 Ibid., citing Matheson, ‘The Amendment of the War Crimes Act’, AJIL 2007.
207 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 11.
208 This would mirror the establishments of ad hoc criminal tribunals in the past. If the Security
Council so decided, it has been questioned whether the ICC would be able to accept such
jurisdiction: see, e.g., C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the “War against Terrorism”’,
78 (2002) International Affairs 301. In relation to 9/11, this was not a realistic option given
inter alia US opposition and its veto power within the Council.
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While the relevance of the ICC in the ‘war on terror’ is considered in Part B
of this chapter,209 certain characteristics of the ICC, pertinent to an assessment
of its relevance to terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world, are
worthy of note here. The Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed in international or non-international
armed conflict and, with effect from 2017, the crime of aggression.210 More-
over, while not presently covered by the ICC Statute, it is also at least conceiv-
able that ‘terrorism’ as a specific crime, comprising a broader ambit of conduct,
may come to be included within the ICC Statute at some future date.211
In order for offences to be tried by the ICC, however, the Court’s jurisdiction
must be triggered in accordance with the Statute, which can be done in several
ways.212 The Security Council, which has repeatedly called for justice
responses to international terrorism post- September 11, could confer juris-
diction on the Court as it has in other cases, unless the veto power prevented
this.213 Absent Council referral, the Court’s jurisdiction depends on the state
on whose territory the atrocities were committed, or a state whose nationals
are suspected of responsibility, having ratified the Statute or accepted the
Court’s jurisdiction.214 Nationals of a state party are therefore potentially
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.215 Jurisdiction over nationals of non-states
209 See Chapter 4, para. 4B.1.2.2 below.
210 See Article 8bis of the amended Statute. See above, para. 4A.1.1.3 for discussion of the
exercise of jurisdiction over aggression. Although the ICC review conference approved
the amendment, it requires a further decision to activate the amendment, which will take
effect only after 1.1 2017. See also Article 15bis for the special conditions attaching to the
exercise of jurisdiction over aggression.
211 SC Res. 1377 (2001) called for such inclusion; see ‘The ICC: 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq and
Beyond’, Chapter 4, para. 4B.1.2.2 below.
212 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 13 ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction’, which provides for referral
by (a) the Security Council or (b) by a state party or (c) a propio motu investigation by the
Prosecutor as triggering jurisdiction. In respect of the last two, however, the ‘preconditions
for the exercise of Jurisdiction’ in Article 12 must be satisfied, namely that the state of
territory or of nationality is a state party.
213 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 13. The Security Council used its powers to refer several
situations to the Court in the first decade of its life: Libya (SC Res. 1970 (2011), 26 February
2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1970); and Sudan (SC Res. 1593 (2005), 31 March 2005, UN Doc.
S/RES/1593). By contrast, the failure to refer Syria in 2011-12 has drawn harsh criticism.
The Court does not depend on SC referral or approval (Article 13), provided there is a
link via the state of territory or nationality as discussed below (Article 12: preconditions
for the exercise of Jurisdiction).
214 ICC Statute Article 12. Cote d’Ivoire fell into the latter category, being the first non-state
party to the state to accept the courts jurisdiction. See ‘Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court’, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FBD2D966-
93CF-4A86-B590-46293E819A65/279844/ICDEENG5.pdf. For the Cote d’Ivoire litigation,
see Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11.
215 See P. Sands, ‘Our Troops Alone Risk Prosecution’, The Guardian, 15 January 2003.
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parties would depend on the state on whose territory the crime is committed
being a party or accepting jurisdiction.216
Critically, however, ICC jurisdiction will only operate where the state itself
does not take necessary and reasonable measures to investigate or prosecute
allegations of serious crimes.217 The design of the ICC regime is thus, in signi-
ficant part, to act as a catalyst to effective national prosecutions.
b) The role of other international, regional or hybrid ad hoc tribunals
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has broad powers
to take measures for international peace and security, as discussed in Chap-
ter 5, below. In 1994 it exercised those powers to establish two international
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. It is therefore
possible for the Security Council to establish a tribunal or, as has been sug-
gested, to extend the jurisdiction of an existing tribunal, to prosecute serious
offences of international concern.218
International experience also points to hybrid models of quasi-international
justice that have emerged from negotiation and agreement. The approach of
the Nuremberg tribunal suggests that several states can agree together to
establish an international tribunal, conferring on it the power to do ‘what any
one of them might have done singly’, namely prosecute on the basis of one
of the grounds of jurisdiction mentioned above.219 Similarly, an agreement
between the UN and Sierra Leone led to the Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone,220 which combines elements of national law, procedure and
personnel with international components.221 Other examples that might be
described as predominantly domestic tribunals, but with an international
216 As noted above, before the ICC can act, the state of territory or nationality of the accused
must be a party to the ICC treaty or accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 12, ICC Statute.
217 See the relationship of ‘complementarity’ between the ICC and national tribunals in ICC
Statute, Preamble and Articles 17-19. Whether ICC jurisdiction should be conditioned on
national courts meeting certain standards of justice is a matter for debate and subject of
ICC litigation in relation to Libya. The ‘ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, by contrast, established the ‘primacy’ of the international tribunals over national
courts but they may have been premised implicitly on the unavailability or ineffectiveness
of national courts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda at the time in question.
218 G. Robertson, ‘There is a legal way out of this ... ’, The Guardian, 14 September 2001 (calling
for an international or quasi-international tribunal abound in the context of Iraq). The ICC
could also be afforded jurisdiction by the Security Council.
219 The Nuremberg Judgment reasoned that: ‘The signatory Powers created this Tribunal,
defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the
Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have done singly’ (emphasis
added), ‘International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’, 41 (1946)
AJIL 216.
220 Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
4 October 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/915.
221 See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, 145; 97 AJIL 295; UN
Doc. S/2002/246, appendix II.
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aspect, are the human rights court established by the United Nations in East
Timor222 or the tribunal established by the Cambodian government to pro-
secute the crimes related to the Cambodian genocide.223
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has a similarly hybrid nature, but is
noteworthy as a tribunal established by agreement between the government
and the Security Council to investigate and prosecute those responsible for
a specific terrorist incident, namely the killing of former Prime Minister Harari
in Beirut on 14 February 2005.224
The Lockerbie court presents an unusual model that emerged from the
diplomatic impasse over the refusal to extradite suspects in the 1988 bomb-
ing.225 It took the form of a national court sitting on foreign soil, applying
mostly national law, with the exception that there was no jury. This arose as
a compromise solution in the face of allegations as to the inability of the
Scottish courts to dispense fair and impartial justice in the particular case.
While unlikely to gain traction in practice in the future, this scenario could
similarly be invoked to address concerns as to the potential prejudice to the
fairness of trials, of relevance in a world where ‘terrorism’ trials have often
come to be synonymous with abusive processes.226
Whether the establishment of any of the models of ad hoc jurisdiction
remains a feature of international practice in the future is uncertain, as the
rationale for them should in principle be undermined by functioning national
courts capable and willing of doing justice, supplemented by a permanent ICC.
Other proposals for future jurisdictions have emerged, though these are
of less apparent significance, at least as yet. Worthy of note are proposals for
a future African regional criminal jurisdiction, an expansion of the nascent
African Court on Justice and Human Rights, which have essentially been
triggered by tension between the African Union and the ICC over the indict-
ment of president Bashir of Sudan. Whether the proposal will survive and
the expanded jurisdiction ever become a reality remains far from certain, but
it is noted that terrorism is one of the crimes that proponents suggest would
222 The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established such
a system in the Dili district to investigate international crimes that had occurred during
1999.
223 The Cambodian government agreed to create a hybrid court in which Cambodian judges
would be in the majority, with international judges having a right of veto.
224 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
S/2006/176, 21 March 2006.
225 Flight Pan Am 103 was bombed in the airspace over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 people
on board and 11 residents of Lockerbie.
226 See Chapter 7 on fair trial and Chapter 8 on Guantánamo Bay and military commissions
specifically.
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fall within any such jurisdiction.227 While discussions have also unfolded
in an academic context as to merits of an alternative ‘international terrorism
court’, practice post-9/11 reveals little appetite for such a development, and
tend by contrast to underscore the importance of the role of national courts,
bolstered by more effective international cooperation, as discussed further in
Part B below.228
4A.2 IMPLEMENTING JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ENFORCEMENT
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The international criminal justice approach to international terrorism depends,
naturally, on international enforcement.229 International cooperation, in
matters of extradition and ‘mutual assistance’ between states, is essential for
the purposes of, for example, arresting and transferring suspects, freezing
assets and securing evidence.230 As discussed below, rules governing coopera-
tion are, in general, set out in multilateral and bilateral arrangements. These
are supplemented by other obligations – imposed for example by the Security
Council or assumed in international treaties including the sectoral terrorism
treaties. They sit alongside other provisions of international law, notably
international human rights law which reflects such obligations, but imposes
conditions on cooperation.
4A.2.1 Extradition
The duty to extradite may arise from bilateral or multilateral extradition
treaties, which also enshrine exceptions to this duty.231 Crimes under inter-
national law are considered so serious that states are obliged to extradite
persons found on their territory, or to submit them for prosecution in their
227 D. Deya, ‘Is the African Court worth the Wait’, 22 March 2012, available at: http://allafrica.
com/stories/201203221081.html. The AU has defined terrorism in its Counter-terrorism
Convention, which may pave their way for agreement on the scope of the expanded
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to terrorism in Africa.
228 See, e.g., discussion of proposls set out in E. Creegan, ‘A Permanent Hybrid Court for
Terrorism’, 26 (2011) American Univ. Int’l Law Rev. 2, p. 237.
229 The enforcement considered here is for the purposes of ensuring effective criminal prosecu-
tion, as opposed to enforcement of judgments and sentences.
230 Cooperation arises also in relation to, for example, the transfer of sentenced persons, transfer
of proceedings, protection of victims and witnesses and effecting compensation.
231 States may, and increasingly do, extradite on the basis of national law without a treaty
or arrangement, in accordance with the desire to improve international cooperation in
respect of serious offences.
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own state (aut dedere aut judicare).232 Several of the sectoral terrorism treaties
similarly so provide.233 Moreover, Security Council resolutions dealing with
counter-terrorism post September 11 asserted a clear duty on UN member states
to deny safe haven to terrorists and to bring them to justice.234 In 2006 the
UN General Assembly also reiterated this imperative in its Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy.235 As discussed further below, alongside this duty, is
the duty under human rights law not to extradite where there is a real risk
that the fugitive would be subject to certain serious human rights violations
in the state requesting extradition.236 A state’s obligations in respect of extra-
dition must therefore be understood not only by reference to extradition
treaties, but also to other provisions of international law.
4A.2.1.1 Key features of extradition law
Most problems with international cooperation relate to variable degrees of
political will to cooperate. However, extradition regimes have also often been
criticised for their complexity, resulting in obstacles, delay in justice enforce-
ment, and potentially denial of justice, which in turn provide a disincentive
to states to respect the legal process.237 Attempts to reform and modernise
law and procedures, including the removal of domestic obstacles to extradition
and streamlining procedures were underway before September 11 and were
further impelled by those events, as discussed in part B of this chapter.238
Alongside these developments have been others in human rights law that seek
to ensure protection for the person whose extradition is requested. Together
232 This duty aut dedere aut judicare – to extradite or prosecute – is enshrined explicitly in various
human rights instruments, such as the Convention against Torture, Article 5, and interpreted
as implicit in the positive duty to ensure rights under more general human rights instru-
ments: see Chapter 7A.4 ‘Positive Obligations’.
233 The principle is also reflected in specific terrorism conventions: see, e.g., Article 7, Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 16 December 1970, 860
UNTS 12325, in force 14 October 1971); Article 5(2), Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS
14118, in force 26 January 1973); Article 7, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (New York, 14 December 1973, 1035
UNTS 15410, in force 20 February 1977); Article 8(1) International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages (New York, 18 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 21931, in force 3 June 1983).
234 SC Res. 1373, supra note 132.
235 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 8 September 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/288.
236 See this chapter, para. 4A.2.1.2.
237 For a discussion of some of those obstacles see Koufa, ‘Progress Report’, supra note 133,
para. 127 (citing evidence requirements, ‘forum non conveniens’ concerns, including de-
fendants’ rights issues). Generally, and on exceptions such as ‘nationality’ and ‘political
offences’, see also C. Van den Wyngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition (Dor-
drecht, 1980), pp. 148-9. For efforts to enhance cooperation see ‘Developments’ below; and
du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra note 8.
238 See in particular para. 4B.2.
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they have significantly changed the shape of extradition law in recent years;
these developments are to be welcomed so far as they enhance effectiveness,
minimise arbitrariness and safeguard essential human rights protection.
While multiple bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties exist, each
with their own specific provisions, among the traditional principles of extra-
dition law that can be identified from common features of extradition treaties
and practice are the following.239
– Double criminality and ‘Extraditable Offences’: most extradition arrangements
have traditionally provided that an act is only extraditable if it is punishable
as a crime according to the laws of both the requesting state and the requested
state, or according to international law. In general, the crime need not itself
be identical – if the request is for extradition for ‘terrorism’ offences for
example the requested state need not also have an offence of terrorism in
domestic law – but the conduct that forms the basis of the offence must be
punishable in both states, often by a minimum specified penalty.240 It is open
to debate whether this requirement poses an obstacle to efficient cooperation
in terrorism matters, or an important safeguard against abuse in the context
of the amorphous and/or politicised nature of some ‘terrorism’ prosecu-
tions.241
– Specialty and re-extradition: it is a general rule that, once extradited, a suspect
must be tried only for the crime or crimes covered in the extradition request,
and only in the requesting state, unless the consent of the extraditing state
is secured.
– Ne bis in idem (double jeopardy): as a person may not be tried twice in
respect of the same offence, in certain circumstances the state need not extradite
if there has been a final judgment against the suspect in respect of the conduct
in question. Different manifestations of this principle appear in extradition
and human rights treaties.242
239 See also UN Model Treaty on Extradition, GA Res. 45/116, annex, UN Doc. A/45/49 (1990),
30 ILM 1407. For a discussion see R. Cryer, H. Friman, et al., An Introduction to International
Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note 31, pp. 89-93. Others, such as the non-extradition
of nationals in some constitutions are not addressed here. Duffy, ‘Constitutional Compatibil-
ity’, supra note 182 at p. 20.
240 In recent years some States have moved from a ‘list approach’ to extradition which elim-
inates the need to set out all the relevant offences in a subsidiary document and replaces
it with a test based on the applicable penalty.
241 See changes in 4B222. It would be important to have a substantive rather than listing
approach if the principle is to protect from prosecuting legitimate activity, as discussed
in Chapter 7B.11.
242 Surprisingly, human rights treaties would appear only to protect only against prosecution
twice in the same state;see M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘travaux préparatoires’ of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht, 1987), pp. 316-18 and the decisions of the
Human Rights Committee in ARJ v. Australia (Comm. No. 692/1996), Views of 28 July 1997
and A.P. v. Italy (Comm. No. 204/1986), Decision of 2 November 1987, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
31/D/204/1986. However, a broader application of the ne bis in idem principle to extradition
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– Non-extraditable offences and the political offence exception: to protect against
extradition for politically motivated prosecution, and the potential involvement
of foreign states in domestic political entanglements, an exception to obligations
to extradite developed for crimes considered to be political in nature.243 This
exception has however increasingly been removed from international and
national extradition provisions, in particular in respect of certain types of
serious crimes such as the crimes under international law discussed above.244
In relation to terrorism specifically, modern treaties generally exclude the
political offence exception,245 and indeed the Security Council, in Resolution
1373 (2001) insisted that states ensure ‘that claims of political motivation are
not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged
terrorists’.246
– Prima Facie Evidence: while extradition procedures vary considerably, not
least between common law and civil law countries, often in extradition practice
a request for extradition is accompanied by a warrant and basic evidence,
sometimes referred to as ‘prima facie’ evidence, or a showing of ‘probable
cause’.247 Extradition proceedings are not a mini-trial and the evidence
required is clearly much less than would be required to satisfy the requested
state of the guilt of the suspect; clearly the investigation need not be complete
before the extradition is requested (nor need all available evidence be provided
to the requested state). However, extradition (and the detention which accom-
panies it) should not be requested unless or until the evidence provides reason-
able grounds to suspect the individual of having committed the offence,248
and the requirement of sharing a basic degree of evidence was considered
is contained in many extradition treaties including, for example, Article 9 of the European
Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13 December 1957, ETS No. 24, in force 18 April 1960.
243 For background see Van den Wyngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition (Dor-
drecht, 1980).
244 It is commonly recognised that the political offence exception does not cover crimes under
international law, and international agreements expressly so provide. See, e.g., the 1979
Additional Protocol to the 1957 European Extradition Convention; UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 8; UN
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions, Principle 18; Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance
of Persons, Article 5. See generally, C. Van den Wyngaert, The Political Offense Exception,
pp. 134 ff.
245 The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977,
ETS No. 90, excludes the political offence exception as do the United Nations Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the United Nations Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9 December 1999, UN Doc. A/RES/54/109
(1999).
246 SC Res. 1373, supra note 132 at para. 3(g).
247 This is, traditionally, the position in common law countries while some civil law jurisdictions
require a judicial order and sufficient information to establish dual criminality, rather than
‘evidence’ as such.
248 Proceedings must be consistent with the right to liberty and related safeguards, see, e.g.,
Article 9 ICCPR and Chapter 7A.5.3 and 7.7.
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one way of ensuring that this is the case. However, as described in relation
to developments post September 11 below, in certain contexts the requirement
has been watered down in the name of streamlining the extradition process
and effectively countering terrorism.249
– Non-inquiry: The principle that states will not inquire into the good faith
of another state’s request is long established in many states,250 but is subject
to qualification as a matter of national and international law.251 At its strictest,
such a rule might preclude the requested state from considering any evident-
iary questions and require it to be blind to the circumstances of the trial and
treatment of the suspect in the requesting state, neither of which reflect current
international law and practice. While domestic courts are not obliged (nor
necessarily well placed) to actively engage in a detailed assessment of another
state’s system, they are obliged under human rights law not to extradite where
there are substantial grounds for believing that the person’s rights would be
violated in the requesting state, as explained below.252
4A.2.1.2 Extradition and human rights
In its totality, the legal framework governing extradition seeks to accommodate
the essential balance between ensuring an effective system of inter-state co-
operation and protecting the rights of the individual.253
249 See Chapter 4B.2.3, in relation to the European Council Framework Decision on the European
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedure between Member States, 13 June 2002 (2002/
584/JHA), OJ L 190/5, 18 July 2002 (hereinafter ‘European Arrest Warrant’). See also the
Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America (Washington, 31
March 2003) (hereinafter ‘US-UK Extradition Treaty’).
250 It is described as a rule of customary law in I. Bantekas, M. Nash and S. Mackarel, Inter-
national Criminal Law (London, 2001), p. 149. See Cryer & Friman, et al., supra note 31 at
p. 94 (describing it as a feature of common law states); and J. Dugard and C. van den
Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’, 92 (1998) AJIL 188, 190 (noting
that the rule traditionally applied in, e.g., US, UK and Canada, but not in continental
European countries).
251 On national restrictions, see Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’, ibid.
at pp. 190-91. On international legal restrictions see Chapter 7A5.10.
252 When extradition is requested a minimal duty of inquiry may be implicit in human rights
obligations to ensure the individual will not be transferred in face of real risks of serious
violations. This duty may arise before extradition or – where extradition is granted subject
to assurances for example – thereafter (see, e.g., Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002), para. 12; Othman (Abu
Qatada) v. UK, (Appl. No. 8139/09), ECHR Judgment of 12 January 2012.
253 ‘To require such a review [by courts in the extraditing state] of the manner in which a court
not bound by the Convention had applied the principles enshrined in Article 6 would also
thwart the current trend towards strengthening international cooperation in the administra-
tion of justice, a trend which is in principle in the interests of the persons concerned. The
Contracting States are, however, obliged to refuse their cooperation if it emerges that the conviction
is the result of a flagrant denial of justice.’ Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (Appl. No.
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While most general human rights treaties do not address extradition
explicitly, it is well established that the obligations of states to protect and
ensure the human rights of individuals within their jurisdiction extend to
declining to extradite (or otherwise deport or expel) persons to states where
certain of their rights are at serious risk of violation.254 As discussed more
fully in Chapter 7, human rights treaties and the decisions of human rights
bodies interpreting obligations on a case-by-case basis, indicate a prohibition
on extradition where there is substantial risk of, inter alia, torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment, in certain contexts the application
of the death penalty, prolonged arbitrary detention or a ‘flagrant denial’ of
fair trial rights.255
Many of these prohibitions have developed from violations arising com-
monly in the terrorism context. They may arise from the criminal process itself
– the lack of fundamental fair trial guarantees or independence of the tribunal
for example – or the conditions of pre-trial or post-conviction detention. It
falls to be determined case-by-case whether there is a ‘real and personal’ risk
of a serious rights violation in the receiving state.256
Extradition documents broadly reflect these obligations, although not consist-
ently or systematically. The Inter-American Convention on Extradition, for
example, precludes extradition ‘when the offense in question is punishable
in the requesting State by the death penalty, by life imprisonment, or by
degrading punishment’ unless sufficient assurances have been obtained pre-
viously,257 while the European Convention on Extradition makes explicit
12747/87), 26 June 1992, ECtHR, Series A, No. 240, para. 110 (emphasis added). The obliga-
tion not to transfer to flagrant denial of justice was found to constitute a violation in Othman
v. UK, supra note 252.
254 This principle of ‘non-refoulement’ is discussed in detail in Chapter 7A.4.5.10 B5.10.
255 It remains open whether the same principle applies to other rights violations under these
conventions, as discussed in Chapter 7. The express prohibition of extradition or surrender
in cases where some of the rights protected would be likely to be infringed in the requesting
state is also contained in certain human rights treaties or instruments. See, e.g., ACHR
(Article 22(8)), UN Convention against Torture (Article 3), and European Charter of Funda-
mental Rights (Article 19). See also Art. 33 Convention Relating to the Status Refugees
(Geneva, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, in force 22 April 1954) expressly prohibiting refoule-
ment of asylum seekers to a country where ‘[their] life or freedom would be threatened
on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.’
256 See, e.g., Othman, supra note 252, where the ECHR found that the transfer to trial of the
applicant in Jordan by a military commission which admitted evidence obtained through
torture, would amount to a flagrant denial of justice. Cf extraditing terrorist suspects to
imprisonment in a super-max prison in the US did not amount to inhuman treatment: Case
of Babar Ahmad and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08,
66911/09 and 67354/09, Judgment, 10 April 2012, paras. 200-215.
257 Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Caracas, 25 February 1981, OAS Treaty Series
No. 60, in force 28 March 1992, Article 9 prohibiting transfer absent sufficient assurances
that the death penalty, life imprisonment, or degrading punishment will not be imposed
or, if imposed, not enforced.
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reference only to the death penalty or discriminatory proceedings.258 The
UN Model Treaty on Extradition suggests that extradition be precluded where
the requested State has substantial grounds to believe human rights norms
on (a) discrimination, (b) torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and punish-
ment, (c) minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings as contained in the
ICCPR would not be respected, or (d) that the judgment of the requesting State
has been rendered in absentia without the accused having the opportunity to
present a defence.259 While these provisions generally derive from – and must
be interpreted by reference to – human rights jurisprudence, they may also
include other issues, such as the ban on life imprisonment, peculiar to parti-
cular constitutional traditions.260
States may seek to reconcile their commitment and obligations in respect
of cooperation with human rights protection in various ways. Not uncommon-
ly, states seek ‘assurances’ from the requesting state that it will act or refrain
from acting in a certain way, but as human rights bodies have recently noted,
this only meets their obligations so far as accompanied, in all the circum-
stances, by genuine post-transfer safeguards for the persons extradited, in-
cluding effective monitoring by the sending state. It is thus emphasised that
the sending state’s responsibility for the rights of the person continues after
extradition, by virtue of the act of expulsion. States may, alternatively, be in
a position to prosecute rather than extradite, in accordance with the aut dedere
aut judicare principle applicable to certain serious offences discussed above;
to this end states may take legislative measures to ensure that domestic law
recognises jurisdiction over serious crimes committed outside the state’s
territory.261
258 Article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 addresses the right to refuse
extradition in the context of the death penalty. See also Article 3(2) excluding extradition
where it is ‘for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race,
religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced
for any of these reasons’.
259 See UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990, Article 3, which precludes extradition where
the requested state has substantial grounds to believe human rights norms on (a) discrimina-
tion, (b) torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment, (c) minimum guarantees
in criminal proceedings would not be respected or (d) ‘the judgment of the requesting State
has been rendered in absentia, [and] the convicted person has not had sufficient notice of
the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his or her defence and he has not had or will
not have the opportunity to have the case retried in his or her presence’. Article 4 adds
optional grounds for refusing extradition including in relation to the death penalty.
260 For example, life imprisonment is prohibited in several constitutions, particularly but not
exclusively in Latin America, so certain extradition treaties treat life imprisonment. See,
e.g., Inter-American Convention on Extradition above. While not prohibited by human rights
law per se, life imprisonment where there is no prospect of early release may raise an issue
of inhuman treatment, e.g., under Article 3 of the ECHR: see Einhorn v. France (Appl. No.
71555/01), Admissibility decision, 16 October 2001, para. 27; Babar Ahmed v UK (Appl.
24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09)), 10 April 2012
261 See 4A.1.3 above.
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4A.2.2 Mutual assistance
Mutual assistance is the process used to obtain evidence and other forms of
information and legal cooperation from a foreign country, and as such is
critical to effective international enforcement of criminal law in relation to
terrorism. The broad legal framework of obligations incumbent on states to
cooperate in criminal matters in respect of international terrorism is increasing-
ly apparent through the Security Council’s resolutions,262 and through the
specific terrorism conventions which commonly impose a general obligation
of cooperation with the investigations of other states.263 This framework does
not, however, provide specific modalities or procedures for such cooperation,
and the challenges to effective cooperation in information and evidence sharing
remain great.264 It has been suggested that the legal framework for coopera-
tion in combating terrorism would benefit from strengthening through a multi-
lateral convention on mutual assistance.265
Like for extradition, there are however mutual assistance treaties on a
bilateral or multilateral basis which provide procedures for the exchange of
evidence and examples of the grounds on which requests can be refused.266
These arrangements are often less formal or rigid than in the case of extra-
dition, with states generally enjoying a larger measure of discretion to grant
or decline requests for assistance.267 As discussed in the human rights chap-
ter, the human rights obligations of states are less clear in respect of mutual
assistance than they are in respect of extradition of persons physically present
on the extraditing state’s territory,268 although, arguably at least, the same
262 SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 136.
263 Cryer & Friman, et al., supra note 31 at p. 103-04. See also Chapter 2.
264 See du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra note 8; Kim Prost, ‘The Need for a Multilateral Cooperat-
ive Framework for Mutual Legal Assistance,’ in Counterterrorism Strategies, supra note 8.
265 Prost, ‘Need for a Multilateral Cooperative Framework’, supra note 264.
266 See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Stras-
bourg, 20 April 1959, ETS No. 30, in force 12 June 1962; Convention on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, adopted by the
European Council on 29 May 2000, OJ C 197/1 of 12 July 2000; Scheme Relating to Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters between Commonwealth Countries; UN Model Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, GA Res. 45/117, 14 December 1990, UN Doc. A/
RES/45/117.
267 Mutual assistance may be rendered on the basis of domestic law without resort to a treaty.
Whereas, traditionally, extradition was predicated on a treaty, the UK e.g. will in principle
grant assistance to any requesting state: C. Nicholls, C. Montgomery and J. Knowles, The
Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: Practice and Procedure (London,
2002)..
268 States have well-established duties to investigate violations within their territory or juris-
diction; seeChapter 7A.4.2. In Rantsev v Cyprus & Russia, the ECHR referred to the duty
of Russia to cooperate in the investigation of crimes on Cypriot territory.
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underlying principles may be held to apply.269 While still not the norm,
several mutual assistance agreements do specifically exclude cooperation
where, for example, the requested state has substantial grounds for believing
that the request for mutual assistance has been made for the purpose of pro-
secuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality
or political opinion or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any
of these reasons.270 Some others suggest that other human rights concerns,271
including the death penalty,272 also provide a basis for refusal to cooper-
ate.273 The practice of states, and the reluctance of some to cooperate in the
face of risks of rights violations in the war on terror is discussed at Part B.
4A.2.3 Cooperation and the Security Council
In certain circumstances, states may consider that such ‘cooperative’ procedures
would be futile or ineffective. Examples may include where a state whose
cooperation is needed is believed to be involved in committing or concealing
the crimes in question (as addressed by the ICJ in Lockerbie),274 or where the
urgency of the situation – due for example to well founded fear of repetition –
demands swifter action than the normal cooperation process would provide.
States may not however simply circumvent the cooperation process and uni-
laterally embark on coercive ‘enforcement’ action directly on another state’s
territory, without falling foul of international legal obligations owed to the
269 While extradition involves persons within the territory or jurisdiction of the extraditing
state, in respect of mutual assistance the person affected may have not at any time been
physically within the state’s territory or subject to its ‘jurisdiction,’upon which the applicabil-
ity of human rights treaties depends: see Chapter 7A2. However, assistance rendered in
the knowledge that it may contribute to a violation of human rights in another state may
offend ‘the general spirit’ of human rights conventions (Soering v. United Kingdom (Appl.
No. 10438/88), Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, No. 161, para. 87) or amount to aiding
or assisting, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 10.
270 Article 8 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism confirms that there
is no obligation to afford mutual assistance in these circumstances.
271 See also UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which envisages refusal
to cooperate in case of persecution, double jeopardy (non bis in idem) and unfair measures
to compel testimony, Articles 4(1)(c)-(e).
272 The commentary to Article 4 of the UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters notes that states may wish to add other grounds for refusal, e.g., ‘the nature of
the applicable penalty (e.g., capital punishment)’.
273 Some treaties and legislation have a much reduced basis for refusal in mutual assistance,
limited solely to ‘where execution of the request would be contrary to national security,
public interest or sovereignty’.
274 Questions of the Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of
14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 3.
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other state (assuming it did not consent)275 and to individuals under human
rights law.276 In such circumstances, it should be recalled that, if faced with
a situation in which normal cooperation procedure would be ineffective, states
can call upon the Security Council to authorise criminal law enforcement action
in the name of international peace and security,277 including where necessary
through the use of force.278 Force employed must always be no more than
necessary to achieve the objective, in this case the apprehension of suspects
or securing vital evidence.
The experience of the ICTY provides an example of Security Council author-
isation for NATO enforcement of arrest warrants internationally. Although that
experience concerned the transfer of persons to an international tribunal
established by the Council, there is nothing to preclude the Council doing the
same in the future in respect of another national or international court seeking
to ensure that justice is done and international peace and security
respected.279 In the context of international terrorism, in which the Council
has called on all states to cooperate, such action would constitute a form of
enforcement of its own resolutions.280
The enforcement of international law is never perfect, and international
criminal law is no exception. However, the unprecedented international con-
sensus generated post-9/11 as regards the need to combat international terror-
ism and render more effective international cooperation in criminal matters,
if directed towards the apprehension of suspects and effective collective
enforcement of international criminal law, could have had – or could yet have –
potentially positive repercussions for the international legal order.
275 If a state seeks to effect law enforcement on another state’s territory without its consent,
it may violate the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force:
see Chapter 5. On the unlawfulness of such enforcement including ‘hot pursuit’ see Oppen-
heim’s International Law, supra note 3 at p. 387.
276 If individuals are transferred for the purposes of criminal process in a way that simply
circumvents the extradition process, violations of individual rights as well as obligations
owed to other state parties to the extradition treaties may arise. See Chapter 10 for examples.
277 The exceptions or grounds for refusal in extradition proceedings do not apply to transfer
to international tribunals. See Duffy, ‘Constitutional Compatibility’, supra note 182, p. 20.
278 The Council has authorised coercive action to apprehend suspects to the ICTY. See also
SC Res. 837 (1993), 6 June 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/837 (1993) in relation to Somalia. See
Chapter 5, para. 5A.2.2.
279 Alternative provision would be made by the Council for human rights protection if extra-
dition were to be circumvented – as was the case, e.g., to surrender before the ICTY.
280 See, e.g., SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 132.
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4B CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM POST-9/11
The second part of this chapter sketches out international practice in relation
to criminal law responses to international terrorism since 9/11.281 In light
of the legal framework set out in the first section of this chapter, it is indis-
putable that egregious crimes under international and national law were
committed on September 11, 2001 and have been committed through other
serious acts of international terrorism since then.282
Most straightforwardly, mass murder and other serious bodily offences
contravened US and other domestic criminal laws. While dispute may arise
as to whether certain acts of terrorism meet the criteria for crimes against
humanity, it is submitted that attacks such as the September 11 attacks
epitomise the sort of massive, systematic and ultimately devastating attack
on civilians embodied in the concept of crimes against humanity.283 Much
more doubtful is the possibility of them constituting war crimes, given the
failure to establish or even assert an ‘armed conflict’ legally speaking,284 or
even aggression, given the lack of state responsibility.285 However, specific
treaty crimes, such as hijacking or terrorist bombing, may provide another
source of applicable criminal law, at least so far as they are implemented into
the prosecuting state’s domestic law.286 Serious doubts would surround the
legitimacy of any prospective prosecution for terrorism on the basis of its status
as a crime under international – as opposed to domestic – law.287 Prosecution
for terrorism offences may proceed under national law, though this depends
281 The criminal justice framework as set out in the foregoing chapter applies also potentially
to serious crimes committed in the name of counter-terrorism. This chapter focuses on the
prosecution of terrorism itself, but see 4B5 below and Chapters 6-10 for examples of criminal-
ity in the war on terror, especially 7B14 and 10.
282 Cf less serious acts that have been prosecuted as ‘terrorism’: see Chapter 2 on lack of clarity
as to terrorism and Chapter 7B5 for examples.
283 Despite the controversies around the policy element discussed in Part A, it is submitted
that the level of coordination and intent attending the September 11 attacks would meet
any ordinary interpretation of the term ‘organisational policy’. This may be less clear as
regards disparate attacks in the name of a dissipated al-Qaeda more than a decade on,
however, or the isolated acts of terrorism by individuals pursuant to the broad ideology
underpinning al-Qaeda. See Chapter 6B.1.
284 See Chapter 6B.1 addressing in more detail the difficulty under current international law
of conceptualising the relationship between states and international criminal networks as
‘armed conflict’, and on 9/11 as not initiating an armed conflict. On war crimes, see above
A.1.1.2.
285 See Chapter 3 on the absence of state responsibility for these crimes. On aggression as a
crime, see 4A.1.13 above.
286 See Chapter 2 for the treaty crimes relating to terrorism. See also Galić Appeals Decision,
supra note 103.
287 On the lack of clarity around a definition, see Chapter 2. On the legality issues arising, see
‘Nullem crimen sine lege’, see Chapters 4A.1.2.2 and 7A.4.3.5. Issues relating to respect for
human rights principles in the criminal context post-9/11 are highlighted in Chapter 7B.4.
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on offences being clearly defined in domestic law, and the accused’s individual
responsibility being established.
As regards questions of jurisdiction, it is also relatively uncontroversial
that many, or indeed all, states are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over certain
acts of international terrorism that amount to crimes under international
law.288 Various national and international jurisdictional possibilities exist
for the prosecution of these crimes. Principles of criminal law preclude certain
bars to prosecution, and facilitate the accountability of the full range of per-
petrators of those attacks. In short, the normative framework highlighted in
Section A provides a promising starting point for addressing crimes such as
the September 11 atrocity through the international enforcement of criminal
law.
The practice of criminal justice post-9/11 is as diverse as the legal systems
within which it unfolds, and meaningful generalisations are, as ever, difficult.
What this chapter seeks to do is to highlight developments in several states
and on the international level which, it is suggested, may indicate certain
features of the evolving criminal justice response to terrorism since the be-
ginning of the ‘war on terror,’ and raise questions as to its implications.
It considers first the remarkable paucity of high level prosecutions and
the apparent neglect of criminal justice in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
which has given way to a more active role for criminal justice, and a burgeon-
ing body of terrorism trials, around the globe. The preference in practice for
national over international judicial responses is explored together with the
potential relevance of international justice for international terrorism in the
future.
The changes and innovations in criminal laws around the globe, pursuant
to an emphasis on the ‘preventive’ utility of criminal law in the struggle against
terrorism, have included new terrorism and ‘associated’ offences (such as
‘membership’ of a terrorist organisation, ‘support’ or ‘apology’), as well as
the loosening of modes of liability, raising numerous questions regarding
implications for the criminal law. These developments have been coupled by
the introduction of exceptional procedures and approaches to principles of
criminal law in the terrorism context. An area of considerable constructive
legal industry, but where challenges remain acute, is in relation to the law
and practice of international cooperation. These issues are considered in turn
below.
Finally, contrasting starkly to the activity in relation to the prosecution
of international terrorism stands the extremely limited application of criminal
law to hold to account those responsible for crimes committed in the name
of the ‘war on terror’. The chapter ends with brief consideration of the ‘other
288 See the various theories of jurisdiction discussed above, Chapter 41.3. Note also that in
certain circumstances states may be obliged, not simply entitled, to exercise jurisdiction.
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side of the coin’ in terms of the application of criminal law to international
crimes committed in the name of security and counter-terrorism.
4B.1 PROSECUTIONS IN PRACTICE POST-9/11
4B.1.1 Paucity of prosecutions post-9/11
Of the features of international criminal practice in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, perhaps the most noteworthy was its scarcity. In late September 2001
President Bush stated that: ‘We will direct every resource at our command,
every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war
to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network.’289 Particular em-
phasis was lent by other leaders to the objective of ensuring that ‘justice’ is
done.290 The Security Council, for its part, underscored the justice objective
in the immediate wake of 9/11 and has reiterated it repeatedly since then.291
However, despite the international commitment in principle and widespread
detentions in practice, there were strikingly few prosecutions.
In the United States, the natural forum for criminal prosecutions in relation
to 9/11, it is well known (and explored elsewhere in this study), that thousands
of persons were detained pursuant to the broadly framed ‘war on terror’ and
described, inter alia, as dangerous criminals,292 yet in the years following
9/11 there were relatively few charges and less completed trials. It was several
years after the attacks, in April 2004, that the first conviction in respect of 9/11
was handed down (which was subsequently quashed).293 At least at first,
289 J. Harris, ‘President Outlines War on Terrorism, Demands Bin Laden be Turned Over’,
Washington Post, 21 September 2001.
290 See, e.g., the UK Prime Minister describing the UK’s role as to ‘construct a consensus behind
a broad agenda of justice and security’ (Speech in Sedgefield constituency, 5 March 2004).
See T.R. Reid, ‘Blair Embraces a New Role as a Chief of War on Terror’, Washington Post,
9 October 2001, reporting UK Prime Minister: ‘It is a fight for freedom ... And I want to
make it a fight for justice, too ....’ See the use of the language of ‘justice’ in the context of
the Bin Laden killing at Chapter 9.
291 See, e.g., SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001), para. 3, where
the Security Council ‘[c]alls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks’.
292 See, e.g., Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld describing Guatánamo detainees as
‘terrorists, trainers, bomb makers, recruiters, financiers … would be suicide bombers,
probably the 20th 9/11 hijacker’. See S. Taylor Jr., ‘Opening Argument – Falsehoods About
Guantanamo’, 4 February 2006 (updated 22 March 2011), available at: http://www.national
journal.com/magazine/opening-argument-falsehoods-about-guantanamo-20060204.
293 Mounir al-Motassadek was convicted and sentenced in 2005 to seven years in jail for
membership of al-Qaeda. He appealed, and in November 2006 was convicted of being an
accessory to over 3,000 counts of murder. Abdelghani Mzoudi was cleared of all charges
in 2004. ‘Profile: Mounir al-Motassadek’, BBC, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
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it seemed that the criminal law had effectively been displaced by security de-
tention as the normal procedure for dealing with persons suspected of involve-
ment in international terrorism.294
A decade on, the picture is considerably different, with many terrorism
trials underway or having concluded, as discussed in the next section. How-
ever, it remains the case that strikingly few of the many persons responsible
for planning and executing the enormous and complex September 11 attacks,
and none of the highest level architects, are among the persons prosecuted
and convicted to date,295 either in the US or elsewhere. While the neglect of
criminal law was far more pronounced in the first few years after 9/11, it
would be overly optimistic to relegate the issue as one of purely historical
significance.296
Many factors may contribute to the dearth of prosecutions, in particular
at the highest levels. Among them are the undoubted investigative and evident-
iary challenges that cases such as these pose. Illicit transnational networks
are difficult to penetrate, and intelligence reports, gathered for different pur-
poses, often lack the evidentiary credentials to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and pose security challenges. Other challenges relate to the international
nature of the crimes and difficulties encountered in securing effective inter-
national cooperation, explored further below.297 However, at times questions
have arisen as to whether all investigative and prosecutorial avenues have
been exhausted. An example from within the US is in the 2010 ‘Guantanamo
Task Force’ report which highlighted various potential sources of evidence
that had not been tested or evaluated in relation to 9/11.298 A key factor in
the paucity of proceedings must surely be the apparent lack of political will
– particularly evident at the early stages of the war on terror – to address
international terrorism as a criminal law enforcement challenge, and the
emphasis that has been placed on the military nature of the (thus named) war
world/europe/2223152.stm.
294 See comments on the relationship between criminal law and other areas below.
295 See, e.g., ‘Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (Guantánamo 9/11 Attacks Trial)’, The New York Times,
availableat:http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/khalid_shaikh
_mohammed.
296 See concerns regarding a de-emphasis of criminal law in resort to the ‘alternatives’ of
targeted killings, military detention or other measures discussed below.
297 See 4.B.1. 2 ‘Terrorism Trials’ below.
298 Guantanamo Task Force Report, 2010: ‘[T]he Task Force identified a number of avenues
for strengthening important cases and developing them for prosecution. For example, the
Task Force determined that there were more than a thousand pieces of potentially relevant
physical evidence (including electronic media) seized during raids in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks that had not yet been systematically catalogued and required further
evaluation for forensic testing. There were potential cooperating witnesses who could testify
against others at trial, and key fact witnesses who needed to be interviewed. Finally, certain
foreign governments, which had been reluctant to cooperate with the military commissions,
could be approached to determine whether they would provide cooperation in a federal
prosecution....’
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on terror.299 Many of those suspected of involvement in the September 11
attacks were – and continue to be – treated as enemy combatants and either
killed or subjected to ‘security’ detention on uncertain legal bases.300 De-
tention of allegedly high-level al-Qaeda operatives focused on intelligence
gathering not on securing criminal trials,301 in line with the priority role
afforded to intelligence agencies rather than law enforcement agencies, with
implications for admissible evidence.302 This intelligence-gathering focus led
one German intelligence source to note that ‘we are more focused on pro-
secuting terrorists while the United States is mainly concerned with preventing
terrorism.’303
Although, as the practice below illustrates, there are now increasing
attempts by the US to use criminal law in counter-terrorism, the military
paradigm continues to cast a long shadow. Most obviously this is seen in the
‘military’ justice of military commissions in use in the US and a number of
other states.304 It is also clear from the increasing numbers of targeted killings
of alleged high-level al-Qaeda suspects, which suggests a continued de-em-
phasis, or a by-passing, of the criminal law enforcement machinery for those
alleged to have the greatest level of responsibility for terrorism but will never
be put on trial.305 Long term military or ‘security’ detention lurks as an
alternative to criminal law where, as the ‘Guantanamo Task Force’ determined
in 2010, prosecutions are not ‘feasible’ (in most cases, due to lack of available
evidence, which would normally lead to an individual’s release, not indefinite
detention).306 In the event that individuals are subjected to criminal process
299 This was particularly so post-2001 but remains the case to some extent at time of writing
in 2013 light of widespread targeted killings. See, e.g., John Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of the
President’s Counterterrorism Strategy’, April 2012, text available at: http://www.cfr.org/
counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100.
300 This is the definition of the situation of the Guantánamo detainees given by the UK Court
of Appeal in R (Abbasi and another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
[2002] EWCA Civ. 159 (hereinafter ‘Abbasi’), para. 64.
301 For those detainees who may, eventually, be tried, the willingness to detain for extended
periods without normal respect for the right to trial without undue delay has reduced the
momentum that usually attends the criminal investigative and prosecutorial process.
302 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, M. Scheinin, Intelligence agencies and their
oversight in the fight against terrorism A/HRC/10/3 (paras. 25-78); and A/HRC/14/46,
and ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel, 2009 (herein-
after ‘Eminent Jurists Report’). See also Chapter 10 on rendition and B.4 below on the
implications of human rights abuses for the criminal process.
303 See ‘Terror Case sets Washington and Berlin at Odds’, Christian Science Monitor, 9 February
2004.
304 See 4B.2.2 below.
305 Chapter 6B.2.2.
306 ‘While the reasons vary from detainee to detainee, generally these detainees cannot be
prosecuted because either there is presently insufficient admissible evidence to establish
the detainee’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in either a federal court or military commis-
sion, or the detainee’s conduct does not constitute a chargeable offense in either a federal
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and eventually released, official statements from within the US administration
have made clear they may then still be subject to administrative detention as
enemy combatants thereafter.307
Widespread use of detention without (or in lieu of) trial for suspected
terrorists, and other non-criminal law ‘alternative’ preventative measures, has
been pervasive far beyond the US, as explored in other chapters of this
study.308 The side-stepping of criminal law and the protections that it entails
has been criticized in numerous states in the context of counter-terrorism.309
Reflections of this approach are seen in Australia, where control orders have
been used on an individual after his criminal sentence was served, raising
questions of double punishment.310
While criminal law is clearly not the only approach that may be used
against terrorists, one of the implications of the overuse of a ‘wartime’ deten-
tion regime or other measures in lieu of criminal law has been a decline in
the perceived significance of criminal law from both the authorities’ perspective
and that of affected individuals.311 If evidence is not (or not yet312) available,
or if individuals are found not guilty, or are sentenced and have served out
their sentences, they have nonetheless been held, in some cases with less
court or military commission.’ Guantanamo Task Force Report 2010, p. 24.
307 E.g., Hamdan, who lent his name to the Supreme Court decision Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra
note 2, was charged with ‘conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism.’ Charges
were dropped on June 5, 2007 and he was then held, without being charged, as an enemy
combatant. He was then re-charged on July 21, 2008, and found guilty of ‘providing material
support’ to al-Qaeda, and was sentenced to five-and-a-half years of imprisonment, having
already served five years of the sentence at the time, before this conviction was set aside.
A Pentagon spokesman promptly noted that Hamdan may still be considered an ‘enemy
combatant’ upon completing his sentence and detained indefinitely. Despite the threat to
detain him indefinitely, the U.S. in November 2008 transferred him to Yemen to serve out
the remainder of his sentence and he was released January 8, 2009. See, e.g., ‘Bin Laden
driver could be held by U.S. after sentence’, CNN, 7 August 2008, available at: http://
www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/07/hamdan.trial/index.html.
308 See Chapter 7B.7 ‘Detention’ and ‘Control Orders’.
309 See, e.g., in the UK, speech by David Davis, MP in the House of Commons: ‘Let me recap.
Rangzieb Ahmed should have been arrested by the UK in 2006, but he was not. The
authorities knew that he intended to travel to Pakistan, so they should have prevented
that; instead, they suggested that the ISI arrest him. They knew that he would be tortured,
and they arranged to construct a list of questions and supply it to the ISI ...’. ; see also
‘Labour fixated on control orders, which operated like a sieve, and prolonged pre-charge
detention which is unnecessary.’ ‘Terror Convictions Plummet’, The Independent, 26 Novem-
ber 2010.
310 Former Guantanamo detainee, Australian David Hicks, who pleaded guilty and completed
his sentence in Australia, discussed in Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12.
311 See e.g. comment on perceived impurity in Chapters 7B.7 and 10. On the so-called war
on al-Qaeda as not an armed conflict properly understood, see Chapter 6. For the implica-
tions more broadly than for criminal law, see ‘War and Human Rights’ in Chapter 7B3.
312 Guantanamo Task Force Report, p. 22 (noting that individuals can continue to be held as
persons ‘designated for continued detention’ while evidence is gathered through ‘further
exploitation of the forensic evidence’ or ‘other detainees may cooperate with Prosecutors’).
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protections and in worse conditions than if they were serving sentences pur-
suant to the criminal process.313 The imperative towards prompt investigation
is therefore diminished where individuals can be subject to prolonged deten-
tion until evidence is acquired. Practice continues to raise important questions
as to the priority afforded to the pursuit of criminal justice, and its inter-re-
lationship with other areas of the legal framework, in the fight against inter-
national terrorism.
4B.1.2 Terrorism Trials
Numbers of prosecutions for terrorism in the US, as elsewhere, have grown
exponentially in recent years, as discussed in the next section.314 Numbers
of prosecutions or convictions do not themselves however reveal much as
regards effective law enforcement for counter-terrorism. This is particularly
so where the nature of new ‘terrorism’ laws around the globe, and their broad
reaching use and abuse, have meant that terrorist convictions have been
rendered for a broad range of conduct from bombing to blogging, some of
which may not be a response to what we commonly understand by terrorism
at all.315
It is, however, undoubtedly the case that there has been a reinvigorated
approach to the use of criminal mechanisms, and a burgeoning of terrorism
trials. While it is impossible to do justice to the range of international practice
here, some examples of state practice are worth highlighting.
313 There are other lawful bases for detention but these tend to be short term, e.g., pursuant
to deportation, or in a genuine armed conflict situation see Chapter 7A7 and for IHL
detentions Chapter 6.
314 One survey cites 2,934 arrests and 2,568 convictions in the United States. ‘Terrorist Trial
Report Card-Center on Law and Security – NYU Law’, The Center on Law and Security,
New York University School of Law, available at: http://www.lawandsecurity.org/
Publications/Terrorism-Trial-Report-Card; see also ‘Introduction to National Security Division
Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions’, 26 March
2010, National Security Division, available at: http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/
march-26-2010-nsd-final-statistics.pdf (providing statistics on over 400 unsealed international
terrorism and terrorism-related convictions from 11 September 2001 – 18 March 2010). See
also AP report, ‘Rightly or Wrngly, Thousands convicted’, below.
315 ‘Rightly or wrongly, thousands convicted of terrorism post-9/11’, AP, 9 April 2011, available
at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44389156/ns/us_news-9_11_ten_years_later/t/rightly-
or-wrongly-thousands-convicted-terrorism-post-/visited 12 December 2012. The report
identifies 119,044 anti-terror arrests and 35,117 convictions in 66 countries; ‘At least 35,000
people worldwide have been convicted as terrorists in the decade since the Sept. 11 attacks
on the United States. But while some bombed hotels or blew up buses, others were put
behind bars for waving a political sign or blogging about a protest.’ See also Terrorist Trial
Report Card, September 11, 2001-September 11, 2009, Center on Law and Security, New York
University School of Law, January 2010.
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In the United States, many terrorism trials are underway concerning
involvement in al Qaeda or associated groups, with some trials completed
and judgments rendered.316 A striking characteristic of US criminal practice
post-9/11 has been the resort to military commissions, as discussed in Chap-
ter 8.317 The rejection of the normal courts and generally applicable principles
and procedures of criminal law is a common characteristic of post-9/11 terror-
ism trials globally, as discussed below.318 However, despite questions about
the suitability of United States’ federal courts for trying international terrorism,
trials have in fact also proceeded in regular courts.319
One characteristic of note from this practice is the high number of con-
victions that have resulted from guilty pleas; on one estimate 80% of terrorism
trials in the US involve such pleas.320 Trials then proceeded according to an
expedited process, such that the normal evidentiary requirements for proving
the case do not apply.321 Examples have included the case against the so-
called ‘twentieth hijacker’ who pleaded guilty to conspiracy in respect of the
9/11 attacks.322 Questions have arisen as to the reliability of such pleas, parti-
cularly where the alternative for the individual is not a trial and the prospect
of acquittal but arbitrary indefinite detention as an ‘enemy combatant’.323
316 See, e.g., US v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 269 (4th Cir. 2008); S. Vladeck, ‘Terrorism Trials and
the Article III Courts After Abu Ali’, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1501 (2010); ‘Would-Be Plane Bomber
Is Sentenced to Life in Prison’, New York Times, 16 February 2012, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/us/would-be-plane-bomber-sentenced-to-life.html (a life
sentence was given for the attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner with explosives
concealed in his underwear on Christmas Day in 2009); United States of America v. Abdul-
mutallab (2012) US District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division (Case No.
10-CR-20005).
317 See Chapter 8, military commission proceedings.
318 Section 4.B.2 on modified procedures below.
319 Bush and others asserted that regular courts were unsuitable. See debate in Stephen
I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 2010.
320 L. Dervan, ‘The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror’, (2010)
27(2) Georgia State University Law Review, p. 239. The report indicates that a similar situation
arises with terrorism trials in Israel.
321 See, e.g., ‘Walker Lindh indicted on 10 counts’, CNN, 6 February 2002; ‘“American Taliban”
jailed for 20 years’, CNN, 4 October 2002. Lindh was accused of being a terrorist trained
by al-Qaeda, who conspired with the Taliban against Americans. He was not accused of
conduct related directly to 9/11.
322 See, e.g., United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, the ‘twentieth hijacker’ pleaded guilty
to conspiracy and membership of an illegal organisation. See ‘Suspected al Qaeda Operative
Charged with Planning Terrorist Actions’, US Department of State Press Release, 21 Decem-
ber 2001; J. Borger, ‘First Man Charged for September 11 Attacks: Muslim Radicalised in
London Faces Death Penalty’, The Guardian, 12 December 2001, available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/12/september11.usa1. For the indictment, see http://
www.justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm.
323 See, e.g., T. Yin, ‘Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention’,
2006 BYU L. Rev. 1255; see also C. Takei, ‘Terrorizing Justice: An Argument that Plea
Bargains Struck Under the Threat of “Enemy Combatant” Detention Violate the Right to
Due Process’, (2006) 47 Boston College Law Rev. 3, p. 581and L. Dervan, ‘The Surprising
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Another characteristic of the charges brought in the US, foreshadowed by
the comments in the preceding section, is that with few notable exceptions,
they have not related to direct involvement in the September 11 attacks them-
selves, and have rarely been brought against persons accused of being high
level al-Qaeda operatives.324 Instead charges lodged in the US have related
almost exclusively to broad forms of ‘material support’ for al-Qaeda325 (in
most cases based on evidence of periods spent at ‘training camps’ in
Afghanistan which has been found insufficient by German courts),326 and
‘conspiracy’ to commit acts of terrorism or conspiracy to provide material
support for terrorist organisations.327
The issues this raises were highlighted when one of the first convictions
before a military commission was subsequently overturned.328 In Hamdan
v. United States, the accused had been prosecuted for ‘material support for
terrorism’ as a war crime, yet the Appeal court found that no such crimes
existed, in national or international law, at the time of the conduct in ques-
tion.329
One example from US practice that may be illustrative both of the potential
of terrorism trials, and some of the challenges arising, is the case of Ahmed
Omar Abu Ali. Abu Ali was convicted by a US federal court of nine counts
of membership of a terrorist organisation and planning terrorist attacks.330
The accused, a victim of extraordinary rendition who was allegedly inter-
rogated and abused by Saudi Arabian officials in cooperation with US agents,
first sought unsuccessfully to have his indictment dismissed due to delay in
presenting him to a court.331 The majority declined, as the relevant rules on
Lessons’, supra note 320.
324 Only a few alleged of high-level involvement in al-Qaeda have been named for trial by
military commission, in most cases almost a decade after their detention. ‘Military Commis-
sions’, Human Rights First, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-
and-security/military-commissions. The US Department of Defense announced that the
Office of Military Commissions prosecutors have sworn charges against five individuals
detained at Guantanamo Bay: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin
’Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi.
‘DOD Announces Charges Sworn Against Five Detainees Allegedly Responsible for 9/11
Attacks’, DoD Press Release, 31 May 2011, No. 458-11, available at: http://www.defense.
gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=14532.
325 See discussion of broad reaching approaches to material support or conspiracy below.
326 See the case of Mzoudi, this chapter, para. 4B.1.1.1 above. See other US cases available at:
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/terrorism.html.
327 R v. Elomar & Others [2010] NSWSC 10, paras. 147-78 (concerning Mohammed Omar Jamal))
is discussed in Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12.
328 Hamdan v. United States, Case No. 11-1257, US courts of Appeal for the District of Colombia,
16 October 2012.
329 Ibid.
330 US v. Abu Ali, supra note 316. For discussion see Vladeck, ‘Terrorism Trials and the Artile
III Courts after Abu Ali’, supra note 316.
331 He alleged the lack of ‘prompt presentment’ violated the Speedy Trial Act and his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.
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‘prompt presentment’ were found only to apply to capture by domestic author-
ities. However, a dissent questioned whether the criteria was not met where
the authorities were actively involved.332
As in many other cases post-9/11,333 this was followed by several other
(ultimately unsuccessful) challenges. Petitions focused on the admissibility
of evidence obtained through torture,334 and the lack of access to – and
opportunity to confront – evidence against him.335 The court ruled that the
Government could use the ‘silent witness’ procedure to disclose classified
information contained in communications to the jury at trial, though Abu Ali
himself would only be able to see the redacted version of the documents. The
case highlights both procedural adaptations, such as the use of evidence by
video link or more controversially ‘silent witnesses’ that arise in the cases,
as well as the challenges that result from allegations of violations (torture and
ill-treatment or undue delay) at the pre-trial stage.336 It also illustrates the
difficult balancing determinations facing judges, and the momentous challenges
facing an accused in cases of this nature, particularly where evidence is
obtained at the hand of foreign officials.337
Looking beyond the US, several European criminal law systems have
developed their experience of prosecuting international terrorism in the past
decade. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it was Germany that took a
leading role in promoting the criminal justice response to 9/11, reflecting the
locus of much of the planning of 9/11 on German soil. The experience of
German courts speaks both to the tenacity of the criminal process and to the
challenges arising.338 In February 2003 the first conviction arising out of the
September 11 attacks was handed down by a Hamburg court to a student for
his role in supporting and organising logistics for the Hamburg branch of al-
332 It also held: ‘(1) U.S. law enforcement officials did not act in a ‘joint venture’ with Saudi
officials in the arrest, detention, or interrogation of the defendant, and (2) Saudi law
enforcement officials did not act as agents of U.S. law enforcement officials, and therefore
Miranda warnings were not required.’ See however the dissent of J. Motz in the appeal court
(Judge Motz dissented saying that US officials proposing questions and being present when
they are asked constitutes ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ participation). Note similar rationale
refusing to dismiss the case based on the violations having been committed by foreign
personnel in R v. Ahmed in English courts, below.
333 See Chapter 8 on military commissions and modified procedures at 4B2.3 below.
334 Judgment, p. 23. See 4B.2.3 below.
335 See ‘Issues of Evidence and Procedure’ at 4B.2.3 below; he challenged the ’silent witness’
procedure where evidence was made available to the jury but not to him.
336 See 4B.2.3 below and 4B.2.4.
337 It is described as the first case in which US courts had to rely in large part on evidence
obtained by foreign officials:, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43940-
2005Feb22.html. Where recognised rights violations have arisen at the hand of other states,
the accused is therefore denied the protections that would normally apply.
338 See, e.g., C. Safferling, ‘Terror and Law: German Responses to 9/11’, (2006) 4 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 1152-165; T. Kost, ‘Mounir El Motassadeq – A Missed Chance
for Weltinnenpolik?’, German Law Journal, (2007) Vol. 08 No. 04.
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Qaeda; the court found him guilty of membership of a terrorist organisation
and 3,045 counts of accessory to murder in the September 11 attacks.339
However, the conviction was quashed by the Federal Supreme Court of
Germany and the case remanded for retrial, on the basis that the US had
refused to share crucial, potentially exculpatory evidence with the German
courts.340 The Court famously highlighted what it described as the dangers
of allowing the criminal process to be manipulated by a foreign state with-
holding intelligence information in circumstances where its own self-interest
is at stake.341 The US’s unwillingness to share information that was critical
to the trial of the individual was harshly criticised by lawyers and the
courts.342
Motassadeq was re-tried and convicted of ‘membership in a ‘terrorist
organization’,343 but that conviction was also rejected on appeal, and Ger-
many’s Federal Constitutional Court ordered his release.344 It was extremely
close to the end of the line for the criminal process when the German Federal
Supreme Court ruled that the evidence available was sufficient to prove that
Motassadeq knew about and was involved in the preparation of the plan to
hijack the planes, and found him guilty of accessory in 246 counts of murder
and he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.345 Another German trial had
339 Mounir Motassadeq, a 28-year-old Moroccan, was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment
in February 2003. See ‘Motassadeq Convicted For Role in Sept. 11th Attacks’, Washington
Post, 20 February 2003. See discussion in C. Safferling, ‘Terror and Law: German Responses
to 9/11’, (2006) 4 Journal of Int’l Criminal Justice 1152-65.
340 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany, 3 March 2004, Strafverteitiger (BGH),
StV 4/2004, of February 7, 2006. The evidence withheld was witness testimony or transcripts
of statements during interrogation by, among others, the person suspected of being the
ringleader of the relevant branch of al-Qaeda.
341 Ibid.
342 Lawyers alleged that ‘[s]tatements [the US authorities] kept secret led to a guilty verdict’.
See ‘Judge frees 9/11 suspects in Germany. Ruling could undo only conviction’, Washington
Post, 12 December 2003. When some of the statements by key witnesses that had been with-
held during trial were eventually disclosed – following the quashing of the conviction –
they included statements that the accused had not been privy to the 9/11 plot: see M.
Landler, ‘U.S. Report Adds Fog to 9/11 Retrial’, New York Times, 12 August 2004. On
German frustration with US non-cooperation see e.g. ‘9/11 Suspect Could Face Reduced
Charges’, Washington Post, 5 February 2003; ‘Judge Frees 9/11 Suspect in Germany’, Washing-
ton Post, 12 December 2003; ‘September 11 Terror Suspect Acquitted’, Deutsche Welle, 6
February 2004.
343 Motassadeq, Judgment, Higher Regional Court of Hamburg, August 19 2005.
344 Federal Constitutional Court, (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BverfG), decision of 10 January
2007, Reg. no.2 BvR 2557/06, available at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
345 Decision of November 15, 2006. On January 8, 2007, he was sentenced by the Oberlandes-
gericht Hamburg to 15 years in prison. On May 2 the Federal Court of Justice of Germany
rejected a plea for revision.
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ended in acquittal one month earlier revealing similar challenges.346 On the
basis of lack of evidence that the accused had any prior knowledge of the
attacks, the Court acquitted, but took the unusual step of noting that it was
not convinced of the defendant’s innocence but unable to reach any other
decision given the limited evidence available to it.347 These cases served as
a critical early illustration of evidentiary challenges and the importance of
improving intelligence sharing between the US and European states.
Spain, for its part, has a long tradition of terrorism trials stemming from
its experience with the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), with an estimated 140
convictions for terrorism each year.348 As regards efforts to pursue criminal
proceedings in respect of the September 11 attacks, various international arrest
warrants were issued by Spanish courts including some high level suspects
– notably including Osama bin Laden.349 However, few cases proceeded
beyond the warrant stage for want of international enforcement. Some that
did, such as that of the al-Jazeera correspondent remanded in custody, related
not to direct involvement in the attacks but to support or, membership of, or
recruitment to, al-Qaeda.350
By contrast, the Spanish criminal process moved promptly in response to
the attacks on Spanish soil, the so-called ‘11-M’ attacks that claimed 191 lives
and injured a further 1,856 victims on 3 March 2007. While not without its
critics, that process involved a relatively prompt criminal investigation, and
prosecution of complex terrorist crimes involving multiple accused (29 were
brought to trial), which in most cases resulted in convictions.351 In some cases,
346 Reportedly the evidence was made available to German authorities but permission to share
with the court not granted. See P. Finn, ‘9/11 Suspect could face reduced charges. German
judge says he understands alleged accomplice’s claims of unfair trial’, Washington Post,
5 February 2003; ‘September 11 Terror Suspect Acquitted’, Deutsche Welle, 6 February 2004.
347 Abdelghani Mzoudi, who was charged in a similar way to Motassadeq, was freed by a
German court in December 2003 after a letter from the Federal Office of Criminal Investiga-
tion, the BKA, raised serious doubts that he had any prior knowledge of the attacks. See
‘German Court Frees 9/11 Suspect’, BBC News, 11 December 2003.
348 Associated Press Report on Terrorism Trials, 4 Sept. 2011.
349 See ‘Spain Indicts Osama bin Laden on 9/11 Charges’, Associated Press, 17 September 2003,
reporting the indictment by investigative magistrate Baltasar Garzon of a total of 35 people
for terrorist activities connected to al-Qaeda. The Spanish indictment (based on the principle
of universal jurisdiction for acts such as those of 9/11) represents the first known indictment
of bin Laden for the 2001 terrorist attacks, while in the United States, bin Laden was charged
with the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
350 R. Tremlett, ‘Al-Jazeera man faces terror trial’, The Guardian, 12 September 2003. The suspect,
Tayssir Alouni, conducted exclusive interviews with Osama bin Laden during the Afghan-
istan war and is reportedly accused of membership of a terrorist organisation.
351 On 31 October 2007, the ‘Audiencia Nacional’ acquitted eight and convicted the others for
various levels of participation in the attacks, upheld on 17 July 2008. The judgement served
the ‘historical clarification’ role of criminal trials, by clarifying the cause of the attacks, and
e.g. the non-involvement of ETA, despite assertions to the effect by politicians in the
immediate aftermath.
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prosecutions have been overturned on appeal for lack of fair trial protections
offered to the accused.352
The UK is another European state with a history of terrorism, and terrorism
trials, and which also experienced direct attacks from al-Qaeda associated
individuals in recent years. The relatively low prosecution rates in the UK have
been criticised, contrasted against the broad-ranging investigative powers
assumed in the decade following 9/11.353 However, high profile terrorism
cases have been completed, including in respect of the London ‘7/7’
bombings.354 In some cases, the legitimacy of the criminal process has been
questioned in light of the abusive circumstances of the accused’s pre-trial
detention and torture,355 just as in the US cases discussed above. The evolving
approach of UK courts occurs against the experiential backdrop of notorious
miscarriages of justice in terrorism cases in the past, which have led to abuse
of process objections being upheld and cases dismissed. While this has not
occurred post-9/11, courts have indicated that the involvement of UK officials
in serious abuse at the pre-trial stage could have this effect.356
Other European states, although not themselves the subject of attack, are
playing a role in investigating and prosecuting related terrorist activity. In
Italy, post-9/11 several cases promptly proceeded to trial under a ‘fast-track’
procedure whereby a limited amount of evidence is provided and reduced
sentences are handed down if convictions are secured. Once again the charges
352 For example, the Spanish conviction of Hamed Abderrahman Ahmad was overturned on
appeal for lack of respect for the presumption of innocence. (22 June 2006) Spanish Supreme
Court; ‘Spanish “al-Qa’eda fighter” set free’, The Telegraph, 26 July 2006, available at: http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1524882/Spanish-al-Qaeda-fighter-set-free.html.
353 See, e.g., ‘Terror Convictions Plummet’, The Telegraph, 26 November 2010, available at: http:/
/www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8160214/Terror-convictions-
plummet.html. The report notes that in 2009 no convictions resulted from a stop and search
power used more than 100,000 times. The number of people charged under counter-terror
laws was reported as 12 in 2009/10 compared with 54 in 2006/07, of which five were
prosecuted and three convicted.
354 For example, in January 2007, five men were sentenced to life in prison by the Central
Criminal Court of London for plotting to bomb various targets in London. In July 2007,
Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Hussain Osman and Ramzi Mohammed were found
guilty of conspiracy to murder in connection with the 21 July 2005 London bombings and
each sentenced to life imprisonment. Many other cases concern terrorist plans (e.g., in April
2005, Saajid Badat was sentenced by the Central Criminal Court of London to 13 years in
prison for planning to blow up a passenger plane) or possession (eg in September 2005,
Andrew Rowe was sentenced by the Central Criminal Court of London to 15 years in prison
for possessing items which could be used in terrorist attacks).
355 See, e.g., R. v Ahmed (Rangzieb), R. v Ahmed (Habib), Court of Appeal (Criminal Division),
25 February 2011, [2011] EWCA Crim 184; [2011] Crim. L.R. 734 concerning two British
citizens convicted of terrorist offences after having been allegedly tortured in Pakistan,
and challenged the case on abuse of process grounds. It was ultimately unsuccessful as
UK authorities were not found themselves to have been involved. See 4.B.4 below on the
strained inter-relationship between human rights and criminal justice.
356 R v. Ahmed, ibid. See similar rationale of the court in Abu Ali, above.
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relate not to September 11 itself, but to falsifying documents, breaking immi-
gration laws, and criminal association with the intent to obtain and transport
arms.357 In France too, several trials have proceeded for various forms of
support for al-Qaeda or plotting of terrorist attacks.358
A noteworthy example of the practice of criminal courts from the African
continent is the case against those accused of the ‘Kampala World Cup’
bombings of 10 July 2010, heard before Ugandan courts in 2011. A number
of the characteristics and challenges associated with terrorism trials are given
graphic illustration by this case.359 At the outset, the process of investigation
and transfer – via extra-legal rendition – is a reminder of the lack of due
process in the handling of terrorist suspects.360 Among those ultimately
detained and charged was a human rights activist, who had advised the other
suspects and claimed he was being punished for his human rights work,361
recalling the dangers of broad reaching approaches to ‘association’ with
terrorism as a criminal offence.362
When brought before a criminal court and granted bail (a basic right absent
exceptional circumstances such as fear of flight), there were huge public
protests – a reminder of the political pressures within which judges operate
in terrorism cases. Mirroring the discussion above on guilty pleas in the US,
at the outset of trial two suspects pleaded guilty, reportedly in order to escape
the application of the death penalty. At the trial of the remaining suspects,
issues arose regarding the admissibility of evidence in light of human rights
abuses surrounding the process. Charges against him and another four were
dismissed for lack of evidence, albeit only after he had served a year in deten-
tion.363 Although some suggest the acquittals should be seen as a failure and
they provoked protests, it should be recalled that it is ultimately to the credit
357 They are charged with supplying false documents, breaking immigration laws, and criminal
association with the intent to obtain and transport arms, explosives and chemicals. See
‘Terror suspects go on trial in Italy’, Associated Press, 5 February 2002.
358 See, e.g., ‘Former Cern scientist faces terror trial in France’, The Guardian, 29 March 2012,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/29/cern-scientist-terror-trial-
france; ‘France Arrests al-Qaeda Suspects’, BBC News, 6 June 2003, available at: http://
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2967202.stm ; and V. Von Derschau, ‘France Detains
Suspected Islamic Militants’, AP, 15 September 2004.
359 ‘Kenya’s world cup joy shattered by blasts,’ BBC, 12 July 2010, available at: http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/10605457
360 See Chapter 10 Extraordinary Rendition.
361 ‘Kenyan Rendition Accuser Framed’, BBC News, 13 September 2011, available at: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14900624. Kenyan high court advocate Mbugua Mureithi
and Al Amin Kimathi, executive director of the Kenyan NGO, Muslim Human Rights Forum
(MHRF) were both among the detainees. Trial observers were also later detained at the
border. See A. Singh and P. Sands, ‘Uganda Must Release Al Amin Kimathi’, Voices, 25
April 2011, available at: http://www.soros.org/voices/uganda-must-release-al-amin-kimathi,
362 See Chapter 4B2 below and Chapter 7B.11 below.
363 ‘Ugandans jailed for Kampala World Cup bombing’, 16 September 2011, BBC News, available
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14944664 .
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of a criminal court, and the rule of law it is charged with upholding, that it
acquits those whose guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This
determination to resist political pressure may have been influenced by the
recent establishment of a specialised international crimes division within the
Ugandan High Court, illustrating the importance of such specialised provision
within national courts and investigative bodies.364
Across the states of Asia and the Middle East, experience of terrorism
prosecutions, like terrorism itself, is neither new nor a result of the so-called
war on terror. There is abundant practice in terrorism prosecutions in recent
years, however, such as the trial and conviction under ordinary criminal law,
after a decade long investigation, of those found responsible for the Bali
attacks.365 In many other states, terrorism trials have raised multiple issues
concerning independence of the judiciary, use of special courts and procedures,
and respect for the fundamental principles of criminal law.366
As a result, there is a vast and developing body of experience in terrorism
trials on a global scale. It is difficult to identify trends from disparate practice,
but even this snapshot illustration of cases begins to show both the potential
and the challenges of using the criminal process to hold to account those who
plan, support and carry out terrorist acts. The practical and legal challenges
are compounded by political pressure on law enforcement authorities and the
courts. Much of the practice of trials to date reveals resort to modified juris-
dictions or criminal procedures, and questions regarding respect for principles
of criminal law, that will be addressed more fully in the sections that follow.
364 The establishment of an International Crimes Division (ICAD) in the Ugandan High Court
may have been instrumental in resisting the political pressure, highlights the importance
of specialised units, better equipped to deal with the political pressure in most cases.
365 Umur Patek was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on July 2012. He was not charged
with terrorism, as an Indonesian court had previous ruled out the ex-post facto application
of the 2003 terrorism law, but the trial proceeded on the basis of ordinary criminal law.
See eg. Indonesian militant jailed for 20 years for role in Bali bombings. See http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/indonesia-militant-bali-bombings. On Indonesia
courts more generally, see H. Juwana, ‘Indonesia’s Anti Terrorism Law’, in V. Ramraj, M.
Hor, et al., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), pp. 290-309.
366 See, e.g., special courts, commissions or procedures in Bangladesh, Jordan or Egypt. For
controversies around trials and lack of independence in Pakistan, see, e.g., International
Bar Association Human Rights Institute, A Long March to Justice: A report on judicial independ-
ence and integrity in Pakistan, September 2009, though similar issues arise elsewhere. The
pressure to ensure speedy justice in terrorism trials has also been criticised as infringing
on fair trial rights; see eg. Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review, “Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
in Accordance with Paragraph 15(c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution
5/1: Pakistan”, 25 March 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/2/PAK3, para. 37.
Criminal justice 169
4B.1.3 International v. national models of justice post 9/11
4B.1.3.1 Focus on justice for terrorism at the national level
Increased focus on combatting international terrorism, and on the challenges
in national systems’ responses, raises questions as to the appropriate vertical
and horizontal relationship between national and international courts. Do (or
should) national courts per se take priority over international ones for crimes
of this nature, or vice versa?367 What has been, and what should be, the role
of international courts, including the ICC?
Proponents of an international tribunal in the aftermath of 9/11 suggested
that justice, or indeed the perception of justice, favoured the prosecution of
September 11 offences before an impartial court outside the US, preferably in
an international tribunal that would reflect the international nature of these
egregious crimes and that community’s interest in seeing justice done.368 The
other (predominant) view was that, provided national courts are able and
willing to do justice, which the US courts (among other courts) appeared in
principle to be, international alternatives were unnecessary.
It is noteworthy that despite the attacks occurring at the cusp of the devel-
opment of the system of international criminal law, proposals for an inter-
national tribunal post-9/11 never really garnered support. The ICC would not
have had jurisdiction over the September 11 attacks themselves, as the ICC
Statute entered into force afterwards and has no retroactive effect.369 While
theoretically possible if the Security Council had referred,370 the ICC therefore
had no realistic impact on the prosecution of the September 11 attacks them-
367 The ICC is clearly bound by ‘complementarity’, but it takes a different approach from the
ad hoc tribunals, see above. In addition to the vertical relationship between international
courts and national courts, questions arise as to the horizontal relationship between national
bases of jurisdiction: does or should territorial jurisdiction necessary prevail over universal
jurisdiction? On uncertainty surrounding these issues, see Framework, Section A above.
368 See A.M. Slaughter, ‘Terrorism and Justice’, Financial Times, 12 October 2003, p. 23, arguing
that an international tribunal comprising US and Islamic judges should be set up to try
terrorists, which would not only add legitimacy to the proceedings but help overcome
practical obstacles to effective prosecution. See, e.g., M.A. Drumbl, ‘Judging the September
11 Terrorist Attack’, 24 (2002) HRQ 323; J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War
Against Terrorism and Human Rights’, 14 (2003) EJIL 241, 261.
369 The ICC Statute did not enter into force until 17 July 2002; see Article 11.
370 The Security Council could, arguably, exercise its Chapter VII powers (see Chapter 5A.2.2)
to confer jurisdiction on the Court to go beyond Article 11, but this was not a conceivable
route at least as long as the US opposed the Court and has a Security Council veto.
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selves, not least due to steadfast US opposition.371 Nor has it been seriously
considered to exercise jurisdiction over subsequent terrorist attacks.
In principle the emphasis on national courts is consistent with the ethos
of the system of international justice,372 including the ‘complementarity’
regime373 recognising the priority of domestic over international prosecution,
and arguably at least also of the territorial state over other jurisdictions.374
Practice post-9/11 may indeed have a contributory role in consolidating this
principle of the primacy of national courts. Primacy should not, however, be
confused with exclusivity – deference lasts only as long as domestic courts
are able and willing to ensure that justice is done in relation to the particular
situation.375 The sovereign right of states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction
is accompanied by their sovereign responsibility to do so respecting inter-
national fair trial standards as enshrined in applicable human rights law and
IHL.
The minimum benchmarks of a fair trial also constitute prerequisites around
which international support for and cooperation with criminal justice processes
should take shape.376 If states cannot or will not meet the most basic inter-
national standards, arguably other foreign, international or quasi-international
tribunals can and should be seized of jurisdiction to ensure that criminal justice
can be done without justice being compromised.377 In the light of the many
371 President Clinton signed the ICC Statute shortly before leaving office on 31 December 2000
(see ‘The Right Action’, New York Times, 1 January 2001, at A6) but in May 2002, the Bush
administration purported to ‘undo’ the signature and notified the United Nations that it
did not intend to ratify. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (6 May 2002),
available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
372 The relationship between the ICC and national tribunals is governed by the ‘complementar-
ity regime’ in the ICC Statute. ICC Statute, supra note 4; see also Section 4A.1.3.2(a) above.
373 See, e.g., the ICC’s deference to national courts that are investigating or prosecuting, pro-
vided they are willing and able to do so effectively. ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Articles
17-19.
374 See the ‘vertical’ complementarity principle in the ICC Statute; ad hoc tribunals and relation-
ships between national jurisdictions, above 4A13. See also the Spanish rendition and Guan-
tánamo cases under Chapters 4B6 (below) and 7B14.
375 For example, questions arose concerning the compatibility of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
for Crimes Against Humanity with internationally accepted fair trial standards. See, e.g.,
P. Ford, ‘Iraqi tribunal stirs fierce debate’, Christian Science Monitor, 1 October 2003; C.
Savage, ‘Tribunal for Hussein Trial Criticized’, The Boston Globe, 17 December 2003.
376 See, e.g., Chapter 7A5.10 and the law relating to extradition and mutual assistance 4A2,
above. The conditions on which this priority depends include, as the OAS has suggested
post-9/11, guaranteeing ‘the application of rules of due process for the alleged perpetrators,
and that there is an effective will to bring them to justice’. OAS Resolution 1/03 on ‘Trial
for International Crimes’, Washington DC, 24 October 2003.
377 It has similarly been argued in the ICC context that even with its clear rule of complement-
arity, a state whose prosecutions would amount to flagrant denials of justice, should not
be seen as meeting the test and justifying deference; see arguments in Prosecutor v. Saif al-
Islam Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11, and the prosecutorial position in Senussi,
at http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/related
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controversies surrounding the neglect- or the abuse- of the criminal process
in relation to terrorism, and the corresponding impediments to cooperation
that have arisen, it may again become pertinent to ask whether, in certain
exceptional circumstances, foreign or international jurisdictional alternatives
should be revived as a bulwark against ineffective or abusive national proceed-
ings.
As noted above, terrorism was excluded from the ICC Statute primarily
due to the lack of a definition, but also for other reasons, including a per-
ception (which may have shifted since 9/11), that terrorism did not rank
among the most serious crimes to which the ICC should direct its attention.378
It is conceivable that serious acts of international terrorism could fall within
ICC jurisdiction in the future, as the office of the prosecutor has suggested in
relation to the possible investigation of crimes by Boko Haram in Nigeria.379
Terrorist crimes that were part of a sufficiently widespread or systematic attack
on a predominantly civilian population, such as those entailed in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, could fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, for example as crimes
against humanity. ICC jurisdiction will generally depend (absent Security Coun-
cil referral)380 on the state on whose territory the atrocities were committed,
or a state whose nationals are suspected of responsibility, having ratified the
Statute or accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.381 For crimes involving inter-
national networks of individuals, it is likely that a considerable range of states
would satisfy the nexus requirement.382
Moreover, ICC jurisdiction over ‘terrorism’ specifically remains a possibility
for the future if a definition can be agreed. However, it is noteworthy that
the events of 9/11 and their aftermath have had less immediate impact on
%20cases/icc01110111/court%20records/filing%20of%20the%20participants/office%20of%20
the%20prosecutor/Pages/321.aspx.
378 As noted in Chapter 2, this crime was excluded in 1998 from the Statute primarily due
to the lack of a definition, but also for other reasons, including a perception that terrorism
did not rank among the most serious crimes to which the ICC should direct its attention.
This perception may have shifted post-9/11, as reflected in the condemnation of terrorism
post 9/11 as ‘one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the
twenty-first century’. SC Res. 1377 (2001), 12 November 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001).
Note also SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 132, which categorised ‘all acts of international
terrorism’ as threats to international peace and security.
379 See in this respect, statement by the ICC prosecutor. ‘As you know, these crimes may be
called terrorists attacks but they could also qualify as crimes against humanity….” ‘Terrorist
attacks in Nigeria may constitute crimes against humanity – ICC’, PANAPRESS, 4 July
2012, available at: http://www.panapress.com/Terrorist-attacks-in-Nigeria-may-constitute-
crimes-against-humanity---iCC---15-834146-32-lang2-index.html last accessed at 12 December
2012.
380 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 13 on Security Council referral and Article 12 on pre-
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.
381 ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Article 12.
382 Among the states party to the ICC Statute are several whose nationals were suspected of
involvement in the September 11 crimes for example.
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the negotiations around a definition of terrorism, or on proposals for the Court
to exercise jurisdiction over ‘terrorism’, than some may have anticipated.383
Limited support is also found for establishing a separate international terrorism
tribunal.384 While the world’s first terrorism tribunal has been established
in relation to one specific incident, in the form of the Lebanon tribunal, for
various (principled and pragmatic) reasons it may be doubted that such ad
hoc responses are likely to frequently find favour in the future.385
4B.1.3.2 The ICC and State Responses: Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond?
ICC jurisdiction is also potentially relevant to measures taken in response to
international terrorism, addressed below. This could include a number of
practices addressed in this volume that may amount to crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court, which have unfolded after the Statute’s entry into
force.386 The ICC could for example have exercised jurisdiction over war
crimes in association with the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, or poten-
tially crimes against humanity or acts of aggression of sufficient gravity com-
mitted elsewhere, provided the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
were met.387
In relation to Afghanistan for example, as a result of its ratification of the
ICC statute on 10 February 2003, the ICC has jurisdiction over relevant crimes
committed by the nationals of any state (including non-state parties such as
the US) in Afghanistan.388 A practical impediment to the exercise of that juris-
383 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Eighth
Session, The Hague, November 18-26, 2009, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20, Appendix III, pp.
65-66.
384 ‘The Case for Establishing an International Tribunal for International Terrorist Organizations’,
E. Ivanov, 2013. Working Paper, Internaitonal Institute for counter-terrorism proposes a tribunal
under the aupsices of the Security Council to determine terrorist organsiations. Cassese, International
Criminal Law, supra note 131. See also unsuccessful Dutch proposal to amend the ICC Statute
to include terrorism at the Kampala review conference: Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Eighth Session, The Hague, November
18-26, 2009, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20, Appendix III at 65-66.
385 Principled concerns relate to the politicisation of the process and its selectivity which ahs
affected the tribunal’s credibility. Pragmatic concerns include the huge expense of establish-
ing ad hoc tribunals, once a permanent tribunal exists in the form of the ICC.
386 Many calls for ICC engagement have made heard, including ‘Blair should face war crimes
trial over Iraq, says Desmond Tutu’, The Independent, 2 September 2012, available at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/blair-should-face-war-crimes-trial-over-iraq-
says-desmond-tutu-8100798.html.
387 As noted above, this requires that the state on whose territory the crime arises or the state
of nationality has ratified or accepts the court’s jurisdiction unless the Security Council
refers the situation to the Court. ICC Statute, supra note 4 at Articles 12-13.
388 As noted above, before the ICC can act, the state of territory or nationality of the accused
must be a party to the ICC treaty or accept the Court’s jurisdiction. ICC Statute, supra note
4 at Article 12. The state can accept the Court’s jurisdiction for a specific situation arising
before ratification, but after entry into force of the ICC Statute.
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diction arises, however, as regards US nationals as the US has negotiated special
agreements with governments around the world, including with the govern-
ment of Afghanistan, to the effect that those governments will not transfer
US personnel to the ICC.389 One longer-term side effect of the abuses com-
mitted by the US in the course of the ‘war on terror’ may be an undermining
of its ability to secure such agreements in the future.390 By contrast, despite
the transitional government’s brief expression of intention to ratify in 2005,
Iraq has not ratified the Statute.391 But the UK, for example, has been a state
party since 4 October 2001, satisfying the alternative ‘nationality’ nexus392
for UK nationals involved in conduct that might amount to war crimes or
crimes against humanity after that date.393 Hundreds of submissions have
been made calling for the investigation of crimes394 in Iraq including by UK
nationals allegedly acting in ‘common purpose’ or ‘joint criminal enterprise’
with US nationals.395 A preliminary analysis done by the Prosecutor in 2006
led to the decision that on information available at that time, the gravity
389 On the agreements, see generally Human Rights Watch, ‘United States Efforts to Undermine
the International Criminal Court: Impunity Agreements’, 4 September 2002, available at:
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRWArt98legalpaper.pdf.
390 These so-called ‘Article 98 agreements’ were controversial before (see ibid.) but met with
intensified opposition in light of evidence of US war crimes in Iraq. See, e.g., Warren Hoge,
‘Annan Assails US for Seeking Peacekeeper Immunity’, International Herald Tribune, 19 June
2004. The US dropped its attempt to get UN backing for these agreements in light of the
Iraq abuse scandals. See Warren Hoge, ‘Prison Abuse Halts U.S. Bid for Troop Immunity’,
24 June 2004. On the agreements, see ibid. On questions as to their lawfulness for parties
to the Statute, see J. Crawford, P. Sands and R. Wilde, ‘Joint Legal Opinion on bilateral
agreements sought by the United States under 98(2) of the ICC Statute’. These documents
and an updated list of ‘Article 98 agreements’ may be consulted on the website of the
Coalition for the ICC, available at: http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissuesimpunity
agreem.html.
391 In February 2005 the Iraqi transitional government announced its decision to ratify the
ICC Statute, but promptly withdrew that decision. The Coalition for the International
Criminal Court alleged this was due to pressure from the US. H. Rizvi, ‘Groups Urge Iraq
to Join ICC’, 8 August 2005, available at: http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?
file=/headlines05/0808-06.htm.
392 The case of the United Kingdom is not however isolated, as the nationals of a number of
other states party to the ICC Statute are currently taking part in the military operations
in Iraq.
393 See P. Sands, ‘Our Troops Alone Risk Prosecution’, The Guardian, 15 January 2003.
394 While the majority related to war crimes, to which the prosecutor conducted a preliminary
analysis (see below), some related to aggression over which the Court did not have juris-
diction. ‘Communications received by the Office of the Prosecutor’, ICC Press Release, 16
July 2003, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F5470312-25C8-4432-81C4-
8F08353BB5E5 /277680/16_july__english1.pdf.
395 ‘Report of the Inquiry into the Alleged Commission of War Crimes by Coalition Forces
in the Iraq War During 2003’, Peacerights, 8-9 November 2003, pp. 14-20 (the report was
commissioned by Peacerights and prepared by eight academics).
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standard required by the Statute was not met.396 This determination could
change in light of allegations of egregious crimes committed in Iraq.397 A
key question in respect of Iraq on Afghanistan is likely to be whether or not
domestic authorities themselves take appropriate measures to investigate
thoroughly allegations on the national level.398
Multiple allegations have also arisen as to aggression having been com-
mitted in Iraq.399 Some of these were also submitted to the ICC Prosecutor
for investigation, but were rejected as the ICC cannot (at least as yet) exercise
jurisdiction over aggression. The Statute and subsequent negotiations clearly
anticipate that in the future acts of aggression will fall within the Court’s
rubric, once agreement is reached on a definition and conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Beyond the armed conflicts, the review of war on terror measures through-
out this volume – such as with the extraordinary rendition programme,400
or, potentially, programme of targeted killings401 – prompt the question
whether they may amount to crimes against humanity. As noted in Chapter
10, rendition unfolded on the territory of several states parties. Where the
preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction are met, they could also conceivab-
ly be subject to ICC jurisdiction if no state ultimately proves willing or able
to hold perpetrators to account.402
396 Articles 8(1), 17 and 53. See statement referring to 240 communications, ICC, Office of the
Prosecutor, 2006, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-
AB77-4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.‘The
resulting information did not allow for the conclusion that there was a reasonable basis
to believe that a clearly excessive attack within the jurisdiction of the Court had been
committed ...’
397 See Chapter 6B and 7B6 on allegations of torture against UK personnel in Iraq.
398 See ‘Statement on communications concerning Iraq’, The Hague, 9 February 2006, pp. 8-9.
‘Taking into account all the considerations, the situation did not appear to meet the required
threshold of the Statute. In light of the conclusion reached on gravity, it was unnecessary
to reach a conclusion on complementarity.’ See also F. Guariglia, ‘The Selection of Cases
by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’, in Stahn and Sluiter
(eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden, 2009), pp. 209-17.
‘Complementarity’ of the ICC to national systems, see ICC Statute, supra note 4, Preamble
and Articles 17-19.
399 See, e.g., ‘Lawyers doubt Iraq war legality’, BBC News, 7 March 2003, reporting a letter from
UK law teachers on the unlawfulness of the prospective attack on Iraq, which described
such an attack as an act of aggression. See also the interview with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, Interview with BBC News Correspondent, John Simpson,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2773759.stm (questioning
whether it was ‘a war of aggression rather than a war for the implementation of the United
Nations resolutions’).
400 See Chapter 10 on Extraordinary Rendition’.
401 See Chapter 7B3, ‘War and Human Rights’.
402 Among the many obstacles is lack of Pakistani ratification, and the poor ratification rate
in the Middle East, where only two states have ratified as of July 2012.
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4B.2 THE CHANGING FACE OF CRIMINAL LAW AND TERRORISM
In the years following 9/11 the world witnessed a massive flurry of criminal
legislative activity across the globe.403 In large part this followed the Security
Council’s call to states to ensure that terrorist acts and financing ‘are estab-
lished as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations….’404
This was supplemented by subsequent international and regional impulses
calling for example for criminalisation of incitement and provocation to terror-
ism.405
Legislation post-9/11 was often passed quickly, in part in response to the
pressure on states to provide information to the Security Council regarding
legislative changes within ninety days.406 Unsurprisingly, processes were
at times criticised as lacking in-depth assessment of the sufficiency of existing
laws, or the compatibility of the new laws with the underlying principles of
criminal law in domestic systems.407 The same rushed-through approach
is commonly seen in legislation passed following particular terror attacks, often
in response to political pressure to be responding, and seen to be responding,
to terrorism.408
Changes in national laws have also reflected the increased focus – on the
international, regional and national levels – on the question of how to harness
criminal law not only as a tool to respond to acts of terrorism after the fact,
but to its prevention.409 Criminal law has long had a preventive dimension
and experience shows the role that effective law enforcement plays in pre-
venting terrorism and other serious crime.410 The extent of this focus and
its interpretation in recent practice, however, raises questions as to the limits
of the preventive use of criminal law, as criminal anti-terrorism laws embrace
an ever-broader range of prohibited conduct, reaching further back into pre-
paratory acts and further out to the environment that sustains or ‘supports’
the terrorism.
403 See, e.g., Survey of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc.
S/2008/379 (2008).
404 SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 132.
405 See SC Resolution 1624 (2005) calling on state to criminalise ‘incitement’, or Council of
Europe Resolution 2007/8 relating to ‘provocation’ to commit terrorism. See below 4B21
in this section ‘Incitement, Provocation, Glorification or Apology’.
406 SC Res. 1373 (2001), supra note 132. Confusion was generated by the UNSC 1373 pushing
for criminalisation absent clarity, see Chapter 7B.1. Similar issues arose concerning UNSC
1267 and provisions on freezing of assets.
407 Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 302.
408 An example is the Indian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act 2008, adopted in
haste following the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
409 For one manifestation on the international level, see the UNODC Handbook on Criminal
Justice Responses to Terrorism, supra note 157, (focusing on the use of criminal law ‘prevent-
ively’).
410 See, e.g., Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 311, p. 123.
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In addition, an increase in investigative, detention or other powers and
a decline in oversight and procedural safeguards have been common, as have
modifications in the normal rules of procedure and evidence.411 In some
instances, these developments may respond to genuine challenges that terror-
ism poses to the criminal law, while in others they may reveal a certain oppor-
tunism facilitated by the ‘war on terror’. In either case, developments in laws
and practice around terrorism in recent years have led to wide-reaching
approaches to substantive offences and modes of liability, as well as innova-
tions in applicable procedures, as illustrated in turn below.
4B.2.1 Creation of new ‘terrorism’ and ancillary offences: widening the net
i) ‘Terrorism’
As explored fully in Chapter 2, there is no internationally agreed upon defini-
tion of terrorism under treaty or customary law. When the Security Council
nonetheless called on states to criminalise and punish terrorism severely, it
fell to states to fill the legality gap and ensure that terrorism was defined with
precision in national law. While some guidance was given, belatedly, at the
UN level as to the components of such a definition,412 in practice there is great
diversity in definitions of terrorism on the international, regional and national
levels. Many of those definitions have been criticised for their breadth or lack
of precision, with serious concern arising from a range of international author-
ities in respect of infringements of the cardinal principles of criminal law.413
Of particular relevance are the principles nullum crimen sine lege, requiring
clarity and specificity in criminal law.414
Also central is the principle of individual responsibility, requiring that the
law punish on the basis of the criminal conduct of the particular individual,
411 See Chapter 7 parts 7B.2.1. and 7B3.2 on detention, and other powers implicating human
rights; on diminished judicial oversight see Chapter 11.
412 E.g., SC Res. 1566 ‘description’ of terrorism in Chapter 2. The Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin (E/CN.4/2006/98), sec. III (‘Reflections on the Issue
of Defining “Terrorism”’), 28 December 2005suggested that ‘terrorist offences’ should be
confined to instances where the following three conditions are cumulatively meet: (a) acts
committed with the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury, or the taking of
hostages; (b) for the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or
compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act; and (c) constituting offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
413 For examples see Chapter 2.2 ‘National Measures’ and 7B.5; and Eminent Jurists Report,
supra note 302 at pp. 124-27.
414 Ibid.
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in line with their subjective fault and respecting the presumption of inno-
cence.415 Some of the developments considered below raise questions regard-
ing one or both of the basic elements of any offence – that it must involve both
criminal conduct and criminal intent. Indeed, questions arise as to whether
some of the conduct embraced by terrorism and associated definitions is
properly ‘culpable’ at all, and the appropriateness of engaging the sanction
and stigma of criminal law.416 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
while Countering Terrorism has noted that in defining the term ‘terrorism’
it is important to ensure that it is confined in its use to ‘conduct that is of a
genuinely terrorist nature’.417
Examples abound of basic criminal law principles being tested by
approaches to the definition of the crime of terrorism.418 Even relatively
mainstream definitions that reflect closely international instruments have been
under attack, such as where the Canadian Courts found that state’s definition
to fall foul of human rights standards.419 Specific human rights issues that
have flowed from broadly defined ‘terrorism’ crimes being used to preclude
freedom of association, expression of dissent or other disfavoured conduct
are illustrated in Chapter 7.420
Closely associated with the cardinal principle of legality, is the principle
of non-retroactivity. While most criminal laws post-9/11 did not have retro-
active effect, some did. An example is Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism law, which
was struck down for affording retroactive effect to new terrorism crimes.421
Related questions have also arisen as to whether prosecutions can proceed
in relation to conduct that was criminal under international (but not national)
law at the time of its commission. As a matter of international law, where the
crimes are well established in international law at the time of their commission,
there is no requirement that they also be enshrined in national law for the
415 On the nature of the presumption of innocence, see A. Ashowrth, (2006) ‘Four threats to
the presumption of innocence’, (2006) 10 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof
4, pp. 241-78.
416 See discussion on ‘status offences’ and guilt by association in K. Roach, ‘The Criminal Law
and Terrorism’ in V. Ramraj, M. Hor, et al., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 140.
417 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 42.
418 Ibid.; see further below for particular offences eg the scope of ‘material support’ for terrorism
which has been held by US courts to be overly broad.
419 R v. Khawaja [2006] OJ 4245, at 73. The case is before the Supreme Court which, on 11 June
2012, heard arguments that the December 2001 Anti-terrorism Act violates the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
420 For examples of prosecutions of indigenous groups, women’s groups and unions, See
Chapter 7B.11 ‘Proscribing dissent – expression, association, assembly’.
421 See, e.g., H. Juwana, ‘Indonesia’s Anti Terrorism Law’, in V. Ramraj, M. Hor, et al., Global
Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 290-309.
See also sec. 38 of the Pakistani Anti-Terrorism Act at http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm.
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nullum crimen principle.422 In relation to terrorism under international law,
as discussed above, this is problematic however, as the predominant view is
that terrorism is not a crime as such under customary law, nor is there a
generic terrorism treaty that purports to criminalise terrorism.423 The specific
conventions addressing particular forms of terrorism were not themselves
intended to provide a basis for criminal prosecution, but to oblige states to
criminalise in domestic law.424
The import of these issues is seen for example in the US Supreme Court
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in which the Petitioner successfully challenged
the ability to prosecute him before a military commission for ‘conspiracy to
commit war crimes’.425 While ‘war crimes’ were enshrined in domestic law
at the relevant time, the Court had good reason to ultimately consider that
‘conspiracy to commit war crimes’ was a separate crime not established in
national or international law at the relevant time.426
ii) Before the Crime? Conspiracy, Preparatory Acts, Planning, and Possession …
Suggestions of a paradigm shift towards criminal law as a preventative tool
is particularly apparent in relation to the prosecution of ‘preparatory’ or
enabling acts. Post-9/11 legislatures have often created new specific offences,
while established crimes have also been subject to new interpretations and
approaches in the terrorism context. These developments generally seek to
enhance the efficiency of the law, by enabling states to address terrorism,
within a pre-established rule of law framework, before attacks materialise.
In some cases however, tensions arise regarding compatibility with basic
criminal law principles.
In many states, criminal laws have long provided the basis to prosecute
‘preventively’ in that the harmful act need not have been accomplished, or
even necessarily attempted, for a common law concept of ‘conspiracy’ or a
civil law ‘association de malfaiteurs’ to arise.427 In recent years, conspiracy
422 Article 15 ICCPR has an explicit exception for crimes under international law. Cf terrorism
crimes in the sectoral treaties which do not themselves criminalise, but oblige states to do
so. See the distinction in more detail in Cryer & Friman, et al., supra note 31.
423 See Chapter 2 on the contrary (but isolated) view of the Appeals chamber of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon.
424 See above Part A.114 and Chapter 2; Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague’, supra note
130.
425 The Military Commissions Act 2006 establishes the crimes within the military commission’s
jurisdiction, including conspiracy is included in this list. It is treated as a death penalty
offense if death results from the conspiracy. See Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value’, supra note
7.
426 Hamdan v. U.S., supra note 328; see majority Judgement of J. Stevens, and J. Thomas dissent,
ibid.
427 The UNODC Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism, supra note 157, notes
the offences of conspiracy and criminal association are obvious models for preventive
intervention against the planning and preparation of criminal acts; both continental law
concepts of elicit association and/or the common law concepts of ‘conspiracy’ relate to
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laws have been used expansively, notably in the US, to prosecute from the
earliest ‘planning’ stage of would-be terrorist activity.
One of the issues arising in practice has been an increasingly flexible
approach to the interpretation of a criminal ‘plan,’ and to the connection
between individuals required for a ‘conspiracy,’ raising doubts as to legal
certainty in respect of the scope of the offence. For example, in the US case
of Rahman, all the defendants were convicted of ‘seditious conspiracy to levy
war against the United States’, involving numerous disparate acts whereby
‘a number of rather tenuously connected behaviors’ were charged as a single
case of conspiracy.428 While a plan clearly does not have to be limited to
a single act of violence, it has been suggested that it does require some defini-
tion beyond acts of violence within the United States generally.429 Under
a flexible approach to the alleged plan a broad range of conduct, from com-
pleted crimes to ‘schemes’ were treated as part of a larger crime, with the
ancillary effect of allowing a broad range of evidence being placed before the
jury that would normally be considered irrelevant and inadmissible.
Conspiracy laws are also coupled with the introduction in some systems
of crimes involving acts ‘preparatory to terrorism’ (or as discussed below
material support for terrorism) where individuals are prosecuted for conspiracy
to commit such prepatory or supportive acts.430 In many cases, traditional
conspiracy laws required at least a preparatory step towards the commission
of the crime, thus safeguarding the notion that prosecution must be based on
the conduct of the individual.431 By contrast, where the individual may not
yet have actually done anything, these developments may represent a contro-
versial move from criminalising conduct to criminalising intention or even
thought.432
Another manifestation of the increasing emphasis on early intervention
is criminalising ‘possession’ of articles that may ultimately be used in terrorist
agreements to commit crime.
428 W. McCormack, ‘Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism’ (2005) 37
Georgetown Journal of Int’l Law 1: ‘Some of these actions constituted completed crimes. Others
were attempts. And yet others were unfulfilled plans or schemes. … Evidence of all these
various offenses was introduced in a single trial because they allegedly formed part of a
single plan.’
429 Ibid.
430 In one Australian case, for instance, a 23 year prison sentenced was imposed for a junior
role in a conspiracy to commit acts in preparation for a terrorist act, where no specific act
had yet been agreed upon and where there was not necessarily any intention to injure
people. The case of R v Elomar & Others [2010] NSWSC 10, paras. 147-78 (concerning
Mohammed Omar Jamal) discussed in Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12;
see also below on conspiracy to provide material support.
431 Ibid.
432 In the UK, see eg the prosecution of Samina Malik, discussed in Chapter 7B.11; see I.
Bunglawala, ‘Don’t even think about it’, The Guardian, 6 December 2007.
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attacks.433 So far as possession might be seen as a first step towards carrying
out an attack, it would often already be covered by conspiracy laws. Tensions
again arise however where possession is dissociated from or too remote from
the commission of a terrorist act. The issue was highlighted by the case of R.
v. Zafar in the English courts434 where the appellants were convicted of
possession of computer discs and hard drives containing extremist propaganda,
the purpose of which – according to the prosecution – was to incite persons
to travel to Pakistan to take part in ‘jihad’. The Court of appeal quashed the
convictions, holding that there must be some direct connection between the
article possessed and the act of terrorism alleged, of which there was no such
evidence in this case.435
iii) Membership of terrorist organisations
A common addition to the legislative books post-9/11 has been the crime of
membership of a terrorist organisation.436 The Security Council – in Resolu-
tion 1267, adopted before 2001, and subsequent resolutions adopted since
then – provided the impetus by obliging states to criminalise membership of
terrorist organisations on the domestic level. Prosecuting criminal organisations
is nothing new, as noted in Part A: for many states, membership of a criminal
organisation was already enshrined in domestic law, and the idea of pro-
secuting criminal organisations in international law dates at least back to
Nuremberg. On one level, the fact that many more states have adopted such
criminal laws post-9/11 should not then be surprising or necessarily contro-
versial.
However, in practice, throughout history, controversy has surrounded the
labelling of terrorist organisations, from Mandela’s ANC437 to Arafat’s PLO438
433 In the UK, e.g. the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 (TA 2000 and TA 2006) introduced
offences of: possessing an article or record of information for a terrorist purpose (s.57, TA
2000) or possessing a record of information likely to be useful in committing an act of
terrorism (s.58, TA 2000) as new terrorism offences. Others included failing to disclose
information about a terrorist offence (s.38BTA2000), inciting an act of terrorism overseas
(s.59, TA 2000), intentionally or recklessly encouraging an act of terrorism (s.1, TA 2006),
disseminating a terrorist publication (s.2, TA 2006), preparing to commit a terrorist offence
(s.5, TA 2006) and engaging in terrorism training (ss.6 and 8, TA 2006).
434 R. V. Zafar (Aitzaz) [2008] EWCA Crim 184; [2008] Q.B. 810 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
435 F. Galli, ‘Developments in the construction of criminal legislation – R. v Zafar and Others’,
(2008) 172(33) Justice of the Peace 532-35.
436 While such crimes are widespread, some examples (Australia, Tanzania and Uganda and
the U.K.) are discussed in the Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 302 at p. 134.
437 ‘I was called a terrorist yesterday, but when I came out of jail, many people embraced me,
including my enemies, and that is what I normally tell other people who say those who
are struggling for liberation in their country are terrorists. I tell them that I was also a
terrorist yesterday, but, today, I am admired by the very people who said I was one’. Nelson
Mandala, Larry King Live, 16 May, 2000.
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and far beyond.439 Post-9/11, the same controversies surrounding terrorism
appear but in heightened form, in light of the stretching of the terrorism label
to reach diverse ‘undesirable’ conduct.440 As history attests, caution is due
to avoid guilt by association, and to ensure that the individual is being pro-
secuted commensurately with individual criminal responsibility, as well to
avoid the political manipulation of the criminal law against political opponents.
The crime of membership of a terrorist organisation is blighted with all of the
same definitional uncertainties as this definition of terrorism itself, with a few
more added.441
A first additional level of difficulty relates to what ‘membership’ means
in the context of an entity such as al Qaeda, which has been described a ‘loose
network of cells,’ or al Shabaab with its massive and diverse popular support
base. How should ‘membership’ in these circumstances be understood or estab-
lished? In unstructured movements where there is no system of membership
as such, these concepts are not straightforward. As was noted in relation to
the London 7/7 bombers, individuals that consider themselves members may
be bound together by little more than broad overlapping ideologies.442 Parti-
cular concerns arise where individuals have a role far removed from terrorist
activity as such. The potential for slippage from punishing individual conduct
to punishing ideology, or from individual responsibility to guilt by association,
is clear.443
A second level of doubt that has arisen in practice relates to the role of
the executive (nationally or internationally) in identifying proscribed organisa-
tions.444 The designation of ‘terrorist’ organisations by the executive under
certain anti-terror legislation may in practice reduce the critical role of the crim-
438 ‘The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which
each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation
of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called
terrorist, otherwise the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British
colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would
be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also
be terrorism …. This is actually a just and proper struggle consecrated by the United Nations
Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights …. the justice of the cause
determines the right to struggle.’ Arafat, Address to the UN, 1984.
439 See generally Chapter 2, and Chapter 7 on eg Proscribing Dissent. The Eminent Jurists panel
notes that the now president of the Maldives was charged with terrorism in 2005 for leading
a political protest. Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 311, p. 126.
440 See, e.g., Chapter 7B.11 ‘Proscribing Dissent’ (referring to women’s groups and indigenous
groups being labelled terrorists).
441 A heightened standard of clarity and specificity is required under criminal law, and
additional uncertainties arise regarding membership as highlighted in this section below.
442 See, e.g., Chapter 6B.1.
443 See Ch.7B.11 ‘Proscribing dissent’ – expression, association, assembly.
444 Chapter 7B.8. Listing and Delisting.
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inal courts in determining guilt and displacing the presumption of inno-
cence.445 It has been noted as imperative that criminal courts can and do
assess both the nature of the organisation in question – whether it amounts
to a ‘terrorist’ organisation properly so called – and the role and culpability
of the individual, in convicting and punishing under the criminal law.446
Deference to terrorist ‘lists’ drawn up internationally, regionally or nation-
ally447 may challenge the presumption of innocence; innocence which must
be dislodged only by a court of law, applying criminal law commensurately
with individual criminal responsibility on a case-by-case basis, with doubt
being resolved in favour of the accused.448
iv) Failing to provide information
Another development accompanying the preventative paradigm is the shift
of focus from conduct to omission, criminalising those who fail to expose
would-be terrorists. Once again, criminalising omission is of course not novel
in criminal law, but it is exceptional, usually based on the particular respons-
ibilities attaching to groups of individuals in law.449 Some new terrorism
laws seek to intervene preventively by broadening the scope of persons con-
sidered to have such responsibilities, for example imposing a duty on all
citizens (including family members) to report any information that might
conceivably lead to the prevention of terrorism.
Questions regarding clarity of scope and the foreseeability of criminal law
necessarily arise from provision – such as in UK anti-terrorism legislation –
which provide that a person who ‘believes’ information ‘might be of material
assistance’ in preventing terrorism or securing convictions commits an offence
if he or she does not disclose the information to police as soon as reasonably
practicable.450 Although it is rare for charges to be brought under this section,
445 See, e.g., India’s anti-terrorism law which allows the Home Ministry of the central govern-
ment to declare a group to be a ‘terrorist organization’. See ‘Back to the Future: India’s 2008
Counterterrorism Laws’, Human Rights Watch, 2008, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/india0710webwcover_0.pdf.
446 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 42.
447 Chapter 7.B.8.
448 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee General Comment 32, Right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), regarding the Pre-
sumption of Innocence.
449 See, e.g., above Superior Responsibility in International Criminal Law which requires a
superior- subordinate relationship, with obligations that flow therefrom.
450 Section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 reintroduced the old section 19 of the PTA which
had been limited to terrorism in the context of Northern Ireland and criticized for its impact
on family life and society. The new act relates to information the person believes to assist
in ‘(a) preventing the commission by another person of an act of terrorism or, (b) in securing
the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of another person, in the UK, for an offence
involving the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism’.
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cases have been brought.451 While the objective of these laws are legitimate,
caution is due as regards the implications for legal certainty, as well as for
the stigmatisation and penalisation of families and communities.452
v) Material Support for Terrorist Organisations
An important feature of criminal practice that raises related concerns is the
adoption of laws criminalising various forms of ‘support’ for terrorism or for
prohibited organisations. It is perhaps in this context that concerns regarding
criminalisation of essentially non-culpable behaviour have been most acute.
Although these laws have some reflection in existing criminal concepts such
as aiding and abetting or the specific liability mode of ‘intentionally con-
tributing to the commission of a crime by a group’ under the Rome Statute,
their scope goes far beyond established modes of liability under international
criminal law. Notably, the US laws on ‘material support’ incriminate support
for a terrorist organisation of any form. While there is a limited exception for
the provision of ‘medicine and religious materials,’ cases have demonstrated
a very restrictive approach to the interpretation of even this narrow ex-
ception.453 Criminal laws cover not only support that contributes in some
way to acts of international terrorism, the conduct which the criminal law seeks
ultimately to repress and punish, but even innocent or well intentioned acts
that support the non-terrorist roles that organisations on terrorism lists may,
and in practice do at times, perform. Individuals may thus be prosecuted for
conduct that is not in any way ‘culpable,’ and even paradoxically for conduct
directed in some way at the prevention of terrorism.
This is illustrated in startling fashion by the 2010 decision of the US
Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, where a divided court
found that it was constitutional to criminalise support for a terrorist
organisation (PKK), in respect of the advocacy and training of members of that
451 Yeshiemebet Girma and others were charged with and convicted of failing to provide
information about acts of terrorism, contrary to section 38B (1) (b) of the Terrorism Act
2000; see C. Walter, S. Vöneky, V. Röben and F. Schorkopf, Terrorism as a Challenge for
National and International Law (Springer, 2005), p. 613.
452 See Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 302, p. 134 citing the danger that media, defence
lawyers, human rights groups and family members (especially children) are penalised. On
the radicalizing potential of such measures, and the ‘symbolic reminder of a group’s shared
circumstance vis-a-vis authorities and their agents of control’, see C. Campbell, ‘Beyond
Radicalization: Towards and Integrated Anti-Violence Rule of Law Strategy’, in A. Salinas
de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 255-82, p. 272.
453 United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp 2d 492 (SDNY 2007), 499 and United States v. Farhane
634 F2d 127 (2 Cir.2011); see Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures
on Principled Humanitarian Action,’ Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, July 2013,
independent study commissioned by ODHA and the Norwegian Refugee Council (‘Human-
itarian Study 2013’), p. 40.
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group to use international law to resolve disputes and obtain remedies.454
In the absence of subjective fault, one may ask on what basis the individual
can properly be subjected to the criminal law. Such laws are not unique to
the US. In other states, including Australia, Denmark and Canada, criminal
laws allow for prosecution despite the lack of intention to contribute to a
criminal act.455 The use of individuals as means, not ends, is anathema to
the concept of individualised responsibility in criminal law.
The potential implications for a broad range of legitimate activity was
acknowledged in a later case in lower courts in the US, where a federal judge
reportedly struck down the legal provisions allowing for detention on grounds
of ‘material support’ as ‘unconstitutionally overbroad’.456 The judge
recognised the legitimate fear of journalists, scholars and political activists
that they could face detention for exercising their rights.457 The laws that
have been most commonly been used to prosecute terrorism in the US are
conspiracy laws (addressed above) and ‘material support’ laws. They have
been used in combination to particularly broad effect, as ‘conspiracy to provide
454 Holder v Humanitarian Law Project (2010) 561 US; See J. Fraterman, ‘Criminalizing Humanitar-
ian Relief: Are US Material Support for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International
Humanitarian Law?’, 14 January 2011, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1750963
. U.S. District Judge Audrey Collins in Los Angeles ruled that the Patriot Act was ‘imper-
missibly vague’ in prohibiting individuals or groups from giving ‘expert advice or assist-
ance’ to designated terrorist organizations. The crime may arise anywhere in the world
if the suspect is a US national or resident or enters the US any time after the commission
of the offence.
455 See Humanitarian Study, supra note 453, referring e.g., to ‘low standards of intent’ for such
offences in Australia, Denmark and Canada for example. It notes that in some states
knowledge that a group is listed would suffice to render any support a criminal offence
while in the UK ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ such designation would suffice; pp. 41, 45.
See eg Sn 114b Danish Criminal code on financial or other support to terrorism.
456 In September 2012, a federal judge struck down Section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2012 that allowed for indefinite detention for ‘substantially’ or
‘directly’ provides ‘support’ to forces such as al-Qaeda or the Taliban: Hedges v. Obama,
12 Civ. 331 (KBF) (2012) and opinion at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/09/2012-09-12-permanent-injunction-order.pdf . The judge noted the law
was ‘unconstitutionally overbroad’ and recognised legitimate fears in claims by journalists,
scholars and political activists that they could face indefinite detention for exercising First
Amendment rights. ‘Anti-terrorism law struck down by federal judge’, POLITICO, 13
September 2012, available at: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81169.html.
See also Judge Audrey Collins in the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles who ruled that the
Patriot Act was ‘impermissibly vague’ in prohibiting individuals or groups from giving
‘expert advice or assistance’ to designated terrorist organizations. ‘U.S. Judge Voids Portion
of Patriot Act as Illegally Vague’, LA Times, 30 July 2005, available at: http://articles.latimes.
com/2005/jul/30/local/me-patriot30.
457 Ibid. Lawyers are also at risk from overbroad criminal notions of providing support. In
2012 a ten-year prison sentence was upheld in federal court for a 73-year-old attorney who
was convicted in 2005 of ‘providing aid to terrorism’ for sharing statements from her client,
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, with the media. See ‘Why justice is at risk in the Babar Ahmad
extradition case’, The Guardian, 5 October 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2012/oct/05/justice-risk-babar-ahmad-extradition.
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material support’ further waters down and stretched the potential reach of
criminal law.458
A particular form of support for terrorism that is typically criminalised,
and which raises similar concerns, is the financing of terrorism. Combating
the financing of terrorism and money laundering is a key priority in the
international fight against terrorism, as well reflected in the legal frame-
work,459 and one beset with real law enforcement challenges.460 Extremely
broad-reaching criminal laws have been passed into law that cover any form
of potential financial provision ‘direct or indirect’ to an individual or group
designated terrorist. It is often irrelevant whether or not there is any intention
to contribute to terrorism or this in fact results.461 Similar concerns therefore
arise as regards the potential to greatly widen the criminal net to cover inno-
cent or legitimate activity.462
vi) Incitement, Provocation, Glorification or Apology for Terrorism
Another way in which inchoate offences have been expanded pursuant to the
shift towards a preventive paradigm is in the trend to criminalise acts that
encourage, incite or provoke acts of terrorism.
UN Security Council Resolution 1624 of 2005 called on states to prohibit
incitement,463 marking something of a departure from international criminal
law practice (where incitement is an established form of liability for genocide
though not for other crimes).464 While clearly raising questions regarding
free expression, there is nothing in human rights law that would preclude
prosecuting those that incite violence; on the contrary, states may be obliged
to do so.465 Provided the offence is clearly defined, and the restriction on
458 This basis for criminal prosecution has been common in the US in recent years.
459 See eg Articles 2 and 4 of the widely ratified 1999 International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism (Financing Convention), and SC Res 1373 which closely
reflects the Financing Convention, both in Chapter 2.
460 See eg M.A. Drumbl, Transnational Terrorist Financing, Criminal and Civil Perspective,
German Law Journal 2008.
461 See eg ‘Interpretative Note to FATF Special Recommendation II: Criminalising the financing
of terrorism and associated money laundering ‘, FATF paras 3-8. The Note indicates that
states should embrace a broad range of forms of responsibility for this offence.
462 See eg Humanitarian Study, supra, on the implications for humanitarian organisations of
these crimes, and of FATF recommendations (including recommendation 8 on ensuring
NGOs are not abused for terrorism).
463 SC Resolution 1624 (2005), 14 December 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1624 (2005), called upon
all States to ‘adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance
with their obligations under international law to: (a) Prohibit by law incitement to commit
a terrorist act or acts ...’.
464 See ICC Statute, supra note 4, Article 25. Incitement is included to reflect the Genocide
Convention.
465 See positive obligations 7A.4.2, and human rights cases making clear that free expression
is not absolute and can be restricted where incitement to violence is involved at 7A5.6;
see also the practice at 7B.11.
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rights necessary and proportionate, such laws provide an important tool in
the prevention of terrorism.
Some innovations in criminal law strain these criteria however. For
example, the obligation to penalise ‘provocation’ in Security Council resolutions
appears to go further than existing international criminal law for example.466
While similar forms of liability are recognized in international criminal law
(such as ‘inducing’ the commission of a crime or acting ‘in common purpose’,
or as part of a ‘joint criminal enterprise’), these require that the crime ‘in fact
occurs or is attempted’.467 By contrast crimes of incitement or provocation
may however go further by criminalising expression which may not have
contributed in any way to criminal activity or indeed been intended to have
such an impact.
The Security Council’s inclusion of ‘provocation’ was picked up in various
forms, including in the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism (2005), Article 5 which requires States parties to adopt such measures
as may be necessary to criminalize ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence’.468 This Convention limits the potential scope of provocation by im-
posing the ‘double requirement of a subjective intent to incite (encourage) the
commission of terrorist offences and an objective danger that one or more such
offences would be committed’.469 However, the Convention has been relied
upon by states to justify wider-ranging measures that go beyond these para-
meters.
The UK notoriously included the crime of ‘glorification of terrorism’ in its
anti-terrorism legislation, referring specifically to the Europe Convention on
the Prevention of Terrorism as the basis for so doing.470 The glorification
or encouragement offences, unlike the European Convention, did not require
that the statement in fact encouraged any person to engage in a terrorist act
– explicitly de-linking this form of encouragement from its actual effect.471
466 S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 463.
467 See ‘Indirect Criminal Responsibility’ at Part A above.
468 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism was modified by Council
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008. The consequence is the intro-
duction of three new offences: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment
for terrorism; and training for terrorism.
469 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism: ‘the distribution, or otherwise
making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of
a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences,
causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed’. The Special Rapporteur
of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has referred to Article 5 as ‘a sound
response which would respect human rights’. E/CN.4/2006/98, p. 17, par. 56c (citing the
Convention as a model).
470 See Explanatory notes to the Terrorism Act of 2006
471 S. Chehani Ekaratne, ‘Redundant Restriction: The U.K.’s Offense of Glorifying Terrorism’,
(2010) 23(1) Harvard Law School Human Rights Journal, 205-22. It need only be ‘likely’ to be
understood as encouraging terrorism.
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Moreover, the person making the statement or publishing the document need
not intend to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, with recklessness
as to this result sufficing. There has been widespread criticism of the glorifica-
tion provision, for its breadth, susceptibility to abuse, and disproportionate
impact on freedom of expression, by among others by the UN Human Rights
Committee.472 Despite this, similar provisions on ‘glorification’ have been
proposed, adopted and relied upon to prosecute in other states.473 The UN
Human Rights Committee has called for the revision of legal provisions on
‘encouraging’ terrorism.474
The criminalisation of expression and opinion also takes the form of crimes
that express sympathy, justification or ‘apology’ for ‘terrorist’ causes. One such
broad reaching provision appears in the Russian Anti-Terrorism Act which
includes the ‘popularisation of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or
information urging terrorist activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity
of the exercise of such activity’.475 Another is the Turkish Counter-terrorism
law that sanctions those who ‘make propaganda for a Terrorist organization
or for its aims’.476 As with all such associated offences, the wide-reaching
scope of these terms must be seen alongside the expansive definitions of
terrorism itself.
472 It was criticised for breadth, susceptibility to abuse, and disproportionate impact on freedom
of expression. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/ GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 2008). See E. Barendt, ‘Threats to Freedom of Speech in
the United Kingdom?’, (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Review 895.
473 Article 578 of the Spanish Penal Code prohibits ‘glorification of terrorism;’ see, e.g., the
convictions in the “Esteban, Miriam and Valentina” case before the Audiencia Nacional: .
See ICJ Terrorism Bulletin, No 51, April 2011. On Canada proposals, see C. Forcese, ‘Crim-
inalizing Glorification of Terrorism: Bad Idea on Stilts’, National Security Law Blog, available
at: http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2011/11/18/criminaliz-
ing-glorification-of-terrorism-bad-idea-on-stilts.html. See also F. Hassan, ‘Do Anti-Terrorism
Act Amendments Threaten Free Speech?’, Huffington Post, 22 November 2011, available
at:http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/farzana-hassan/anti-terrorism-act-canada_b_1104538.html
and ‘Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review of the Anti-Terrorism Act and
Related Issues’, Government Response to the Seventh Report of the Standing Committee
on Public Safety and National Security Subcommittee on the Review of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3066235
&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&File=15.
474 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
Ninety-third session CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, 21 July 2008.
475 Federal Law No. 35-Fz of March 6, 2006 on Counteraction Against Terrorism.
476 Turkish Counter-terrorism Law, 2006, Article 7 of Law 3713. On proportionality of penalties
see Yilmaz and Kiliç v. Turkey, (Appl. No. 68514/01), Judgment of 17 July 2008.
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4B.2.2 Penalties and Sentencing in Terrorism Cases
Resort to the criminal law is, in itself, intended to reflect the seriousness with
which the state takes acts of terrorism. The imposition of proportionately tough
sentencing for serious acts of ‘terrorism’ can be an important part of both the
‘expressivist’ and the ‘retributivist’ functions of criminal law in this field.477
Security Council in 1373 underlined the duty to ensure that ‘the punishment
duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts’.478
One tension that arises is that the tendency to impose ‘tough’ penalties
for conduct that falls within the purview of ‘terrorism’ is out of sync with
another tendency towards an overly inclusive approach to terrorism, associated
crimes and modes of liability embracing a range of more and much less
culpable behaviour. As such, sentences imposed may be out of proportion
to the conduct of the individual. Cited as an example of this is the Australian
case R v Elomar & Others, where a young man was sentenced to 23 years in
prison for a relatively minor role in a conspiracy to commit acts in preparation
for a terrorist act.479 Likewise, the imposition of serious sentences for terror-
ism and ancillary offences that cover mere expressions of support de-linked
from the commission of a crime, have been found to give rise to particular
concerns regarding proportionality. This is seen for example in the ECtHR case
law condemning the lack of proportion in custodial sentences for terrorist
offences that amounted to expressions of support for Abdullah Ocalan.480
It has been suggested that ‘special sentencing rules for terrorists’ are
emerging.481 Concern was expressed for example in a 2012 case before US
courts, where a federal appeals court overturned a lower courts sentence,
477 See Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value’, supra note 7; see also 7B.4.2‘Terrorism, penalties and
nulla poena sine lege’.
478 SC Res. 1373 (2001).
479 No specific terrorist attack had yet been agreed upon still less effectuated, and it has been
suggested that there was not necessarily any intention to injure people involved in the plot.
See R v Elomar & Others [2010] NSWSC 10, paras. 147-78 (concerning Mohammed Omar
Jamal), discussed in Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12.
480 See, e.g., Yilmaz and Kiliç v. Turkey, supra note 476. The applicant’s three years and nine
months prison sentence for ‘aiding and abetting an illegal organization’, a crime under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, was based on participation in demonstrations expressing
support for Abdullah Öcalan. The European Court of Human Rights concluded that, even
if the interference in the freedom of expression could be justified by the need to preserve
public order, it was clearly disproportionate due to the severity of the sentences.
481 US v. Ressam, 679 F. 3d 1069, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (dissenting Judge Mary M. Shroeder wrote:
‘Our courts are well equipped to treat each offense and offender individually, and we should
not create special sentencing rules and procedures for terrorists’). See, e.g., ‘Appeals Court
Overturns Millennium Bomb-Plot Sentence; Calls it Too Light’, The New York Times, 12 March
2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/us/appeals-court-overturns-
millennium-bomb-plot-sentence.html.
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imposed on Ahmed Ressam the so-called ‘millennium bomber’,482 on the
basis of the undue leniency of a twenty two year prison sentence.483 A note-
worthy dissent opined that the appeals court had overstepped its authority
in overturning the sentence, instead of deferring to the lower court’s assessment
on the facts of the particular case, on the basis that ‘the majority simply did
not like the idea of a terrorist leaving prison after only 22 years’.484 The dis-
sent noted that ‘[o]ur courts are well equipped to treat each offense and
offender individually, and we should not create special sentencing rules and
procedures for terrorists’.485
English courts, suggesting that heavy and indeterminate penalties may
be justified by the unprecedented nature of current terrorist threats, set down
stringent sentencing guidelines in the context of the criminal cases concerning
the & July London bombings.486 A later case from the same courts cautioned
however that ‘whilst there is a need for deterrent sentencing in terrorism cases,
if sentences are imposed in this area which are more severe than the case
merits, this will be more likely to inflame rather than deter extremism’.487
An unduly punitive approach has likewise been described as ‘counter-product-
ive’ to criminal law aims, as ‘they may not only further radicalise offenders
but also alienate the community from which they come, thus fuelling further
discontent with the dominant legal and political order’.488
A case-by-case evaluation of sentencing is critical to ensuring
proportionality. While sentencing guidelines may arguably erode this function,
it is eviscerated by the imposition in some states of mandatory sentences for
crimes such as terrorism. The established role of the judge in assessing the
penalty, taking into account the facts and individual circumstances, is replaced
by an abstract assessment of appropriate punishment by the executive and/or
legislature.489 As mandatory sentences are intended in part to send a message
482 The Algerian national known as the ‘Millennium Bomber’ plotted to set off explosives at
Los Angeles International Airport on 31 December 1999.
483 An 11-judge panel from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
to send the case back to the district court for a tougher sentence.
484 Dissenting Judgement of Judge Mary M. Schroeder, supra note 481; see also the decision
by the US Appeals Court in US v. Abu Ali, supra note 316, to overturn a thirty-year prison
sentence followed by thirty years supervision on release as too lenient, and the dissent
of J. Motz. The US Supreme Court denied the writ for certiori in 2009.
485 Dissenting Judgement of Judge Mary M. Schroeder, supra note 481.
486 On sentencing guidelines in UK see landmark judgment of R. v. Barot, [2008] 1 Cr. App.
R(S) 247(45), followed in R. v. Ibrahim, [2008] 4 All E.R. 208 concerning the London bom-
bings.
487 R. v. Rahman & Mohammed, [2008] 4 All E.R. 661 CA (Crim. Div.).
488 Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, supra note 12.
489 Egypt had mandatory death penalty for terrorism, which was challenged in Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights (on behalf of Sabbah and Others) v Arab Republic of
Egypt, Communication No. 334/06, 13 February 2012, ACHPR, brief available at: http://
www.interights.org/taba/index.html . See also, for example, Human Rights Committee
statement on the impermissibility of a mandatory death penalty: Francisco Juan Larranaga
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regarding the seriousness with which crimes are regarded, they are generally
severe. In some cases the even carry the death penalty. The increased resort
to the death penalty in the context of terrorism trials has given rise to concern
regarding proportionality.490 In particular its ‘mandatory’ application, ir-
respective of the circumstances of the accused brings the criminal process into
conflict with the human rights framework’s requirements regarding proportion-
ate penalties and the protection of the right to life.491
4B.2.3 Modified Procedures and Principles of Criminal Law
A further feature of criminal practice in relation to international terrorism are
the jurisdictional, procedural or evidentiary rules that in some ways exempt
terrorism investigations and trials from the normally applicable principles and
processes of criminal law. It is imperative that states have the necessary powers
to investigate effectively and prove criminal conduct beyond reasonable doubt.
Making police powers ‘more flexible and useful’ and removing obstacles that
impede investigation or trial, is a legitimate priority, provided it respects the
legal framework, including the principle of legality, presumption of innocence
and basic fair trial rights.492
It is well known that detention pursuant to the war on terror has involved
prolonged arbitrary detention, abusive interrogation techniques, torture and
inhuman treatment with confessions and incriminations of questionable reliabil-
ity.493 Often these practices were aimed at unfettered intelligence gathering,
unrelated to (but rather a side-stepping of) the criminal process. As these
practices are addressed in other chapters they are not addressed specifically
here, though their impact on criminal prosecutions is discussed below.494
They are, moreover, a reminder of the drift in the role of intelligence agencies
in a number of states, which carry out arrest, detention and investigation, and
v. The Philippines (Comm. no. 1421/2005), Human Rights Committee, 24 July 2006, para.
7.2.
490 See Chapter 7B For example, Amnesty International notes the sharp increase in the number
of death sentences passed in trials of people accused of having links to al-Qaeda, or to the
Huthi armed group in Yemen. ‘Yemen: Cracking Down under Pressure’, Amnesty Inter-
national, 2010, p. 22, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE31/010/
2010/en/da8bd0cc-37ab-4472-80b3-bcf8a48fc827/mde310102010en.pdf .
491 See, e.g.. HR Committee statement on the impermissibility of a mandatory death penalty:
Francisco Juan Larranaga v. The Philippines, above, (Comm. no. 1421/2005), Human Rights
Committee, 24 July 2006, para 7.2; see also Chapter 7 ‘Nullum Poena Sine Lege’. Where
capital punishment is not abolished, it may be applied only for the most serious crimes,
following a fair trial.
492 UNODC Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism, supra note 157.




the importance of clarifying and distinguishing intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies respective roles, especially in relation to criminal justice
efforts.495
Within the criminal law framework itself, there are myriad examples of
the normally applicable rules and protections of criminal law being excluded
or limited for terrorist suspects. These commonly include expanded periods
of pre-trial detention,496 sometimes without the essential rights to consult
a lawyer or to challenge lawfulness.497 Among the most striking examples
of exceptionalism in the criminal sphere are the resort to special courts, and
modifications to applicable evidentiary rules, addressed in turn below.
i) ‘Special’ Jurisdictions
The creation of special courts and tribunals to try terrorism cases has been
a feature of international practice in a surprising number of states.498 Most
well known are the Military Commissions established by the US to try a
relatively small percentage of the Guantanamo detainees, discussed in Chap-
ter 8. President Bush justified their establishment by stating that ‘Given the
danger … and the nature of international terrorism, … it is not practicable
to apply … the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal’ cases.499 However, as seen above, federal courts have
overcome these challenges in terrorism cases where they have had jurisdiction
to do so. The intensity of the political debate was clear when President
Obama’s proposal to submit Guantanamo detainees to trial by normal federal
criminal courts ultimately failed.500 After several constitutional challenges,501
495 See, e.g., Scheinin Special Rapporteur Reports A/HRC/10/3 (paras. 25-78) and A/HRC/14/
46.
496 See Chapter 7A5.3 and Chapter 8 in relation to Guantanamo detainees. In certain cases
relatively extended periods may be justified by complex evidence gathering, sometimes
internationally. Bail is often restricted in terrorism cases but pre-trial detention must be
strictly necessary, and subject to safeguards including access to a lawyer and judicial
oversight.
497 See Chapters 7A5.3, 7B7 and 8 on detention and fair trial rights.
498 See, e.g., military commissions and special security courts for terrorism in, for example,
US, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Syria. Many more states used such courts during repressive
periods, but subsequently repealed (and sometimes banned) them, as the Latin American
experience demonstrates. The Eminent Jurists panel notes that in addition there are states
with use centralize or specialized courts for terrorism cases, such as Spain, France, Tunisia,
Morocco and Yemen. Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 302, p. 141.
499 President Bush signed a Military Order on 13 November 2001 which noted that: ‘Given
the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism, ...
it is not practicable to apply in military commission’s under this order the principles of
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal’ cases in the
United States district courts.’ (para. 6).
500 See Chapter 8 on Guantánamo. ‘Our courts and juries of our citizens are tough enough
to convict terrorists, and the record makes that clear. ....’ ‘Remarks by the President on
National Security’, 21 May 2009, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, available
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.
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new pieces of legislation and rules of procedure, the commissions are now
functioning at ‘Camp Justice’ in Guantanamo Bay.502
The exceptionalist criminal law framework that accompanies terrorism
charges have also provided the context for military commissions and special
terrorism courts in many other states.503 Indeed post-9/11, the then Egyptian
President Mubarak famously cited the US position on military commissions
as indicating that the Egyptians were justified in their long having used such
commissions.504 The Egyptian ‘state security courts’, whose introduction was
justified by reference to a national security emergency but which remained
a feature of terrorism trials in Egypt for thirty years,505 have recently been
lacking the necessary independence and impartiality.506 New special con-
demned by the African Commission as courts have also emerged, as exem-
plified by the announcement in 2013 of the establishment of a new terrorism
court in Bangladesh to respond to the backlog created by the number of cases
filed under novel Anti-terrorism laws.507
Human rights bodies have often held that the use of special courts that
depend on and are closely linked to the executive or the military lack the
independence and impartiality required of a criminal court, a sine qua non upon
See also Vladeck, ‘Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts after Abu Ali’, supra note 316.
501 The military commission convened to judge Hamdan was held unconstitutional by the
US Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 2 as it ‘lacks power to proceed because
its structure and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions.’
502 Following Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, ibid., the law was changed by the Military Commission Act,
which provided improvements to due process rights in the rules of evidence and procedure
of the military commissions, though their compatibility with international requirements
is still questionable – see Chapter 8. The shift, and eventual compromise, is reflected in
e.g. the fact that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible. But evidence obtained
through methods in ‘which the degree of coercion is disputed’ may be admitted subject
to certain conditions. See Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value’, supra note 7, p. 12.
503 For examples, see eg in Yemen, the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) was created in the
name of ‘countering terrorism’ in 2004, and three additional SCCs were then established
in 2009. The SCC has been used to convict people such as journalists covering the conflict
in Sa’dah, or grievances expressed by the Southern Movement. Hundreds have been tried
by the SCC since its establishment in 1999. See ‘Cracking Down Under Pressure’, supra note
604; see also Sabbah v Egypt.
504 ‘In the Name of Counter-Terrorism’, Human Rights Watch, March 2003.
505 ‘The Emergency Law in Egypt’, International Federation for Human Rights, 3 February
2011, available at: http://www.fidh.org/the-emergency-law-in-egypt .
506 Sabbah v Egypt, supra note 603.
507 In Bangladesh, a new Anti-terrorism law was introduced in 2009, and modified in 2011.
Nearly 200 cases had been filed under it and the pace of such trials was subject to political
criticism. On 13 February 2013 Law Minister Shafique Ahmed announced to parliament
the prompt establishemtn of a special terrorism court. See ‘Special tribunal planned to reduce
’terror trial’ backlog’, http://khabarsouthasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/
2013/03/06/feature-01
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which the legitimacy of the criminal process depends.508 They have also em-
phasized, specifically, that military tribunals are in principle inappropriate
fora to try civilians, including for terrorism.509
Special jurisdictions are often invoked precisely as they guarantee less due
process rights, raising specific fair trial issues. In many cases resort to special
courts or tribunals may be accompanied by closed trials, bail may not be
permitted by law, access to counsel or to evidence may be curtailed and rules
on evidence are generally more ‘flexible’.510 Unsurprisingly, they are often
therefore found to fall short of specific fair trial guarantees. An example from
Pakistan involved the establishment of special anti-terrorism courts on the
basis of the need for ‘speedy trial’,511 or of the need for military jurisdiction
over civilians accused of offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act.512 In practice
these courts have been much criticised for undermining basic fair trial safe-
guards.513
ii) Modified Approaches to Procedure and Evidence
Even in respect of terrorism trials before regular courts, many modifications
to procedures have been introduced by anti-terror legislation around the globe.
While in some cases the procedures are limited to terrorism, in others they
are already used in other contexts but have been given public profile through
the terrorism cases.514 These have commonly included special measures con-
cerning restrictions on access to classified or sensitive evidence, or differing
508 See Chapter 7 on ‘Fair trial’ and Chapter 8B.4.5 on US ‘Military Commissions’. The African
Commission has noted in clear terms in a decision of 2012 related to terrorism trials before
Egyptian special courts; see Sabbah v Egypt, supra note 603
509 Ibid.
510 See Chapter 8B.4.5 on US ‘Military Commissions’.
511 Section 13 of the Pakistani Anti-Terrorism Act.
512 For example, International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, A Long March to Justice:
A report on judicial independence and integrity in Pakistan, September 2009, p. 65. Human Rights
Watch, ‘Destroying Legality: Pakistan’s Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges’, 2007, pp. 25-26.
See also, Amnesty International, ‘Human Rights in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’, 2010.
513 Reported in Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review,
‘Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accord-
ance with Paragraph 15(c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Pakistan’,
25 March 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/2/PAK3, paragraph 37. Under 2007 amendments to the
Army Act 1962, the military may try civilians for a wide range of offences previously under
the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s civilian judiciary.
514 See, e.g., Terrorist Trial Report Card, September 11, 2001-September 11, 2009, Center on
Law and Security, New York University School of Law, January 2010: ‘Our research suggests
that the techniques employed by prosecutors in terrorism-associated cases – notably the
use of informants and lesser charges – do not differ markedly from those employed in
prosecuting serious drug charges and organized crime. High-profile terrorism cases, in
effect, have drawn greater attention to longstanding but little-noticed criticisms of well-
established prosecutorial tactics.’
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rules on admissibility. In the criminal context,515 the burden of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and discharging the presumption of innocence, and
the right to confront evidence against the accused, have long been held sacro-
sanct. Some of these modifications jar with traditional safeguards around which
the criminal law is built.
As practice unfolds several examples emerge of courts having had to
determine procedures and evidence that address various apparently competing
factors: protection of sensitive information, ensuring that reliable evidence
can be used, while guaranteeing basic rights such as fair trial and the integrity
of the courts proceedings. A recurrent issue emerging in the context of the
so called war on terror, is the admissibility of torture evidence that may be
obtained through torture or ill-treatment. This was seen for example in the
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali case referred to above516 where a victim of extra-
ordinarily rendition challenged the admissibility of the testimony of Saudi
officers’ and his own inculpatory statements made while in Saudi custody,
on the basis of his alleged torture and ill-treatment. The Court found that
evidence obtained through torture could not be admitted and the government
must demonstrate the voluntariness of the evidence; however, on the facts
of that case it found, controversially, that ‘the government has met its burden
of proving that Mr Abu Ali’s statements were voluntary’ and the Appeals
Court upheld this decision.517 This was one of many cases where issues
regarding admissibility of torture evidence have arisen and the authorities
have argued that the onus should lie with the accused to prove that the torture
was obtained through torture.518
Mr Ali also challenged his lack of access to – and opportunity to confront –
evidence against the accused, another common feature of recent terrorism trials.
The court ruled that the Government could use the ‘silent witness’ procedure
to disclose classified information contained in communications to the jury at
trial, though Abu Ali himself would only be able to see the redacted version
of the documents. Dismissing a motion for complete disclosure, the district
court concluded that the redacted version of the documents provided to Abu
Ali therefore ‘me[t] the defense’s need for access to the information’.519
515 The handling of such issues by human rights bodies have often related to other contexts,
for example, the balancing buy the courts re immigration procedures or special measures,
as explained in Chapter 7 see the UK cases of A& Others (derogation) on access to evidence
and A&Others (torture evidence) on admissibility in Chapter 11.
516 United States v. Abu Ali, note 325. See discussion of the case under 4B.1.2 ‘Terrorism Trials’;
see also Vladeck, ‘Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts after Abu Ali’, supra note 325.
517 Vladeck, ibid, p.5
518 Chapter 7B5.3; The ECHR has found the onus should lie with the state to demonstrate that
evidence was not obtained through torture, not vice versa.
519 Ibid.
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Similar schemes have unfolded in states that limit the accused’s access to
evidence.520
As terrorism trials continue to unfold, and judges determine the right
balance between protecting genuinely sensitive information and ensuring fair
trial, internationally accepted standards in relation to evidence and procedure
may be further clarified.521 Ensuring that justice is done and seen to be done
in terrorism cases is an essential aspects of the rule of law response to terror-
ism, as opposed to perceptions of a ‘victors justice’ or of a ‘criminal law of
the enemy’.522
iii) Principles of Criminal Justice and Terrorism trials
Basic principles of criminal law, including the presumption of innocence, have
been challenged in the context of terrorism trials in diverse ways. Most ob-
viously, public authorities have shown themselves particularly prone to vilify
suspected ‘terrorists’ as criminals pending trial, partly in the context of touting
their capture for political advantage.523 The Human Rights Committee has
noted that adverse public comments about an accused person,524 like extens-
ive negative portrayal in the media – another common feature in the terrorism
context525 – may violate the accused person’s right to be presumed innocence.
Political pressure on courts to convict those publicly declared ‘terrorists’
has at times given rise to concerns regarding the presumption of innocence;
in other contexts the opposite pressure is apparent, and high acquittal rates
has been attributed to intimidation of prosecutors and the judiciary by the
520 E.g. in Canadian courts see Ahmed, Alizadeh, and Sher criminal cases involving disputes
regarding access to secret evidence; ‘Terror suspect wants secret evidence against him
revealed’, Globe and Mail, 23 Aug. 2012 http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
terror-suspect-wants-secret-evidence-against-him-revealed/article1693369/?service=mobile.
For the issue in the military commissions Guantánamo see Chapter 8 and in the civil context
elsewhere see 7B.7.3.
521 This will occur in the future as these cases proceed through the higher courts and on to
human rights bodies, developing law and practice in this field.
522 On the link between the ‘expressivist’ function of criminal law and due process see, e.g.,
Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value’, supra note 7. M. Tondini, ‘Beyond the Law of the Enemy:
Recovering from the Failures of the Global War on Terrorism through (Criminal) Law’,
in Processi Storici e Politiche di Pace / Historical Processes and Peace Politics, Vol. 3, No. 5, 2008,
pp. 59-81
523 Note comments on allegations against Abu Zubaydah for example upon capture which
were withdrawn once he had access to counsel, noted in Chapter 8 on Guantanamo.
524 Communication No. 770/1997, Gridin v. Russian Federation (views adopted on 20 July 2000),
UN Doc. GAOR, A/55/40 (vol. II), paragraph 8.3 where high-ranking law enforcement
officials had made public statements portraying an accused person of being guilty of certain
crimes, there was a violation of the presumption
525 Saidov v. Tajikistan (964/2001), ICCPR, A/59/40 vol. II (8 July 2004) 164 at paras. 6.6-7,
(where State-directed media extensively described an accused as a criminal).
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accused.526 It goes without saying that the criminal law can only hope to
meet any of its rule of law aims if courts and prosecutors are rigorously
independent and fairly and dispassionately apply the criminal law.
Exceptionalist approaches to terrorism trials can also be seen in the applica-
tion of the principles of criminal law in terrorism cases. The most troubling
are those laws that effectively suspend the presumption of innocence by
shifting the burden of proof to the accused to prove his or her innocence in
terrorism cases.527 This is evident in terrorism laws in a number of states,
as illustrated by the Indian Amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Preven-
tion) Amendment Act, 2008, passed in response to the Mumbai attacks.528
The law provides that where some evidence indicates the involvement of the
accused, the onus is on him to refute this, contrary to the generally applicable
burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Similar
rules are found in the legislations of other states.529
A less striking yet noteworthy example of the suspension of normally
applicable rules and standards lies in a piece of Spanish legislation from 2010
which treats murder that results from acts of terrorism, as opposed to other
forms of murder, as ‘imprescriptible’.530 The basis for the contrast in the Span-
ish order between its treatment of crimes of terrorism and other crimes in this
respect is not readily apparent. It is particularly curious that crimes against
humanity of the Franco-era to have not been declared imprescriptible (and
the Judge who decided that they were he was criminally prosecuted), yet the
legislature had no difficulty in exempting the crime of terrorism from the
normal rules on prescription. These and other exceptional approaches are often
justified by assumptions about the gravity of terrorism, an assumption which
as explained above may or may not withstand scrutiny in the particular case.
526 See, e.g., ‘Acquittals in terrorism cases: Prosecuting in fear, Metropolitan, Islamabad, Malik
Asad’, 15 August 2011, available at: http://dawn.com/2011/08/15/acquittals-in-terrorism-
cases-prosecuting-in-fear.
527 See e.g. HRC General Comments 13 and 32, which make clear that the presumption of
innocence is a fundamental human rights principle. See also Chapter 7A ‘Fair Trial’.
528 See ‘Human Rights Features’, Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, 22 January 2009, available
at: http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF191.htm . This provision removes the
right to remain silent, but also effectively the presumption of innocence. During the parlia-
mentary debates, the Home Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram justified this reversal of the
burden of proof on the grounds that in the past, terrorists have evaded conviction because
they were permitted to remain silent. Mr. Chidambaram stated that if evidence points to
the accused ‘then the accused has a duty to enter the box or let an evidence to say that
I am giving contrary evidence’.
529 Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 311, p. 154 (referring to Australia, Pakistan, Tanzania,
Uganda and the U.K as states where changes to ancillary terrorism place the burden on
the accused to disprove certain elements of the charges).
530 The Ley Organica 5/2010, 22 June 2010.
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4B.3 PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN INTER-STATE COOPERATION POST-9/11
One area of considerable legal industry in the field of counter-terrorism in
recent years has been in relation to international cooperation. There have been
significant normative, institutional and practical developments aimed at
clarifying states obligations to cooperate in criminal matters in relation to
counter-terrorism, and to enhance the capacity and efficiency of national
systems to meet those obligations.
In the first few years after 9/11, practice was slow to develop. Relatively
few formal requests for extradition and mutual assistance from the US appear
to have been processed for example,531 reflecting the lack of national prosecu-
tions and the ‘informal’ or ‘extraordinary’ approach to some of the international
cooperation at that time.532 As the practice of extradition and mutual legal
assistance requests has developed, it has exposed interesting challenges and
tensions of a legal, political and practical nature.
4B.3.1 International standards and cooperation
The obligation to cooperate in the prevention and prosecution of serious crime
was already well established long before 9/11. In numerous ways international,
regional and national bodies responded to 9/11 with initiatives aimed at
strengthening or clarifying those obligations. Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted
by the Security Council on 28 September 2001, provided the most significant
normative landmark.533 Going beyond earlier resolutions, it established the
obligation of all states to, among other things, afford other states the greatest
measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or proceedings
in relation to terrorism.534 The Security Council called on states to ratify exist-
ing terrorism conventions which have been identified as hitherto lacking imple-
mentation.535 As a result, there has been a significant increase in the number
of state parties to these conventions, which provide an important framework
531 It is noted that it is difficult to monitor practice in respect of mutual assistance, as requests
are generally confidential.
532 As discussed at the start of Part B, it reflects the military as opposed to law enforcement
focus of the ‘war on terror,’ as well as the troubling level of informal cooperation through,
for example, the rendition programme discussed at Chapter 10.
533 SC Res. 1373 (2001); see also SC Res. 1368 (2001) noting the importance of cooperation as
part of the collective framework for countering terrorism). The significant obligations were,
however, imposed in SC Res. 1373 (2001).
534 The General Assembly has also called on states to take all necessary and effective measures
to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism. A Counter-Terrorism Sub-Committee was
established by the Security Council, to which states report steps taken to comply with the
resolution. See the reports to the 1373 Committee at www.un.org/Docs/SC/Committees/
1373.
535 SC Res. 1373 (2001) at para. 3.
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for cooperation in respect of specific forms of terrorism.536 While the Security
Council also called for progress on a comprehensive terrorism convention,537
as discussed in Chapter 2 these developments have not borne fruit, and dispute
continues as to the viability and desirability of such a convention, as well as
the key elements of the definition of terrorism.
On the regional level, as the renewed focus on international terrorism has
been the catalyst to measures to enhance cooperation.538 The European Union
has been particularly prolific in this area in recent years: in addition to devel-
opment of common definitions of crimes539 and common security strategy,540
there have been multiple terrorism-specific developments (such as the Frame-
work Decision on Terrorism),541 as well as others which, while proposed
before 9/11 and going beyond cooperation on terrorism specifically, were
impelled by the political imperative surrounding cooperation post 9/11. Shortly
after 9/11 the introduction of a Pan-European Arrest Warrant in 2002, for
example, streamlines and expedites the extradition procedure within Europe
and removes certain traditional limits on the obligation to extradite, such as
the political offence exception, rule of specialty and the double criminality
requirement.542
As regards mutual legal assistance, a significant development within the
European Union was the Framework Decision on the European Evidence
536 On these developments, see Chapter 2, in particular 2.1.2-2.1.5; see also report of the Counter-
Terrorism Sub-Committee, supra note 534; and du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra note 8.
537 One advantage of such a Convention is that it could arguably provide a broader framework
for international cooperation, though its desirability and viability remain controversial;
see Prost, ‘Need for a Multilateral Cooperative Framework’, supra note 264.
538 For a more thorough overview of developments, see du Plessis, ‘A Snapshot’, supra note
8.
539 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism has been modified by Council
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, introducing three new offences
in EU legislation: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism,
and training for terrorism. See ‘The Changing Face of Criminal Law’ above at 4B.2.
540 In February 2010, the EU issued its first internal security strategy, which highlights terrorism
as a key threat facing the EU and aims to develop a coherent and comprehensive EU
strategy to tackle terrorism and a wide range of organized crimes, cybercrime, money
laundering, and natural and man-made disasters. See, e.g., K. Archick, ‘US-EU cooperation
against Terrorism’, Congressional Research Service, May 2012, available at: http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf.
541 See European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/
475/JHA), OJ L 164/3 of 22 June 2002 (hereinafter ‘European Council Framework Decision
on Combating Terrorism’). See also the EU Action Plan on Terrorism (the ‘roadmap’)
Commission document 10773/2/02/REV 2, 17 July 2002. This defines, shapes and provides
for monitoring of the direction of joint action taken by European Governments and is
frequently updated.
542 European Arrest Warrant, supra note 249, will abolish double criminality for numerous
offences, the speciality principle and the political offence exception. France, Belgium,
Portugal, Luxembourg and Spain have signed treaties to bring the new extradition proced-
ures into effect by 2003. The UK intends to implement them in 2004.
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Warrant (EEW),543 which like its extradition counterpart, is not terrorist-speci-
fic but its birth has been induced by the impetus around improving coopera-
tion in the counter-terrorism field. The EEW sets up a system for securing
prompt access to objects, documents and data for use in criminal proceedings
from another member State.544 As such, it is considered by many as having
important potential to enhance evidence gathering and transfer of evidence
in criminal proceedings across borders. At the same time, the system exposes
the challenge to ensure consistent levels of training and capacity and appro-
priate evidence gathering and handling, while safeguarding the rights of the
defence.545
A range of other Framework Decisions have also been adopted. These cover
for example the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities,
the confiscation and freezing of assets and joint investigation teams,546 the
application of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal
matters, enabling sentenced persons to be transferred to another member State
for enforcement of their sentences547 and the supervision of probation
measures and alternative sanctions in other European states.548
Other regional cooperation measures have also been adopted and
strengthened over time, within the Council of Europe,549 the Americas,550
Caricom and South Asia551 for example. Within the African continent, inter-
543 See Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008, on the European
evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in
proceedings in criminal matters.
544 This was originally proposed in a Commission Communication November 2003. COM(2003)
688 final.
545 ‘EU evidence exchange warning’, The Law Society Gazette, 25 September 2008, available at:
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/eu-evidence-exchange-warning.
546 Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States
of the European Union OJ L 386/89, 29.12.2006; Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of
24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property
OJ L 68/49, 15.3.2005; Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA on the application of
the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders OJ L 328 of 24.11.2006; and
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/JHA) OJ L
162/1 20.6.2002. See also Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of November 27th
2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters has been adopted.
547 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of November 27th 2008.
548 Ibid.
549 See, e.g., Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
(Strasbourg, 15 May 2003), ETS No. 190, not yet in force), hereinafter ‘Protocol to the
European Convention against Terrorism’.
550 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (Bridgetown, 3 June 2002, OAS Res. 1840
(XII-O/02), not yet in force).
551 In addition, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) adopted an
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Combating Terrorism, on 6
January 2004.
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esting new developments have arisen on a pan-African basis,552 which among
other things make practical arrangements (such as the establishment of national
contact points) to facilitate the timely exchange and sharing of information
and cooperation in the suppression of terrorist financing, and provide a basis
for extradition between African Union states.553 Sub-regionally, East Afri-
can,554 ECOWAS555 and SADC states556 have all now reached sub-regional co-
operation agreements.
Cooperation between other states and the United States has been the focus
of particular attention post-9/11. For example, trans-Atlantic cooperation
between European Union member states and US law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies has led to several – at times controversial – new measures.557
Several extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties have been concluded
between the US and EU itself.558 These expedite the extradition process, facil-
itate access to information and the exchange of personal data and strengthen
operational links between investigative and law enforcement agencies.559
These treaties are supplemented by bilateral agreements.560 Despite these
developments, certain well known challenges in fostering closer US-EU counter-
terrorism and law enforcement cooperation are however outstanding. Among
them, US concerns regarding intelligence sharing on the one side has impeded
prosecutorial efforts in many cases, related to terrorism and counter-terrorism,
552 Following the introduction of the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism which calls for increased cooperation, the African Union produced he Decision
on the Elaboration of a Code of Conduct on Terrorism (OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/8(II)
Add. 11) and the Decision on Terrorism in Africa (OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.15 (II)).
There is now a protocol too: Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 08 July 2004.
553 Its main purpose is to enhance the effective implementation of the Convention and to give
effect to Article 3(d) of the Protocol.
554 Note the importance of this breakthrough as regards the potential to combat the sort of
‘informal’ or extraordinary rendition witnessed in relation to the Kampala bombings,
discussed above in this chapter, and not uncommon in broader practice.
555 Discussed in du Plessis and M. Ewi, ‘Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism in Africa:
The Role of the African Union and Sub-Regional Organizations’, in A. Salinas de Frías,
K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch. 36.
556 Ibid.
557 At the EU summit in Copenhagen in September 2002, agreement was reached between
the US and the EU on how to swiftly and effectively exchange information between their
respective forces. See ‘EU-US co-operation in fighting terrorism’, EU Presidency Press release,
14 September 2002. See also ‘Informal EU Justice and Home Affairs Council, 13-14 September
2002’, Statewatch News online, September 2002.
558 See, e.g., Council Decision of 6 June 2003 concerning signature of the Agreements between
the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters; Agreement on extradition between the European Union and
the United States of America, 7 July 2003; OJ L 181, 19 July 2003, 25 ff.
559 Eurojust (the provisional public prosecution agency of EU) and the US are to consider
cooperation agreements. Joint Investigation Teams may be established where appropriate.
560 On related controversies, see 4B.2.2.2. below on the UK and US agreements.
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as illustrated above.561 Differences on data privacy and data protection,562
detention policies and fair trial guarantees563 and differences in the US and
EU terrorist designation lists,564 are also described as impediments to fuller
cooperation.
Institutional developments have unfolded, aimed variously at facilitating
cooperation, providing technical assistance and building capacity to enhance
the investigation and prosecution of terrorism and inter-state cooperation.
Examples, with divergent roles and capacity, range from Eurojust, a judicial
coordination unit within the European Union,565 the Inter-american Commit-
tee against Terrorism of the OAS, to the intergovernmental Global Counter-
Terrorism Forum established at the initiative of the US Secretary of State in
2011, with a ‘primary focus on countering violent extremism and strengthening
criminal justice and other rule of law institutions necessary to prevent and
counter terrorism’.566 This complements the existing international and regional
entities with a role in facilitating investigation and prevention of terrorism,
such as Interpol and Europol.
To varying degrees these initiatives respond to at least some of the many
real challenges that have hampered cooperation in the past, be they legal or
procedural obstacles, lack of trust and understanding between states, lack of
capacity, or lack of procedures or mechanisms in place domestically. Enhanced
cooperation for bringing persons to justice and securing reliable evidence is
essential if states are to meet their obligations to prevent and punish serious
crimes such as those committed on 9/11. For the most part then the industry
in this field – aimed at establishing clear obligations, efficient procedures for
561 Examples are given throughout this book of the refusal to cooperate with foreign proceed-
ings in respect of investigation, justice and accountability for war on terror related offences,
as well as in relation to the terrorism criminal cases highlighted above. See, e.g., the Motasse-
deq case in Germany at 4B.1.2, the UK investigations at 7B.14 or non-cooperation with Polish
investigation into renditions, at Chapter 10
562 See EU-US Cooperation against Terrorism Congressional Briefing which recognises that
‘The negotiation of several U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements, from those related
to tracking terrorist financial data to sharing airline passenger information, have been
complicated by on-going EU concerns about whether the United States could guarantee
a sufficient level of protection for European citizens’ personal data.’
563 See, e.g., Cooperation and Human Rights Concerns below.
564 ‘US-EU cooperation against Terrorism’, supra note 540.
565 Although conceived previously, the Eurojust website describes 9/11 as the catalyst to its
establishment, by Council Decision 187/JHA, as a judicial coordination unit on organised
crime, including terrorism. Eurojust, available at: http://eurojust.europa.eu/Pages/
home.aspx.
566 See e.g. Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, Factsheet, available at: http://www.cfr.org/
counterterrorism/fact-sheet-global-counterterrorism-forum/p28460 Although currently co-
chaired by the US and Egypt, states not perhaps at the helm of best practice in relation
to counter-terrorism within a rule of law framework, the ‘primary focus on countering
violent extremism and strengthening criminal justice and other rule of law institutions
necessary to prevent and counter terrorism’ is noteworthy.
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giving effect to them and enhancing capacity to deliver – is, or at least should
be, a positive development. However as highlighted below, questions arise
as to some of these developments, in particular their compatibility with other
international obligations, notably in the field of human rights.567
4B.3.2 Streamlining Cooperation and Relevant Safeguards?
The international standards mentioned above, aimed at strengthening obliga-
tions to cooperate, have not always developed in line with the co-existent
obligations not to cooperate where there is a substantial risk of serious rights
violation in the state requesting extradition or mutual legal assistance. In some
situations, those obligations were apparently ignored, as in Security Council
Resolution 1373,568 In others they were reflected selectively or restrictively
as in the Protocol amending the European Convention on Terrorism, which
referred to some of the rights that require to be protected through the obliga-
tion of non-refoulement, but not to others.569 This may have generated con-
fusion as to applicable legal standards and rendered the rights vulnerable.
It must be noted that, ultimately, both the Security Council and the Council
of Europe for example have clarified that the obligations in respect of coopera-
tion against terrorism must be interpreted consistently with international
human rights.570 Human rights bodies, through jurisprudence, have in turn
clarified the scope and nature of many of these obligations.571 Another ques-
tion is how these obligations are given effect in practice, or whether measures
aimed at enhancing the process of cooperation have unduly jeopardized human
rights protection.
Several of the innovations in cooperation mentioned above, such as the
Pan-European arrest warrant (‘European Arrest Warrant’),572 procedures for
567 See 4B.4. More detail on their compatibility with obligations in the field of human rights
is discussed at Chapter 7A.5.10 and 7B.10.
568 SC Res. 1373 (2001) imposed broad-reaching obligations e.g.of cooperation, without reference
to human rights.
569 Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg,
15 May 2003, ETS, No. 190 (not yet in force). The Protocol precludes extradition where there
is a risk of torture but not inhuman or degrading treatment or denial of justice and fails
therefore to reflect fully relevant human rights law. For discussion of the Protocol, see
Chapter 7B.10 below.
570 See, e.g., SC Res. 1456 (2003), 20 January 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003); the Draft
Explanatory Report on the European Convention on Terrorism as it will be revised by the
Protocol amending the Convention upon its entry into force, adopted on 13 February 2003,
text available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/090-rev.htm; and
see generally Chapter 7B1.
571 See refoulement in Chapter 7 – this has been an area of considerable jurisprudential develop-
ment post 9/11; see also examples of cases in Chapter 11.
572 See eg the European Arrest Warrant discussed above.
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US-UK extradition,573 or African sub-regional regimes adopted under the
auspices of SADC and IGAD,574 significantly change extradition practice and
procedures between the states affected by them. While aimed at modernising
and expediting notoriously tardy extradition procedures, they also curtail of
the role of the judge in extradition proceedings, potentially dismantling essen-
tial human rights protection against unlawful transfer.575 Among the contro-
versial aspects are those highlighted below.576
4B.3.2.1 Lowering evidentiary requirements in extradition proceedings
Among the steps taken in the name of expediting the extradition process are
those that seek to remove the requirement that the requesting state provide
a basic degree of evidence to the requested state.577 The European Arrest
Warrant for example – initiated before the September 11 attacks but which
advanced more rapidly thereafter – lowers the threshold, requiring only the
provision of basic ‘information’ (as opposed to evidence) regarding the alleged
offence, where it was committed and the involvement of the suspected per-
petrator.578 While controversial, concerns about the adoption of the European
Arrest Warrant were to some degree assuaged by the fact that it removes this
requirement only as between EU countries, and proposals to do the same for
other countries was rejected by the EU and opposed explicitly in the UK parlia-
ment at the time.579
573 Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, Washington, 31
March 2003 (hereinafter ‘US-UK Extradition Treaty’).
574 See du Plessis and Ewi, ‘Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism in Africa’, supra note 555.
575 See ‘Mutual Recognition of final decisions in criminal matters’, Statewatch, at http://
www.statewatch.org/news/sept00/16ftamut.htm; and JUSTICE at www.justice.org.uk/
publications/listofpublications/index.html. The European Arrest Warrant, supra note 249,
requires a judicial (as opposed to executive) decision in the issuing state (Article 1) and
shouldbe applied so as to ‘have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental
rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty of the
European Union’. See also the Preamble setting out the possibility of refusing extradition
if the prosecution is for discriminatory purposes. The question however is how these rights
are safeguarded in practice given the streamlined procedure.
576 Also controversial are the restriction of the rule of specialty in the European Arrest Warrant
and of the ne bis in idem principle (as regards third states) in the US-UK treaty.
577 Differences between civil and common law traditions is noted above in Part A. This change
is more significant for common law than civil law countries.
578 Article 8, European Arrest Warrant, supra note 249.
579 At the time of the European Arrest Warrant, the EU refused to accept the lowering of this
standard to non-EU countries. The UK parliament Home Affairs Committee at that time
also ‘express[ed] concerns at proposals to relax the requirement that extradition requests
from non-European countries must demonstrate that there is a prima facie case to answer’.
See Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons Press Release 2002-03, 5 December 2002,
No. 5 ‘Home Affairs Committee savages EU arrest warrant proposals’. Despite this, this
was done in the UK-US bilateral treaty.
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Despite this, the subsequent UK-US Extradition treaty also removed the
requirement that a basic level of evidence580 be provided in requests from
the US to the UK (but not vice versa).581 While similar to the European Arrest
Warrant procedure, greater controversy arises from the context of extradition
requests emanating from the US. Specifically, there is concern that the arrange-
ments allow for extradition requests to be made by the United States as a
precautionary measure, prior to the establishment of sufficient evidence to
justify submitting the suspect to criminal process.582 For example, in the UK,
the case of Lofti Raissi – an Algerian national detained at the request of the
US on suspicion of involvement in training the September 11 pilots – resulted
in his release from high security detention after five months, after the US
authorities consistently failed to provide evidence to justify his extradition.
Had this case, or others like it,583 unfolded after the entry into force of the
new US-UK extradition treaty removing the evidentiary requirement, he would
have been extradited despite the lack of evidence against him. Many other
cases may likewise proceed without any evidentiary basis or this fact even
coming to light. Pressure is growing for a reappraisal of the UK-US Extradition
arrangements so the position may yet change.584
4B.3.2.2 Removal of double criminality and political offence exceptions
The European Arrest Warrant has drawn particular criticism for the removal
of the double (or ‘dual’) criminality principle, by virtue of which a state does
not extradite for conduct not punishable in its own law. This rule, which serves
both to protect the state from embarrassing diplomatic difficulties and the
individual from abusive prosecution,585 has often been described as a prin-
580 Previously, under the prior treaty, evidence sufficient for the committal of the individual
in the UK was required.
581 Article 8(3)(c), US-UK Extradition Treaty. Whereas the US would provide basic statements
of ‘information’ the UK would still have to demonstrate ‘a reasonable basis to believe that
the person sought committed the offense’. The differential is purportedly justified by
reference to the US constitutional guarantee not to be extradited without judicial oversight
of the evidence against him or her.
582 On the human rights standards applicable to arrest and the general prohibition on prevent-
ive detention, see Chapter 7A.53.
583 See for example the Boumidiene case, dismissed by the Bosnian Supreme Court due to lack
of evidence, despite which the authorities transferred the suspect.
584 See discussion at e.g., ‘UK-US extradition treaty overhaul urged’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-17553860, or ‘Wanted by the US? Brace for extradition’, Financial Times, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5c9825d2-1cfe-11e2-abeb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TT0GX4rK,
both 30 March 2012.
585 The principle remains relevant within the European context (particularly perhaps in an
expanded Europe) so far as fundamental differences remain, e.g., in laws relating to abortion
and homosexuality, which some states criminalise yet the prosecution of which would be
considered by other states and human rights standards as to amount to a human rights
violation. On the rationale as, in part, protecting the nullum crimen sine lege principle, see
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ciple of customary law.586 Particular concern arose from the ‘ill-defined nature
of the 32 categories of offence which will be exempt from the dual criminality
requirement’,587 which include ‘terrorism’, ‘participation in a criminal
organisation’ and ‘racism and xenophobia’.588 Given the inherent susceptibil-
ity to abuse of broadly defined laws (including – as the work of human rights
courts and bodies demonstrates – laws of ‘terrorism’),589 the double criminal-
ity safeguard guaranteed an essential element of judicial oversight in the extra-
diting state.
Both the US-UK treaty and the European Arrest Warrant remove the ‘poli-
tical offence’ exception. This exception has grown increasingly controversial
(in particular as it came to be seen as providing a ‘legal loophole for terror-
ists’)590 has also been excluded by various extradition arrangements as
regards serious crimes.591 So far as its removal applies to serious crimes under
international law, clarifying that they are neither ‘political’ nor justifiable,
whatever their underlying ideology, it is to be welcomed as consistent with
shifts in international law and practice in favour of accountability. However,
the removal of this exception may enhance vulnerability in the context of
broadly defined offences of terrorism and association therewith, which often
cover more and less serious crimes and are susceptible to politicization. As
such, in the absence of a politicl offense exception the importance of a broad
and operational rule of non-refoulement,592 to ensure that extradition is not
Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’, supra note 250.
586 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 313; I. Stanbrook and C. Stanbrook, Extradition: Law and Practice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 20.
587 See Home Affairs Committee report on Extradition Bill, supra note 279. The Committee
expressed concern at the erosion of the dual criminality principle, ‘in particular’ given the
ill-defined nature of the offences.
588 Article 2.2, European Arrest Warrant, supra note 249.
589 See Chapters 2 and 7.
590 For an increasingly rare defence of this principle, see C.H. Pyle, Extradition Politics and Human
Rights (Philadelphia, 2001), in particular ch. 15, ‘Gutting the Political Offense Exception’,
pp. 197-206.
591 See Chapter 2 on terrorism conventions, and Chapter 4, para. 4A.2, as regards crimes under
international law.
592 Note that the non-discrimination rule (which is included in the Preamble of the European
Arrest Warrant) reduces the dangers of political abuse inherent in the application of the
terrorism label and the European Arrest Warrant confirms that it does not affect the duties
of states in respect of human rights. European Arrest Warrant, supra note 249. The challenge,
however, will be to ensure that the protections that human rights law does afford are
operational within the streamlined procedure envisaged. For the rule see Chapter 7A and
for positive developments reasserting the rule and clarifying its scope in this context, see
Chapter 7B.10 ‘Dispatching the Problem: Return and the Refoulement post 9/11’.
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sought as a vehicle for political repression or other human rights abuse,593
is all the more important.
4B.4 THE IMPACT OF ‘WAR ON TERROR’ VIOLATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The goals of preventing terrorism, prosecuting those responsible (with effective
cooperation) and protecting human rights are compatible and mutually re-
inforcing.594 In practice, however, serious tensions have arisen. Abusive pre-
trial detention and interrogation regimes, the erosion of the principles nullum
crimen sine lege, presumption of innocence or the right to trial before an inde-
pendent judiciary, among others, have raised questions about the fairness and
indeed legitimacy of counter-terrorism criminal processes in many states.
Developments in state cooperation, while generally positive, have also at time
jeopardised respect for human rights protections.
The human rights deficit affects the legitimacy of the criminal process. As
this section indicates, fundamental human rights violations have also impeded
that process much more directly, by affecting the ability to access evidence,
secure custody of suspects or to hold them to account.
4B.4.1 Inability to Secure Suspects: Extradition and Human Rights
Section A above records the obligations of states – by virtue of bilateral extra-
dition and mutual assistance treaties as well as positive obligations in inter-
national human rights law – to cooperate with one another in the repression
of serious crime and, in certain circumstances, and to refrain from providing
such cooperation on human rights grounds.595 This corresponds to detailed
rules on non-refoulement in human rights law. As regards the impact of these
obligations on cooperation practice, the landscape is mixed. The work of the
human rights bodies post 9/11 demonstrates numerous occasions on which
states have shown little, or only selective, respect for these obligations by
593 The historical roots of the political offence exception relate principally in sovereignty and
political expediency, to avoid one regime becoming embroiled in the political affairs of
another, though it has since been used by individuals to challenge extradition. See Dugard
and Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’, supra note 250, p. 188 (noting that this
exception allows states to refuse extradition where the individual ‘is engaged in the struggle
for human rights in the requesting state’).
594 See, e.g., the integrated approach in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006, supra
note 235, Chapter 7B.1.
595 See also Chapter 7A.4.1.1, A.5.10 and B.10.
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transferring suspected terrorists despite a substantial risk to their basic
rights.596 At the same time there are many other examples of states being
unable to meet extraditions requests in terrorism cases because of the risks
to terrorist suspects in the requesting state.
An early example relates to the death penalty, where the practice of Euro-
pean states to require ‘assurances’ that the death penalty will not be applied
as a pre-condition to extradition is well established. Unsurprisingly, then the
EU states made clear that ‘no EU country will extradite suspects to the US if
the death penalty might apply’597 and the Council of Europe has likewise
confirmed that all Member States should refuse to extradite in such cases.598
Consistent with this, cases such as that of Mamdouh Mahmud Salim – who
faced charges of terrorist conspiracy in the US – proceeded on the basis of
undertakings given by the United States to German officials that prosecutors
would not seek the death penalty if the suspect were extradited to the US.599
Likewise, states have withheld extradition on grounds of the risk of torture
or ill-treatment or a violation of related safeguards.600
Recent jurisprudence on non-refoulement in the counter-terrorism context
has clarified the human rights obligations not to extradite where there are risks
not only of torture and ill treatment, but of abuses in the criminal process so
serious as to amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.601 One issue that has
caused states particular pause in their willingness to cooperate has been resort
to military or special courts, of on-going relevance in several states around
the world.602 The UK was thus unable to extradite a terrorist suspect to Jordan
to stand trial before a court which lacked independence and impartiality, or
596 The case work of the Human Rights Committee, for example, illustrates the piecemeal
approach in state practice offering protection from certain rights and not others, at odds
with the human rights obligations of the state. See, e.g., Concluding observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Portugal, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/PRT (2003), para. 12.
597 Statement by Danish Justice Minister Lene Espersen delivered during the Danish Presidency
of the EU. See I. Black, ‘Extradition of terror suspects ruled out. EU will not expose prisoners
to US death penalty’, The Guardian, 14 September 2002.
598 Council of Europe, Resolution 1271 (2002), ‘Combating Terrorism and Respect for Human
Rights’. This accords with the ECtHR’s decision in Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note
269, (discussed above, Section A).
599 See ‘Death Penalty Phase of Bombings Trial Begins’, CNN.com, 30 May 2001, available at:
http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2001/LAW/05/30/embassy.bombings.01.
600 Whether it meets the high threshold for a violation of torture or inhumane treatment
depends on the facts; see Chapter 7A52, and eg the extradition of terrorist suspects to trial
which relied on evidence obtained through torture was precluded (in Othman, supra note
252), whereas extradition to confinement at a super-max prison in the US was not (Ahmed
v. UK). See Chapter 7B.5.10.
601 See, e.g., Othman, supra note 252; see also Chapter 7.
602 The use of military commissions, and the criticism of them for their due process deficit,
are addressed at 4B.2.3, Chapter 7B3.1.
208 Chapter 4
where evidence obtained through torture would be relied upon.603 While
it is important that not any potential risk of violation of fair trial guarantees
should impede international cooperation, lest the system grind to a halt, where
violations of core fair trial rights (amounting to a flagrant denial of justice)
are at stake, the legitimacy of the law enforcement process hangs in the bal-
ance. States cannot, and have not in practice, been able to extradite as a result
of requesting states failure to respect basic fair trial rights.
On the same basis, it would appear that states could not extradite an
individual to be held unlawfully in Guantanamo Bay, or to stand trial before
a US established military commission, for example.604 An early harbinger
of the cooperation impediment that military commission would become came
in the form of a Spanish Foreign Ministry statement that Spain would not agree
to a request to extradite eight alleged Islamist terrorists unless the United States
agreed that they would be tried by a civilian court and not by the military
commissions.605 The Spanish authorities are reported as having insisted that
persons extradited would ‘not be subject to military or special tribunals, or
to summary justice’ and they must be tried in public with the opportunity
to confront one’s accuser.606 Another example of a similar position appears
in a later Dutch case, where the suspect was ultimately extradited from the
Netherlands to the US but only on condition that he be neither labelled an
enemy combatant nor tried by military commission, and that Dutch courts
would be able to review and possibly modify his sentence upon his return.607
The impact of the inability of states to provide certain forms of cooperation
in light of their human rights obligations is acknowledged in the US’ 2010
Guantanamo Bay Task Force report. The report notes that states had been
unwilling to cooperate with the military commissions scheme, but which would
– the report suggested – have greater willingness to cooperate with federal
prosecutions in regular courts.608
603 Othman v. UK, supra. Chapter 7B.5.10 on non-refoulement notes the practice of seeking
assurances to enable to state to extradite where it otherwise could not.
604 As the majority of Guantánamo detainees were not formally extradited, there has been
little practice testing this principle. See however Ahmed v. UK case noting that extradition
could proceed as there was no such risk of rendition or detention at Guantánamo.
605 S. Dillon, ‘A Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions’, New
York Times, 24 November 2001, reporting that a spokesman for Spain’s Foreign Ministry
confirmed that Spain would only extradite detainees to countries that offer defendants the
legal guarantees provided by Spanish courts. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said, ‘if
we’re talking about a tribunal in the United States with summary procedures and military
judges, then these are not the same conditions that would characterise a trial in Spain or
France or England or anywhere else in Europe’.
606 J. Yoldi, ‘España advierte a EEUU de que no extraditará a miembros de AlQaeda’, el Pais,
23 November 2001.
607 See the case of Al Delaema, Supreme Court of The Netherlands, Judgment of 5 September
2006.
608 Guantanamo Task Force Report 2010, p. 20.
Criminal justice 209
4B.4.2 Inability to Secure Mutual Legal Assistance
Practice is more difficult to assess in the field of mutual assistance cooperation,
due to the confidentiality and relative informality of mutual assistance requests.
It would appear, however, that in several cases since September 11 European
states have indicated their unwillingness to provide other forms of cooperation
including mutual assistance if the evidence would be used towards the applica-
tion of the death penalty.
Examples of states having publicly informed the US that they would with-
hold evidence absent assurances that it would not be used to secure the death
penalty, include statements from Germany and France in relation to the
provision of documentary evidence against the alleged September 11 con-
spirator, Zacarias Moussaoui.609 The German statement emphasised that it
was necessary to distinguish between sharing information with the United
States that is necessary to help prevent another attack and handing over
evidence that could help sentence a person to death.610 This principle of non-
cooperation in light of human rights concerns has also been reflected, to a
limited degree, in mutual assistance arrangements entered into since September
11, as well as in earlier such arrangements.611
4B.4.3 Abuse of Process and Jeopardising Trial?
Perhaps the clearest counter-terrorism paradox would be if criminal trials
simply could not proceed, not because of the challenges of investigation and
prosecution but because of the nature of the abuses carried out in the name
of counter-terrorism. Although the situation remains opaque, this may well
be the case in respect of some of the detainees held at Guantanamo indefinitely,
who the US claims are too dangerous to be released but who it is not ‘feasible’
609 Germany’s former Justice Minister, Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, said that Germany would
provide documents only on condition that they ‘may not be used for a death sentence or
an execution’ (Associated Press, 1 September 2002). Marylise Lebranchu, the then French
Minister of Justice, stated that, under Article 6 of the treaty governing judicial cooperation
between France and the United States, France could either refuse assistance, or make it
conditional on certain demands. She confirmed that ‘any document should only be passed
on to the Americans to help them with their enquiries on condition that such document
[is] not used to get a conviction carrying a death penalty’ (statement reported at
www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/597/in4.htm).
610 See the statement of the German Justice Minister, ibid.
611 See, e.g., the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism which specifically notes that
the obligation of mutual assistance does not apply where there is a substantial basis for
believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting on discriminatory
grounds. Article 14 (Non-discrimination), Inter-American Convention against Terrorism.
The Convention also reflects more generally the duty to interpret the convention in accord
with, among other areas of international law, international human rights law. This reflects
other pre-existing standards. See, e.g., Article 8, European Convention on Terrorism.
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to prosecute.612 It is impossible to asses how many criminal cases, from
Guantánamo or elsewhere around the world, are simply not being brought
on the basis of what they may reveal regarding abuses, or the prospects of
the trial being thrown out on abuse of process grounds.
The issue is increasingly live in terrorism trials. As the Australian Courts
made clear in the Banbrika case, abuses resulting from conditions of detention
and treatment pre-trial may themselves simply render a trial unfair.613 Inter-
national practice in other areas may support the view that, at a certain point,
conduct such as prejudicial publicity may also render a fair trial no longer
possible.614
While cases in which such a drastic outcome remain rare, there are
examples of this risk appearing in practice. An interesting example is where
the Canadian Courts rejected a US extradition request for Abdullah Khadr,615
as a remedy to ‘distance’ the courts from the grave violations and misconduct
against Abdullah Khadr while he was detained in Pakistan. The first instance
court had held that the extradition request could not be satisfied due to the
gross misconduct of the US, contravening ‘fundamental notions of justice’.616
The ability to secure inter-state cooperation in criminal matters may therefore
not only be affected by future risks of abuse in the requesting state (discussed
under refoulement), but also by the extent of violations of human rights in
the past.
In other cases it has been argued that the level of abuse to which the
individual has been subject, or the length of the pre-trial process, is such that
the trial would be an ‘abuse of process,’ or inherently so tainted that it
jeopardises the integrity of proceedings or could never be deemed fair. This
was seen in US courts in the Abu Ali case cited above, for example, where the
majority rejected the claim, on the basis that the harm alleged had been at
612 This leads to a vicious circle for detainees who continue to be victims of indefinite arbitrary
detention, which may be based on the extent of their earlier torture. See Chapter 8.
613 R v Benbrika (Ruling No 20) [2008] VSC (20 March 2008).
614 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra note 20. Although the prejudice arising from the prosecutor’s
public statements regarding the accused were insufficient to stop the trial in that case, the
decision makes clear that greater prejudice would indeed have had that effect. Instead,
it was a factor taken into account in sentencing. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, No. ICC-01-04-01/06,
Decision on Sentence, 10 July 2012.
615 United States of America v. Khadr (2011) ONCA 3582 0110506 Docket: C52633. Abdullah Khadr
was apprehended in Pakistan in 2004 and held for 14 months without warrant or access
to a lawyer. He was denied access to consular services, and his repatriation to Canada by
the Pakistani authorities was delayed. Upon return to Canada, he was rearrested in Decem-
ber 2005 under the US extradition request, having been was indicted in the US on charges
of supplying weapons to al-Qaeda. The Court of Appeal of Ontario upheld the judgment
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.The US was described as the driving force behind
Abdullah Khadr’s capture, on ransom, in Pakistan.See Chapter 6B.2.4. ‘The Role of Rewards
and the Bounty Hunter in IHL.’
616 Ibid.
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the hands of foreign state officials.617 This was reflected in the subsequent
case of R v Ahmed before English courts.618 On the facts of that case, the Court
also refused to stay a criminal case, but in doing so noted that the allegations
of torture or complicity in torture had not been substantiated, that there was
no link between the allegations of abuse and the accused’s trial and no evid-
ence of wrong doing by UK authorities, either in his alleged torture or through
the receipt of intelligence information.619 The judgment suggests that, had
there been any such link between the information received and his trial (either
through capture of the individual or the reliance on evidence on which the
prosecution was based), or had UK officials been involved in any unlawfulness,
including indirectly through complicity under international law, a stay of
proceedings may have been required.
As the Court made clear in Ahmed, not every allegation of rights violations
can or should thwart the ability to hold to account for serious crimes, but
certain abuses may affect the legitimacy of the criminal process itself. As
terrorism trials continue to unfold, questions regarding the circumstances in
which stay of proceedings are appropriate, or required – including the doubtful
criteria of whether the abuse was at the hand of the prosecuting state as
opposed to another620 – are likely to be further explored. The potential for
human rights abuses in the war on terror to ultimately impede the ability to
prosecute and punish terrorism in the future is striking.
617 The rule of prompt presentment to a court only applied to US officials not where the
individual was detained by others abroad.
618 R. v. Ahmed (Rangzieb), R. v Ahmed (Habib), Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 25 February
2011, [2011] EWCA Crim 184; [2011] Crim. L.R. 734. The accused’s allegations included
of torture in Uzbekistan and Pakistan prior to his transfer to UK custody.
619 The difficult issue the court had to grapple with in that case was whether the receipt of
information that may have been obtained through torture was itself a wrong that justified
stay of proceedings. See chapter 3 on state responsibility through aiding and assisting under
international law. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had thoroughly investiga-
ted whether the UK had connived at his unlawful rendition to the UK by the Pakistani
authorities for the purpose of putting him on trial in the UK; on the controversial issues
of complicity under international law that arise, see Chapter 10. Note footnote, ibid, on
questions regarding the rationale for this distinction.
620 Note the distinction based on the the states own wrongs is controversial, and departs from
the approach on admissibility of evidence in A & Ors (no. 2) in Chapter 11. The Ahmed
case rightly rejected the idea that the purpose of stays was punishment of national author-
ities, and suggested that the rule serve to preserve the integrity of proceedings, which
arguably applies irrespective of which authority is responsible for the abuse. Moreover,
if the aim is even partly protection of individuals, avoiding ‘encouragement’ of torture (A
& Ors, Ch 11), this rationale applies irrespective of the wrong doing state.
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4B.4.4 Inadmissibility of Evidence
Finally, many of the criminal trials unfolding post 9/11 are hindered by
questions regarding the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained.621 Where
evidence is obtained through torture or cruel treatment, it may well not consti-
tute reliable evidence, but it cannot in any event be admitted in any criminal
trial.622 This may limit the basis for trial, or ultimately lead to cases being
dropped or convictions being overturned.
In one of a growing number of examples, a French court overturned
terrorist conspiracy convictions for five former Guantánamo detainees on the
basis that information gathered by French intelligence officials in Guantánamo
violated French evidentiary rules.623 Disregard for human rights may then
ultimately come at a high price not only for the individual but for the criminal
justice system which is curtailed in its ability to discharge its punitive and
rule of law mandate.
4B.5 CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM CRIMES: THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE COIN
In the war on terror, criminal justice is a double-sided coin. On one, there is
the role of criminal justice to prevent and punish terrorism, on which this
chapter focuses. On the other is the role of criminal justice in addressing those
crimes that have been committed in the name of counter-terrorism. But the
practice set out above, from normative developments designed to stretch the
web of criminal law to cover terrorism to burgeoning criminal terrorism trials,
contrasts starkly with the dearth of activity in holding to account those re-
sponsible for violations on the other ‘side’. The same legal provisions, and
certainly the same rule of law perspective, demand that the law be brought
to bear equally on serious crimes committed through terrorism or counter-
terrorism.
621 E.g., Among the many examples see, e.g., US v. Abu Ali, supra note 316, where the US courts
referred to above, the Motassedeq case before German courts also discussed above, or the
French Appeals Court decision to overturn a conviction on this basis. In Othman, supra
note 252, the ECHR found that the likelihood of using evidence obtained through torture
rendered the trial unfair.
622 Art. 15, Convention against Torture, Chapter 7A53 and Chapter 8.
623 ‘A French appeals court … overturned terrorist conspiracy convictions for five former
inmates of the Guantánamo Bay prison who were tried and convicted in 2007, after they
were returned to France. The court ruled that information gathered by French intelligence
officials in interrogations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, violated French rules for permissible
evidence, and that there was no other proof of wrongdoing.’ ‘Terror Convictions Overturned
in France’, The New York Times, 24 February 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/25/world/europe/25france.html . This was also an issue in the Mounir El Motasse-
deq Case before the German Courts discussed above, supra note 339.
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As noted above, it is now beyond reasonable dispute that measures taken
in the name of the global ‘war on terror’ have amounted to crimes under both
international and national law. One obvious example, addressed in detail
elsewhere in this study, is the extraordinary rendition programme, involving
systematic state practices of abduction, torture and secret detention in bespoke
‘black sites’, which could amount to many crimes including torture and
enforced disappearance, and potentially also crimes against humanity and,
for any detentions genuinely associated with an armed conflict, war crimes.624
Egregious acts of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond give rise to serious
allegations of war crimes.625 Systematic prolonged arbitrary detention in
violation of fundamental norms as seen in Guantanamo may, arguably, also
amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity.626 The same has been
alleged in respect of the systematic campaigns of targeted killings.627
The range of forms of individual criminal responsibility explored in this
chapter suggest a range of potential charges, involving direct and indirect
perpetration, such as ordering, instigation, aiding and assisting and co-per-
petration against a range of the intellectual and material authors of these
crimes. It is also clear that a range of states, at whose hands or on whose
territory the crimes unfolded, share responsibility for the investigation and
prosecution of those crimes, and cooperation in relation to the same.628
Yet practice of investigating and, in particular, prosecuting these crimes
remains striking in its scarcity. The developments, or lack of developments,
will be explored in subsequent chapters of this study.629 Suffice to anticipate
here that accountability in respect of war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq has
been minimal, against low-level perpetrators, and in respect of isolated rather
than systematic practices.630 There have been no US indictments for the wide-
spread torture and abuse of detainees by the CIA and associates through the
624 Chapter 10 on Rendition.
625 See violations of IHL in Chapter 6, and Chapter 7B.14 ‘Justice and Accountability’.
626 ICC Statute, supra note 4, Article 7(1)(e) ...; crime against humanity of ‘imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law’; see also Elements of the Crimes Doc, Art 7(1)(e).
627 See ‘Ferencz Condemns Drone Attacks: “A Crime Against Humanity” -- 26 Bipartisan
Congress Members, UN Question Unmanned Aerial Assaults’, Peculiar Progressive, 19
June 2012, available at: http://peculiarprogressive.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/ferencz-con-
demns-drone-attacks-crime.html .
628 Although lead by the CIA, a broad range of other states were involved either in hosting
black sites for CIA interrogation, themselves detaining and interrogating detainees on their
territory, see Chapter 10. Allegations of cooperation with ????????. See Chapters 6 (IHL)
and 9 ‘Justice Done? The Killing of Osama bin Laden’.
629 Chapter 7B.14 ‘Justice, Accountability and Reparation’ discusses whether human rights
duty has been met, and Chapter 8 on Guantánamo and Chapter 10 on Rendition deal in
more detail with particular justice developments in those areas. Some of the obstacles to
justice are also highlighted in the context of human rights litigation (but in some cases
relevant also to criminal investigation) in the chapter on the role of the courts, Chapter 11.
630 Chapter 7B.14.
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extraordinary rendition programme or beyond,631 and official ‘review’ has
been closed.632 There is no statement of intent to investigate and where appro-
priate prosecute or acknowledgement that there is a legal obligation to do
so.633
Evidence is not scarce. President Bush, among others, has openly admitted
authorising waterboarding,634 while the former head of counter-terrorism
at the CIA acknowledges overseeing it and destroying 92 videotapes of inter-
rogation sessions.635 Seen through the rule of law lens, torture and the de-
struction of evidence in relation to it are serious offences, yet the sense of
impunity surrounding them, at least in the US, appears entrenched.636 Ques-
tions inevitably arise regarding the implications of the underuse of criminal
law in this context, including for the deterrent and expressive functions of
the criminal law outlined in the introduction to this chapter.
In the face of inactivity by the United States authorities, developments in
the investigation and prosecution of war on terror crimes have however been
unfolding elsewhere, as detailed in subsequent chapters. These processes have,
unsurprisingly, met with intense challenges. These include investigative
challenges,637 broad-reaching state secrecy,638 the refusal of US coopera-
631 Chapter 10.7.
632 Ibid.
633 As noted in Chapter 7, ibid., Obama famously pledged to ‘look forward as opposed to
looking backwards’ on various Bush administration programs but initially kept open the
possibility of accountability of broken laws. ‘Obama Reluctant to Look into Bush Programs’,
11 January 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire.
html.
634 Previous President Bush admitted ordering waterboarding. The previous CIA head of
counter-terrorism, Jose Rodriguez, admitted ordering it. Donald Rumsfeld stated that the
US military did not waterboard, but remained silent on whether the CIA did.
635 See J. Rodriguez, Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives
(Threshold Editions, 2012).
636 See Chapter 10 for criticism that ‘we don’t put our torturers on trial. We put them on book
tours.’ C. Pierce, ‘Waterboards, Drones and the Drones Who Love Them’, Esquire Politics
Blog, available at: http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/jose-rodriguez-cia-book-8484289.
637 Many of the crimes were subject to what has been described as a ‘concerted cover up’ and
suffer from comlete lack of US cooperation (see Council fo Europe Second Report into
Rendition (2007), and Commisioner Hammerberg’s statement, in Chapter 10.7), making
investigations challenging but not impossible.
638 See, e.g., the trial in the Abu Omar case in Italy or the Polish investigation , where broad
reaching approaches to ‘state secrecy’ shrouded the investigation and limited the charges;
see chapter 10.
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tion,639 and the reported imposition of political pressure on states not to pur-
sue the cases.640
Despite this, many states that cooperated with the US in alleged criminality
have committed to undertaking some form of investigation, with varying
degrees of force and success, and at various stages of development.641 These
include the first prosecutions that have also taken place (albeit in absentia),
leading to convictions of Italian and CIA officials for Abu Omar’s rendition
in Italian courts.642 Criminal investigations are open in several other states,
including into allegations of systematic torture and ill-treatment in US detention
facilities’, and possible crimes committed by former government lawyers who
provided the legal justification for torture and unlawful detention.643 In an
interesting example of the ‘horizontal complementarity’ between national
jurisdictions,644 in one case a Spanish judge in charge of the latter case
ordered a ‘temporary stay of proceedings’, transferring the matter to the US
Department of Justice ‘for it to be continued urging it to indicate at the proper
time the measures finally taken by virtue of the transfer procedure’.645 One
might question the appropriateness of this deference in the absence of a firm
commitment by the US to investigate, but it will be revealing to see what if
639 Non-cooperation is noted in the previous section. See also the el Masri case where the
Minister of Justice announced that due to lack of cooperation from US authorities, it would
not be pursuing the extradition requests. ‘US rejects Germany bid for extradition of CIA
agents in el-Masri rendition’, JURIST, Saturday, September 22, 2007, available at: http://
jurist.org/paperchase/2007/09/us-rejects-germany-bid-for-extradition.php. UK prosecutors
alluded to lack of cooperation in deciding that the Mohamdad case could not lead to
prosecution of any individual. ‘Joint statement by the Director of Public Prosecutions and
the Metropolitan Police Service’, CPS, 12 January 2012 at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/
press_statements/joint_statement_by_the_director_of_public_prosecutions_and_the_metro
politan_police_service .
640 U.S. pressure on states not to investigate renditions has been reported and condemned
by e.g. the European HR Commissioner on Human Rights.‘Wikileaks’ documents also
records US meetings with European counterparts to this end: e.g. ‘Officials Pressed Germans
on Kidnapping by CIA’, New York Times, 8 December 2010, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/europe/09wikileaks-elmasri.html; ‘Garzon Opens
Second Investigation Into Alleged US Torture of Terrorism Detainees’, Cable from US
Embassy Madrid, 5 May 2009, available at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id
=09MADRID440.
641 See, e.g., Chapter 7B.14 on justice and accountability failure generally and Chapter 10 and
Chapter 8 discussions on failures in respect of rendition and Guantanamo abuse specifically.
See e.g. Romania and Lithuania, cursory investigation into rendition or UK enquiries but
no criminal prosecutions.
642 See Chapter 10 on Rendition.
643 See Chapter 8C3 on Spanish investigations into abuse at Guantanamo and elsewhere. See
Chapter 10.7 on other initiative in eg Poland and elsewhere to hold officials of the US and
other states to account for rendition.
644 Part 4.A.1.3 above.
645 A ‘temporary stay of proceedings’ was ordered as the case was ‘transferred’ to the Deptart-
ment of Justice, in an interesting example of horizontal complementarity between states
See further Chapter8C3.
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anything this invitation at accountability dialogue produces, and how the
dynamics of deference will evolve should the US fail to take steps towards
meaningful accountability.
Despite the difficulties, investigations and, gradually, prosecutions do seem
to be gaining some momentum.646 The limited prosecutions to date means
that issues around immunities, or permissible defences, have not arisen in
practice. There have however been various attempts to confer immunities on
US personnel who committed crimes against detainees,647 or to manufacture’
defences for interrogators and others involved in their mistreatment.648 These
developments are themselves relevant to the perceived legitimacy and potential
‘expressive’ value of the criminal law in countering crimes, whether terrorist
or counter-terrorist.649 Their full practical import remains to be seen if pro-
secutions for war on terror crimes gathers pace. Notably, in the one case where
they have been raised internationally, concerning the CIA agents convicted
in Milan, claims for immunity were rejected by the Court.650
While momentum may be gathering around accountability for some of
the most extreme crimes outside the US, the results remain limited. The contrast
of approach, as between the rigour, and perhaps at times over-zealous exuber-
ance, with which criminal law responses to terrorism have been embraced
internationally in recent years and the muted criminal justice response to the
crimes of the war on terror is striking. The legitimacy, and hence the value,
of the criminal law function can only be seriously diminished by such striking
selectivity of its application.
4B.6 CONCLUSION
Acts of international terrorism constitute crimes under national and often also
international law. A rule of law approach to counter-terrorism requires that
they be prosecuted, in accordance with due process, and that those responsible
be held to account with proportionate penalties. The lack of an internationally
accepted crime of ‘terrorism’ should not impede this process: serious acts of
terrorism constitute core crimes under international law, while national systems
646 These are supported and catalysed by international human rights cases, which seek, inter
alia, to insist that the states in question meet their human rights obligation to investigate
and prosecute. See Chapter 11.
647 Chapter 7B.14.
648 J. Resnik, ‘Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts’ (2010) 110 Columbia Law
Review 579.
649 Chapter 7B Introduction.
650 See eg Chapter 10; Abu Omar case; ‘Convictions in Abu Omar rendition case a step toward




have increasingly incorporated forms of terrorism, among other relevant
crimes, in domestic law. While there may be some gaps and areas of tension,
a detailed body of international law and practice exists in relation to crimes,
principles of law, jurisdiction and cooperation which, if applied effectively,
equips the international community in its criminal response to international
terrorism.
The immediate wake of 9/11 saw unprecedented international solidarity
with the United States and a shared global commitment to justice. Remarkable
unity of purpose attended international dialogue on combating terrorism post
9/11. Questions arise as to the extent to which the opportunity to improve
the system of international criminal justice, and international cooperation in
the enforcement of law, has been seized or squandered.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there seemed relatively little role for
criminal process. The goal of terrorism prevention involved the massive
detaining [of] potential terrorist threats’651 but principally with a view to in-
telligence gathering rather than seeing criminal justice done against those
responsible for serious crimes. Many of those responsible have been put on
kill lists rather than subject to arrest warrants. Cooperation was often ‘informal’
and transfers extra-legal, as epitomized by the extraordinary rendition pro-
gramme. Alternative measures prevailed around globe, from preventive
detention, sanctions, control orders and other measures. Many of these had
a similar effect on the individual as a criminal conviction but without the rights
associated with it.
It may be, however, that over time the pendulum has began to swing back
towards a more central role for criminal law enforcement, as states, inter-
national institutions and commentators acknowledge the limitations and the
implications of undue focus on military responses to terrorism. The relationship
between military and criminal law responses remains an uneasy one in some
states, notably in the US. There is, however, a shift of emphasis towards greater
priority afforded to criminal justice and to strengthening international criminal
cooperation.652 Extensive developments in the fabric of criminal laws, increas-
ing experience of terrorism prosecutions in practice, and concerted international
attention to enhancing international cooperation may suggest that the op-
portunity was not squandered as hopelessly as may have been thought.
Yet as the experience of terrorism prosecutions unfolds, domestic criminal
processes and international cooperation reveal serious tensions within the rule
of law edifice. Expanded criminal offences and modes of liability enhance the
651 Testimony of Attorney-General John Ashcroft before the US House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary, 5 June 2003, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/
2003/060503aghouseremarks.htm .
652 Criminal justice has certainly received increased visibility over time and is now strikingly
present in international discourse around effective counter-terrorism, as seen for example
in the centrality afforded to it in the coordinated UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
and the range of international initiatives to enhance cooperation set out above.
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preventive potential of the criminal law, yet they have lead to prosecutions
of individuals far removed from the ‘genuinely criminal conduct’ that is the
normal reserve of criminal law.653 Adapted approaches to procedure and
evidence may seek to meet security challenges, but jeopardize the right to trial
before an independent and impartial tribunal, or the ability to mount a mean-
ingful defence. The ever-expanding reach of criminal norms and adaptation
of criminal process puts real strain on the most basic criminal law principles
– legality, individual responsibility, the presumption of innocence, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and due process – upon which the legitimacy of
the criminal law depends.
The experience of national courts post 9/11 also reflects in part a failure
of international cooperation, despite the emphasis placed on enhancing co-
operation in criminal matters post 9/11. The examples explored above, and
others, illustrate the unwillingness on the part of some states, notably the US,
to share information with courts in other states, impeding international justice
efforts.654 In what has been described as a ‘bitter irony in the global war
against terrorism’,655 the US stands accused of hampering proper convictions,
but also withholding potentially exonerating information from criminal
courts.656
Practical, political and legal obstacles to effective extradition and mutual
legal assistance remain.657 It is increasingly evident that poor human rights
practices at the investigative stage have impeded international cooperation
and/or effective prosecutions, the full extent of which remains to be seen. Even
some of those standards and procedures advanced in the name of enhancing
cooperation and the international justice it serves, have undercut judicial
safeguards that are all the more critical post 9/11.
As noted in the introduction, the criminal law holds real promise in com-
bating terrorism within a rule of law framework. Meeting the challenge of
using it effectively, while upholding rather than undermining the rule of law,
remains a work in progress. By contrast, meeting the parallel challenge of
ensuring accountability also for those that commit crimes in the name of
counter-terrorism is a far more remote ideal.
653 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 4.
654 See eg the German example leading to the the Mzoudi acquittal outlined at 4B12.
655 See ‘Terror Case sets Washington and Berlin at Odds’, Christian Science Monitor, 9 February
2004.
656 See eg Criticism by German prosecutors at 4B.1.2 above.
657 Prost, ‘Need for a Multilateral Cooperative Framework’, supra note 279.
5 The Use of Force
We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights ... to establish conditions under which justice and respect
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained ... to unite our strength to maintain international
peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in
the common interest ... have resolved to combine our effort to accomplish
these aims.
(Preamble, UN Charter, 26 June 1945)
This chapter considers the law relevant to the question whether, and if so in
what circumstances, states are entitled to resort to the use of force under
international law as a response to acts, or threats, of international terrorism.
The legality of the use of force between states under international law is
referred to as the ‘jus ad bellum’. Part A of the chapter addresses key aspects
of the relevant legal framework, which part B then analyses alongside examples
of state practice in response to international terrorism since 9/11. Specifically,
it addresses the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq which followed
9/11 and the ongoing attacks on members of al Qaeda and associated groups
around the world.
The distinction between the body of law addressed here, and those con-
sidered in other chapters of this study, bears emphasis at the outset. The jus
ad bellum which determines when use of force on another state’s territory is
lawful must be distinguished from jus in bello that encompasses the rules that
apply once force has been used and a conflict is underway, and which applies
irrespective of whether the resort to force was lawful.1 The lawfulness of the
use of force between states, discussed here, is also distinct from the lawfulness
under human rights law of the use of lethal force.2 The use of force may be
lawful under the jus ad bellum, but still a violation of the individual’s rights
1 The jus in bello, or humanitarian law (IHL) regulates the conduct of hostilities and treatment
of persons, and requires, inter alia, that civilians must not be the object of attack, which
is addressed in Chapter 6.
2 International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is discussed in Chapter 7.
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under the quite different normative standards of IHRL.3 As practice will show,
confusion – whether deliberately fueled or inadvertent – has often surrounded
these divergent areas of law and the justifications available to states under
each.4 Subsequent chapters explore how the various areas of law might apply,
and the interplay between them, in particular situations.5
5A THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5A.1 THE USE OF FORCE AS A LAST RESORT
Where a terrorist attack amounts to criminal conduct, the appropriate frame-
work of law is that of law enforcement. As discussed in Chapter 4, persons
who are directly responsible for a crime or, in certain circumstances, indirectly
responsible for contributing to it or failing to prevent it, should be brought
to justice before national courts or international tribunals.
Under international law there is an obligation to resolve disputes by
peaceful means, which may also be relevant in certain circumstances. This
obligation is enshrined in Article 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations,
which states: ‘All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, shall
not be compromised.’6 Peaceful means of dispute resolution include arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement,7 non-adjudicatory methods such as negotiation, good
offices, mediation, conciliation or inquiry, and settlement under the auspices
of the United Nations or regional organizations. As they are directed towards
addressing state responsibility, their relevance to the present study is effectively
3 The legal standards are different under different areas of law, even where the terminology
may disguise this – e.g., the concept of ‘proportionality’ has a different meaning and effect
under IHRL, IHL, and jus ad bellum, as does ‘self defence’ under criminal law, which is
analogous to but different from the standard that may justify the lethal use of force under
IHRL or the use of force under the jus ad bellum, addressed later.
4 For an example of confusion see e.g. reliance on arguments that territorial states have
‘consented,’ relevant to the use of force under the jus ad bellum but not the legitimacy of
action under IHL or IHRL, or comments on the U.S. justification of ‘self defence’ in relation
to the killing of Bin Laden in Chapter 9.
5 See, e.g., Chapters 9 and 10 on the diverse issues raised by each area of law in relation to
the killing of Osama bin Laden or the Extraordinary Rendition programme respectively.
6 A similar obligation was already enshrined in the so-called Briand-Kellog Pact: Article 2,
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Paris,
27 August 1928, in force 24 July 1929.
7 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
is empowered to determine infringements by one state of the rights of another, order
provisional measures and advise on the interpretation of law; see Article 92 UN Charter.
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limited to disputes related to state-supported terrorism, and potentially to
action taken by states in the name of counter-terrorism.8
The question of the lawfulness of the use of force should only arise in
circumstances where none of these peaceful means are at the aggrieved states’
disposal, or where such means have been exhausted or found to be ineffective.9
This reflects the ‘general principle ... whereby States can only have recourse
to military force as a last resort’.10
5A.2 THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL RULE AND
EXCEPTIONS
The current rules governing the lawfulness of the use of force are contained
in the UN Charter and customary international law. The advent of the UN
Charter represented a moment of legal metamorphosis, when traditional legal
concepts such as the ‘just war’ and lawful reprisals were radically altered by
the new law of the United Nations, which greatly restricted the circumstances
in which the use of force can be lawfully deployed.11 The underlying ‘pur-
poses’ of the UN Charter are set out in Article 1, the first of which is:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace.
The primacy of this objective is reflected in the Charter’s preamble, which
opens with the famous expression of determination ‘to save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war.’12 Article 2 then sets out certain fundamental
‘principles’, one of which is the general rule prohibiting the use of force.13
Article 2(4) obliges all Members of the United Nations to refrain in their
8 The avenues for peaceful dispute settlement discussed here pre-suppose a level of state
responsibility, discussed in Chapter 3.
9 This requirement manifests itself throughout the law on the use of force; see e.g. the require-
ment of ‘necessity’ of self defence and in the Security Council’s power to take ‘necessary
measures,’ below.
10 A. Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 38 (1989) ICLQ
589 at 596.
11 See L. Henkin, ‘Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy’, in Henkin et al., Right v. Might: Inter-
national Law and the Use of Force (New York, 1991), pp. 37 ff. See also T. Franck, Recourse
to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002).
12 Preamble, UN Charter.
13 Article 2(4).
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international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The overwhelming majority of commentators recognise that the obligation
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter reflects customary international law.14
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case15 noted that
Article 2(4) reflects customary law,16 despite the fact that state practice is ‘not
perfect’ in the sense that States have not ‘refrained with complete consistency
from the use of force.’17 It has since described it as a ‘cornerstone of the UN
Charter’.18 The prohibition of the use of force against another State is one
of the relatively few rules of international law which has been recognised as
having attained the status of jus cogens,19 though it has also been suggested
that the jus cogens status may properly be limited to the prohibition on launch-
ing aggressive war.20 The resort to force by states in contravention of this
rule may amount to an act of aggression for which states, but also individuals,
may be responsible.21 As will be discussed, it may also amount to an ‘armed
attack’ against another state, a prerequisite for the use of force in self defence.22
14 See, generally, A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the
United Nations. A Commentary, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 133-5, citing
authoritative writings in support of this position.
15 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits,
ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 (‘Nicaragua case’).
16 Ibid., para. 190.
17 Ibid., para. 186.
18 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (hereinafter ‘Armed Activities case’) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, 201, at para. 148.
19 See ICJ, Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 190 and ILC Commentaries to Articles on State
Responsibility, Commentary to Article 40(4). See Chapter 1, para. 1.2.1.
20 N. Blokker and N. Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality,
a Need for a Change?, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005).
21 The UN Charter designates the Security Council as the organ competent to determine, in
concreto, if a breach of the prohibition of the use of force amounts to an act of aggression.
For the definition of aggression see GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, UN Doc.
A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Article 1. ‘Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Defini-
tion.’ Article 3 lists acts which qualify as an act of aggression’ including ‘(g) The sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed
above, or its substantial involvement therein.’ In 2010 the 13th plenary meeting of the ICC
Review Conference agreed upon a definition of aggression for ICC purposes (RC/Res 6.,
11 June 2010, Annex 1); see new Article 8 bis in Chapter 4A.1.
22 Not every act of unlawful use of force will be sufficiently serious to amount to an act of
aggression or an armed attack. See Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 195.
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Article 2(4) is generally accepted as infringed by any ‘forcible trespass,’ how-
ever limited in geography or time, and whatever its purpose.23 As such it
has been noted that the references to territorial integrity and political independ-
ence were not intended to qualify the prohibition, but on the contrary to
emphasise (and thus to strengthen) the protection of the nation state from
aggressive interference by other states.24
It perhaps goes without saying that where a state has the ‘consent’ of the
territorial state or intervenes at its ‘invitation’, there is no use of force against
the territorial integrity of the state at all. These are therefore key preliminary
questions of fact, which are often less straightforward to ascertain than might
meet the eye.25 It is only where there is no consent that the general prohibition
on the use of force arises.
Certain exceptions to the prohibition are contemplated in the Charter itself.
These exceptions, which will be critical to the assessment in Part B of the
lawfulness of measures taken in the counter-terroism context, involve: (a) the
use of force in self defence, and (b) Security Council authorisation of force,
on the basis that the Council determines it necessary for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security.
While other possible justifications for the use of force have at times been
advanced, such as ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘pro-democratic intervention’
or ‘self help’, they provide doubtful justification for the lawful use of force,
as discussed below. Instead, to rest on a secure legal foundation, any resort
to armed force should either constitute self defence or be authorised by the
Security Council. It is unsurprising then that it is these legal justifications that
have been invoked explicitly by states in the context of resorting to force
against terrorism in the post September 11 world, in relation to Afghanistan,
Iraq, or the ongoing cross border lethal use of force against alleged al Qaeda
terrorists in numerous states around the globe discussed in Part B.
23 J. Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2012), p. 74 (citing A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in B. Simma et al., Commentary, note 14,
p. 112-36, 123-4. Cf. D.W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (Manchester University
Press, 1958), p. 152. See discussion of possible thresholds of scale applicable to an armed
attack by non-state actors for the purposes of self defence later.
24 On the process whereby this language came to be included, see, e.g., T. M. Franck, Recourse
to Force, supra note 11, p. 12; C.D. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Foundations
of Public International Law), 3rd ed. (USA: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 31-33.
25 Consent is relevant to ongoing lethal force against terrorism at Chapter 5.B.3, or in relation
to the killing of Bin Laden at Chapter 9. Indications that a state has or has not consented
may be politically motivated and as one commentator notes often have to be taken ‘with
a grain of salt’: M.N. Schmitt, International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines
(Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) p.183. On the possible relevance of
‘intervention by invitation’ as a ‘possible legal justification’ in relation to Afghanistan, see
M. Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after September 11’, 51 (2002)
ICLQ 401, pp. 403-4. Invitation is certainly relevant after regime change introduced a
government friendly to those executing the ‘war on terror’.
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5A.2.1 Self defence
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.
As the Charter’s reference to the ‘inherent’ right of self defence may reflect,
Article 51 was intended to encompass customary international law. Where
Article 51 lacks specificity, an understanding of its content can therefore be
informed by customary law.26 However, customary law continues to exist
alongside the Charter and, as will be noted, in limited respects its content may
not be identical.
Self defence is an exception to the ‘general duty of all states to respect the
territorial integrity of other states’,27 and the only established exception to
the prohibition on the use of non-UN authorised force.28 As Oppenheim’s Inter-
national Law notes, ‘[l]ike all exceptions, it is to be strictly applied’.29 The strict
approach is particularly important given that self defence operates, at least
initially, in the absence of a mechanism to ascertain the validity of a state’s
claim to exercise the right. In practice, states resorting to force very often
invoke self defence as a basis for the legality of action, even where no such
tenable justification exists.30
The essence of self defence, as the term suggests, lies in its defensive
objective: it is neither retaliation nor punishment for past attacks, nor
26 See, e.g., the tests of necessity and proportionality, which are not explicit in the Charter
but are principles of customary law held by the ICJ to be part of the ‘inherent’ right of
self defence under Article 51 – Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 194. By contrast, the rules on
reporting to the Security Council are explicit in the Charter but are not rules of customary
law. They are binding as conventional law on the UN member states as parties to the
Charter, Nicaragua case, para. 194.
27 R.Y. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I, 9th ed. (London:
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 421.
28 On other possible legal justifications for unilateral resort to force advanced by certain
authors but of doubtful legal standing in current international law, see this chapter, para.
5A.3 and N. Lubell, ‘Extra-Territorial Use of Force agaisnt Non-state Actors’, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), Chapter 3 who addresses, and dismisses, hot pursuit, necessity
and piracy as exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force.
29 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 27, p. 421.
30 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 118.
A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 306, points out
that self defence has been abused in practice, especially by great powers.
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deterrence against possible future attacks.31 The former distinguishes permiss-
ible self defence, which consists of necessary and proportionate measures to
protect oneself against a future threat, from prohibited reprisals, which are
responsive and largely punitive. While earlier law allowed reprisals in limited
circumstances,32 the law changed with the advent of the UN Charter, which
is on its face inconsistent with retaliatory or punitive measures of force.33
In 1970, the Friendly Relations Declaration, considered to constitute customary
law on the point, confirmed that ‘states have a duty to refrain from acts of
reprisal involving the use of force’.34 Central to an assessment of justifiable
self defence is an assessment of the actual threat to a state, and an identification
of the measures necessary to avert that threat, to which defensive action must
be directed and limited. The conditions which are generally considered to
require satisfaction before resort to force can be justified as self defence are
set out below.
5A.2.1.1 Conditions for the exercise of self defence
a) Questions Concerning the ‘Armed attack’ Requirement
Article 51 contemplates self defence only ‘if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations’. As affirmed by the International Court of
Justice, ‘[s]tates do not have a right of ... armed response to acts which do not
constitute an “armed attack”’.35 The ICJ has indicated that the attack should
be mounted from outside the state itself.36 As noted below, the ‘armed attack’
31 See discussion of anticipatory or pre-emptive self defence, Chapter 5A.2.1.1(a). Threats of
future attacks that fall outside the scope of permissible self defence may however amount
to threats to international peace and security for which the Security Council is uniquely
empowered to authorise force.
32 Prior to the UN Charter, the definitive statement of the permissible use of reprisals was
found in the 1928 Naulilaa case. See C. Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law’, 81 (1952) RdC 455, pp. 458-60.
33 See Article 2(4), Article 42 and Article 51, UN Charter.
34 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations’, 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), para. 6. While not a binding
instrument, the Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted by consensus by the General
Assembly, provides insight into the understanding of states as to the law in 1970 and is
often cited as customary international law binding on all states – see Nicaragua, note 15,
para. 188.
35 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 110.
36 M.N. Schmitt, ‘Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normat-
ive Framework’ (hereinafter ‘Transnational Terrorism’), 56 (2008) Naval Law Review 1, p.
12 notes this was one point of agreement between all judges in the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July
2004, ICJ Reports 2004 (hereinafter ‘Wall Advisory Opinion’). In finding there was no right
to self defence, the majority distinguished the Israeli situation from that contemplated by
SC Res. 1368 and 1373. See also E. Wilmshurst, ‘Principles of International Law on the Use
of Force by States In Self-Defence’, Chatham House Working Paper, 2005, p. 6 (hereinafter
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requirement is one of the most controversial of the self defence conditions,
and highlights a number of areas where international law is unsettled.
Several issues have given rise to controversy as regards the scope of an
Article 51 ‘armed attack,’ which will be discussed in turn. A preliminary issue
relates to the targets of the attack. The second, of central relevance in the post
September 11 context explored in the second part of this chapter, concerns
the authors of the attack, specifically whether the use of force by non-state
actors may constitute an ‘armed attack’ for the purposes of triggering self
defence, or whether a state must be responsible to justify the use of force
against that state. A third issue, less central post 9/11 but which has assumed
more significance in the years following those attacks,37 relates to whether
there is a threshold or scale requirement for an armed attack, or whether any
cross border use of force suffices. The fourth is the thorny issue of whether
‘anticipatory,’ ‘preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ self defence is permissible and,
if so, the parameters of such a right.
i) Targets of an Armed Attack: While there is no accepted definition of armed
attack for these purposes, Article 2(4) refers to resort to force against another
state’s territorial integrity or political independence.38 As noted above, attacks
on the state’s territory, irrespective of scale, are generally considered to qualify
as amounting to attacks against the state’s territorial integrity.39 Among the
issues in dispute as regards the targets of the armed attack is whether an attack
against a state’s nationals, or its interests, overseas could suffice to constitute
an armed attack.40 Support in state practice and academic writing for ‘self
‘Chatham House Principles’), available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/
papers/view/108106. It may be open to question whether this logic would hold in all
circumstances; where.g. an attack was launched from within the state, either by another
state or by a non-state actor located elsewhere, defensive action could be required abroad
to avert the ongoing or a subsequent attack. Attacks that originated entirely from within
a state are however certainly less likely to give rise to the necessity of action in self defence
another state.
37 See 6A.3.1 justifications for targeted killings in self defence, including the question of
whether there can be a continuing attack established through an accumulation of events.
38 See Article 2(4). On the extent to which the language was intended to limit, see Franck,
Recourse to Force, supra note 11 above. The debate on whether attacks against nationals might
suffice is addressed below.
39 Note however the suggestion that there is a scale requirement for attacks by non-state actors
at 5A2.1.
40 See S. Ratner, ‘The Meaning of Armed Attack,’ in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.),
Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges,
(Cambridge University Press, 2013). Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note
30, p.118-19. See discussion of the US National Security Staregies and the protection of broad
U.S. interests at 5B.2.
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defence’ to cover defence of nationals abroad is uneven,41 and while such
a right may exist in certain exceptional circumstances,42 it has been suggested
that further clarification on this matter is required.43
By contrast, the protection of broader ‘interests’ beyond the integrity and
independence of the state, and, arguably, nationals abroad, finds no justification
within the law of self defence.
ii) State responsibility for the attack: a sine qua non? A second controversial
question relating to the scope of an ‘armed attack’ under Article 51 is whether
a state must be responsible for the attack for the right to self defence to be
triggered, or whether the right to self defence arises even where a non-state
actor is responsible for the attack (without attribution to a state). The signific-
ance of this question in determining the scope of the law of self defence in
the contemporary world was put beyond doubt by the September 11 attacks.44
The international law of jus ad bellum, including self defence, developed
on the assumption that disputes and resolutions would occur between states
and those that act on their behalf. Yet this assumption has been subject to
increasing doubt in recent years. On the one hand, the language of Article
51 of the Charter does not explicitly require state involvement in the attack
to trigger self defence.45 Nor does the logic of self defence (as permitting a
state to take whatever action might be necessary to defend itself against an
actual or imminent attack) require proof of state involvement in that attack.
Indeed, the seminal Caroline case of 1837 involved non-state actors, operating
without any apparent state support, indicating that – at least pre-Charter –
41 Gray, ibid., at 156-157, notes that ‘few states have accepted a legal right to protect nationals
abroad.’ She cites the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Israel as having
relied upon this argument.
42 D.W. Bowett, supra, at 93, notes that it is unreasonable to characterise every threat to
nationals located abroad as a threat to the security of the state. M. Byers, ‘Terrorism, the
Use of Force and International Law after September 11’, 51 (2002) ICLQ 401, at 406 refers
to the tacit approval by most states of the Entebbe incident wherein Israel stormed a hijacked
plane in Uganda carrying Israeli nationals. Separate from questions as to whether self
defence arises at all are those relating to the proportionality of force to the objective of
rescuing or protecting nationals.
43 Ratner, ‘The Meaning of Armed Attack’, note 40, p. 710.
44 9/11 was widely attributed to the al-Qaeda network in circumstances where state responsib-
ility for the attacks remained uncertain and was not directly asserted. See, e.g., document
published by the UK Government, ‘Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the U.S.,
11 September 2001’, 4 October 2001. For a discussion of the responsibility of al-Qaeda, see
S.D. Murphy (ed.), ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law Contemporary Practice’, 96 (2002) AJIL 237. On the test whereby acts of private actors
become attributable to the state see Chapter 3.
45 Note, however, that as the Charter was drafted on an assumption that force was inter-state
and that it governed inter-state relations, too much reliance on the omission of express
wording from the Charter would be misplaced.
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the law had no difficulty with self defence against force employed by non-state
actors.46
On the other hand, while the proposition that self defence might arise in
response to non-state actor terrorist attacks might not be problematic in prin-
ciple, concerns do arise from the reality that non-state actors do not operate
out of the high seas but are based in other states’ territories.47 Doubts arise
as to whether an interpretation of Article 51 that allows those states to be
attacked absent a substantial link to the offending non-state actor is an inter-
pretation consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,
including the protection of the territorial integrity and political independence
of states.48 This is particularly so where terrorist cells operate globally,
potentially rendering many states susceptible to attack if, for example, mere
presence on the state’s territory would suffice to justify force in self defence,
with the inevitable potential for an escalation in conflict.49
The predominant view before September 11 appeared to be that for self
defence to be justified, acts of individuals or groups must be attributed to the
state,50 with controversy centering instead on the standard for attributing
responsibility.51 While some commentators said so explicitly, other writers,
and indeed the ICJ judgment in Nicaragua, appeared to assume that a state must
46 The Caroline case of 1837, which, as noted earlier, sets down the customary law of self
defence, involved the destruction by the British of an American ship, the Caroline, which
was assisting forces rebelling against the Crown in Canada. It was common ground that
the U.S. government had tried to restrain the private initiatives supporting the insurrection
and arguably there was not therefore any state involvement. See M. Reisman, ‘International
Legal Responses to Terrorism’, 22 (1999) Houston Journal of International Law 3, at 46.
47 See eg. G.M. Travalio, ‘Terrorism, International Law and the Use of Military Force’, 18 (2000)
Wisconsin International Law Journal 145.
48 Like any treaty, the UN Charter must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning,
as understood in context, and in accordance with its object and purpose – see Article 31,
VCLT 1969 para. 1. Subsequent agreements or practice are also relevant to interpretation:
Article 31(3)(a) and (b), VCLT 1969; Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, in particular p. 180; Certain Expenses of
the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962,
pp. 157 and 159.
49 Arguably, such vulnerability is limited by a strict application of the necessity and propor-
tionality test to any response, discussed later. See also Chapter 5B.1 on application to
Afghanistan.
50 See, e.g. Cassese, ‘Legal Response to Terrorism’, note 10, at 596, Travalio, ‘Terrorism’, supra
note 47, above. Cf. e.g., R. Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against Bin
Laden’, 24 (1999) Yale Journal of International Law 559, at 564. While the U.S. and Israel have
been said to long hold this view, the UN until the 1980s denied that Article 51 could justify
the use of force as a response to terrorist attacks: see G.Z. Capaldo, ‘Providing a Right of
Self Defense Against Large Scale Attacks by Irregular Forces: The Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict’
48 (2007) Harvard International Law Journal 101, p. 104 and C. Tams, ‘The Use of Force against
Terrorists’, 20 (2009) The European Journal of International Law 2, p. 386. Both notes the shift
in the approach to this question by states individually and at UN level.
51 See Chapter 3.1. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24.
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be involved in the armed attack.52 However, the response to the events of
September 11 – notably the widespread reference to the Afghanistan interven-
tion being justified despite state responsibility not having being made out
against Afghanistan – is often cited as indicative of a different view of the law,
or at least as an indication of how the law may have shifted or be shifting,
influenced by the events of 9/11 and responses.53
Surprisingly perhaps, in the Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ reiterated its
view that ‘Article 51 of the Charter ... recognizes the existence of an inherent
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another
State.’54 Despite strong dissenting judgments on this point,55 it was suggested
that such a clear statement of the Court must, in the words of one of those
dissenting judges, ‘be regarded as a statement of the law as it now stands’.56
However, in the Uganda v. DRC judgment shortly thereafter, the Court retreated
to a more equivocal position in which it acknowledged but declined to address
the issue of ‘whether and under what conditions contemporary international
law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular
forces,’ somewhat muting the force of the Court’s previous opinion on the
matter.57
Moreover, subsequent practice, while less striking in the range and nature
of the state responses than the response to the Afghanistan intervention,
appears to support the view that self defence may arise in respect of terrorist
attacks irrespective of attribution. As discussed further in Part B, in relation
to shifts in the law since 9/11, in the context of Israeli or Turkish claims to
use self defence against non-state groups in the Lebanon in 2006 or Northern
52 Nicaragua, note 15, para. 195. Rendering assistance to armed groups, while it may amount
to unlawful intervention, did not itself constitute an armed attack as the acts of the irregulars
were not attributable to the state according to an ‘effective control’ test. See also Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 2007, para. 377-415. Chapter 3.1.
53 Widespread reference to the right to ‘self defence’ post 9/11 (despite lack of attribution
to the Afghan state), including by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, has been
cited as indicating that non-state actors may be responsible for an Article 51 attack. See
e.g., Greenwood, ‘International Law and the “War against Terrorism”’, 78 (2002) International
Affairs, 301 or C. Tams, note 50. A minority view holds that states implicitly recognised
that there was a degree of state involvement underlying those attacks: see, e.g., L. Sadat,
‘Terrorism and the Rule of Law’, 3 (2004) Washington University Global Studies Law Review
135, at 150; M. Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law’, 84 (2002) IRRC 401 and D. Jinks, ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed
Groups’, 4 (2003) Chicago Journal of International Law 83.
54 Wall Advisory Opinion, note 36, para. 139.
55 Wall Advisory Opinion, ibid, Opinion of Judges Higgins, para. 33 and Judge Kooijmans,
para. 35. Kooijmans describes the ICJ as having by-passed the approach of the Security
Council in Resolution 1373. Wall Advisory Opinion, note 36, Dissenting Opinion, J. Buergen-
thal, para 6.
56 Opinion of Judge Higgins, ibid.
57 Armed Activities case, note 18, para. 147 thereby apparently tempering the impact of its Wall
Opinion.
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Iraq in 2008, respectively, attribution was not treated as a defining question.58
While there is still controversy, and room for alternative interpretations of
practice, it would appear then to be the case that ‘it is now well accepted that
non-state actors, even when not acting on behalf of a state, may commit armed
attacks that trigger a state’s right of […] self-defence.’59
If, alternatively, as some still claim,60 a state link is required, the key
question becomes the standard by which action of non-state actors becomes
attributable to the state. As already discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the
level of support which may render the state responsible for the attack is a
question of degree, dependent ultimately on the exercise of sufficient control
over the conduct of those directly responsible for the attack.61 While support
for terrorists of various degrees and form may be prohibited in international
law, it does not necessarily render the state constructively responsible for an
armed attack, or entitle other states to use force against it. As such, it has been
suggested by those that consider state responsibility for the armed attack
essential, that what practice post 9/11 reveals is that the standards of attribu-
tion have loosened in respect of terrorism specifically.62 While the stronger
view may be that attribution is not a legal pre-requisite for the existence of
an armed attack, as the global practice of terrorism and counter-terrorism
continues to unfold, the law on self defence, and on state responsibility, and
the relationship between the two, is likely to develop further.
iii) A Threshold of Scale and Effects, and Continuing Attacks? An armed attack
has traditionally been considered to imply the use of force of considerable
seriousness in terms of its scale and effects. The ICJ, setting out certain para-
meters for when interference in a state through support for armed groups
might amount to an armed attack, has consistently considered it necessary
58 S.C. Res. 1701 (2006), 11 August 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006). See, e.g., Secretary
General Press Release UN Doc. SG/SM/10570, SC8791, 20 July 2006, and discussion of
states’ positions in Security Council discussions. I. Foss, ‘Is there Something Rotten in the
State of Jus ad Bellum? State Responses to Terrorism and the Jus ad Bellum’, 2010, The
Selected Works of Ian Foss, p. 25-28, available at: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ian_foss; Tams, ‘The Use of Force’, note 50, at 379
and 380.
59 N. Schrijver and L. van den Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-terrorism
and International Law’ (hereinafter ‘Leiden Recommendations’), Grotius Centre, 1 April
2010, available at: http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recom
mendations%201%20April%202010.pdf para. 38. ‘Chatham House Principles’, note 36.
60 Capaldo ‘Right of Self Defence’, note 50, p. 106 or T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51
of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press,
2010), 486-89.
61 See ICJ in the Nicaragua case, note 15, discussed in Chapter 3. Other formulae for support
have been put forward. See, e.g., Cassese, International Law, note 30, p. 312, who describes
the degree of support required as ‘major and demonstrable’. As noted in Chapter 3, some
suggest the standard may require adjustment post 9/11.
62 See Chapter 3.
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to distinguish between ‘grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an
armed attack) from other less grave forms.’63 It found, for example, that the
supply of arms or logistical support was not per se sufficient to constitute an
armed attack, while sending armed bands or mercenaries into the territory
of another state was.64 An armed attack for purposes of Article 51 has also
been said to exclude ‘isolated or sporadic attacks’.65
However it has increasingly been suggested that a distinction is due in
this respect between an armed attack by a state and by non-state actors. Where
one state resorts to force against another, the predominant view is that this
amounts to an armed attack, irrespective of intensity.66 However, so far as
it is accepted that attacks may emanate from non-state actors, various experts
have suggested that this can, or perhaps should, only amount to an armed
attack where it is ‘large scale.’67
It is generally accepted that an attack need not occur all at once, but may
arise through a series of attacks over time.68 For a series of events to amount
to one armed attack, it would have to emanate from the same source.69 If
the series of attacks is part of sufficiently close continuum to amount to effect-
ively one attack, it may meet a threshold that none of the smaller attacks would
themselves meet. However, if an attack were to continue over a prolonged
period it may bring into question the nature or the imminence of the threat
63 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 191; see also Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic
of Iran v. United States of America) (hereinafter ‘Oil Platforms case’), Judgment, ICJ Reports
2003, para. 161, which also referred to ‘large scale attacks,’ albeit in the context of action
by armed groups supported by the state. See Tams, ‘The Use of Force’ supra note 50, p.
387.
64 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 195. The same approach was taken in the Oil Platforms Case,
ibid.
65 A. Cassese, ‘Legal Response to Terrorism’, supra note 10, 18 states that self defence ‘requires
a pattern of violent terrorist action rather than just being isolated or sporadic acts’.
66 ‘Leiden Recommendations’, supra note 59, para. 39, suggesting that ‘Article 51 does not
include a scale requirement for an armed attack ...’ except for attacks by non-state actors.
Dinstein rejects a threshold beyond a very low threshold of ‘trifling’ or ‘de minimis’ effects;
Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence, 4th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 195. M.N. Schmitt, ‘Transnational Terrorism’, note 36, p. 14 also notes the ‘scale and
effects’ requirement makes sense in the context of non-state actors. ‘Chatham House
Principles’, note 36, at 966.
67 Leiden Recommendations, supra note 59, para. 39. ‘Chatham House Principles’, ibid, principle
6. The principles recognise this is not the view set down by the ICJ. For another view
disputing that there are different scale requirements, see Ratner, ‘The Meaning of Armed
Attack’, note 40. See 5B.1 (Afghanistan) and 2 (Attacks on Al Qaeda) on developments in
thinking and practice as regards whether the attack must be attributable to the state.
68 Ibid, para 11 C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the United States’ Air Operation against
Libya’, (1987) 89 West Virginia Law Review 933, 942, p 955-56. Tams, supra note 50, suggests
more debate is required to clarify whether an accumulation of events doctrine is accepted
in international law.
69 See Leiden Recommendations, note 59; E. Wilmshurst ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, in Herik
and Schrijver, Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order, note 40.
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being defended against,70 and the need to resort to measures of self defence,
discussed next, as collective action under the Charter may then be possible.
iv) A right of anticipatory self defence? The existence of a right to ‘anticipatory,’
‘preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’71 self defence – a right to resort to force in self
defence before an armed attack has occurred or to prevent or avert a future
attack – is the subject of considerable controversy.72
Article 51 of the UN Charter permits resort to force in self defence ‘if an
armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations’. The ‘ordinary
meaning’ of the Article 51 language appears to require that an attack has
actually happened or ‘occurred’,73 as opposed to being simply threatened,74
as does a ‘contextual’ reading of the provision which, unlike other provisions
of the Charter, omits any reference to the ‘threat’ of attack.75
On a ‘purposive’ interpretation of the provision – whether permitting
anticipatory self defence furthers or undermines the Charter’s objectives –
opinion has long been more divided. On the one hand, opponents of the right
can highlight the dangers of permitting pre-emptive strikes based on a state’s
own assessment of risk, as a slippery slope that may ultimately lead to the
unravelling of the prohibition on the use of force altogether, inconsistent with
the Charter’s fundamental purposes and principles. On the other, a compelling
argument advanced in support of a right to ‘anticipatory self defence’ is an
appeal to ‘common sense’76 – that it is illogical or unreasonable to require
70 See Anticipatory self defence later in this chapter.
71 On the significance of the different terms, see e.g. N. Lubell, Extra-territorial Use of Force
supra note 28, p. 55. As will be seen anticipatory self defence appears to have growing
acceptance whereas a broad doctrine of pre-emptive or preventive use of force is currentl
put forward by the U.S. but has virtually no international support. See 5B.2.
72 The extent of the significance of this issue was not immediately apparent in the wake of
the September 11 attacks, which had occurred, but has been brought into sharp focus by
the subsequent debate on legal justifications for on-going force against terrorists abroad
(see B.2 including the U.S. National Security Strategy of 17 September 2002) asserted a
broad-reaching right to resort to preemptive force.
73 The clause ‘if an armed attack occurs’ was inserted in Article 51 at the initiative of the U.S.
delegation at the San Francisco Conference. During the debate the U.S. insisted the caveat
‘was intentional and sound. We did not want exercised the right of self defence before an
armed attack has occurred.’
74 See generally M. Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Preemptive Force’ (hereinafter
‘Preemptive Force’), 14 (2003) EJIL 227, specifically at 228.
75 See Article 2(4) and Article 39, belying any suggestion that the omission of the threats from
Article 51 was inadvertent. See Bothe, ‘Preemptive Force’, ibid., at 228-9.
76 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use it (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), 242: ‘In a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret
an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate
before it can defend itself.’ Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69, at 747.
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a state to wait until it has been attacked to ‘defend’ itself.77 An analogy may
be provided by criminal law, where the absurdity of needing to wait to be
fatally shot to invoke self defence is apparent.78 The nature of contemporary
weapons systems – and the possibility of an initial potentially devastating
attack – is cited as bolstering the argument in favour of a more flexible inter-
pretation of Article 51.79 As one commentator recently noted, ‘no law ...
should be interpreted to compel the reductio ad absurdum that states invariably
must await a first, perhaps decisive, military strike before using force to protect
themselves’.80
The opposing camps may be reconciled to some degree to the extent that
there is room for debate as to when an attack actually ‘begins,’ when defensive
action is ‘interceptive’ rather than anticipatory,81 or when an attack is
ongoing.82 Thus a flexible approach to the definition of armed attack may
effectively have the same result as acceptance of anticipatory self defence,
allowing states to respond to preparatory acts and to avert the completion
of the attack. Thus the rejection of a right of anticipatory self defence does
not oblige states to be sitting ducks until harm is suffered; preparatory acts,
coupled with evidence of an intent to attack, might be considered to constitute
the effective commencement of an attack which can be averted before it
achieves its destructive effect.83
77 See O. Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 82 (1984) Michigan Law Review
1620, at 1634: ‘It is important that the right of self defence should not freely allow the use
of force in anticipation of an attack or in response to the threat. At the same time, we must
recognize that there may well be situations in which the imminence of an attack is so clear
and the danger so great that defensive action is essential.’ See also T.M. Franck, ‘When,
If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force without Prior Security Council Authorization?’
5 (2001) Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 51, at 59-60, who notes in this respect
that it may be necessary to respond to ‘challenging transformations’ such as increased
weapons capability.
78 Like its international counterpart, criminal law does however recognise strict limits on the
circumstances in which preemptive action may be taken. See A. Ashworth, Principles of
Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 147-8; G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 85 ff.
79 Higgins, supra note 76. On changing circumstances post the Charter’s inception and flexible
interpretation, see Franck, Recourse to Force, supra note 11, pp. 5-9.
80 Ibid., p. 98. However Franck acknowledges that ‘a general relaxation of Article 51’s prohi-
bitions on unilateral war-making to permit unilateral recourse to force whenever a state
feels potentially threatened could lead to another reductio ad absurdum’.
81 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence, supra note 66 p. 191. He talks of ‘embarking on
an apparently irreversible course of action’ that casts the die. Schmitt notes this broad
approach is close to what others in fact call anticipatory self defence. Schmitt, ‘Transnational
Terrorism’, supra note 36, p. 17.
82 See discussion on a ‘series of attacks’ earlier.
83 M.E. O’Connell, ‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’, 13 (2002) EJIL 63; Bothe, ‘Preemptive
Force’, note 74, at 229-30 suggests that the requirement of armed attack is uncontroversial
and that it is on the meaning of such attack that there is controversy. He suggests that
certain imminent attacks may be seen as ‘equivalent to an armed attack.’
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Those who assert a right of anticipatory self defence generally rely upon
customary law, which they argue diverges from the Charter in this respect,84
but which is acknowledged by the reference to the ‘inherent’ right in Article
51 itself.85 One question is whether this right survived the introduction of
Article 51, clearly worded to the contrary, and whether the Charter’s framers
intended a parallel inconsistent body of law to run alongside the Charter,
particularly the Charter’s quasi-constitutional status. Another is whether there
is sufficient state practice since 1945 to support the existence of a continuing
customary norm at variance with the Charter, as recourse to anticipatory self
defence as a legal justification for using force remains limited.86
Doctrinal debate among academic commentators on the question of anti-
cipatory self defence, at least before September 11, revealed little consensus.87
Oppenheim’s International Law suggests that the position is that ‘while anti-
cipatory action in self defence is normally unlawful, it is not necessarily
unlawful in all circumstances’.88 This approach may hold true post 9/11, but
it has been suggested that there is growing acceptance of a limited right of
self defence against ongoing and imminent attacks since then.89
What is clear is that if a right to anticipatory self defence exists, it is strictly
limited. The circumstances in which anticipatory self defence might be per-
84 The Article 51 reference to the ‘inherent’ right of self defence is cited as supporting the
continued existence of customary rules. Schachter, ‘The Right of States’, note 77, at 1633,
and G.M. Travalio, ‘Terrorism, International Law and the Use of Military Force’, note 47,
at 149, stating, similarly, that ‘the presence of an armed attack is one of the bases for the
exercise of the right of self defence under Article 51, but not the exclusive basis.’
85 See the Caroline case, to be discussed.
86 On one of the few occasions on which it was expressly invoked, in relation to Israel’s attack
on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, states generally shied away from debating the lawful-
ness of anticipatory self defence as such, but the underlying action met with condemnation
as a violation of the law on use of force: see SC Res. 487 (1981), 19 June 1981, UN Doc.
S/RES/487 (1981). Franck, Recourse to Force, note ??????@@?, suggests that on other occasions
despite state’s reluctance to refer to it as such, reactions have been more equivocal.For
discussion of state practice post Charter, see Gray, International Law and the Use of Force,
note 24, p. 118.
87 Among writers holding that there is no right of self defence until an armed attack has
actually commenced, see, e.g. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 256-7, B. Simma et al., Commentary, note 14; Gray, International Law and
the Use of Force, note 24, p. 117-18; Bothe, ‘Preemptive Force’, above, note 74, at 230. A num-
ber of authoritative commentators recognise a right to act in self defence against an imminent
armed attack. See, e.g., Bowett, note 23, pp. 187-92; Oppenheim’s International Law, supra
note 27, p. 421; C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’, 4 (2003) San Diego International Law Journal 7; E.P.J. Myjer
and N. D. White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?’, 7 (2002)
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5; note 76; O’Connell, ‘Law of Sanctions’ and Wilmshurst,
‘Anticipatory Self Defence.’
88 Oppenheim’s International Law, p. 421.
89 See Part 5B.2 below.
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mitted were set out in the seminal Caroline case of 1837,90 the language of
which has been widely cited as establishing, and at the same time strictly
limiting, the circumstances in which the use of self defence in anticipation of
an attack might be permissible. The Caroline test has been endorsed in sub-
sequent judicial decisions as enshrining the appropriate customary law
standard,91 and has been described by one commentator as going ‘as far as
pre-emptive self defence possibly goes under current international law’.92
The test proposed by US Secretary of State and agreed by the opposing party,
the British, was that there had to be a necessity that was ‘instant, overwhelm-
ing, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’.93
It is clear that a distinction must be drawn between a real and immediate
threat of armed attack, and a potential or speculative risk thereof. A threat
must be concrete and identifiable. While some may question whether the need
for ‘no moment for deliberation’ goes too far,94 it emphasises the immediacy
of the threat for permissible anticipatory self defence.95 A temporal dimension,
which emphasizes the immediacy or imminence, in line with the exceptional
or ‘emergency’ nature of anticipatory self defence, remains a critical criterion,
and one that is closely linked to (if not subsumed by) the notion of necessity
discussed below.96 While a threat, like an attack itself, may arise over a period
of time, and it is a question of degree at what point it becomes real and
immediate, the passage of considerable time between a threat arising and its
response may raise doubts concerning the requirement of immediacy (and
with it the necessity of the use of force as a response, to be discussed later).
90 The correspondence between the U.S. and the British Government relating to the case is
reproduced in 29 (1841) British and Foreign State Papers 1137-1130 and 30 (1842) British and
Foreign State Papers 195-196.
91 See, e.g., the judgment of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the trial of Goering;D.J.
Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. (London, 1998), p. 896;R. Higgins,
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press, 1994),
p. 242.
92 Bothe, ‘Preemptive Force’, note 74 suggesting that the Caroline formula represents the law
pre-Charter and that a more restrictive view should be taken in light of Article 51. On
positions advanced post 9/11 and the potential shift in legal standards see B.2.
93 Letter dated 24 April 1841 from the U.S. Secretary of State Webster to the Government of
the United Kingdom, Fox, reprinted in Harris, Cases and Materials, note 91, p. 895 The
Caroline ‘necessity and proportionality’ test applies to any action of self defence, but it is
‘even more pressing in relation to anticipatory self defence than [it is] in other circum-
stances’. Ibid., at 421.
94 Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69.
95 See the U.S. position on the ‘imminence’ requirement as regards the use of force against
terrorist suspects at 5B3 below. Cf. Wilmshurst, ibid.
96 As suggested by Christian Tams, imminence may not provide an additional restraint as
it is implicit in necessity. C. Tams, “Necessity and Proportionality and their Practical
Application to Self-Defence against Terrorists’’ in v.d. Herik and Schrijver, chapter 12.
However on another view it is useful to consider the temporal element separately from
necessity as it emphasizes that the use of force before an attack has begun is exceptional
and requires a high level of justification. Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, ibid.
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Finally, it follows from the above test that the capacity to inflict harm,
however grave, is insufficient, unless the circumstances indicate a real and
imminent threat to carry out an armed attack. As such, there is little to suggest
that the existence of weapons, even those of mass destruction, is considered
per se sufficient to justify a claim to self defence. The oft-cited destructive
capability of al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups and individuals is clearly
distinct from the real and immediate threat posed by a particular source. The
rationale is reflected in domestic criminal law, where the fact that someone
intends harm, or indeed possesses a weapon with the potential to do harm,
or both, may justify other measures of intervention but plainly would not
justify the use of force in self defence, whereas brandishing a weapon where
the context indicates an immediate and unavoidable threat, would.97
So far as anticipatory self defence can be accepted under international law,
it is an exception within an exception. It follows that any such right must be
strictly and carefully construed. Issues that have arisen with regard to a lax
approach, which moves from the notion of anticipatory self defence to prevent-
ive or pre-emptive self defence are discussed in relation to post 9/11 practice
at Part B.98
In conclusion, the nature of the armed attack, in particular the non-state
actor origin of the attack and its potentially ‘anticipatory’ nature, are con-
tentious issues in relation to which the law may be in flux. As Part B will
explore, issues related to the armed attack have been central to responses to
international terrorism before 9/11,99 and since then.100
b) Necessity and proportionality
As noted, necessity and proportionality are universally recognised as require-
ments of the law of self defence, under customary law and the UN Charter.101
For self defence to be justified, any response must be necessary to avert the
97 See Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, note 78, on the imminence and duty to prevent
conflict and Fletcher, Criminal Law, note 78.
98 ‘Chatham House principles’, note 36; Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69.
99 E.g. L.M. Campbell, ‘Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to
Strike Sudan and Afghanistan’, 74 (2000) Tulane Law Review 1067, or S. Schiedeman,
‘Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism’, 50 (2000) Syracuse Law Review at 249.
100 While the problems of nationals or state ‘interests’ appear of less relevance to its response
to the events of September 11, which were considered an existing armed attack, on U.S.
territory, the issue is of broader relevance to the use of force through targeted killings
invoked in response to on-going terrorist attacks or threats in the future. See, e.g., Chapter
5.B.2.
101 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 176. The necessity and proportionality rules are ‘well estab-
lished in customary international law’. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 (hereinafter ‘Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion’), para. 141. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p.
148.
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imminent threat or continuing attack.102 These factors, which (unlike the
armed attack requirement) are prospective as opposed to retrospective, are
critical in distinguishing lawful self defence from unlawful reprisals.103
As noted earlier, the requirement reflected in the Caroline case of 1837, is
of a ‘necessity ... that ... is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation’. The necessity of force presupposes
that all alternative, peaceful means have been exhausted, are lacking or would
be ineffective as against the anticipated threat.104 In recent years, it has been
suggested that the unwillingness or inability of a state to take such action may
be a pre-requisite for the use of force against non-state actors on that state’s
territory.105 If a state on whose territory the targets are present is able and
willing to take the required action, through criminal law enforcement, use of
force or otherwise, the use of force by the state will not be necessary.
Necessity may itself imply a degree of immediacy. While an immediate
response may not be an effective response, the longer the time lapse, the more
tenuous the argument becomes as to the urgent necessity of unilateral action,
as opposed to collective action under the UN umbrella.
Logically, for measures to be necessary to avert a threat, they must be
capable of doing so. A relevant question in determining the right to self
defence is therefore the effectiveness of any proposed measure. If measures
against those responsible for an attack will increase the threat then they can
hardly be said to be necessary to avert it. To this extent questions relating to
the impact of the use of force as a counter terrorist strategy, and the likelihood
of encouraging or impeding future acts of terrorism, are questions of potential
relevance not only to the political expediency but also to the lawfulness of
the use of force.
Proportionality and necessity are intertwined, with proportionality requir-
ing that the force used be no more than necessary to repel the threat pres-
ented.106 Consistent with the underlying purpose of self defence, to defend
the state from on-going or imminent harm, it is important that the
102 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 176. The Caroline case of 1837 set down what has been
described as the customary law standard on necessity and proportionality. Campbell,
‘Defending Against Terrorism’, note 99, at 1067 and Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self
Defence, note 66, at 205.
103 See Lubell, Extra-Territorial Use of Force, supra note 28, p. 52-3.
104 See Schiedeman, ‘Standards of Proof’, note 100, at 270. For questions as to the exhaustion
of such means post 9/11 see section 5B.2.
105 See N Lubell, supra note 28; A.S. Deeks, ‘Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama
Bin Laden’, ASIL Insight, http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm who observes that while
there may be agreement on the test it is difficult to apply in practice. See also A. Deeks
‘Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense’,
V.J.I.L. Vol 52.3, p. 483. See further below B.2.3 on the necessity of the use force against
al Qaeda and associates in war on terror practice.
106 Tams, ‘Necessity and Proportionality’ in Herik and Schrijver, Counterterrorism Strategies
in a Fragmented International Legal Order, note 40.
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proportionality test should be applied vis-à-vis the requirements of repelling
the threat, rather than, as is often suggested, measured against the scale of
the threat or of any prior armed attack.107 Arguments as to numbers of per-
sons killed in the original attack outweighing numbers killed in subsequent
counter-measures are of political relevance only. Assertions that ‘the intensity
of force used in self-defence must be about the same as the intensity defended
against’ is too loose an approach to proportionality in the context of self
defence, where the key question is the different one of what is strictly required
to avert the threat.108 It seems all the more critical not to measure
proportionality against potential harm. Thus, it has been suggested that an
approach to preventive self defence against ‘indeterminate’ threats make it
difficult if not impossible to apply the proportionality calculus.109 One com-
mentator has noted, as an example of the limits imposed by the proportionality
test, that ‘the victim of aggression must not occupy the aggressor’s territory,
unless strictly required by the need to hold the aggressor in check and prevent
him from continuing the aggression by other means’.110
The question of whether (and which) States are responsible for an armed
attack (whether or not, as discussed above, a sine qua non of self defence) is
relevant to the question whether particular measures are justified as necessary
and proportionate. Logically, necessity and proportionality require a link
between the target of ‘defensive action’ and the threat being defended against.
Targeting state institutions, for example, absent evidence of their connection
to the threat or their ability to control that threat, is difficult to justify as a
necessary and proportionate measure of self defence.111
In summary, the use of force in self defence is not automatically justified,
even where there has been an armed attack and there is evidence of an im-
minent second attack or continuing attack that needs to be repelled. An
appraisal must then be made, in the light of the facts, of the necessity and
effectiveness of the measures proposed to counter that threat, and whether
the measures proposed are proportionate to it. It follows from the necessity
(and proportionality) test, that self defence can only be justified where the
targets of defensive action have been clearly identified, such that their parti-
cular contribution to the threat in question has been properly assessed.
107 Necessity and proportionality are thus closely interrelated.
108 F.L. Kirgis, ‘Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel’s Use of Armed Force in Lebanon’,
10 (2006) American Society of International Law 20, available at: http://www.asil.org/insights/
2006/08/insights060817.html in the context of Israeli/Hezbollah affair. See comment in
Capaldo, ‘Right of Self Defence’, supra note 50.
109 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note 24, p. 203.
110 Cassese, International Law, note 30, p. 305.
111 See Afghanistan, 5B.1.
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c) Self defence and the Security Council
Two particular issues arise regarding the relationship between the right to
self defence and the role of the Security Council. The first is the immediate
requirement that any individual or collective self defence measure be reported
to the Council.
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Reflecting this, Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which provides for the organisation
to act ‘in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognised
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, specifically provides that
‘[a]ny such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council.’While the ICJ found there
to be no requirement under customary law to report to the Security Council,
the requirement is explicit in the Charter itself which is binding on all UN
members.112 Failure to report may, moreover, constitute evidence that the
state did not consider itself to be acting in self defence.113
The second issue, though somewhat more controversial, is the limitation
on the right to self defence as only justifying the use of force under the Charter
until the Council is engaged. The Charter (reflected again in the NATO treaty),
certainly appears to envisage self defence as a temporary right, pending
Council engagement. Article 51 provides for:
the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs
... , until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.
The NATO Treaty records at Article 5 that ‘[s]uch measures [of collective self
defence] shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security’.
The Charter clearly assumes that once states can, they will seek Council
engagement. If the Council is not engaged or does not engage, for whatever
reason, the right of self defence continues for as long as the conditions for the
exercise of self defence are met, but when the Council does engage, the Charter
appears to envisage that the right to use force in self defence is superseded.
No provision is made for state preference to continue to exercise the unilateral
112 Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 200.
113 Ibid.
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right of self defence. In any event, unilateral resort to force would be of doubt-
ful ‘necessity’ if measures were being taken under the collective security
umbrella. In practice, the Council has been unusually active in its approach
to counter-terrorism since 9/11, albeit in a general rather than fact or context
specific way,114 and it has not authorized the use of force in response to inter-
national terrorism.115 Despite the level of Council activity post 9/11, it may
be doubted whether the nature of that involvement could be understood as
engagement of a type that would affect the right of self defence,116 though
it does raise the question of what might constitute such engagement and the
inter-relationship in practice between the right to self defence and the role
of the Council.
5A.2.1.2 Individual or collective self defence
The UN Charter enshrines the notion that self defence can be individual or
collective, but the precise meaning of ‘collective self defence’ has generated
some debate. Specifically, it is disputed whether Article 51 permits only the
collective exercise of individual self defence (by states all of whom are subject
to the attack or threat thereof), or whether it empowers other states, whose
interests are not affected, to support a victim state in the exercise of that state’s
right of self defence.The majority of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case took the latter
view: that a state’s interests need not be directly affected where the injured
state requests assistance,117 which has been described as corresponding to
state practice since 1945.118 However, a dissenting judgment distinguishes
self defence from ‘vicarious defence,’ noting that ‘there should, even in ‘collect-
ive self defence’, be some real element of self’.119
114 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 7.B.1.
115 See, e.g., discussion of the legislative and quasi judicial roles in Ch 7.B.1 ‘Security v Human
Rights’
116 SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). Measures such as
those imposed in SC Res. 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001),
given the breadth of their reach, could be argued to constitute Council ‘engagement’ to
take the measures necessary for international peace and security, but the fact that it referred
to the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self defence as recognized by the Charter
of the United Nations as reiterated in Res. 1368 (2001)’ belies this approach.
117 Nicaragua case, note 15, paras. 104-5. See also Cassese, ‘Legal Response to Terrorism’, supra
note 10, at 597: ‘Collective self defence requires that the State has been requested or author-
ised to intervene by the [injured] State.’
118 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 188; describes the insistence on third
state interest as ‘far fetched’.
119 See Sir Robert Jennings’ dissenting opinion in Nicaragua case, note 15, at 545. Gray, Inter-
national Law and the Use of Force, note 39, pp. 187-88 notes that ‘many others follow the
Jennings approach’ (while herself describing the position as ‘far fetched in the light of state
practice since 1945’). See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence, note 66.
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The recognition of the collective nature of the right to self defence is
reflected in various treaties, including the NATO treaty.120 Article 5 provides:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security
of the North Atlantic area.
No autonomous right to use force is, or could be, contained in the NATO treaty
or any other agreement. As the NATO treaty clause itself indicates, the lawful
use of collective force is limited by the UN Charter.121 In this sense, the right
enjoyed by the regional or other collective security organisation is the same
as that of any individual state. The significance of the NATO treaty in this
respect is, however, twofold. First, the NATO treaty is seen to operate as a
standing request to other members to assist in its defence. Secondly, while
self defence under the UN Charter (unlike a decision by the Security Council)
is permissive, not obligatory,122 the NATO treaty goes further, by obliging states
parties to it to act. However, as noted above, these arrangements can only oblige
states to take measures that they are entitled to take consistent with the UN
Charter provisions on self defence.123
As set out in the following section, only the Security Council can authorise
measures in the interest of peace and security that are not justified in the self
defence of any state. However, the Council may, and in practice does, mandate
collective or regional organisations to take those measures on its behalf.
120 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 4 April 1949, 34 UNTS 243. For another regional security
treaty, see, e.g., Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro, 2 September
1947, 21 UNTS 324, in force 3 December 1948, Article 3(1). Like the NATO treaty, this
regional security treaty was also activated post 9/11: see K. De Young, ‘OAS Nations
Activate Mutual Defense Treaty’, Washington Post, 20 September 2001.
121 Unlike the Security Council, NATO has no independent powers to authorise the use of
force. Unless it is mandated to act on behalf of the Security Council, NATO power (like
that of member states) is predicated on the principle of self defence.
122 Proposals to oblige other member states to assist victims of aggression were rejected during
the negotiation of the Charter. See Franck, Recourse to Force, note 11 p. 46.
123 Article 103 UN Charter.
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5A.2.2 Security Council: maintenance of international peace and security
In situations where self defence cannot be justified, the only lawful use of force
is that authorised by the Security Council.124 The Security Council has broad
powers, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,125 to determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression126 and
to take (or to authorise) those measures – including ultimately the use of
force – that it deems necessary to address the situation.
Article 39 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to ‘make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security’. The ‘measures’ referred to are further
specified in the Articles that follow. In particular, Article 41 concerns ‘measures
not involving the use of armed force’ that the Security Council may adopt
to give effect to its decisions and establishes an obligation on Member States
to apply such measures. Supplementing those powers, Article 42 confers on
the Security Council unique powers to mandate enforcement action, where
the non-coercive measures are deemed, or proved to be, inadequate.
The language of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII may be
recommendatory – ‘calling on’ all states, or particular states, to take action –
or it may be mandatory, ‘deciding’ that specific measures should be adopted.
It is these ‘decisions’ that are binding on member states which, under Article
25, are required ‘to accept and carry out’ the Council’s decisions. If questions
arise as to non-compliance with these obligations, it is for the Council to decide
whether there has been a breach and what measures are appropriate in
response.127
The UN Charter originally envisaged a form of international stand-by force
at the beckoning of the Council.128 This UN force has however never come
into being and, in practice, the Council has instead discharged its enforcement
mandate by delegation,129 nominating member states generally, or specific
124 To some extent the GA assumed the Council’s role where the latter could not discharge
its mandate during the Cold War: ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution (GA Res. 377 (V), 3
November 1950, UN Doc. A/RES/377 (V)) to address the situation in Korea, pursuant to
which it established a temporary UN presence in Korea.
125 Chapter VII is entitled ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace
and Acts of Aggression’.
126 Article 39
127 These measures may of course involve the use of force. See automaticity debate, later in
chapter.
128 Article 43 commits all members ‘to make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities…’.
129 Franck, Recourse to Force, note11, p. 43, refers to the Security Council authorisation of action
by states as opposed to by the Security Council itself as the ‘adapted power’ of the Council.
C. Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarisation: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq’,
13 (2001) EJIL 1 at 2-3 notes increasing concern, since the 1991 Iraq invasion, to ensure that
the Council retains control over UN authorised, but state executed, operations.
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states, to take measures involving the use of force. Numerous situations have
arisen in the post Cold-war era where states, regional organisations or ‘co-
alitions of the willing’ have been authorised to take ‘all necessary measures’
(which in Council speak clearly includes forceful measures) to give effect to
the Council’s decisions.130
5A.2.2.1 The Security Council and international peace and security: powers and
limitations
The Security Council’s power to decide measures involving the use of force
is ample but not limitless.131 The Council enjoys a broad discretion to deter-
mine the existence of a threat to or a breach of international peace or security,
or whether particular conduct constitutes an act of aggression.132 The text
of Article 42 poses some limits on the power of the Security Council to adopt
coercive measures, however, by specifying that measures implying the use
of armed force should constitute the extrema ratio, to be taken only where ‘the
Security Council considers that measures [provided for in Article 41] would
be inadequate or have proven to be inadequate’ and that the measures adopted
must be ‘necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security’.
Moreover, the course of action decided by the Security Council must be
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as defined
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.
a) ‘Threat to or breach of international peace and security’ and terrorism
The first condition for the application of measures under Chapter VII of the
Charter is, as noted above, that the situation must amount to a threat to, or
breach of, ‘international peace and security’. The concept of ‘threat to, or breach
of, international peace and security’ has been given an increasingly broad
interpretation by the Security Council. Through practice, the phrase has come
to include matters that would originally – when the Charter was framed –
have been thought internal questions for the state. For example the deposing
of a democratically elected government,133 the commission of extremely
serious violations of human rights134 and the potential imminent massacre
130 See S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace. Humanitarian Intervention and International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 123 and Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarisation’, note 129,
at 2-3. Since the Cold War era situations in which the Council has done so include: Kuwait
(1990-91), Somalia (1992-93), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (1993), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995- ), Great
Lakes (1996), Central African Republic (1997), Albania (1997), Kosovo (1999- ), and East
Timor (1999), Cote d’Ivoire (2003) and Libya (2011).
131 N. White, The Law of International Organsiations (Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 90.
132 For discussion of the definition of aggression, see Chapter 4A.1.1.3.
133 See SC Res. 841 (1993), 16 June 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/841 (1993), concerning Haiti.
134 See SC Res. 418 (1977), 4 November 1977, UN Doc. S/RES/418 (1977) concerning apartheid
in South Africa and SC Res. 232 (1966), 16 December 1966, UN Doc. S/RES/232 (1966)
concerning white minority rule in Rhodesia.
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of civilians,135 non-international conflicts136 have all been deemed to con-
stitute threats to ‘international peace and security’.137 In practice the standard
to be applied by the Council has come to be viewed as fairly flexible, with
security against overuse residing in the collective mechanism that applies it
rather than in the confines of its terms, by contrast to the stricter standards
governing unilateral use of force.138
Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), addressing Libya’s refusal to
extradite the Lockerbie bombing suspects,139 was the first in a series of resolu-
tions in which the Council articulated a relationship between terrorism and
international peace and security. Like subsequent resolutions on the attempted
assassination of Egypt’s President Mubarak140 and the bombings of the US
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,141 the Lockerbie resolution noted that ‘the
suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States
are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security’. Likewise, Security Council resolutions adopted
in response to September 11 and subsequently have unequivocally determined
the events of that day and (more controversially) international terrorism more
broadly, as constituting a threat to international peace and security.142
While the terms of Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 of September
2001, and the resolution that followed the Madrid bombing of March 2003,
suggest that ‘any act of international terrorism’ amounts to a threat to inter-
135 SC Res. 1973 on Libya (2011), note 121. The Council debate focused on ‘the mission being
authorised as that of protecting threatened Libyan civilians against violent atrocities that
were allegedly being massively threatened by the Qaddafi government, with special
reference at the time to an alleged imminent massacre of civilians trapped in the then
besieged city of Benghazi. The debate emphasised the application of the norm of Responsib-
ility to Protect (R2P). R. Falk, ‘NATO intervention in Libya: Acting beyond the UN mandate’
(hereinafter ‘Beyond the Mandate’), Third World Resurgence, available at: http://www.
twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2011/253/world1.htm
136 See SC Res. 713 (1991), 25 September 1991, UN Doc. S/RES/713 (1991), concerning Somalia
and SC Res. 794 (1992), 3 December 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) concerning Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
137 See discussion on humanitarian intervention and pro-democratic intervention, paras. 3.3.1
and 3.3.2 in this Chapter.
138 It falls to the state invoking self defence, in the initial stage, to apply and determine the
legitimacy of its recourse to force. Susceptibility to abuse in the absence of any external
oversight is great and therefore the exception to the prohibition on the use of force must
be narrowly construed.
139 SC Res. 748 (1992), 31 March 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
140 SC Res. 1044 (1996), 16 August 1996, UN Doc. S/RES/1044 (1996).
141 SC Res. 1189 (1998), 13 August 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1189 (1998) and SC Res. 1267 (1999),
15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
142 See SC Res. 1368 (2001), note 117. On 28 September 2001 the SC adopted SC Res. 1373 (2001),
note 117, described as a ‘wide-ranging, comprehensive resolution with steps and strategies
to combat international terrorism’. The Council plainly did not however authorise the use
of force
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national peace and security,143 this is to be doubted, particularly given the
absence of international accord around the substance and scope of the defi-
nition of terrorism. Moreover, the Council’s own earlier Resolution 1269 of
1999 ‘[u]nequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism
... in particular those which could threaten international peace and security’.144 What
is clear is that the concept of a threat to international peace and security may
encompass acts of ‘terrorism’, to which Chapter VII action could be directed.
b) Measures to maintain and restore international peace and security
As noted above, the fact that there is a threat to international peace and
security itself is not sufficient to trigger the lawful use of force. Consistent
with the principles of the UN as enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the Char-
ter,145 and reflected in the language of Article 42, for military action to be
possible, the Security Council must consider non-military measures under
Article 41 of the Charter to be (or have been) inadequate. TheSecurity Council
has to determine that those measures would be ineffective for the purpose
of restoring international peace and security, and that force is necessary.
Logically, necessity encapsulates an element of proportionality – the particular
measures taken should be capable of furthering international peace and secur-
ity and the force used should be no more than necessary to achieve this
purpose. These are essentially factual questions for the Council’s assessment
in light of the prevailing circumstances.
The Council has broad discretion to decide which measures are appropriate
to maintain and restore international peace and security in the particular
situation. Measures that the Council may decide to authorise or mandate under
the Chapter VII rubric of maintaining international peace and security cover
a wide array, some involving armed force and others not, as history attests.
In the post-Cold War period, non-forceful measures have included establish-
ment of ad hoc criminal tribunals,146 referral of situations to the ICC,147 the
143 SC Res. 1368 (2001), note 117, condemns 9/11 as, ‘like any act of international terrorism’,
‘a threat to international peace and security’. The Preamble of resolution 1373 (2001), note
117, likewise notes that ‘such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat
to international peace and security’. See also SC Res. 1530 (2004), 11 March 2004, UN Doc.
S/RES/1530 (2004), where the Council, condemning the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11
March 2004, stated that it ‘regard[ed] such act, like any act of terrorism, as a threat to peace
and security’.
144 SC Res. 1269 (1999), 19 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999) (emphasis added).
145 See Article 2(3) on resolution of disputes through peaceful means and Article 2(4) on the
non-use of force.
146 On the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, see
Chapter 4.
147 SC Res. 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011) through which the
Security Council referred the crisis in Libya to the prosecutor of the ICC; SC Res. 2000 (2011)
27 July 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/2000 (2011), where the Council referred the situation following
the 28 November 2010 Ivorian elections; SC Res. 1593 (2005), 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/
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imposition of a war reparations procedure,148 attempts to force the extradition
of alleged terrorists,149 and sanctions lists with a view to freezing of assets
and banning movement of persons placed on Council ‘lists’.150
The Council has authorised ‘enforcement action’ through coercive measures,
for example, to restore a democratically elected government in Haiti151 and
to end apartheid in South Africa,152 white minority rule in Rhodesia153 and
armed conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina154 and Somalia,155 and more recently
to protect civilians in Libya.156 The use of force for the purpose of cross-
border criminal law enforcement – which may be impermissible if uni-
lateral157 – also forms part of the Council’s enforcement arsenal, and has been
invoked in several situations in recent years.158
As regards measures that may overstep the constitutional limits highlighted
above, it has been questioned to what extent the Council is empowered, for
example, to authorise ‘regime change’, given the Charter’s protection of states’
‘political independence’ as a fundamental principle.159 The Security Council
has in fact intervened only once to effect a change of government – where
a de facto government had usurped power, causing serious unrest, and the
Security Council authorised force to restore the democratically elected govern-
ment – and it did so emphasising the exceptional nature of the measure.160
It also authorized the Libyan intervention in 2011 that led to deposing the
RES/1593 (2005) the Council decided to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC
prosecutor – the first ICC referral giving the ICC jurisdiction over a non-state party.
148 Reparation procedure for Iraq, described by Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 142,
pp. 121-2. Chesterman also refers to the demarcation of a territorial boundary between
Iraq and Kuwait, ibid., p. 122.
149 Extradition measures involved suspects from Libya and Sudan, Chesterman, ibid.
150 SC Res. 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
151 SC Res. 841 (1993), note 145.
152 SC Res. 418 (1977), note 146.
153 SC Res. 232 (1966), note 146.
154 SC Res. 713 (1991), note 148.
155 SC Res. 794 (1992), note 148.
156 SC Res. 1973 (2011), note 121; see Falk, ‘Beyond the Mandate’, note 147.
157 History indicates several examples of unilateral enforcement action in the territory of other
states having been condemned. See for example United States v. Alvarez-Machain 504 US
655 (1992) and Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Israel Supreme Court 1962), reprinted
in 36 ILR 277 at 299, 304. Oppenheim’s International Law, p. 387..
158 See, e.g., SC Res. 837 (1993), 6 June 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/837 (1993), in relation to Somalia.
The possibility of invoking Security Council powers for the enforcement of criminal law
is addressed at Chapter 4.
159 This was questioned in the context of Iraq, see, e.g., R. Singh and A. MacDonald, ‘Legality
of use of force against Iraq’, Opinion for Peacerights, 10 September 2002, available at http://
www.lcnp.org/global/IraqOpinion10.9.02.pdf (hereinafter ‘Singh and MacDonald, Opinion
on Iraq’), at para. 79 noting that ‘[W]hile the Security Council can demand that Iraq achieve
certain results, it cannot dictate its choice of government. … a change of regime cannot
be considered absolutely necessary to achieving the Security Council’s legitimate aims.’
160 See SC Res. 841 (1993) on Haiti, note 133, which was justified in part by reference to broader
regional implications.
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Qaddaffi regime, though that resolution demanded a ceasefire and an end
to attacks on civilians, authorised ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians
and civilian-poulated areas,’ and a no-fly zone,161 rather than regime change
as such, causing questions as to whether NATO went beyond what the Council
had in fact authorized.162 While removal of an unpopular government by
the Council, as an end in itself, would not find support in the Charter, the
Council would appear to be empowered to authorise force against a regime
which it found to pose a threat to peace and security, which could not be
averted other than through the regime’s demise.
While it is clear that the Security Council’s powers are limited to action
taken in accordance with the Charter, less clear are the consequences of over-
reach, and whether any other body is entitled to review the Council’s de-
cisions.163 While this issue may become relevant to decisions of the Security
Council to authorise measures of force against terrorism in the future, it is
not central in the absence of such Council authorisation in the first years of
the ‘war on terror’.164
5A.2.2.2 Express and implied authorisation to use force: interpreting resolutions
Consistent with general principles of legal interpretation, a Security Council
resolution must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the
language used, understood in its context and in light of the resolution’s pur-
161 SC Res. 1973 (2011), note 121 para 4 authorizes ’ all necessary measures, … to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including
Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force …’.
162 Richard Falk notes that although SC Res. 1973 does authorise ‘all necessary measures,’ and
the resolution is ‘vague,’ the debate reveals that the measures authorized related to averting
massacre. By contrast, ‘once under way, the NATO operation unilaterally expanded and
qualitatively shifted the mission as authorised, and almost immediately acted to help the
rebels win the war and to make non-negotiable the dismantling of the Qaddafi regime.
NATO made these moves without even attempting to explain that it was somehow still
acting primarily to protect Libyan civilians. This was not just another instance of “mission
creep” as had occurred previously in UN peacekeeping operations (for instance, the Gulf
War of 1991), but rather mission creep on steroids!’ Falk, ‘Beyond the Mandate’, note 135.
163 See Chapter 7 B.1 ‘Security v Human Rights’ See also on the lack of UN accountability,
Scheinin, U.N. Doc. A/65/258 (2010), note 142, paras. 17-80. For the role of the ICJ and
ICTY in reviewing the powers of the Council, see S. Lamb, ‘Legal Limits to UN Security
Council Powers’, in G. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law:
Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford, 1999), pp. 361 ff. and J. E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the
Security Council’, 90 (1996) AJIL 1.
164 It is uncontroversial that force against terrorism has not explicitly been authorised in the
Council’s several resolutions on terrorism, discussed at Chapters 2 and 7. Regarding implied
authorisation and Iraq, see this Chapter 5 B.2.1.1.
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pose. This analysis can be informed by debates that lead to the resolution’s
adoption and, to a more limited degree, by statements made thereupon.165
Given the justifications invoked by states for the use of force post Septem-
ber 11 (particularly in Iraq), discussed in section B of this chapter, two issues
relating to the interpretation of Resolutions and the manner in which the
Security Council authorises states to use force are worthy of mention. The first
is whether authorisation can be inferred from earlier Security Council resolu-
tions; the second is whether states can unilaterally ‘enforce’ obligations
imposed by the Council, absent a decision of the Council to that effect.
‘Implied authorisation’ is, per se, a controversial notion. Its legitimacy has
been questioned as stretching too far ‘legal flexibility’.166 In practice, reliance
by states on implied authorisation as a legal justification in the past has been
limited and, where invoked, subject to criticism.167 Characteristically, it has
been asserted not as a primary justification for resort to force but one coupled
with the breach by the target state of its international obligations and/or
humanitarian intervention,168 an approach which has been described as a
‘combination of a series of weak arguments in the hope that cumulatively they
will be persuasive’.169
Moreover, practice attests to the fact that where the Council authorises
force it will generally do so in clear terms. For example, Resolution 678 of 19
November 1990, one of many Security Council Resolutions handed down
during the Gulf Conflict and universally understood to authorise the use of
force, stated that: ‘the Security Council authorises member states cooperating
with the government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Resolution 660’.170 The ‘all necessary means’ language, while not
165 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1971, note 15, at p. 53; M. Byers, ‘The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade
of Forceful Measures Against Iraq’, 13 (2002) EJIL 21 and M. Wood, “The Interpreta-
tion of Security Council Resolutions”, 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 82
(1998).
166 R. Higgins, ‘International Law in a Changing International System’, 58 (1999) Cambridge
Law Journal 78, at 94.
167 See generally Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarisation’, note 129, which addresses the use of force
in Iraq up to and including 2001; see also Higgins, ‘Changing International System’, note178.
168 Implied authorisation appeared to be relied upon in relation to the use of force in the no-fly
zones of Northern Iraq, although the UK later specified its legal justification as humanitarian
intervention which, it noted, ‘supported’ SC Resolution 688 (1990), 5 April 1991, UN Doc.
S/RES/688 (1991). For UK justification see Hansard debate, 26 February 2001, in Gray,
‘From Unity to Polarisation’, note 129, at 9. It was also invoked by at least some states
involved in the Kosovo NATO action, although again alongside other justifications, notably
humanitarian intervention.
169 Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarisation’, note 129, at 16 notes that this cumulative ‘weak argu-
ment’ approach is ‘typical legal reasoning, and common in the area of the use of force’.
170 SC Res. 660, 2 August 1990, UN Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) called for the withdrawal of Iraq
from Kuwait.
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explicit, is universally understood in the diplomatic context as synonymous
with the authorisation of necessary force.171
Given the fundamental principle prohibiting resort to force, and the ex-
ceptional nature of the right to do so, there must be a strong presumption
against implied (as opposed to clearly expressed) authorisation172 or open-
ended authorisation to use force, and in favour of a strict interpretation that
limits the right to use force to the particular situation and purpose to which
the authorisation was directed.173
Moreover, given the unique power vested in the Council to determine
breaches of peace and security and to authorise force, if necessary, resolutions
must not be interpreted in a manner that would ultimately divest the Council
of this role.174 The Council will often threaten to authorise force in the event
of non-compliance, by referring to the ‘severest consequences’ that a material
breach of a resolution will attract, but it remains within the exclusive power
of the Council to decide whether there has been a breach, whether at that point
in time the breach amounts to a threat to international peace and security and
whether, in turn, the threat necessitates and justifies coercive measures. While
it can and does delegate the carrying out of measures of enforcement, the
Council does not, and could not (without abrogating its constitutional respons-
ibilities), delegate the power to decide whether the particular situation, in the
light of all prevailing circumstances, justifies the use of force. Often resolutions
expressly indicate the Council’s intention to decide what measures should be
taken in the event of a breach but even where they do not this may be inferred
from the Council’s exclusive remit under the Charter.
It follows that where a state does not meet its obligations under Council
resolutions, there is no automatic right of other states to ‘enforce’ these obliga-
tions. The power to authorise enforcement resides in the Council itself, in
accordance with its powers and responsibilities under the Charter, and not
with member states.175 An attempt to justify force on this basis would fall
foul of the international law it purports to uphold.
5A.2.2.3 Veto power and the ‘failure’ of the Council to act
The voting system adopted in the Charter was intended to ensure political
balance, with the safeguards against overuse implicit in the exceptional powers
171 By contrast, note the absence of such language in the post-September 11 resolutions,
confimed by the general reference to self defence in the first post 9/11 resolution 1368.
172 This is sometimes referred to as the ‘automaticity’ question.
173 The fact that SC Res. 1368 (2001), note 117, is framed as against ‘terrorism’ in general, rather
than any particular situation, provides an additional reason why the resolution could not
be interpreted as authorising force consistently with the UN Charter.
174 See the discussion of attempts to rely on authorisation given in the context of the invasion
of Kuwait to justify force against Iraq in a quite different context, para 5B.
175 Article 39, Article 42.
250 Chapter 5
vested in the Council.176 In other words, it was never meant to be easy to
get Council approval to use force under the Charter system. This system, and
the veto power in particular, has been subject to criticism since its in-
ception,177 with criticism harshest and most justified during the Security
Council inertia of the Cold War era.178 But such stagnation is distinct from
a scenario where diplomacy fails and a functioning Council cannot agree,179
or the Council never being approached in the first place.180 Despite the veto,
which the US now invokes more than any other permanent member, and
despite controversial refusals to authorize force, such as in light of the crisis
in Syria of 2011-12,181 numerous resolutions have been passed in recent years,
including authorising the use of force, raising the potential for robust Council
engagement. It may be that the limitations in the Council role to date, and
concerns regarding unilateral resort to force in recent years, have contributed
to greater emphasis on the need to reform and improve the UN system for
collective security.182
Council authorisation remains a sine qua non for the legitimate resort to
force other than in self defence. It is worthy of emphasis, in conclusion, that
the obligation on states is not to give the Council a first opportunity to
176 A Security Council resolution is passed by a majority of states sitting on the Council voting
in its favour, absent the use of the veto by one of the Council’s five permanent members.
The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russia, the UK
and the U.S.
177 Certain non-permanent members have long challenged the legitimacy of the veto power,
while some contend that the Council, as envisaged at its inception, has essentially failed.
Franck, Recourse to Force, note 11, p. 52.Many others, while acknowledging its imperfections,
support it as the only available system of collective security. See generally Cassese, Inter-
national Law, note 30, chapters 13 and 14, and Bothe, ‘Preemptive Force’, note 74.
178 See e.g. ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution, above. The rationale is that while the Council has
primary responsibility for international peace and security under the Charter, the General
Assembly can assume ‘secondary’ responsibility where the Council is paralysed. See Certain
Expenses case, pp. 164-5 and 168. A presumption was that action taken by the UN for the
fulfilment of one of the UN Charter’s purposes was not ultra vires.
179 The secondary General Assembly ‘powers’ have not however been invoked for decades..
180 See 5B.1 on Afghanistan, where Operation Enduring Freedom continues for over a decade
without seeking SC approval, or also B.2, where approval has not been sought.
181 The refusal of the Council to authorize measures such as sanctions or indeed the use of
force in Syria in 2012 on has provoked much controversy. See, e.g., ‘Friction at the UN as
Russia and China veto another Resolution on Syrian Sanctions’, New York Times, 19 July
2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-
china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html Syria and Russia describe the violence as the
state’s response to acts of ‘terorism’ in Syria. See, e.g., ‘Russia says US tries to Justify
Terrorism in Syria’, Reuters, 25 July 2012.
182 Among many documents and proposals for Council reform see, e.g., ‘In Larger Freedom’,
report of 2005, UN Doc A/59/2005; and ‘Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the
General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’, 19 Septem-
ber 2012. UN Doc A/67/L.1, para. 35. See also ‘Hoping to Bring Security Council in Line
with Contemporary Realitites, Speakers in Open Debate Urge Members to Unblock Resist-
ance to Reform’ Security Council 60870th Meeting, (UN Doc. SC/1083).
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authorise force, before themselves proceeding unilaterally, but to refrain from
the use of force unless or until such authorisation is achieved.
5A.3 OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE? THE LAUDABLE AIMS AND
DOUBTFUL LAWFULNESS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OR ‘FORCE TO
ENFORCE’
As noted above, the UN Charter contains a prohibition on the use of force by
states, and one explicit exception thereto in the case of self defence. The starting
point for assessing any other purported legal justification of potential relevance
to the use of force post September 11, is their incompatibility with the plain
wording of the Charter. Their validity depends essentially on the establishment
of a compelling argument that a pre-existing customary rule continues to exist
post Charter, or that a new customary rule has developed alongside the
Charter.183
The reluctance on the part of the majority of states as regards the develop-
ment of customary international law that would extend or dilute exceptions
to the prohibition on the use force might be explained in the following words
of a Swedish delegate to the Security Council:
The charter does not authorise any exception to this [Article 2(4)] rule except for
the right of self defence. This is no coincidence or oversight. Any formal exceptions
permitting the use of force or military interventions in order to achieve other aims,
however laudable, would be bound to be abused, especially by the big and strong,
and to pose a threat, especially to the small and weak.184
Unlike self defence or Security Council authorisation, the justifications dis-
cussed in this section were not invoked directly by states resorting to force
post September 11 and as such cannot constitute legal justifications for action
taken. However, as they were alluded to alongside the legal justifications
discussed elsewhere in the chapter in the context of the use of force in response
to terrorism post 9/11, their relevance in legal terms deserves brief considera-
tion.
183 As will be discussed, attempts to interpret Article 2(4) as itself consistent with other
justifications for resort to force have been broadly discredited. It is noted that there is
however only limited scope for the development of customary law rules that are inconsistent
on their face with the provisions of the Charter. See Gray, International Law and the Use of
Force, note 24.
184 Swedish representative to the Security Council debate on Entebbe incident involving use
of force by Israel against hijackers in Uganda, SC 1940th meeting, in Chesterman, Just War
or Just Peace, note 130, p. 26.
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5A.3.1 Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect ‘R2P’
Proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention assert that inter-
national law allows states, in exceptional circumstances, to intervene militarily
to avert ‘grave humanitarian crisis’185 or ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.186 More
recently, a broader discussion on the developing notion of the international
community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ (‘R2P’) has emerged and is sometimes
cited as comprising the right (or rather the responsibility) to use force to
prevent mass atrocities.187
A crucial distinction must however be drawn between the controversial
assertion of the right of humanitarian or protective intervention by states,
acting individually or in coalitions, and the power of the Security Council to
authorise military force on humanitarian grounds. As noted above, the Security
Council has the power to authorise enforcement measures it deems necessary
pursuant to international peace and security, which has been interpreted by
the Council as encompassing prevention of humanitarian crisis.188 This is
reinforced by the ‘R2P’ doctrine, which is explicit in respect of the Council’s
role in authorizing force.189
185 UK justification in Iraq no-fly zones, 26 February 2001, House of Commons Hansard
Debates, in Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarisation’, note 129, at 9.
186 See for example W.M. Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Charter Article
2(4)’, 78 (1984) AJIL 64; F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality,
2nd ed. (New York, 1997). For a detailed critique of these theories, and others, see, in
general, Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130.
187 On R2P, see ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001 (hereinafter ‘R2P Report 2001’), available
at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), paras. 199-209, available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/
report2.pdf ; UN GA Res. of 7 October 2009 on the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/
RES/63/308 (2009). See e.g., Brunnee, Jutta and Toope, Stephen J., The Responsibility to
Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality? (February 11, 2010). Global Responsibility
to Protect, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551296 acknowledges
controversy with ‘humanitarian intervention,’ p. VII, and presenting a much more limited
proposal regarding use of force.
188 The Council authorised coercive measures under Chapter VII against apartheid in South
Africa and white minority rule in Rhodesia (SC Res. 232 (1966), note 136), to end non-
international armed conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SC Res. 713 (1991), note 136) and
Somalia (SC Res. 794 (1992), note 136), and to protect civilians from crimes against humanity
in Libya (SC Res. 1973 (2011), note 121). In practice such crises have usually been accom-
panied by an ‘international’ element, such as refugee influx or the prospect of other states
becoming drawn into conflict.
189 E.g. Sumnmit Outcome Document, para 239. R2P acknowledges the primary role of the
Security Council but leaves open the possibility that other organsations, the GA or regional
organizations, fill the role if the Council cannot. As described by Nicholas Tsagourias, R2P
endorses the aims behind humanitarian intervention while ‘removing the rather charged
language of intervention, and by dressing the action in institutional cloths.’ N. Tsagourias,
‘Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime’, 41 (2010) Netherlands Yearbook of
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Different questions arise in respect of the right of states acting without
Council authorisation. As noted above, there is, at a minimum, a ‘heavy burden
of proof – an obligation to rebut a solid negative presumption’on those who
seek to justify recourse to force on these grounds.190 Yet state practice in
support of the emergence of a customary law right to use unilateral force
within the framework of – or alongside – the UN Charter remains scarce.191
While numerous interventions have involved a humanitarian element, such
as interventions by India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in
1978 and Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, the states involved relied primarily
on other, more traditional, forms of justification, such as self defence. A right
to intervene to avert humanitarian catastrophe was asserted by the United
Kingdom in the context of Northern Iraq in 1991,192 and again, most force-
fully, by some (but not all) of the states involved in the NATO intervention in
Kosovo in 1999.193 The Kosovo intervention is often cited by proponents of
humanitarian intervention, but it is noteworthy that many of the states
involved relied principally on other justifications, such as Security Council
support, as the legal basis of the campaign.194 The same was true of the inter-
ventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), discussed later.195 The lack
of state practice in support of a right to intervene pursuant to the much dis-
cussed ‘R2P’ (including the failure of states to intervene in Darfur or Syria)
is even more pronounced.196
International Law, p. 25. See ‘R2P Report 2001’, note 187.
190 Franck, Recourse to Force, note 11, p. 151.
191 ‘In the past five years, more than 133 states (representing approximately 80 percent of the
world’s population) have issued individual or joint statements rejecting the legalization
of [humanitarian intervention]... . The weight of academic opinion is also against it.’ R.
Goodman, ‘Humaniatarian Intervention and Pretexts for War,’ 100 (2006) AJIL 107, p. 108.
Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 57-9.
192 Statement of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reported in Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 36-7.
193 Statement of United Kingdom to the Security Council, justifying ‘an exceptional measure
to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,’ SCOR 3988th meeting, 24 March
1999 at 12. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 42-3 notes that only the
Netherlands and the UK asserted that the action was a legal (as opposed to moral) response
to a humanitarian catastrophe.
194 Numerous states relied on the fact that the action supported the Security Council’s objectives
for Kosovo, despite the absence of authorisation for military action. See e.g. White House
statement in S. Murphy, ‘Legal Regulation of the Use of Force’, 93 (1999) AJIL 628, at 631.
On the arguments of states before the ICJ, noting that only Belgium argued humanitarian
intervention, see Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130, p. 46.
195 See Section B.2.1.6.
196 The principles of R2P appeared to have some effect in Libya, where the Council authorised
force, but not in Syria. While not definitive, as states may chose not to exercise the right
for various reasons, there is little apparent basis in state practice to indicate support for
a unilateral right (or collective right, outwith the UN system) to use force pursuant to R2P.
The dearth of state practice on R2P undercuts any assertion of a legal norm having emerged
in relation to the use of force. See e.g. Brunee and Toope, note 187, p. 17. See discussion
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While there is much dispute on what the law should provide for, even
among those who support such intervention in principle, there are relatively
few who assert the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention under
current international law;197 this is exemplified by it being described on occa-
sion as a ‘situation precluding wrongfulness’ rather than as a lawful basis for
resort to force in international law.198 Likewise, several independent enquiries
in the wake of the Kosovo intervention found it to have been illegal but
morally justifiable, and called for the elaboration of new legal guidelines in
this area.199 However, the ambivalence of many is reflected in the fact that
just as humanitarian or protective grounds have not been invoked frequently
by states as a legal justification for action, nor has intervention in circumstances
where the motivation was – at least in part – humanitarian met with consistent
condemnation from states or the Security Council.200
As so few states have asserted a legal right to intervene on these grounds,
it follows that the parameters of the concepts remain undeveloped. The UK
– seen to be an advocate of a right to humanitarian intervention in the Iraq
and Kosovo contexts201 – justified as lawful intervention occurring only in
the following certain exceptional circumstances:
“Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In these circum-
stances and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian
necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now proposed is
‘The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility
to Protect, D Akande, ejiltalk, 28 August 2013.
197 See Fourth Report of the Forth Foreign Affairs Committee, 1999-2000, at www.parlia-
ment.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm1999/28/2802.htm, inquiring into, inter alia, the
lawfulness of the Kosovo intervention, which noted that the ‘sternest critic’ as well as the
‘firmest supporter’ of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (referring to Professors Brownlie
and Greenwood, respectively) agreed that ‘the provisions of the UN Charter were not
complied with’.
198 Advisory Council on International Affairs, Failing States: A Global Responsibility, Advisory
Report No. 35, May 2004, p. 59 (hereinafter Dutch AIV Report 2004).
199 See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, Inter-
national Response, Lessons Learned 164 (2000). See also Foreign Affairs Committee Kosovo
Report, para. 138, ‘we conclude that NATO’S military action, if of dubious legality in the
current state of international law, was justified on moral grounds’. See also Dutch AIV Report
2004, note 198.
200 Absence of condemnation may be a principal measure of state practice and opinio juris,
but not necessarily so: see Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 21. It has
also been pointed out that lack of response may evidence the common inadequacy of
enforcement of international law, rather than an endorsement of the legality of humanitarian
intervention. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130.
201 This was a reversal of its previous view that such intervention was ‘at best not unam-
biguously illegal’ (see the internal document of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
cited in Chesterman, ibid., p. 2).
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directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum
judged necessary for that purpose”.202
Academic proponents of the development of the law on humanitarian interven-
tion have suggested different prospective formulae, including for example the
addition of a requirement that execution be by a ‘multinational force’.203 As
regards R2P, the newer incarnation proposes to focus more narrowly on the
protection against genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic
cleansing, and as noted above recognises the importance of collective or
institutional rather than unilateral action.
The issue of the use of force for humanitarian protective purposes is
extremely sensitive, lying as it does at the heart of the twin objectives of the
UN Charter to prohibit the use of force and to protect humanity.204 While
States can and should take measures to ensure respect for human rights and
prevent crimes under international law,205 ICJ’s statement that “the use of
force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect”
appears to remain valid as a statement of law.206 Likewise, as discussed at
Chapter 3, the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility
preclude the use of force as a counter measure against international
wrongs.207 Rather, it would appear to remain the exclusive remit of the UN
Security Council to legitimise coercive measures, other than in self defence,
‘whatever be the present defects in international organisation’.208
It is noted that some writers have also asserted a right to pro-democratic
intervention, closely associated with but separate from the notion of human-
itarian intervention.209 The assertion of this exception to the use of force
202 Statement by the UK representative to the Security Council, S/PV 3988 (1999) 12, in Chester-
man, Just War or Just Peace, note 130, p. 212. On the grounds put forward in relation to
Iraq, see Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 37.
203 Recommendations of Professor Vaughan Lowe, in Foreign Affairs Committee Kosovo Report,
p. 369. For other academics’ proposed guidelines see R.B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations (Charlottesville, 1973); Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, note 198.
204 See Article 2(3) (on human rights) and Article 2(4), UN Charter. Note however that the
statement of Russia before the Security Council in the context of the Kosovo debate ques-
tioned whether ‘the unilateral use of force will lead precisely to a situation with truly
devastating humanitarian consequences’, SCOR (LIV) 3988th meeting, at 2-3 in Franck,
Recourse to Force, note 11, pp. 167-8.
205 See Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC’s Articles on States Responsibility regarding the collective
responsibility for serious breaches of international obligations, including human rights,
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7.
206 See Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 35.
207 ILC’s Articles, Article 50.
208 Corfu Channel case, note 202, p. 29.
209 See Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self Determination’, note 186. Another manifestiation is ‘anti-
tyranny’ intervention, see A. D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response
to Tyranny’, 84 (1990) AJIL 516, Cf. M. Byers and S. Chesterman, ‘“You, the People”: Pro-
democratic Intervention in International Law’, in G.H. Fox and B.R. Roth, Democratic
Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 259-292. On democracy
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suffers from all of the difficulties of humanitarian or protective intervention,
discussed above, aggravated by the assertion of a substantially lower threshold
for intervention, and finds no real support in legal doctrine or state
practice.210 As one commentator notes, ‘if taken literally such a rule would
render up to a third of the world’s states susceptible to intervention on this
basis. More realistically, it opens the way to selective application of a principle
that is prone to abuse.’211 The unilateral use of force on such grounds must
again be distinguished from the role of the Security Council. Yet as noted
above even the Council has been reticent to authorise forceful measures to
remove one government (whatever its political complexion or indeed human
rights record) and replace it with another in the name of international peace
and security.212
In summary, although the issue remains controversial, it is doubtful that
the heavy burden of establishing a customary right of forceful intervention
on humanitarian grounds has been discharged.213 Momentum around the
notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is, however, gaining ground and the
law may yet shift to accommodate such an exception to prevent imminent
humanitarian crisis in the future.214 It remains to be seen whether coherent
rules, and procedural and evidentiary safeguards against abuse, can be
elaborated, and the issue is likely, once again, to revert to questions regarding
the role of a collective security mechanism.
Finally, while an exception on such humanitarian grounds could conceiv-
ably cover the aversion of extremely serious acts of terrorism, this would arise
only in extremely rare situations. One can readily envisage, however, that
should such a norm develop in the future, it would be invoked in justification
as a human right, see, in general, J. Crawford, ‘Democracy and International Law’, 93 44
(1993) BYIL 113.
210 While the United States is cited as relying on it (among other grounds) in Grenada, it
expressly distanced itself from such a claim in its 1989 invasion of Panama; Statement of
the United States to the Security Council, S/PV 2902, reported in Gray, International Law
and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 57.
211 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130, p. 90.
212 The sole example of it having done so was Haiti, where the Security Council, emphasising
the ‘unique character of the present situation in Haiti’ authorised the use of force to remove
the military junta that had overthrown the first democratically elected government, and
to return the ousted President Aristide. As noted, there is controversy as to whether this
was what the Council authorized in relation to the Libya intervention, even if this was
the result. See Chapter 5A.2.2.
213 This militates strongly against its legality as discussed in Gray, International Law and the
Use of Force, note 24, p. 24 referring to the ICJ in the Nicaragua case: ‘[F]or the Court the
fact that states did not claim a new right of intervention was a decisive factor in the rejection
of the emergence of any customary law right.’
214 It is noted that states resorting to use of force post September 11, including the erstwhile
foremost proponent of the humanitarian justification, the UK, while emphasising the
humanitarian element to the military approach, have not sought to rely on humanitarian
intervention as a legal justification.
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for the use of force against terrorism, just as the one permissible basis for
unilateral force that currently exists, self defence is at present.215
5A.3.2 Breakdown in international enforcement?
A question of potential relevance to some of the justifications for use of force
made in the context of counter-terrorism is whether a state is entitled to resort
to force where another state unlawfully violates its essential interests, and the
international enforcement machinery contemplated in the UN Charter fails.
It has aptly been described as an argument of ‘some moral force’ that an
aggrieved state should be able to enforce its own rights where the ‘source of
the right’ does not do so.216 Flying, as it does, in the face of the clear prohi-
bition in Article 2(4) and the foundations of the collective security system
established in the UN Charter, a particularly heavy onus would lie on the
proponent of such a view.
However, while states will often invoke non-compliance to bolster the
perceived justice of their use of force, state practice in support of ‘self help’
as a legal justification (as opposed to a factor mitigating the culpability of
illegal resort to force) is again limited.217 The ICJ in the Corfu Channel case
noted that Albania had violated its international obligations but found that,
while this was an extenuating circumstance, it did not justify recourse to
force.218 Likewise, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State
responsibility, while recognising that counter measures against another state
that has violated its obligations are permitted, make clear that such measures
‘shall not affect ... the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force
contained in the UN Charter’.219 While a state may, in the face of violations,
take measures of ‘self help’, under the current system of international law these
do not include resort to force.
The failure of states to meet international obligations, for example to hold
to account those responsible for terrorism, may be relevant to an assessment
of aspects of the self defence test, notably the necessity test that requires that
215 On overuse of self defence, see, e.g., Part 5B. Note that elements of humanitarian arguments
accompanied the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, without full-blown humanitarian
intervention being invoked. See the discussion of the legitimacy of the idea of force to
enforce in the Report of the Dutch Committee of Inquiry into the war in Iraq, NLIR 2010,
supra note 198.
216 See Franck, Recourse to Force, note 11 p. 109, where he opines that the protracted failure
of the UN to redress an egregious wrong may give rise to a limited right of self help.
217 In the post 9/11 practice explored at Part B, failure to meet international duties in respect
of terrorism has been invoked in most debates around the legitimacy of certain responses.
218 Corfu Channel case, note 202, p. 35. See also Nicaragua case, note 15, para. 202, on the general
principle of non-intervention. See also Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130, p. 54.
219 Article 50, ILC’s Articles.
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the use of force be a last resort.220 But beyond self defence, the assertion of
a right of unilateral law enforcement ‘bears no relation to the text of Article
2(4) and establishes no limits on which rights may be vindicated or by
whom’.221 Enforcement of international law has always been and remains
a predominant Achilles heel in the international legal system.222 If its in-
adequacies, and those of the Security Council veto system in particular, could
be relied upon to justify unilateral force it may represent the unraveling of
the prohibition on the use of force and the collective fabric of the UN Charter.
5A.3.3 Hot Pursuit?
Finally, it has occasionally been suggested that cross border incursions against
terrorists can be justified on grounds of ‘hot pursuit’.223 This reflects a mis-
application of a doctrine applicable to the law of the sea, which ‘involves no
violation of territorial sovereignty,’ to unlawful cross border incursions which
do.224 Despite misunderstandings in this respect, there is little support in
practice or doctrine for an exception to the prohibition on the use of force on
these grounds.225
5A.4 FAILED AND FAILING STATES AND THE USE OF FORCE
Growing attention has been dedicated in recent years to the related pheno-
menon of failed and failing states. State failure undoubtedly has serious
implications for human beings and for the international legal order.226 Con-
220 See discussion of the unwillingness and inability of states to address threats of terrorism
as a basis for action in B.2.1. later in this chapter. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence,
note 36, at 247, referring to self defence where the state is unwilling and unable as ‘extra-
territorial law enforcement’ and Schmitt, ‘Transnational Terrorism’, note 36 at 27, emphasis-
ing that self defence against non-state actors necessarily involves breaches of states’ duties.
221 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, note 130, p. 56, referring to the theory of ‘self help’,
in support of humanitarian intervention, put forward by Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self
Determination’, note 186.
222 On advances to improve enforcement of international criminal law post 9/11 see Chapter 4B.
223 See justifications by Turkey for incursions in in Northern Iraq at 5B.5 below.
224 Oppenheim’s International Law, p. 387 on the distinction.
225 Oppenheim, ibid., Dinstein, note 66 p.176, Lubell, ‘Extra-Territorial Use of Force, Chapter 3.
226 The issue is not new, but has been given renewed emphasis in part due to the link to the
‘war on terror’. See, e.g., G. Helman and S. Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign Policy,
1992-1993, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_
states. They note that ‘From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia
in Europe, from Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a
disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of
sustaining itself as a member of the international community.’ For a discussion of the issue
and its implications, see, e.g., Dutch AIV Report 2004, note 198; J. Piazza, ‘Incubators of
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cerns have often been expressed, not least by successive US administrations,
that such states provide staging or breeding grounds for terrorism.227 One
of the questions that arises is the relevance of the failed or failing nature of
states to the law on the use of force against terrorism in those states.228
On one level, the question that arises is whether interventions in a failed
state with no government to protect borders or exert sovereignty can be said
to be in violation of Article 2(4) at all. The basic international legal principle
is, however, that the state (not the government) is the legal entity that bears
rights, and continues to do so even after governments may fail. As such, to
equate loss of sovereignty with loss of government, still less with weak govern-
ment, finds little support as an argument of law.
On the current state of law and practice, there is also no separate exception
justifying the use of force in failed or failing states. Rather, the failed or failing
nature of states may be relevant to an assessment of facts relevant to deter-
mining the lawfulness of force under one of the established exceptions in
international law.
Firstly, the Security Council may well consider the failing nature of a state
as a relevant factor in determining both the existence of a threat to international
peace and security, and the necesssity of multilateral action in light of the lack
of the state’s own lack of capacity to act. The risk of terrorist attacks flourishing
unchecked in a failed state or, more strikingly, the human rights implications
that flow for the states own nationals of such a situation, may well provide
the basis for Council action.229 Were a broader right of protective intervention
on the part of states, beyond action by the Council, to develop in the future,
state failure may well be a factor that would contribute to an assessment of
the need for such intervention.
Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?’, 52 (2008) Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 469, available at: http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/
Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20States%20ISQ%202008.pdf.
227 Obama has emphasized addressing failed states on several occasions. See, e.g., discussion
that ‘[b]efore the American invasion, Afghanistan was a failed state whose government
did not provide for the security and needs of its people,’ providing ‘the perfect environment
in which al Qaeda could flourish’. ‘Increase Non-Military Aid to Afghanistan by $1 billion’,
available at: http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/CounterterrorismFactSheet.pdf. The Bush
Administration’s national security strategy highlights the problem of failed states. For
examples, see M. Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts: Redefinition of the Concept
of Terrorism Beyond Violent Acts, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) (hereinafter Indirect
Responsibility); questioning the empirical basis for this see A. Schmid, ‘Why Terrorism? Root
Causes, Some Empirical Findings, and the case of 9/11,’ in Lehto, ibid.
228 See, e.g., B. Dunlap, ‘State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror’, 27
(2004) Boston College International and Comparitive Law Review 453, available at: http://
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol27/iss2/9.
229 See, e.g., Haiti SC Res. 841 (1993), note 133, and Darfur SC Res. 1593 (2005), note 147, which
may have been examples of this. The Council does not treat states failure as a ground in
itself however. Dutch AIV Report 2004, note 209, p. 55.
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Notably, failure may also be relevant to an assessment of when the use
of force is permissible in self defence against terrorist groups. The assessment
that the territorial state out of which such groups may operate was not willing
or able to address the threat, while not determinative of the lawfulness of
defensive action (all criteria including imminence of an attack would need
to be satisfied), it may be an important factor pointing towards the necessity
of force and the lack of an alternative cooperative framework for addressing
the threat. So while it is not a separate ground for use of force, ‘in the case
of state failure, another circumstance that does warrant intervention may exist
at the same time’.230
In short, alternative justifications for the use of force have little support
in current international law. Reliance on self defence is, increasingly, the way
in which states justify unilateral force, whatever the true motivation and nature
of the operations. Sometimes this entails stretching the concept beyond it’s
natural elasticity and raising questions about the distortion of the exception
and its effect. This is particularly apparent in practice in relation to the use
of force post 9/11 to which we now turn.
5B THE USE OF FORCE POST 9/11
In the immediate wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States
committed itself to a sustained ‘war on terror’,231 a significant component
of which has involved the use of force by the United States, and on occasion
its allies, abroad. It began with the large scale military interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq,232 and has continued with the use of lethal force
against suspected terrirorists in other states, with strikes to date at least in
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, with the potential for further expansion.The
latter is the latest manifestation of a policy of preventive – or pre-emptive –
force against terrorist threats, which was advanced most radically in the United
States National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 and which continues in
practice in somewhat modified form.233
230 Dutch AIV Report 2004, note 198, p. 67.
231 See Address of the U.S. President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People, 20 September 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. The categorisation of this as a ‘war’ is discussed in
Chapter 6B1.
232 The U.S. military campaign against Iraq (‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’) and the parallel British
military operation (‘Operation Telic’) began on 19 March 2003.
233 See inter alia US National Security Strategies, below Chapter 5B.3; speeches from President
Bush, State of the Union speech to joint session of Congress, Jan 29, 2002 and more recently
President Obama, Speech on US drones and counter-terrorism policy, 23 May 2013, Chap-
ter5B2. On the ‘war on al Qaeda and associated groups’ and IHL see Chapter 6B.1.1.
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Multiple questions arise regarding the application of the legal framework
set out in the preceding section of this chapter. This section seeks to highlight
some of those questions considered to be of particular significance to an
assessment of the lawfulness of the use of force employed since September
11, while highlighting areas of potential development of the law in this field.
5B.1 AFGHANISTAN
The military intervention in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001 and con-
tinues to the present day.234 The legal justification for military action,
advanced by both the United States and its principal ally, the United Kingdom,
was self defence in response to 9/11 and in anticipation of a future attack.
Both states reported to the Security Council under Article 51. The US noted
that measures were taken as a response to the armed attacks of 9/11 and to
‘prevent and deter’ further attacks.235 The United Kingdom took a narrower
view, justifying the use of force in self defence ‘to avert the continuing threat
of attacks from the same source’ as the September 11 attacks.236 However,
when it came to the objectives of military action, these were presented, at
various points and in various guises, as attacking al-Qaeda training camps
and personnel, compelling the Taleban to hand over al-Qaeda suspects, and,
ultimately, toppling the Taleban regime.237
234 ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ began in the immediate aftermath of September 11, on 7
October 2001, and was not necessarily limited to operations in Afghanistan. It has involved
the U.S. and several allies. A UN authorized force, ISAF, was established in 2002 to assist
the government, in the interests of international peace and security. However it is separate
from OEF which continues to operate alongside ISAF in the pursuit of Taleban and Al
Qaeda. For more detail see e.g. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 194.
235 See ‘Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN
SCOR, 56th Session, UN Doc. S/2001/946: ‘In response to these attacks, and in accordance
with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, United States armed forces
have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States
... We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organiza-
tions and other States.’
236 See ‘Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. S/2001/947 (2001): ‘These forces have
now been employed in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self defence,
recognized in Article 51, following the terrorist outrage of 11th September, to avert the
continuing threat of attacks from the same source.’
237 On the objectives of the campaign, see statement by the UK Prime Minister (‘Attack on
Afghanistan: Tony Blair statement’, CNN.com, 7 October 2001, at http://edition.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/10/07/gen.blair.speech). See also the report on the military objectives
of the campaign released by the British Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence, ‘Defeating
International Terrorism: Campaign Objectives’, available at http://www.operations.mod.uk/
veritas/faq/objectives.htm). Noting apparent inconsistencies between descriptions of
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The unprecedented unity following the September 11 attacks translated
into either open or tacit support for military action in Afghanistan.238 Many
states indicated their support for the campaign overtly, for example by allow-
ing their airspace to be used,239 or offering logistical support.240 There was
little state opposition expressed in respect of the military action, and the
validity of the legal justifications proffered appeared to almost go unquestioned
behind expressions of condolence and sympathy with the US.241 At first,
critical appraisal of the lawfulness of the Afghan intervention from academics
and civil society was also extremely cautious and hesitant; considerably more
such criticism has emerged as some distance is gained from the autumn of
2001.242
State reactions to the use of force in Afghanistan, as elsewhere, are relevant
to an assessment of the lawfulness of the use of force in that context. They
may also potentially, be relevant to an assessment of the development of the
law. One incident itself rarely changes the law, particularly if it conflicts with
an established rule, and the events in question must be seen in the context
of how similar situations were addressed in the past and in particular whether
they are replicated in the future. While there are differences of views as to
the extent to which the Afghanistan intervention had a ‘radical and lasting
transformative effect on the law of self defence,’243 as will be seen there are
campaign objectives advanced at different times, see, e.g., V. Lowe, ‘The Iraq Crisis: What
Now?’, 52 (2003) ICLQ 859 at 860.
238 S. Ratner, ‘Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11’, 96 (2002) AJIL 905, at 910,
citing the only questions concerning legality as having come from North Korea, Sudan,
Iraq, Cuba, Malaysia, and Iran. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 193,
citing China, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan among others as having supported the interven-
tion.
239 E.g., Greece and Turkey. See House of Commons Research Paper 01/72, ‘September 11:
The Response’, 31 October 2001, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/
research/rp2001/rp01-072.pdf (hereinafter ‘House of Commons Research Paper 01/72’),
p. 28.
240 Japan pledged logistical support. See House of Commons Research Paper 01/72, note 239,
p. 29-30.
241 Even the Islamic conference communiqué of 11 October 2001 was notably silent on the
U.S. bombardment, while stating that ‘We have endorsed a global consensus and condem-
nation of terrorist acts, condolence and sympathy with the United States and a commitment
to eradication of international terrorism.’ See ‘Islamic Leaders condemn terrorism’, CNN.com,
11 October 2001, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/10/11/
gen.qatar.oic. Iran was among the few states opposed to the intervention (‘Islamic Leaders
Condemn Terrorism’, ibid.)
242 See, e.g., Myjer and White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack’, note 87; J. Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force
against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond’, 35 (2002) Cornell International Law Journal
533, who criticise the lawfulness of the intervention as it unfolded against the Taleban as
well as al-Qaeda. See also S. Kapferer, ‘Ends and Means in Politics: International Law as
Framework for Political Decision Making’, 15 (2002) Revue québéquoise de droit international
101. Tams, ‘Use of Force Against Terrorists’ supra note 50 p. 391.
243 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 194.
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grounds to consider that it was instrumental in contributing to a legal shift
at least in respect of certain aspects of the law of self defence.
5B.1.1 Key questions arising
The questions arising as relevant to the lawfulness of the use of force in
Afghanistan, addressed in this section, relate principally to whether the right
of self defence was triggered and the requirements of necessity and
proportionality met. Specific questions include the following: could the use
of force in self defence be justified where al-Qaeda, as opposed to the state
of Afghanistan, was considered responsible for the September 11 attacks; could
regime change be justified in these circumstances; was Afghanistan a case of
justifiable anticipatory self defence;244 was the use of force a last resort and
did the states involved discharge the burden of so demonstrating; what rel-
evance should be attached to the failure to engage the Security Council to take
the necessary measures, in preference for prolonged reliance on self defence?
5B.1.1.1 Armed Attack by a Terrorist Group: Dispensing with the State responsibility
requirement?
Among the key legal issues of relevance to the lawfulness of the intervention
is whether self defence could justify the use of force in Afghanistan in response
to ‘terrorist’ attacks by a non-state actor such as al-Qaeda. In other words,
where individuals, networks or organisations are responsible for an attack,
could self defence be used against them on the territory of another state, even
where their actions could not be attributed to that state?245
As set out above, while not uncontroversial, the dominant view (or at least
assumption) until the time of the 9/11 attacks was that armed attack occurred
at the hand of a state, with differences of view more commonly revolving
around the standard for attribution.246 It was notable, then, that while
multiple allegations were lodged against the Taleban,247 the case for its legal
244 As this issue was not controversial in relation to Afghanistan but came into sharp focus
in relation to Iraq, anticipatory self defence in Afghanistan is considered at Section 5.B.2.
245 There can be little doubt that the events of 9/11 met other ‘armed attack’ criteria relating
to scale and intensity threshold (see A.2.1); the focus here is on authorship and the status
of actors as the controversial issue.
246 See Part A.2.1; cf US and Israel’s more isolated positions pre 9/11.
247 There were various references to the Taleban having ‘harboured’, ‘supported’ or ‘protected’
al-Qaeda (UK letter to the Security Council, statements by U.S. President and NATO
Secretary General, discussed at Chapter 2) but not to the regime having been legally
responsible for the attacks. See, e.g., the statement made on 7 October 2001 by the UK Prime
Minister (note 237): ‘There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has
been through all the available evidence, including intelligence material, that these attacks
were carried out by the al Qaeda network headed by Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear
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responsibility for the September 11 attacks was never made out in terms by
the states seeking to engage in military action in Afghanistan.248 From
information publicly available, it is open to question whether the Taleban
regime had the power and authority in respect of al-Qaeda to satisfy the degree
of control required for the acts of private entities to be legally attributed to
it. This is a question of fact, the onus of proof in respect of which would
normally rest with those seeking to establish responsibility, but intervening
states in Afghanistan declined to do so. No evidence of the regime’s ‘control’
over al-Qaeda, nor clarity as to the other allegations against the regime (and
legal consequences thereof), was advanced.
The September 11 attacks were nonetheless broadly characterised – in-
cluding, in their immediate aftermath, by the Security Council,249 NATO250
and other bodies251 – as amounting to ‘armed attacks’ for the purposes of
self defence. On one view these statements, and the conduct of at least some
intervening states, could conceivably have been based on assumptions as to
the responsibility of Afghanistan, consistent with state responsibility being
a prerequisite of the law of self defence.252 But on another view the accept-
ance of the right to self defence as arising in response to the September 11
attacks, absent assertions of state responsibility, strengthens the case that such
responsibility was not (or no longer) a prerequisite for self defence under
Article 51, at least in the peculiar circumstances of Afghanistan.253
While perhaps not dispositive, the Afghan intervention and reactions
thereto did appear to tilt the balance away from the necessity of a state re-
that they are harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan. ...We
have set the objective to pursue those responsible for the attacks, to eradicate bin Laden’s
network of terrorism and to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring him.’
248 Acts of private individuals become attributable to the state where the latter exercises
‘effective control’ over the conduct of the former; the Taliban may also be responsible for
‘indirect aggression’ where it has ‘substantial involvement’ in the activities of al-Qaeda.
For more detail on applicable standards, see Chapter 3.
249 Resolution 1368 (2001), recognised the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,
implicitly accepting that that terrorist attacks addressed in the Resolution constituted
‘armed attacks’ under Article 51.
250 NATO press release (2001) 124.
251 NATO, OAS, EU and others organisations also affirmed the right of self defence. See C. Gray
‘The US National Security Strategy and the New “Bush Doctrine” on Pre-emptive Self-
Defence’, (2002) 1 Chinese Journal of International Law 437, p. 441.
252 By noting that force would be used against ‘the same source’ as the September 11 attacks,
while identifying the Taleban as one of the objectives of the military intervention, the UK’s
position could be interpreted as having been premised on an assumption that the test had
been satisfied. (See however C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the “War against
Terrorism”’, note 53, at 303, noting that no such allegations of responsibility were made).
See L. Sadat, ‘Terrorism and the Rule of Law’, note 53,at 150.
253 See Greenwood, ‘War against Terrorism’, ibid. See Gray, International Law and the Use of
Force, note 24, p. 208 on the peculiar circumstances and the view of some that Afghanistan
may be seen as a ‘one-off’ situation. Cf Tams, ‘The Use of Force’, note 50. See also conclu-
sions in this chapter and Chapter 12.
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sponsibility nexus.254 As noted in Part A, this apparent shift was swiftly
countered by a subsequent ICJ opinion, however, reasserting the traditional
view that self defence arises in response to an attack by or on behalf of a
state,255 though as noted in the legal framework section a subsequent ICJ
decision was more equivocal.256
Subsequent state practice showed that the approach adopted vis-à-vis
Afghanistan was not an aberration. Perhaps the clearest example is the Turkish
incursion into Northern Iraq in 2008, to combat ‘terrorism’ and those that ‘help
or harbor terrorists.’ State responses did not indicate opposition, in principle,
to the use of force against armed groups as a violation of Article 2(4).257
Another example relates to the Hezbollah attacks that prompted Israeli in-
cursions into Lebanese territory in 2006; Israel was condemned for the lack
of proportionality of the attacks, but not for using force and invoking self
defence against a non-state group (although some of Israel’s statements held
Lebanon responsible for the attacks).258 Just as with ‘Operation Enduring
Freedom’ in Afghanistan, the question of attribution does not appear to have
been treated as a defining question in these situations. The non-state actor
issuewas not a significant feature of debate on the legality of subsequent cross
border capture operations.259
While there is still controversy, and room for alternative interpretations
of practice, the weight of commentary supports the view that clear cut attri-
bution is no longer a pre-requisite to trigger resort to self defence.260 It would
seem that widespread references to the right to ‘self defence’ post 9/11, in-
cluding by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, represented or con-
254 As noted in this Chapter 5B.4 this development will have to be assessed in context, in light
of subsequent approaches to other similar situations.
255 Wall Advisory Opinion, note 36, para. 139, discussed at Section 5.A.2.1.1.(ii).
256 Armed Activities case, note 18. See section A.5A211(a)(i)
257 Other states appear to have been broadly supportive and even the criticism was couched
in terms of the use of force as ‘not the best response. The territorial integrity of Iraq is for
us very important,’ rather than as unlawful. Foss, supra note 58, at 28-31, Tams, ‘The Use
of Force’, note 63, p. 380.
258 S.C. Res. 1701 (2006), 11 August 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006). See, e.g., Secretary
General Press Release UN Doc. SG/SM/10570, SC8791, 20 July 2006, and discussion of
states’ positions in Security Council discussions. Foss, ibid., at 26. Statement of G8 noting
Israel was ‘exercising the right to defend itself ...’. Many condemned the lack of proportion-
ality rather than the use of force per se. See, e.g., Foss, ibid., at 25-28, Tams, ‘The Use of
Force’, note 63, at 379.
259 Chapter 9 on the Bin Laden operation and e.g. the U.S. intervention in Libya in 2013 to
capture suspected terrorist al Libi who was taken to stand trial in a U.S. court: ‘Captured
in Libya, 1998 Bombing Suspect Pleads Not Guilty in a Manhattan Court’, NY Times, 13
Oct 2013.
260 Leiden Recommendations, note 59, para. 38. ‘Chatham House Principles’, note 36; Wilms-
hurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69; Tams, ‘Use of Force’, supra note 50, p. 381;
Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida,
and Iraq’, note 87.
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tributed to a shift in the law.261 The question of attribution is no longer con-
sidered an essential, though it may yet be relevant to other questions, including
the permissible scope of action in self defence, addressed later in this chapter.
There is some question whether states simply dispensed with the need
for a state nexus in Afghanistan, or whether they might have been endorsing
a lower standard than the traditional ‘effective control’ test for attributing
conduct to the state.262 A shift in standards of attribution may have broader
implications for the international legal framework, including finding states
responsible for a broader range of private actors, which states may not be
willing to embrace.263 It may be that a loosening of the law on self defence
has found favour over a rewriting of the laws on state responsibility.264
It is noteworthy, however, that while the reactions of states and com-
mentators supportive of the use of force in Afghanistan, noted above, seemed
to suggest there is no state responsibility requirement, they do appear to rest
on assumptions of some degree of ‘culpability’ on the part of the Afghanistan
de facto government. It is not however always apparent whether this is a legal
prerequisite (or factor rendering the operation more politically palatable), and
what precisely is the legal relevance of the various formulae put forward to
the effect that the Taleban had supported, harboured, protected, or provided
safe haven for terrorists265 or that it had ‘violated international law’ in its
relationship with al-Qaeda,266 or otherwise.267
The approach adopted in Afghanistan may have paved the way for, or
influenced, subsequent reliance on states having ‘harboured’ terrorists (the
Israeli allegation against Lebanon in 2006268) or been ‘unwilling or unable’
to address terrorist threats, as providing a basis for the use of force against
261 See, e.g., Greenwood, ‘War against Terrorism’, note 53. Like the Security Council, NATO,
the OAS, the EU and other international organisations also referred to the right of ‘self
defence’ shortly after 9/11.
262 On the assertion that the recognition of ‘self defence’ represents not a rejection of the state
responsibility requirement, but a lowering of the standard by which the conduct of indi-
viduals becomes attributable to the state see e.g. Jinks and Sassòli note 53.
263 See discussion in Chapter 3 on e.g. responsibility for terrorism and for private contractors,
often engaged in counterterrorist activity without the state being effectively accountable
for their actions.
264 Lehto, Indirect Responsibility, note 227 at 405, suggests that it ‘seems easier to accept a new
interpretation of the rules governing the use of force than to set aside the rules of attribu-
tion’.
265 For instances where these formulae were used, see Chapter 3. Note also that the U.S.
National Security Strategy commits the U.S. to holding to account ‘nations that are compro-
mised by terror’.
266 Greenwood, ‘War against Terrorism’, note 53, p. 313. See the rule against the use of force
being invoked as a remedy for violation of obligations, discussed earlier in this Chapter.
267 These wrongs, which were well established, may provoke a right and duty to take steps
against a regime, but do not provide a legal justification for using force and they were not
invoked as doing so.
268 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 234-5.
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them.269 A number of the questions that arose of relevance to state responses
to the Afghan intervention are therefore of broader significance in relation
to the use of force against al Qaeda (and other terrorist groups), addressed
in the following section.
While certain of the wrongs committed by the Taleban regime may well
have created rights and obligations on the part of the international community,
they appeared to fall short of amounting to state involvement in the armed
attack against another state, and created a dubious legal justification for the
use of force.270 The legal relevance, to the use of force, of a state having failed
in its obligations to prevent acts of terrorism was not made clear. Obvious
doubts related to lack of clarity as to the legal standards and by whom these
determinations could be safely and appropriately be judged.271
The introduction of notions of culpability may in practice be an attempt
to limit (at least a little) the circumstances in which such force can be used
on another state’s territory, rather than purporting to provide a legal justifica-
tion as such. Other interpretations of the law pursue a similar end, such as
the suggestion noted above that only ‘large scale’ attacks by non-state actors
should trigger the right to use force in self defence.272 There is clearly an
awareness of the potential practical and political implications of the removal
of the state responsibility link. If a mere territorial link between a state and
a responsible organisation were to be sufficient to justify use of force against
that state, might the states of ‘North America, South America, Europe, Africa,
the Middle East and across Asia’ which, according to reports, have terrorist
cells operating in their territories, be susceptible to attack?273
The drive to interpret self defence as allowing states to take necessary
measures while limiting the circumstances in which this might arise to avoid
overreach and ready resort to force is understandable. The multiple claims
by states to be using force against terrorists in recent years testify to the
importance of restraint. The contours of the concepts surrounding self defence
269 See B.2. below for the Obama administration’s reference to unwillingness or inability in
the context of self defence, or the more extreme position advanced by Jack Goldmsith,
former President Bush adviser, that the prohibition on force does not apply where a state
in ‘unable to unwilling’ to meet the threat itself.
270 On state responsibility and permissible action against wrongdoer states, see Chapter 3. As
noted in section 5A, the use of force is not justified as a counter-measure against wrong-
doing states, unless justified in self defence.
271 See Chapter 3 on State responsibility and the impermissibility of force as a counter-measure.
‘R2P’ reflects the role of the Security Council is making such determinations.
272 Leiden Recommendations, note 59, para. 39. See threshold discussion in 5A.2.1.1 of this
chapter.
273 ‘U.S. National Security Strategy’, note 251, p. 5. The direct planning of the September 11
attacks took place in several countries, but there is little suggestion that those states should
be vulnerable to attack from others defending against the global terrorist threat. Allegations
of failure to exercise due diligence are common in most such states at some point; see
Chapter 7A4.
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– whose stretching in recent years may have been followed by attempts to
shrink them back to a safer size – may need to continue to be defined and
clarified in the years ahead.
5B.1.1.2 Regime change as necessary and proportionate?
It may be accepted as compelling that the rationale of self defence requires
a state to be able to take necessary measures to defend itself against those
responsible for an imminent or on-going attack, whatever their status and
wherever their location, and irrespective of attribution. It may remain doubtful,
however, on what basis force can then be directed against the institutions of
a state, with a view to regime change, where that state has not been found,
or indeed alleged, to be responsible for the attack or the source of any on-going
or future attack.274 Questions as to the respect for the territorial integrity and
political independence of the state, reflected in Article 2(4) of the Charter, are
all the more pressing where force is used not only against private actors on
the state’s territory but against the institutions of the state itself, and particular-
ly with a view to bringing about a change in regime.
A key issue to arise in relation to the military intervention in Afghanistan
is therefore whether targeting institutions of the state, and regime change, was
a legitimate objective under the law of self defence, and specifically how it
measures up against the necessity and proportionality test? Where a state does
not exercise sufficient ‘control’ over the organisation’s conduct to be legally
responsible for it, in what circumstances, then, is the government’s removal
nonetheless strictly necessary and proportionate to avert the threat? A parti-
cularly heavy onus must lie on states seeking to rely on their own right of
self defence to remove another government, given the Charter’s fundamental
principle of sovereign equality and political independence, to demonstrate
the strict necessity of such measures.275
Despite statements by the UK that force would be directed against the ‘same
source’ as the September 11 attacks, the military intervention in Afghanistan
went beyond the targeting of al-Qaeda operations, to the removal of the
Taleban regime.276 However, the UK government was evidently uncomfortable
with the concept of regime change and sought carefully to restrict its justifica-
tion for the removal of the Taleban as necessary to destroy the al-Qaeda
274 For the purposes of necessity, brief incursions onto foreign territory to take particular
measures of defence, maybe distinguished from removal of a government.
275 Article 2(4) and 2(7) UN Charter.
276 See, e.g., Blair speech of 7 October 2001, note 237; The British Ministry of Defence (note
237) expressly stated that one of the immediate objectives of the so-called Operation Veritas
was to bring about ‘[a] sufficient change in the leadership to ensure that Afghanistan’s
links to international terrorism are broken ... where necessary taking political and military
action to fragment the present Taliban regime, including through support for Pushtoon
groups opposed to the regime as well as forces in the Northern Alliance’.
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network (even if, as noted above, it did not then clarify the factual basis for
its assessment of this relationship between the Taleban and al-Qaeda).277
Concerns about ‘regime change’ were even more apparent in relation to
Iraq discussed at 5B3. In that context, while the US placed considerable em-
phasis on ‘regime change’ and the removal of Saddam Hussein, going so far
as to place a bounty on his head, it is noteworthy that European states support-
ive of the United States again sought to distance themselves from these object-
ives, emphasising that ‘Our goal is to safeguard world peace and security by
ensuring that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction.’278 Such
issues have been described as dividing the US and UK governments, and the
latter took pains to emphasise that while regime change might be a welcome
‘consequence’ it was not the ‘aim’ if the intervention.279 As such, it may be
doubtful then whether the Afghan situation, particularly when seen in context
of the Iraqi one that followed it, provides any basis for asserting a new legal
doctrine of regime change.280
While the support for the use of force in Afghanistan in 2001 was undoubt-
edly overwhelming, it is questionable whether the same consensus attended
the necessity and proportionality of the actual use of force as it unfolded in
the months and now many years that followed. The lawfulness of targeting
the Taleban depends on whether doing so was genuinely necessary to protect
the intervening states – a question of fact that appears never to have been
clearly established.281 The continued reliance on self defence as a basis for
277 See, e.g., statement of the UK Prime Minister: ‘Our target the whole time is to close down
the terrorist network in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban regime stand between us and that
objective, then we have to remove them. If they choose – as they have done so far at least –
to side with bin Laden ... ’ (‘Blair: We have no choice but war’, The Mirror, 31 October 2003).
See also ‘Blair says evidence against bin Laden ’powerful’ Radio Interview with Tony Blair
on ABC Local Radio, Australia, 1 October 2001: ‘If [the Taliban] are not prepared to give
up bin Laden, which they could do if they wanted to, then they become an obstacle that
we have to disable or remove in order to get to bin Laden. So that’s their choice. So it’s
not as if we set out with the aim of changing the Taliban regime, but if they remain in the
way of achieving our objective, namely that bin Laden’s associates are yielded up, and
the terror camps are closed. Then the Taliban themselves become our enemy’ (transcript
available at: http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/428882).
278 M. Champion, ‘Eight European Leaders Voice Their Support for U.S. on Iraq, Letter From
Group of Countries Isolates France, Germany, Smooths Path to War,’ Wall Street Journal,
30 January 2003, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,SB104387547015844
5104,00.html (23 October 2012). The open letter was signed by the Prime Ministers or
Presidents of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
279 The UK Attorney General advised that regime change would not be a lawful objective.
54 ICLQ (2005) 767, para 36. See discussion in Gray, International Law and the Use of Force,
note 24, p.231-34.
280 On the view that there is no such support, see Gray ‘Regime Change’, ibid., 231.
281 Doubts as to the relationship between the Taleban and al-Qaeda, and whether the former
really controlled the actions of the latter, grew over time. See, e.g., the reports of the 9/11
Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States) noting
270 Chapter 5
forceful action in Afghanistan against Taleban and al Qaeda years later raises
‘growing concern that Operation Enduring Freedom overstretched the limits of
self-defence.’282
5B.1.1.3 Last resort?
A question much discussed in relation to Iraq but relevant also to the use of
force in Afghanistan and elsewhere is whether the military intervention was,
as it must be under the law, a last resort, with all peaceful means having been
exhausted in accordance with Article 2(3) of the Charter. According to state-
ments by the US President and UK Prime Minister, the bombardment of
Afghanistan and the Taleban was justified, in part, by reference to the fact
that attempts to secure the extradition of bin Laden and others had been
unsuccessful. Before 9/11, extradition of bin Laden had certainly been sought
through the Security Council,283 although post 9/11 it took the form of a
demand, outwith the extradition process, that he and others be ‘turned over’
for extradition from the United States.284
Did this suggest that military action (at least against the Taleban) may not
have been necessary if the Taleban had cooperated and been ‘prepared to give
up bin Laden’?285 It is a question of fact whether all efforts to handle this
matter by the criminal law route were exhausted, whether the international
cooperation was fully engaged and exhausted, whether the requests for extra-
dition could have been made more effective if bolstered by robust international
coordination (and backed up where necessary by Security Council authorisation
that members of the Taleban leadership opposed 9/11for strategic reasons.
282 Tams, ‘The Use of Force’, note 50, p. 378.
283 See, e.g., SC Res. 1333 (2000), 19 December 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000). Post 9/11,
the Council again urged compliance with earlier resolutions. ‘Security Council Urges Taliban
to Comply with Texts Ordering Bin Laden Handover’, United Nations News Centre, 18
September 2001, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=1501
&Cr=iraq&Cr1=.
284 Reportedly the U.S. demanded extradition, the Taleban requested proof of bin Laden’s
involvement and later (with the prospect of air strikes looming) said it would consider
turning him over to a third country but the U.S. administration indicated that it would
not negotiate. After strikes began, the Taleban reiterated its offer: see, e.g., Toronto Star, 6
October 2001, p. A4; or Associated Press, 7 October 2001): ‘Under Islamic law, we can put
him on trial according to allegations raised against him and then the evidence would be
provided to the court.’ It may be that cooperation was not feasible and would not have
weakened al-Qaeda sufficiently, but, as has been noted, ‘that case was never really made
in public’. See R. Falk, ‘Appraising the War against Afghanistan’, p. II, available at http://
www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/falk.htm.
285 See Radio Interview with Tony Blair: ‘If they are not prepared to give up Bin Laden, which
they could do if they want, they become an obstacle. That is their choice’, ABC Radio, note
277.
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to use coercive measures),286 or whether the ‘extradition’ ultimatum was
essentially of presentational significance. If self defence were justified at the
outset, could the threats at a certain point have been addressed through law
enforcement and was this justified on an ongoing basis?
While it would be far-fetched to suggest that the existence of the complex
system of national and international criminal justice automatically renders
the right to use force in self defence redundant, should be one of the alternat-
ives that states are obliged to explore in assessing the necessity of resorting
to force. What may be noteworthy then is that the criminal law paradigm and
its relationship to the necessity of the use of force was virtually absent from
post September 11 discourse by those that were responsible, ultimately, for
the Afghan intervention. While people can reasonably disagree on whether
law enforcement measures alone would have been effective to meet the threat
posed, and the Afghan record gives cause for profound skepticism,287 the
question remains whether, in these circumstances, the case for the necessity
of force (of the nature and scale employed in Afghanistan) was adequately
made out at all relevant stages.
5B.1.1.4 Self defence and the Security Council post 9/11
Indications are that in the wake of 9/11 the Security Council was poised to
assume its responsibility in respect of a situation that it condemned, the day
after the attacks, as a ‘threat to international peace and security’,288 in clear
reference to its unique powers to determine and take measures (including if
necessary the use of force) to address such threats. It also ‘[e]xpresse[d] its
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations’.289 However, this
dimension of the Council’s role was not invoked by states, which proceeded
instead to act unilaterally and through US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’.290
While the UN subsequently authorized ISAF in Afghanistan, it is noteworthy
that despite the passage of more than a decade into the enduring military
286 One question is whether criminal law enforcement in conjunction with military force might
debilitate the threat, reducing the scope for military action even if it fails to avert it alto-
gether.
287 Prior efforts to secure suspects and process suspected terrorists are a factor in such a
determination. However, the possibility of unprecedented post 9/11 unity providing the
basis for an enhanced cooperation initiative, if necessary supported by the use of force as
a law enforcement tool, should also be considered. See Chapter 4.
288 SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001), para. 1.
289 Ibid., para. 5.
290 It has been pointed out that the coalition was not brought under the umbrella of the UN,
in contrast to the Gulf Coalition that used force against Iraq in 1990. See Myjer and White,
‘The Twin Towers Attack’, note 87, at 7. See however, the separate ISAF operation.
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operation in Afghanistan, the US continues to purport to act in self defence
through Operation Enduring Freedom.291
Military action in Afghanistan therefore prompts questions as to the correct
relationship between permissible self defence and collective action under the
Charter. While the US and its allies may have fulfilled the obligation under
Article 51 to ‘report’ measures taken in self defence to the Council, one ques-
tion is whether they should have attempted to secure a mandate from the
Council instead of relying on self defence one month after the attack.292 The
Article 51 reference to self defence ‘until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ suggests so.
It may be questioned then whether the refusal to engage the Council in this
context undermined the collective security mechanism.293
So far as the use of force is unilateral (permissibly so in the case of self
defence) the underlying assessments – such as whether alternative means exist,
whether a threat is imminent, or whether it is necessary in the wake of an
attack to remove governments perceived to be sympathetic to terrorist causes –
are in turn unilateral. In part this highlights the importance of having strict
and clearly defined criteria for self defence. It also underlines the importance
of a collective mechanism assuming its role at the earliest opportunity. Grow-
ing lack of confidence in the reliability of intelligence on the basis of which
decisions are made, generated through the ‘war on terror’, underscores the
importance of checks on individual states’ discretion to act. By refusing to
engage – rather than only report to – the Security Council, states avoided
accountability and oversight of the resort to armed force internationally.
5B.2 THE USE OF FORCE IN THE ‘WAR’ WITH AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED
TERRORISTS WORLDWIDE
Alongside the conflict in Afghanistan, the US has consistently claimed to be
waging a broader war against ’al Qaeda and associated groups’ (as discussed
in chapter 6, IHL).294 Pursuant to this, it claims the right to use force against
291 It referred to the operation once, while extending the operation of ISAF. Gray, International
Law and the Use of Force, note 24, p. 207.
292 Note also that questions have been raised as to whether the requirement of ‘immediacy’
was met by action taken outside the Security Council framework one month on: see
generally Myjer and White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack’, note 87.
293 Article 51 itself provides for self defence ‘until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security’ and imposes an obligation to report.
294 See further Chapter 6.B.1. See inter alia George W. Bush, State of the Union speech to joint
session of Congress, Jan 29, 2002; US National Security Strategies, below; most recently
President Obama, Speech on US drones and counter-terrorism policy, 23 May 2013, note
233.
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non-state actors in territories beyond traditional battlefields.295 In practice,
the US has in fact used cross border force against terrorists on a widespread
basis, in several states and with growing regularity in recent years.296 Most
commonly, this involves air strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly
referred to as ‘drones’). Although not limited to Pakistan,297 it is noted that
reports indicate thousands of deaths through drone killings in that state
alone.298 In Yemen, such attacks are on the rise.299 While less information
is available in relation to Somalia, it is clear that numerous attacks have also
occurred there, apparently mainly against members of the the al Shabaab
organisation believed to have close links to al Qaeda.300 Less commonly,
Special Forces operations have also conducted raids to kill (or on occasion
to capture) suspected al Qaeda operatives, as illustrated by the particualr case
295 “The long war against terrorist networks extends far beyond the borders of Iraq and
Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by irregular warfare – operations
in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. In recent years, U.S.
forces have been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to
police and govern their nations.” US Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review
Report (2006) p.11.
296 “In January 2009, when Obama came to power, the drone programme existed only for
Pakistan and had seen 44 strikes in five years. With Obama in office it expanded to Afghan-
istan, Yemen and Somalia with more than 250 strikes. Since April there have been 14 strikes
in Yemen alone.” ‘Drone wars and state secrecy – how Barack Obama became a hardliner’
Paul Harris, The Observer, Saturday 2 June 2012 20.56 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/jun/02/drone-wars-secrecy-barack-obama.
297 The Guardian’s website maps the locations of drones strikes in Pakistan: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/2012/aug/02/drone-attacks-pakistan-
map?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews>.
298 See e.g., Stanford Law School Report Living Under Drones (2012) at < http://livingunder
drones.org>; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) reports that drone strikes killed
2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan from June 2004 through mid-September 2012. It has been
noted that the number has now surpassed the number of those killed in 9/11, though of
course legally the requirements of self defence do not involve numbers calculations but
proportionality to the attack or imminent threat being averted, as noted in part A and
further below. Chapter 6B22 for more detail on drones.
299 TBIJ asserts that the Yemen casualties since 2002 have amounted to between 362-1,052
(reported) and that there have been between 53-63 confirmed U.S. operations in Yemen
over this time. For examples see <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/05/08/
yemen-reported-us-covert-action-2012/>.
300 While reporting on the U.S. intervention in Somalia (2001) is described as incomplete, TBIJ
has reported approximately 170 people have been killed since 2007, and that there have
been up to 23 U.S. strikes and 9 drone strikes between 2007 and 2012. The main target of
US action in Somalia has been militant group al Shabaab which is reported as having strong
links with al Qaeda. [Reuters, ‘Qaeda leader says Somalia’s Shabaab joins group’ Feb 9 2012
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/ozatp-qaeda-shabaab-idAFJOE8180BP
20120209>], though al Qaeda leaders are also among those targeted: see e.g. Eric Schmitt




of Osama bin Laden discussed in Chapter 9.301 The actual, and potential,
scope of such international operations remains uncertain; one area of specula-
tion for example is whether, or how, the increased CIA surveillance over sways
of Africa for example will translate into the ‘elimination’ of detected
threats.302 What is clear is that targeted killings have vastly increased in the
course of the war on terror.303
The US justifies the use of force, including the now frequent resort to drone
killings, as ‘consistent with its inherent right to self defense under international
law’.304 It has claimed the right to attack al Qaeda and associated entities
and individuals “anywhere in the world,” consistent with the perception of
a “global battlefield” and a conflict against international terror networks of
‘global reach’.305 The nature of the escalated resort to force by the US raises
many questions from across the legal framework.306 The implications of the
‘long war’ and the ‘global battlefield’ for the laws of war/IHL, and the inter-
relationship with human rights protections, for example, are often the focus
of attention, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. But critical issues also arise as
regards the implications for the principles enshrined in Article 2(4) and the
strained approach to the concept of self defence in international law. Some
of the key questions arising in respect of the purported right to use force
301 See Lubell ‘the War(?) with al Qaeda’, referring to operations in Syria, p. 428, and the Libya
raid to capture al Libi, October 2013, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), Classification of Conflicts
(Oxford), 2013.
302 See, e.g., ‘U.S. expands secret intelligence operations in Africa’ Washington Post, 14 June
2012. The surveillance planes are launched from one of a series of bases where states appear
to have consented, but travel into many other African states where counterterrorism is
described as the main U.S. priority. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_
story.html.
303 See below, though Obama heralded a reduced resort to drones in the future in his 2013
National Defense University speech.
304 E.g., Harold Koh, Comments at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter ‘ASIL Comments 2010’) 25 March 2010, available at:
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. John O. Brennan, Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-
ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. A released DOJ White Paper, “Lawfulness of a Lethal
Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida
or An Associated Force,” disclosed by NBC News, 4 Feb 2013 provides the perameters
of the US legal position; see also President Obama, speech, 23 May 2013, note 233, asserts
the lawfulness of all such actions under the law of self defence.
305 George W. Bush, State of the Union speech to joint session of Congress, Jan 29, 2002; Obama
continued to assert the right to target enemies wherever they are; see below for emerging
qualifications such as the willingness and ability of the state.
306 This is for many reasons, related to IHRL, IHL – see, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial arbitrary executions among other condemnation (available at: http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/SRExecutionsIndex.aspx) – though they also raise serious
issues regarding the law on the use of force which are the focus of this chapter.
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against members of al Qaeda on a potentially global scale are highlighted
below.
5B.2.1 Overriding Sovereignty? Questioning the relevance of Article 2(4)
A preliminary question has arisen regarding whether the targeted use of force
against al Qaeda suspects in certain states around the world, in certain circum-
stances, engages the article 2(4) prohibition at all. On a perhaps extreme view,
it would be unnecessary to invoke self defence as there would be no use of
force in prima facie violation of Article 2(4).
One question in this vein is whether limited incursions onto another state’s
territory, for the purposes of a targeted killing for example (as opposed to
the large scale military interventions that characterized early resort to force
in the war on terror), should be considered to violate territorial integrity or
political independence envisioned in Article 2(4) at all. The fact that states often
emphasise the ‘limited’ nature of incursions may suggest that this is relevant
to the determination of lawfulness.307 However, as noted in relation to the
legal framework set out above, the dominant reading of international law as
it currently stands is that there is no ‘threshold’ for the use of force between
states, such that limited excursions might be considered excluded from the
prohibition. Rather, any coercive incursion onto another state’s territory may
violate Article 2(4) unless it can be justified by reference to one of the ex-
ceptions outlined above.308
Another view to emerge from debate in the United States, but of doubtful
legal force, is that if a territorial state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to itself address
the terrorist threat from its territory, the Charter’s ‘sovereignty concerns are
overcome’ and there is simply no violation of Article 2(4).309 While as noted
below, willingness and ability may be one factor of relevance to an assessment
of whether self defence is necessary,310 it must, however, be seriously doubted
307 Tams, ‘Use of Force’, supra note 50, p. 388.
308 This relates to the question of a ‘threshold’ discussed in a different context (when an armed
attack by terrorist groups might arise) in part A.
309 Jack Goldmsith, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel tasked with providing legal
guidance to the president and executive branchsuggests that the ‘U.N. Charter’s sovereignty
concerns are overcome because the nation in question is unwilling or unable to address
the group’s threat to the United States.’ http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/thoughts-on-
the-latest-round-of-johnson-v-koh. It contrasts this view to that of Harold Koh which
suggests, in line with international law, that the U.S. needs to justify its position by reference
to self defence. See also The Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Policy Divide, America and the
Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy June 2007, p. 2, p. 7.
310 It appears to be in the context of an assertion of self defence that the Obama administration
asserts the relevance of willingness or ability test, not as a separate exception: note the
debate between Koh and Goldsmith. Koh’s view is that it is part of the self defence assess-
ment, and it is addressed further, in that context, to be discussed.
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that the fundamental protection of Article 2(4) is simply removed in these
circumstances.311
States do have obligations to act against terrorism on their territory, as
explained for example in Chapter 2, but the legal framework is clear that the
use of force is not one of the countermeasures that states may take in response
to violations.312 Nor, as noted above, is the unilateral use of force to ‘enforce’
international law a recognized exception.313 Many – if not most – states
struggle to various degrees to address the threat of terrorism, and it is difficult
to countenance the implications for international stability if allegations of such
unwillingness or inability alone, as determined by another state unilaterally,
were per se to remove sovereign protection. Indeed, even in relation to the
more extreme and difficult situations of failed and failing states in Chapter
5 Part A, it is questioned that the Article 2(4) protection ceases to exist. Rather
the question must remain whether or not, absent collective UN authorized
action, the conditions for the exercise of the right to self defence are met.314
One preliminary question regarding Article 2(4) that is key, however, is
whether there is territorial state consent to the particular use of force. While
not relevant to many aspects of the framework – a territorial state cannot
consent to a violation of human rights on its territory by another state, or to
violations of IHL – if a state consents to the cross border operations in question,
there is no violation of the state’s territorial integrity. It appears for example
that Yemen had consented to operations on its territory in relation to the first
drone strike of 2002, while the situation in respect of Pakistan remains debat-
able.315 Recent practices recalls that it is often politically difficult for govern-
ments to publicly acknowledge that they have consented to the United States’
carrying out targeted killings on their territory, which makes this a murky
determination of fact. An illustration of this emerged from the revelation that
the President of Yemen approved US operations against al Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula while stating that ‘we’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not
yours’;316 another was the statement by the foreign minister of Burkina Faso
311 These doubts arise all the more strongly in the context of ‘failed and failing’ state scenarios,
discussed previously, but as noted even there Article 2(4) applies; see Dutch report, supra
note 194 and discussion at at 5A.4.
312 Chapter 3.3.1.
313 See 5A.3.2, ‘Force to Enforce’. States in practice rely on self defence not law enforcement
rationale, though they may sweeten their case by reference to infractions by the territorial
state – Afghanistan is a prime example. See e.g. discussion in Tams, ‘Use of Force’, supra
note 50, p. 378.
314 Chapter 5.A.3.4 ‘Failed and Failing States’.
315 See Lubell, ‘The War (?) with al Qaeda’, supra note 302, p. 430 and Chapter 9 in relation
to the killing of Osama bin Laden.
316 U.S. Embassy cable from Yemen, 4 January 2010, Yemeni president Salah rejects U.S. ground
presence (www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242380). In C. Gray,
‘President Obama’s 2010 United States National Security Strategy and International Law
on the Use of Force’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 35 (2010), para. 23.
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on the importance of being ‘very, very discreet’ in relation to whether the state
permitted US special forces operations on their territory.317 The result may
be confusion of fact, but not of law, on the critical preliminary question of
state consent.
The fact that the US administration consistently relies on self defence may
support the assumption that, at least some of the time, the attacks on members
of al Qaeda are not being conducted with the states’ consent. Nor can there
be a serious contention that they are justified by Security Council resolutions.
The lawfulness of the increasing resort to targeted killings in other states
territorities must therefore depend on the stregnth of the US claim that the
attacks are justifiable under the law of self defence.
5B.2.2 Justifications based on Self Defence
In response to mounting criticism of their wide resort to targeted killings, the
US President and several high level officials have set out the perameters of
the US position on self defence. The right to self defence has variously be
justified on the basis that ‘al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the
United States, and indeed continues to attack us,’ and that ‘high level al Qaeda
leaders are planning attacks.’318 Likewise, it has stated ‘we conduct targeted
strikes because they are necessary to mitigate an actual ongoing threat – to
stop plots, prevent future attacks, and save American lives.’319
In relying on self defence as the justification, the questions to be addressed
in relation to each incidence of use of force are whether, in accordance with
the legal framework set out above, an armed attack has occurred or – if anti-
cipatory self defence is accepted – one is imminent, and if the use of force is
necessary and proportionate to avert it.320
317 E.g., Washington Post 14 June 2012, (note 328), citing an interview with Djibril Bassole,
the foreign minister of Burkina Faso, praised security relations between his country and
the United States, but declining to answer questions about the activities of U.S. Special
Operations forces in his country. ‘I cannot provide details, but it has been very, very
helpful,’ he said. ‘This cooperation should be very, very discreet. We should not show to
al-Qaeda that we are now working with the Americans.’ http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/
gJQAHyvAbV_story_4.html.
318 Koh, ‘ASIL Comments 2010’, see note 304.
319 John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
speech on counterterrorism of 30 April 2012 at http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/
brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100 Brennan 2012 speech.
320 See Chapter 5A.
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5B.2.2.1 Identifying the ‘Armed Attack’?
As discussed in the legal framework and in relation to Afghanistan, while the
matter remains in dispute, the predominant view would now appear to be
that non-state actors may launch an armed attack, triggering the right of self
defence.321 While 9/11 was, understandably, widely considered to constitute
such an attack, the nature or source of any current ‘attack’ from ‘al Qaeda and
associated groups’, many years on from 9/11, is far less obvious.322 It is, for
example, doubtful that to the extent that there have been attacks on the US
from al Qaeda since then, that they could meet the scale or intensity threshold
that is often thought to apply for an armed attack by a non-state group.323
One approach, reflected in occasional references to the targeted terrorists
as participating in a ‘continuing’ attack against the US, is that there is an
ongoing terrorist attack, which may have began on 9/11 but continues to the
present day.324 The law acknowledges that a series or accumulation of attacks
may in certain circumstances constitute the armed attack – and the series taken
together may meet any intensity threshold that singly they would not have
met. The suggestion, however, of one ‘ongoing’ attack broad enough to
embrace the 9/11 attacks of more than a decade ago, and the disparate attacks
by disperate entities since then, would surely constitute such an elastic
approach to armed attack as to be unsustainable.
Moreover, for acts of violence to form part of one larger armed attack for
the purposes of self defence they would have to emanate in some degree from
‘the same source.’325 Reports of the diminished, disparate and increasingly
individualised nature of al Qaeda actors, discussed in more detail in Chapter
6, make this case harder to sustain as time goes on. It must be doubted whether
attacks (or, as noted below, threats) from al Qaeda and its uncertain “asso-
ciated” groups, still less the “a far-reaching network of violence and
321 See Chapter 5B.1.1.4, ‘Self-defence and the Security Council Post 9/11’.
322 On the nature of al Qaeda and its shift from an organsiation or netwrosk to a broad
umbrella ideology, and its capacity, see Chapter 6.B.1
323 On the intensity threshold see Chapter 5A.2.1.1, ‘Conditions for the exercise of self defence’.
See Lehto, note 227, on the diminished nature of al Qaeda, and the incidence of attacks
in recent years.
324 “As recent events have shown, al-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United
States, and indeed continues to attack us.” Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’ (Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, 2 March 2010) accessed at <http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm>.
325 See, e.g., Leiden Recommendations, note 59, para 11.
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hatred,”326 could conceivably be considered to constitute a continuum from
the same source.327
5B.2.2.2 From Anticipatory Self Defence to Preventive Force?
More plausible perhaps, and consistent with the emphasis the US places on
prevention, is the argument that what the US asserts is a right to act not against
an existing attack but against the threat of future attacks. Other than references
to al Qaeda ‘continuing to attack us,’ most of the administration’s justifications
referred to the ‘on-going threats,’ and the right to act to stop ‘plots’ and to
act against those ‘planning’ to attack the US. It is the assertion of the right to
exercise self defence ‘preventively’ in this way that has given rise to one of
the most controversial, and most potentially significant, differences of view
as to the scope and limits of self defence against terrorism post 9/11.
It is worth sketching out, therefore, the expansive doctrine of self defence
against terrorism that has been advanced, in various guises, by the United
States since the inception of the war on terror. In its most extreme and explicit
form, it was presented in the US National Security Strategy of 2002 which states
that the US will ‘exercise our right of self defence by acting preemptively
against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people
and our country ... by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches
our borders’..328 The NSS premised self defence not on an existing attack, nor
indeed (expressly rejecting the Caroline criteria) an imminent attack, but on
the threat represented by ‘terrorists’ on the one hand, and ‘tyrants’ and ‘rogue
states ... determined to acquire WMDs’ on the other.329 Even the threat need
not yet have existed, as the US National Security Strategy envisaged military
326 See discussion on the scope of the entity the U.S. purports to be entitled to attack, and to
be at war with in Chapter 6. See, e.g., President Obama’s cover letter to the 2010 Strategy:
“For nearly a decade, our Nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of violence
and hatred;” U.S. President Barack Obama, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America’, May 2010, p. 20, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf: ‘Yet this is not a global war against a tactic
– terrorism or a religion – Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and
its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners.’
327 This logical proposition is supported e.g. in the Leiden Recommendations, note 59, para.
39.
328 Presented by President Bush on September 2002. See the doctrine being endorsed explicitly
in the 2006 National Security Strategy, but it was not mentioned in the 2010 incarnation.
On the extent to which this reflects a shift see later in this chapter.
329 While the link between the two is referred to throughout the U.S. National Security Strategy
– by reference to the ‘crossroads of radicalism and technology’ and the ‘overlap between
states that sponsor terrorism and those that pursue weapons of mass destruction’ – the
basis for the assertion of this link has been the subject of controversy in relation to Iraq
and beyond. See G. Miller, ‘Iraq – Terrorism Link Continues to Be Problematic’, Los Angeles
Times, 9 September 2003. Note the 2010 NSS continues to note as a key threat the risk of
‘extremists’ accessing WMDs.
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action ‘against such emerging threats before they are fully formed’ with an
emphasis on the language of prevention, pre-emption, dissuasion and
deterrence.330 Such a policy of pre-emptive force did not apparently require
clear and specific evidence of an impending attack, and it was unclear how
speculative the threat might be to purport to justify the pre-emptive use of
force in self defence.331 The 2006 National Security Strategy that followed
emphatically endorsed the doctrine of pre-emption, explicitly noting that ‘The
place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same.’332
It emphasized that ‘to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent
right of self-defence.’333
What remains of the NSS doctrine of pre-emption in US policy and
practice?334 The answer is not apparent on the face of President Obama’s
2010 Strategy; while resoundingly different in tone, and audibly so on some
substantive issues, it was hushed on the use of force, and silent on pre-emptive
self defence.335 In its immediate wake some question whether this meant
an abandonment of the policy of pre-emption on the one hand, or its continuity
on the other.336 The continuity of its position in respect of the preventive
use of force in self defence was, however, made resoundingly clear through
the practice of increasing resort to targeted killings and the justifications
presented in response.
Among the key questions arising in this respect is the nature and source
of the current threat and whether it might be sufficient to trigger the ex-
ceptional right to use force in anticipatory self defence. Emanating as it does
from a non-state actor, presumably absent any assertion of state responsibility,
the law may require that a threat would have to be of a significant scale, real
and immediate, leaving no alternative to the use of force to avert the attack.
The US has, in the course of its war on terror, sought to present a tighter
approach to the sort of ‘threats’ that might satisfy the self defence criteria,
330 The U.S. National Security Strategy includes e.g. ‘prevent[ing] our enemies from threatening
us ... with WMDs’ (p. 7) and to ‘dissuad[ing] future military competition; deter[ing] threats
against the US and against US’ interests, allies and friends’ (p. 29).
331 ‘The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively’, ibid., section V.
332 U.S. President George W. Bush, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America’, 16 March 2006, p. 23, available at: http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.
pdf (hereinafter ‘U.S. National Security Strategy 2006’).
333 Ibid. at 18.
334 The latter question will be addressed in the ‘Conclusions’ later in this chapter.
335 It does emphasise tha the use of force must be a last resort, consistent with the cnouraging
emphasis on alternative solutions to military force, and on multi-lateralism – see further
5.B.4. See ‘Internationalism’ in Chapter 5B.4.
336 Gray, supra note 316.
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referring for example to a ‘significant threat,’ though the nature and scope
of the threats that would justify use of force in self defence remain un-
certain.337 It has provided illustrations of such threats as ones that: ‘might
be posed by an individual who is an operational leader of al-Qaeda or one
of its associated forces. Or perhaps the individual is himself an operative –
in the midst of actually training for or planning to carry out attacks against
US interests. Or perhaps the individual possesses unique operational skills that
are being leveraged in a planned attack.’338 These are real threats that many
individuals around the world engaged in criminal activity might pose, and
they must be addressed. However, it must be questioned whether they present
the sort of exceptional situations or ‘international emergency’ that the law of
self defence was intended to address.339 In some guises the US has suggested
that the use of force would be limited to ‘high level’ terrorists while in others
this requirement as such is not present.340
Notably, while the language of pre-emption is no longer favoured or
prominent, all justifications assert the right to self defence in the absence of
a concrete identifiable threat of imminent attack. The emphasis on using force
against those ‘planning’ attacks and ‘intending’ to carry them out341 would
appear to fall some way short of the legal pre-requisites for exceptional resort
to anticipatory self defence set out in Part A.
The US at various stages appeared to reject the imminence requirement,
reflected most starkly in President Bush’s explicit rejection of imminence in
his State of the Union address of 2003 or the NSS.342 Obama administration
representatives also appeared to shun an imminence requirement suggesting
337 As regards the nature of the threat, see also John Brennan speech 30 April 2012, hereafter
Brennan speech, April 2012: “And what do we mean by a significant threat? I am not
referring to some hypothetical threat – the mere possibility that a member of al-Qa’ida might
try to attack us at some point in the future.” http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/
brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100.
338 Brennan speech, April 2012.
339 Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69.
340 See e.g. the DOJ White Paper February 2013 note 304 which includes this requirement and
the Obama speech of 23 May 2013, note 233, which does not.
341 H.Koh ASIL, Washington D.C. March 25, 2012 states: Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict,
the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its
citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons
such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.” Accessed at <http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm>.
342 President Bush stated ‘[s]ome have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since
when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice
before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all
words, and all recriminations would come too late.’ See also 2002 U.S. National Security
Strategy, note 251: ‘To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.’
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that the law has become more ‘relaxed in this respect’.343 However, while
there may be growing recognition of the existence of a right of anticipatory
self defence, and some stretching also by others of the definition of the ‘immin-
ence’ requirement that may test the limits of the term, there is little support
for the call to dispense with it.344
Arguably, recognition that imminence is considered a requirement under
international law by other states is reflected in US National Security adviser
Brennan’s attempts to reconcile divergent international opinions as simply
differences as to how you ‘define imminence,’345 or in the DOJ White paper
which acknowledged the requirement of imminence while defining it so
broadly as to have lost all meaning.346 It is uncertain how one could plausibly
define it in a way that would allow attacks on al Qaeda operatives or others
on the basis that they are contributing to the planning of possible future
attacks.
An expansive approach to the right to act preemptive or preventively has
been coupled with a broad view of related concepts that increase the potential
scope of the purported right. First, a broad approach is applied to the targets
of the threats that might justify self defence. This is seen, again in its most
striking form, in the National Security Strategies, which included threats
against ‘the United States, the American people and our interests at home and
abroad’.347 The US position had long been to invoke self defence in defence
of territory and (more controversially) of nationals abroad, but the ambiguity
343 Brennan speech, April 2012, claming the law had ‘relaxed’. Note that Koh ASIL 2010
recognises imminence as a ‘consideration’, but not apparently a legal pre-requsiite: ‘Of
course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the
threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those
states to suppress the threat the target poses.’ The DOJ White Paper of February 2013
recognises the requirement of imminence, and purports to define it but focuses on the
difficulties with imminence ion the context of terrorism.
344 See the wide view of imminence put forward by the UK Attorney General, in Gray 2008,
supra note 24 p. 215. Wilmshurst, supra note 69.
345 Speech of John O. Brennan at Harvard Law School, Cambridge Massechustetts 6 September
2011: Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how you define “immin-
ence.” He notes later “We are finding increasing recognition in the international community
that a more flexible understanding of “imminence” may be appropriate when dealing with
terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves
in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts.”
346 DOJ White Paper, supra note 304 p. 3 notes attacks outside undefined zones of hostilities
would be against senior operational leaders of al Qaeda or associated forces who represent
an ‘imminent threat.’ However, imminence is confusingly defined by reference to what
it is not, including that it ‘does not require clear evidence of a specific attack…,’ while
explaining that it should take into account various factors including that some people are
“continually planning attacks” and the “likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks”
p. 7-8.
347 See also reference to the protection of U.S. friends and allies in U.S. National Security
Strategy, note 72, p. 29.
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and potentially extremely wide-reaching scope of the reference to other ‘inter-
ests’ begged questions as to the nature of such interests and limits thereon
and went far beyond the standardd for self defence established in international
law, set out in the legal framework in Chapter 5A above. More recent presenta-
tions of the US position have focused less on such broad-reaching ‘interests’,
but have continued to refer to the prevention not only of attacks on the US
but on ‘allies and partners’ for example.348
Just as the targets of attack are broadly framed, so too, critically, is the
source of the threat, which is not limited to al Qaeda: as the 2010 NSS made
clear, it includes the “growing threat from the group’s allies worldwide”.349
This corresponds with reports that, in fact, members of other terrorist organisa-
tions other than al Qaeda are now being subject to attack by the US.350 While
recent attempts to move away from the ‘war on terror’ language are seen as
an attempt to better define the enemy, they do not then greatly limit its scope,
as seen for example from the explanation that “[T]his is not a global war
against a tactic – terrorism or a religion – Islam. We are at war with a specific
network, al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the
United States, our allies, and partners.’351 Threats posed to other nations or
interests, by other groups worldwide, appear to be embraced, broadening sig-
nificantly the scope of the potential use of force for the prevention of terrorist
threats worldwide.352
Self defence is defensive rather than preventive. It can be justified to repel
or to avert an attack, always as an exceptional measure of last resort, but not
to prevent the (undoubtedly often real) risks of undefined future attacks.353
Attractive as strategies of prevention rather than response are, the general
acceptance of the unilateral right to use force against global threats is irreconcil-
348 Examples include “The nation is at war with terrorist organizations that pose a threat to
its security and that of other societies that cherish the principle of self-government”, US
National Military Strategic Plan; US National Security Strategy 2010.
349 2010 US National Security Strategy: ‘Al Qa’ida’s core in Pakistan remains the most
dangerous component of the larger network, but we also face a growing threat from the
group’s allies worldwide.’
350 See e.g. report of the head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, ‘Uzbek rebel killed in
Pakistan’, BBC News, 2 October 2009 in Lubell, ‘The War against al Qaeda’, note 301, p.
427.
351 Ibid., at 20. See also DOJ White Paper, 4 February 2013, and President Obama 23 May 2013
speech, supra note 254.
352 See e.g. U.S. National Military Strategic Plan, note 347.
353 Wilmshurst, ‘Anticipatory Self Defence’, note 69, notes that ‘Outside the US the Bush
doctrine has had little or no support from States or commentators, and is widely rejected
as impermissible under international law.’ She cites e.g. the statement by the UK’s Foreign
Secretary, Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism,
Session 2002-2003 Cm 5793, 8; In Larger Freedom, UN. Doc A/59/2005 (2005) para. 188-192;
C. Gray ‘The US National Security Strategy and the New “Bush Doctrine” on Pre-emptive
Self-Defence’, supra note 251, at 437; C. Greenwood ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive
Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Iraq’, note 87.
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able with the exceptional nature of self defence, the even more exceptional
nature of anticipatory self defence, and ultimately the fundamental prohibition
on the use of force under international law.
5B.2.3 Necessary and Proportionate Force and Terrorism
For the reasons set out above, it is doubtful that an analysis of the legality
of preventive use of force against al Qaeda members around the world would
meet the requirements to trigger self defence and proceed to the necessity and
proportionality test. If, however, circumstances arose in which terrorists were
engaged in a large scale attack against the US, as on 9/11, or such an attack
was imminent, the right to self defence may be triggered and the question
to be addressed would be the necessity and proportionality of the particular
measures of force proposed to avert the threat.354
The use of force must plainly be a last resort. A fundamental question of
relevance to the lawfulness of self defence is whether criminal law, backed
up with enhanced experience of prosecuting terrorism international cooperation
is not available as an option.
The existence of challenges and even a certain degree of risk may be
inherent in law enforcement. As the war on terror amply illustrates, detention
can be a legal and political quagmire.355 But the criminal cooperation model
cannot simply be set aside as costly, inconvenient or risky and therefore
unrealistic. The unilateral use of force will be lawful only if, in the particular
circumstances of the individual’s case, there is no prospect of averting the
threat by other means. It may be noteworthy that in Afghanistan there had
been indictments issued in respect of Taleban and al-Qaeda operating out of
afghan territory, the government had at least in principle been asked to engage
to extradite, backed up by the Security Council. By contrast, there is little
suggestion by the US that all of the hundreds of individuals now being targeted
are subject to international arrest warrants (open or sealed).
One of the ways in which the US doctrine of self defence has become more
restricted in its presentation over the course of the war on terror has been
through the apparent qualification of its right to act where the state is ‘un-
willing or unable’ to do so.356 Considerable emphasis has, in practice, been
354 See Chapter 5A.2.1.1 and the Nicaragua case.
355 See Chapter 7B ‘Human Rights and Security Post September 11’ and Chapter 6B ‘Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and the ‘War on Terror’’ for further discussion of detention
in armed conflict. See also Chapter 8 Guantanamo Bay.
356 U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, in an apparent attempt to appease allies, responded
to concerns regarding geographic scope by stating that they only target in states which
are unwilling or unable to stop the terrorists, though as noted this is relevant to jus ad
bellum, not to IHL. ‘Holder Speech on National Securirty, Northwestern University, 4 March
2012. See also Obama, 23 May 2013 speech, note 251, and earlier: “What I said was that
The Use of Force 285
placed on states’ inability or unwillingness to cooperate to avert the threats,
in relation to the bin Laden operation and in other contexts,357 and has been
subject of academic commentary for example.358 This reflects practice from
other states where emphasis has been placed on the unwillingness and inability
of other states to address threats as a justification for action in self defence.359
If the territorial state were willing and able to act, the use of force would
be unnecessary. It is therefore appropriate that willingness and ability be taken
into account as an element of the necessity test. It should be emphasized,
however, that it is not a separate justification for the use of force under inter-
national law, and the lawfulness of the use of force depends on all of the
conditions for self defence being met.
Likewise, while states are under an obligation to act to address threats and
attacks emanating from their territory, the right of other states to use unilateral
force is not a consequence that flows from a breach of this obligation.360
Unwillingess and inability should therefore be understood not as providing
carte blanche to a state to use force but as an aspect of the self defence test
among others. This is especially important given that many aspects of the
parameters of unwillingness and inability remain unclear, which may represent
an area of the law ripe for legal development or clarification.361
Finally, the particular instance of resort to force, for example to kill or
capture a particular individual, would have to be necessary (and no more than
necessary) to avert the threat. This depends on reliable information being
available concerning the particular role of the individual, and would by its
nature appear to limit the use of force to high level individuals making a direct
contribution to an attack, actual or impending, who need to be stopped to stop
if we have actionable intelligence against bin Laden or other key al-Qaida officials ... and
Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we should.” Presidential Candidates
Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23392577/ns/
politics-decision_08.
357 Andy Merten, Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, MSNBC (Feb. 28, 2008, 4:24 PM),
and Obama Vows to ’Take Out’ Terror Targets in Pakistan, AFP (Sept. 28, 2008), available
at http:// tinyurl.com/6mlznzx (“If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act” against al-Qaida
leaders, “then we should take them out.”), in A. Deeks, ‘Unwilling or Unable’ supra note
105, fn 2.
358 For academic discussion of this topic, see A Deeks, ibid; Tams, ‘Light Treatment of a
Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case’, 16 EJIL (2005) 963. T Wais-
berg, ‘Colombia’s Use of Force in Ecuador Against a Terrorist Organization: International
Law and the Use of Force Against Non-State Actors’, ASIL Insights, August 22, 2008 <http:/
/www.asil.org/insights080822.cfm>.
359 Russia in respect of Georgia, Israel in respect of Lebanon and Turjey in respect of Northern
Iraq are cited as examples in Deeks, note 105.
360 Chapter 2.
361 A former state department legal adviser A. Deeks puts forward factors for an assessment
of inability and unwillingness which she states should should constrain states and provide
necessary clarity to the legal framework of necessity and proportionality in self defence.
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the attack.362 Killing individuals who are suspected to make a more remote
contribution, or killings causing widespread harm beyond the targets (as
alleged in relation to some drone attacks), are likely to fall foul of the require-
ments of necessity and proportionality.363 A fortiori, attacks against ‘indeter-
minate’ rather than specific concrete threats, renders impossible the application
of the necessity and proportionality calculus, and must be inconsistent with
the legal framework.364
5B.3 IRAQ
Arguably the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 should not properly be
understood as a response to international terrorism at all, and should therefore
lie beyond the scope of this study. However, the Iraq intervention was justified
repeatedly by reference to the threat of terrorism, to an ‘axis of evil’ including
Iraq, and both Iraq and Afghanistan were described by the Bush administration
as the “front lines of the war on terror.”365 The US argued that its engagement
in Iraq would be ‘the death knell for terrorism.’366
The legal justifications for the use of force in Iraq differed from those
invoked in relation to Afghanistan, and they differed as between states
involved in the intervention. Unlike in Afghanistan, there was no suggestion
that the targets of intervention were responsible for the events of 9/11, and
in that sense Iraq was not a ‘response’ to September 11 at all. Though
tangential links between Iraq and terrorism were floated sporadically, the Iraq
intervention represented an extension of the ‘war on terror’ beyond terrorists
to the longstanding question of the threat posed by the alleged existence of
weapons of mass destruction and by Saddam Hussein’s regime.
While many arguments were raised before and after the intervention,
separately and cumulatively, the US appears to have relied both on self defence
362 Note however how targets are identified in practice, including through eg ‘pattern of life’
of doubtful consistency with this test, in Chapter 6A.3.1.
363 See Chapters 6B.3.1 on high levels of civilian casualties despite the purported precision
compared to other weapons systems. Note that the proportionality analysis here – which
requires that action be necessary and proportionate to avert the attack – is different from
that under IHL which requires proportion to the concrete military advantage, which may
be a broader formula.
364 Gray, Use of Force, supra note 24, p. 203.
365 Gray, Use of Force, supra note 24, p. 1. See comments by Bush in President Bush Meets with
Prime Minister Blair. Remarks by the President and British Prime Minister Tony Blair’,
White House Press Release, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/ releases/2003/01/20030131-23.html. See G. Miller, ‘Iraq-Terrorism Link Continues
to Be Problematic’, Los Angeles Times, 9 September 2003. On lack of evidence of any such
link, see 9/11 Commission Report Chapter 3.
366 Condoleezza Rice in P. Reynolds, ‘Iraq War Helped al Qaeda Recruit’, BBC, 19 October
2004.
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and on the ‘enforcement’ of UN resolutions as legal bases for intervention.367
The UK’s legal justification was Security Council authorisation: that even
without securing the desired further UN resolution authorising the use of force
in Iraq, authorisation could be implied (or ‘revived’) from earlier resolutions
of the Council.368 A similar approach appears to have been adopted by the
Dutch government in its decision to support the Iraq intervention.369
The degree of support or, at least, passive acquiescence in the use of force
in Afghanistan stands in sharp distinction to the subsequent global divisions
over the lawfulness of the resort to force in Iraq. While proponents of military
action can be found among states and legal commentators, the Iraq intervention
provoked unprecedented opposition, based in significant part on widespread
concerns as to its lawfulness. Unusually outspoken statements on the
unlawfulness of the Iraq intervention were heard before and after the interven-
tion, including from many states, individually370 and collectively,371 the
367 After the adoption of SC Res. 1441 (2002), 8 November 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002),
the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN noted that the resolution ‘does not constrain
any state from acting to defend ... or to enforce relevant UN resolutions’ (U.S. Permanent
Representative to the UN Ambassador John Negroponte, Statement to the UN Security
Council, U.S. Mission to the UN Press Release, 8 November 2002, available at: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2002/15018.htm). See generally, also W.H. Taft IV and
T. Buchenwald, ‘Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Preemption, Iraq, and Inter-
national Law’, 97 (2003) AJIL 557.
368 See ‘Legal Basis for Use of Force against Iraq’, opinion published by the UK Attorney
General, Lord Goldsmith, on 17 March 2003, available at: http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/Page3287. For contrary view of this
opinion and evidence given in its support to the Iraq Inquiry, see D. Akande and M.
Milanovic, ‘Submission to the Inquiry on the UK’s Legal Justification for the Iraq War and
Lord Goldsmith’s Legal Advice’, 14 June 2010. The Inquiry had yet to report but was
expected to do so in 2013. Letter from J. Chilcott to the Prime Minister 13 July 2012, available
at:http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/54266/2012-07-13%20chilcot%20cameron.pdf.
This includes an outline of the Inquiry’s report.
369 Report of the Dutch Committee of Inquiry into the war in Iraq, NLIR 2010, supra note 194.
The Dutch were not directly involved in but offered support to the Iraq intervention. The
Inquiry report was critical of the lack of an adequate legal basis for the war, at p.136,
including rejecting what was presented as the “corpus theory” akin to the UK approach,
p.134.
370 See, e.g., the responses of France, Russia, China, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Iran discussed in House of Commons Research Paper 02/64, ‘Iraq and Security Council
Resolution 1441’, 21 November 2002, pp. 33-6, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/
commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-064.pdf. Comments of French President Chirac, on
23 September 2003 that “The war launched without Security Council authorisation shook
the multilateral system”, ‘Bush urges UN unity on Iraq’, BBC News, 23 September 2002,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3130880.stm; ‘Vatican reasserts
opposition to war in Iraq’, Catholic News, 4 October 2002, available at: http://www.cathnews.
com/news/210/27.php; Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister refers to Iraq as ‘war of aggression’
(see Interview 17 February 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_
east/2773759.stm).
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UN Secretary-General,372 official enquiries,373 legal scholars and international
civil society,374 with resignations following opposition in several cases.375
There are some indications that governments may have recognized that
lawfulness was questionable, but nonetheless supported the intervention,
raising questions as to the authority of law and its relationship with legit-
imacy.376
The onus lies on states seeking to justify the use of force to demonstrate
its lawfulness, and international reactions raise serious doubts as to whether
this onus was discharged.377 Among the questions arising regarding the
lawfulness of the use of force in Iraq are the following: whether the Security
Council ‘authorised’ the use of force, implicitly; whether states can act to
‘enforce’ earlier resolutions against Iraq, where the Council itself fails to do
so; whether a broad right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self defence might
be invoked to justify the use of force in this context; and whether the interven-
371 Communiqué of the Arab Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, 1 March 2003, available at:
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/030303/2003030324.html. (‘Arab leaders
declare opposition to war in Iraq’, CNN, 2 March 2003, available at: http://www-
cgi.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.arab.ministers).
372 P. Tyler and F. Barringer, ‘Annan says US will violate Charter if it acts without approval’,
New York Times, 11 March 2003, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/11/
international/middleeast/11NATI.html.
373 See the Dutch Inquiry Report, 2010, supra note 194; the UK inquiry report is pending
publication.
374 Opposition was evident from demonstrations around the world of unparalleled proportions.
Objections came from many sources: wee e.g.: ‘Letter to The Times’, Sir Franklin Berman,
UK legal adviser from 1991 to 1999, and Sir Arthur Watts, UK legal adviser from 1987 to
1991 (The Times, Letters, 20 March 2003); open letter to the UK Prime Minister from sixteen
academic lawyers (‘War Would Be Illegal’, The Guardian, 7 March 2003); ‘Coalition of the
Willing – A Pre-emptive Strike on Iraq Would Constitute a Crime against Humanity, Write
43 Experts on International Law and Human Rights’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February
2003; J. Sallot, ‘Attack Illegal, Experts Say’, Globe and Mail, 20 March 2003, reporting an
open letter signed by 31 Canadian professors of international law.
375 E. MacAskill, ‘Adviser Quits Foreign Office over Legality of War’, The Guardian, 22 March
2003; T. Happold ‘Short Quits Blair’s Government’, The Guardian, 12 May 2003; M. Tempest,
‘Cook Resigns from Cabinet over Iraq’, The Guardian, 17 March 2003; US Department of
State, Daily Press Briefing by Richard Boucher, 11 March 2003, available at: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18621.htm, reporting the resignation of two senior
officers of the U.S. Department of State ‘in relation to the situation with Iraq’.
376 O. Burkeman and J. Borger, ‘War Critics Astonished as US Hawk Admits Invasion Was
Illegal’, The Guardian, 20 November 2003, noting comments by the Pentagon’s Richard Perle:
‘I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing.’ See also
legal advice by UK and Dutch legal advisers; see eg Dutch Inquiry Report, supra note 194,
p. 108 – describing any possible legal basis under existing resolutions as ‘wafer-thin’. See
also the minority view in the course of the Dutch Inquiry Report itself that despite the
unlawfulness, support for the intervention may be justifiable; Additional note of Peter van
Walsum, Inquiry report, p. 133.
377 Article 2(4) puts the onus on states seeking to justify the use of force. See also Watts and
Berman, ‘Letter to The Times’, note 374.
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tion that unfolded was strictly necessary and proportionate, pursuant to its
objectives.
5B.3.1 Security Council authorisation?
Questions relating to the role of the Security Council come into sharpest focus
in relation to the use of force in Iraq. The first question, critical to the
lawfulness of the action in Iraq, in accordance with justifications proferred
by the UK at the time, is whether the Security Council had in fact implicitly
authorised use of force in Iraq. This is essentially a question of the correct
interpretation of the resolutions in question, though it raises broader questions
regarding the proper approach to the interpretation of Chapter VII resolutions.
The background facts to the assertion of implied authorisation are, in brief,
as follows.378 In 1991, in the context of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Resolu-
tion 678 authorised states to ‘use all necessary means’ to effect Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait and ‘to restore international peace and security in the region’.
Resolution 686 marked a provisional cessation of hostilities, while expressly
preserving the right to use force under Resolution 678, and Resolution 687
imposed a permanent ceasefire, without reference to the right to use force.
The Resolution 687 cease-fire was conditional on Iraqi destruction of existing
weapons of mass destruction and non-acquisition of others, and to this end
cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors. Subsequent resolutions, including
Resolution 1154, found Iraq in ‘material breach’ of these conditions, ordered
that immediate access be given to the inspectors and warned of ‘the severest
consequences’ of failure to do so, while explicitly noting that the Council
would ‘remain actively seized of the matter’.379
Post September 11, and post Afghanistan, the US and UK sought a further
resolution on Iraq.380 After negotiation, Resolution 1441 (2002) was
passed.381 It found Iraq in ‘material breach’ of earlier resolutions and gave
it ‘a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’ by setting
up an ‘enhanced inspection team’. It warned that non-cooperation would
constitute a ‘further material breach’ which would ‘be reported to the Council
for assessment’ and that the Council would ‘convene immediately ... in order
to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the
relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and secur-
ity’. The Council ‘Recall[ed], in that context, that the Council has repeatedly
378 For a description of the background and facts, see generally Dutch Inquiry Report, 2010,
supra note 194.
379 SC Res. 1154 (1998), 2 March 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1154 (1998) and SC Res. 1205 (1998),
5 November 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1205 (1998).
380 See C. Lynch, ‘US Presses UN to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution’, Washington Post,
7 November 2002.
381 SC Res. 1441 (2002), supra note 367.
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warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations’. Subsequent attempts (driven by the UK and US)
to negotiate a further resolution authorising the use of force failed.382
One of the legal justifications invoked for resorting to force was nonetheless
Council authorisation. The US did so by focusing on the existence of a ‘material
breach’ of the Council-imposed obligations as triggering the right to engage
the use of force.383 This argument has been aptly criticised as ignoring the
collective rather than unilateral nature of the process: the decision not only
whether there is material breach but also what action to take in response falls
to the Council not individual states.384 As noted in relation to ‘force to
enforce,’ there is no unilateral right of states to take such enforcement action
involving the use of force.
From the UK, the purported legal justification took the form of what might
be described as a mixture of cumulative, implied, or revived authorisation.
In accordance with advice of the UK Attorney General, published in summary
form on March 2003,385 the argument simply put was that the authorisation
to use force in Resolution 678 was suspended conditionally (not revoked) by
Resolution 687 and that once the Council had found Iraq in breach of those
conditions (Resolution 1441) the original right to use force was revived.
This argument has given rise to intense controversy on various grounds,
stemming from the ordinary meaning of UN resolutions, their context and
purpose.386 The first is that while Resolution 678 uncontroversially authorised
force, it did so for a particular purpose, namely to address the situation occa-
sioned by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in the context of circumstances pre-
valent in 1990. Absent express Council indication to the contrary, such author-
382 While many states opposed the use of force, it was the French expression of intention to
veto any resolution seeking to authorise force that was reported as having led the U.S. and
UK to abandon ‘the UN route’, although the French later denied this interpretation of their
words. See the speech given by the UK Prime Minister on 5 March 2003, justifying military
action in Iraq and warning of the continued threat of global terrorism (‘Full text: Tony Blair’s
speech’, The Guardian, 5 March 2004, available at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/
0%2C12956%2C1162991%2C00.html).
383 See memoranda produced by the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice:
‘Authority of the President under Domestic and International Law to Use Military Force Against
Iraq’, 23 October 2002, available at: http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/iraq-opinion-final.pdf;
and ‘Effect of a Recent United Nations Security Council Resolution on the Authority of the President
under International Law to Use Military Force Against Iraq’, 8 November 2002, available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/unscr.pdf. Akande and Milanovic, ‘Iraq Inquiry’,
note 368, para. 5.
384 Akande and Milanovic, ibid.
385 See earlier discussion. The Attorney General notoriously changed his advice, a point on
which he was called to account before the Iraq Inquiry. See Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice
to the Prime Minister of 14 January and 12 February 2003 and Lord Goldsmith’s memo-
randum to the Prime Minister on SC Res. 1441, 7 March 2003, para. 9, and testimony to
the Inquiry.
386 See Chapter 5.
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isation cannot be interpreted as supportive of the use of force in a very differ-
ent conflict, to address a very different threat, in 2003, in the context of circum-
stances necessarily quite distinct from those prevalent over a decade earlier.
Second, the plain wording of Resolutions 1154 and 1441, passed since the
1990 resolution, makes clear the Council’s intention to remain ‘seized’ of the
matter at each stage and to itself ‘consider’ how to address the situation as
it unfolds.387 The context of the debate in the Council leading to the adoption
of other Iraq resolutions, and statements made thereupon, reveal no agreement
that states should have a right to use force as a result of those resolutions or
an automatic right to do so in the event of a further breach. Indeed such
‘automaticity’ was expressly rejected by certain participating states in the
context of Resolution 1441.388
Moreover, the fact that renewed attempts were made to achieve a further
resolution expressly authorising force undermine the argument, ultimately
advanced, that no such resolution was necessary anyway.389
The controversy also spawns general questions regarding Security Council
resolutions and their interpretation of broader relevance to the use of force
against terrorism. These include whether the authorisation to use force can
ever be implied or, given the exceptional nature of the use of force, and the
stakes involved, it must be clear and explicit, and understood as limited to
the context and purpose for which it was given.390 As regards the ‘shelf life’
of any authorisation to use force, can the assessment of the requirements of
international peace and security at one point have continued relevance many
months and years later, or does it require clear revival by the Council? Could
an overly flexible interpretation of resolutions have a chilling impact on the
willingness of states to reach decisions within the Council in the future?391
Can – as the notion of ‘automaticity’ suggests – the Council delegate to member
states determinations as to what action, including the use of force, might be
necessary in the event of breach of its resolutions? Or, as has been suggested,
in accordance with the constitutional role of the Council is it to be doubted
387 See the travaux préparatoires to Resolutions 1154 and 1441, referred to in R. Singh and
A. MacDonald, ‘Legality of Use of Force against Iraq’, Opinion for Peacerights, 10 September
2002, para. 58, available at: http://www.lcnp.org/global/IraqOpinion10.9.02.pdf (hereinafter
‘Singh and MacDonald, Opinion on Iraq’).
388 Ibid.
389 The AG advised that the resolution was unnecessary on this basis. For a discussion of the
basis of this, see his advice to the Inquiry on 27 January 2010, and that of Elizabeth Wilm-
hurst then Deputy Legal Adviser on 26 January 2010, at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/.
390 See Framework, Section A of this Chapter.
391 See R. Higgins, ‘International Law in a Changing International System’, 58 (1999) Cambridge
Law Journal 78.
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not only whether the Council did delegate, but also whether it could have
delegated, such an assessment to individual states?392
The UK Attorney General had himself acknowledged at an earlier stage
that the ‘revival’ argument ‘is not widely accepted among academic com-
mentators’ and that he would not be confident of winning the argument ‘if
the matter ever came before a court’.393 The matter is now before a UK official
enquiry, which will report in due course.394 As noted above, the Dutch
Inquiry for its part completed its work in 2010 and delivered a critical report,
rejecting the arguments that either the ‘corpus’ of resolutions read together,
or material breach of prior resolutions, could constitute an adequate legal basis
for the intervention.395 The idea that prior authorisation may be relied upon
many years after the fact, for purposes not contemplated at the time of the
resolution, has little legal support, and if accepted would seriously destabilise
the collective security system.396
5B.3.2 Force to enforce UN resolutions?
Explaining the US vote in favour of Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002),
the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Negroponte,
stated that ‘[i]f the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a
further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state
from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce
relevant UN resolutions and protect world peace and security’.397 In the absence
of Council authorisation, can states rely on a breach of international obligations,
including Security Council resolutions, to justify the use of force?
There is no legal basis for the unilateral use of force pursuant to law
enforcement within the framework of international law. Statements such as
that cited appear to conflate and confuse the ‘inherent’ right to self defence
under the Charter and the right to use force to enforce law or otherwise protect
international peace and security, which is not inherent and exists only if
392 As noted in Part A, under the Charter it is for the Council to decide not only if there is
a breach and if it amounts, at the relevant time, to a threat to international peace and
security, but also what measures would be appropriate to address such a threat.
393 He advised therefore that the safer route would be to go for a second resolution, though
he later said the better view was that the revival argument would suffice, on the apparent
basis that no further resolution would be feasible. See testimony of Elzabeth Wilmshurst
to the Iraq Inquiry, available at: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43617/100126pm-
wilmshurst.pdf (hereinafter ‘Wilmshurst Testimony’), and Akande and Milanovic, ‘Iraq
Inquiry’, supra note 368.
394 The report is expected during 2013. See http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk.
395 Ducth Iraq Inquiry, 2010, above, Chapter 8 including the conclusion on p. 136.
396 Akande and Milanovic, ‘Iraq Inquiry’, note 368, at paras. 9 and 10.
397 Statement of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Negroponte,
following adoption of Resolution 1441, supra note 367.
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conferred by the Security Council. As noted in Part A, the measures of self
help that a state may take to enforce its own rights against an offending state
cannot amount to the use of force. Moreover, while certain circumstances, such
as serious violations of human rights, may give rise to the responsibility of
a broader range of states to act to stop the breach, there is no unilateral use
of force other than in self defence.398
5B.3.3 Unilateral Action where the Council Fails to Act?
In advancing this role for states, or specifically the United States, as enforcers
of obligations (and thereby protectors of the ‘relevance of the UN’), emphasis
was placed on Security Council failure to act. In the context of the Iraq
invasion, it was justified by reference to the fact that no explicit authorisation
could be obtained because the veto power had been ‘abused’, in particular
by France which had threatened its use ‘unreasonably’.
This implies a doctrine of ‘reasonableness’ surrounding the use of the veto
that international law does not recognise and which would, in practice,
eviscerate the Council’s authority.399 When the Charter was adopted, the
veto power for the five permanent members was inserted for political reasons,
to maintain a degree of political ‘balance’ in the decisions of the Security
Council, an inherently political body, albeit one with unique legal powers.
States’ reasons for voting and vetoing, which are in turn often political and
controversial in nature, cannot affect the legal effect of the veto power.400
Permitting a state to use force based on its assessment of what the Council
would have done had all members acted ‘reasonably’ would clearly be a
nonsense.
As noted, history does provide the precedent of the General Assembly’s
assumption of the Council’s responsibilities where the latter was deemed
unable to discharge its mandate, though a broad-reaching difference of view
(as over the issue of Iraq) is of course distinct from the paralysis of the Cold
War era. In any event, in the Iraq context assertions of Council failure did not
give rise to assertions of an alternative role for the General Assembly or other
398 See Chapter 3, para. 3.1.3. On the disputed right to intervention to prevent humanitarian
catastrophe, see Chapter 5A.3.1 and 5B.2.1.6.
399 See ‘Lawyers Doubt Iraq War Legality’, BBC, 7 March 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2829717.stm. It has also been pointed out that the position may not
serve the interests of the U.S. and UK as beneficiaries of the veto power; the U.S. is the
state resorting to that power most frequently.
400 Article 27 of the Charter provides that non-procedural matters require nine out of fifteen
votes, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.
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established collective mechanism, but rather resort to the unilateral, US-led,
use of force.401
Both the US and UK expressed a preference for Council authorisation at
an early stage, while reserving their right to use force unilaterally or multi-
laterally outside the UN framework if UN consensus could not be achieved and
the Security Council ‘fails to act decisively’.402 (When the US formed the view
that a resolution would not be feasible, both states reverted to arguing that
it was not, in any event, necessary.403) This would appear to imply that
Council authorisation is optional rather than mandatory and that, at most,
resort to the Council is a remedy to be exhausted before invoking force uni-
laterally. Despite the rhetoric of ensuring the ‘relevance’ of the UN and the
enforcement of its decisions, an approach whereby a State gives the Council
time within which to act, threatening do so itself if the Council does not, raises
broader questions relating to the ultimate impact on the legitimacy of the
Charter’s collective security mechanism.
Do the events surrounding the Iraq invasion therefore indicate a
marginalisation of role of the Security Council in favour of unilateral or select-
ive collective approaches, and if so what might be the impact of such a shift
in other situations? Or, assessed with the benefit of a longer lens, does the
extent of the harsh criticism of the use of force in Iraq indicate a backlash away
from unilateralism accepted in relation to Afghanistan towards endorsement
of ‘the UN route’? The Iraq experience may have contributed to the momentum
that grows around whether and how the Security Council system might be
strengthened, reformed and made more effective.404
401 Neither the GA nor for that matter NATO (though, as already noted, the latter has no
independent authority unless self defence) were involved in resort to force in Iraq.
402 See, e.g., ‘Powell Says No Quid-Pro-Quos Exchanged for U.N. Vote’, U.S. Department of
State Press Release, 10 November 2002, available at: http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_11/
alia/a2110803.htm: ‘I can assure you if [Saddam Hussein] doesn’t comply this time, we
are going to ask the U.N. to give authorization for all necessary means. If the U.N. isn’t
willing to do that, the United States, with like-minded nations, will go and disarm him
forcefully ...’ See also UK Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 25 February 2003,
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030225/
debtext/30225-05. ‘…If disarmament cannot happen by means of the UN route because
Saddam Hussein is not co-operating properly, then what? We shall be left with a choice
between leaving him there, with his weapons of mass destruction, in charge of Iraq – the
will of the UN having therefore been set at nothing – and using force.’
403 See ‘Wilmshurst Testimony’, supra note 393.
404 See UN Doc A/59/565 (2004), supra note 187. Secretary-General’s statement to the General
Assembly on his Report ‘In Larger Freedom’, United Nations, 21 March 2005, available at:
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=1355. UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005),
paras. 152-154. See also Reforming the UN Security Council in Pursuance of Collective
Security, Nico Schrijver, Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2007), Vol. 12 No. 1, 127-138.
The Use of Force 295
5B.3.4 Anticipatory self defence?
Post 9/11 the issue of anticipatory self defence first arose, to some extent, in
relation to Afghanistan, as the attack committed on 9/11 was apparently over
by the time the military response was launched on 7 October, although the
threat of future attacks remained.405 Perhaps as a result of the nature of the
9/11 attacks themselves, hitherto controversial questions regarding the legit-
imacy of anticipatory self defence were hardly raised in that context, leading
to the stark assertion shortly after the Afghan invasion that ‘in the changed
post-September 11 environment, the concept of anticipatory self defence
requires no explanation or justification’.406 To the extent that the apparent
acceptance of anticipatory self defence in Afghanistan may strengthen the case
for such a right, it would, however, do so only in very limited circumstances.
In Afghanistan those circumstances included (a) a prior attack (of a massive
scale), (b) an expressed intention to carry out future attacks, and, arguably,
(c) an indication by the Security Council that the requirements of self defence
have been satisfied.407 Any analysis of the impact of the law in this field must
therefore take account of these limitations408 and be assessed in context, in
particular in light of the controversy generated over the subsequent assertions
of anticipatory self defence in Iraq and elsewhere.
In relation to Iraq, the US made several references to the need to act ‘to
defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq’.409 Unlike Afghanistan, there
was no meaningful attempt to link Iraq to the attack of September 11 or other
attacks, or indeed to al-Qaeda, and as such the justification was clearly anti-
cipatory self defence, without any prior attack. One immediate doubt that such
arguments generated in the context of Iraq was what immediate ‘threat’ Iraq
and the alleged weapons of mass destruction posed to the intervening nations
405 See U.S. letter to the Security Council which emphasised the preventive and deterrent effect
of the use of force.
406 W.K. Lietzau, ‘Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?’, in M.N. Schmitt and G.L.
Beruto (eds.), Terrorism and International Law, Challenges and Responses (Sanremo, 2003) 75,
at p. 77.
407 Preamble, SC Res. 1368 (2001), note 288, and SC Res. 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN
Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
408 Account should also be taken of the peculiarities of the Afghan situation; see this chapter,
para. 5B.4.
409 Statement of the U.S. Representative to the UN, note 454. Similar justifications for the
military action in Iraq have been put forward by the U.S. President. See, e.g., George W.
Bush, UN General Assembly in New York City Address, 12 September 2002, available at:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.
See also Taft IV and Buchenwald, ‘Agora: Future Implications’, note 367; J. Yoo, ‘Agora:
Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: International Law and the War in Iraq’, 97 (2003)
AJIL 563.
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and whether it could meet the criteria for self defence.410 In the UK, it was,
with time, made clear that Iraq was not considered by the government to pose
an imminent threat to the UK; but in fact no reliance had been placed by the
UK on self defence.411
The US, however, focused on much publicised concerns regarding the
possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein’s regime, in
apparent support of the right to use force to prevent ‘dangerous nations’
threatening the US and the world with ‘destructive weapons’.412 What is
critical for an assessment of lawfulness is not what we now know about the
threat (or lack of one) from WMDs in Iraq, but what the government in ques-
tion reasonably believed, upon best inquiry, to have been the case at the
relevant time.413 While the possession and development of weapons of mass
destruction certainly raises legal issues,414 including the fact that Iraq specific-
ally had obligations in this respect imposed by the Security Council,415
unlawfulness in this respect clearly does not per se justify the use of force in
self defence.416 The critical question, whether any such weapons represented
a real and immediate threat to the US, was not addressed by the US, which
preferred to advance an expanded conception of pre-emptive self defence as
enabling states to act preventively before such threats are formed.417 If Iraq
410 See Chapter 5A.2.1. There was no evidence of other nations in the Middle Eastern region
having requested that the intervening forces act in ‘collective self defence, so the threat
must have been to the intervening states’. See Bothe, ‘Preemptive Force’, supra note 74, at
234. Where the threat is against one of those states, others can however act in collective
self defence if requested to do so by the ‘victim’ state.
411 In the context of the extended debate on the ‘45 minute claim’ published by the UK Govern-
ment in a dossier of evidence against Iraq, the UK Government clarified that there was
not thought to be any such imminent threat to the UK from Iraq. See R. Norton-Taylor and
N. Watt, ‘No. 10 Knew: Iraq No Threat’, The Guardian, 19 August 2003.
412 President Bush’s State of the Union Address: ‘I will not wait on events, while dangers
gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America
will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most
destructive weapons.’ On U.S. reliance on self defence in Iraq, see Ambassador Negroponte’s
intervention before the Security Council, supra note 367.
413 See generally, ‘Briefings of the Security Council’, 27 January, 14 February, and 7 March 2003,
made by Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix, available at: http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/
new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp.
414 In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons the ICJ noted that, under the terms of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, all states had an obligation in good faith to seek nuclear disarma-
ment via international negotiations. See in this respect R. Falk, ‘Appraising the War against
Afghanistan’, note 284.
415 Note Security Council resolutions directed against specific states detailing their obligations
to disarm, see, e.g., SC Res. 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), concerning
the conditions for the ceasefire in Iraq, including disarmament, discussed in section A.
416 It may, however, be a breach of international peace and security, but, as already noted,
this must be determined by the Security Council.
417 See 5B.3.1 and 5.B.4. See discussion of the controversial U.S. National Security Strategy 2002
that advanced this view prior to Iraq, below.
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did not pose an immediate threat, it did, it was suggested, pose a potential
threat.
Suffice to recall that the claims to lawfulness on the grounds of self defence
in the context of Iraq met with short shrift from other states; indeed the Dutch
Inquiry described it as ‘universally recognised’ that there was no such legal
basis.418 The apparent attempt, at least at the early stages, to rely on self
defence arguments went undefended, and as time went on appears tohave
been deemphasised by the United States itself.419
The fact that, as is now known, evidence did not emerge of weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq following the invasion underscore the questions,
highlighted above, as to the degree of evidence that should be required for
the use of force against another state, and the lack of any procedure for safe-
guarding the application of the law of self defence, when states adopt a uni-
lateralist approach outwith the UN framework.
5B.3.5 Humanitarian intervention?
Finally, both the US and UK peppered their discourse on Iraq, and Afghanistan,
with references to the humanitarian situations in those countries, but without
purporting to rely onhumanitarian intervention as a legal justification as
such.420 Some have questioned whether humanitarian intervention might
not have provided a more plausible basis for legality than other arguments
advanced, given the notoriety of the Taleban and Sadam Hussein’s regimes.421
The reluctance of states to advance the argument, particularly on the part
of the UK as the erstwhile proponent of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention
in exceptional circumstances, may be seen to reflect the controversial nature
of the right and undermine the case for its establishment in international law.
Or, more compellingly, it may reflect acknowledgement that the formulae of
418 Iraq Inquiry report, 2010, supra note 194.
419 See Taft IV and Buchenwald, ‘Agora: Future Implications’, supra note 409, writing in 2003,
who place less emphasis on self defence than Negroponte and Bush did in the autumn
of 2002; see also Statement of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, note 399.
420 See e.g., U.S. President’s Message to the Iraqi People, 10 April 2003, available at: http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030410-2.html and ‘A
Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’, paper published by the UK Government on 17 March
2003, available at: http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/number-10.gov.
uk/output/page3280.asp: ‘The Iraqi people deserve to be lifted from tyranny and allowed
to determine the future of their country for themselves....’ See also the remarks made by
the U.S. President on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (‘President
Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan’, White House Press Release,
19 March 2004, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2004/03/images/20040319-3_d031904-515h.html) and cf. K. Roth, ‘War in Iraq: Not a
Humanitarian Intervention’, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2004.
421 See, e.g., R. Falk, ‘Appraising the War against Afghanistan’, note 296.
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pre-requisites advanced in other contexts for such intervention – notably the
requirement of imminent humanitarian catastrophe or crisis – were not satis-
fied, despite the undoubted brutality of the regimes in question. In addition,
it may be that the timing of the interventions, following 9/11, belied the notion
that the true objective (as opposed to desirable side effect) was humanitarian
in nature.
5B.4 THE US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES: INTERNATIONALISM, UNI-
LATERALISM OR EXCEPTIONALISM?
The US National Security Strategies are discussed above in relation to self
defence specifically. Their approach to collective security, and to international
law more broadly, also deserve mention.
The 2002 Strategy describes itself as ‘based on a distinctly American inter-
nationalism’.422 While there are several references to allies, coalitions and
international institutions (in that order), it clearly presents a multilateral
approach to the use of force as optional rather than mandatory and places
emphasis on the readiness of the US to use pre-emptive force unilaterally. It
notes that: ‘[w]hile the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to
exercise our right of self defence by acting preemptively’.423 One striking
feature of the US National Security Strategy in the post 9/11 context was
therefore its readiness to unilateralism.
In this respect a notable shift is apparent in the decade of the war on terror.
The 2010 NSS emphasizes engagement, diplomacy, strategic multilateralism
and strengthening organisations such as UN and NATO (alongside maintaining
US military supremacy).424 The key question is of course not what is in the
document but what is in the policy, and how it is given effect. The turn
towards international community may be a noteworthy reflection of the lessons
of the war on terror, and the effects of excessive unilateralism epitomized in
the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006. The lauding of multilateral-
ism currently jars, however, with the invocation of such a broad-reaching right
to use force unilaterally and preemptively anywhere in the world, as discussed
in the preceding section.
Finally, the prominence and relevance of international law in the US
National Security Strategies is worthy of comment. As noted above, there is
no apparent attempt, direct or indirect, to justify the policy of preemptive self
422 U.S. National Security Strategy, note 72, p. 1.
423 U.S. National Security Strategy, note 72, p. 7. It also notes that ‘wherever possible, the U.S.
will rely on regional organisations and states ... where they meet their obligations to fight
terrorism’ (ibid., p. 8).
424 Grey, CJIL para 3. See also Koh ASIL 2010, note 413.
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defence by reference to international law in any of the Strategies. In 2002,
international law is referred to explicitly only once, with regard not to US
policy but in the characterisation of ‘rogue states’ which, inter alia, ‘display
no regard for international law, threaten their neighbours, and callously violate
international treaties to which they are party’.425 In 2006 it is not mentioned
at all. In 2010, there are many references to international law, but they are
still selective. No attempt is made to justify the policy of self defence according
to international law, with the emphasis instead on enforcement of international
law breaches by others. For example, it notes that ‘We are strengthening
international norms to isolate governments that flout them and to marshal
cooperation against non-governmental actors who endanger our common
security.’426
Regrettably, when reference is made to international law, it continues to
be presented as applicable to others, rather than being expressly acknowledged
as also a constraint on the United States. Conversely, it is open to question
whether it envisages that the same standards – for example regarding global
pre-emptive self defence – that it advances for the US should be available to
others. If not, the Strategies may represent not so much to a doctrine of uni-
lateralism as one of US exceptionalism, that challenges the universality and
credibility of the international legal order that the 2010 US Strategy, en-
couragingly, purports to uphold.
5B.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST TERRORISM BY OTHER
STATES
While the focus of this Chapter is on the practice of the US, which has led the
war on terror, it bears emphasis that the practice of cross border force is far
from unique to the US, and a similar model may be arising recurrently in
international practice in recent years.427
Notably, the Russian Federation has an anti-terrorism law conferring on
the Russian President the right to send Russian special forces beyond Russia’s
borders, potentially to any state where he considers it necessary, in order to
425 Rogue states are also described as violating human rights, being determined to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring terrorism, rejecting basic human values and
‘hat[ing] the United States and everything for which it stands’. U.S. National Security
Strategy, note 72, p. 14.
426 Ibid., para 18. C Gray, para 4, who notes that ‘a similar approach is taken in the 2010 UK
National Security Strategy’; see www.number10.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2010/10/
national-security-strategy-55815.
427 This chapter concerns only use of force against other states; for increasing resort to force
against people in their own territory in the name of counterterrorism, the relevant frame-
work is human rights law in Chapter 7. For example Syria justified a brutal clampdown
during 2012 as action against terrorism.
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take whatever measure he deems necessary, to combat terrorism.428 Other
examples emerge from practice including the open announcement by Kenya
on October 2011 that it would be taking cross border action against al Shabaab
militants in Somalia.429 Turkish justified its cross-border incursions against
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) camps in northern Iraq by reference both to
self defence and ‘hot pursuit.’430 Colombian incursions into Ecuador to take
action against FARC rebels based there provides another example.431
While each of these situations raises different issues, there has been a wave
of assertions of a broad-reaching right to take cross border coercive measures
in the name of the prevention of terrorism. Some of them were relevant to
consideration of how the legal framework may have developed, as noted
above.432 The significance of the questions raised regarding the US’s asserted
right to use force against terrorists anywhere in the world are therefore
heightened. The US approach may legitimise the same approach by others,
as practice already indicates,433 with significant implications for the pro-
hibition on the use of force at the heart of the international order. It may also
contribute, in the future, to a shift in the law itself.434 It has been noted that
428 S.T. Bridge, ‘Russia’s New Counteracting Terrorism Law: The Legal Implications of Pursuing
Terrorists Beyond the Borders of the Russian Federation’, 3 (2009) Columbia Journal of East
European Law 1.
429 E. Hughes, ‘In (Hot) Pursuit of Justice? The Legality of Kenyan Military Operations in
Somalia’, 20 (2012) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 471.
430 ‘The U.S. has expressed solidarity with Turkey in its fight against terror, saying that it
recognizes that Ankara is exercising its right to self-defense with recent air strikes against
bases of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq’. Today’s Zaman,
Istanbul, 23 August 2011, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-254728-us-
recognizes-turkeys-right-to-self-defense-in-air-strikes-over-iraq.html
431 Tams, ‘The Use of Force’, supra note 50.
432 See for example, shifting approaches to the question of attribution and practice post-Afghan-
istan, Chapter 5B.2.
433 In passing the 2006 law ‘On countering terrorism’ with its broad reaching right to target
terrorists abroad, Russian legislators reportedly stated that they were “emulating Israeli
and US actions in adopting a law allowing the use of military and special forces outside
the country’s borders against external threats.” See Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extra-judicial executions A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010), para 25. Violations in other areas
of law have likewise justified further violations by others, as illustrated in Chapters 7-10.
434 Christian Tams concludes that ‘in the course of two decades, the legal rules governing the
use of force have been re-adjusted, so to permit forcible responses against terrorism under
more lenient conditions.’ See Tams, ‘Use of Force’ supra note 50, at p. 361. In some areas,
e.g. on self defence being possible against ‘terrorist’ attacks without state attribution, that
shift may already have taken place (see 5.A.2.1 noting that the predominant view post 9/11
seems to be that the source of an armed attack for self defence purposes need not be a state.)
In others e.g. on pre-emptive self defence there is insufficient support for that proposition
in internaitonal practice for there to be a shift, but that may change over time (see 5A.2.1
on anticipatory self defence).
The Use of Force 301
‘if other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States
does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.’435
5B.6 CONCLUSION
The previous chapter considered the role of criminal law and international
law enforcement in the struggle against international terrorism. The use of
force by states is not an alternative for states where that enforcement proves
challenging or even inadequate. Rather the prohibition on the use of force is
one of the most fundamental norms of international law around which the
current legal order is built. The use of force against terrorism can be justified
only where one of the exceptions to that prohibition apply – through Security
Council authorization or the conditions for self defence being met. If they are
to remain exceptions, they must be strictly construed.
The use of force has, however, been a major part of the war on terror. In
the early stages, it took the form of large scale military interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and it has evolved into a global campaign of targeted
killings which has killed thousands of people in several states, and which gives
every indication of being set to continue as a method of choice for years to
come.
The Security Council’s uncharacteristically proactive role post 9/11 is
discussed in other chapters,436 but the Council has notably not authorised
the use of force.437 This may itself reflect the reluctance on the part of the
international community to endorse the use of force as an appropriate tool
against terrorism. This reluctance may in turn be increased following the
experience of more than a decade of a ‘war on terror.’ While the use of force
in Iraq has been singularly condemned for its unlawfulness and having shaken
435 K. Anderson, ‘Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War’, Written
Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2010, p. 5, para. 11, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/
congress/2010_hr/032310anderson.pdf (hereinafter ‘Anderson Written Testimony’). Alston,
‘Statement of U.N. Special Rapporteur on U.S. Targeted Killings Without Due Process’,
supra note 433; see e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
436 See Chapter 2 and in particular Chapter 7B.1 on the Council’s novel legislative and quasi-
judicial roles.
437 Whether the Council had authorised force was only a real issue at all in relation to the
use of force in Iraq as explained above, and the argument does not withstand scrutiny as
the Dutch Inquiry’s report exemplifies.
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the international system,438 the effectiveness of the use of force as a dominant
approach in combating terrorism has been questioned more broadly.439
The real battleground of the ad bellum post 9/11 has been the potential
scope and limits of the right of self defence. Reflecting its status as the one
recognized exception to prohibition on unilateral force, the self defence blanket
has been stretched, perhaps to tearing point, over a range of conduct and
circumstances which it is submitted it cannot conceivably cover. The incon-
sistensies between practice and the law, highlighted in this chapter, have been
striking. As have claims that the fabric of the law has been altered along the
way, though the extent of this shift should be treated with some caution.
Assertions of legal shift are most pertinent, and most compelling, in relation
to Afghanistan, where the use of force, like the September 11 attacks that
preceded it, met with overwhelmingly unified international support. Arguably,
this was so without a number of questions relevant to an assessment of the
lawfulness of the use of force ever being asked or answered. The first question
was whether the attribution of terrorist acts to a state was a prerequisite to
the existence of an ‘armed attack’ and the right to use self defence in the
territory of that state. State responses to the Afghan intervention have therefore
been broadly cited as contributing to a shift in the law in this respect.440 This
appears to be supported by subsequent practice, which suggests that in the
debate on the lawfulness of cross border incursions in the course of counter-
terrorism operations onto other states territories, attribution is rarely raised
as a legal requirement.441
Emphasis has instead been placed on the ‘unwillingness and inability’ of
states on whose territory self defence is employed to address the threats of
terrorism emanating from their territory. Such unwillingness or inability is
a legal pre-requisite to the neceesity of action in self defence, but caution is
undoubtedly due not to inflate, as some have, the significance of the assessment
by one state of another as ‘unwilling or unable’ as somehow rendering moot
the basic sovereignty concerns or the applicability of the Article 2(4) prohi-
438 Chirac, 23 September 2003, supra note 370. Iraq is often cited as a deterrent to further use
of force in Syria and elsewhere. See also Spanish president Zapatero noting that after the
Madrid attacks that ‘You cannot combat terrorism with war. What war does, as has
happened in Iraq, is to proliferate hate, violence and terror’, El Pais, 16 March 2004. See
recognition of negative impact of Iraq also in President Obama Speech on Drones and
Counter-terrorism, 23 May 2013.
439 Gray, supra note 24, p. 2 notes that the experience of Afghan, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia
do not suggest that the use of force has been an effective response to terrorism See also
e.g. the contrasting approach of the UN Global Strategy, Chapter 7B3 See ICJ Eminent Jurists
Panel Report 2010.
440 See 5A.2.1.1.
441 In assessing such impact on the law the reactions must be considered in context, by refer-
ence for example to events that followed, such as the intervention in Iraq, and Israeli attacks
on Syria. Eg UN Press Release, 5 October 2003, UN Doc. SC/7887 or the Turkish incursion
into Northern Iraq. See Tams, ‘Use of Force’, supra note 50, p. 379.
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bition. While the imperative of enhanced international law enforcement is clear,
it does not provide legal justification for the unilateral use of force. It may
support the claim of lack of alternatives to the use of force, as required be self
defence, where the conditions for self defence are met.
Beyond apparently dispensing with the attribution requirement, the lasting
effect of the Afghan intervention and response is less clear. Legally speaking,
serious doubts must attend the proportionality of targeting in Afghanistan,
and whether attacking state institutions with a view to brigning about regime
change was truly necessary to avert the attack. Yet the Afghan intervention
was marked by an unwillingness to question or insist on necessity and
proportionality in the response to 9/11, or to raise the politically unpopular
questions regarding the lawfulness of the broad scope of the intervention,
including regime change. Such questions were clear in October 2001, and to
the extent that self defence could plausibly be invoked in Afghanistan many
years later, became glaring.
The failure to question lawfulness in reaction to Afghanistan is of course
less surprising from a political perspective. Shock and revulsion at the Septem-
ber 11 attacks was followed by apprehension as to the response that might
ensue, particularly in light of the threatening rhetoric that those not ‘for’ the
campaign would be considered ‘against’ it, and held to account according-
ly.442 Afghanistan was not only a pariah state with an exceptionally notorious
human rights record, for which it had been widely condemned, its de facto
government was also uniquely unpopular in the region and globally. At least
in the short term there was much to be lost and little to be gained geopolitical-
ly from opposition to this conflict. It is possible to speculate that certain
reactions, or the absence thereof, may have been based less on a view as to
the lawfulness of military action and more on flexibility borne of a reluctance
to defend the Taliban or take the intervening forces to task.443 It is unclear
to what extent the many unique features of that situation may limit the extent
442 See, for example, the State of the Union Speech by the United States’ President, 20 September
2001: ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States
as a hostile regime.’ (Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush, 2001-2008, The White
House, p. 69, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bush
record/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf). See also ‘axis of evil’ speech,
U.S. President George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 29 January 2002, available
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
443 While what states say and do is critical for the opinio juris rather than political motivation,
where there is ambiguity, regard can legitimately be had to the context in which state
reactions unfold. Such political factors may be directly relevant to assessing the precedential
value, if any, of action, and the likelihood that similar ‘flexibility’ would be shown in the
future.
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to which the legacy of Afghanistan will be seen to be a broader ‘relaxing’ of
the requirements of self defence.444
More recently, in particular with the shift to resort to targeted killings,
the focus of controversy is on ‘pre-emptive’ or preventive self defence. While
the assertion of the right to use force to prevent threats of terrorism, rather
than responding to on-going or imminent attacks, has been a stalwark of US
strategies since 9/11. The potential implications of the ‘revolutionary’445 view
of self defence, advanced in the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and
2006 and continued through the practice of targeted killings, are serious.
Particularly so where the expansive view of anticipatory self defence combines
with the apparent loosening or abolition of the state responsibility link: the
net impact is that an unclear threat from an unclear entity with unclear links
to states may render those states, their representatives and citizens vulnerable
to attack.
This view has, however, found little support and generated considerable
controversy, leaving serious cause to doubt that there might be a shift in
international law towards acceptance of such a doctrine.446 The US National
Security Strategy of 2002 and 2006, to the extent that they purported to present
a legal argument as to the state of the law at all, did not garner international
support.447 When it was relied upon (among other grounds), by the US in
relation to Iraq, it was not endorsed by any other state involved in that inter-
vention and met with firm rebuke from many other states and com-
mentators.448 More recently, the UK once again made clear the opposition
to pre-emptive self defence that it has maintained throughout the war on
terror.449 The lack of indication of acceptance of such an approach by the
broader international community of states means that it is highly unlikely,
however, at least for the time being, to impact on international law.450
444 A more flexible approach to self defence has been suggested by various academics as noted
above and reflected in US policy. The dangers of e.g. acceptance of attacks from non-state
actors are limited so long as self defence is otherwise curtailed by strict respect for eg
necessity and proportionality, but practice to date suggests otherwise.
445 Gray, ‘Bush Doctrine’, supra note 353.
446 Gray, ibid. para 30 states of the U.S. decision not to include it in the 2010 NSS, “...it could
be argued that the absence of express reaffirmation does weaken any claim that there is
a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense in international law.”
447 See ‘Iraq’ B3. The isolation of the U.S. position on preemptive force is acknowledged
implicitly in the Brennan speech of April 2012, where he tries, unconvincingly, to reduce
the differences to different definitions of imminence.
448 See, e.g., the statement of the French President, Jacques Chirac, on 23 September 2003, supra
note 370. Although Iraq was mostly about the interpretation of Council resolutions the
US on occasion also referred to its right to act preemptively.
449 Foremost U.S. ally in the WOT, the UK, has consistently rejected ‘preemptive’ self defence
(in Iraq and in 2012 in rejecting U.S. requests for assistance in relation to Iran): http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/26/iran-military-action-downing-street.
450 See the discussion on ‘how international law changes’ in Chapter 1.2.2.
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The United States for its part has distanced itself from extreme expressions
of a doctrine of preemption, reflecting at least an appreciation of the inter-
national isolation of its legal position.451 It has presented encouraging
messages regarding the importance of multilateralism, which may hint at
lessons learned from aspects of its unilateral resort to force since 9/11.452
While these statements reassure on one level, they juxtapose with the growing
unilateral resort to force across borders, and the assertion by the world’s
dominant military power of the right to do so anywhere on the global battle-
field.453 As recent practice has clarified, there is no support in international
law for the right to use force for prevention, as opposed to in response to an
on-going or imminent attack. The extent to which this practice will be adopted
by other states (as foreshadowed by the Russian Federation’s law on the use
of force), and the potential implications for the prohibition on the use of force
in international law, are uncertain.
The use of force post 9/11 has certainly challenged the boundaries of the
international legal framework in many ways. Resort to force has taken many
different forms, provoking vastly different state reactions to them. While the
use of force in Afghanistan, like the September 11 attacks that preceded it,
met with perhaps unprecedented international unity, the use of force in Iraq
caused international division rarely seen in the post-Cold War era. As regards
the latest frontier of the war on terrorism, the broader assertion of the right
to use of force against al Qaeda and the implementation of a targeted killings
programme on a potential global scale, the extent to which the unfolding
international response condemns, condones or endorses this may influence
the ultimate impact on the jus ad bellum.454
States may become more robust in their insistence on respect for inter-
national law as forceful action continues to be used against lower level sus-
pected terrorists, in a broader range of states. The debate may yet clarify the
limits of the law’s flexibility and the dangers of an unbridled unilateralism
or the stretching beyond plausible limits of the notion of self defence.455
Experience thus far, however, appears to point to a more ‘flexible’ understand-
ing of standards in relation to the prohibition on the use of force, the full
451 See US National Security Strategy 2010 which did not address the issue and Brennan April
2012 speech noting why it matters to find common ground on international law with other
states. This may all make it less likely that the assertion of a right to use force preventively
will affect the prohibition on the use of preemptive self defence in internaitonla law.
452 See ‘Multilateralism’ at 5.B.4.
453 U.S. military spending stands at half of the world’s total military spending. Its military
capacity is not comparable to that of any other nation. Gray, note 343, notes “But the limits
of military power are clear from the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
are acknowledged in the 2010 USNSS.”
454 Little condemnation was seen around the bin Laden operation, discussed separately at
Chapter 9; the impact of that particular situation on the law may support the flexible
approach whereby states are reluctant to condemn incursions of this type.
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implications of which – for the practice of states around the world – remain
to be seen.
6 International humanitarian law
‘I observed that men rushed to war for slight causes or no causes at all,
and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any
respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general
decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes.’
Hugo Grotius, 16251
‘The war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped, and defeated.’
G.W. Bush, 20012
‘We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will
define us.’
B. Obama, 20133
Discussions around the scope and nature of international humanitarian law
(IHL) have dominated legal discourse in the ‘war on terror’. Whether this
attention is deserved, or represents an overstretching of the notion of ‘war’
and with it an inflation of the relevance of IHL, is a matter of considerable
dispute. IHL applies to particular conduct carried out in association with an
‘armed conflict’ as understood under IHL. Undoubtedly a critical preliminary
matter, on which the nature of applicable law depends,4 is whether, when
and where operations aimed at counter-terrorism form part of an armed
conflict properly so-called.5 Beyond disputes concerning the applicability of
IHL, are other myriad questions regarding the interpretation and application
1 H. Grotius, On Laws of War and Peace (Paris, 1625), para. 28.
2 Address of the former U.S. President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People, 20 September 2001.
3 Address by President Obama to the National Defence University, 23 May 2013.
4 While the generally applicable framework of human rights law (IHRL) continues to apply
in armed conflict alongside IHL, its content is in significant respects altered by the co-
applicability of IHL. See Chapter 7B3.
5 See below 6A1.
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of IHL, and even the adequacy of a legal framework often impugned post 9/11
as ill equipped to address a ‘new war’ against a new enemy.6
This chapter seeks to set out the legal framework as it currently governs
the conduct of states and non-state parties to armed conflicts. Part A of this
chapter – which sketches out the legal framework of IHL – will begin with the
law that defines whether there is an armed conflict, if so what sort of conflict,
and when it begins and ends. This will be followed by a summary of specific
provisions of the legal framework of IHL, in relation to who may be targeted,
lawful methods and means of warfare and humanitarian protections that are
relevant to terrorism and action against terrorism in such armed conflicts.
Part B of this chapter explores in more detail how this legal framework
has been applied in practice in the context of the ‘war on terror’ since 2001.
The question of greatest controversy and import is whether there can be, as
the US government asserts, a conflict with al-Qaeda and associates or with
terrorist networks of global reach. In this context, controversies surrounding
terrorist networks as ‘parties’ to an armed conflict, and the relevance of the
lack of temporal or geographic limits to the putative war of global reach, will
be highlighted. In light of current international law, it will be doubted whether
there can, legally, be an armed conflict with a movement such as al-Qaeda.
There have, however, undoubtedly been conflicts since 9/11, most obviously
in Afghanistan, Iraq or more recently Mali for example, which are often
described as linked in varying ways to the fight against terrorism, to which
IHL applies. Moreover, if the US seeks to invoke IHL in support of its conduct
in broader contexts it should, at a minimum, be expected to apply the law
consistently, and act in accordance with its terms.
Particular practices employed in recent years – from the designation of
‘enemy combatants’ to the use of drones to killings of persons considered
members of al-Qaeda, for example – will therefore be considered in light of
the legal framework. Specific issues that have arisen in the Afghan conflict,
to which IHL clearly applies, are also discussed. IHL issues will also be
addressed in subsequent chapters: Chapter 7 will explore the inter-relationship
between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), and Chapters 8-10
apply the legal framework in case studies concerning the Guantanamo Bay
detainees, the killing of Osama bin Laden or the Extraordinary Rendition
programme.
6 See, e.g., U.S. President George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 29 January 2002;
Statement by Ambassador at Large, Pierre Prosper, Address at Chatham House, 20 February
2002 cited in E. Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 2; see also discussion on the ‘changing characteristics of war’
in M. Berdal, ‘The “New Wars” Thesis Revisited’, in H. Strachan and S. Scheipers (eds.),
The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 109.
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6A THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
International humanitarian law is applicable once there has been a resort to
force, and an armed conflict has arisen. The threshold legal question for IHL
to be relevant is whether there is an armed conflict, in accordance with the
legal definition and understandings of the term discussed below. The use of
the ‘terrorism’ label is not determinative of, and indeed not generally relevant
to, the question of whether there is an armed conflict properly so-called.7 For
various reasons, chiefly political in nature, armed groups engaged in an armed
conflict are often labelled ‘terrorists,’ particularly by opponents; this has been
common historically in situations of non-international conflict, and may be
more evident post 9/11.8 Conversely, one of the unusual characteristics of
the so-called ‘war on terror’ has been the labelling of terrorist organisations
as ‘enemy combatants’ engaged in an armed conflict.9
This tendency to conflate terrorism and conflict by politicians, lawyers and
the media has elicited much criticism in recent years for the confusion it
generates, and its legal and practical implications.10 The questions of whether
there is an armed conflict, and whether particular acts are carried out in
association with it, are preliminary legal questions, which must be determined
by reference to IHL.
7 See, e.g., Ljube Boškoski, et al, ICTY IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 10 July 2008, where the Macedonian
government considered the group in question as ‘terrorist’, while the ICTY found it was
party to an armed conflict. Likewise, Israel considers Hezbollah a terrorist organisation,
but the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry into Lebanon noted that this did not
influence the qualification of the armed conflict: UN Report of the Commission of Inquiry
on Lebanon, 23 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/3/2, paras. 8, 9, 57, 62.
8 A common scenario arises in which governments designate opponents ‘terrorists’ to
delegitimize them, and to prosecute them under criminal law, rather than treating them
as participants in an armed conflict with rights upon capture. References to armed groups
as ‘terrorists’ is common in many states, such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Russia (with
regard to Chechnya), and some suggest increasingly so since 9/11: see A. Bianchi and Y.
Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Oxford: Hart 2011) p. 100. Criminal
charges have reportedly been used as ‘bargaining chips’ e.g. in Nepal in 2006 where the
government agreed to drop terrorism charges against the rebels in exchange for a ceasefire.
‘Nepal calls ceasefire with rebels’, BBC News, 3 May 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/south_asia/4969422.stm.
9 See discussion of US policy post 9/11 at Part B, and chapters 8 and 12. See also the Israeli
Supreme Court’s qualification of a ‘continuous situation of armed conflict’ between Israel
and Palestinian ‘terrorist organizations’. The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
The Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02, Israeli Supreme Court, 14 December 2006, para. 16
(hereinafter ‘Ruling on Targeted Killings’)..
10 See, e.g., J. Pejic, ‘Armed Conflict and Terrorism: There is a (Big) Difference’, in A. Salinas
de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 171-204. Pejic discusses legal, political and
practical reasons for keeping the terms distinct, including e.g. the risk of criminalizing lawful
acts under IHL and disincentivising peace negotiations, at p. 203.
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The precise content of IHL varies, to some degree, depending on the nature
of the conflict. For IHL purposes, conflicts are broadly categorized into inter-
national or non-international in nature, although (as explored further below)
the distinction is often unclear in practice and there are multiple variants on
each form of conflict.11 In any event, it is increasingly recognised that a com-
mon set of core of principles applies to any type of conflict. IHL imposes
constraints on how a conflict may be waged, its primary objective being to
protect certain persons who do not (or no longer) take part in hostilities and
to limit the methods and means of warfare for the benefit of all.12 For this
reason, a key consideration under IHL – unlike human rights law for example
– is the status of the individual (as a combatant, a civilian, a person partici-
pating directly in hostilities, etcetera), which determines, to some extent,
whether and under what circumstances that individual can be attacked, as
well as the precise rights to which he or she is entitled upon capture.13
Where IHL does apply, it must be applied consistently. For example, as
will be discussed further below, IHL recognises that ‘combatants’ are entitled
to engage in conflict, and therefore it deprives them of their immunity from
attack, while providing that once they are hors de combat, they must be subject
to protections associated with their status, and cannot be prosecuted for
engaging in hostilities. Particular rules must not be seen in isolation, but should
be considered mindful of the range of consequences that flow from the status
of individuals under IHL.
IHL should also be considered in the context of broader international law.
Its relationship with other areas of international law, and its distinction from
them, should be borne in mind. For example, the law that governs armed
conflict (sometimes known as the jus in bello) applies irrespective of whether
or not the use of force is itself lawful (according to the jus ad bellum, addressed
at Chapter 5). Although, as shall be seen, in practice the two are at times
conflated,14 they are separate bodies of law raising different legal issues.15
11 Recent practice shows that some conflicts do not fit readily into either category, being
‘transnational’ in nature, as discussed further below. On classification of conflicts, see Pejic,
‘The protective scope of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye’, ICRC, Vol. 93, No.
881, March 2011, p. 195 (hereinafter ‘Protective scope of CA3’) and generally Wilmshurst,
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6.
12 The principal international instruments dealing with IHL are the four Geneva Conventions
(GC) of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977
(AP I and II). As noted by the ICJ, however, other rules are equally relevant. See Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p.
226 (hereafter ‘Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion’), para. 75.
13 Core principles of IHL, such as the principles of humanity, military necessity and distinction
apply at all times, as do humanitarian protections under Common Article 3. See further
below and Chapter 8.
14 See e.g. 6B.2.1 below on drone killings and the US justification of ‘self-defence or IHL’.
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Force may amount to an armed attack giving rise to a right of self defence,
without amounting to an armed conflict.16 On the other hand, the IHL rules
that come into play in armed conflict sit alongside a core of international
human rights law that applies in all situations. Although IHL is addressed in
this chapter and IHRL in the next, it is important to have regard to both areas
of law and the interplay between them in order to fully understand applicable
law in particular armed conflict scenarios. As explored more fully in Chapter
7.B.3, this is particularly important where IHL may not provide specific rules
on a particular issue (which we will see is especially relevant in non-inter-
national armed conflict situations).17
The critical preliminary question is, however, whether there is an armed
conflict to which IHL applies at all, if so what sort of conflict, and when it
begins and ends.
6A.1 WHEN AND WHERE IHL APPLIES
6A.1.1 Armed conflict: international or non-international
IHL applies in time of armed conflict. While the terminology of ‘war’ is often
invoked, it should be noted that ‘such references may prove to be more of
emotional and political significance than legal’.18 This is all the more true
of emotive references in the post-September 11 world to the ‘war on terror’.
The same could be said of references to ‘terrorism’ which, as noted above,
are not legally significant for the purposes of determining whether there is
an ‘armed conflict’, and if so which rules of IHL apply.
While ‘armed conflict’ is not defined in IHL treaties,19 the following defini-
tion, set down by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), has been widely accepted:
15 The lawfulness of one does not implicate directly the lawfulness of the other: the use of
force in another state’s territory may be lawful in self defence while the particular action
taken is unlawful under IHL (or under IHRL). Conversely, unlawful force does not necessar-
ily imply a violation of IHL.
16 Chapter 4 discusses 9/11 as an ‘armed attack’, while Section B explains why it did not
amount to an armed conflict.
17 See, e.g., ‘Persons detained by the US in relation to armed conflict and the fight against
terrorism – the role of the ICRC’, ICRC, 9 January 2012, available at: http://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/misc/united-states-detention.htm. On sometimes difficult
questions of interplay, see Chapter 7.B.3.
18 C. Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 39, 44.
19 See ICRC Commentary GC I, pp. 49-51.
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[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State.20
The question of whether an armed conflict exists involves an essentially factual
assessment,21 rather than one ‘laden with legal technicalities’.22 In this factual
assessment no relevance should be attached, for example, to the existence or
otherwise of a ‘declaration of war’, or to acknowledgement by the parties that
they are in a state of war.23 Likewise, it is irrelevant that an opposing party
(or other states) recognise the status of the other party, in determining whether
there is, in fact, an ‘armed conflict’ or its nature.24 Instead, as discussed further
below, the essential characteristic of any armed conflict, international or non-
international (considered in turn below), is the resort to force between two
or more identifiable parties.
In practice, it may well be difficult to distinguish between armed conflict
and organised crime, as it often is to distinguish between civil unrest and non-
international conflict, or between international armed conflict (IAC) and non-
international armed conflict (NIAC).25 The current legal framework is premised,
however, upon IHL applying only in armed conflict, and its content varying,
to some extent, depending upon the nature of the conflict.26
20 Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995 (hereinafter ‘Tadić Jurisdiction Decision’),
para. 70. See also ICC Statute.
21 Disputes arise not infrequently as to whether particular facts satisfy the threshold particular-
ly of non-international conflicts. See below as regards the disputed war on al-Qaeda post-
September 11.
22 Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application’, supra note 18, p. 42.
23 Ibid., p. 45. Common Article 2(1).
24 As, e.g., in Afghanistan, the fact that a state party to a treaty is not represented by a
recognised government does not affect the international nature of the conflict or applicable
IHL. Article 4 (A)(3) and GC III. See, in general, D. Schindler, ‘The Different Types of Armed
Conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols’, (1979-II) 163 RdC 117.
25 In 2010, the UK Ministry of Defence forecast that: ‘The distinction between inter-state and
intra-state war, and between regular and irregular warfare, will remain blurred and categor-
ising conflicts will often be difficult’. DCDC, ‘Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040’, MOD
02/10c30(2010) and UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, cited in Wilmshurst,
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6, p.4.
26 Although some propose the ‘unification of international humanitarian law’ into one body
of law applicable to any conflict, (see L Moir, ‘Towards the Unification of International
Humanitarian Law’, in Burchill R., White, N.D., Morris, J. (Eds.), International Conflict and
Security Law, (Cambridge, 2005), pp 108-128) and others a redefinition of how we understand
conflict itself (see infra, US position and supporters), this chapter attempts to focus on an
assessment of the law as it currently stands rather than how the law might evolve in the
future. See also Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ICC, 14 March 2012
para 539.
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6A.1.1.1 International Armed Conflict
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, and the definition of armed conflict
advanced above, both make clear that an international armed conflict (IAC) exists
where force is directed by one state against another,27 and this is generally
thought to be the case irrespective of duration or intensity.28
While the proposition that the parties to international armed conflict
constitute two or more states generally holds true, it is subject to qualification.
Firstly, cases of total or partial military occupation, even if met with no armed
resistance, and even if there is no longer any opposing party, still constitute
international conflicts for the purposes of IHL.29 Moreover, since the 1970s,
wars of self-determination against colonial domination have likewise been
included within the rubric of international conflicts for the purposes of IHL.30
An international armed conflict may also arise where a state or states
intervene in a non-international conflict (NIAC), such that there are then states
on both sides of the conflict.31 They may become parties by intervening with
their own troops, having other participants act on their behalf, or by rendering
direct support to the military operations of one of the parties.32 Some contro-
versy surrounds the nature of the conflict that emerges from a state intervening
on another state’s territory, on the side of the state, or indeed if there is no
other state involved on the conflict, such that the resulting conflict involves
a (foreign) state on one side and a non-state actor on another. The majority
view,33 endorsed by the ICC, is that ‘in the absence of two States opposing
each other, there is no international armed conflict.’34
27 Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions applies to ‘…any other armed conflict, which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them’.
28 See the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 2: ‘Any difference ... leading to the interven-
tion of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict ... It makes no difference how
long the conflict lasts or how much slaughter takes place’. See, e.g., ICRC Commentary to
GC VI, p. 19. As regards the existence, or not, of an ‘intensity threshold’, see part A.1.1.2
(i). On the jus ad bellum arising, see Chapter 5.
29 Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application’, supra note 18, p. 41. On occupation, see 6A.3.4 below.
30 See Art. 1 AP I.
31 Examples might include the recent intervention in Libya.
32 See ICTY, Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 20, paras. 137-40.
33 See a recent study of international experts under the auspices of the International Law
Programme at Chatham House, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of
Conflicts, supra note 6, noting a minority view that the use of force by one state in the
territory of another gives rise to IAC, and the majority view that extra-territorial conflicts
between states and non-state actors are NIACs. See also G. Aldrich, ‘The Laws of War on
Land’, 94 (2000) AJIL 42, p. 62.
34 Lubanga Judgment, note 26, para 541.
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The Lebanon conflict of 2006 may illustrate the complexity of the issues
arising in practice.35 That scenario (although complicated by some assertions
of the Lebanese state’s responsibility),36 was a situation where force was
predominantly directed at Hezbollah, a non-state actor, on another state’s soil.
The Israeli military intervention against Hezbollah targets was considered by
some to constitute an IAC on the basis of their transnational nature;37 for
others, they gave rise to a cross-border NIAC, based on the state versus non-
state nature of the parties.38 For yet others (on perhaps the best view), it gave
rise to a simultaneous IAC (between Israel and Lebanon, so far as the state’s
facilities and airports were attacked in pursuit of the ultimate Hezbollah target)
and a NIAC (between Israel and Hezbollah forces).39 Classification of this type
of transnational use of force is clearly an area where opinion is divided and
law and practice are likely to develop in years to come.
A further issue, on which some uncertainty has crept into the traditional
approach to international conflicts, is whether there is an ‘intensity’ require-
ment for the use of force to give rise to any kind of armed conflict. The tradi-
tional view, reflected in the ICTY definition referred to above,40 is that inter-
state use of force is per se sufficient to give rise to an IAC irrespective of its
intensity.41 While this view may remain dominant, it has also been questioned
whether every forceful action should be seen as triggering an armed conflict,
35 For a detailed discussion of the nature of the conflict, see I. Scobbie, ‘Lebanon 2006’, in
Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6, p. 387. The
conflict is said to have began with Hezbollah cross border incursions on 12 July 2006, as
it mounted operation True Promise, although some contend it began with IDF forces
entering Lebanese village, p. 390.
36 In a letter dated 12 July 2006, from Israel’s Permanent Representative to the UN to the
President of the Security Council, Israel alleged an ‘acts of war from Lebanon’; however,
Israel subsequently claimed that its actions were not against Lebanon but Hezbollah: Tzipi
Livni, former Vice Prime Minister of Israel, press conference, 19 July 2006; see also ibid, p.
392-93.
37 UN Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 7, para. 57. See also J.
Stewart, ‘The UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon: A Legal Appraisal’, 5 (2007) J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1039, 1042-43; Bianchi and Naqvi supra note 7, p. 79; see also Akande, ‘Extraterrit-
orial Armed Conflicts’ in Wilmshurst supra note 33.
38 This emphasis on the nature of the parties not geography accords with the ICTY approach.
It rejected the proposition that IAC could arise between a state and non-state forces, absent
a relationship of ‘overall control’ by a state over said non-state actors; see Tadić, IT-94-1-A,
Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999 (hereinafter ‘Tadić Appeal Judgment’); see also
Chapter 3 on different standards of attribution for state responsibility purposes.
39 Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 11.
40 In that definition, the intensity requirement only applies to NIACs.
41 See the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, note26, and
Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 11, p. 191-93 for policy reasons for rejecting
a threshold for IACs.
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and whether this may not rather depend on the ‘surrounding circumstances’.42
There was no doubt in the context of the Israeli military action (involving more
than 100 airstrikes in one month) that any threshold of violence was satis-
fied.43 It has been pointed out, however, that brief interventions involving
force against specific terrorist targets have been a fairly common feature of
practice in recent years, yet it is rare for the states involved or others to suggest
that an inter-state conflict has arisen as a result.44 While this may explained
by other reasons, including in some cases doubts as to whether the force may
have been based on state consent,45 in other cases where there is apparently
no such consent, reluctance to invoke the armed conflict paradigm may reflect
perceptions regarding the force not having met a certain threshold.46 Thus,
while the predominant view of current law remains that there is no threshold
for IAC, this may be another area of the law where there is at least scope for
differences of view as to whether a certain minimal threshold of force separates
random acts of force from armed conflict for IAC, as it does for NIAC, to which
we now turn.
6A.1.1.2 Non-International Armed Conflict
For the most part, determining the existence of an international armed conflict
is relatively straightforward, involving the use of force between states. The
classification of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) creates somewhat greater
scope for dispute as to whether a particular situation amounts to an armed
conflict, as opposed to ‘internal disturbances and tensions [or] isolated and
42 E.g. should arrest on another state’s territory, even if unlawful under the jus ad bellum,
amount to ‘armed conflict’ triggering IHL? See, e.g., International Law Association (ILA),
‘Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’, The Hague Confer-
ence 2010 (hereinafter ‘ILA Report’). Eg. UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict, Sec. 3.3.1 (OUP 2005) suggests consideration of ‘surrounding circumstances’
is required. The Ministry of Justice, ‘War Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive powers’,
Consultation Paper CP26/07, 25 October 2007, p. 25, para. 48 (available at http://www.
official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7239/7239.pdf) also suggests there may be
some threshold. See also Bianchi and Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism,
supra note 8 p. 76-77.
43 Hezbollah attacked Israeli villages and captured two Israeli soldiers. Israel responded with
a month of air strikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon, an airport blockade and
ground invasion. See UN Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note
7; Bianchi and Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, supra note 8, p. 57.
44 Bianchi and Naqvi, ibid.
45 See, e.g., lethal attacks in Yemen or Pakistan, discussed below and Chapter 5.
46 Situations where there is no such apparent consent may include the targeting of alleged
al-Qaeda in Pakistan yet, while there are divergent views on conflicts in Pakistan, few allege
the existence of an IAC between the US and Pakistan. See Bianchi and Naqvi, International
Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, note 8, p. 76-77.
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sporadic acts of violence’,47 which are explicitly excluded by IHL from the
scope of armed conflict. This has historically often been a matter of contro-
versy, not least because, as already noted, states are reluctant to acknowledge
the existence of conflict and in particular to acknowledge insurgents and confer
any perceived legitimacy upon them as parties to a conflict.
The factors that are central to the factual determination of the existence
of a NIAC fall into two categories: firstly, the intensity and duration of the
violence,48 and secondly, the nature and organisation of the parties.49
Developments in the nature and complexity of NIACs have led the ICRC
in recent years to describe an expanded typology of conflict that recognises
multiple scenarios as potentially giving rise to NIACs. These include conflicts
on one state’s territory between the state’s forces and armed groups, or
between such groups; conflicts where international forces or other states
intervene on the side of the state; conflicts that are based in one territory and
spill over to another; and conflicts between states and armed groups across
borders.50 This reflects developments in practice, to which the legal framework
seeks to adjust, and the complexity and controversy surrounding questions
relating to the classification of conflicts.51 However, in each scenario, the key
questions remain whether the intensity threshold has been met and whether
the parties meet the organisational requirements of parties to a NIAC, both
addressed in turn below.
47 ‘This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts.’ Article 1(2) AP I.
48 M. Sassòli, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict: Qualification of the Conflict and Its Parties’,
background papers presented at the 2003 Sanremo Round Table on IHL; see Fleck, ‘Non-
International Armed Conflict’, supra note 18. See also ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian
Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, 30th Annual Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, October 2007, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/ihl-challenges-30th-international-conference-eng.pdf , (hereinafter ‘ICRC Report
on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’).
49 See Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ICC, 14 March 2012. See generally,
‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48; Sassòli, ‘Non-
International Armed Conflict’, supra note 48; Fleck, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’,
supra note 18.
50 Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 10, p. 195. Another category – transnational
conflicts without territorial limits, asserted by some ‘almost exclusively in the United States’
and addressed below – is rejected by the ICRC as not amounting to a NIAC. See generally,
‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48; see also Lubanga,
supra note 49.
51 See generally Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6.
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i) The Intensity Requirement?
The factual existence of armed force,52 of a level that distinguishes it from
law enforcement, is a key criterion of non-international armed conflict.53 Both
the ICTY and the ICC have suggested that a NIAC involves ‘protracted’ violence;
this formula put forward in Tadić, was endorsed to an extent more recently
by the ICC in the Lubanga case, affirming that the groups involved need to have
the ability to plan and carry out operations ‘for a prolonged period of time.’54
Other judgements of the ICTY have placed the emphasis on the intensity
rather than the duration of violence, which may better reflect the legal test.55
This is consistent with the historical treatment of non-state actor violence, for
example involving ETA or the IRA, which were certainly prolonged over an
extensive period of time but may not have passed the intensity threshold at
any one time and which were not, at least generally, considered to have
amounted to armed conflict. This stands in contrast with the intense hostilities
between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in July of 2006, which, as noted
above, were considered as meeting the intensity threshold for a non-inter-
national armed conflict. Regarding the sorts of factors that may contribute
to an assessment of this threshold in less clear-cut instances, the ICTY has
provided certain ‘indicators’, which assist in this assessment. These include
the number of confrontations, the actors involved, the types of weaponry used
and the extent of injuries and destruction.56
ii) The ‘Parties’ to a NIAC?
The parties to non-international armed conflict may be ‘governmental author-
ities and armed groups’, or two (or more) armed groups.57 In addition, as
noted above, where other states or international organisations become involved
on the side of the state in a conflict, which is generally considered to remain
‘non-international’ so long as state forces on the one side oppose non-state
actors on the other.58 A controversial question relates to the circumstances
in which an armed group may constitute a party to an armed conflict.59
Under IHL the non-state (or ‘insurgent’) groups that may constitute parties
must be capable of identification as a party to the conflict and must have
52 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 7, para. 51.
53 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers’, 1 January
2011, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm.
See 6A.1.1.1 above.
54 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29
January 2007, para. 234. See also Lubanga, Judgment, supra note 49.
55 Ramush Haradinaj, ICTY-04-84-T, Judgment, 3 April 2008, paras. 49, 60.
56 Ibid. In Lubanga, Judgment, supra note 49.
57 See ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(f).
58 J. Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force’,
ICRC, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6.
59 See Part 6B.1.1.1 below on whether al-Qaeda or associated groups may constitute such a
party.
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attained a certain degree of internal organisation.60 This has been made clear
by the ICTY in several cases, including the Haradinaj decision, and has been
followed by the ICC in the Lubanga judgment.61 Jurisprudence points to several
‘indicators’ or ‘non-exhaustive criteria’ to establish whether the organisational
requirement is fulfilled, which include the existence of a command structure
and disciplinary rules and systems within the group, potentially (but not
necessarily) involving the control of territory and the existence of an oper-
ational headquarters; the ability to procure arms and to plan and carry out
controlled military operations; the extent, seriousness and intensity of military
operations and the ability to coordinate and negotiate settlement of the con-
flict.62 By contrast, control of territory is not a requirement to constitute a
party to a non-international armed conflict (although it is a jurisdictional
threshold for the application of one of the applicable treaties, Additional
Protocol II).63
The identification of the parties to a conflict is a key criterion on which
the operation of IHL rules and principles of distinction and responsibility rest.
While compliance with IHL is not itself a criterion,64 the group must be capable
of observing the rules of IHL to constitute a party to an armed conflict.65 The
significance of this issue for the ‘war on terror’ will be explored in Part B
below.66
6A.1.2 Temporal scope of IHL: defining a Start and an End Point?
When, in accordance with the criteria set out above, an armed conflict begins,
involving the use of force between identifiable parties, the application of IHL
is automatically triggered. IHL applies from the initiation of an armed conflict
60 The ICRC emphasises the ‘identifiable nature of the parties, and those associated with them’.
See ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 19. On
discipline as a criterion, see Sassòli, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’, supra note 48.
61 Haradinaj, 2008 Decision, supra note 55, paras. 49, 60; see also Boškoski, paras. 194-206; see
ICC’s ‘non-exhaustive list of factors’ in Lubanga Judgment para 536-7.
62 See Limaj, et al., IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 90 (citing Slobodan Milošević,
IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16 June 2004 Rule, paras. 23-24);
see also Haradinaj, supra note 55, paras. 49, 60 for a set of indicative factors. Lubanga, ibid.
63 The territorial requirement is however a jurisdictional threshold for the application of AP
II, but not for the existence of an armed conflict under IHL; Lubanga para 536.. See Fleck,
‘Non-International Armed Conflict’, supra note 18, and Sassòli, ‘Non-International Armed
Conflict’, supra note 48.
64 Sassòli, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’, supra note 48.
65 See Boškoski, supra note 5, para. 205: the ‘organisational ability to comply’ was relevant,
not compliance itself, and the key question was ‘level of organisation’. See also ‘ICRC Report
on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47, p. 18-19.
66 See part 6B.1.1.2 below.
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until the general close of military operations.67 In relation to situations of
occupation, while difficulties arise in identifying the beginning and end of
an occupation, particularly long-term occupation,68 the obligations of the
occupying state continue until one year after the occupation comes to an end.
For international armed conflict, it is usually at least relatively straight-
forward to identify the point at which force between states triggers an armed
conflict. For non-international armed conflict, the stage at which violence of
sufficient intensity arose, or in line with the approach of the ICTY, when hostil-
ities became ‘protracted’, may be less readily identifiable.
The end point of an armed conflict in turn occurs when the conditions for
the establishment of a conflict cease to exist – where there is no longer use
of force meeting any relevant threshold or no longer groups capable of con-
stituting identifiable parties to the conflict. A temporary or tentative cessation
of hostilities is clearly insufficient.69 just as while a formal declaration is un-
necessary to bring about an end of military operations as it was to initiate
‘armed conflict’. Rather, the questions are primarily factual ones: has there
been a definitive cessation of active hostilities, bringing the conflict to an end?
In case of non-international armed conflict, are any on-going hostilities of
insufficient scale or intensity to constitute an armed conflict, having reverted
to sporadic violence? Where the other party to the conflict capitulates, or
indeed no longer qualifies as a party, then it should follow that the cessation
of hostilities is definitive and the conflict terminated.
6A.1.3 Identifiable Territorial scope and the reach of IHL?
In the event of an armed conflict, it has been said that ‘international human-
itarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of States party to inter-
national armed conflict or, in the case of non-international conflicts, the whole
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place
there’.70 Clearly then the reach of IHL can extend beyond the immediate area
of hostilities or zone of battle. Traditionally, IHL was not however considered
67 Formulae used vary between IHL instruments, e.g. Article 6 GC IV refers to application
until ‘the general close of military operations’, and on occupied territory until the end of
occupation ; Article 118 GC III refers to the duty to repatriate at the ‘cessation of active
hostilities’. The Tadić Appeal Judgment invokes the perhaps looser phrase ‘until a general
conclusion of peace is reached’, supra note 20, para. 70. See also H.-P. Gasser, ‘Protection
of the Civilian Population’, in Fleck, Handbook of Humanitarian Law, supra note 18, pp. 209,
221. This does not limit specific obligations beyond the end of hostilities, e.g. to identify
weapons that may continue to cause injury beyond the cessation of hostilities.
68 ICRC, ‘Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 26-27; Wilmshurst,
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6, p. 484.
69 Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application’, supra note 18, p. 62.
70 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 38, para. 70. Territory includes land, rivers, territorial
sea and air space. See Lubanga, supra note 48.
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to extend to the territory of states not party to the conflict, unless those states
allow their territory to be used by one of the belligerents.71 It now seems
increasingly well established that armed conflicts can and do spillover into
the territories of states not party to the conflict. In respect of non-international
armed conflict specifically, the ICTY has noted that while such conflicts gen-
erally arise ‘within a state’, the conflict need not unfold entirely within one
state’s geographic borders.72 The Rwanda Statute acknowledged the same,
by explicitly reflecting the cross-border history of that conflict.73 The ICRC,
and an increasing body of commentary, recognise that a non-international
conflict may ‘spillover’ or even be ‘cross border’ without this necessarily
altering the non-international nature of the conflict.74
The territorial sphere of NIACs may therefore have become more fluid, in
accordance with developing realities. While a rigid approach to territorial limits
of a NIAC is therefore increasingly untenable,75 it has also been subject to much
dispute whether the territorial dimension can be dispensed with entirely, as
proposed by the US in relation to the controversial ‘global war on terror’
discussed in Part B below.76 It has been suggested in response that some link
to the territory of a state party to the Geneva Conventions, or a territorial locus
for an armed conflict, is essential, even if it may expand beyond that state.77
What is clear is that the key factors for determining whether a NIAC exists
remain the nature of the parties to the conflict and the intensity of violence.
71 Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of IHL’, supra note 18, p. 51. If neutral territory is drawn
into the area of war, and hostilities are conducted there, rival belligerents may also be
entitled to take measures on that territory.
72 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 38, para. 70
73 ‘The territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend to the
territory of Rwanda ... as well as to the territory of neighbouring States in respect of serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed by Rwandan citizens.’ Statute for
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNSCR 955, 8 November 1994, Art. 7 (ICTR
Statute).
74 See ICRC expanded typology in Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 58; see, e.g., N.
Schrijver and L. Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counterterrorism and Inter-
national Law’, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, 1 April 2010, para. 63,
available at: http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recom
mendations%201%20 April%202010.pdf (hereinafter ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations’).
‘It is possible for an armed conflict involving non-state actors to extend to the territory
of more than one state, without necessarily qualifying as an international armed conflict.
Such “transnational” armed conflicts would be subject to IHL applicable to non-international
armed conflicts.’ Cf Akande, ‘Extraterritorial Armed Conflicts’, supra note 33.
75 See ibid and Bianchi and Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, supra note 8,
p. 30.
76 See Part B.1.1. below for a discussion on the ‘global war’ controversy.
77 The precise geographic limits of NIACs, and how such spillover or expansion airsides,
is a matter of some debate as discussed in Part B. See, e.g., Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’,
supra note 58.
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6A.2 APPLICABLE LAW
The rules that govern any armed conflict depend, to a significant extent, on
the international or non-international nature of the conflict discussed above.
The applicability of some (but by no means all) treaty rules depends also on
whether they have been ratified by all parties to the conflict. However, certain
core rules of customary law are applicable irrespective of treaty ratification
or the nature of the conflict.78
Historically, the focus of IHL was on governing international armed conflict,
to which a more comprehensive body of treaty law therefore applies.79 Devel-
opments in practice and legal thinking, however, have ‘blurred’ the distinction
between international and non-international conflict and the rules applicable
to each,80 such that a ‘common core’ of customary IHL applies whatever the
nature of the conflict.81 Beyond treaties and customary law, reference must
also be made to how IHL has been interpreted and applied by judicial bodies,
national and international. While such jurisprudence was historically quite
scarce, a noteworthy shift came with the work of international criminal tribu-
nals, notably the UN ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
as well as other ad hoc tribunals and since then the ICC.82 By applying IHL
in the context of concrete criminal cases, this jurisprudence has often led to
a more rigorous analysis of the precise content and meaning of IHL.83
A long-established and intricate body of treaty law regulates the conduct
of international conflicts and the protection of persons and property, such as
the Hague Regulations of 1907,84 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
78 See J. Henckaerts and L. Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005 (hereinafter ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’).
79 Detailed rules governing IACs contrast to a more skeletal body of treaty law for NIACs
(though the gap was narrowed by common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and AP
II and through subsequent jurisprudence and practice). Divergence is seen e.g. in the ICC
Statute Art 8.
80 The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals found basic rules and principles in instruments
addressed only to international conflict to apply to both types of conflict; see e.g. Tadić
Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 20, paras. 119-24; see also Lubanga, supra note 48.
81 Ibid, and the ICTY’s approach to a common core of war crimes; see S. Boelaert-Suominen,
‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Common Core of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable to All Armed Conflict’, 13 (2000) LJIL 619, 630.
82 International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established by SC Res. 827 (1993), 25 May
1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTR, established by SC Res. 955 (1994), adopted on 8
November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) and ICC Statute 1998, all discussed in Chap-
ter 4.
83 Grave breaches and other serious violations of IHL may carry individual responsibility,
but not all violations of IHL are criminal: see Chapter 4A.1.1.2.
84 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to the
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October
1907), 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (Series 3) 461, in force 26 January 1910 (hereinafter ‘1907
Hague Regulations’).
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First Additional Protocol thereto of 1977 and the Hague Convention on Cul-
tural Property of 1954.85 To bind states parties to the conflict as treaty law,86
the particular treaties must have been ratified or acceded to by those parties.87
The US, UK and Afghanistan are all party to the four Geneva Conventions, for
example, which were therefore binding on those states in the international
armed conflict in Afghanistan as treaty law, though few other relevant treaties
have been accepted by all parties.
While historically certain IHL treaty provisions only applied as treaty law
if all parties to the conflict were parties to the treaty,88 contemporary IHL
rejects such a principle. The Geneva Conventions for example are binding on
states parties engaged in armed conflicts, irrespective of whether other parties
to the conflict are party to the Conventions. This reflects the fact that the core
of IHL treaty provisions, by their nature, enshrine obligations erga omnes (i.e.
obligations owed to all states, not merely the other parties to the treaty)89
and that the content of many key provisions of treaties such as the Geneva
Conventions is also customary law, discussed below. Moreover, where a treaty
is applicable, its binding nature on parties to the conflict is not affected by
the fact that an adversary may violate the obligations contained therein.90
Non-observance of particular binding rules by one party does not justify
violations by another.91 In this vein, the ICTY has emphasised that crimes
85 IHL instruments relating to conduct of hostilities and to the protection of persons caught
up in armed conflict, are often broadly referred to as ‘Hague’ and ‘Geneva’ law respectively
86 The nature and number of parties to a conflict is a question of fact that may change over
time. For the purposes of the conflict in Afghanistan, the position of Afghanistan, the US
and UK is considered.
87 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 33, in force
27 January 1980. According to Article 18, VCLT, States are also required not to defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty that they have signed but not yet ratified.
88 Eg contrast the St Petersburg Declaration 1868 with the Geneva Conventions or Additional
Protocols.
89 See Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions imposing obligations on all high contracting parties.
See also ICRC Commentary to GC I: ‘A State does not proclaim the principle of the protection
due to wounded and sick combatants in the hope of saving a certain number of its own
nationals. It does so out of respect for the human person as such.’ See also Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32;
T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, 94 (2000) AJIL 239, p. 249; T. Meron,
‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’, 81 (1987) AJIL 348, 349.
90 ‘Reciprocity’ in the observance of IHL was a traditional principle that has been rejected
in modern IHL. See Meron, ‘Humanization’, supra note 89, pp. 247-48, 251.
91 See Article 51(8) AP I: ‘Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to
the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population.’ See also
Article 60(5) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enshrining the principle that, as
regards treaties of a ‘humanitarian character’, the breach of treaty obligations is no excuse
for material breach by other parties.
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committed by an adversary can never justify the perpetration of serious viola-
tions of IHL.92
As regards non-international armed conflicts, a far more limited body of
treaty law applies, the core provisions of which are Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977, which applies when
certain conditions are met.93 Given the relative dearth of treaty rules, custom-
ary law is of particular significance.94
Among the fundamental principles of IHL that apply, irrespective of the
application of treaty law, are the competing considerations of humanity and
military necessity, reflected throughout IHL, from which the particular principles
of distinction, proportionality and the prohibition on causing superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering derive.95 These principles can be considered customary
international law, applicable to all conflicts.96
The treaties mentioned above remain relevant so far as they reflect or
provide evidence of customary law, and the rules contained therein may
therefore be binding on states whether or not they are parties to particular
treaties. Among the critical treaties that are recognised to fall into this category
are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907.97 The bulk of the provisions
of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions are recognised
92 See the discussion of this principle – ‘tu quoque’ – in Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgment,
14 January 2000, paras. 765, 515-36 and Martic, IT-95-11-I, Rule 61 Decision, 8 March 1996,
paras. 15-17.
93 Article 1 AP II sets out the jurisdictional threshold for the application of that treaty, re-
quiring that the organised groups are under responsible command and exercise control
over part of the state’s territory.
94 For a detailed analysis of the content of the customary rules of IHL, see ‘ICRC Study on
Customary IHL’.
95 See ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78. T. Meron, Human Rights and Human-
itarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 74, noting that
‘no self respecting state’ would deny the application of the principle of humanity to internal
as well as international conflicts. On the ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ having
the force of jus cogens, see Delalic et al., IT-96-21-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber),
20 February 2001, para. 143. The principles reflect the ‘dictates of public conscience’ estab-
lished in ICJ jurisprudence: Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, ICJ Reports
1949, p. 4; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, para. 7.
96 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 218, and Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra
note 19, para. 102, As early as 1899, the Martens Clause (Preamble to the Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs on Land) provided that certain basic standards of conduct
apply to all conflicts. Later common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enshrined the
same ‘principles of humanity’, which are considered customary law applicable to all
conflicts.
97 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S25704. The report was unanimously approved by SC
Res. 827 (1993), supra note 82.
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as forming part of customary law.98As noted above, as a matter of customary
law, there are now relatively few outstanding areas in which the content of
legal protection in international and non-international conflict is different; some
of these areas are discussed elsewhere in this book.99
The following section sketches out certain basic IHL rules concerning the
selection of legitimate targets, lawful methods and means of warfare and the
humanitarian protection due to persons affected by an armed conflict, all of
which will be relevant to assessing the lawfulness of measures taken in the
‘war on terror’ discussed in Part B.
While little significance attaches to the use of the terrorism label as such,
it should be noted that IHL prohibits the range of violent conduct that would
commonly be referred to as ‘terrorism’ if committed outside armed conflict.100
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, IHL also contains specific rules prohibiting
acts of ‘terrorism’ or ‘spreading terror among the civilian population’ within
armed conflict,101 though acts of terrorism would fall foul of a broader range
of IHL rules, most notably the basic principle requiring the protection of the
civilian population from attack. As discussed in Section B of this chapter, the
rules sketched out here are directly relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness
of measures taken in response to international terrorism post 9/11.
6A.2.1 Targeting: the principle of distinction and proportionality
IHL regulates who and what may be the legitimate target of military action
during armed conflict. At the heart of these rules is the principle of distinction,
which counters the notion of total war and requires that civilians and civilian
objects must be distinguished from military targets, and operations directed
only against the latter. Distinction is the single most important principle for
98 The UK is party to AP I, but Afghanistan and the US are not, although the US signed it
on 12 December 1977. However, as the ICRC notes, ‘it is not disputed that most of [AP
I’s] norms on the conduct of hostilities also reflect customary international law.’ The ICTY
has describes it as ‘not controversial that major parts of both Protocols reflect customary
law’. Kordić and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Indictment, 2 March 1999, para. 30.
99 See ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78. Issues regarding detention safeguards
is an example where IHL provides little guidance in NIACs, as discussed in Chapter 7.3.
The rules on POW status, e.g., do not apply in non-international armed conflict, therefore
fighters in a NIAC, if captured, can be prosecuted for fighting against the state. Other
protections such as humane treatment, safeguards against arbitrary detention and fair trial
guarantees apply to both. See also Chapter 8 on rules governing Guantanamo detentions.
100 On definitions and elements of terrorism, see Chapter 2.
101 Art. 33 GC IV and Art. 4(2)(d) AP II address the treatment of persons in the power of the
adversary. Art. 51(2) AP I and Art. 13(2) AP II specifically prohibit the infliction of acts
of terror on the civilian population with the primary purpose of spreading terror.
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the protection of the victims of armed conflict, and is a principle of customary
law applicable to all types of armed conflict.102
As explained below, attacks are unlawful if they are: (a) directed specifically
against civilians or civilian objects; (b) launched indiscriminately without
distinction between civilians and military targets or (c) directed at military
objectives, but anticipated to cause damage to civilians or civilian objects that
is disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated at the time of launch-
ing the attack.103 As regards objects, only those, which contribute to the ad-
versary’s military capability, the destruction of which would give rise to
definite military advantage, may be attacked.104 The law imposes certain
positive obligations on those responsible for attacks to ensure that these rules
are given meaningful effect.
6A.2.1.1 Lethal Use of Force against Combatants and Armed Groups?
In international armed conflict, members of the armed forces of an adversary
are perhaps the most obvious legitimate military targets.105 They have the
‘privilege’ of being entitled to use force, but it carries with it the serious
implications, one of which is being susceptible to lawful targeting, as well as
the privileged status of POW if captured, including immunity from prosecution
for participating in hostilities, as discussed below. ‘Combatants’ include not
only regular troops but may also comprise, under certain conditions,106 ir-
regular groups that fight alongside them and are ‘under a command responsible
to that party for the conduct of its subordinates’.107 Members of an armed group
102 The ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Vol. I, Ch. 1.
103 See Article 51(2) and (4) AP I and Article 13 AP II.
104 See Article 52(2) of Protocol I and Article 13 of Protocol II.
105 Article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third (Prisoners of War) Geneva Convention and Article
43(2) of AP I list persons who are members of armed forces or who are otherwise entitled
to combatant status and thus have ‘the right to participate directly in hostilities’.
106 The criteria in the Geneva Conventions have been relaxed under AP I. GC III requires that
members of militias and volunteer corps other than the State’s recognised regular armed
forces fulfil four requirements: they must (a) have a commander responsible for sub-
ordinates; (b) have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) carry arms openly;
and (d) operate in accordance with the laws and customs of war. See also 1907 Hague
Regulations, supra note 84. However, AP I relaxed criteria (e.g., of wearing a fixed distinct-
ive symbol) on account of having expanded the armed conflicts covered by the Protocol
to include wars of liberation. Hence, carrying arms openly during military operations and
being visible to the enemy preceding an attack became sufficient. See Pejic, ‘Armed Conflict
and Terrorism’, supra note 10, p. 178. On these criteria being invoked to deny POW status
see Chapter 8.
107 The ICRC study on customary law states that ‘[a]ll members of the armed forces of a party
to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel’ and ‘[t]he armed
forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which
are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates’. ‘ICRC
Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rules 3-4.
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that ‘belongs’ to a party to the conflict may also be considered de facto combat-
ants and also be susceptible to attack.108
The lethal targeting of those who fight with the adversary’s forces, which
may amount to murder if there is no armed conflict, is generally considered
lawful in time of conflict under IHL. The traditional view is that a combatant
in an IAC may legitimately be subject to lethal use force at all times during
the conflict, even if off-duty at the time of attack, although there is a growing
body of authority that where ‘alternatives’ to the use of lethal force prove
possible in the circumstances, these should be employed, consistent with the
principles of humanity and military necessity.109
Undoubtedly, as soon as combatants are hors de combat (not engaged in
military action), voluntarily or involuntarily, for example through injury,
illness, surrender or capture, they are no longer military objectives but become
entitled to the protection of the law. Hence it is unlawful to kill a person who
has been wounded, has surrendered or been captured, or is otherwise no
longer participating in the conflict.110
In these circumstances, it is clear that the acts of killing and taking prisoner
are not lawful interchangeable alternatives. While members of the armed forces
are generally lawful targets, certain persons accompanying the armed forces,
such as medical and religious personnel, are not.111 It will be a question of
fact, dependent on the political-military role of individuals in position of
authority within the particular regime, whether they are de facto operating
as part of the armed forces.Combatants among the civilian population do not
necessarily deprive the entire population of its civilian character; rather, the
legitimacy of targeting a ‘mixed’ group would depend on the question of
proportionality, discussed below.112
108 See D. Kretzmer, ‘Use of Lethal Force against Suspected Terrorists’, in A. Salinas de Frías,
K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (OUP, 2012),
p. 638.
109 It is increasing asserted that if a party could incapacitate and capture, instead of kill, a
combatant, at no added military cost, this should be done. See, e.g. The Power to Kill or
Capture Enemy Combatants, R Goodman, EJIL, Vol. 24, 2013; N. Melzer, Targeted Killing
in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 73; Kretzmer, ‘Use of Lethal
Force’, supra note 108, p. 639; P.Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions’, Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/24Add.6, 8 May 2010, p. 10 (hereinafter ‘Alston Study on Targeted
Killings’); DOJ White Paper, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S.
Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force,” disclosed
by NBC News, 4 Feb 2013. For the evolving US position see Part B.See also the related rules
on direct participation of civilians in hostilities and loss of immunity below.
110 Note that for persons who are not members of the armed forces or organised groups
belonging to the armed forces, they are civilians and the test is whether they are taking
a ‘direct part in hostilities’, below. ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Con-
flicts’, supra note 48, p. 22.
111 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 4.
112 See part 6A.2.4 below.
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In non-international conflict, the question of lawful targeting is more
controversial. This is because treaty law governing NIACs does not provide
a definition of persons who may be subject to attack (comparable to the defini-
tion of combatants applicable only in international conflicts). This is largely
for the reason already alluded to- that states did not wish to recognise the
right of armed groups on their territory to engage in armed conflict. As a result
there is no right of belligerency as such under NIAC, and individuals engaged
in conflict may be prosecuted for taking up arms.
Conversely, there is no explicitly recognised right to target such individuals,
though this may be implicit. Some commentators suggest that, absent an
explicit provision of IHL, rules comparable to those applicable in IAC can be
read into the law of NIAC. As such, organised armed groups would be treated
as legitimate targets on the same basis as combatants in IAC.113 Others sug-
gest, however, that as the rules are different (there being no privileges of
belligerency or upon capture), such persons remain civilians under IHL. In
either case, it is well recognised that they lose their protection from attack so
far as they directly participate in hostilities, addressed below.
6A.2.1.2 Civilian Protection and ‘Direct and Active Participation in Hostilities’
The cardinal rule of humanitarian law is that civilians must not be the object
of attack. While this follows logically from the fore-mentioned rule that only
military objectives may be targeted, explicit provision for civilians appears
throughout humanitarian law.114 As discussed below, attacks against civilians
are prohibited not only where they are deliberately directed against the civilian
population as such, but also where the attacks are ‘indiscriminate’ or ‘dis-
proportionate’.115 There is no exception to this prohibition,116 and the notion
that it is limited by the principle of military necessity has been rejected.117
Civilian immunity from attack is lost only where the person takes an active
and direct part in hostilities, as set down in IHL treaties118 and customary
law.119 This is reflected for example in a decision by the Israeli Supreme
Court, which found that the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
113 The ICRC Guidance controversially suggested that those that take up arms and participate
in conflict in a “continuous combat function” may then be attacked at any time, even when
they are not in fact directly participating at that time. See discussion on the ICRC Guidance
below.
114 See e.g. Article 51(2) AP I and Article 13(2) AP II
115 While this section focuses only on military attacks directed against civilians as such, many
other acts against civilians are prohibited by IHL, expressly or implicitly: see 6A.3.3 below.
116 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rules 5-6.
117 For example, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Galić, supra note 115, expressly rejected
the suggestion that the rule can be derogated from by invoking military necessity.
118 Article 51(3) of AP I states that “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
119 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 6.
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amounted to an IAC in which terrorist groups participated as civilians who
had lost their immunity from attack:120 ‘terrorists participating in hostilities
do not cease to be civilians but by their acts they deny themselves the aspect
of their civilian status which grants them protection from military attack’.121
Thus, according to the Israeli Supreme Court, terrorists may be targeted for
military purposes where they actively and directly participate in hostilities.
Yet, since 9/11 the scope of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ (DPH) – and the
circumstances in which individual ‘terrorists’ might fall into this category,
thereby losing their civilian immunity from attack – has been the focus of
uncertainty and dispute.122
i) What Constitutes Direct Participation in Hostilities?
While the ICRC study notes that customary international law enshrines the
principle, it acknowledges that ‘a clear and uniform definition of direct parti-
cipation in hostilities has not been developed in state practice’.123 As dis-
cussed below, a subsequent ICRC document, ‘Interpretative Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, was therefore published in 2009
in an attempt to provide greater guidance on the meaning of direct participa-
tion, when and for how long civilian immunity is lost.124 While the Guidance
has itself been subject of considerable dispute from a range of sources and
should not be taken as a categorical statement of the law in this area, it pro-
vides one important reference point from an undisputedly authoritative source
on IHL.125
120 The Supreme Court’s starting point, based on previous jurisprudence, was that an armed
conflict exists ‘between Israel and [] various terrorist organizations…’. Targeted Killings
judgment, supra note 7, para. 16. This may reflect an unduly broad approach to the defini-
tion of armed conflict, rendering it questionable whether the situation should have been
governed by IHL as the Court determined. Even so, the court’s approach to the interpretation
of IHL may yet be instructive. See also Chapter 7B3 on this judgment and the interplay
of IHL/IHRL.
121 Ibid., at para. 31.
122 The legal framework is discussed in the section that follows. Its application and debates
post-9/11 are in Part B below.
123 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, p. 23.
124 Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under IHL’,
ICRC, 2009 (hereinafter ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’).
125 Critiques and discussion of the ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’ abound. See e.g. R. Goodman and
D. Jinks, ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l
L. & Pol. 637 (2010). See in response N. Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance between Military
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 831 (2010).
the range of concerns. See also K. Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l
L. & Pol. 641 (2010); M. Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
Constitutive Elements’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697 (2010); W. H. Parks, ‘Part IX of the
ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally
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‘Direct participation in hostilities’ (DPH) covers ‘acts of war which by their
nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equip-
ment of the enemy armed forces’.126 An ‘act of war’ plainly covers fighting
against opposing armed forces on the one hand, while not including, for
example, moral or philosophical support for or affiliation to the adversary,
on the other. But many areas of uncertainty – to be assessed on the facts of
each case – lie in between.127 The ICRC 2009 Guidance noted that DPH refers
to ‘specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities
between parties to an armed conflict’,128 which are designed to cause harm
to the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict
or, alternatively, death, injury, or destruction of protected persons or property,
and have a causal nexus with that harm.129
By way of example, the Israeli Supreme Court found that selling food,
providing strategic analysis and logistical general support, including monetary
aid, were taking an indirect rather than a direct part in hostilities and would
not meet the DPH criteria.130 By contrast, operating weapons or collecting
intelligence on armed forces was, in the Court’s view, sufficiently ‘direct and
active’ participation in hostilities to deprive the civilian of his or her civilian
status.131 The ICRC for its part in distinguishing ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ partici-
pation, has found that ‘war sustaining’ roles, which do not give rise to loss
of civilian immunity, ‘would additionally include political, economic or media
activities supporting the general war effort (e.g. political propaganda, financial
transactions, production of agricultural or non-military industrial goods)’.132
Undoubtedly, there remain grey areas. Although one commentator has
suggested that ‘[g]rey areas should be interpreted liberally, i.e., in favour of
finding direct participation’,133 it is suggested that direct participation should
be narrowly construed, in line with the fundamental nature of the protection
of civilians in IHL. This is consistent with the rule that if any doubt arises as
Incorrect’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769 (2010). Some of these authors note that the ICRC
DPH Guidance is not customary international law.
126 ICRC Commentary AP 1, p. 619, para. 1944.
127 See, e.g., Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict,
2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 172; F. Kalshoven and L.
Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law,
ICRC, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); see also ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra
note 124.
128 ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 125, Part 1, IV.
129 Ibid., Part I, V.
130 Ruling on Targeted Killings, supra note 9, para. 34.
131 Ibid., para. 35.
132 ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 125, p. 5; Goodman and Jinks fn 123 above.
133 M. Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict’, in H.
Fischer, et al eds., Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festschrift fur Dieter Fleck
(Berlin: BWV, 2004), pp. 505-09.
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to whether someone is a combatant or a civilian, he or she must be presumed
a civilian.134
ii) For How Long is Immunity from Attack Lost Through Direct Participation?
Under the relevant IHL provisions cited above, where a civilian does directly
participate in hostilities, he or she loses protected status only ‘for such time’
as his or her participation continues. Considerable debate surrounds the
interpretation of this phrase, as reflected in the ICRC Guidance. The ICRC
Guidance suggests, somewhat novelly, that those civilians who have a ‘conti-
nuous combat function’ in hostilities may be targeted for as long as they
exercise such a function.135 By contrast, a civilian who participates on an
ad hoc basis can only be targeted while actually engaging in the hostile acts
themselves.136
Whether the ‘continuous combat function’ category reflects customary law
may be doubtful, with some suggesting that the ‘for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities’ standard merits a narrower interpretation, whereby
immunity is lost only for as long as the hostile acts themselves are under-
way.137 Even before the ICRC Guidance, however, it had been recognized
that some flexibility is due in this regard and that at least so far as a civilian
engaged in a series or a ‘chain of acts’, whereby one act is completed but others
being prepared, he or she may be considered still actively and directly par-
ticipating in hostilities during that chain of events.138 In the same vein, even
on a narrower approach to immunity being lost only while the individual
participates in the particular act(s) or operations, legal experts seem to agree
that civilians preparing or returning from combat operations are still con-
sidered to be directly participating in hostilities, although a precise indication
as to when such preparation begins and return ends remains controversial.139
iii) Limits on the Use of Force against those Directly participating in Hostilities?
The fact that a civilian directly participating in hostilities may have lost im-
munity from attack does not however mean that the lethal use of force against
that person will always be justified. The question arises as to the extent to
which, consistent with the principles of military necessity and humanity, there
is an obligation under IHL to use less harmful means, short of lethal force,
134 As noted in Article 50 AP I: ‘In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person
shall be considered a civilian’; see ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 125, p. 71 et seq.
135 ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 124, Part 1, II and VII. See also Kretzmer, supra note
108, p. 638. Former Special Rapporteur Philip Alston criticised this as creating a status-based
exception rather than a specific-acts based approach, see ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’,
supra note 109; see response in Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 57.
136 ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 124, pp. 44-45.
137 ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109.
138 Ruling on Targeted Killings, supra note 9, para. 39.
139 See ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 125, p. 67.
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against individuals taking direct participating in hostilities where this proves
feasible.
The ICRC Guidance on DPH provides that where the circumstances are such
that the armed or police forces of the government may be able to capture an
individual without resorting to lethal force, without jeopardising its own forces
or military advantage, the principle of humanity requires that this be done.140
Likewise, a landmark decision by the Israeli Supreme Court adopted a parallel
approach when it stated as follows:
[A] civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as
he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed. In our domestic law, that
rule is called for by the principle of proportionality. Indeed, among the military
means, one must choose the means whose harm to the human rights of the harmed
person is smallest. Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be
arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means, which should be em-
ployed.141
The view that such persons, despite losing civilian immunity, still should not
be killed unless less harmful means have been considered and, if possible,
exhausted, may flow from principles of IHL (as emphasised by the ICRC) or
the increasing cross fertilisation between IHL and human rights law, both
applicable in situations of armed conflict.142 As noted above, there is increas-
ing support in doctrine and practice related to counter-terrorism that capture
should where feasible be employed in preference to killing, though much doubt
remains around questions of feasibility.143 While it would be difficult to assert
categorically where the law on this point currently stands, it is at a minimum
sufficiently in flux to question the entitlement under IHL to kill civilians
engaged in hostilities without careful consideration of less onerous alternatives.
6A.2.1.3 Targetable Objects
As regards objects that may be targeted, the most widely accepted definition
is that in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, which states:
140 ‘[I]t would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving
him or her an opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use
of lethal force.’ See ibid., p. 82.
141 Ruling on Targeted Killings, supra note 9, para. 40.
142 See Chapter7B.3 on Interplay with human rights law. The Court’s approach above is reflected
in the approach of human rights bodies that e.g. ‘Before resorting to the use of deadly force,
all measures to arrest and detain persons suspected of being in the process of committing
acts of terror must be exhausted.’ ‘Concluding Observations, Israel’, Human Rights Commit-
tee, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para. 15.
143 See note 106, and the Obama administration’s endorsement in principle discussed in Part B.
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In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.144
This definition has been described as almost certainly embodying customary
law.145
The basic rule is that attacks against civilian objects are prohibited.146
The ICTY considers the prohibition on attacking ‘civilian objects’ or ‘dwellings
and other installations that are used only by civilian populations’ part of
customary law, applicable to all conflicts.147 In addition to this general rule,
attacks against certain specific categories of objects, such as buildings dedicated
to religion, charity, education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments148
and cultural property149 are specifically prohibited by particular international
instruments.
Some of the most difficult issues of targeting arise in relation to objects
with dual military and civilian uses, such as bridges, roads, electric-power
installations or communications networks. The controversy surrounding
targeting television networks, which arose during the NATO bombing of the
former Yugoslavia (and again in Afghanistan),150 is an example. The question
of fact is whether the target makes an effective contribution to military action
and its destruction offers direct military advantage. International humanitarian
law provides that ‘in case of doubt whether an object which is normally
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used’.151
Finally, while it is a serious violation of humanitarian law to deliberately
put military objectives in the vicinity of civilians, doing so does not necessarily
justify an attack from the adversary. If destruction of a target offers direct
military advantage, that advantage must outweigh any incidental loss to
144 Article 51(2) AP I (emphasis added).
145 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 8.
146 Article 52 AP I: ‘General protection of civilian objects: Civilian objects shall not be the object
of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives
as defined in paragraph 2.’ On AP I rules governing conduct of hostilities as custom, see
‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47, p. 8.
147 Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 19, paras. 110-11 and the Trial Chamber’s decision
of 2 March 1999 on the joint defence motion to dismiss the amended indictment in Kordić
and Cerkez, supra note 98, para. 31.
148 Article 56, 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84.
149 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
1954, Articles 53 and 85. See Article 1 (definition) and Article 4; see also Article 53, AP I
and Article 16, AP II. The obligation to respect cultural property ‘may be waived only in
cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver’. Article 4(2).
150 See para. 6B.2.1 on targeting below.
151 Article 52(3), AP I.
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civilians, all feasible steps having been taken to minimise civilian losses.152
The lawfulness of an attack in an area where there is both a legitimate target
and persons or objects that are immune from attack depends on questions of
proportionality, as discussed below.
6A.2.2 Indiscriminate attacks and those causing disproportionate civilian loss
In addition to the rule that attacks must not be specifically directed against
civilians and civilian objects is another that provides that attacks must not
be indiscriminate, that is, directed against military and civilian objectives
without distinction.153 The prohibition on indiscriminate attacks is a funda-
mental aspect of the customary principle of distinction, applicable in all con-
flicts.154
Closely linked to the principle of distinction is the ‘proportionality’ rule,
which requires that those directing attacks against military objectives must
ensure that civilian losses are not disproportionate to the direct and concrete
military advantage anticipated to result from the attack.155 Proportionality
is generally accepted as a norm of customary international law.156
There is no precise formula for this proportionality calculus, and the
relative weight to be attached to civilian and military losses will depend on
all the circumstances. However, a few specific points deserve emphasis. First,
the military advantage anticipated must be ‘direct and concrete’.157 It cannot
152 See the discussion of proportionality and precautionary measures that must be taken by
commanders, including the duty to minimise civilian loss and warn civilians of impending
attacks, in this part, below.
153 Article 51 AP I refers to five forms of indiscriminate attacks, all of which are prohibited:
those which are not directed at a specific military objective (para. 4(a)), those which employ
a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective (para.
4(b)), those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
(para. 4(c)), an area attack treating separate and distinct military objectives in an area
containing a concentration of civilians as a single military objective (para. 5(a)), and an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental civilian casualties or civilian property
damage disproportionate to the expected military advantage. Different classifications of the
same principles appear in different contexts. ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note
78, Rules 11 and 12.
154 Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 20, para. 127; Kordić, supra note 98, para. 31; ‘ICRC
Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rules 11 and 12.
155 Article 51(5) AP I.
156 See generally J. Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’, 87 (1993) AJIL
391; see also W.J. Fenrick, ‘Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offence’, 7 (1997)
Duke J. of Comparative and Int’l L. 539, 545 noting that the proportionality rule, ‘is a logically
necessary part of any decision making process which attempts to reconcile humanitarian
imperatives and military requirements during armed conflict’. See generally W.H. Parks,
‘Air War and the Law of War’, 32 (1990) Air Force L. Rev. 1; ‘ICRC Study on Customary
IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 14.
157 Article 57(2) AP I.
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be long-term or speculative. The assessment of military advantage against
potential loss must be made in relation to a particular military operation, not
in relation to a battle, still less to a conflict as a whole.158 Such an evaluation
is not to be made after the fact, when the number of civilian and military
casualties can be compared, but based on the information available at the
relevant time and in the context of all the prevailing circumstances.
Finally, a mistaken evaluation of proportionality, just like a mistaken
identification of a target, is not necessarily unlawful. However, ignorance as
to the nature of the target, its military contribution or the extent of civilian
losses is not per se an excuse. IHL lays down certain duties on those responsible
for attacks that safeguard the principles of distinction and proportionality;
if civilian losses result from a situation where these duties have not been
observed, then a violation of IHL has occurred (and a crime may also have
been committed by the person responsible for ordering the attack as discussed
at Chapter 4, Section B).
6A.2.3 Necessary precautions in attack
Complicated issues of targeting may arise, for example in respect of defended
cities with ‘dual use’ facilities and the close intermingling of civilian and
military elements. Likewise, rural terrain and guerrilla tactics may make target
identification difficult. However, core principles of international humanitarian
law require that every responsible military commander must take certain
feasible precautions to ensure the lawfulness of a military attack.159
These include the commander’s duty to verify the nature of the target. It
is no excuse that a commander or other person who plans or decides upon
an attack does not have the information available as to the true nature of a
target, as IHL imposes a duty to inquire. If a commander cannot, upon inquiry,
obtain the necessary information, he or she cannot attack assuming the target
to be legitimate. On the contrary, if in doubt, the assumption must be that
the target is protected.160
158 See L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The Value of the 1977 Geneva Protocols for the Protection of
Civilians’, in M.A. Meyer (ed.), Armed Conflict and the New Law. Aspects of the 1977 Geneva
Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention (London, 1989), pp. 137 ff. Note, however, that
many states appear to take a broader view of the proportionality calculus, and the ICC
Statute’s reference to proportionality as involving an assessment of the ‘overall military
advantage anticipated,’Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
159 Article 57 AP I; ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 15 and 16.
160 This principle is reflected in Article 50(1) AP I, which states that ‘in case of doubt whether
a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’. See also Blaskić,
Judgment, Case IT-95-14-T. As noted above, a similar principle is reflected in Article 50
in respect of objects.
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While an attacking side will understandably want to protect its forces, this
does not take priority over precautions to protect civilians in the planning
and execution of an attack, whose protection IHL clearly emphasises.161 Thus
in the choice of weapons and systems, it is obliged to use systems that provide
for and enable reliable target identification.
Moreover, even if a target is identified and is legitimate (being a military
objective that satisfies the proportionality rule), commanders must take all
feasible steps to minimise the damage to civilian life and objects resulting from
the military action. These include giving warnings of attacks that may affect
the civilian population162 and, where there is a choice of targets, choosing
those least injurious to civilian life or objects.163
6A.2.4 Methods and means of warfare: unnecessary suffering
The prohibition on waging war in a manner that causes unnecessary suffering
and superfluous injury is a fundamental tenet of international law. The ex-
pression ‘unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury’ is used in a number
of legal instruments, yet nowhere is it defined.164 The concept is, however,
clearly linked to the customary principle that all suffering caused in conflict
should be pursuant, and proportionate, to military necessity. As such, the ICJ
161 See ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47, p. 13.
162 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Rule 20 identifies this requirement for
both IACs and NIACs; Article 57(2)(c) AP I; see Meron, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian
Norms’, supra note 95, p. 65, noting that an expert study on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff acknowledged this duty as customary law.
163 See Article 57(2) AP I: ‘(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) Do everything
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects
and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning
of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol
to attack them; (ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; (iii) Refrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) An attack shall be cancelled
or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject
to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (c) Effective
advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.’ See also Article 50(7) AP I.
164 See Article 23(e) 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84; Article 35 AP I; CCW Convention
1980.
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has described causing ‘unnecessary suffering to combatants’ as causing ‘harm
greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives’.165
An evaluation of what amounts to unnecessary suffering has to be case
and context specific. However, certain methods and means of warfare, or
particular weapons systems, are considered by definition to cause unnecessary
suffering, as reflected n the specific treaty provisions that regulate the use of
particular weapons166 and the case by case determinations – of for example
homemade mortars to nuclear weapons – by international courts.167 The
customary law prohibition on weapons causing unnecessary suffering covers
those that are either (a) cruel or excessive in the nature and degree of suffering
they cause, or (b) incapable of distinguishing combatant from civilian.168
Among the first group are weapons considered so inherently abhorrent that they
are banned absolutely, even when directed against combatants or other lawful
targets, such as blinding laser weapons or poisons.169 The second group
covers weapons that are banned due to their inability to distinguish between
civilian and soldier and hence inherently indiscriminate by nature, which ar-
guably includes anti-personnel landmines.170
Controversy has centred on whether particular weapons systems fall within
this definition and are prohibited by general international law. This is exem-
plified by the serious questions raised as to the lawfulness of the use of cluster
bombs,171 on two main grounds. First, because they are designed to disperse
165 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, para. 78. On the status of the principle
as ‘established custom’, see ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, p. 241 et seq.
166 See e.g. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS
577, in force 1 March 1999 (hereinafter ‘Landmines Convention’); Article 23(e) 1907 Hague
Regulations, supra note 84; Article 35 AP I; Biological Weapons Convention, London, 10
April 1972, in force 26 March 1975; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris,
13 January 1993, in force 29 April 1997 (hereinafter ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’).
167 In Blaskić, supra note 160, paras. 501, 512 where use of homemade mortars constituted an
indiscriminate attack. See also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, para. 95.
168 In its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ibid, para. 78, the ICJ held: ‘States must never
... use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.’
169 Eg CCW Convention’s four Protocols prohibiting the use of specific conventional weapons
on ‘Non-Detectable Fragments’ (1980), ‘Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices’ (1980
amended 1996),‘Incendiary Weapons’(1980) and ‘Blinding Laser Weapons’ (1995). See also
Second Hague Declaration 1899; Article 23(a) of the 1907 Hague Regulations; Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, 1928; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ibid para. 54.
170 Eg anti-personnel landmines have often been cited as violative of these principles, due to
their inability to distinguish civilian from military limbs. See also Landmines Convention
and CCW protocol II above.
171 There is a NATO policy prohibiting the use of cluster munitions in Afghanistan, in place
since 2007. The inherent lawfulness of cluster bombs has not been adjudicated but see ICTY
decision in the preliminary hearing in the case of Martić, IT-95-11-R61, Review of the
Indictment, 8 March 1996, discussed below; see also ‘Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use
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submunitions over a wide area and cannot be confined within the parameters
of a military target.172 Second, due to a high reported initial failure rate –
estimated at seven percent on cluster bombs employed by the US – a significant
amount of bomblets do not detonate immediately, lying dormant until dis-
turbed at some future point.173 The unpredictability of the person or object
that will ultimately detonate the bomblets is such that the impact of these
bomblets may be considered indiscriminate. In these circumstances, they
effectively act as landmines, which have been subject to a widely ratified
comprehensive treaty prohibition174 and which are considered a violation
of the prohibition on the use of indiscriminate weapons.175 Cluster bombs
were prohibited in a specific Convention which entered into force in 2010,176
consolidating earlier doubts as to their lawfulness reflected in international
practice,177 and in earlier US practice in other contexts.178
of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia’, Human Rights Watch Report, June 1999, available
at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/05/11/natos-use-cluster-munitions-yugoslavia ;
see also ‘Cluster Bomblets Litter Afghanistan’, Human Rights Watch Press Release, 16
November 2001, available at: http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/CBAfgh1116.htm.
172 See para. 6B.2.2 below; see also ‘Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring
Freedom and the Afghanistan War’, n. 3, Project on Defense Alternatives, Research Mono-
graph No. 6, 30 January 2002, available at http://www.comw.org/pda.
173 See ‘Long After the Air Raids, Bomblets Bring More Death’, The Guardian, 28 January 2002,
availableat:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/28/afghanistan.suzannegolden
berg.
174 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS, in force
1 March 1999. As of 5 December 2012, 159 states are party to the Landmines Convention.
Data available at: http://www.icbl.org/ratification.
175 See also Human Rights Watch, ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues and the Afghan
Conflict: Open Letter to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense Ministers’,
17 October 2001, available at: http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/nato1017-ltr.htm.
176 The Convention on Cluster Munitions, which prohibits the use, transfer and stockpiling
of cluster bombs, came into force in August 2010. The United Kingdom and Afghanistan
are States Parties, but the US has neither signed nor ratified the Convention.
177 See reports in the context of Afghanistan, above. For earlier reports, see, e.g., HRW, ‘Ticking
Time Bombs, supra note 171; HRW, ‘Cluster Bomblets’, supra note 173. See preliminary
hearing in the case of Martić, IT-95-11-R61, Review of the Indictment, 8 March 1996, above,
indicated that the use of cluster bombs in the circumstances of that case may provide the
basis for an indiscriminate attack charge. The Prosecutor’s office of the ICTY noted a‘clear
trend’ towards their prohibition, in ‘Final Report by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 12 June 2000,
39 (2000) ILM 1257.
178 Reportedly during the 1995 Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, air combat commander
Major-General Michael Ryan prohibited the use of cluster bombs, in recognition of the
inherent danger to civilians. See also US Air-Force-sponsored study cited in HRW, ‘Inter-




IHL governs not only the conduct of hostilities, addressed above, but also
affords protection to persons in the hands of ‘the enemy’. The key provisions
of the Geneva Conventions provide that such persons are considered ‘pro-
tected’ from the moment when they fall into the hands of the adverse
party.179
All persons taking no active part, or no longer taking part, in hostilities
are entitled to protection under IHL; protections are due both to those who
have never taken part in hostilities and to those who once did but are now
hors de combat. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which is custom-
ary international law applicable in all situations, provides that such persons
must be treated humanely, without discrimination, and specifically prohibits
violence to life and person, including cruel treatment, hostage-taking, outrages
upon personal dignity and carrying out of sentences and executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees.180 Beyond Article 3, more detailed provisions are
contained elsewhere in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, many of which
reflect and give expression to fundamental principles of IHL, in particular the
principle of humanity, and may as such reflect customary law.
6A.2.5.1 Civilians
The duty to protect the civilian population lies at the heart of IHL. Rules
regarding targeting of civilians are described above. As noted, for as long as
civilians take up arms and participate directly in hostilities they may lose their
immunity from attack, and they may also be prosecuted under domestic laws
for engaging in conflict.181 However all civilians, whether or not they took
up arms, are entitled to the humanitarian protections set out in Common
Article 3182 and customary law applicable to all conflicts.183 Additional
provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention (which applies to civilians that
‘find themselves ... in the hands of a Party to the Conflict or Occupying
179 Human rights provisions, outlined in Chapter 7, apply to persons detained on a state’s
territory or under its jurisdiction and supplement the specific provisions of IHL. See 7B3
on interplay between the two branches.
180 ‘Common Article 3.
181 It is not a violation of IHL or a war crime to engage in conflict as such, but nor does IHL
offer protection from prosecution under domestic law, other than for privileged combatants
entitled to POW status.
182 Common Article 3 provides humanitarian protection to all persons who do not, or no longer,
take active part in hostilities.
183 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Part VII, especially Ch. 32 ‘fundamental
guarantees’.
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Power184 of which they are not nationals’)185 and Additional Protocol I
apply to international conflicts.
The power into whose hands protected persons fall is obliged to refrain
from violating their rights, but also to take necessary proactive steps to ensure
their protection.186 IHL makes explicit reference to a range of human rights
protections,187 for example respect for ‘honour, family rights, their religious
convictions and their manners and customs’,188 procedural rights relating
to detention and fair trial,189 property rights,190 and particular groups, such
as children, are entitled to special additional protection.191 The duty of
humanitarian protection extends also to ensuring that relief operations are
conducted for the benefit of civilians, in territory under the control of a party
to the conflict.192
6A.2.5.2 Prisoners of war and the wounded or sick
Although combatants and other persons taking a direct part in hostilities are
military objectives and may be attacked, the moment such persons surrender
or are rendered hors de combat, they become entitled to protection.193 That
protection is provided for all conflicts by common Article 3 and for inter-
national conflicts in the First and Third Geneva Conventions relating to the
treatment of the ‘wounded, sick and shipwrecked’ and ‘prisoners of war’,
respectively,194 supplemented by Additional Protocol I. As noted above, these
184 Specific obligations relating to Occupying Powers are addressed at 6A.3.4 below.
185 See Article 4 GC IV and Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 19, para. 578-84.
186 This includes ‘all measures required to ensure the safety of civilians ...’. Gasser, supra note
67, p. 212.
187 Article 38 GC IV – medical care, religion, freedom to leave territory, as discussed by Gasser,
supra note 67, p. 283, and Article 39 GC IV (right to work).
188 Article 27(1) GC IV.
189 See provisions of GC IV and AP I in Chapter 8 on Guantanamo Bay.
190 The guarantee of property rights is found principally in Article 46(2) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations rather than the Geneva Conventions, although see also Article 53 GC IV.
191 Article 24 GC IV; see also Article 77 AP I. These rights under IHL are supplemented by
those enshrined in human rights law, which applies to all persons within a state’s territory
and subject to its jurisdiction, irrespective of nationality, as described in the following
chapter.
192 See Article 59 GC IV on the duties of occupying powers to ‘allow and facilitate rapid and
unimpeded passage’ of relief operations and Article 23 GC IV which imposes a similar
obligation on all high contracting parties. Article 70 AP I extended the obligation to accept
humanitarian relief to civilians in any territory of a party to the conflict.
193 This section deals with POWs and Sick and Wounded. See the basic rights to which all
detainees are entitled in Chapter 8 in relation to the Guantanamo detainees.
194 GC I and III.
340 Chapter 6
Conventions are binding as treaty law, but the key provisions are in any event
customary in nature.195
As regards ‘prisoner of war’ status, which arises in international armed
conflict, the Third Geneva Convention imposes limits on those who are entitled
to such status. These include: (a) members of the armed forces of the opposing
party, whether they belong to a recognised government or not, (b) members
of militia or volunteer corps, provided they satisfy certain conditions, namely
‘being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed
distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; carrying arms openly; conducting
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war’196 and (c)
levées en masse.197 AP I recognises some loosening of these criteria,198 and
commentators have noted the need for flexibility in order ‘to avoid paralysing
the legal process as much as possible and, in the case of humanitarian conven-
tions, to enable them to serve their protective goals’.199
Among the most basic protections owed to POWs under the Convention
are the duties to treat them humanely and protect them from danger,200 to
supply them with food, clothing and medical care201 and to protect them
from public curiosity.202 The procedural guarantees due to POWs are discussed
in detail in relation to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay at Chapter 8.
In brief, they are also entitled to elaborate due process guarantees, including
trial by courts that respect the same standards of justice as those respected
by the courts that would try members of the military of the detaining state.203
They may not be subject to any coercion in order to extract information from
them and are entitled to disclose only their names, date of birth and rank or
position within the armed forces.204 POWs may not be subject to any punish-
ment or reprisal for action taken by the forces on whose side they fought. A
POW may not then be prosecuted by the capturing power for participation in
hostilities or for any lawful acts of war; however, consistent with the duty
to prosecute war crimes,205 serious violations of IHL are subject to prosecution.
195 See, e.g., Report of the UN Secretary General introducing the Statute of the ICTY, supra
note 97. Note that POW status does not however apply in non-international armed conflict,
although, as noted below, the principles may be applied in that context, too. ‘ICRC Study
on Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Ch. 32 and 33.
196 Article 4(A) GC III.
197 Article 4(6) GC III.
198 See Article 44(3) AP I.
199 T. Meron, ‘Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’,
92 (1998) AJIL 236. But see co-application of IHRL in Chapter 7B3.
200 Article 19 GC III.
201 Article 20 GC III.
202 Article 13 GC III.
203 See Article 84 and Articles 99-108 GC III.
204 Article 17 GC III.
205 The Geneva Conventions expressly oblige states to prosecute grave breaches, applicable
in international conflict, while other sources, including the preamble to the ICC Statute,
suggest an obligation to prosecute war crimes in all conflicts.
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When hostilities have ceased POWs must be repatriated.206 Other detailed
rules regarding, inter alia, personal possessions, camps, structure, complaints
and correspondence are set out in the Convention.207
If any doubt arises as to entitlement to POW status, a competent tribunal
must determine the matter.208 Pending such determination, the captured
individual shall in any case enjoy the protection guaranteed to prisoners of
war by the Third Geneva Convention.209 Moreover, on numerous occasions,
states have, as a matter of practice, extended POW status to cover persons not
strictly entitled to such status under IHL, as was for example the practice of
the United States in Vietnam.210 This may reflect in part the core human-
itarian IHL principles manifest in the specific provisions of GC III, as well as
the desire to ensure similar treatment of their own forces if captured.
In any event, if the prisoners in question do not qualify for POW protection
under the Geneva Convention itself, to the extent that certain of the provisions
of that Convention are derived from the principles of humanity (and military
necessity), they may apply as customary law. Moreover, as discussed in more
detail in Chapter 8, they are, in any event, entitled to other protections under
GC IV or, at a minimum, under common Article 3 and Article 75 AP I.211
With regard to the sick or wounded, as noted above they may not be
subject to attack and, as with all persons hors de combat, they are entitled to
humane treatment. In addition, there is a positive obligation under the First
Geneva Convention to search for and collect the sick and wounded.212 They
must be protected, cared for and their medical needs attended to.213 To this
end, protection must also be afforded to medical personnel and equipment.214
The First Geneva Convention concerns only the injured or sick among the
armed forces. However, AP I extends its coverage also to civilians and others
in medical need. Even when AP I is not binding as treaty law,215 the principle
of caring for sick and wounded civilians is consistent with the basic principle
206 Article 118 GC III provides that ‘POWs shall be released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities.’
207 See for example, H. Fischer, ‘Protection of Prisoners of War’, in Fleck, Handbook of Human-
itarian Law, supra note 17, p. 321, and H. McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law: The
Regulation of Armed Conflict (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1990), pp. 89-108.
208 GC III, Article 5. While the tribunal must be ‘independent’ it need not necessarily be
international, according to existing rules. The inclusion of an international element in that
tribunal has been proposed to safeguard its independence. See Gasser, ‘International
Humanitarian Law: An Introduction’ in H. Haug (ed.), Humanity for all: the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, Geneva, 1993), p. 22.
209 Article 5 GC III.
210 See the description of US practice in Vietnam, in Gasser, supra note 67.
211 Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 20, para. 102, citing the ICJ in the Nicaragua para.
218.
212 Article 15 GC I.
213 Ibid.; Article 12 GC I; Article 10 AP I; Article 7 AP III.
214 Articles 24 and 25 GC I.
215 The US and Afghanistan are not parties to AP I.
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of humanity and the general duty to protect civilians, under customary
law.216
6A.2.6 Occupiers’ obligations
IHL enshrines obligations specifically directed towards territory ‘placed under
the control of the hostile army’, or ‘occupied’, during armed conflict.217 Where
a power is present on the territory in question and exercises de facto control
of it, it is in occupation. The key criterion is whether the state exercised effect-
ive control, which may transcend the formal assumption of responsibility by
a new authority. The obligations set out in IHL apply whether or not the
occupying power meets with armed resistance.218 The obligations incumbent
on the occupying power are found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Hague law that preceded it219 and the subsequent provisions of AP I; the bulk
of these provisions reflect customary law.220 As with other areas, these obliga-
tions supplement those of IHRL, which apply wherever the state exercises its
authority or control.221
On the one hand, IHL establishes positive obligations on the occupying
power to administer the territory, including establishing or maintaining law
and order and a functioning legal system,222 and protecting the population
from attacks from their troops and private parties.223 The human rights of
the occupied population must be respected224 and they must not be detained
except where (and for as long as) ‘imperative reasons of security’ so justify,
and then subject to procedural safeguards.225 The power must ensure that
the population has adequate food, medical supplies and facilities and, where
necessary, that relief operations can be carried out.226 On the other hand,
IHL limits the authority of the occupying power, reflecting the transitional
216 See W. Rabus, ‘Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’, in Fleck, Handbook of
Humanitarian Law, supra note 18, p. 293, 294. Rabus notes that AP I Articles 6 and 8 extend
the definition of the sick to cover those civilians who need medical assistance.
217 Article 42, 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84. On the sources and the extent of the
obligation of the occupying powers both under IHL and IHRL see ICJ Advisory Opinion
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
9 July 2004, paras. 123-31.
218 ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47, p. 14.
219 In particular, the 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84.
220 See ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47, p. 8.
221 See Chapter 7 Section A, the IHRL Framework for controversy as to extra-territorial applica-
tion of IHRL in certain circumstances including application to occupied Iraq.
222 Article 43, 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84.
223 Article 47, 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 84. For the IHRL obligations Chapter 7A.4.1.
224 Article 27 GC IV enshrines the general obligation: specific rights are provided for elsewhere,
e.g., rights to fair trial in Article 75(1) GC IV.
225 These include appeal and six-monthly review.
226 See Articles 55-60 GC IV.
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nature of occupation, to prevent it from benefiting from the occupation at the
expense of the local population, or from making far-reaching or unnecessary
changes in the political structure or legal system during its occupation.227
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians also prohibits
the transfer or deportation of individuals from occupied territory.228
6A.2.7 Responsibility and ensuring compliance with IHL
Parties to an armed conflict are bound to respect the applicable rules of IHL.
They will be responsible for violations of those rules by their own armed
forces, and by other irregular forces that fight alongside their own forces,
where these could be said to fall under their ‘overall control’; such control
arises where the Party ‘has a role in organising, co-ordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group’.229
Moreover, all states party to the Geneva Conventions have obligations to
‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions by all states.230 Article 1 common to
the Geneva Conventions imposes the duty on all High Contracting Parties
to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions, meaning that they should
‘do everything in their power to ensure that it is respected universally’.231
In 1968 and 1977 this positive obligation was reaffirmed without controversy
by a broad representation of states, as a result of which the First Additional
Protocol makes similar provision.232 Whether or not party to a conflict, states
parties to the Geneva Conventions are therefore obliged to take reasonable
227 See, e.g., Articles 43 and 64 GC IV. The fact that this limitation is subject to exception in
the interests of the population may provide a basis for the non-application of laws that
would violate human rights law, as some human rights groups have noted.
228 Article 49, GC IV. See Chapter 10 on Extraordinary Renditions.
229 Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 20, para. 137. See Chapter 3, above. Note that this
test of responsibility of a party to the conflict under IHL is distinct from the state responsib-
ility test (Chapter 3) or the individual criminal responsibility that may attach to a com-
mander or other superior in respect of the acts or omissions of his or her subordinates
(Chapter 4A.1.2).
230 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. ‘The proper working of the system of
protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should
not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their
power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied
universally.’ See ICRC Commentary on GC IV, p. 16.
231 Ibid, Common Article 1. This positive obligation was reaffirmed without controversy during
the negotiation of AP I. See W.T. Mallison and S.V. Mallison, ‘The Juridical Status of
Privileged Combatants under the Geneva Protocol of 1977 concerning International Con-
flicts’, 42 (1978) Law and Contemporary Problems 4, 12.
232 Mallison and Mallison, ibid, note that Article 1(1) of AP I paraphrases the obligations set
forth in Article 1 of the 1949 Conventions.
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and appropriate measures to ensure that other parties observe the Conven-
tions.233 This obligation applies in respect of international and non-inter-
national armed conflicts.234
It follows from this obligation on all states parties that they should not
directly facilitate or encourage violations, for example by cooperating with
an offending state in criminal or military matters,235 where it is believed that
IHL is being violated.236 Moreover, beyond desisting from committing, en-
couraging or assisting such violations, the positive obligation to ensure respect
requires positive measures to prevent violations by other states parties. As
the ICJ noted in The Wall:
In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while
respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance
by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.237
States parties would enjoy discretion to decide what measures they deem
necessary or effective, which may entail invoking the under-utilised inter-state
judicial mechanisms,238 or, at a minimum, making diplomatic representations
regarding violations. As observance of humanitarian law transcends the sphere
of interest of any individual state, action should not be taken only by states
parties to the conflict, nor should it be limited to representations or other
measures directed towards the protection of a state’s own nationals.
Finally, while not all violations of IHL carry individual criminal responsib-
ility, serious violations may also amount to war crimes for which individuals
can be held to account before national or international courts.239 As discussed
233 ICRC Commentary to AP I, p. 18. This reflects the fundamental nature of IHL obligations
as obligations erga omnes, see Introduction.
234 See ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 21.
235 Criminal cooperation may include transferring individuals through extradition or other
process, while military assistance may include provisions of weapons or other logistical
assistance or certain types of training.
236 See Meron, ‘Geneva Conventions’, supra note 89, at 349. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case, supra
note 96, para. 220, asserted the customary nature of such an obligation.
237 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 159.
238 Recourse to the ICJ is available between states, and human rights bodies such as the Human
Rights Committee under the ICCPR could be invoked by one state against another for the
application of human rights law (which as discussed in 7.B.3 would have to be interpreted
in light of IHL in armed conflict situations).
239 All violations involve the responsibility of the party to the conflict, but only some serious
violations entail individual criminal responsibility under customary or conventional law
as discussed at Chapter 4. See, e.g., Article 3 Statute of the ICTY or Article 8 ICC Statute.
Where violations do amount to war crimes they may be subject to prosecution on the
national or international level and certain war crimes carry universal jurisdiction – Chapter
4A3. See W. J. Fenrick, ‘Article 8. War Crimes’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 173.
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at Chapter 4, responsibility may be direct – for committing, ordering or aiding
and abetting the commission of violations – or indirect, for superiors who fail
to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent violations by formal
or informal subordinates. A specific additional positive obligation on states
parties to the Geneva Conventions is the duty, in the event of grave breaches
of the Conventions, such as mistreatment of POWs or depriving them of the
rights of a fair trial, to seek out and prosecute those individuals respons-
ible.240 Then Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary ex-
ecutions, Philip Alston, has emphasised the obligation to ensure accountability
for violations under IHL.241
Despite these obligations, it is often noted that the challenge to IHL lies
in ensuring effective compliance. Beyond the responsibility of states, outlined
above, the ICRC has a crucial, but limited, role as monitor of compliance with
IHL and protector of persons caught up in armed conflict.242 Other mechan-
isms exist in principle,243 but in practice are not utilised, or grossly under-
utilised, with the result that it is doubtful whether any meaningful IHL mechan-
ism currently exists for rendering accountable parties that violate IHL, still less
to provide individual or collective redress for victims of violations. Human
rights mechanisms may, in certain circumstances, fulfil this role, to the extent
that they apply human rights law alongside IHL, in times of armed conflict.244
240 ‘Grave breaches’ provisions appear in all four Geneva Conventions and AP I. See, e.g.,
Articles 147 and 148 of GC IV and Article 85 AP I. For direct and indirect criminal respons-
ibility, see Chapter 4, para. 4A.1.2.1. See discussion of this and interplay with IHRL obliga-
tions to investigate in Chapter 7B3.
241 See, e.g., ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, pp. 25-26.
242 For a detailed analysis of the role of the ‘watchdog function’ of the ICRC, see, in general,
Y. Sandoz, The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International Human-
itarian Law (Geneva, 1998). However, the ICRC’s strength is also its limitation, in that it
generally works confidentially and without publicly condemning any party. In relation
to Guantanamo Bay and Iraq, the ICRC may have adopted an unusually visible and vocal
approach: see e.g., ICRC, ‘Guantanamo Bay: Overview of the ICRC’s work for internees’,
30 January 2004, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/
5qrc5v.htm. A report leaked in 2009 on ‘High Value Detainees’ indicates the sort of con-
fidential communication between the ICRC and States, available at: http://
assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf, discussed in Chapter 10.
243 The Geneva Conventions set up the institution of Protecting Powers, i.e., neutral states
or some other entity that, following designation by the parties to the conflict, would act
to protect the interests of wounded or sick personnel, prisoners of war, internees, or other
persons controlled by a hostile power. This has rarely been used and generally lacks
credibility: ICRC Commentary to AP I, p. 77; Y. Sandoz, ‘Mechanisms of Implementation
under IHL, International Human Rights Law and Refugee Law’, paper presented at the
2003 Sanremo Round Table on IHL, ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed
Conflicts’, supra note 48.
244 The approach of human rights courts and bodies and their willingness to engage with IHL
alongside HRL vary. See H. Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict? The Interplay between Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in L. van den Herik and
N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting
the Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and Chapter 7B.3. The ‘ICRC
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The need and/or desirability of an additional mechanism specifically directed
towards IHL has long been under discussion but remains contentious.245 In
this context the paramount role of international community of states in en-
suring compliance with IHL is particularly critical.
6B INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE ‘WAR ON
TERROR’
Since September 11 the world has been constantly reminded that it is at war,
albeit ‘a different kind of war.’246 A correct understanding of whether IHL
applies in any given situation depends on an understanding of whether there
is in fact an armed conflict, if so with whom, and the nature of that conflict.
The first part of this chapter therefore considers basic questions relating
to the existence, scope and nature of armed conflicts that may have arisen post-
9/11. Is there, or can there be, an armed conflict of global reach with al-Qaeda
and associates or other terrorist networks, and what is the nature of the con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq? The second part of the chapter highlights
specific questions to have arisen regarding the IHL framework, including in
relation to targeting and the use of force – such as the extensive practice of
drone killings of suspected al Qaeda or related terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen
or Somalia, or the identification of drug lords and other ‘supporters’ of al
Qaeda as legitimate targets in Afghanistan – or the compatibility of ‘war on
terror’ detention policy with IHL rules.247
Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 23, notes that the
role of human rights mechanisms in this respect was encouraged.
245 See proposals to establish a mechanism for individual complaint under IHL, advanced at
the Hague centennial conference 1999, in ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed
Conflicts’, supra note 48.
246 ‘The President has made very plain to the American people that the war on terrorism is
not a traditional war ... in the sense that there is one known battlefield or one known nation
or one known region. The President has made clear that we will fight the war on terrorism
wherever we need to fight the war on terrorism ... this is a different kind of war, with a
different kind of battlefield, where known political boundaries, which previously existed
in traditional wars do not exist in the war on terrorism.’ Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer,
Aboard Air Force One, 5 November 2002, available at: www.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/11/20021105-2.html; see also Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, supra note 6;
Statement by Ambassador at Large, Pierre Prosper, supra note 6. The Obama administration
also asserts it is engaged in a ‘current, novel type of armed conflict’ (‘Respondents’ memo-
randum regarding the Government’s detention authority relative to detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay’, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH), p. 1, para. 2) and ‘a different kind of war’,
(Speech by President Obama, National Defense University, 23 May 2013).
247 Detention is touched upon here and developed in other chapters; see Chapter 7B3 on
interplay of IHL and IHRL and Chapter 8 on Guantanamo.
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6B.1 ARMED CONFLICTS SINCE 9/11
6B.1.1 Conflict with ‘al-Qaeda and associated groups’?
It has at times been tempting to dismiss post 9/11 references to the ‘war on
terror’ as simply a rhetorical device with no more meaning than the wars on
drugs or on crime oft-invoked in political circles. While there clearly cannot
be an armed conflict with an abstract phenomenon, too much sleight of hand
would overlook the seriousness with which the view was and is advanced
by governments and at least some commentators, that there is an armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, and other unidentified terrorist individuals, networks
or organisations.
Since 9/11, successive US administrations have argued, in varying forms
of words, that they were or are engaged in an armed conflict of global reach
with al-Qaeda and “associated” forces.248 The position of the Bush administra-
tion originally suggested that this conflict was akin to an international conflict,
albeit a new kind of conflict that did not fit into any of the IHL categories.249
This conflict was asserted to exist alongside the further international conflict
in Afghanistan, although on occasion the two were conflated into ‘in an armed
conflict with al Qaida, the Taliban, and their supporters’.250
248 ‘The United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and asso-
ciated forces. Members of al Qaeda were responsible for the attacks on the United States
of September 11, 2001, and for many other terrorist attacks, including against the United
States, its personnel, and its allies throughout the world. These forces continue to fight
the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and they continue to
plan additional acts of terror throughout the world.’ G. Bush, ‘Executive Order: Interpreta-
tion of the Geneva Convention Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention
and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency’, Executive Order 13440, 20
July 2007, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13440.htm. See also Bush
2001 speech. note 1. The Obama administration essentially followed this line: see inter alia,
speech by President Obama 23 May 2013, note 106; US National Security Strategy 2010;
H. Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), 25 March 2010, available at: http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (hereinafter ‘ASIL Speech’) and further
examples below.
249 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) on the government’s position, accepted
by the Court of Appeals. After the Hamdan judgement, it shifted to contemplating that the
conflict may have been non-international.
250 For more recent statements under the Obama administration see, e.g., submission to the
UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/
Rev.1/Add.1, 12 February 2008, p. 3, para. 12. The US claimed: ‘The United States is engaged
in an armed conflict with al Qaida, the Taliban, and their supporters.’ Koh, ‘ASIL Speech’,
supra note 248; Executive Order 13440, 20 July 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/eo/eo-13440.htm like Obama speech of 23 may 2013, provided that: ‘The United
States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.’
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The Obama administration came to power heralding a radical shift of
approach by appearing to have promptly abandoned the ‘war on terror’
epithet.251 Media reports that the ‘war on terror’ was dead252 were, however,
themselves short-lived. In his national security remarks on May 21, 2009
President Obama stated: ‘Now let me be clear. We are indeed at war with al
Qaeda and its affiliates.’253 That this was more than simple political rhetoric
was made clear from the US administration’s legal position in subsequent
litigation and from multiple high level speeches since, which have confirmed
that the US considers itself engaged in an ‘armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the
Taliban and associated forces.’254 Despite rejecting over time the broad ‘war
on a tactic’255 and acknowledging the need to move away from a ‘perpetual
251 In The Hague in March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: ‘The [Obama]
administration has stopped using the phrase and I think that speaks for itself ....’, Reuters,
30 March 2009, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/30/us-obama-
rhetoric-idUSTRE52T7MH2 0090330; see also A. Kamen, ‘The End of the Global War on
Terror’, The Washington Post, 24 March 2009, available at: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
44/2009/03/23/ the_end_of_the_global_war_on_t.html, referring to a leaked memo from
the Office of Security Review, which states: ‘This Administration prefers to avoid using
the term “Long War” or “Global War on Terror” [GWOT]. Please use “Overseas Con-
tingency Operation.”
252 See, e.g., Kamen, ‘The End of the Global War on Terror’, ibid, ‘[t]he decade-long global war
on terror, which effectively ended with the killing of Osama bin Laden’, in ‘Goodbye, good
riddance to the global war on terror’, Globe and Mail, 7 September 2011 at: http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/goodbye-good-riddance-to-the-global-
war-on-terror/article2155295.
253 B. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on National Security’, The White House Office of the
Press Secretary, 21 May 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/; see also, Obama, ‘Inaugural
Address’, 20 January 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-
address/. ‘Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred’
and 23 May 2013 speech note 106.
254 Koh ‘ASIL Speech’, supra note 248. See also E. Holder, Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Address at Northwestern University School of Law, 5 March 2012), available at:
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html(hereinafter
‘Holder Speech on Targeted Killing’); J. Johnson, ‘National security law, lawyers and
lawyering in the Obama Administration’, Speech at the Yale Law School on 22 February
2012, transcript available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-
yale-law-school/ (hereinafter ‘Johnson Speech on National Security’); J. O. Brennan,
‘Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our
Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws’, 16 September 2011, available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-
our-security-adhering-our-values-an ; see also J. O. Brennan, ‘Speech at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism
Strategy’, 30 April 2012, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/30/watch-
live-john-brennan-president-s-counterterrorism-strategy.
255 Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the President’s Speech on
Counterterrorism, 23 May 2013 at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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war’ paradigm, the administration’s assertion that it is at war with al Qaeda
and associated forces remained intact.256
As is relatively common for parties to a conflict, its approach to the nature
of that conflict is less clearly articulated. It appears however to have evolved
from considering the purported conflict with al-Qaeda an international con-
flict,257 to considering it non-international in nature.258 Such a shift may
reflect the decision of the US Supreme Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, where the
Court found that Common Article 3 applies to detainees captured pursuant
to the ‘war on terror’.259 This has been cited in support of the existence of
a non-international conflict with al Qaeda, though whether the Supreme Court
judgement really provides support for this view, as opposed to upholding
the applicability of minimal protective rules to any person detained, has itself
proved contentious. While some read Hamdan as at least assuming that there
is a global NIAC against al-Qaeda,260 others question whether the Court in
fact took any position on the existence or nature of the armed conflict(s) in
Afghanistan or beyond.261 In any event it has been relied upon by the US
administration as providing legal imprimatur to its position that it is engaged
in a NIAC with al-Qaeda and others.
The position of the United States administration regarding the existence
of an armed conflict with al Qaeda contrasts starkly with the positions and
practice of other states, including close US allies in the war on terror. Attacks
in London, Madrid, Denmark and elsewhere did not provoke claims from
affected states that an armed conflict had arisen, and indeed those governments
256 Obama, May 2013 speech, note 246.
257 See, e.g., J. Pejic, ‘“Unlawful/Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations and Consequences’, in
M. Schmitt and Pejic (eds.) International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines (Brill,
2007), p. 341.
258 The Obama administration has referred to a ‘current, novel type of armed conflict’ and
appears to rely on the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Hamdan to support the
existence of a non-international conflict against armed groups, such as al-Qaeda and the
Taleban.
259 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
260 See, e.g., J. Ku and J. Yoo, ‘Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs
Deference to the Executive Branch’, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 23, 2006, p. 111. ‘[T]he
Court held that Common Article 3...applied to the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda...The Court
concluded that the war with al Qaeda in Afghanistan...qualifies as a ‘conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.’
261 See, e.g., J. Cerone, ‘Status of Detainees in Non-International Armed Conflict, and Their
Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’,
American Society for International Law (ASIL), Volume 10, Issue 17, 26 February 2009,
para. 12. ‘Ultimately, the Court chose not to take a position on whether there were two
separate conflicts, and refrained from characterizing the nature of the conflict(s).’ Eg E.
Shamir-Borer, ‘Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed Conflict’,
21 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 601, 607-08 (2007) noting the Court ‘reserved its position on the nature
and classification of the conflict’.
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distanced themselves from the war paradigm.262 Despite close alliances
between the US and UK in counter-terrorism, the UK former Attorney General
is among those who described the notion of a war on terror as ‘not only
misleading but positively dangerous’.263 Examples abound of international
actors, including the ICRC, other inter-governmental organisations and author-
itative commentators rejecting the notion of an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda.264
The question that has been pivotal in much of this international discourse,
and which has lead to a gaping transatlantic rift,265 is this: can or should
al-Qaeda and other networks be considered parties to an armed conflict, to
be defeated militarily in accordance with IHL, or should they properly be
understood as criminal organisations, requiring effective law enforcement?
Many policy arguments, emphasising the merits and demerits of considering
al-Qaeda to be a party to a conflict have been advanced since September 11,
262 ‘On the contrary, the post September 11 terrorist bombings in London, Madrid and Bali
were not treated as acts of war, but as criminal acts, and the authorities applied law
enforcement, not military, means to address them.’ Eminent Jurists Panel, ‘Report of the
Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: Assessing
Damage, Urging Action’, International Commission of Jurists, 2009, retrieved from http://
ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf (hereinafter ‘Eminent Jurists Panel Report’). See, e.g. then
Director of Public Prosecutions: ‘London is not a battlefield. Those innocents who were
murdered on July 7 2005 were not victims of war... We need to be very clear about this.
On the streets of London, there is no such thing as a “war on terror”, just as there can be
no such thing as a “war on drugs” ... The fight against terrorism on the streets of Britain
is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the enforcement of our laws and the winning
of justice for those damaged by their infringement.’ K. Macdonald, ‘Security and Rights’,
Crown Prosecution Service, 23 January 2007, available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/
articles/security_ rights/ last visited 6 December 2012.
263 Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General from 2001 to 2007, ‘Justice and the Rule of Law’, 43
Int’l Lawyer 27, 29 (2009): ‘... saying “War on Terror” then justifies holding people without
trial after the international armed conflict has come to an end until this amorphous “War
on Terror” has come to an end-and who is going to say when it has?’ K. MacDonald, ibid.
264 See, e.g., ICRC, ‘Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 47. ‘On the basis
of an analysis of the available facts, the ICRC does not share the view that a global war
is being waged and it takes a case-by-case approach to the legal qualification of situations
of violence that are colloquially referred to as part of the “war on terror.”’ European
Commission for Democracy Through Law, ‘Opinion on the International Legal Obligations
of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State
Transport of Prisoners’, Venice Commission 66th Plenary Session, 17-18 March 2006, available
at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.asp#_ftnref47 ; Eminent
Jurists Panel, supra note 262.
265 Proponents of a global war with al-Qaeda are described as ‘almost exclusively in the US’.
Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 10, p. 195. In support of the armed conflict
model, see Bellinger, ‘Armed Conflict with Al Qaida?’, Opinio Juris, 15 January 2007, para.
9, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/15/armed-conflict-with-al-qaida. On the
divide, see, e.g., A. Dworkin, ‘Beyond the War on Terror: Towards a New Transatlantic
Framework for Counterterrorism’, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009, available
at: http://hiram7.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/towards-a-new-transatlantic-framework-for-
counterterrorism.pdf.
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of relevance to on-going discussions as to whether and if so how IHL might
develop in the future. The focus of this section, however, is on whether, under
current international law, the relationship between the US or other states and
al-Qaeda and associates can meet the criteria for the contemporary definition
of armed conflict.
As set out in the legal framework in Part A of this chapter, the key criteria
require firstly, the use of force, and secondly, the existence of identifiable
parties to the conflict with particular characteristics. Additional questions that
have emerged regarding the reach of ‘conflict’ – temporally, as regards the
‘long war’ that may never end, or spatially, as regards whether an armed
conflict can be geographically limitless and ‘global’ in scope. The legal criteria
set out in Part A fall to be considered in relation to the questions whether there
might in fact be an international or a non-international armed conflict with
al-Qaeda. These categories of conflict are considered in turn below.
6B.1.1.1 An ‘International’ armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated groups?
September 11 left no room for doubt that terrorist entities such as al-Qaeda
can and do resort to the ‘use of force’ across international frontiers, satisfying
the first criterion for an IAC. While some question the intensity of that force
over time, the predominant view is that there is no threshold of intensity
required in international (as opposed to non-international) armed conflict.266
The more difficult question regarding qualification as an IAC relates to the
nature of the ‘parties’ to an international conflict, which, according to current
IHL, must be states. Exceptions to the inter-state model of IAC – including
‘liberation movements’ engaged in a struggle against colonial domination267
or perhaps non-state entities exercising ‘quasi-state’ functions – do not seem
relevant to al-Qaeda and related entities.268
Armed groups such as al-Qaeda, or armed individuals, may of course act
under the authority of a state or states, but only if their conduct is attributable
to the state, as set out in Chapter 3.269 As noted there, and in Chapter 5 in
relation to the use of force in response to 9/11, there has been no serious
assertion of state responsibility for al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. Even in the
266 As noted in Part A, above, some now suggest that there is an intensity threshold even for
IAC. See ‘ILA Report’, supra note 28; Bianchi and Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law
and Terrorism, supra note 8, p. 76-77. If this is so, there may be questions as to whether
it has been met; see below in relation to NIAC, Intensity.
267 Article 1(4) AP I includes ‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in their exercise of the right
of self-determination’ within the definition of international armed conflict within the
meaning of Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
268 While these exceptions are at least conceivably relevant to some armed groups that may
be labelled ‘terrorist’, they do not appear relevant to the situation in respect of al-Qaeda.
269 On legal standards for attributing the conduct of private actors to states, see Chapter 3.1.1.
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immediate aftermath of 9/11, when many allegations were levelled at the
Taleban, there was little suggestion that Afghanistan was legally responsible
for the September 11 attacks or that the criteria whereby acts are attributable
to states were satisfied through that state (or any other’s) relationship of control
over al-Qaeda or its conduct.
Members of terrorist groups may, however, constitute irregulars fighting
alongside state forces in an IAC, provided they meet certain conditions and
are under the states command and control.270 Some suggest this may have
been the case for certain al Qaeda associates in Afghanistan in 2001, depending
on their relationship with Taleban forces.271 The overwhelming weight of
opinion would however suggest that they cannot themselves constitute a party
to an international conflict against the US absent such state support.272 Despite
the first glance attraction of the original US position that if there is a conflict
arising out of acts of ‘international terrorism’, it should be considered ‘inter-
national’ in nature,273 there is decreasing reliance on such an argument, either
by the administration or others,274 and it finds little support in the criteria
for international armed conflict under current international law.275 Whether
there might be a conflict with al Qaeda or others depends therefore on it falling
within the definition of a non-international armed conflict.
6B.1.1.2 A ‘non-international armed conflict’ with al-Qaeda and associated groups?
As regards the criteria for the existence of a non-international armed conflict
set out in Part A above, the first is that the use of force employed must reach
a certain threshold of intensity and be distinguishable from sporadic or isolated
acts of violence. If, in accordance with the weight of international practice,
270 See Chapter 6A.2.1 above referring to criteria to constitute a combatant under Art. 4 GCIII
and AP I.
271 See generally, Dworkin, supra note 265; see also A2.1 on the definition of combatant and
of ‘armed forces’ as comprising also armed groups that meet certain conditions and fight
alongside a party to a conflict.
272 Cross ref to definition in part A.1. As noted, this no longer even appears to be the US
position. Nor can al Qaeda and associates be a party to a NIAC for reasons set out below.
273 See, e.g., ‘Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees’, supra note 248, §2c; Pejic,
‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 11, p. 195.
274 The view now advanced by the US administration appears to be that there is a ‘non-
international’ armed conflict, albeit of global reach, with al-Qaeda and associates. Both
administrations have at times conflated the Afghan conflict which was international at the
outset with this broader alleged conflict so it can be difficult to discern into which category
the administrations would put the conflict at various stages.
275 See part A.1.1.1 ‘p. 32 for a minority view that such conflict is international and the ‘more
common view’ is that such a conflict would be international, in Wilmshurst, Classification,
p. 32.
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the attack were measured in intensity, without regard to duration,276 the scale
of the September 11 attacks would have comfortably reached the intensity
threshold. More difficult, however, is the question whether violence by ‘al-
Qaeda and associates’ continues to meet the intensity threshold many years
later, and in light of developments since then. It has been questioned whether
the frequency, scale and nature of al Qaeda attacks is such that the force
involved can be considered sufficient to amount to an armed conflict rather
than sporadic – albeit deadly – violence.277
It has been observed that it would be necessary to amalgamate, and con-
sider as one conflict, all acts attributed to al-Qaeda and associates in its diverse
forms in recent years, including the attacks in Madrid, Bali, London, Denmark,
Glasgow and elsewhere to meet the threshold. Yet, despite occasional reference
to a ‘conflict with the United States and its allies’,278 such an approach is
belied by the fact that the governments in those states – unlike the US – very
much rejected the idea of the attacks as acts of armed conflict.279 Moreover,
as explored further before (in relation to the parties to the conflict), it must
be doubted to what extent the various attacks can meaningfully be said to
have emanated from the same source, so as to constitute an attack that might
meet the intensity threshold of hostilities.
It is, in any event, the second prong of the test, regarding the nature of
the ‘parties’ to an armed conflict that is perhaps more problematic for pro-
ponents of the ‘war with al Qaeda and associates’ paradigm. It is to be serious-
ly doubted that an entity such as al-Qaeda could possess the characteristics
of an ‘armed group’ as understood by IHL, such that it can be a party to a non-
international armed conflict. As set out in Part A, the jurisprudence of the ICTY
makes clear that an armed conflict can only exist with non-state actors that
enjoy a certain level of organisation, which may be assessed by reference to
276 See Part 6A.1.1.2 above. See also ICTY intensity ‘indicators’, e.g.. number of confrontations,
the actors involved, types of weaponry used and extent of injuries and destruction in
Haradinaj, supra note 55, paras. 49, 60. Haradinaj also notes the criterion of protracted
violence refers more to the intensity than duration.
277 See, e.g., Eminent Jurists Panel Report, supra note 262, p. 54; see generally Pejic, ‘Protective
scope of CA3’, supra note 10; see also the ‘Intensity’ threshold and Haradinaj, ibid..
278 Eg‘[t]hese forces continue to fight the United States and its allies ...’ and ‘[t]o succeed, we
and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains’. See Bush, Executive Order
13440, and Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan’, 27 March 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/.
279 See Eminent Jurists Panel, supra note 262, p. 54, ‘[t]he Panel, however, received no informa-
tion indicating that any of these [ally] States consider themselves to be engaged in an armed
conflict with these [terrorist] groups’. However, in response to the kidnapping and murder
of a French citizen by al-Qaeda forces, France’s Prime Minister Francois Fillon did recently
state: ‘We are at war with al Qaeda and that’s why we have been supporting Mauritanian
forces fighting al Qaeda for months... the fight against terrorism will continue and will
be reinforced.’ P. Taylor, ‘PM Fillon says France “at war” with al Qaeda’, Reuters, 27 July
2010, available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE66Q1B920100727.
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‘indicative’ factors.280 These include whether the group has sufficiently identi-
fiable scope and membership, sufficient organisation and structure, and the
capability of abiding by the rules of IHL.281
Since 9/11, al-Qaeda has variously been described as an organisation, a
‘network of networks’,282 ‘a series of loosely connected operational and sup-
port cells’,283 an ‘ideology’ or even ‘a far-reaching network of violence and
hatred’.284 There is little in what is known about the entity, or movement,
that is al Qaeda, still less ‘associates’ that would suggest it meets the require-
ments of structured organisation, under military command and control, as
envisaged by the legal standards.285
Moreover, in this context, identifying the alleged ‘party’ is itself problem-
atic; it is unclear whether al Qaeda should be conceived of as one organisation,
or as disparate regional, national, local or individual manifestations of a
broadly similar ideology.286 To borrow the phrase of the Director of the FBI,
would all the ‘al Qaeda franchises’ form part of the party to the conflict?287
The matter is clearly further complicated by the consistent assertion of being
in conflict also with the unidentified ‘affiliates’ or ‘associates’ of al-Qaeda.288
The identification of parties to a conflict is essential to the rationale of IHL,
280 See A.1.1.2 for indicative factors. In Haradinaj, supra note 55, para. 49, 60.
281 Haradinaj, supra note 55, para. 60; see the factors in Boškoski, supra note 7, para. 194; see
generally Sassòli, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’, supra note 48.
282 N. Lubell, ‘Classification of Conflicts’, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification
of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 424.
283 The UK Government relies on this definition, first provided in the letter of 19 September
2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolu-
tion 1267 of 1999: see ‘SIAC “Generic Determination”’, 29 October 2003, cases SC/1/2002;
SC/6/2002; SC/7/2002; SC/9/2002; SC/10/2002, para. 130: Ajouaou and others v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, available at http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgments/
siac/outcomes/Generic Determination.htm.
284 ‘Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.’ B. Obama,
‘Inaugural Address’, supra note 253.
285 See, e.g., M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?’, Nordic Journal of Int’l
Law, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2009, p. 508: ‘While Al-Qaida may be able to issue statements and claim
responsibility for different attacks, its coherence and grip are arguably not at a level that
allows for meticulous planning of each and every attack, as these are increasingly left for
autonomous action by groups that are only loosely if at all connected to wider regional
or global networks. Scholars and experts debate the degree of organisation versus autonomy
within Al-Qaida, but there is a fairly general perception that a distinction must be made
between the structure of the movement during the period from 1996 to 2001 and its structure
today.’
286 As reflected in Obama’s May 2013 speech, the diffuse and individualised nature of the
evolving threat counters the notion of al Qaeda as a party to an armed conflict as such..
287 R. Mueller, Director FBI, ‘From 9/11 to 7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges
of Tomorrow’, Chatham House, 7 April 2008, available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org.
uk/files/11301_070408mueller.pdf.
288 There is emerging evidence of U.S. attacks on persons associated with other groups, such
as al Shabaab in Somalia (see below B.2.2.1) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (in
Lubell, ‘Classification of Conflicts’, supra note 282, p. 427).
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yet the identity of these associates is shrouded in secrecy. The US has main-
tained a long list of quite disparate ‘terrorists and terrorist groups’ whose
affiliates are classified as ‘enemy combatants’, signalling the potential breadth
of those that may be covered, and raising further doubts as to the identification
of the precise parameters of the putative party to the conflict.
Related uncertainties concern how one can define and identify with suffi-
cient clarity the relationship between particular individuals and their member-
ship, support or sympathy for this group or groups. Judicial inquiries following
the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 revealed that
‘their authors were perhaps not linked to Al Qaeda by anything other than
consulting the same websites and harbouring the same hate against Western
societies as Al Qaeda apparently does’.289 Yet the logic, structure and effective
operation of IHL depend precisely on the ability to identify and distinguish
the opposing party, with critical implications for targeting and humanitarian
protection.290
While these doubts were already present in 2001, they have increased in
recent years, as knowledge of al-Qaeda has grown on the one hand, and as
its capacity and core structure have apparently been depleted on the other.291
While some reports have raised concerns about swelling numbers of individual
terrorist volunteers in the wake of controversial ‘counter-terrorist’ practices
and the conflict in Iraq,292 indications are that the higher ranks and resources
have been greatly depleted,293 further diminishing the claim to military
organisation, control or coordination. One commentator recently described
‘a new generation of Islamic terrorists who act alone, abetted by Jihadi web
289 M. Sassòli, ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’, HPCR
Occasional Paper Series, Winter 2006, No. 6, p. 10, available at: www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/
default/files/ publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf. This was true of numerous smaller attacks
since then e.g. the Boston marathon attacks in early 2013,.
290 See ‘ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 19; see
generally, Paust, ‘There is No Need to Revise the Laws of War in Light of September 11’,
ASIL Task Force Papers, November 2002, available at: http://www.asil.org/taskforce/
paust.pdf last visited 7 December 2012.
291 See, e.g., M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?’, supra note 289, p.
508: ‘… there is a fairly general perception that a distinction must be made between the
structure of the movement during the period from 1996 to 2001 and its structure today.’
292 Eg P. Reynolds, ‘Iraq War Helped al Qaeda Recruit’, BBC, 19 October 2004, available at:
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3756650.stm; M. Mazzeti, ‘Spy Agencies Say Iraq War
Worsens Terrorism Threat’, New York Times, 24 September 2006, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html?pagewanted=andU.S.
National Security Strategy, May 2010, pp. 21-22, 36, available at: http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer /national_security_strategy.pdf.
293 See Obama, ‘Address on the War in Afghanistan’, 1 December 2009, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html?pagewanted=all last noting
‘Within a matter of months [of sending troops to Afghanistan], al Qaeda was scattered
and many of its operatives were killed... ’. See also 23 May 2013 speech.
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sites ...’,294 which bears no relation to the requirements of structure and con-
trol implicit in IHL. The image that prevails is of an al-Qaeda that is increas-
ingly disparate and decentralized, embodied in individual, sporadic, unpredict-
able and largely uncoordinated attacks.295 While the threat may be no less
real, and the need for concerted international measures of prevention no less
pressing, its claim to constitute an identifiable, organised party to an armed
conflict is surely less compelling.
There is, therefore, good reason for the widespread view among govern-
ments, IGOs, international experts and commentators alike, that al-Qaeda and
related groups lack the characteristics of armed groups under IHL, and that
there is no armed conflict with al Qaeda and associates.296 While al-Qaeda
may have had a role in the NIAC in Afghanistan alongside the Taleban, and
may on some views have constituted a party to the conflict at that point, it
has been noted that ‘this legal status would have certainly been lost as a
consequence of Al Qaeda’s subsequent transformation into a rather loosely
connected network of terrorist cells. And most certainly, individual terrorist
action all over the globe carried out on the basis of an “Al Qaeda franchise
model” cannot be attributed to Al Qaeda as a non-State party to a non-inter-
national armed conflict of global reach’.297
Despite re-packaging the ‘war on terror,’ the US has consistently maintained
the right to wage war on suspected terrorists and terrorist groups. However,
treating them as parties to an armed conflict, rather than organised criminals
294 In light of the terrorist attack against a Jewish school in Toulouse in March 2012, French
counter-terrorist analyst John-Louis Bruguière referred to a ‘new generation of Islamic
terrorists who act alone, abetted by jihadi Web sites and their own anger’. D. Bilefksy and
M. de la Baume, ‘French Gunman Seen as Homegrown Militant’, The New York Times, 21
March 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/world/europe/moham-
med-merah-france-shooting-suspect-seen-as-home-grown-militant.html?pagewanted=all.
295 See M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?’, supra note 285, pp. 509-10.
‘The infrastructure of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, according to most accounts, was largely
destroyed by the US-led military campaign in 2001-2002 ... . It is not always possible to
ascertain whether a particular terrorist act has been directed, facilitated or just inspired
by Al-Qaida ... . [I]t is hard to see how Al-Qaida, in particular in its present decentralized
and dispersed form, could qualify as a party to an armed conflict.’
296 See, e.g., Eminent Jurists Panel Report, supra note 262, p. 54 that ‘[t]he dominant view seems
to be that al-Qaeda is a loosely connected network rather than a single transnational
organisation. However, even if al-Qaeda were considered to be a cohesive and well-ordered
collective that shared common strategies and tactics, it is still difficult to conceive of it as
a unitary armed force and, as such, a party to the conflict. The inclusion of indeterminate
“associated groups” makes it even more difficult ... Both practically and legally, there is
no identifiable party to the conflict with which negotiation, defeat or surrender can occur.’
See also the many voices cited above.
297 C. Kreâ, ‘Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational
Armed Conflicts’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 15, No. 2, 15 July 2010, p. 8; on
the analysis of al-Qaeda as a ‘franchise model’, see also ‘America and al-Qaeda: The killing
of Osama bin Laden’, The Economist, 2 May 2011, available at: www.economist.com/blogs/
lexington/2011 /05/america_and_al-qaeda.
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that resort to the use of force, has little support in the international legal
framework. As the ICRC has noted:
‘“Terrorism” is a phenomenon. Both practically and legally, war cannot be waged
against a phenomenon, but only against an identifiable party to an armed conflict.
For these reasons, it would be more appropriate to speak of a multifaceted “fight
against terrorism” rather than a “war on terrorism.”’298
6B.1.1.3 The ‘Global’ War: Territorial Limits and Armed Conflict?
One of the most novel aspects of the US government’s claim to be engaged
in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda et al is the assertion that there can be an
armed conflict that is territorially limitless – a conflict against a non-state actor
of ‘global’ reach.299 This adds a further layer of controversy to the assertion
of being at war with al-Qaeda and associated groups. Is there, in the language
of one commentator, a ‘legal geography of war’,300 a territorial dimension
to the definition of armed conflict? Does IHL only apply in a particular state
where the criteria for ‘armed conflict’ are met, or can it travel with those
participating in a conflict from afar? Or indeed as the US appears to suggest,
can IHL apply on a global scale to a potentially limitless conflict with no
territorial nexus at all?
The US government’s positionis that its armed conflict with al-Qaeda is
not limited to any specified territory, but ‘follows’ the members and associates
of al-Qaeda, thus providing a basis to invoke ‘law of war’ rules on targeting
and detention anywhere in the world.301 This has been described as a ‘funda-
298 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers’, supra
note 52. See also Pejic, ‘Armed Conflict and Terrorism’, supra note 10.
299 See, e.g., Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer, supra note 248; see also Bush, ‘State of the Union
Address’, supra note 4; Statement by Ambassador at Large, Pierre Prosper, supra note 4;
‘Johnson Speech on National Security’, supra note 256 (reiterating argument that US has
the right under the AUMF to the use of force against al-Qaeda and associated forces, and
not all terrorists, but reaffirmed the right to do so ‘without a geographic limitation’); A.
Deeks, ‘Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama bin Laden’, ASIL Insights, 5 May
2011, Vol. 5, Iss. 11, p. 2, available at: http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm.
300 K. Anderson, ‘Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether
there Is a Legal Geography of War’, Hoover Institution Online Volume Essay ‘Future Challenges’,
forthcoming, SSRN Working Paper Version 26 April 2011, pp. 3-15. The author describes
the view that ‘there is no legal geography of war beyond the conduct of hostilities’.
301 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support
of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)
(No. 10 Civ. 1469). See also Deeks, ‘Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama bin
Laden’, supra note 303, p. 2: ‘For the United States (and others that adopt this position),
once a state is in an armed conflict with a non-state armed group, that conflict follows the
members of that group wherever they go, as long as the group’s members continue to
engage in hostilities against that state (either on the “hot battlefield” or from their new
location).’
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mentally new aspect to the arguments’ concerning armed conflict with non-
state groups.302
As the legal framework set out in Part A made clear,303 developments
in practice have lead to a flexible approach to the territorial scope of armed
conflict, whereby it is well accepted, for example, that a NIAC can ‘spill over’
– or occur across – territorial borders.304 Yet the US assertion that there are
no geographic limits has caused international consternation,305 and has been
described as ‘perhaps the most controversial aspect’ of the US position.306
Perhaps this is because the notion of a limitless global conflict jars with the
inherently limited, definable and exceptional nature of armed conflict (and
applicable law).307 Or it may be the increased vulnerability of states to the
use of force on their territories, and the potential for escalation of conflict
which the international community committed through the UN Charter to
avoid, that brings with it a particular degree of international caution.308
Proponents of the ‘global’ armed conflict suggest that it is necessary to
ensure that individuals forming part of an armed conflict, but operating outside
of the zone of conflict, cannot escape the consequences of applicable IHL.309
If the reality is that individuals are engaged in hostilities (e.g., ordering or
planning) from another state’s territory, the law must allow them to be targeted
on the same basis as those participating in a traditional zone of battle.310
302 M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?’, supra note 285, p. 505-06.
303 See 6A.1.3 on the evolving approach to territorial scope of conflict in IHL and examples.
304 Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 11, p. 195.
305 See ibid. Pejic suggests there must be a ‘hook’ to a national territory to constitute a NIAC
under current IHL, and that support for the opposite view is limited to the US. The ICRC
like many others appears to reject the ‘global’ war notion: ‘ICRC Report on IHL and
Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48, p. 10; see also M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror
– Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?’, supra note 285, p. 508: ‘[A]lthough a non-international
conflict can extend to the territory of several states, the geographical scope of the conflict
must be defined.’ See, e.g., G. Rona, ‘Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the “War on Terror”’, in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 27:2,
Summer/Fall 2003, p. 64. See also Schrijver and Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations’,
supra note 74.
306 Deeks, ‘Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama bin Laden’, supra note 303, p.
2.
307 It is the existence of armed conflict that carries with it the applicable rules on IHL and
affects at least some of the applicable rules of IHRL, with important consequences: see
Chapter7A.3.4 and 7B3.
308 UN Charter Arts 1 and 2(4).
309 See, e.g., M. Lewis, ‘The Boundaries of the Battlefield’, Opinio Juris, 15 May 2011, para. 5,
available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/15/the-boundaries-of-the-battlefield/ last visited
8 December 2012. Lewis expresses concern that individuals should not be ‘immune from
targeting based purely on geography’; see also K. Anderson, ‘“Ten Years In” Conference
at BU Law School’, 15 October 2011, available at: http://volokh.com/2011/10/15/ten-years-
in-conference-at-bu-law-school/.
310 Ibid.
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On the other hand, others note that while conflicts undoubtedly can extend
beyond one state’s borders, the legal definition of armed conflict still requires
that for IHL to be invoked in any state, the threshold of conflict would need
to be met within that particular state.311 Otherwise, IHL standards may be
brought to bear in states where the threshold is not met, in response to threats
or sporadic attacks, which are precisely the sort of situations intended to be
covered by law enforcement and excluded from the ambit of IHL. Increased
difficulties arise in identifying one organised armed group that might meet
the criteria of a party to a conflict where the entity operates, in various in-
carnations, on a global scale. In this respect it may be that concerns raised
in relation to the global battlefield are closely related to the need to meet the
legal criteria for the definition of armed conflict (of threshold and parties)
mentioned above.
At a minimum, it would seem that there must be at least some nexus to
a particular locus of an armed conflict where the legal criteria are met, for
IHL to apply.312 If individuals are to be targeted remotely, it must be in
accordance with the rules regarding legitimate targeting in respect of that
conflict. A greater onus may rest with a state to establish that individuals’
thousands of miles from a conflict in fact belonged to a party to the conflict
or were direct participants in hostilities from afar. Moreover, it should be noted
that even if one accepts the application of IHL in principle, the geographic locus
far from the ‘battlefield’ scenario may, in certain circumstances, make it more
likely that capturing rather than killing the individual is feasible, which IHL
may therefore require.313 The applicability of IHL may therefore not have
the effect in all situations that some suggest of entitling the state to engage
in the use of lethal force anywhere in the world.314
The wide-ranging notion of a world at war without any geographic defini-
tion causes clear legal and policy discomfort and has been described as having
little support outside the US.315 In this respect, in testimony to the US House
of Representatives, one American commentator noted that the US is ‘remarkably
indifferent to the increasingly vehement and pronounced rejection’ of the view
311 Schrijver and Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations’, para. 63: ‘[I]t is possible for an armed
conflict involving non-state actors to extend to the territory of more than one state ... subject
to IHL applicable to non-international armed conflicts. This will, however, depend on
whether, within any particular state, the factual conditions are met for an armed conflict to
exist.’
312 Ibid.
313 See ‘direct participation in hostilities’ ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 124, p.7, and 7B3
on IHL and IHRL.
314 This is true even under the rules of IHL (or of course the law ad bellum or IHRL that co-
applies alongside IHL addressed in the next chapter).
315 Proponents of a global war with al-Qaeda are described as ‘almost exclusively in the US’.
Pejic, ‘Protective scope of CA3’, supra note 11, p. 195.
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that the US can ‘simply follow combatants anywhere and attack them’.316
Undoubtedly, however, the debate concerning the extent to which armed
conflict is territorially linked or limited are questions of increasing international
attention, and areas where the law is likely to continue to be debated and
potentially developed.317
The significance of interpreting IHL to permit attacks on the basis of con-
flicts ‘travelling’ in this way goes beyond US practices. In 2012, a court in Qatar
convicted two Russian intelligence agents for the assassination of the former
Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, whose car exploded outside
a mosque in Doha, Qatar.318 Counter-terror legislation in the Russian Feder-
ation has been criticized for enshrining in law a broad reaching authority to
use force to eliminate the terrorist threat wherever it arises around the
globe.319 Serious concern regarding such ‘international assassinations’ by
Russian intelligence agents – of individuals considered by the authorities to
be supportive of Chechen rebels – is a reminder of the dangers of opening
up the possibility of resort to force anywhere in the world on the basis of a
connection to an armed conflict states or continents away.
6B.1.1.4 The ‘War without End’?
A further concern that is often voiced in this context is the indefinite, or
interminable, nature of what has been described as the ‘long war’.320 The
Bush administration characterized the position with over-reaching declarations
that the war would not end ‘until until every terrorist group of global reach
316 K. Anderson, ‘Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War’, Written
Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2010, p. 5, para. 11, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/
congress/2010_hr/032310anderson.pdf (hereinafter ‘Anderson Written Testimony’). ‘P.
Alston, ‘Statement of U.N. Special Rapporteur on U.S. Targeted Killings Without Due
Process’, 3 August 2010, available at: http://www.aclu.org/national-security/statement-un-
special-rapporteur-us-targeted-killings-without-due-process; see, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,
727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). US Attorney General Eric Holder responded to concerns
regarding geographic scope by stating that they only target in states which are unwilling
or unable to stop the terrorists, though as noted this is relevant to the jus ad bellum of
Chapter 5, not to IHL. ‘Holder Speech on Targeted Killing’.
317 See, e.g., Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6.
318 S.L. Myers, ‘Qatar Court Convicts 2 Russians in Top Chechen’s Death’, The New York Times,
1 July 2004, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/01/world/qatar-court-convicts-
2-russians-in-top-chechen-s-death.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
319 See generally, S. Bridge, ‘Russia’s New Counteracting Terrorism Law: The Legal Implications
of Pursuing Terrorists beyond the Borders of the Russian Federation’, 3 Colum. J. E. Eur.
L. 1 (2009).
320 See, e.g., D. Roper, ‘Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War’, Parameters,
Autumn 2008, available at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Global_COIN.pdf.
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has been found, stopped and defeated’.321 The Obama administration may
have been mindful of the disquiet concerning the end point of his alleged
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and others when he shifted the language
employed, from the ‘long war’ to ‘overseas contingency operations,’322 and
warned against seepage into a ‘perpetual war’.323 But the continuing pro-
position that there is a potential global armed conflict with al-Qaeda, associated
forces and others, raises questions as to when and how such a conflict – and
the lethal use of force model or indefinite detention justified pursuant to it –
might ever end.
Armed conflicts end when the conditions that qualify as conflict cease to
exist. In practice, armed conflicts often last an extremely long time: it would
be absurd to suggest that the decades-long conflicts in Guatemala, the
Philippines or Congo for example were any less armed conflicts for their
duration. But one question is whether this is distinguishable from a situation
that may not, realistically, be capable of being brought to a definitive end.
Terrorism has always been a feature of human existence and as President
Obama acknowledged, his predecessor’s promised day when it comes to an
end will never materialise.324 As regards the alleged conflict with al-Qaeda
and ‘associates’ or related ‘terrorist networks of violence’, doubts as to its
nature as a loose ideological network rather than an organised armed group,
discussed above, compound doubts as to when, if ever, it can be definitively
quashed, and if it were, how would we know?
The political determination to end any conflict, real or perceived, is critic-
ally important.325 In legal terms, however, armed conflict ends when hostil-
ities of a certain threshold (for NIAC) between identifiable parties no longer
exist; the key questions are therefore same as for establishment of conflict in
the first place. Rather than constituting separate legal criteria, the concerns
regarding ‘war without end’ are perhaps additional policy reasons for rejecting
the notion of an amorphous armed conflict with al-Qaeda in the first place.
Uncertainty and obfuscation as to the existence and scope of the ‘war(s)’,
and against whom they are being fought, spills over, inevitably, into confusion
as to when, if ever, they will end, which are critical determinations for applic-
able law and those affected for example by detention powers.326 Understand-
321 Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 September
2001,availableat:http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html.
322 Kamen, ‘The End of the Global War on Terror’, supra.
323 Obama, National Defense University speech, 23 May 2013.
324 See recognition of this in President Obama’s 23 May 2013 speech, note 244 and Bush note 1.
325 Obama 23 May 2013. See Bush at note 1 above.
326 As noted above, persons detained in the context of an international conflict in Afghanistan
are entitled to release upon the cessation of the international conflict, so implications for
prisoners are serious. The IHL framework in armed conflict (which modifies the IHRL
framework that normally applies), is by its nature exceptional and for a limited period of
time, with a potentially identifiable and verifiable end-point.
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ing the parameters of the conflict, as arising between identifiable parties in
the particular context of Afghanistan (or Iraq), rather than against terrorism
more broadly in the world at large, is the first step towards meaningful imple-
mentation of, and monitoring of respect for, IHL.327
6B.1.2 Real armed conflicts post 9/11: Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond?
6B.1.2.1 Nature of the conflict in Afghanistan
By contrast to the uncertainty surrounding ambiguous notions as to the ‘war
on terror’ or being at war with terrorists, relative clarity attends the fact that
an international armed conflict arose in Afghanistan, with the military action
that commenced on 7 October 2001, if not before. The parties to the conflict
in Afghanistan on and following 7 October 2001 were the armed forces of the
US and its allies on the one hand, and Afghanistan represented by the Taleban
and its supporters (including elements of al-Qaeda), on the other.328
There was also an armed conflict in Afghanistan before the 2001 interven-
tion, between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, though it was probably
non-international in nature since the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan
many years before 2011329 The intervention of several allied states on that
date resulted in an international conflict, albeit one that appears to have been
waged alongside, and in connection with, the continuing non-international
conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taleban.
Somewhat more difficult questions relate to the nature of the conflict as
it evolved in the later stages. It should be noted that murkiness often stems
in part from assertions concerning a broader conflict with al-Qaeda and asso-
ciates, discussed above, and its uncertain relationship with the conflict in
Afghanistan. Successive US administrations, and to some extent the US Supreme
Court, have contributed to this by intermingling references to an ‘armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces,’ in Afghanistan and
beyond.330 While it is at times unclear to what extent the Afghan conflict
327 See Chapter 7, para. 7A.3.4 on the relationship between IHL and IHRL during armed conflict.
328 Questions arise as to the relationship between al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Taliban
– whether the former fell under the overall control of the latter, or vice versa, and whether
they were one and the same party to the conflict or not. Francoise Hampson suggests that
for all intents and purposes there was one international conflict at this time. F. J. Hampson,
‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts,
supra note 6, p. 242.
329 Contentions that Pakistan fought alongside the Taleban prior to 7 October 2001, if true,
suggest the conflict may already have been internationalised. Paust, ‘There is No Need
to Revise the Laws of War in Light of September 11’, p. 3. Note, however, the difference
of view on international vs. non-international nature of a conflict where an intervening
state fights alongside government as opposed to insurgents, above.
330 See above Bush, Obama and Koh’s references to the conflict discussed previously.
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is considered to have been subsumed by the broader claim of global armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, or vice versa, as noted above there is little support for
such a broader conflict with al Qaeda as a matter of law in any event. Legally,
therefore, the question is the nature of the conflict – or conflicts – in Afghan-
istan, and whether military action that purports to be taken against al Qaeda
operatives worldwide can be justified as a ‘spillover’ from, and arguably the
remote engagement in, such an armed conflict.331
On 19 June 2002, once the Taleban government had been definitively
removed from power and the Loya Jirga constituted,332 the state of Afghan-
istan came to be represented by a government and forces friendly to the US
and allied states, Afghanistan’s erstwhile opponent in the international armed
conflict. From that point, rebel forces on the one hand (presumably a mixture
of al-Qaeda and remnants of the Taleban which had transformed from de facto
government to non-state armed group) fought against the state of Afghanistan
and other states.
As such, the net result was armed conflict(s) between states and armed
groups, apparently therefore of the non-international variety.333 Some suggest
that there have been, and at time of writing still are, three related but distinct
non-international conflicts that have unfolded in Afghanistan since 2002.334
One is the conflict between the government of Afghanistan established in June
2002 and the remnants of the Taleban and, perhaps, al-Qaeda.335 The situation
in Afghanistan where a non-international armed conflict existed before the
military intervention of 7 October 2001, appears to have reverted to a situation
of non-international armed conflict post-June 2002, albeit with the rebels and
government forces having changed face. A second conflict is the continuation
of Operation Enduring Freedom launched by the US on 7 October 2001 and
which continues to the present time, with the aim of preventing attacks ‘from
Al Qaeda and Taleban remnants.’336 The third is conflict in which the ISAF
331 See examples below in relation to ‘Targeting’ of al-Qaeda worldwide at 6B.3.1.
332 See ‘Karzai sworn in as president’, BBC News, 19 June 2002, available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2052680.stm.
333 It is a question of fact whether the remnants of the Taleban meet the requirements of a
‘party’ to a conflict, set out above, though it seems very likely that they would. Their
relationship with al Qaeda also remains unclear. See Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’,
supra note 334, p. 256.
334 Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, supra note 334. The extent to which they form one
conflict with various parties or separate conflicts may be a matter of dispute, but the parties
appear to recognize the very different nature of the interventions by Operation Enduring
Freedom and the ISAF forces for example.
335 ‘Al Qaeda’s Diminished Role Stirs Afghan Troop Debate’, The Wall Street Journal, 5 October
2009, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125469118585462615.html.
336 Secretary of State for the Defence to UK House of Commons, 20 June 2002, cited in Ham-
pson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, supra note 334, p. 255
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forces are engaged, mandated under SC Resolution 1386 and subsequent
resolutions, against the Taleban and related non-state party.337
While a certain degree of controversy arises concerning the impact on the
classification of conflict of the engagement of outside states, there is little
support in current international law and doctrine for the continuing involve-
ment of the US or others beyond June 2002 meaning that the conflict remains
international.338A related question is when the Afghan conflict might end.339
As noted, the international armed conflict in Afghanistan appears to have
ended on 19 June 2002 when Hamid Karzai was sworn in as President of
Afghanistan. If the international conflict is over, another legal basis for detain-
ing persons originally held pursuant to IHL applicable in international conflicts,
under IHL applicable in non-international conflicts or IHRL, must be relied
upon.340 POWs, for example, should be released at the end of the international
conflict, unless prosecuted, or some other legal basis exists to justify their
continued detention.341
As regards the non-international armed conflict(s) post-June 2002, the
question whether the relevant criteria for armed conflict continue to be satisfied
must be assessed on an on-going basis, including following the US withdrawal
in 2014.342 At a certain point the requirement of on-going violence of signi-
ficant intensity (as opposed to isolated or sporadic acts of violence) will no
337 As noted in Chapter 5, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established
by the U.N. Security Council at the end of December 2001, and NATO assumed responsibil-
ity for the force as of 2003. Over forty nations have committed personnel. It operates
alongside Operation Enduring Freedom led by the U.S. Some uncertainty and differences
of approach from within ISAF are reported to surround the identification of the nature
of the opposing ‘party,’ which has had an effect on disputes regarding targeting discussed
further below. See A. Cole, ‘Legal Issues in Forming the Coalition’, in M. Schmitt (ed.), The
War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, (2009) Vol. 85, US Naval War College International
Law Studies, p. 146; see also Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, supra note 334, p. 260.
338 Part 6A.1.1. on limited dispute remaining over whether the support of outside states on
the side of state forces (as in Mali in 2013) automatically renders a conflict international.
See Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, supra note 334.
339 The official position of the US Government is that the war against Afghanistan ended,
though its role in Afghanistan continues: see, e.g., ‘In coordination with the government
of Afghanistan, the coalition here continues to train the Afghan National Army, provide
civil affairs support, and disrupt, deny, and destroy terrorist and anti-government forces
in order to establish a stable and secure Afghanistan.’ Press release of the US Department
of Defense, 10 January 2004, available at: http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/
update/feb2004/au022804.html. It is clear, however, in practice that military operations
conducted by coalition forces are very much on-going as of 2012, often justified by reference
to the prevention of terrorism. See Koh, ‘ASIL Speech’, supra note 248; ‘Johnson Speech
on National Security’, supra note 254.
340 See Chapter 7, part B.3 on ‘Interplay’ as to what this legal basis might be.
341 On lawful bases for detention see Chapter 8B.4.1. Once international armed conflict ends,
and becomes non-international, prisoners can no longer be held as POWs. They should
then be released or put on trial, unless there is another basis for their detention (in accord-
ance with IHRL).
342 E.g. President Obama, State of the Union address, 2013.
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longer be satisfied. At a certain point the Taleban may also be definitively
defeated in such a way that the party to the conflict may cease to exist and
(as there is unlikely to be any conflict with al-Qaeda as such, as discussed
above) what was an armed conflict will revert to acts of violence regulated
not by IHL but by other areas of law, notably criminal and human rights law.
6B.1.2.2 The conflict in Iraq and obligations of occupying forces
International forces intervened militarily in Iraq on 19 March 2003, giving rise
to an international armed conflict.343 Shortly thereafter there ensued a
situation of occupation, also governed by the law of IHL applicable to inter-
national armed conflict.344 The existence and nature of the Iraqi belligerent
occupation was relatively straightforward, with controversy focusing instead
on compliance with such obligations345 and when the coalition forces’ ‘occu-
pier’s obligations’ ceased.346 On 1 May 2003, then US President George Bush
declared that ‘major combat operations in Iraq have ended’.347 The institution
of a new government in Iraq took effect in June 2004, but as noted above, the
transfer of formal authority does not necessarily end the occupier’s responsibil-
ities, unless an alternative functioning government has assumed de facto control
over its population and territory and the determination of the point at which
effective control was assumed by the new Iraqi government is a question of
fact.348 The law of occupation applies, moreover, until one year after there
343 See SC Res. 1483 (2003), 22 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1483, recognising the Iraq situation
as an international armed conflict. For more detailed analysis of the background, classifica-
tion of the conflict at various stages, see M. N. Schmitt, ‘Iraq (2003 onwards)’ in Wilmshurst,
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6, p. 356.
344 Applicable IHL includes specific obligations incumbent on occupying forces, described
above, 6A.3.4.
345 Many questions arise as to the satisfaction of those obligations by coalition forces, which
are not explored here. See torture and ill-treatment, Chapter 7B6, and procedural rights
of detainees, below and Chapter 8.
346 The test for occupation is a factual one based on the effective control of territory or persons.
However, IHL provides that the rules continue to apply to occupation one year after
withdrawal. See Article 6 GC IV. Schmitt suggests that as of June 2004 and SC Resolution
1546 (referring to looking forward to the end of the occupation), the occupation ceased.
Schmitt, ‘Iraq (2003 onwards)’, supra note 343, p. 369.
347 Bush, ‘President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended’, 1 May
2003, para. 1, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2003/05/20030501-15.html.
348 See ICRC, ‘Iraq: civilians continue to pay the highest price in the conflict’, Press Briefing,
30 November 2006, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/press-
briefing/iraq-briefing-301106.htm. For dispute regarding the nature of the conflict in Iraq,
see Bianchi and Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, supra note 5, p. 114.
ICRC statements in respect of the situation in Iraq long after the 2004 handover indicated
that IHL continued to apply to the situation in Iraq.
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is a general close of military operations or the occupying power ceases to
exercise such effective control.349
In assessing the law applicable to the conduct of the occupying forces
during that period, it should be borne in mind that the parallel application
of human rights law alongside these rules of IHL is particularly essential in
occupation, where the state assumes responsibility for a broad range of aspects
of civilian life.350 At a certain point, following Security Council resolution
and the acceptance by the legal community of the sovereign responsibilities
of the new Iraqi government, the conflict came to be recognised as a non-
international armed conflict with external involvement.351
The existence of armed conflict is a legal question to be addressed on the
basis of ever evolving facts. In addition to the two large scale post 9/11
military interventions highlighted above, questions frequently arise regarding
the existence of conflicts in other states and areas affected by the war on terror,
notably Pakistan, but also Yemen, Somalia, and beyond, of relevance to the
lawfulness of measures taken against international terrorism in recent years.
Whether there are conflicts, and if so their nature and applicable law, are issues
on which there are differing views, as will be noted further in relation to
particular issues of IHL below.352
6B.2 PARTICULAR ISSUES OF IHL IN THE POST 9/11 “WARS”
6B.2.1 ‘Enemy Combatants’
The status of individuals is critical under IHL, as set out in Part A. It determines
applicable law, governing whether (and if so when) the individuals can law-
fully be attacked, and to some extent the rights to which they are entitled upon
capture.353 Departures from the existing legal framework in relation to the
particular issues addressed below, on targeting and detention for example,
has to a large extent been foreshadowed by the rejection of established cat-
egories of persons, and confusion and obfuscation as to whether there are ‘new’
categories, or gaps in the categorization of persons caught up in an armed
349 As noted above, it continues for longer where the occupying power continues to exercise
control in the territory. See Article 6(3) GC IV and Article 3(b) AP I.
350 See, e.g., Case of al-Skeini v. The United Kingdom, ECHR Grand Chamber, Judgment, 7 July
2011.
351 Schmitt describes the Security Council and the legal community embracing the ‘legal fiction’
of Iraqi control, and the end of occupation. Schmitt, ‘Iraq (2003 onwards)’, supra note 343,
p. 369. The conflict became non-international, as recognised by the ICRC, despite not being
explicitly referred to as such by the US or UK. ICRC ‘protecting Persons Deprived of
Freedom Remains a Priority’ ICRC, June 2004.
352 See below 6B2.2.
353 Eg Chapter 7B3 and Chapter 9.
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conflict.354 Invariably these putative gaps or uncertainties have been relied
upon to justify broader approaches to who may be targeted and narrowed
approaches to the protections to which individuals are entitled upon capture.
The introduction of a novel category of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ was
promoted by the US post-9/11 and remains in force.355 It has been noted that
the term ‘enemy combatant’ is confusing, not least because ‘combatants’ is
a term of relevance only in IAC (which, as noted above, is not generally con-
sidered relevant to the alleged conflict with al-Qaeda or to the situation in
Afghanistan post 2002 for example). More significantly, the notion of ‘unlawful’
participation in conflict, or ‘unprivileged belligerency’, as it is more traditional-
ly called, is not in fact new to IHL but is regulated by it in some detail.356
Persons who engage in hostilities without the ‘privilege’ to do so are con-
sidered civilians directly participating in hostilities. As reflected above, IHL
allows such individuals to be targeted, subject to certain constraints, for as
long as they engage in hostilities. They can also be prosecuted for that engage-
ment. Finally, they can be detained if ‘imperative reasons of security so re-
quire’, which is a threshold likely to be met for those actively engaged in
hostilities. It has thus been questioned why a ‘new’ category, or indeed addi-
tional measures beyond those permitted by current IHL, could be necessary,
at least without ‘a complete departure from the values that underpin inter-
national humanitarian law’.357
However, the introduction of a novel category of ‘unlawful enemy com-
batants’ was promoted in support of the view that such persons were not
adequately covered by existing IHL; this accorded with the controversial view
of the legal adviser that ‘there is a category of behaviour not covered by the
354 See Chapter 8 for discussion of the lack of ‘gaps’ between categories of persons: as the Pictet
Commentary makes clear, all have some status under IHL.
355 The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ was first put into legislation in Section 948a of The
Military Commissions Act of 2006: ‘The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ means – (i) a
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy com-
batant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of
the President or the Secretary of Defense.’
356 Pejic, ‘“Unlawful/Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations and Consequences’, supra note 257,
p. 341.
357 ‘Unless one is advocating a complete departure from the values that underpin international
humanitarian law, it is difficult to see why the current rules, inadequate in some aspects
as they may be, present an obstacle to dealing with civilians who have taken a direct part
in hostilities. It has yet to be explained what additional measures could be implemented
with respect to “unlawful combatants” that would not run the risk of leading to violations
of the right to life, physical integrity and human dignity that lie at the core of humanitarian
law.’ Ibid., p. 342.
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legal system.’358 The enemy combatant label provided the pretext, as will
be seen, for targeting individuals as ‘combatants’, but providing none of the
privileges or protections associated with that or any other status under IHL
upon capture. Although the Obama administration changed the nomenclature
in some contexts to ‘unprivileged belligerent’, it retained the approach to the
implications of this classification, namely susceptibility to attack on the same
basis as a combatant but without the protections associated with that status
in international law.359 The rules on targeting and detention, and their
application, interpretation and/or disregard in practice, are addressed further
below.
6B.2.2 Targeting and the Lethal Use of Force
As noted in the legal framework section above, one of the most important
consequences of armed conflict and the applicability of IHL is the potential
for the lawful use of force against the adversary. IHL rules that permit targeting
of particular groups of individuals engaged in conflict stand in sharp dis-
tinction to the human rights framework governing in time of peace, under
which the use of force will only very exceptionally be lawful.360 The deter-
mination of whether a situation is genuinely an armed conflict, the status of
individuals and whether they are legitimate targets within it, is therefore
literally life or death determinations of fundamental importance. In many of
the circumstances in which the lethal use of force has been used in the ‘war
on terror’ or ‘war with al Qaeda and associated groups’, including many of
those addressed below, the critical question is whether the IHL framework
applies at all, in light of the issues highlighted in the previous section.
Additional questions arise, addressed below, concerning whether particular
policies and practices are consistent with that ‘law of war’ framework on which
protagonists seek to rely to justify their conduct. The following are among
the many practices that have brought into question respect for rules on tar-
geting under IHL.
358 ‘Why is it so hard for people to understand that there is a category of behaviour not covered
by the legal system?’ J. Yoo, legal counsel to former US President George W. Bush, quoted
in J. Mayer, ‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Ren-
dition” Program’, The New Yorker, 8 February 2005.
359 In Guantanamo litigation the Obama administration preferred ‘unprivileged enemy belliger-
ent’. This is mirrored in The Military Commissions Act of 2009, amending the 2006 version,
and providing: ‘The term ‘unprivileged enemy belligerent’ means an individual (other than
a privileged belligerent) who – (A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the
alleged offense under this chapter.’ H. R. 2647-385, 28 October 2009, Sec. 948a(6)-(7).
360 Chapter 7A5.1 ‘The Right to Life’ and 7B.3 The ‘War’ and Human Rights’.
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6B.2.2.1 Targeted Killings and Drone Attacks on Terrorist suspects worldwide?
Among the most contentious measures against suspected terrorists is the lethal
targeting, beyond zones of hostilities, of ‘those persons who [the US considers]
were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or asso-
ciated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners’.361 In particular, the widespread use of remotely operated
weapons systems – ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ (UAVs) commonly referred to
as ‘drones,’ has been the subject of a considerable, and growing, body of
international legal analysis.362
Drones were originally developed for intelligence gathering and sur-
veillance purposes, but have been adapted as weapons systems. Their benefits
are said to include their surveillance capability, ability to attack remote in-
accessible areas, and their relative accuracy and precision.363 Their unique
feature and perhaps their primary appeal for states lies in their remote opera-
tion, hence involving little or no risk to the state’s own forces when carrying
out attacks. The CIA operates ‘Predator’ and ‘Reaper’364 drones from its head-
361 In 2012 Jeh Charles Johnson, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, sought
to clarify the Obama administration’s targeting practice in these terms, to reassure that
the unidentified ““associated force” is not any terrorist group in the world that merely
embraces the al Qaeda ideology,’ though as noted many questions remain regarding the
parties to the putative conflict. See full speech, Johnson Speech on National Security’, supra
note 254. See also speech by Obama’s National Defense University speech, May 2013, supra.
362 Government positions, and numerous NGO and UN reports, are referred to below. See
eg. ‘Advisory Report on Armed Drones’, Advisory Committee on Issues of Public Inter-
national Law to the Dutch government and parliament, Report No. 23, July 2013.Among
the academic commentary see e.g. T.M. McDonnell, ‘Sow What You Reap? Using Predator
and Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic
Terrorists’, 44 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 243, 253 (2012); See also M. E. O’Connell, ‘Unlawful
Killing with Combat Drones; A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009’, in S. Bronitt (ed.),
Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force (Hart, 2012). J. Masters,
‘Targeted Killings’, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 January 2013, available at: http://
www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. Issues also arise regarding targeted
operations by special forces – see also Chapter 9 on the killing of bin Laden.
363 Leon Panetta asserted in 2009 that drone attacks are ‘precise and cause only limited collateral
damage;’ see also ‘A Defense of Drones’, Editorial (Anonymous), Wall Street Journal (Eastern
Edition), 2 April 2010, p. A.16. On the potential ‘humanitarian law’ advantages of drones,
see B. Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, ‘Interim report to the General Assembly
on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in counter-terrorism operations’ (‘Interim Report’)
18 September 2013, A/68/389. Cf. Counter-terrorism experts David Kilcullen and Andrew
Exum estimated that for every one intended fatal target there are 50 unintended deaths.
O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones’, ibid; see also reports on civilian
casualties below.
364 The Reaper is newer, ‘larger and more powerful than the MQ-1 Predator‘. U.S. Air Force,
‘MQ-9 Reaper’, 5 January 2012, available at: http://www.af.mil/information/ factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id=6405.
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quarters in Langley, Virginia, though reports indicate the expansion of its
drone bases to various states around the world.365
Since the first use of drones in the war on terror in 2002, attacks have
expanded in geographic scope and grown exponentially in their numbers and
impact. Drones were employed by the armed forces of the US and UK in
Afghanistan and Iraq,366 but gave rise to greatest concern as information
emerged as to their widespread use by the CIA to kill targeted individuals
beyond zones of armed conflict.367 Thus far, drones have killed in Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia, though the potential geographic scope of the ‘capture
or kill’ programme has been made clear by US representatives open assertion
of the right to kill persons who ‘attack US interests’ whoever, or wherever,
they may be.368
As regards the extent of lethal strikes by drones or otherwise, reliable
estimates vary and there is a dearth of official information.369 Extensive
emerging media, NGO and academic studies, and to some extent official in-
formation, renders beyond reasonable dispute, however, the massive scale
of operations in recent years. Credible reports put the number killed in
365 See e.g. ‘US Building Secret Drone Bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula’, Washington Post,
20 September 2011, available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-20/world/
35273162_1_undeclared-drone-wars-seychelles-president-james-michel-unmanned-aircraft
(reporting new bases in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula). Another report suggests that
the US operates 57 drone bases: N. Turse, ‘Mapping America’s Shadowy Drone Wars’, Tom
Dispatch, 16 October 2011, cited in McDonnell, ‘Sow What You Reap?’, supra note 374, p.
253.
366 R. Evans and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘RAF “relying” on drones in Afghanistan Guardian’, The
Guardian, 7 February 2010, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/07/raf-
drones-afghanistan; see ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 7; L. Ure,
‘Armchair pilots striking Afghanistan by remote control’, CNN, 9 July 2008, available at:
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-09/tech/remote.fighters_1_unmanned-aircraft-uavs-pilots?_
s=PM:TECH last visited 13 December 2012.
367 See ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 7; see also M. Hosenball, ‘Secret
panel can put Americans on “kill list”’, Reuters, 5 October 2011, available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-cia-killlist-idUSTRE79475C20111005 “There is
no public record of the operations or decisions of the panel...Neither is there any law
establishing its existence or setting out the rules by which it is supposed to operate.’ See
also G. Miller, ‘U.S. citizen in CIA’s cross hairs’, The Los Angeles Times, 31 January 2010,
available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/31/world/la-fg-cia-awlaki31-2010jan31
last visited 13 December 2012.
368 Statement by Brennan June 2010, in E. Lake, ‘Dozens of Americans believed to have joined
terrorists’, The Washington Times, 24 June 2012, available at: http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2010/jun/24/dozens-from-us-on-list-of-targets-as-terrorists. ‘If an American
person or citizen is in a Yemen or in a Pakistan or in Somalia or another place, and they
are trying to carry out attacks against U.S. interests, they will also face the full brunt of
a U.S. response’.
369 See further below on Drones, transparency and accountability.
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Pakistan alone by 2012 at around three thousand.370 According to one report
at least 174 of the ‘militants’ attacked have been children,371 while some of
those have been mistakes (as illustrated by the killing of Pakistani soldiers
for example).372 As information emerges it becomes clearer that the nature
and numbers of those dead goes far beyond the select, high level and highly
dangerous terrorists that are referred to in government statements.373
Although remote from the intensity of strikes in Pakistan, Yemen was the
site of the first drone attack of this nature, against al-Harithi and others in
2002,374 followed by the killing of US citizen Al-Aulaqi (described as ‘the
leader of external operations for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’)375 and
his 16 year old son in 2011,376 and of numerous attacks thereafter.377 In
Somalia, it would appear that numerous attacks have also been lodged, against
370 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization,
reports that available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan
from June 2004 through mid-September 2012. See TBIJ, available at: http://www.thebureau
investigates.com/category/projects/drones last visited 5 December 2012; see likewise the
thorough reports ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US
Drone Practices in Pakistan’, Stanford Law School and NYU Law School, September 2012,
(‘Living Under Drones’) and Amnesty International, ‘Will I be next? US Drone Strikes in
Pakistan,’ ASA 33/013/2013, October 2013. On the dramatic increase under Obama’s
administration, see e.g. P. Bergen and K. Tiedemann, ‘Washington’s Phantom War: The




372 See also e.g. ‘Obama maintains NATO drone strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers was
not deliberate... but stops short of offering apology’, The Daily Mail, 5 December 2011,
available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2070067/Obama-maintains-NATO-
drone-strike-killed-24-Pakistani-soldiers-deliberate.html#ixzz1 ryJDpoHO. On significant
drone failure rates, see McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?', supra note 374, p. 258 (noting
that government reports indicate that unmanned aerial systems experience a failure rate
100 times greater than that of manned aircraft.
373 C. Stafford Smith, ‘Sleepwalking into the Drone Age’, The Observer, 3 June 2012, p. 31. See
also part 6B.3.1.2, below.
374 Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, a former bin Laden security guard, was killed, along with six others,
in Yemen when his car was attacked with a missile from a Predator drone. ‘Sources: US
kills Cole suspect’, CNN, 4 November 2002, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-04/
world/yemen.blast_1_cia-drone-marib-international-killers.
375 M. Mazzetti, E. Schmitt and R. Worth, ‘Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in
Yemen’, The New York Times, 30 September 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/01/ world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html. See also ‘Holder
Speech on Targeted Killing’, supra note 254.
376 P. Finn and G. Miller, ‘Anwar al-Awlaki’s family speaks out against his son’s death in
airstrike’, The Washington Post, 17 October 2011. See also ‘Holder Speech’, ibid.
377 TBIJ puts Yemen casualties since 2002 at between 362-1,052 (reported) with between 53-63
confirmed US operations in Yemen over this time. See http://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/category/projects/drones last visited 5 December 2012. See Human Rights Watch,
“Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen”,
October 2013 which examines a series of strikes it suggests were unlawful during 2012/13.
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al-Qaeda targets and militant group al Shabaab that is reported to have links
with al-Qaeda.378
Controversy and uncertainty surrounds most aspects of the drone pro-
gramme. This includes: who is subject to attack, whether in fact it is limited
to the high-level leaders that some but not all government accounts suggest
and who are the unidentified “associated” forces that the US is targeting;379
what ‘threat’ those targets represent (to the US, its nationals, its interests or
those of its allies); what is the extent of the impact, direct or indirect, on the
civilian population; what is the broader strategic impact on terrorism and
counter-terrorism;380 by whom are they employed, or might they be employed
in the future;381; and is there meaningful oversight and accountability.382
Despite this, the programme is described as one of the successes of President
Obama’s counter-terror strategy and the US President has acknowledged that
he personally approves each incidence of lethal killing.383
International reaction to the resort to and increase in drone killings post-
9/11 has been neglectfully slow. Media and human rights groups have been
accused of focusing on Guantanamo and detentions policy to the neglect of
a policy of targeted killings that has spread stealthily throughout the war on
terror.384 To some extent this has changed over time, so far as drone killings
have moved centre stage as matters of international attention and concern.
States have, individually and collectively, continued to show extreme reluctance
to outspoken condemnation, the implications of which, for the practice by a
378 ‘Qaeda leader says Somalia’s Shabaab joins group’, Reuters, 9 February 2012, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/ozatp-qaeda-shabaab-idAFJOE8180BP20120209.
See also E. Schmitt and J. Gettleman, ‘Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia’, The New
York Times, 2 May 2008. TBIJ has reported that 170 people have been killed since 2007, and
23 US strikes and 9 drone strikes between 2007 and 2012.
379 Obama’s 23 May 2013 speech does not limit targeting to high level officials but the leaked
White paper, note 106, did.
380 See e.g. Living Under Drones, p125-146.
381 Special operations forces can also be involved in targeted killings: see e.g. N. Davies,
‘Afghanistan war logs: Task Force 373 – special forces hunting top Taliban’, The Guardian,
25 July 2010, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/task-force-373-
secret-afghanistan-taliban and Chapter 9. Reports also suggest that private contractors may
have some role in implementing the CIA programme though the extent of this remains
unclear. See, e.g., ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 7.
382 Although the Obama administration originally refused to comment on targeting policy,
under increasing pressure it has acknowledged their use, that the president personally
approves the list and the parameters of its legal position, while refusing to release legal
advice. Obama has also stated the government is considering safeguards for their use. See
e.g. White Paper and Obama 23 May 2013 speech, supra note 106. Koh notes there is no
obligation to provide judicial process under IHL before using lethal force. Koh, ‘ASIL
Speech’, supra note 245.
383 ‘Secret Kill List Tests Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, 29 June 2012,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html.
384 McDonnell, ‘Sow What You Reap?’, supra note 362, p. 261.
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range of states in the future and for international standards, is a matter of
speculation.385 These muted responses have been coupled with emergent
questions regarding other states cooperation with, and potentially shared
responsibility in, the US drone programme.386
In the absence of clear state responses, those of international entities become
all the more important in clarifying where practices fall foul of the legal
framework. Several UN experts have, to varying degrees, expressed their
concern over the lawfulness of drone killings,387 and suggested that while
there may be ‘no need for new law,’388 there is a need for a “comprehensive
overview by the international community” of targeted killings.389 There is
growing concern that, in the words of a former Special Rapporteur on extra-
judicial, summary or arbitrary executions:
“The United States’ assertion of ill-defined license to commit targeted killings
against individuals around the globe, without accountability, does grave damage
to the international legal frameworks designed to protect the right to life.390”
Targeted killings are, of course, neither new391 nor unique to the US.392
While the scale of the CIA attacks, and muted responses to them, may set them
apart, the practice is echoed in that of other states which employ force against
those they label terrorist, such as the notorious practice of Israeli targeted
385 Eg. A Dworkin, Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position, ECFR/84 July
2013.
386 Information remains elusive, though see emerging allegations in e.g. Drone Strike Prompts
Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies, R. Somaiya, NY Times, 30 Jan 2013; Drone Killing
Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange with US Intelligence, H. Stark, de Speigal,
27 May 2011.Amnesty International mentions Germany, UK and Australia in ‘Will I be Next’,
supra, p. 54.
387 Statement to UN by C. Heyns and B. Emmerson, Special Rapporteurs on Extra-judicial
executions and Terrorism respectively, 25 Oct 2013, ‘Drone attacks: UN rights experts
express concern about the potential illegal use of armed drones’ http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13905&LangID=E. Ben Emmerson’s report
on drones is spending publication, expected in 2014, but see Interim Report 2013. ‘UN
launches Inquiry into Drone Killings’, BBC, 24 January 2013, available at: http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-21176279; and B. Emmerson, Interim Report, 18 September 2013.
388 B. Emmerson, Interim Report, ibid.
389 Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
20 October 2011, GA/SHC/4016, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/
gashc4016.doc.htm.
390 ‘If other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill
people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.’ Alston, ‘Statement of U.N. Special
Rapporteur on U.S. Targeted Killings without Due Process’, supra note 322.
391 McDonnell refers to examples such as the unsuccessful attempt on Castro’s life by the US
or the assassination of Harai, allegedly by Syria. McDonnell, ‘Sow What You Reap?’, supra
note 362, p. 263.
392 See ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 5.
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killings,393 the killings of members of Jeemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and
other South East Asian countries,394 or the Russian Federation’s policy of
targeted killings of those it identifies as Chechen terrorists.395 As one UN
Expert noted: ‘The problems caused by terrorism and asymmetrical warfare
are real and cannot be ignored. However, part of the concern about a State
killing its opponents in other countries halfway around the world, far from
any armed conflict, is the precedent it sets for all States to act in this
way…’.396 In this respect it is chilling to reflect that over 50 states reportedly
already possess drones or the technology to produce them,397 heightening
further the importance of clarity as regards the legal framework and strict
adherence to it.
6B.2.2.2 Legal Justifications for the Use of Drone Killings?
The US administration purports to justify the lawfulness of such killings by
reference to self-defence and IHL.398 This is one of numerous examples of
the blurring of the boundaries of jus ad bellum and in bello; the criteria for
lawful use of force in self defence, addressed in Chapter 4,399 are distinct
from the legal question whether drone killings can be justified by a strict
393 Ibid. See Emmerson Interim Report for examples.
394 See, e.g., ‘Indonesia: Police Kill 5 Suspects in Terrorist Ring’, The New York Times, 20 March
2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/asia/indonesia-police-kill-
5-suspects-in-terrorist-ring.html ; F. Whaley, ‘Philippine Officials Say Raid Killed Militants’,
The New York Times, 2 February 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/
world/asia/philippines-says-raid-killed-senior-militants.html. Jeemaah Islamiyah is described
as a radical Islamic organization based in Indonesia with ‘links to Al Qaeda’, which was
responsible for, inter alia, the notorious attack on a Bali nightclub that killed 202 people
in October 2002.
395 ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 8.
396 Statement by Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial executions; Alston, note
387.
397 ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra note 109, p. 9. Alston noted that many states
have or are acquiring this technology, which may also become available to non-state actors.
See also, ‘UN launches Inquiry into Drone Killings’, supra note 402. The Special Rapporteur
on counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson, stated that 51 states had the
technology to use drones. See e.g.. W. Wan and P. Finn, ‘Global Race on to Match U.S. Drone
Capabilities’, The Washington Post, 4 July 2011, available at: http://www.washington-
post.com/world/national-security/globalrace-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/
30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html.
398 See Koh, ‘ASIL Speech’, supra note 248; ‘Holder Speech on Targeted Killing’, supra note
248; ‘Johnson Speech on National Security’, supra note 254.
399 Self-defence is an exception to the prohibition on the use of force against another state,
but requires that the force be necessary and proportionate to a threat being defended against.
See Chapter 5.
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application of IHL.400 It also illustrates the selective reference to the legal
framework by neglecting the relevance of international human rights law. As
discussed in Chapter 7, if the attacks are in fact carried out in the context of
armed conflict, IHRL remains relevant alongside (and must be interpreted in
light of) IHL.401 More significantly perhaps, to the extent that those targeted
are not in fact killed in the context of an armed conflict, the distinct rules of
IHRL govern, under which the targeting of individuals could rarely, if ever,
be lawful.402
A preliminary question on which lawfulness depends, which must be
answered in relation to any operation, is therefore whether IHL is applicable
at all. If so, it must be established that the individuals identified and targeted
were legitimate targets, as party to a conflict in which the US is engaged, or
as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities when they are attacked. There
must have been sufficient and reliable information to establish the lawfulness
of the target and its context, including the nature and extent of civilian
casualties anticipated. Civilian losses must have been proportionate to concrete
military advantage and minimized. It may also be essential to determine
whether the lethal use of force was militarily necessary, or whether there were,
in any of these cases, circumstances in which it may have been feasible to
detain rather than kill the target.403 Allegedly unlawful strikes should be
investigated, and where appropriate victims offered a remedy for their wrongs.
In light of the legal framework, some question whether these weapons
might be considered inherently unlawful.404 This question will undoubtedly
be the subject of future legal attention, taking into account the weapons
systems capabilities and limitations, and whether necessary military assess-
400 Eg. President Obama’s National Defense University speech of May 2013 stated that members
of Al-Qaeda and undefined “associated forces” would be targeted if they were part of a
“continuous and imminent threat” to the United States. This may be relevant to whether
there is a right to act in self defence under Chapter 4, but not to whether particular actions
were justified under IHL.
401 See e.g.. IHRL on the right to life in Chapter 7A.5.1 and practice at Chapter 7B.3.
402 Ibid. Chapter 7 will explain why it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to justify the systematic
targeted killings of terrorist suspects, by drones or otherwise, outside genuine armed
conflict.
403 Obama has stated, in his May 2013 speech that drones would only be used where capture
was not feasible, though an on the spot assessment of this is precluded by the nature of
the weapons system. On this controversial area of international law, see Part A above e.g.
6A2.1.2 and 7B3.
404 M. Wardrop, ‘Unmanned drones could be banned, says senior judge’, The Telegraph, 6 July
2009, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5755446/Unmanned
-drones-could-be-banned-says-senior-judge.html. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark




ments and responses are possible from a remote location?405 There may well
be calls for legal development in response to the expanding reality of drone
warfare, as there have been in response to other technological developments
and emerging weapons systems in the past. For the time being, however, it
may be doubtful that the weapons system is inherently unlawful406 with the
more fruitful question is how these weapons technologies are being employed
in practice and whether or not, in each particular case, the existing framework
of law is being respected.
6B.2.2.3 Drone Killings as part of Armed Conflicts in Pakistan, Yemen and beyond?
Pakistan has been the hotbed of drone activity in recent years, giving rise to
a controversial preliminary question whether there is an armed conflict in
Pakistan to which IHL applies, and if so, between which parties? The existence
of armed conflict(s) in Pakistan is a matter of some dispute,407 as is the ques-
tion whether, if there is an armed conflict, the US is a party to it. While these
are questions of fact, to be assessed at any particular point in time, there is
reason to doubt whether the US could be said to be engaged in a separate
conflict with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),408 or whether (especially
given the formally condemnatory position of the Pakistani authorities) the US
might be intervening (on the side of Pakistan) in a NIAC between Pakistan and
the TTP.409 If not, another possibility may be that parts of the state, notably
north-western Pakistan, may be in conflict as a result of a spillover from the
405 Eg drones are necessarily directed towards killing not capturing; while hardly a unique
feature of a weapons system, it contrasts to forces on the ground (in e.g. Chapter 9). This
raises legal issues in light of the framework above, and at a minimum militates further
in favour of an exceptional rather than the expansive approach.
406 See Dutch Advisory Committee on Drones, supra.
407 ‘At the time of writing, the situation [in Pakistan and Yemen] is yet to reach the one of
armed conflict, which is why drone attacks, as well as other acts of violence, are to be
assessed under the law enforcement model’ in S. Breau, M. Aronsson, R. Joyce, ‘Discussion
Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International Law, and the Recording of Civilian Casualties of
Armed Conflict’, Oxford Research Group, June 2011, p. 9, available at: http://
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG%20Drone%20Attacks%20and%20
International%20Law%20Report.pdf (‘Oxford Research Group’). C.f., B. Saul, ‘Delivered
from Evil… to a minefield of law and consequence’, ABC, 6 May 2011, available at: http://
www.abc.net.au/unleashed/1433114.html.
408 Whether there is a conflict between the Pakistan authorities and the group is separate from
whether there is a conflict in which the US is engaged. There is relatively little support
for such a view but see, e.g., Saul, ibid.
409 The extent of the government’s criticism of the attacks casts serious doubt on this scenario.
While some question the transparency of the government’s protestations (e.g. Khatchadou-
rian, ‘Bin Laden: The Rules of Engagement’, The New Yorker, 4 May 2011, citing Pakistan’s
Prime Minister telling the American ambassador “I don’t care if they do it as long as they
get the right people ...We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it”), this is
plainly different from being jointly engaged in a conflict. See also, e.g., Waraich, supra note
380.
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conflict in Afghanistan.410 Although notably not the justification advanced
by the US, in such a spillover situation, there may well be a basis for legitimate
use of lethal force under IHL, but naturally only against individuals partici-
pating in the Afghan conflict against the US.411
A different scenario arises in relation to Yemen, due to its greater relative
distance, geographically and otherwise, from the Afghan conflict. The drone
killing of American Mr Al-Aulaqi and his son brought the controversy sur-
rounding drone strikes in Yemen into sharp focus,412 though reports of the
wide-reaching effects of numerous attacks since have intensified this.413 While
Mr al-Aulaqi’s infamous exhortations of violence would have rendered him
susceptible to criminal charges, questions arise as to whether his alleged role
in al-Qaeda would render him an active participant in a genuine armed
conflict.414
A key question of fact, to be assessed on an on-going basis, is whether the
intensity threshold would be met for a conflict in Yemen itself. While opinion
varies, it has been suggested that the level of unfolding violence in Yemen
may have reached the threshold for non-international armed conflict between
Al Qaeda and in the Arabian Peninsula and the Yemeni government, perhaps
since 2011.415 There would appear to be little force to the claim that there
was an armed conflict therefore in relation to the first known use of drone
targeted killings by the CIA in the Harithi case in 2002, or for other attacks
resumed in 2009. An outstanding question however is whether the US is a party
to any conflict, which it does not appear to have claimed is the case.416 The
410 N. Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), p. 225; ‘Oxford Research Group’, supra note 416, p. 12: ‘The drone attacks
conducted by the United States in north-west Pakistan are a ‘spillover’ effect from the
conflict in Afghanistan ... the drone attacks taking place outside north-western Pakistan
(FATA and NWFP) shall be assessed under the rules of the law enforcement model.’
411 Lubell, ‘Classification of Conflicts’, supra note 281, p. 255 on the Afghan conflict ‘crossing
borders’ and noting that ‘ if the individual or group are continuing to engage in the armed
conflict from their new location, then operations taken against them could be considered
to be part of the armed conflict.’
412 Part of this controversy and attention was political, related to his U.S. nationality.
413 Between a Drone and al Qaeda, HRW, October 2013, supra.
414 See background to Al Aulaqi in US litigation, supra; for another view, see Chesney, ‘Who
May Be Killed?’, Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case study in the International Legal Regulation
of Lethal Force’, 2 February 2011, Yearbook of International Humanitarian, Vol. 13, M.N.
Schmitt et al, eds., 2010, p. 32; supra note 343 and targeting criteria in A6.2.1 and further
in the next section.
415 Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and al Qaeda,’p.84; cf. Oxford Research group,
supra.
416 ‘Between a Drone and al Qaeda, ibid, p. 84-85.
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same doubts regarding the nature of the – parties to the broader putative
global conflict addressed above – would arise.417
6B.2.2.4 Drones and questions of Lawful Targeting: Identification, Capture and
‘Signature Strikes’?
If there is reliable information that the individual is fighting in an armed
conflict against the US, he may well be a legitimate target. Much remains
unknown about the basis on which targets for drone killings are identified.
Reports indicate that targets are identified by a range of means, which include
the use of local informants, who are paid for information,418 which perhaps
inevitably has given rise to allegations of dubious reliability.419 It has repeat-
edly been recalled that it is critical that states have procedural safeguards to
ensure intelligence is accurate and verifiable.420
One noteworthy feature of drone strikes has been so-called ‘signature
strikes’ against people not known and identified as targets individually, but
targeted on a ‘pattern of life’ analysis or otherwise.421 Lawful targeting on
the basis that the person is directly participating in hostilities must however
be based on the individual’s conduct,422 which must in turn be based on
verifiable and reliable information. In conflict situation where individuals are
not identified by their uniforms, it is undoubtedly more challenging, but also
all the more important, to make careful assessments of individual involvement,
not least given the grave and irreversible nature of the stakes. While some
417 See criteria for parties to the conflict issue addressed above in 6A.1.1. The question is
whether Al Qaeda in the Arabina Peninsula (active in Yemen) meets the criteria for a party
to a NIAC are different questions of fact from whether al Qaeda and associates globally
do so. The US conflict with the latter is more readily dismissed, as set out in earlier sections.
418 See also below Section B.2.3 on bounties.
419 ‘Drones wars and state secrecy – how Barack Obama became a hardliner’, The Guardian,
2 June 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/02/drone-wars-
secrecy-barack-obama. See also C. Stafford Smith, ‘Sleepwalking into the Drone Age’, The
Observer, 3 June 2012, p. 31.
420 Alston, ibid.
421 ‘Pattern of life’ analysis used by CIA means that unidentified persons are targeted for killing
based on patterns of behaviour. G. Miller, ‘At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism
hunt’, The Washington Post, March 24 2012, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/at-cia-a-convert-to-islam-leads-the-terrorism-hunt/2012/03/23/
gIQA2mSqYS_print.html. See also ‘US offered advanced warnings, limits for drone strikes’,
The Tribune, 27 March 2012, available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/355884/us-offered-
advanced-warnings-limits-for-drone-strikes-report/; ‘Signature strikes target groups of men
believed to be militants ... but whose identities aren’t always known. The bulk of CIA’s
drone strikes are signature strikes’ in A. Entous, S. Gorman and J. Barnes, ‘U.S. Tightens
Drone Rules’, The Wall Street Journal, 4 November 2011, available at: http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.html
422 See Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 57, for a response to the criticism of Alston.
Despite differences, both Alston and Pejic emphasise that the targeting of persons directly
participating must be based on the conduct of the individual.
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have suggested use of force in this context depends on an assessment of
imminent harm from an individual, this is open to question,423 but it clearly
does involve an assessment that the particular individual is in fact directly
engaged in hostilities. They may be targeted so long as they are directly so
engaged, or, if the flexible standard of the ICRC Guidance is to be followed,
so long as they are personally engaged in a ‘continuous combat function.’424
The sheer scale of drone attacks, and the apparent references to broad
categorizations of groups of individuals based on ‘pattern of life’ analysis bring
into question whether there has been a rigorous application of targeting rules
in each case. If there is any doubt as to an individual’s civilian status, pre-
sumptions must operate in favour of the individual.
In addition, assuming the individual is in principle a legitimate target in
a real armed conflict, an assessment must still be made of whether all the
conditions for lawful targeting were met.425 These include the critical question
of whether the least onerous measures were adopted, and the controversial
obligation to capture rather than kill, or to harm rather than kill, where feas-
ible.426
Significantly, the Obama administration appears to have accepted that lethal
force should only be use as a last resort, where “capture is not feasible.”427
While questions remain as to what renders capture ‘feasible,’ and respect for
this in practice,428 this acknowledgment by the administration is significant,
and may make a contribution to evolving standards in this field.429 However,
the use of drones, like other forms of aerial attack, by their nature precludes
the possibility of capturing rather than killing proving feasible in the particular
423 ‘In armed conflicts against non-state armed groups who do not wear uniforms and are
often difficult to distinguish from the civilian population, targeting determinations rightfully
require a higher threshold of imminent harm.’ G. Rona, ‘US Targeted Killing Policy Un-
justified’, JURIST, 24 February 2011, available at: http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/gabor-
rona-targeted-killing.php.
424 ‘[Targeting determinations] must be based on conduct: either that the suspect is “directly
participating in hostilities” (DPH), or that he or she performs what the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) calls a “continuous combat function” (CCF) in the
armed conflict.’ Ibid.
425 See part A.3. ‘Specific aspects of IHL’, above. This factual assessment to be made in all the
circumstances is impeded by the lack of information concerning targets and the circum-
stances in which they have been killed. On the lack of transparency, or investigation, see
below in this section on drones and part B.2.4 below.
426 Note 106 above.
427 DOJ leaked White Paper and National Defense University 23 May 2013 speech, note 106.
428 See e.g. S Knuckey and R.Goodman, What Obama’s New Killing Rules Don’t tell You,
Esquire,http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/obama-counterterrorism-speech-questions-
052413. The government’s position appeared at odds with information that it accelerated
drone killings to avoid politically costly detentions.
429 See also Chapter 7B3 for the influence of IHRL, and related developments in this area.
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moment.430 A UN report presented to the General Assembly notes questions
arising from the “the extent to which an advance decision, ruling out the
possibility of offering or accepting an opportunity to surrender, renders such
operations unlawful.”431 This is one of a number of difficult issues of inter-
national law raised by drone attacks, deserving of further legal analysis, where
the framework of international law may evolve in light of responses to inter-
national terrorism.
6B.2.2.5 Drones and Civilian Casualties
While originally touted for their accuracy, as noted above, drone attacks have
given rise to serious concern as regards large numbers of reported civilian
casualties.432 Despite denials by the US administration, including stating in
2010 that there had been not a single collateral casualty,433 civilian casualty
numbers resulting from drone strikes have grown exponentially, and reliable
reporting puts the fact of such casualties beyond plausible deniability.434
Beyond troubling reports of thousands of civilians dead, are others that indicate
devastating broader effects of drone campaign on civilians and civilian life.435
An assessment must be made whether drones can, and in practice in each
situation do, meet the legal requirements of distinction and proportionality.
Considerations of the strengths and inherent limitations of the weapons system
– the surveillance capability of drones on the one hand, and suggestions by
some that the remotely-operated nature of these weapons necessarily make
430 The killing of bin Laden, although ultimately resulting in his death, shows the feasibility
of ground operations. See Chapter 9.
431 Note by the Secretary General, Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights
questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, 30 August 2011, UN Doc. A/66/330, paras. 65-85; Report
of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns
– Addendum – Follow-up to country recommendations – United States of America Human
Rights Council, 20th Session, 29th March 2012, A/HRC/20/22/Add.3, para. 77.
432 Numerous reports document this e.g. ‘Living under Drones’ (Stanford), ‘Will I be Next’
(Amnesty) and ‘Between Drones and al Qaeda’ (HRW). See also Smith, ‘Sleepwalking into
the Drone Age’.
433 President Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, John O. Brennan, and other officials
claimed there were no’ collateral death[s] because of the exceptional proficiency, precision
of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.” S. Shane, ‘C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian
Toll in Drone Strikes’, The New York Times, 11 August 2011, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html ibid. Obama, ‘Your Interview
with the President – 2012’, 30 January 2012, available at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI. Obama Defense University speech, 23 May 2013, note 106.
434 ‘Oxford Research Group’, supra note 416, p. 12; ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, p. 25;
‘Living Under Drones’.
435 Eg Living Under Drones, p. 73 et seq.
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on-the-spot assessments more difficult on the other,436 will contribute to on-
going debate as the role of these weapons within an IHL responsive framework.
In face of the mounting evidence of civilian casualties, the onus must lie with
the state to demonstrate that distinction and proportionality were respected,
and the obligations to protect civilians from the effects of conflict have been
met, in each situation.437 However, as noted below, rather than discharge
this onus, the US has shrouded the programme, including their own casualty
figures and possible explanations that would assist assessments of lawfulness,
in secrecy. Whether due to the nature of the weapon system, the poor in-
telligence on which attacks are based or other reason, the fact is that drone
attacks have cost thousands of civilian lives, strained relations between the
US and Pakistani and Afghan governments, and given rise to growing inter-
national concern.438
In addition to incidental civilian deaths, particular controversy attends
‘follow-up strikes’, which have been criticized as leading to the death of
rescuers, and as having no justification under IHL.439
Civilian casualties through drone killings have been described as having
‘replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants,’440 with
necessary implications for the effectiveness of the use of drone in combating
terrorism.441 As noted in the COIN manual, ‘an operation that kills five in-
436 For a discussion on the ‘video-game control’ aspect of drone use and intelligence failings,
see J. Mayer, ‘The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?’,
The New Yorker, 26 October 2009, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/
10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer.
437 Eg. the TBIJ found that between 2,429-3,097 individuals were killed in Pakistan drone
attacks, of which between 479-811 were civilians. C. Woods and C. Lambs, ‘Obama terror
drones: CIA tactics in Pakistan include targeting rescuers and funerals’, at http://www.the
bureauinvestigates.com /category/projects/drone-data/.
438 J. Boone, ‘Pakistani MPs say US drone strikes must end before relations improve’, The
Guardian, 20 March 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/
pakistani-us-drone-strikes-relations; T. Wright, ‘Pakistan Seeks End to Drones’, The Wall
Street Journal, 20 March 2012, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB1000142405270
2304636404577292792576081400.html; M. Zenko, ‘What Happens if Afghanistan Shuts Down
the U.S. Drone Program There?’, The Atlantic, 9 December 2012, available at: http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/what-happens-if-afghanistan-shuts-
down-the-us-drone-program-there/255602/. ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, p. 25;
‘Living Under Drones’.
439 See statement by Christof Heyns, the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial
killings, in June 2012 criticising ‘double tap’ drone strikes, in which a second missile is
fired at people coming to aid the wounded. Heyns suggested that this could constitute
a war crime. See also D. Akande, ‘US Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Can it be Legal to Target
Rescuers & Funeralgoers?’, EJIL Talk, 12 February 2012, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.
org/us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-can-it-be-legal-to-target-rescuers-funeralgoers.
440 ‘Drones have replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants; in his
2010 guilty plea, Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square,
justified targeting civilians by telling the judge, “When the drones hit, they don’t see
children.”’ Ibid.
441 See e.g. ‘Between Drones and al Qaeda’, HRW,‘AQAP surge and backlash,’ p.24 et seq.
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surgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment
of fifty more insurgents’.442
6B.2.2.6 Transparency, Accountability and Drones
While transparency around targets and the use of force in allegedly conflict
situations will always be necessarily curtailed, the lack of transparency and
accountability for IHL violations in the war on terror generally has been parti-
cularly controversial, and all the more so in relation to drone killings.443
The US administration has been sharply criticised, by people on different
sides of the debate on the lawfulness of the targeted killings of al-Qaeda
operatives444 and by successive Special Rapporteurs,445 for secrecy around
that programme that extended to refusing to acknowledge its existence until
2010, and continuing resistance to clarifying its legal basis. In response perhaps
to growing international and domestic pressure, it has presented greater
information on its broad legal justification, representing an important move
towards transparency, though not the details of legal advice on which the
programme is purportedly based.446
Concerns regarding weak positive identification procedures, and the lack
of independent post-strike reviews and where appropriate investigations
conducted afterwards, remain.447 Reports that, instead, journalists have been
442 Headquarters, Department of the Army & Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Develop-
ment Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, (2006), available at: http://
www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf (hereinafter COIN Manual), cited
in Schmitt (ed.), The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, pp. 309-310; Hampson, ‘Afghanistan
2001-2010’, supra note 8, p. 259.
443 On the lack of transparency, or investigation, see below in this section on drones and B.2.4
below; see also Chapter 7B.14 on ‘Justice and Accountability’.
444 Anderson Written Testimony, supra note 322, p. 2; Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, supra note 322. See
C. Savage, ‘Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen’, The New York Times, 8
October 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-
us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-acitizen.html.
445 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip
Alston – Addendum – Mission to the United States of America [Human Rights Council]
11th Session, 28th May 2009. Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights
Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, UN GA, 65th
Session, 23rd August 2010, A/65/321 at para 87. C. Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, supra note 439, para. 76; Emmerson,
Interim Report, 18 September 2013 emphasises the need for greater disclosure.
446 Knuckey and Goodman, What the Killing Rules Don’t Tell, note 436
447 ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, note 109; Lewis, ‘The Boundaries of the Battlefield’,
note 315.
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punished for reporting on drone attacks puts a particularly dark face on the
lack of transparency around drone killings.448
The fact that such strikes are carried out not only by the military, but also
by civilian intelligence agencies, heightens concerns both as to the lawfulness
of these attacks under IHL, the absence of the normal framework of command
and control enshrined in IHL, and further undermines the prospect of oversight
and accountability.449 It remains to be seen whether the US decision to shift
responsibility for such killings from the CIA to Department of Defense will
alter the approach to transparency in practice.450 Thus far, requests and legal
measures in pursuit of a degree of information for those affected by the policy,
and ultimately the opportunity to challenge, have been summarily dis-
missed.451 While developments in relation to other terror lists have gone a
long way to ensuring the rights of those whose movement, property or other
rights are affected,452 these death lists remain beyond the pale of legal or
judicial oversight.
6B.2.3 ‘Wanted Dead or Alive:’ Rewards and the Bounty Hunter in IHL
Speaking with reporters after a Pentagon briefing on 17 September 2001, then
President George Bush stated of Osama bin Laden: ‘I want justice. And there’s
an old poster out West I recall, that said, “Wanted, Dead or Alive.”’453 The
same terminology has been used in respect of other high-level targets who,
as noted above, appear on controversial ‘kill or capture’ CIA lists.454
448 A Yemeni journalist was arrested for exposing U.S. military intervention in Yemen, including
information regarding drone strikes. J. Scahill, ‘Why Is President Obama Keeping a Journalist
in Prison in Yemen?’, The Nation, 13 March 2012, available at: http://www.thenation.com/
article/166757/why-president-obama-keeping-journalist-prison-yemen
449 Actions by intelligence agencies have often been criticised as undermining transparency.
See M. Scheinin, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, UN Doc. No. A/
HRC/10/3, 4 February 2009, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G09/106/25/PDF/G0910625.pdf ; and ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra
note 109, p.26.
450 Obama, National Defense University speech, May 2013; on the implications of the CIA
role, see B. Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on Terrorism’s Interim Report, para 46.
451 See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, supra note 322 where the family of al-Aulaqi sought information
regarding the grounds for putting someone on a ‘kill-list’ and the lawful basis for the
asserted authority to use lethal force; the case was dismissed on state’s secrets grounds.
See Chapter 11 on litigation.
452 See e.g. Chapter 7B.8 on terrorism sanctions lists, and Chapter 11.‘on the ‘Role of the Courts’.
453 ‘Bush: bin Laden “Wanted Dead or Alive”’, CNN, 17 September 2001, available at: http://
articles.cnn.com/2001-09-17/us/bush.powell.terrorism_1_bin-qaeda-terrorist.
454 ‘Secretary Napolitano Confirms Al-Awlaki Is Wanted Dead Or Alive’, CNN, 21 July 2011,
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSOFGlGOdCo.
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The practice of offering financial rewards for those that assist the United
States towards the killing or capturing of suspected members of al-Qaeda or
associated groups has characterised the war on terror in Afghanistan and, on
occasion, beyond. After 9/11, a pre-existing US scheme to solicit information
on international terrorists known as ‘Rewards for Justice’ was revamped in
the counter-terrorism context.455 Often large sums of money have been
awarded for individuals, information or contributions towards capture or
killing of ‘most-wanted’ individuals.456 Examples of the ‘wanted dead or
alive’ mantra and US assisted bounties have arisen in relation to alleged terror-
ists in other states also.457
This practice raises a range of serious concerns in light of the framework
of IHL. The scope for mistaken identities and abuse is obvious where indi-
viduals sell information for financial reward. In practice, the intelligence
gathered in this way has been criticised for its unreliability, often leading to
erroneous targeting or mistaken capture,458 as revealed in the case of many
early Guantanamo inmates detained on this basis.459
455 “Washington initiated its bounty program in 1984...The program was enhanced significantly
under the 2001 Patriot Act, which, among other things, increased the overall funding, and,
in particular, boosted the total available in certain individual cases, such as bin Laden, to
$25 million... In most cases, rewards are capped at $5 million and are often considerably
smaller...’ ‘US Bounty Scheme Targets Terrorist’, Forbes, 21 February 2008, available at: http:/
/www.forbes.com/2008/02/20/terrorism-bounty-taliban-cx_0221oxford.html.TheRewards
for Justice program is described as “one of the most valuable U.S. Government assets in
the fight against international terrorism....Since the inception of the Rewards for Justice
program in 1984, the United States Government has paid more than $100 million to over
70 people who provided actionable information that put terrorists behind bars or prevented
acts of international terrorism worldwide.’ ‘Program Overview’, Rewards for Justice, 12
December 2012, available at: http://www.rewardsforjustice.net notes that
456 ‘US/INTERNATIONAL: Counter-terror bounties’, The New York Times, 5 December 2008,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/25/news/25iht-20oxan-terrorbounties.
10376135.html;US bounty Scheme, ibid, details amounts offered for various individuals.
457 See, e.g., in the Philippines in February 2012, two individuals were killed who carried a
$50,000 and a $5 million reward from the United States respectively; see F. Whaley,
‘Philippine Officials Say Raid Killed Militants’, The New York Times, 2 February 2012,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/asia/philippines-says-raid-killed-
senior-militants.html; see also ‘Wanted, Zulkifli bin Hir, Up to $5 Million Reward’, Rewards
for Justice, available at: http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page= zulkifli&
language=English.
458 ‘Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the scheme is a tendency to attract false information,
which has led to deleterious strategic effects in the past.’ ‘US/INTERNATIONAL: Counter-
terror bounties’, supra note 463; see also M. Samari, ‘Bounties paid for terror suspects’,
Amnesty International, 16 January 2007, available at: http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/
comments/2167. See also C Stafford Smith, Sleepwalking into Drones, supra 6B2.3.
459 ‘More than 85 percent of detainees at Guantanamo Bay were arrested, not on the Afghan-
istan battlefield by US forces, but by the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in Afghan-
istan, and in Pakistan at a time when rewards of up to US$5,000 were paid for every
’terrorist’ turned over to the United States.’
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To the extent that the policy directly or indirectly encourages individuals
to themselves engage in unlawful activity, including ultimately killing or
capturing listed individuals, it is antithetical to the basis of IHL, with its careful
attention to rules on belligerency, status and the principle of distinction.460
Private individuals do not have belligerents privilege, nor any right to engage
either in combat under IHL or in law enforcement under that paradigm. The
obligations, safeguards and oversight that would at least in principle arise
for parties to conflict under IHL are absent.
Although it has perhaps had less attention than other issues, it is submitted
that the public ‘bounties’ placed on the head of individuals, on uncertain legal
basis and with no accountability or possibility of challenge, is a graphic
reminder of the extent to which the WOT has become, in the language of George
Bush, the Wild West of international practice. The ‘wanted dead or alive’
approach, so far as it incites or induces private actors to commit crimes, could
constitute not only acts for which the state has responsibility under inter-
national law, but also crimes both under international and domestic law.461
6B.2.4 ‘War on Terror’ Detentions and IHL
The widespread detention of individuals in relation to the war on terror is
notorious, and has given rise to the historic anomaly of Guantanamo Bay
addressed in Chapter 8, and the rule of law nadir of the Extraordinary Rendi-
tion programme, discussed in Chapter 10. Issues related to detention have
also given rise to difficult issues concerning the interplay of legal regimes,
notably the inter-relationship between IHL and IHRL and its bearing on safe-
guards in detention addressed in Chapter 7B.3. Myriad legal issues have
therefore arisen in the course of what has been described as the ‘legal and
political disaster’ of the US detention policy, which will not be developed here
as they are addressed in those chapters.462
No chapter on IHL would be complete, however, without brief regard to
three of the key questions that have arisen regarding the IHL framework.
Notably, these issues go far beyond Guantanamo or the CIA secret prisons to
affect the detainees (estimated at more than one hundred thousand)463 who
have been, and continue to be, detained without charge by the US since 2001,
including in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as beyond.
460 The principles at stake are reflected in the rules governing mercenaries. ‘ICRC Study on
Customary IHL’, supra note 78, Vol. I, Rule 108.
461 See Art. 25 ICC Statute and Chapter 4.
462 D. Cole, ‘Out of the Shadows, Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorist and War’, 97
Cal. L. Rev. 693, 727 (2009).
463 R. Chesney, ‘Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens’, 52 B.C.
L. Rev. 769, 770 (2011).
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6B.2.4.1 Lawful Basis for Detention
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed the Military Order ‘Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism’,
providing the authorizing the detention of non-US citizens with respect to
whom:
‘(1) there is reason, to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is or
was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided
or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in pre-
paration therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause,
injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harboured one or more indi-
viduals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order;
and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to
this order.’464
Over time, and across administrations, the US has continued to assert and act
upon a broad reaching right to detain ‘enemy combatants’ including those
that ‘were part of, or substantially supported Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces’.465 It has been suggested that ‘more than one hundred
thousand individuals have been detained without criminal charge’ by the US
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo since 2001, giving rise to an immense
amount of scholarship, advocacy, and litigation while ‘the question of who
lawfully may be detained remains unsettled in important respects’.466 The
lack of clarity or consensus as to who may be detained has been identified
on several levels, notably on a group level – as to which groups could be
detained and whether it covered only the Taleban and al-Qaeda or also
others – and on an individual level, as to ‘the mix of conditions that are
necessary or sufficient to justify the detention of a particular person’.467
The US administration has persistently justified its detention policy as lawful
under the regime applicable to ‘law of war detentions’. IHL does provide a
lawful basis for detention of certain categories of individuals in the context
of, and for reasons associated with, an armed conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq
were such conflicts, and many of the detainees held by the US were captured
464 Bush, Military Order of November 13, 2001, ‘Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism’, Sec. 1.
465 ‘Substantial’ has not been defined, although the brief states: ‘It is neither possible nor
advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and degree
of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or
would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework....”
See Hamdan, ‘Respondents’ memorandum regarding the Government’s detention authority
relative to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay’, supra note 249, p. 2.
466 Chesney, supra note 463, p. 770.
467 Ibid.
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at least in those geographic areas, although numerous others were captured
at various locations around the globe and with no apparent connections to
those recognised armed conflicts. There is strong reason to doubt therefore
whether many of the particular individuals were detained in relation to an
armed conflict, as opposed to the broader fight against international terrorism,
al-Qaeda or others.468
In an armed conflict, the power to detain for reasons associated with the
conflict is explicit in IHL in relation to IAC and, while not uncontroversial, it
may be considered implicit in case of NIAC.469 As set out above, combatants
and fighters may be detained until the end of the conflict – members of the
armed forces, such as Taliban fighters referred to above, would thus appear
detainable and entitled to POW status. Civilians may also be detained but so
long as ‘absolute necessity’470 or ‘imperative reasons of security’471 so
require, a standard which has been referred to as a ‘minimum legal standard
that should inform internment decisions in all situations of violence, including
NIACS’.472
Available information concerning categories of detainees, such as those
referred to in the Obama administration’s Guantanamo Task Force Report,
illustrate the range of individuals who have been subject to the emergency
detention measures in practice, and suggest many that go beyond the IHL
parameters.473 They consist of: (a) ‘Leaders, operatives, and facilitators
involved in terrorist plots against US targets’, (b) others who ‘may not have
been directly involved in terrorist plots against US targets’ but who are believed
to have had ‘organizational roles within al-Qaida or associated terrorist organ-
izations’, including for example, persons who provide ‘logistical support to
al-Qaida’s training operations’ and ‘facilitators who helped move money and
personnel’, (c) Taliban leaders and members of anti-Coalition militia groups,
(d) ‘low-level foreign fighters’ who have ‘varying degrees of connection to
al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated groups, but who lacked a significant
468 See 6B.1.1 ‘Armed conflict with al-Qaeda, associates and “terrorist groups of global reach”?’
for a discussion on armed conflict with al-Qaeda.
469 NIAC does not provide an explicit power to detain, though it has been argued with some
force that this power may be inherent in the nature of armed conflict – just as parties can
use force, so must they be able to detain as an alternative: see Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’,
supra note 58, p. 10. See also US Supreme Court Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)
(plurality opinion); see also (Thomas, J.) (dissenting opinion).
470 GC Art. 42(1).
471 GC Art. 78(1).
472 Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 58, p. 15.
473 Executive Order 13492, 22 January 2009, called for an interagency review of the status of
all Guantanamo detainees.
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leadership or other specialized role’,474 and (e) ‘miscellaneous others’ who
do not fit into any of the groups.475
Clearly those directly participating in hostilities could be detained in either
type of conflict. However, it must be highly doubtful in relation to those
rendering looser forms of ‘support’ to a broad range of groups, whether
imperative reasons of security genuinely require their detention. While a very
small number of the detainees could be considered ‘fighters’ in any sense the
US acknowledged that most had not themselves engaged in hostile acts.476
One can only speculate about the undefined ‘miscellaneous’ group that falls
beyond any of these categories. Assessments of risk posed, and the necessity
of detention, should be made in relation to the individual, based on his or
her own conduct.477 Yet it has been suggested that the detainee report indi-
cates that more than half of the detainees were detained on grounds unrelated
to their personal conduct.478 Many were considered ‘members’ of a broad
range of groups, going far beyond even the groups on US terrorism lists, while
the vast majority were associated in some more remote way with international
terrorism.479
The assessment of whether imperative reasons of security exist must be
made on an on-going basis, and the person released once there is no longer
a compelling need for detention. The fact that individuals may ‘have been’
members of prohibited groups in the past is insufficient, other than as relevant
to a careful assessment of the real security imperative requiring the individual
at the present time.
Notably, in light of the focus of much of the war on terror detentions,480
IHL does not envisage detention under these provisions for interrogation or
474 The report notes that this majority group ‘do[es] not appear to have been among those
selected for more advanced training geared toward terrorist operations abroad’. Guantanamo
Review Task Force Final Report, 22 January 2012, p. 14 available at: http://www.justice.gov/
ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
475 Ibid. 13-14.
476 Note the US administration maintains there is no need to be linked to a hostile act. See
al Bahini v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
477 Cf the position for members of the armed forces in IAC who may be detained as POWs.
478 Chapter 8. M. Denbeaux and J. Denbeaux, ‘The Guantanamo Detainees: The Government’s
Story’, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of
Department of Defense Data, p. 2, available at: http://law.shu.edu/publications/guan
tanamoReports/guantanamo_report_ final_2_08_06.pdf
479 Ibid. at p.2. ‘The Government has detained numerous persons based on mere affiliations
with a large number of groups that in fact, are not on the Department of Homeland Security
terrorist watch list. Moreover, the nexus between such a detainee and such organizations
varies considerably. Eight percent are detained because they are deemed “fighters for;”
30% considered “members of;” a large majority – 60% – are detained merely because they
are “associated with” a group or groups the Government asserts are terrorist organizations.
For 2% of the prisoners their nexus to any terrorist group is unidentified.’
480 Se e Chapter 10 on intelligence gathering by the CIA and Chapter 7B7 on torture in Iraq.
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intelligence gathering purposes.481 Nor does IHL allow detention as punish-
ment.482 IHL detention is not an alternative to criminal law, where it is con-
sidered not practicable or ‘feasible’ for whatever reason to prosecute. While
the official US position has, at various stages, referred to ‘security’ alongside
‘US interests’ and ‘foreign policy’ considerations as justifying detentions,483
the latter categories provide no apparent basis for detention under IHL.
In conclusion, IHL does provide a broad basis for detention of various
categories of persons considered to pose a threat during armed conflict, notably
fighting forces and in limited situations where imperative reasons of security
so demand, civilians. The detention of many of those captured since 9/11 may
well be justified under IHL. Uncertainties stem, however, from a refusal to
operate within, and apply consistently, established categories of IHL. Concerns
in this respect are closely linked to concerns regarding the absence of meaning-
ful and rigorous individualised assessments and the importance of respect
for the safeguards enshrined in IHL, addressed below.
6B.2.4.2 Procedural Safeguards
The detention of ‘war on terror’ detainees without legal safeguards has been
a notorious feature of post-9/11 practice. Other chapters elaborate on this
phenomenon in the context of the Guantanamo detentions and the Extra-
ordinary Rendition programme (ERP), which together epitomize the conse-
quences of procedural protection voids. The hard-won litigation that led to
acknowledgement of the right of Guantanamo detainees to habeas corpus is
discussed in relation to the role of courts in Chapter 11. Yet many detainees
elsewhere continue to be held without due process or meaningful review of
the lawfulness of their detention, including in Afghanistan where the right
to challenge the lawfulness of that detention through habeas proceedings, was
consistently denied by the administration, and by US courts.484
IHL does not provide explicit rules regarding the safeguards to which
detainees are entitled in non-international conflicts, and as discussed in Chapter
7B3, there is an area where genuine uncertainties and significant disagreement
arises as regards the applicable framework. On one view, as there are no rules
– no ‘lex specialis’ – of IHL, human rights law continues to apply. On another,
481 ‘The indefinite detention of prisoners of war and civilian internees for purposes of continued
interrogation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.’ Commission
on Human Rights, Joint Report ‘Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay’, 27 February
2006, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, para. 23.
482 Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 58.
483 Bush, Military Order of November 13, 2001, Sec. 1.13. Obama’s Executive Order 13492
creates and charges the Task Force with finding ‘lawful’ means ‘... consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice,
for the disposition of the detainee’.
484 See Baghram litigation, Chapter 11.
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the gap should be filled by principles of IHL, applied by analogy.485 On any
view, certain minimum standards common to both fields of law must surely
apply. As the ICRC’s ‘Minimum Guidelines’ suggest, this must include reasons,
effective opportunity to challenge (which must include access to evidence
against them), and periodic review as to the continued existence of the imperat-
ive reasons that made such detention necessary.486 The facts and circum-
stances of detentions and the lack of meaningful review of all detentions fall
significantly short of even these basic minimum requirements of international
law.
6B.2.4.3 End of the Conflict and Detention
Finally, as noted in relation to the ‘War without End’ discussion above, when
an armed conflict comes to an end the lawful basis for detention under IHL
also ends, and detention must end with it, or another legal basis must be
provided. If the conflict shifts in nature from international to non-international,
as happened in both Afghanistan and Iraq for example, different legal con-
siderations apply and the detention must be justified in accordance with the
law that then applies. The ICRC suggests that the minimum standard of ‘im-
perative reasons of security’ may still justify detention, and the relevant
minimum safeguards continue to apply, while others suggest a greater role
for human rights law in non-international conflicts settings, where less pre-
scriptive rules of IHL apply.487 When armed conflict ceases, undoubtedly it
is the provisions of human rights law that then apply, as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has noted: ‘since that IAC [in
Afghanistan] ceased, however, IHRL standards have applied in the normal
fashion’.488 IHL provides for detention to come to an end and relocation of
detainees.
Despite many detainees having been detained in relation to the conflict
in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, the ‘ending of combat in Afghanistan and
485 See discussion in Chapter 7B3.
486 See generally, Pejic, ‘Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative
detention in armed con?ict and other situations of violence’, ICRC, Vol. 87 No. 858, June
2005 (hereinafter ‘ICRC Minimum Guidelines’).
487 See the ECtHR decision in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, Judgment,
ECtHR, 7 July 2011, on detention in armed conflict situation in Iraq, and the critique thereof
in J. Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment: the oversight of
international humanitarian law’, 93(883) 2011 International Review of the Red Cross 837
(stressing the importance of having regard to the inherent right to detain under IHL); see
also 7B.3 ‘The “war” and human rights’.
488 PACE, ‘Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay’, Res.1433 (2005),
para. 4.
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Iraq appears to have no consequences for the ending of detention’.489 The
defence secretary, Leon E. Panetta, announced that the US hoped to end its
combat mission in Afghanistan in 2013 as it did in Iraq in 2011, yet apparently
maintained the right to continue to hold enemy detainees ‘for the duration
of hostilities’.490 A media report recently encapsulated the situation in these
terms: ‘By asserting, for political purposes, that the nation’s two wars are
ending while planning behind the scenes for a longer-term war against al-
Qaeda terrorists, the man who pledged to bring America’s wars to an end
has instead laid the basis for an endless battle.’491
6B.3 THE AFGHAN CONFLICT AND PARTICULAR ISSUES OF IHL COMPLIANCE
Many issues of compliance with IHL have arisen in the course of the ‘war on
terror’, in relation to the genuine armed conflicts that followed 9/11, in
Afghanistan and Iraq, some of which have been addressed above or in other
chapters.492 The US’s assertions concerning the existence of a broad conflict
with al Qaeda, rejected as a matter of law above, is often conflated with the
conflict against the Taleban in Afghanistan. It may be assumed that the
approaches it takes to, for example, target identification in relation to the
conflict in Afghanistan, would hold true as part of its purported broader war
on al Qaeda. This section highlights three groups of IHL issues to have arisen
by reference to examples from the military action in Afghanistan that com-
menced on 7 October 2001. The first group raises questions of targeting and
the principle of distinction. The second relates to the methods and means of
warfare employed. The third concerns the humanitarian protection afforded
to those who have fallen into the power of the Coalition and its Northern
Alliance allies.
6B.3.1 Targeting
6B.3.1.1 Drug Lords, Financiers and other ‘nexus targets’: identifying the targets
for legitimate lethal force in Afghanistan
Several questions have arisen in the Afghan conflict concerning the legitimacy
of selected targets. Some relate to not uncommon controversies, such as the
489 M. L. Dudziak, ‘This War Is Not Over Yet’, The International Herald Tribune, 15 February




492 Eg Chapter 7B.7, 8 and 11.
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bombardment on 11 October 2001 of the Afghan radio station,493 which was
reminiscent of the attack on the television station during the Kosovo conflict,
provoking considerable controversy in this context as in others, as to the
legitimacy of target selection.494 US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld sought to
justify the attack on the basis that the radio station was ‘the propaganda
machine of the opposing forces’, while others question the legitimacy of
targeting civilian radio and television stations, even where they are used for
propaganda purposes.495
More novel, and more controversial, were other issues around target
identification in Afghanistan. Reports indicate that, differences of view between
the states engaged in conflict in Afghanistan as to who were the parties to
the conflict, discussed above,496 translated into differences of views as to who
were legitimate targets.497
Particular controversies arose when the US purported to broaden the
categories of persons considered legitimate targets for lethal force, including
specifically the targeting of drug lords, financiers and other ‘nexus targets’
who provide support for insurgency. In August 2009, the United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations confirmed that US forces in Afghanistan are
now mandated to kill or capture drug traffickers in Afghanistan with links
to the Taleban.498 The Committee was informed of the considerable impact
of drug trafficking on the financing of the insurgency,499 and that the Rules
of Engagement and IHL have therefore been ‘interpreted’ so as to include drug
traffickers with proven links to the insurgency on the so-called joint inte-
493 See Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Accountability for Civilian Deaths’, News Release,
26 October 2001, AI Index: ASA/11/022/2001.
494 See e.g. ‘Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Cam-
paign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, supra note 177; Report of the Prosecutor
on the NATO Bombing Campaign, supra note 177; see also M. Cottier, ‘Did NATO Forces
Commit War Crimes during the Kosovo Conflict? Reflections on the Prosecutor’s Report
of 13 June 2000’ in H. Fischer, C. Kreâ and S.R. Lüder (eds.), International and National
Prosecution of Crimes under International Law: Current Developments (Berlin, 2001), pp.
505, 516-30.
495 See Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Accountability for Civilian Deaths’, supra note
493.
496 6B.1.2 ‘The Real Armed Conflicts: The nature of the Afghan conflict’.
497 See Cole, ‘Legal Issues in Forming the Coalition’, supra note 344, p. 146; Hampson, ‘Afghan-
istan 2001-2010’, supra note 334, p. 260
498 ‘Afghanistan’s Narco-War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents’,
A Report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 August 2009, available at:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html (hereinafter ‘Afghanistan’s Narco-War’);
see also D. Akande, ‘US/NATO Targeting of Afghan Drug Traffickers: An Illegal and
Dangerous Precedent?’, EJIL Talk, 13 September 2009, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/
usnato-targeting-of-afghan-drug-traffickers-an-illegal-and-dangerous-precedent/.
499 The Taleban is estimated to receive between $70 and $500 million annually from the drug
trade, which clearly has a critical role in financing the insurgency. ‘Afghanistan’s Narco-
War’, supra note 498, p. 10.
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grated prioritised target list.500 The result was ‘a list of 367 “kill or capture”
targets, including 50 nexus targets who link drugs and insurgency’.501
Media reports indicate that guidance originally provided by NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Craddock, stated that drug
traffickers and narcotics facilities could be treated as legitimate targets,502
and that it was ‘no longer necessary to produce intelligence or other evidence
that each particular drug trafficker or narcotics facility in Afghanistan meets
the criteria of being a military objective’.503 In an interesting example of the
transatlantic legal tussle, however, this approach was reportedly challenged,
inter alia on grounds of inconsistency with IHL, by at least some NATO mem-
bers.504 Various solutions were reported, one of which was for certain mem-
ber states to ‘opt-out’ of certain operations,505 Though there also appears
to have been a shift in position as a result, with the policy ultimately being
limited to targeting drug lords and financiers ‘on the battlefield’,506 while
the NATO website had indicated targeting of those ‘with a link’ to the in-
surgency.507
These changes may reflect at least some passing regard to the legal frame-
work that governs target identification, but do they amount to consistency
with it? The framework requires that in a non-international conflict such as
Afghanistan, only those fighters (in a ‘continuous combat function’), or civilians
directly participating in hostilities at the time, can be deemed to have lost their
immunity from attack.508 One requirement of ‘direct participation,’ that it
adversely affects the military operations or capabilities of the adversary, may
well be satisfied by financing, but far less clear is whether it might be said
to amount to a ‘direct causal link between the act and the harm’. This is
particularly clear in light of the ICRC guidance which states that this causation
500 Ibid. pp. 15-16.
501 Ibid.
502 Eg. M. Gebauer and S. Koelbl, ‘Battling Drugs in Afghanistan: Order to Kill Angers German
Politicians’, Der Spiegel, 29 January 2009, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,604430,00.html.
503 Ibid; see also Akande, supra note 498.
504 S. Koelbl, ‘NATO High Commander Issues Illegitimate Order to Kill’, Der Spiegel, 29 January
2009, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,604183,00.html. On
the internal political repudiation of this approach in the German parliamentary debate,
see, e.g., M. Gebauer and S. Koelbl, ‘Battling Drugs in Afghanistan: Order to Kill Angers
German Politicians’, supra.
505 ‘P. Finn, ‘NATO to Target Afghan Drug Lords Who Aid Taliban’, The Washington Post,
11 October 2008, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/10/10/AR2008101001818.html. The report notes that the agreement was for some
states to opt out of operations, adding that the US and UK supported striking drug
traffickers, while ‘some European countries, including Germany and Spain’ questioned
this on mandate and policy grounds.
506 This is how the policy was expressed to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
507 Akande, ‘US/NATO Targeting of Afghan Drug Traffickers’, supra note 506.
508 See Chapter 6A.2.1.2
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arises ‘in one causal step’, and that ‘an act must be specifically designed to
directly cause the required threshold of harm’.509
More fundamentally perhaps, while there are undoubtedly areas of un-
certainty and scope for interpretation as to the meaning of ‘direct participation’,
it is generally understood that the individual should be engaged in some way
in ‘hostilities’, not in the many other forms of support on which any insurgency
or conflict may depend. Indeed, the ICRC Guidance specifically excludes ‘war
sustaining’ efforts or ‘economic support’ or ‘financial’ transactions from the
scope of its definition of ‘direct participation in hostilities’.510 Likewise, the
Israeli Supreme Court has rejected, the notion that financing insurgency can
amount to direct participation that displaces the immunity from attack.511
While some argue that those who finance attacks can be subject to attack, this
has been described as ‘definitely a rare minority viewpoint that has not been
accepted by the international community.’512
The references to targeting the drug lords ‘on the battlefield’ or ‘with links’
to the insurgency may seek to draw the targeting practice closer to the legal
framework. Absent evidence of a more direct role in hostilities,513 the tar-
geting practice appears out of sync with current IHL and a potentially danger-
ous attempt to broaden the circumstances in which the lethal use of force can
be invoked: ‘To permit anyone who is involved in the war sustaining effort
to be a direct target is to allow for unrestricted warfare – practically everyone
could be a target.’514
Criminal activity often sustains armed conflict, and the criminal law frame-
work set out in Chapter 4, as well as the broader law enforcement and preven-
tion framework reflected in human rights law, continue to operate alongside
that of IHL. The lack of authority to target these individuals under IHL does
not therefore mean that the legal framework does not contemplate action to
be taken against drug lords and others that fund the unlawful use of force,
and where appropriate and effective, the destruction or seizure of factories
and fields.
509 ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 124, p. 59.
510 See Chapter 6A.2.1.2; ’ICRC DPH Guidance’, supra note 124, p. 51.
511 Decision on Targeted Killings, supra note 7, para 35.
512 J. Paust, ‘The United States’ Use of Drones in Pakistan’, EJIL Talk, 29 September 2009,
available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-united-states-use-of-drones-in-pakistan/.
513 The question, which remains unanswered, is whether these references envisage a factual
scenario in which drug lords do in fact directly participate in hostilities.
514 Akande, ‘US/NATO Targeting of Afghan Drug Traffickers’, supra note 498.
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6B.3.1.2 Civilian casualties and targeting in Afghanistan
Reports appear to indicate that thousands of civilians were killed (and many
civilian objects destroyed) during the early stages of the military campaign515
by the United States and its allies, originally referred to ‘Operation Infinite
Justice’ and later as ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’.516 The heavy reliance
on airstrikes has been criticized as responsible for large numbers of civilian
casualties and a consistent matter of concern by observers.517
Numbers of civilian deaths do not themselves add up to violations of IHL.
The key question to be addressed in relation to any particular incident is
whether the underlying conduct of hostility rules were fully respected. In
relation to the majority of controversial aerial bombardment incidents, where
persons or property attacked were clearly not per se legitimate targets, the
question is not target selection as such, but whether there is an IHL justification
for hitting what is, on its face, an unlawful target. Such justification may be
based, for example, on mistaken identity or proportionality.518 Among the
reported incidents of aerial bombardment that raise such questions are several
attacks on wedding parties, where reportedly traditional celebrations with
gunfire have been misinterpreted and led to multiple deaths.519 The pur-
ported justification in such cases may be mistaken identity as to the nature
of targets. Like the proportionality of any anticipated civilian losses, the
assessment of targets must be made in light of information available at the
time, taking into account the conditions of the conflict, though particularly
515 Professor M. Herold’s independent study on civilian casualties in Afghanistan, for example,
which was widely cited by the media, states that at least 3,767 civilians were killed by US
bombs between 7 October and 10 December, a figure which has recently been revised to
nearing 4,000. See ‘A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of
Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting’, most recent edition of study available at: http:/
/pubpages.unh.edu/%7Emwherold last visited 12 December 2012. A more conservative
report places the number of civilian deaths due to aerial bombardment between 1,000 and
1,300. See C. Conetta, ‘Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom
and the Afghanistan war’, Project on Defense Alternatives, 30 January 2002, available at:
http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf.
516 Following protests, principally by the Muslim community in the US, ‘Operation Infinite
Justice’ was renamed ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ on 25 September 2001.
517 According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), airstrikes
were responsible for 25% of all civilian casualties in 2008, and 63% of PGF-caused civilian
casualties; see ‘From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspective on Operations of Pro-Govern-
ment Forces in Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),
December 2008, p. 2, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/ 4a03f60e2.pdf.
518 At no time has it been the official policy of the Coalition to target civilians, and few
commentators would contend that attacks on civilians were intentional; the emphasis in
the following is thus on the more pertinent questions regarding the obligations in place
to safeguard the principle of distinction.
519 See Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Accountability for Civilian Deaths’; see also ‘From
Hope to Fear’, p. 12.
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over time a certain degree of local knowledge might reasonably be
assumed.520
In a number of cases, there were reportedly legitimate military targets in
the vicinity,521 and the question is whether there were sufficient attempts
to distinguish the two, the proportionality of foreseeable civilian losses as
against the military advantage anticipated, and whether all feasible steps were
taken to minimise such losses,522 including the use of methods and means
of warfare which are not inherently unreliable or indiscriminate but as precise
as possible, and which limit as much as possible collateral losses.523 While
the proportionality assessment is not a numbers game, involving simple
balancing of military casualties against numbers of civilians, in the presence
of heavy civilian casualties, a weighty onus rests with the party responsible
for ensuring compliance with IHL, and in possession of the relevant informa-
tion, to account for the lawfulness of the action. Contrary to suggestions that
have on occasion been made in the war on terror context, civilian losses might
be judged as excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage in the
particular situation (not the conflict as a whole).
Other types of targeting issues have arisen in the course of the Afghan
conflict, which involve conduct that is on its face plainly unlawful, apparently
caused by individual soldiers or groups acting without and beyond the scope
of their orders. Examples include egregious accounts in early 2012 of a ram-
page leading to the massacre of an Afghan family,524 or the burning of Korans
by soldiers,525 provoking tensions between the authorities and intervening
forces. Other examples include the incident in which a suicide attack blowing
up a US marine’s vehicle prompted indiscriminate shooting at vehicles and
pedestrians at the site of the attack and along the next 16 kilometres of road,
520 See ‘Afghanistan Civilian Casualties’ the Guardian, 12 April 2013. http://www.guardian.co.
uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics. For egs see
‘Afghanistan: New Civilian Deaths Due to U.S. Bombing’, 30 October 2001‘Afghanistan:
U.S. Bombs Kill Twenty-three Civilians: Rights Group Urges Immediate Investigation’, 26
October 2001, available at: http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/afghan1026.htm.
521 Where the military target was not hit, the question becomes accuracy and the considerations
are those in relation to error, set out below.
522 As noted above, the situation must be appraised from the point of view of the reasonable
commander at the time of the attack, taking into account conditions of conflict.
523 See this chapter, 6A.3.2. This may involve choosing to employ precision-guided weapons.
See HRW, ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues’, supra note 175.
524 T. Shah and G. Bowley, ‘An Afghan Comes Home to a Massacre’, International Herald
Tribune, 12 March 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/world/asia/us-
army-sergeant-suspected-in-afghanistan-shooting.html.
525 A. Rubin, ‘Afghan Protests Over the Burning of Korans at a U.S. Base Escalate’, International
Herald Tribune, 22 February 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/
world/asia/koran-burning-in-afghanistan-prompts-second-day-of-protests.html.
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resulting in multiple deaths and injuries.526 For these issues, the questions
that arise may be less legal questions regarding targeting and proportionality,
but rather how much is being done within the forces to prevent such incidents
and, most significantly, whether a thorough investigation and accountability
ensues.527
A final issue of continuing concern that emerged several years into the
military campaign in Afghanistan is the widespread resort to – and the handl-
ing of – night raids, which in many documented cases has lead to deaths of
civilian adults and children, and allegations of lack of cultural sensitivity on
one level and serious ill treatment on another. While the US has on occasion
admitted causing civilian deaths – including in one case of six children –
through night raids, it also engenders a particularly extreme lack of trans-
parency and accountability. It is reportedly often difficult to ascertain – at the
time, or after the fact – who the raiders are (some of whom are reportedly
private contractors) and under which authority they act, still less to obtain
investigation, redress or accountability.528 On the contrary, disclosed docu-
ments suggest that allegations of civilian deaths in Afghanistan have been met
with cover up from within the armed forces.529
6B.3.2 Methods and means: cluster bombs in Afghanistan
As noted in Part A, the use of weapons that are indiscriminate, or which cause
cruel and unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, is a violation of IHL.
The use of drones, and particular issues arising in the context of Afghanistan,
were addressed above.530
In the Afghan conflict, as in the Iraqi conflict that followed, particular
controversy has also surrounded the use of cluster bombs. It has been reported
that in the early part of Operation Enduring Freedom, between October and
the end of 2001, 1,210 cluster bombs were employed by allied forces in
526 See Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission – Investigation, ‘Use of indiscrim-
inate and excessive force against civilians by US forces following a VBIED attack in Nan-
gahar province on 4 March 2007, p. 1. The AIHRC investigation of the incident found that
the large majority, if not all of the victims were civilians. 12 people were killed and 35
injured, including several women and children.
527 See discussion on accountability, above.
528 A. Rubin, ‘U.S. Transfers Control of Night Raids to Afghanistan’, International Herald Tribune,
8 December 2012, available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/world/asia/deal-reached-on-
controversial-afghan-night-raids.html. See, e.g., ‘Alston Study on Targeted Killings’, supra
note 109.
529 D. Walsh, ‘Afghanistan war logs: How US marines sanitised record of bloodbath’, The




Afghanistan.531 Each aerial cluster bomb contains a significant amount of
smaller ‘bomblets’ which, when deployed, cover an extensive area.532 As the
framework section of this chapter indicates, cluster bombs are controversial
as they disperse submunitions over a wide area and cannot therefore be
directed with precision or confined within the parameters of a military
target.533 In Afghanistan UN reports give examples of US cluster bombs tar-
geting a military compound near the city of Herat, but striking only a mosque
used by the military but also a village some 500 to 1,000 metres away.534
Cluster bombs are also controversial for their initial failure rate; unsurprisingly
then, reports record bomblets lying dormant in Afghanistan long after military
attacks, until disturbed at some future point causing random civilian
deaths.535
Indications of shifting policy towards cluster bombs by the US in other
contexts536 did not lead to the avoidance of the use of these controversial
weapons in Afghanistan. As noted above, cluster bombs are of increasingly
doubtful legality.537 In respect of incidents where these controversial weapons
have been employed and heavy civilian casualties have resulted, the party
should bear the burden of justifying their use and demonstrating that the duty
of care to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons was satisfied.
Finally, other circumstances attending the use of such weapons compound
concerns as to unlawfulness. These are given dramatic illustration by the
statement issued by US ‘Psychological Operations’ to the people of Afghanistan
in 2001:
531 See Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the
United States in Afghanistan’, December 2002, available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2002/us-
afghanistan; HRW, ‘Cluster Bomblets’ supra note 173. The former notes that 1,228 cluster
bombs containing 248,056 bomblets were dropped during the aerial bombardment campaign
and the latter notes that in the first few weeks of November 2001, the US had deployed
350 cluster bombs. Human Rights Watch notes that the use of such weapons was more
restricted than in the past, and that their accuracy was improved by new technology, but
to an insufficient degree to alleviate concerns. See, however, Conetta, ‘Strange Victory’,
supra note 522.
532 For the controversy around the use of cluster bombs by the US military, see also ‘US Deploys
Controversial Weapon’, The Guardian, 12 October 2001, available at: http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2001/oct/12/afghanistan.terrorism7. The 1,210 cluster bomb units reportedly
deployed between October to December 2001 gave rise to the dispersal of a total of 244,420
bomblets. See further Conetta, ‘Strange Victory’, supra note 522.
533 See 6A.3.2 above.
534 See R. Norton-Taylor and R. Carroll, ‘US Cluster Bombing Provokes Anger’, The Guardian,
25 October 2001, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/25/afghanistan.
terrorism1.
535 See S. Goldenberg, ‘Long After the Air Raids, Bomblets Bring More Death’, The Guardian,
28 January 2002, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/28/ afghanistan.
suzannegoldenberg. See also Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Accountability for Civilian
Deaths’.
536 See statement regarding US policy in Bosnia, mentioned in Chapter 6A above.
537 See 6A.3.2 above.
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Noble Afghan people: as you know, the coalition countries have been air-dropping
daily humanitarian rations for you. The food ration is enclosed in yellow plastic
bags. They come in the shape of rectangular or long squares. The food inside the
bags is Halal and very nutritional ... In areas away from where food has been
dropped, cluster bombs will also be dropped. The colour of these bombs is also
yellow ... Do not confuse the cylinder-shaped bomb with the rectangular food
bag.538
In these circumstances it may be doubtful that the duty of care owed to the
civilian population has been discharged in respect of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding resort to the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan.
6B.3.3 Humanitarian protection of prisoners
It is perhaps surprising that many of the most controversial aspects of the
application of the IHL framework post 9/11 have arisen in relation to human-
itarian protection, designed to protect basic human dignity with which few
would take open exception.539 Yet questionable compliance with these norms
has arisen in many contexts post 9/11 including in relation to the detentions
in Guantanamo Bay, ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and torture by proxy
in multiple contexts worldwide, discussed elsewhere,540 as well as repeatedly
in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Many examples of the ill-treatment treatment of prisoners, disregarding
international humanitarian law, arise in the form of allegations of, inter alia,
summary executions, torture, sexual abuse and other forms of ill-treatment.
These issues have captured international attention most sharply – and graphic-
ally – in relation to the widely reported torture and mistreatment of prisoners
by US troops at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.541 Evidence has also emerged
538 US Psychological Operations Radio, 28 October 2001, quoted in BBC News, ‘Radio Warns
Afghans over Food Parcels’, 28 October 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/monitoring/media_reports/newsid_1624000/1624787.stm.
539 While the focus is on treatment of prisoners, many other humanitarian issues arise, such
as the obligations to allow humanitarian relief to affected civilians that has been criticised
by UN agencies and others which has been described as perhaps the most serious issue
of IHL compliance in relation to Afghanistan: S. Kapferer, ‘Ends and Means in Politics:
International Law as Framework for Political Decision-making’, in P. Eden and T. O’Donnell
(eds.), September 11, 2001: a Turning Point in International and Domestic Law (2005), pp. 25-84.
540 See Chapters 7B7, 8 and 10.
541 See, e.g., ‘America’s shame’, The Guardian, 1 May 2004, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2004/may/01/usa.iraq; S. Chan and M. Amon, ‘Prisoner Abuse Probe Widened.




recurrently of serious violations by or with the collusion of UK troops in
Iraq.542
In Afghanistan, reports of torture and ill treatment by the US relate to
interrogation techniques ranging from the issuance of death threats against
prisoners to the imposition of other forms of gross physical and psychological
duress. One early such case involved the widely reported allegations of ill
treatment of detainees in United States custody at the Baghram Air Base north
of Kabul.543 In December 2002, two men being held for questioning died in
circumstances where official autopsies concluded that they had suffered ‘blunt
force injuries’ and that their deaths were homicides;544 despite an official
undertaking to investigate the matter, no information was made public.545
As information on extraordinary renditions emerged, the involvement of this
and other Afghan detentions centres as one of the stations for torture and ill-
treatment has also became clear.546
Other examples of mistreatment relate to abysmal conditions of detention
and transfer, resulting in death and serious injuries at the hand of the Northern
Alliance.547 Numerous allegations have emerged of the extra-judicial ex-
ecution of prisoners by Northern Alliance fighters.548 These allegations high-
light particular issues that arise in respect of irregular forces, such as the
Northern Alliance, and the legal relationship between those acts and the US
542 See e.g. ‘British personnel reveal horrors of secret US base in Baghdad’, Guardian 1 April
2013 accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/01/camp-nama-iraq-human-
rights-abuses last viewed 27 April 2013 on torturous interrogation techniques in a camp
run by the US but with the involvement of the UK. On allegations concerning UK troops
see e.g.. ‘High Court Challenge over Iraqi Civilian Deaths’, The Guardian, 28 July 2004,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1270930,00.html; see also Baha
Mousa Public Inquiry Report, available at: www.bahamousainquiry.com and Chapter 7B7.
543 See S. Goldenberg, ‘CIA Accused of Torture at Baghram Base’, The Guardian, 27 December
2002, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/dec/27/usa.afghanistan;T.
Wagner, ‘Amnesty Criticizes U.S. for Afghan Deaths’, Associated Press, 30 November 2003.
544 D. Campbell, ‘Afghan Prisoners Beaten to Death at US Military Interrogation Base. “Blunt
Force Injuries” Cited In Murder Ruling’, The Guardian, 7 March 2003, available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/07/usa.afghanistan. See also J. Turley, ‘Rights on
the Rack. Alleged Torture in Terror War Imperils U.S. Standards of Humanity’, Los Angeles
Times, 6 March 2003 and C. Gall, ‘U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody’,
New York Times, 4 March 2003, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/06/
opinion/oe-turley6.
545 See Chapter 7.B.14.
546 See Chapter 10.
547 See ‘Slow Death on the Jail Convoy of Misery,’ Daily Telegraph, 19 March 2002, available
at:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1388204/Slow-death-
on-the-jail-convoy-of-misery.html, on hundreds of deaths due to transporting Taleban
prisoners for days in crammed freight containers, without sufficient air.
548 See e.g. R. McCarthy and N. Watt, ‘Alliance accused of brutality in capture of Kunduz’,
The Guardian, 27 November 2001, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/
nov/27/afghanistan.rorymccarthy; L. Harding and R. McCarthy, ‘Hundreds of Pakistanis
Believed Massacred’, The Guardian, 13 November 2001, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2001/nov/13/pakistan.afghanistan.
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and its allies in Afghanistan. The US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has
stated that US policy has been to ‘have the forces on the ground that have been
opposing the Taliban and Al-Qaida take prisoners themselves and then allow
us to do whatever interrogating might be appropriate’.549
Executions, torture and ill-treatment do not raise complex legal questions
regarding the application of the IHL framework. If established, they are
straightforwardly violations of IHL. In light of parallel allegations arising from
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, others have emerged as
to these practices revealing a systematic policy of encouraging, justifying and/
or turning a blind eye to, such abuse.550 Questions arise regarding criminal
responsibility of those that ordered or, under the doctrine of superior respons-
ibility, failed to prevent such practices may also arise, though with little effect
on accountability thus far.551 At an absolute minimum, questions arose as
to whether those in positions of responsibility are doing sufficient to discharge
their duty to ensure that their troops respect IHL, and the extent of ‘institutional
and personal responsibility’ at ‘high levels’.552 Likewise, the ‘message’ sent
to those on the ground, including through memoranda of legal advice advo-
cating the lawfulness of measures amounting to torture or ill-treatment, provide
a veneer of legitimacy to plainly unlawful behaviour.553 Similar questions
arise with renewed intensity in relation to those one step removed, whether
irregulars such as the Northern Alliance or private foreign contractors and
security companies active in Afghanistan,554 who lack much of the training
and preparation enjoyed by regular troops, but who nonetheless are invited
to act in consort with coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Finally, questions relate to respect for the broader responsibility incumbent
on other states party to the Geneva Conventions, as a result of the positive
duties to ensure respect for IHL.555 This implies a duty to refrain from colla-
borating and cooperating with those that flout IHL standards, and a duty to
549 Department of Defence, News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, 26 Novem-
ber 2001, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/g011126-D-6570C.html.
550 See Chapter 7B7.
551 On individual responsibility for ordering, aiding and abetting or for failure of superiors
to take reasonable measures to prevent serious violations of IHL, see Chapter 4A1.2. See
Chapter 7B14.
552 See, e.g., the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations,
the ‘Shlessinger report’, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824
finalreport.pdf, on ‘both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels’ for Abu
Ghraib. The ICC prosecutor’s office annual report of 2012 notes allegations in relation to
the situation in Afghanistan.
553 See, e.g., M. Mazzetti and S. Shane, ‘Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A.’,
The New York Times, 17 April 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/
politics/17detain.html.
554 Swisspeace Report, infra 565, on the US military working with an estimated 2-3,000 former
Afghan militia fighters as auxiliaries and the influx of private security companies in a range
of non-combat roles, including intelligence, interrogation and surveillance; see Chapter 33.2.
555 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, see Chapter 3.31.
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make reasonable inquiries into the activities of potential allies before forging
alliances; the duty plainly cannot be reconciled with the formation of alliances
with notorious leaders, renowned for past violations, as in Afghanistan.556
6B.3.4 Transparency, inquiry and accountability?
Assessing the lawfulness of many of these controversial measures highlighted
above depends on information, including of an intelligence nature, to which
the public does not, generally, have access. This was particularly so during
a military campaign that was characterised by a relative lack of transparency,
both in terms of information briefings from the states involved and the absence
of media on the territory of the conflict.557 In such circumstances, and in the
face of widespread casualties, the onus shifts to the responsible armed forces
to demonstrate that the prerequisites of IHL were satisfied in the particular
case.
It has been noted that in the putative war on terror “one of the greatest
challenges in the analysis of this conflict stems from the lack of available
information about virtually every aspect under examination.”558 Calls for
explanations and, as appropriate, independent inquiries into apparent viola-
tions have often gone unheeded, or met with responses that have been
criticised as tardy and inadequate.559 In one exceptional case, following the
deaths of prisoners in US custody at the Baghram Air Base in Afghanistan,
the US authorities stated that an inquiry would be conducted,560 but the pro-
gress or findings of the investigation were then never made public, despite
repeated requests for a full and public criminal investigation and explana-
556 See, e.g., ‘Slow Death on the Jail Convoy of Misery’, supra note 547 reporting that ‘the
captors owe allegiance to Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum, the northern warlord whose men
committed similar atrocities in 1997’.
557 The Afghan conflict contrasts unfavourably in this respect with the Kosovo campaign of
1999, wherein NATO held daily briefings, and the Iraq conflict where media presence was
considerable. See Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Accountability for Civilian Deaths’,
supra note 501 (describing as ‘disturbing’ the lack of public information, and noting the
lack of access given to impartial observers).
558 Lubell, ‘The War (?) against al Qaeda’, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification
of Conflicts, supra note 6, p. 451.
559 See ‘From Hope to Fear’, supra note 517, emphasizing the lack of transparency and im-
portance of accountability. On threats against journalists who sought to investigate indis-
criminate civilian deaths, see Targeting Civilians, above.
560 Chapter 7B.14.
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tion.561 Reports also suggest cover-up operations including threats to journal-
ists in an attempt to suppress information.562
In turn, as discussed in other chapters, the Obama administrations consist-
ently oppose judicial oversight of its conduct in Afghanistan, through habeas
corpus review, on the basis that ‘federal courts should not thrust themselves
into the extraordinary role of reviewing the military’s conduct of active hostil-
ities.’563 It has employed this rationale in relation to persons not detained
in Afghanistan in relation to that conflict at all (but captured elsewhere and
transferred in to a situation of unlawful detention), a fact which the govern-
ment in its pleadings describes as ‘immaterial’.564
The responsibility of states, parties to the conflict and individuals should
be given effect in respect of crimes and violations in Afghanistan. The land-
scape for responsibility and accountability was complicated – whether deliber-
ately or not – by the multiple actors, including non-state armed groups, private
security companies565 and intelligence agencies of various states566 engaged
in detention and alleged ill-treatment in Afghanistan.
Accountability has been identified as a key concern in Afghanistan,567
yet this area remains much neglected in Afghanistan as in the putative ‘war
with al Qaeda’ more broadly.568 The Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial
Summary or Arbitrary Executions has reiterated obligations to respect, and
ensure respect of, IHL, which entail an obligation effectively to investigate
suspected violations, using impartial and independent procedures, and to
prosecute and punish violations:
... the support of both the people in Afghanistan and the international community
is dependent upon a sense that the international forces are doing what they think
the people of Afghanistan should be doing – being held to account.569
561 See e.g. also Wagner, ‘Amnesty Criticizes U.S.’
562 The AIHRP condemned the refusal to provide information or access to the site in the
aftermaths of the attack by US marines following the suicide attack, and journalists being
threatened and forced to delete all pictures and videos they had taken; see Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission, supra note 534.
563 US Justice Department response to the habeas motion of al Bakri, 8 September 2008, cited
in Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001-2010’, supra note 334, p. 268. See more detail on the case
in Chapter 11.
564 Ibid.
565 See generally, ‘Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An exploratory study
of Afghanistan and Angola’, Swisspeace, Ulrike Joras and Adrian Schuster (eds.), 2008 and
Chapter 3.3.2.
566 Philip Alston noted that ‘[t]hese issues of accountability are exacerbated by the operation
of forces within this country that are not accountable to any military but appear to be
controlled by foreign intelligence services’. See P. Alston, ‘Press Statement’.
567 See Alston, ‘Press Statement’; see also ‘From Hope to Fear’.
568 On measures of accountability thus far see Ch. 7.14.
569 See Alston, ‘Press Statement’.
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6B.4 CONCLUSION
By suggesting that the ‘war on terror’ is an armed conflict of global reach,
of which Afghanistan was but a part, the implication is that the rules of IHL
applicable in armed conflict govern all aspects of the counter-terrorist measures
taken post September 11. This chapter has addressed how the ‘war on terror’
may include the military action taken in Afghanistan, but it certainly goes far
beyond armed conflict in any legal sense. While the Afghan and Iraq interven-
tions led to armed conflicts between identifiable parties, with identifiable end
points, neither the September 11 attacks nor the subsequent multi-faceted fight
against terrorism meets the legal criteria of armed conflict.
The proposition that there is an armed conflict between states and al-Qaeda
has been as tenaciously defended by the US since 9/11 as it has been increas-
ingly robustly rejected by other international actors. The result is a regrettable
transatlantic rift of significant proportions and import, on the fundamental
question of whether and when the armed conflict paradigm applies. The
question of the existence and scope of armed conflicts post-9/11 is critical and
defining. It underpins the proper identification of the legal framework, an
essential precursor to its observance. IHL has been relied upon to apply to
situations beyond genuine armed conflicts, with an impact on other areas of
law, notably human rights law addressed in the following chapter. Its content
has been overstretched to purportedly justify exceptional powers, then under-
applied by ignoring the responsibilities that IHL imports.
Despite occasional and surprising assertions by the US of a new conflict
paradigm garnering international acceptance, it is highly doubtful in light of
the schism in practice and approaches to the law, that the international legal
framework has been transformed as regards the definition of conflict or the
emergence of new categories of conflict.570 The practice explored in this chap-
ter has undoubtedly fostered acute international attention to the legal frame-
work, and development on certain aspects may well unfold over time. Areas
of intense debate and potential future development that have been highlighted
include certain issues around classification of conflicts,571 whether persons
can be targeted on the basis of their membership of an armed group that does
constitute a party to a non-international conflict, the scope of ‘direct participa-
tion in hostilities,’ novel issues emerging from the specific nature of drone
technology,572 as well as some issues concerning the inter-relationship
between IHL and human rights law in the next chapter.573
570 See Part A ‘The Legal Framework’ for a discussion on how the legal framework changes.
E. Wilmshurt, ‘Conclusions’, in Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts,
supra note 6, pp. 499-501.
571 Chapter 6A1.1.2.
572 Chapter 6B.2.2 on drones, above.
573 Chapter 7B.3 on the Interplay between IHL and IHRL.
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There can be little doubt that IHL has been shaken and undermined post
9/11, including by assertions that the legal framework is quaint and outmoded,
ill-equipped to address the ‘new challenges’ and the ‘new kind of war’. The
examination of the legal framework set out in this chapter casts doubt on that
proposition.
IHL allows for the use of force against non-state actors when they engage
in an armed conflict, but a high threshold is deliberately placed on when such
a conflict arises, given the profound implications on international norms and
human peace and security. Where an armed group, whether using the name
of al-Qaeda or another, meets the criteria of party to conflict and engages in
hostilities in any particular part of the world, IHL may well govern. On the
facts available, however, the legal criteria is simply not met for an armed
conflict, still less one of global reach, with ‘al Qaeda and associates.’ Likewise,
the manufacture of the enemy combatant criteria with its broad reaching
implications is not the result of a gap in the law: IHL envisages and provides
for unprivileged belligerents, for example, and provides rules consistent with
the principles of IHL.574 If individual members of terrorist groups take up
arms in an armed conflict, IHL provides rules on their status, the scope of the
right to target them, the possibility of prosecuting them, and their treatment
upon detention.575 The persistence of torture and ill-treatment contrasts to
uncontroversial clarity as regards the legal framework governing humanitarian
protections.
The challenge that emerges appears to be less related to the adequacy of
the legal framework as to the refusal to be constrained by its terms, or to apply
it consistently – and not only (in the words of then US president Bush) to the
extent deemed ‘appropriate’ or ‘consistent with military necessity’ by the state
itself.576 While there are areas of legitimate dispute as regards the legal frame-
work, and areas where it will continue to develop in the future, in part in
response to the practice of the war on terror, there is an abundance of viola-
tions of the letter and the spirit of IHL the war on terror. The full impact of
novel approaches to the use of IHL as justifications for conduct – such as its
approach to detention or treatment of ‘enemy combatants’, drone killing of
alleged terrorists anywhere in the world or targeting so called ‘nexus targets’ –
remains to be seen. The potential for war on terror practices to be replicated
elsewhere is already clear.577
574 Pejic, ‘“Unlawful/Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations and Consequences’, supra note 256,
p. 341.
575 Chapter B.2.1 ‘Enemy Combatants’, above.
576 See, e.g., Bush’s order that the Geneva Conventions would be applied ‘ the extent appro-
priate’. ‘Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees’, supra note 117.
577 Eg. ‘enemy combatant’ nomenclature being used elsewhere, see e.g. calls for the Boston
bomber in 2013 to be held as an enemy combatant, rejected by the US government; see
debate at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/04/23/boston-bomber-acted-as-
enemy-combatant, visited 30 April 2013. Eg drones and targeted killings by the US and
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Allegations of violations have been coupled by the failure to conduct
thorough investigations and, subject to genuine and compelling security
concerns, to make the findings of such investigations public, to restore the
national and international confidence in the lawfulness and hence legitimacy
of military action. Critical questions moving forward will be the commitment
of states parties – those directly responsible and others – to ensure that effective
measures are taken to avoid repetition and to hold to account those individuals
directly and indirectly responsible for IHL violations amounting to war crimes.
Several concluding distinctions may be worthy of emphasis as regards the
unravelling of the relationship between IHL and terrorism. First, the terrorist
label, always of doubtful relevance in international law given the ambiguity
surrounding its meaning and scope, is not legally significant, still less decisive,
to the application of IHL.578 To assess the existence of an armed conflict and
application of IHL, the question is not whether there can be a conflict with
‘terrorist’ organisations in abstracto but whether, in relation to a particular and
defined set of facts, the requirements regarding use of force and nature of the
parties are met.579
Second, organisations labelled terrorist may well constitute parties to a
conflict, as the Lebanon conflict showed, but the assessment has to be case-by-
case in light of the evolving facts concerning the nature of particular groups
and particular situations of violence. Criminal networks, like any other groups
of individuals, may become involved in an armed conflict by fighting alongside,
or in connection with, a party that meets the criteria set out above.580 Only
very exceptionally will financial or political support by terrorist organisations
render them participants in the armed conflict. The resort to armed force, even
of a significant scale, does not constitute armed conflict despite the challenges
that it poses, some of which may be comparable to armed conflict. IHL is not
the legal framework governing organised criminal activity beyond armed
conflict, which the human rights and criminal law frameworks were intended
to address.
Third, where there is an armed conflict, state or non-state parties to it may
be responsible for ‘terrorism’581 or conduct that may be considered to exploit
Israel being relied upon in Russian, at 6B.2.2, above. Eg resort to military commissions
being relied upon by President Mubarak of Egypt, Chapter 8.
578 See 6A.1: in conflict situations, one party may not infrequently refer to another as a terrorist
or as resorting to terror tactics, while many deny the existence of NIACs within their state,
preferring to label it terrorism. This does not preclude the application of IHL.
579 The question, as sometimes posed, whether there can be an armed conflict with a ‘terrorist’
organisation is not therefore the most helpful and cannot be answered in the abstract.
580 See, e.g., the Afghan conflict in which components of al-Qaeda appear to have fought with
the Taleban. See ‘Active and Direct Participation’ in Hostilities, Section A above
581 Article 33(1) GC IV on collective penalties and prohibits ‘all measures ... of terrorism’ against
civilians, while the Additional Protocols I and II prohibit ‘[a]cts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population’; Article 51(2)
AP I; Article 13(2) AP II; Galić, supra note 117.
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‘terrorist’ tactics, under IHL, such as attacks against civilians or civilian
objects582 or perfidy.583 However, the commission of ‘terrorism’ by parties
to a conflict should not be confused with the key question whether particular
groups meet the necessary criteria to constitute parties to a conflict in the first
place.
In conclusion, great emphasis has been placed by some on the novel
features of the international landscape post 9/11 with particular emphasis on
the new kind of war raising new kinds of challenges. Implicitly and explicitly,
the relevance of IHL and its capacity to meet the challenges of contemporary
conflict has been attacked following 9/11. Debate around the need, or not,
to revise IHL has consumed considerable attention. To the extent that this leads
to clarifying the content of IHL content, it may yet prove of long-term benefit.
However, considered reflection by international experts has tended to reject
the idea that 9/11 or its aftermath reveal the need for radical revision of
IHL.584 Behind the smoke screen the real challenges continue to lurk, only
reinforced by the putative ‘wars’ on terror or on al-Qaeda and associates, which
relate not to the normative content of IHL but to the need to strengthen the
effectiveness of its implementation.
582 AP I, Article 85.
583 Article 37 AP I. The ICRC Report on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note
48, p. 7, notes that ‘suicide actions’ against civilians are prohibited. Attacks in which
individuals engaging in hostilities pose as civilians, of which numerous examples emerge
post 9/11, amount to perfidy, and the use of human shields, for example, is also prohibited.
584 See Schrijver and Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations’, supra note 74; ‘ICRC Report
on IHL and Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra note 48; Wilmshurst, International Law
and the Classification of Conflicts, supra note 6, p. 500 (discussing specifically classification
of conflicts); ICJ Eminent Jurists panel 2009; Dutch Advisory Report on Drones, note 362;
B Emmerson, Interim Report on Drones, September 2013.
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The epithet ‘subversive’ had such a vast and unpredictable reach, the
struggle against the ‘subversive’ had turned into a demential generalized
repression with the drift that characterizes the hunting of witches and
the possessed.
(National Commission on the Disappeared, Argentina, 1984)1
Defending human rights ... is a prerequisite to every aspect of any
effective counter-terrorism strategy. It is the bond that brings the differ-
ent components together. That means the human rights of all – of the
victims of terrorism, of those suspected of terrorism, of those affected
by the consequences of terrorism.
(UN Secretary General, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Launch 2006)2
The starting point for an analysis of international human rights law (IHRL)
is the principle of universality: human rights stem from the intrinsic value
or the inherent dignity of the human being, irrespective of nationality, status,
or indeed alleged wrong-doing. In this vein, as the German Constitutional
Court has noted, ‘dignity is not therefore at the disposal of the individual,’3
just as it is not at the disposal of the state. Rather, IHRL at its core seeks to
ensure a basic standard of protection for all human beings at all times, in all
places. It becomes more critical, not redundant, in the face of situations of
crisis.
Much state practice post-9/11 has challenged this fundamental premise
of the universality of human rights law, as will be seen in Part B. An exception-
1 Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), Nunca Mas: The Report
of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (1984).
2 UN Secretary General address on the launch of United Against Terrorism: Recommendations
for a Global Counter-terrorism Strategy, 2 May 2006, available at: http://www.un.org/
unitingagainstterrorism/sgstatement.html.
3 BVerfGE 45, 187, 229 (1977); see J. Eckert, ‘Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law’,
in D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), p. 148.
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alist approach has emerged recurrently, questioning the ‘applicability’ of the
human rights framework (whether it is applicable at all, rather than simply
as to how it applies) to certain classes of individuals, offshore locations, in a
‘war’ on terror, or in security challenged situations more broadly. Likewise,
the pitting of ‘security’ against ‘human rights,’ or resort to the war paradigm,
has at times brought into question the very relevance of human rights in the
face of international terrorism, and questioned how apt or well equipped the
human rights framework is to adjust and respond to security challenges.
The legal framework of IHRL set out in Part A of this chapter will address
various ways in which the security versus human rights dichotomy is a false
one. It addresses the inherent flexibility of the human rights framework to
adjust to and accommodate the exigencies of international terrorism. It will
discuss how the effective prevention and punishment of terrorism is itself a
human rights obligation, though the legitimacy, and ultimately effectiveness,
of measures taken as part of a counter-terrorism policy depends on them being
discharged within the human rights and rule of law framework set out in the
remainder of this chapter. Most if not all human rights can be implicated in
counter-terrorism, and the chapter will describe the legal framework in relation
to a broad range of specific rights, in light of a detailed body of law developed
through the application of human rights law in situations of terrorism over
many years and across continents – from Chechnya to Colombia, Turkey to
Egypt, Ireland to Sri Lanka, and far beyond.
Part B will consider the extent to which this framework has been applied
in practice, and the implications for respect for human rights and the rule of
law in the fight against terrorism since 9/11. It will focus on three overarching
issues: challenges to the geographic scope of application of IHRL; the conflictive
but evolving relationship between ‘security’ and human rights; and the impact
of the ‘war’ rhetoric on human rights, including challenging issues of interplay
between IHRL and IHL that arise in the few genuine armed conflict situations.
Part B also highlights many of the specific issues that have arisen in counter-
terrorism practice, from targeted killings, torture and terror blacklists to
deportations, deprivations of liberty and data-retention. This chapter should
be read alongside the case study chapters that analyse in more depth the
human rights implications of Guantánamo Bay (Chapter 8), the killing of
Osama bin Laden (Chapter 9), extraordinary rendition (Chapter 10), and the
chapter on the role of the courts in responding to human rights claims in the
war on terror (Chapter 11).
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7A THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
7A.1 LEGAL BASICS: SOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW4
The basic rules of IHRL are, for the most part, straightforward. They are found
first in international and regional treaties that bind those states parties to them.
Ratification of or accession to human rights treaties is widespread; for example,
at the time of writing there are 167 states parties to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), including the US (the driving force behind
the ‘war on terror’), most of its major allies and the states on whose territories
it has been carried out, while 160 states have ratified the sister International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).5 Regional human
rights treaties also enjoy widespread ratifications, comprising the majority of
states within Europe,6 Africa7 and the Americas.8 In addition to these general
human rights treaties are others on the international and regional levels that
protect specific groups of persons,9 such as the Convention to Eliminate All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or address specific viola-
4 See Chapter 1.2.1.
5 For the status of ratifications of the main UN human rights conventions, see Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Treaties Collection, available at:
www.treaties.un.org. The US, UK, Afghanistan and Iraq are all parties for example, as are
most states on whose territories rendition and targeted killings have occurred, including
Pakistan, which ratified on 23 June 2010.
6 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is binding
on all 47 states of the Council of Europe (CoE). See Council of Europe, European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos.
11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 [hereinafter ‘ECHR’]. For other CoE treaties, see http://
conventions.coe.int.
7 The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), adopted
27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982),, entered
into force 21 October 1986, is binding on 53 African states. For other African human rights
treaties, see http://www.achpr.org/instruments.
8 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) is ratified by 24 states of the Americas.
In addition, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, approved by the
Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948, although initially intended to
be non-binding, has been found to be ‘indirectly binding’; see, e.g., James Terry Roach and
Jay Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Res. 3/87, 22 September 1987, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Annual Report 1986-87, p. 147, at p. 165 and Certain
Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-13/93,
16 July 1993, Inter-american Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Series A, No. 13, paras. 42-5,
referring to the Declaration as a source of ‘international obligations’.
9 These include the: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, New York, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (hereinafter ‘CEDAW’), ratified by
187 states; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS
44, ratified by 193 states; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),
3 May 2008, 2512 UNTS 3, ratified by 137 states by Sept. 2013. For a current list of countries
and ratification dates, see http://treaties.un.org.
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tions, such as the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance.10 States that have signed but not ratified a
convention (for example the US with the ACHR or ICESCR) are not legally bound
by it; however, they undertake to act in good faith, and not inconsistently with
its spirit.11 Moreover, binding treaty provisions are supplemented by the many
so-called ‘soft law’ standards of relevance to terrorism and human rights,
contained in, for example, resolutions of the UN General Assembly or standards
elaborated by other international or regional bodies.12 In addition, the UN
Charter, binding on all 193 UN member states,13 might itself be seen (albeit
not exclusively) as ‘a human rights instrument imposing human rights obliga-
10 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
20 December 2006, adopted by UN GA Res. 61/177 on 12 January 2007. 34 parties have
ratified and 94 parties have signed this convention. For a list of all parties and signatories,
see http://treaties.un.org.
11 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27, 1155 UNTS 331,
8 ILM 679 (1969), 63 AJIL 875 (1969), at Article 18 [hereinafter ‘VCLT’].
12 While not binding per se, they give more detailed expression to some of the binding pre-
scriptions and prohibitions of international law and may reflect customary law, see Chapter
1.2.1.3. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is foremost among the non-treaty
instruments. Others of relevance to human rights and the ‘war on terror’ include the: UN
‘Code of Conduct For Law Enforcement Officials’, UN GA Res. 34/169, 17 December 1979,
UN Doc. A/RES/34/169 (1979); Turku Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards,
Helsinki, 2 December 1990, reprinted in the Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-sixth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1995/116 (1995); Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emerg-
ency, International Law Association (1984), reprinted in 79 AJIL 1072 (1985); UN Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
UN GA Res. 43/173, 9 December 1988, UN Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988); Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1955), UN Doc. A/CONF/611 (1955), annex I;
approved by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July
1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,
Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 26
August to 6 September 1985, UN Doc. A/CONF121/22/Rev.1, 59 and UN GA Res. 40/146,
13 December 1985; UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, 29 November 1985, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34 (1985); Proclamation of
Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April
to 13 May 1968, UN Doc. A/CONF32/41 (1968); The Johannesburg Principles on National
Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39
(1996) (‘Johannesburg Principles’); Special Rapporteur’s report on ‘Framework Principles
for securing the accountability of public officials for gross or systematic human rights
violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorism initiatives’, UN Doc. A/HRC/
22/52 (1 March 2013); Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information,
12 June 2013, (the ‘Tshwane Principles’), endorsed by, e.g., the European Parliamentary
Assembly on 20 Oct 2013, and multiple reports of UN special rapporteurs, working groups
and experts referred to in this study.
13 See Member States of the United Nations, available at: www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
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tions’14 in that it stipulates ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion’ as one of the underlying purposes of the United
Nations.15 Article 1 ensures that both human rights and security should be
understood as purposes underpinning the UN system.16
Alongside treaty provisions is customary international law, which obliges
all states, regardless of whether they have ratified a relevant international or
regional treaty, to respect certain rights and freedoms17 In the case of inter-
national human rights law, and humanitarian law, it has been suggested that
the extent of consistent, ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ practice is not as
important as in some other areas, and that opinio juris of states plays a much
greater role.18 The fact that in some countries there may be daily occurrences
of torture, arbitrary detention and extra-judicial killings does not preclude
the existence of customary international human rights norms as these acts,
while practiced, are universally regarded as unlawful.19
The question whether particular rights are sufficiently supported by state
practice and opinio juris to have passed into customary law is the subject of
much debate.The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the US,
for example, includes prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrim-
ination, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extra-judicial
executions and causing the disappearance of individuals as prohibited in
customary law.20 The significance of the debate is, however, diminished by
the fact that so many states have ratified relevant treaties, and customary
international law is therefore often referred to simply to underscore the uni-
versality of those obligations. But in certain instances it may arise that a state
is not bound by the relevant treaty law or, as discussed below, seeks to ‘de-
14 See B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 92-3; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 532.
15 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, at Article 1(3)
and Articles 55 and 56.
16 The Charter makes provision for the role of the UN in the collective enforcement of inter-
national security however, that are not matched for human rights enforcement. See Chap-
ter 5.
17 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 43; Chapter 1.2.
18 This may be expressed through statements, e.g., in international organisations or by ratifying
a treaty; see generally, T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as International Customa-
ry Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
19 See the approach of the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. See also R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law
and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 19-22.
20 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), section 702.
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rogate’ from its terms or to question its applicability in certain situations,21
and customary status must be assessed to determine which norms are binding
nonetheless.22 It may also be of particular significance in states where custom-
ary – as opposed to treaty – law forms part of domestic law.
Also relevant to our current enquiry is the fact that some of these custom-
ary norms are additionally accepted and recognised as having attained the
status of jus cogens. As such, the obligation cannot be deviated from in any
circumstances, and cannot be changed through shifting state practice as other
customary norms can; instead it can only be overridden by the establishment
of another jus cogens norm.23 Any assessment of the impact of counter-terror-
ism practice on changing law must bear in mind the peremptory status of
certain human rights. Some suggest that these rights largely reflect the core
non-derogable rights in the ICCPR (discussed below),24 and others the shorter
list of non-derogable rights common to the ‘three major human rights
treaties’.25 The US Restatement of Foreign Relations law includes, as a mini-
21 For example, the position of the US is that the ICCPR does not apply extra-territorially
or in the context of an armed conflict, as discussed in Part 7B2 and 3. See, e.g., Second and
Third Periodic Report of the United States of America to the UN Committee on Human
Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Annex
I: Territorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm; Fourth Periodic Report of the
United States of America to the UN Committee on Human Rights Concerning the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/
rls/179781.htm. The US submitted additional information: U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Comments by the Government of the United States of America on the Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/REV.1/ADD.1 (2
Feb. 2008). In its One Year Follow Up report, it provided limited information on issues
arising extra-territorially as ‘a courtesy to the Committee while maintaining that the ICCPR
does not apply’. See generally UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.
22 See 7A.3 in this chapter, noting that derogations from treaty provisions are allowed in
situations of emergency, but states remain bound by custom; see also 7A.3.2.1 in this chapter.
23 See VCLT, supra note 9 at Article 53, which defines jus cogens as ‘a peremptory norm of
general international law ... a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.
24 See Lillich, ‘Civil Rights’, p. 118, fn. 17. The Human Rights Committee, General Comment
No. 29, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 11 August 2001, p. 186, para. 11 notes that
‘[t]he proclamation of certain provisions of the Covenant as being of a non-derogable nature
... is to be seen partly as recognition of the peremptory nature of some fundamental rights
ensured in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g., Articles 6 and 7). However, it is apparent
that some other provisions of the Covenant were included in the list of non-derogable
provisions because it can never become necessary to derogate from these rights during
a state of emergency (e.g., Arts. 11 and 18).’
25 J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During
States of Emergency (Washington, 1994), p. 67 suggests the minimal standard of non-derogable
rights common to the specified conventions covers life, freedom from torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment, slavery and the prohibition of retrospective
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mum, extra-judicial killings, disappearance of individuals, torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and prolonged arbitrary
detention.26 The International Law Commission lists, inter alia, the prohibitions
of aggression, crimes against humanity, torture, apartheid, the basic rules of
humanitarian law in armed conflict and the right to self determination as being
generally accepted as norms from which no derogation is permitted,27 while
the Human Rights Committee adds ‘collective punishments, through arbitrary
deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair
trial.’28 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and several special
rapporteurs have added their support to the view that arbitrary deprivation
of liberty violates jus cogens norms in light of abusive detention practices in
recent years.29
These international norms are accompanied by what might loosely be
termed mechanisms of enforcement. One group of mechanisms are the ‘treaty
bodies’ charged with overseeing the application of their particular constituent
treaty. There are a growing number of such courts or bodies, and examples
of them (and the Conventions which they interpret and seek to give effect to)
include the following: the Human Rights Committee (under the ICCPR), the
UN Committee against Torture (under the CAT), the Committee on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (under the ICESCR),30 the European Court of Human
Rights (under the ECHR), the Inter-American Commission and Court (in relation
to the ACHR, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man)
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and nascent
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (in relation to the ACHPR).31 The
functions of these bodies vary, but commonly they provide a forum (in respect
of states that have accepted their jurisdiction) for individual cases to be brought
alleging violations of human rights,32 as well as often having a broader func-
legislation.
26 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), section 702.
27 See ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Responsibility, Introductory Commentary to
Part Two, Ch. III. It also includes genocide, slavery and racial discrimination.
28 General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, para. 11.
29 Deliberation No. 9, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 24 Dec. 2012,
UN Doc. A/HRC/22/44; Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention
in the Context of Countering Terrorism (‘UN Joint Study’), 19 February 2010, UN Doc. A/
HRC/13/42.
30 An Optional Protocol (UN GA Res, A/RES/63/117 (2008), HRC Resolution 8/2) of 18 June
2008 provides the Committee competence to receive and consider communications.
31 Articles 28 ff. ICCPR; Article 19 ECHR; Article 33 ACHR; Article 17 CEDAW and the
Optional Protocol; and Article 43 CRC.
32 For example, in the Inter-American system individuals petition the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, which may take the case before the Court. Article 5(3) of the Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Burkina Faso, 8-10 June 1998), provides for individual
petition where the State against which the complaint is lodged has made a declaration
accepting the competence of the Court to hear individual claims. Since the introduction
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tion in promoting legal standards and monitoring specific situations.33 Some
of them have the power to issue decisions that states are legally obliged to
follow: the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights or African Court on Justice and Human Rights are
binding on the parties to the ECHR or states which have accepted the juris-
diction of the Inter-American or African Courts, respectively. By contrast, the
decisions of the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
have traditionally been considered authoritative but not legally binding,
although the approach to this question may be evolving through juris-
prudence.34 However, the critical importance of the determinations of each
of the above mechanisms lies in the fact that they provide authoritative inter-
pretations of the treaties in question, which clearly are binding on states parties
to them.
Proposals for a treaty establishing an international human rights court have
not borne fruit,35 and a major challenge remains the patchy competence of
– and victims’ access to – these mechanisms, which are generally dependent
on ratification of particular treaties and/or the state accepting the jurisdiction
of the mechanism. For example, the ability of victims to challenge violations
by the US is limited because it has not accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR36
or the Human Rights Committee, as required for those bodies to receive
individual petitions, though the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(ACommHR) has found it has inherent jurisdiction to consider violations of
the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights. The absence of an Asian
or Middle Eastern mechanism limits the effectiveness of human rights enforce-
ment against many Asian and Middle Eastern states in respect of their activities
of Protocol 11, individuals can institute cases directly before the ECtHR.
33 See, e.g., the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee, or its observations on
country reports, referred to later in this chapter.
34 The Human Rights Committee has indicated that respect for interim measures is obligatory:
see, e.g., M. Dante Piandiong, M. Jesus Morallos and M. Archie Bulan v. Philippines (Comm.
No. 869/1999), decision of 19 October 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999, paras.
5.1, 5.2 and 5.4; Denzil Roberts v. Barbados (Comm. No. 504/992), decision of 19 July 1994,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/504/1992, para. 6.3; Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 17
September 1997, para. 80.
35 See, e.g., M. Nowak, J. Kozma, and M. Scheinin, ‘A World Court of Human Rights – Con-
solidated Draft Statute and Commentary’, May 2012, available at: http://www.eui.eu/
Documents/Law/Professors/Scheinin/ConsolidatedWorldCourtStatute.pdf. There appears
little international appetite for a world human rights court. On treaty-body reform, see,
e.g., http://www.ishr.ch/document-stuff/browse-documents/doc_download/1463-report-of-
the-second-consultation-with-states-parties.
36 The US has not ratified the ACHR or accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, which is
the enforcing body of the ACHR. See http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_
Convention_on_ Human_Rights_sign.htm.
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in the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism.37 Just as challenging how-
ever are the limitations on – and the lack of political commitment to – the
effective functioning of existing treaty bodies and implementation of their
decisions.38
A second group of ‘Charter-based’ mechanisms includes the UN Human
Rights Council for example, which provides a forum for a four-yearly ‘uni-
versal periodic review’ of conformity of states’ laws and practice with human
rights obligations, which regularly include issues regarding counter-terrorism
practices.39 The universality of its reach, and potential for peer review of all
states’ human rights practices, is undoubtedly its strongest feature, particularly
in light of the patchy access to the human rights mechanism mentioned above,
though as a politicised body its real effectiveness remains subject to question.
Under its auspices, Working Groups and Special Rapporteurs dedicated to
issues relevant to terrorism and counter-terrorism, such as the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention or Enforced Disappearance, or the Special Rapporteurs
on Torture, Extra-judicial executions, and a dedicated Rapporteur on counter-
terrorism and human rights, have had critical roles in exposing, monitoring
and exploring in some detail human rights issues arising in the counter-terror-
ism context.40
As will be seen in relation to state practice post-9/11, despite their various
limitations, these mechanisms can be significant on various levels. They seek
to ensure compliance or at least oversight and accountability on the part of
the state; where individual communications are possible, they provide a forum
for victims of violations to present claims and seek a remedy; they provide
normative content and clarity (through authoritative judicial and quasi-judicial
interpretations of the law) to the sometimes relatively skeletal framework of
human rights treaties.41
37 Some have accepted the jurisdiction of the HR Committee, which has therefore addressed
many individual petitions in cases involving terrorism and counter-terrorism in, e.g., Sri
Lanka, India and Nepal. North African Middle Eastern states are bound by the African
Charter mechanisms. The mandate of a new ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights (AICHR) was approved in 2010 but with limited functions: see, e.g., FIDH
commentary, available at: http://www.fidh.org/ASEAN-Human-rights-body-weak.
38 See, e.g., ‘Increasing the Impact of Human Rights Litigation: Implementation of Judgments
and Decisions’, INTERIGHTS Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 2, Winter 2010, available at: http://
www.interights.org/files/39/Bulletin%2016.2.pdf.
39 The Council was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006, UN
GA Res. 60/251 (3 April 2006).
40 There are both UN and/or regional special rapporteurs on a range of additional related
issues, including, e.g., the independence of lawyers and judges, freedom of expression,
assembly and association and the right to health. See http://www.ohchr.org/EN /Issues.
41 By providing detailed analyses of particular situations or interpretations of states’ legal
obligations, they may both clarify legal obligations (lex lata) in the context of counter-
terrorism and herald areas ripe for legal development (lex ferenda).
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While the mechanisms mentioned above are specifically dedicated to human
rights, it should be recalled that there are many other international, regional
and sub-regional institutions or bodies ranging from those under the auspices
of the General Assembly and Security Council of the UN which, increasingly,
discharge mandates in relation to both security and human rights. Notably
the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, which initially
shunned any human rights role, now has a ‘proactive’ human rights role,42
‘routinely taking account of relevant human rights concerns in all their activ-
ities’..43 The High Commissioner for Human Rights office’s broad role includes
liaising with other UN bodies active in the field of international terrorism.44
Other regional entities established to strengthen international security such
as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),45 or to
improve international cooperation such as Eurojust,46 which are not specific-
ally human rights bodies, increasingly have a strong human rights dimension
to their terrorism related work. Likewise, courts, such as the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or the African sub-
regional courts, none of which are human rights courts as such, have addressed
important ground-breaking cases related to the compatibility of counter-terror-
ist measures with IHRL.47
The detailed tapestry of international provisions and mechanisms are
paralleled by the human rights guarantees manifest in the national laws and
42 With the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
by Security Council Resolution 1535 (2004), the Committee ‘began moving toward a more
pro-active policy on human rights’. See http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html.
43 This includes ‘the preparation of preliminary implementation assessments (PIAs) relating
to resolution 1373 (2001), country visits and other interactions with Member States’. See
SC Res. 1963 (2010).
44 See UN GA Res. 58/187 (2003) and Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/68
(‘Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’) on
the role of the High Commissioner’s office.
45 See, e.g., ‘Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism’, 2001, para. 9, Bucharest Ninth
Ministerial Council Decision No. 1, and OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against
Terrorism (PC.DEC/1063).
46 The role of Eurojust within the European region is to ‘reinforce the fight against serious
organised crime including terrorism’, available at: http://eurojust.europa.eu/about/
background/Pages/history.aspx.
47 See, e.g., the important ‘Kadi’ cases before the ECJ on the lawfulness of EU terrorism lists
(in 7B8, below, and Chapter 11), which are the clearest examples. The ICJ is also increasingly
active on human rights issues. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004 (hereinafter ‘The Wall’).
See also the work of the East African Court of Justice on extraordinary rendition, e.g., Omar
Awadh Omar v. The Attorney General Republic of Kenya, App. No. 4 of 2011, East African Court
of Justice at Arusha, First Instance Division, 1 December 2011. On the evolving human rights
jurisdictions of African sub-regional bodies, see H. Duffy, ‘Human rights cases in sub-
regional African courts: towards justice for victims or just more fragmentation?’ in L. van
den Herik and C. Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). See also Chapter 11.
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constitutions of most, if not all, domestic legal systems. Primary responsibility
for the implementation of international human rights law falls to governments
and parliaments on the national level, and to national courts to provide
remedies and reparation.48
IHRL provides a flexible, rule of law framework within which national
systems choose how to protect human rights. Subsidiary to national systems,
it provides norms and mechanisms that essentially seek to protect the indi-
vidual where these national legal regimes fail to do so, as is not infrequently
the case in the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism.49
7A.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
7A.2.1 Territorial scope of human rights obligations – ‘the jurisdiction question’
Generally, a state is not considered responsible for human rights violations
arising on another state’s territory. This basic rule is subject to certain increas-
ingly important qualifications of particular relevance to an appraisal of the
‘war on terror.’50 Human rights conventions must be interpreted in a manner
which render rights ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.’51
As states’ spheres of operation and influence grow in a globalised world, as
perhaps epitomised by the ‘global’ nature of the fight against international
terrorism, a rigid, territorially limited approach to human rights obligations
becomes increasingly untenable and the double standards it would produce
increasingly ‘unconscionable.’52
The precise language delineating the scope of human rights obligations
varies between treaties, with the ECHR and ACHR providing that states must
secure the rights of ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’,53 while the ICCPR refers
to the state party’s obligations to ‘respect and ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present
convention’.54 The jurisprudence of courts and treaty bodies makes clear,
however, that both for the ICCPR, where ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ present
48 See Chapter 11 on the role of the Courts.
49 The ‘exhaustion of domestic remedies’ rule applied by almost all human rights mechanisms
follows the subsidiarity of human rights law.
50 On specific issues raised post-September 11, see 7B.1 below.
51 See, e.g., Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 136, ECHR 2005.
52 In an early case, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 74, para. 12, the HRC described it as
‘unconscionable’ to ‘interpret the responsibility under the ... Covenant as to permit a state
party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.’
53 ECHR, supra note 6 at Article 1.
54 ICCPR, supra note 21 at Article 2.
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a disjunctive test,55 and for regional treaties, which do not mention ‘territory’
at all,56 a state has obligations towards persons within its borders and, ex-
ceptionally, beyond them.
There are many examples of human rights courts and bodies, international
and regional, finding that where states exercise authority and control abroad,
they must assume the obligation to respect the human rights of persons
affected thereby. Thus, for example, the Human Rights Committee found
Uruguay responsible for kidnapping and mistreatment by Uruguayan security
forces on Argentinian soil,57 Israel responsible for violations in occupied
territory;58 and Germany potentially responsibility for German companies
committing violations abroad.59 The European Court of Human Rights found
Turkey responsible for violations by its military in Cyprus,60 Russia for viola-
55 ICCPR, supra note 21 at Article 2 refers to the state party’s obligations to ‘respect and ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised
in the present convention’.
56 ECHR, supra note 6 at Article 1 refers to ‘secur[ing] to everyone within their jurisdiction’
the rights protected therein, and Article 1, ACHR, similarly, refers to ‘ensur[ing] to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction’ the ACHR rights. The African Charter makes no
reference to jurisdiction or territory, simply emphasising the duty to protect the rights in
the Charter.
57 See Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 52/1979), Views of 29 July 1981, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/13/D/52/1979 and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 56/1979), Views of 29
July 1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, in particular the individual opinion of
Tomuschat (attached to both decisions); Montero v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 106/1981), Views
of 31 March 1983, UN Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/106/1981, para. 5. See also Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, at Part B. See generally
HRC, General Comment No. 31, ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant’, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. See also
Concluding Observations of the CESCR: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (2003), para.
15, and Concluding observations of the CESCR: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69 (2001),
paras. 11-12.
58 Concluding observations of the HRC (HRC): Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998);
Concluding observations of the HRC: Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR (2003).
59 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee; Germany, CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6;
31 October 2012, para. 16 which innovatively provides that the state: ‘… is encouraged
to set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in its territory and/
or its jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant through-
out their operations. It is also encouraged to take appropriate measures to strengthen the
remedies provided to protect people who have been victims of activities of such business
enterprises operating abroad.’
60 Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, Merits, 18 December 1996, 23 (1996) EHRR 513.
See also Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Merits, Judgment of 10 May 2001, ECtHR,
Reports 2001-IV. The ECtHR has considered numerous other cases where extra-territorial
application of the Convention has been explicitly endorsed, or not raised as an issue in
dispute. Note, however, the apparently more restrictive approach in Banković and Others
v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, Admissibility decision of
19 December 1999, Reports 2001-XII (concerning the bombardment of Belgrade by NATO
forces).
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tions in the Transnistrian region of Moldova,61 and the UK for violations by
troops in Iraq.62 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in turn
acknowledged that the human rights obligations of the United States continued
to apply during the US invasion of Grenada63 and, more recently, in respect
of the detainees in Guantánamo Bay.64 Finally, the African Commission had
no difficulty finding massive violations by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in
neighbouring DRC.65
Through this practice, several exceptions to the ‘essentially territorial scope
of human rights obligations’ have come to be recognised.66 The first is where
the state exercises effective control of territory abroad,67 in which case it
would appear that the full range of its human rights obligations arise as they
would on its own territory.68 Such effective control of territory can arise
directly through military occupation or indirectly, through control of a ‘sub-
ordinate administration.’69
Second, extra-territorial jurisdiction may arise where the state itself acts
outside its own territory, through the conduct of its organs or agents abroad.
The Human Rights Committee for example has noted ‘that a State party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within
the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the
territory of the State Party ... This principle also applies to those within the
61 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, Appl. No. 48797/99, Judgement of
8 July 2004 [Grand Chamber] (concerning Russian actions in Moldova), and Catan & Others
v. Moldova and Russia, Nos. 4337/04, 8252/05, 8454/06, 19 October 2012.
62 Case of al-Skeini v. The United Kingdom, ECHR Grand Chamber, Judgment, 7 July 2011.
63 See Coard et al. v. the United States, IACHR (Case 10.951), Report No. 109/99, 29 September
1999, Annual Report of the IACHR (1999). The Inter-American Commission referred to
similar previous cases involving the assassination of a Chilean diplomat in the US and
attacks by Surinamese officials in the Netherlands. See, e.g., IACHR, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Chile, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 17, 1985 (referring to Letelier assassina-
tion in Washington, D.C.); Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Suriname,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 21, rev. 1, 1985.
64 See IACHR, Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 13 March 2002.
65 D.R. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ACHPR, Communication 227/99.
66 See, e.g., Ilascu v. Russia, supra note 61; Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60; al-Skeini v. UK,
supra note 62; Catan & Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 78.
67 See, e.g., Turkish control of Northern Cyprus, which gave rise to a series of cases before
the ECtHR. For example, Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 60.
68 This includes obligations of restraint and positive obligations to secure the rights under
the convention: ‘The controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within
the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention
and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations of
those rights.’ ECHR Grand Chamber in al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 79, at para. 138. See also
Catan & Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 78, regarding Russia’s responsibility for
all violations by the local administration in Transnistria).
69 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 60. An example of control through occupation may arise in
DRC v. Burundi et al., supra note 65. For an example of control through the subordinate
administrations, see Catan & Ors, supra note 61.
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power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective
control was obtained.’70 This accords with the approach of the ICJ,71 or the
Inter-American Commission, which has referred to obligations arising extra-
territorially ‘where the person concerned is present in the territory of one state,
but subject to the control of another state – usually through the acts of the
latter’s agents abroad’.72
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights for its part has
developed in a more erratic fashion, which has been euphemistically described
as not always ‘speaking with one voice’.73 Early decisions of the ECtHR’s
predecessor, the European Commission of Human Rights, found states’ obliga-
tions to apply to ‘all persons under their actual responsibility, whether that
authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad.’74 In the
admissibility decision in Banković v. Belgium, however, the Court adopted an
apparently more restrictive approach, finding that the aerial bombardment
by NATO troops of the TV station in Belgrade fell outside the human rights
jurisdiction of the states on the basis of their lack of control of the territory
on which the alleged violations took place.75 The Grand Chamber thus
controversially appeared to require an ‘effective control of territory’ nexus
in all cases, rejecting as insufficient control over the individuals directly affected
by the state’s acts. In justifying its reasoning, the Banković judgment invoked
the regional scope of the Convention which was said to apply to the ‘espace
juridique’ or ‘legal space of the contracting parties’ of the ECHR, of which the
former Yugoslavia was not then part.76
70 HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 57 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Belgium, UN Doc. CPR/CO/81/BEL, 12
August 2004, para. 6.
71 ‘The Wall’, Advisory Opinion, supra note 47, paras. 109 and 111. The ICJ described it as
‘natural’ that ‘while the jurisdiction of states is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be
exercised outside the national territory ...’ It noted that the ICCPR ‘is applicable in respect
of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.’
72 Coard et al. v. the United States, supra note 63, para. 37, and IACommHR Precautionary
Measures in Guantanamo Bay, discussed in part B3.
73 J. Bonello, concurring opinion, al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 62.
74 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 60, p. 282 where the Commission indicated that the critical
question was whether the state’s acts or omissions ‘affect’ individuals abroad; see also Drodz
and Janousek v. France and Spain, Appl. No. 12747/87, Judgment of 26 June 1992, ECtHR,
Series A, No. 240; Hess v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6231/73, Commission Decision on
Admissibility, 28 May 1975, 2 DR 72 (on UK responsibility for the administration of the
Allied Military Prison in Berlin); Reinette v. France, Appl. No. 14009/88, Commission
Decision on Admissibility, 2 October 1989, 63 DR 189 (on French responsibility for detaining
persons on St Vincent).
75 The case concerned allegations of human rights violations resulting from the bombardment
of the Belgrade television station Radio Televizije Srbije by NATO forces on 26 April 1999.
See Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60, para. 70, referring to Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 60.
76 Banković, ibid. at para. 80.
International human rights law 423
Considerable debate, confusion and inconsistency of approach followed.
Numerous subsequent cases of the Court continued to find extra-territorial
acts by state agents to fall within the jurisdiction of the state under the Conven-
tion, even outside the European ‘sphere’, and often without any reference to
Banković.77 On the other hand some national courts clearly felt bound by the
shadow of the Banković Grand Chamber decision.78
A subsequent Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) decision on the extra-territoriality question, the al-Skeini v. UK judgment,
clarified the Court’s position in various respects. The Court determined that
the Convention applies extra-territorially where a state controls territory
abroad, or where its agents violate rights abroad, noting that ‘what is decisive
in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in ques-
tion’.79 The Court re-emphasised the importance of an interpretation of the
Convention that avoids ‘a “vacuum” of protection,’ at odds with the purposive
interpretation of the Convention.80 By making clear that a state’s Convention
obligations may arise extra-territorially where it exercises effective control of
territory or of persons, the al-Skeini judgment brings ECtHR jurisprudence
broadly into line with the long established view of other courts and human
rights treaty bodies.81 However, Grand Chamber decisions do not overturn
previous decisions, leaving some lingering uncertainty around the significance,
77 In, e.g., Andreou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 45653/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), the violations were
a ‘direct and immediate cause’ of the Turkish troops’ actions and the victims within Turkish
jurisdiction; in Medvedyev v. France, Appl no. 3394/03, 2010, law enforcement operations
on the high seas came within the state’s jurisdiction; in Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note
77, Iraqi shepherds killed by Turkish forces during a military operation in Iraq were covered
by the ECHR; as were detainees in Ilascu v. Russia, supra note 61; and Öcalan v. Turkey,
Appl. No. 46221/99, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision of 14 December 2000; or school children
denied education rights in Catan v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 61.
78 Some cases, such as Issa and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, Admissibility decision
of 20 May 2000, where Iraqi shepherds killed by Turkish forces during a military operation
in Iraq were within Turkish jurisdiction; in Andreou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 45653/99 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2008), a woman killed by Turkish troops at the UN buffer zone was not within
territory controlled by Turkey but as she was shot as a ‘direct and immediate cause’ of
the Turksih troops’ actions, she was therefore within Turkish jurisdiction. However in, e.g.,
the forerunner of al-Skeini v. UK, the English national courts felt bound by the Grand
Chamber’s decision in Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60.
79 al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 62 at para. 136.
80 See part B.2.2 ‘Extra-territorial Lethal use of force’, below; see also al-Skeini v. UK, supra note
62 at para. 142. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 60 at para 78; Loizidou v. Turkey, supra
note 60, § 78; Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60, § 80.
81 This Court has considered the principles of control of terrirory and state agent authority
jurisdiction side by side in a number of cases. Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60 at paras.
69-73; Issa v. Turkey, supra note 77.
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if any, of the Banković legacy for the debate on the lawfulness of states’ counter-
terrorism operations abroad.82
While the jurisprudence of human rights bodies now indicates that indi-
viduals may come within the extra-territorial jurisdiction of a state through
the control of territory abroad, or the conduct of state officials or agents abroad,
this does not prevent the issue from remaining controversial. Notable dissenters
are the United States and Israel which reject the extra-territorial scope of the
ICCPR altogether, as discussed further in relation to post-9/11 practice in
Part B.83 Particular controversies regarding the use of force abroad are
addressed in Part B below.
Two other qualifications regarding the extra-territorial scope or effect of
states’ human rights obligations are worthy of brief note. First, where a State
acts towards an individual on its territory in a manner that leads to a violation
of that individual’s rights, the State is responsible, even if the violations
ultimately arise outside its territory. The rule of ‘non-refoulement’ discussed
in detail later,84 prohibits transfer of persons, through expulsion, deportation
or extradition, to another state where there is a substantial risk of their rights
being violated.85 In some ways, however, this is not the extra-territorial appli-
cation of human rights at all as the state’s wrong arises while the individual
is within its territory.
Second, a state’s ‘primary’ obligations under IHRL to guarantee the rights
of those within its jurisdiction sit alongside its ‘secondary’ obligations not to
contribute to wrongs by other states. These obligations do not depend on the
existence of any territorial or jurisdictional link. Thus, for example, a state may
be responsible for aiding and assisting violations by other states irrespective
of whether the state’s contribution and/or the ultimate violation arose on the
state’s territory or were otherwise within its jurisdiction.86 Moreover, certain
egregious human rights violations, which occur entirely at the hand of other
states, on other territories, may nonetheless engage the collective interest of
all states. States may indeed have a duty to cooperate to end serious breaches
82 See, e.g., ‘Pilotless drones and the extraterritorial application of international human rights
treaties’, Bryan S. Hance, comparing drone killings to the geographically limited aerial
bombardments that arose in Banković. Available at: http://www.aabri.com/OC2013
Manuscripts/OC13066.pdf. There is little in the Banković judgment to support the aerial
bombardment as the relevant distinguishing criteria however.
83 The positions of the US and Israel are reflected in their submissions to human rights bodies;
see, e.g., Second to the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America and Israel
to the UNHRC on the ICCPR addressing counter-terrorism abroad, in Part B.2.
84 Chapter 7A.5.10.
85 See, e.g., cases referred to in 7A.4.3.8 of this chapter.
86 See Chapter 3.
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of jus cogens norms, even where no other link exists between the state and
the violation in question.87
7A.2.2 Personal scope of human rights obligations: irrelevance of nationality
or wrongdoing to applicable law
Human rights obligations apply, in principle, to nationals and aliens alike.88
Provided the person comes within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the state, it is irrelevant
to the application of the human rights framework whether that person is a
national of the state. As noted by the Inter-American Commission, ‘[t]he
determination of a state’s responsibility for violations of the international
human rights of a particular individual turns not on the individual’s national-
ity’.89 Human rights law thus protects nationals and non-nationals alike,
although in limited circumstances certain rights – notably relating to political
life – are enjoyed only by a state’s own citizens.90 Conversely, persons are
not generally considered subject to a state’s jurisdiction, for the purposes of
invoking the application of human rights treaties, on the sole basis of national-
ity.91
States in practice offer protection to their own nationals against violations
by other states, and stateless individuals are particularly vulnerable without
such protection, as will be seen from examples of victims of extraordinary
rendition or of arbitrary detention at Guantánamo Bay, discussed in subsequent
chapters.92 However, human rights obligations apply to all persons on the
87 See B.3.4.2, below in this chapter, and Chapter 3.1.3. Note that whether a state has ‘respons-
ibility’ is not however the same question as whether the ‘jurisdictional’ threshold of treaties
is met, or whether human rights courts and bodies acting under them would have compet-
ence over claims in respect of such broader responsibility.
88 ‘[T]he enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must
also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, … in the
territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.’ HRC, General Comment No. 31,
supra note 57 at para. 10.
89 It turns instead on whether ‘that person fell within the state’s authority and control’. Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, supra
note 64.
90 General Comment No. 15: The position of aliens under the Covenant [1986], in UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003), at 140.
91 See, e.g., R (Abbasi and another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, (2002)
EWCA Civ. 159, para. 49 where the argument that a plaintiff was within the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom for ECHR purposes on grounds of his nationality was found to
‘come nowhere near rendering Mr. Abbasi within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
for the purposes of Article 1 on the simple ground that every state enjoys a degree of
authority over its own nationals’.
92 See Chapters 8 and 10 on the practical relevance of nationality to the protection of the rights
as the cases that first came to prominence, and to be released from Guatánamo, were
nationals of Western states while those that languish there are from less influential states
or in some cases stateless persons.
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state’s territory or subject to its jurisdiction as discussed above. Distinctions
in the application of human rights law based on a person’s nationality, which
often come to the fore in counter-terrorism measures,93 far from justifying
differential treatment, may bring the state into conflict with one of the human
rights obligations – the duty not to discriminate on grounds such as race, sex,
religion, sexual orientation or national origin.94
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the essence of human rights
law is that it is applicable to all persons by virtue of their humanity. Clearly
the way in which the framework applies, and how individuals can be treated,
may shift in accord with their behaviour, most obviously through the im-
position of criminal law. As discussed in the following section, certain
restrictions on rights may also be justified in the interests of public safety,
protection of others or national security for example, and the behaviour of
the individual may be relevant to this assessment. But as human rights courts
and bodies have consistently affirmed, the human rights framework remains
applicable to all persons irrespective of their alleged conduct. No one is beyond
the protection of international human rights law.95
7A.3 THE FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CRISIS OR EMERG-
ENCY: ACCOMMODATING SECURITY IMPERATIVES
No circumstances, however extreme, render the framework of human rights
law redundant: on the contrary, human rights protections are most important
in times of national and international strain. The framework of human rights
law thus applies at all times, including in time of emergency or indeed armed
conflict (at which point this body of law intersects with the body of IHL).
However, while the law is omnipresent, it is also responsive to exceptional
situations, including terrorist threats and the existence of armed conflict. It
accommodates exceptional circumstances in several ways discussed below.96
First, certain specified rights may be restricted where necessary, for example
to protect public order or the fundamental rights of others, subject to certain
limits. Second, in times of ‘public emergency’ certain rights may be suspended
(or ‘derogated’ from), such that a more restrictive body of ‘core’ human rights
93 Nationality distinctions have been a feature of state justifications in relation to the practices
of targeted killings, broad surveillance and detentions policy at Part B below.
94 Article 26 ICCPR; Article 14 ECHR; Article 18 ACHPR and Article 24 ACHP. A &Others
(Derogation) case (‘The Belmarsh case’), Judgement of House of Lords, December 2004, para
132. A & Ors. v. UK., Appl. No. 3455/05, ECHR (Grand Chamber) 2009; The United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observa-
tions on the United Kingdom, 10 December 2003, paragraph 17.
95 See, inter alia, Ahmed v. Austria (1996); and CAT Tapia Paez v. Sweden (1997, § 14.5); M. B.
B. v. Sweden, § 6.4.
96 See generally HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 29.
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law applies, though this is again subject to conditions and limitations. Third,
the interplay between IHRL and IHL – such that in armed conflict many of the
provisions of one branch of law must be interpreted in light of the other –
means that human rights law can respond to the special exigencies of armed
conflict, which IHL is often specifically designed to address. Finally, there is
an inherent flexibility in the law, by virtue of which the question whether
rights have been violated will generally depend on the totality of the circum-
stances of the particular situation or case.97
7A.3.1 Flexibility I: Lawful limitations and ‘claw back’ clauses
Some treaty provisions expressly recognise that certain rights are not absolute
and may be restricted in certain circumstances, for example where necessary
to protect national security, public safety or order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. This is one of the ways in which
the human rights framework accommodates security concerns falling short
of a situation of ‘emergency,’ by reflecting the inherent balance between the
protection of an individual’s rights and the rights and interests of others.98
However, these restrictions – or ‘claw back’ clauses99 – attach only to a limited
number of rights.100 Under the ICCPR for example these clauses relate to
freedom of movement (Article 12), freedom of conscience and religion (Article
18) and freedom of expression (Article 19). They do not therefore permit
restrictions on rights relating to liberty and security (Article 9) or the right
to a fair trial (Article 14).101
Lawful restrictions on these rights under claw back clauses must satisfy
certain conditions. They must (a) be subject to the principle of legality, that
is be provided for in clear and accessible law; (b) serve one of the legitimate
aims set out in the particular convention (for example national security, public
order); (c) be no more than strictly necessary to meet that aim and the
97 See, e.g., the jurisprudence on the interpretation of the rights to liberty and fair trial, in-
cluding the role of other safeguards in determining overall fairness at Chapter 8, or the
positive obligations to take feasible and appropriate measures at A4 below.
98 Certain (but not all) aspects of the rights affected by claw back clauses may also be limited
through derogation in the event of emergency and the ‘inherent limits’ approach, discussed
below.
99 R. Higgins, ‘Derogations under Human Rights Treaties’, 48 (1976-77), BYIL 281.
100 These restrictions do not affect, e.g., the rights to life, humane treatment, liberty or the
majority of judicial guarantees. With the exception of religious freedom (see ICCPR, supra
note 21 at Article 18), they tend not to apply to non-derogable rights, discussed below.
101 As regards fair trial rights under Article 14, the claw back clause applies only as an ex-
ception to the general rule that the press and public should be allowed access to criminal
trials. See further 7A.5.
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measures must be proportionate to it. As exceptions, these clauses must be
strictly construed.102
7A.3.2 Flexibility II: Temporary suspension through derogation
Generally, international and regional human rights treaties, notably the ICCPR,
ECHR and ACHR,103 allow states in certain situations, and subject to specific
safeguards, to renounce parts of their obligations in respect of certain
rights.104 The six conditions that must be satisfied for states parties to human
rights treaties to lawfully derogate from their human rights obligations are
set out below.105
i) Public emergency threatening the life of the nation
Not every national disturbance or catastrophe justifies derogation. Both the
ICCPR and ECHR require the existence of a ‘public emergency threatening the
life of a nation,’ while the ACHR refers to an ‘emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party’.106 The emergency has been
described as serious enough to threaten ‘the organised life of the community
of which the state is composed,’107 though it is clear that it need not affect
the whole population,108 nor must it ‘imperil the institutions of the state’
102 Commentators warn of the dangers entailed in a broad interpretation of these clauses. See
Lillich, ‘Civil Rights’, supra note 24, p. 119.
103 ICCPR at Article 4, Article 27 ACHR and ECHR at Article 15.
104 The African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. In Media Rights Agenda and
Constitutional Rights Project case (Comm. Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96), 12th Annual
Activity Report 1998-99, paras. 67-70, the African Commission concludes: ‘limitations on
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or
special circumstances. The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms
of the African Charter are found in Article 27(2), that is that the rights of the Charter “shall
be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and
common interest.”’
105 The derogation clauses govern the conditions and procedure for derogation and the ‘core’
of human rights that is non-derogable – ICCPR at Article 4, ECHR at Article 15 and Article
27(1) ACHR. See, e.g., General Comment No. 29; ‘Study on the Principles Governing the
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights during Armed Conflict and
Internal Disturbances and Tensions’, prepared by Jeremy McBride, consultant to the Steering
Committee for the Development of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Doc. DH-
DEV(2003)001, 19 September 2003.
106 Ibid.; ICCPR, at Article 4, ECHR, at Article 15 and ACHR Article 27(1).
107 See Lawless v. Ireland, Appl. No. 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961, ECtHR, Series A, No. 3,
para. 28.
108 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, ECtHR, Series A, No.
25, para. 207.
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as such.109 A situation of ‘armed conflict’ on the territory of a state would
most likely amount to such an emergency,110 as may other intense security
situations arising from internal disturbances short of armed conflict under
IHL.111
The need to derogate must however be based on an accurate examination
of the actual situation in the country, not mere predictions of future attack.112
The threat that justifies derogation must of course relate to the state seeking
to derogate, as opposed to any other state.113
Particular measures of derogation must be ‘strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation’114 – a standard which is intentionally high, given
the important implications of suspending certain human rights protections.
It follows that the measures of derogation should be no more, and for no
longer, than strictly necessary. The importance of this is highlighted by the
fact that, in practice, states have not infrequently invoked ‘quasi-permanent’
states of emergency under national law to justify otherwise impermissible
restrictions on human rights.115 As with any exception, derogation must be
strictly construed and the legal measures that allow for derogation must
therefore be precise.116
ii) Procedural requirements for derogation and supervision
Derogation clauses contain procedural safeguards. Commonly, they require
a state availing itself of derogation to proclaim the emergency in the state,
inform other states party to the particular instrument of the provisions which
109 A & Others v. UK, Appl. No. 3455/0, 19 February 2009, ECtHR, [2009] ECHR 301, para.179
(noting that a broad range of factors that might contribute to determining the nature and
degree of the actual or imminent threat to the ‘nation’).
110 Only the regional instruments expressly refer to ‘war’ as a ground for derogation perhaps
as ‘express reference to war was struck out in 1952 in order to prevent giving the impression
that the United Nations accepted war’. M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
CCPR Commentary (Kehl am Rheim, 1993), p. 79.
111 See Chapter 6; Nowak states that ‘in addition to armed conflict and internal unrest, serious
natural or environmental catastrophes may also lead to an emergency’. Ibid.
112 See Human Rights Committee, Landinelli Silva et al. v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 34/1978), 8
April 1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978; see also, the decision of the European
Commission of Human Rights in the Greek case, 12 (1969) Yearbook of the European Convention
on Human Rights 170.
113 In cases involving derogation due to ‘terrorist threats’, the threat must have arisen in the
state itself. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment, 18 December 1996,
ECtHR, Reports 1996-VI, para. 68; see also 7B.3 below on derogation in practice post-9/11.
114 See, e.g., ICCPR at Article 4.
115 See, e.g., Concluding observations of the HRC: Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/
71/SYR (2001), para. 6, where the Committee expresses concern about the ‘quasi permanent
emergency’ declared in Syria since 1963. See also observations of the Human Rights Commit-
tee: Egypt, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (2002), para. 6.
116 On ‘the lack of clarity of the legal provisions governing …emergency,’ see Comment of
the Human Rights Committee: Nepal (10/11/1994), UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.42, para. 9.
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it intends to suspend and provide notification to the relevant overseeing treaty
body.117 The notification must clearly detail the rights from which the state
is seeking to derogate (as it cannot be a blanket derogation), the reasons and
the nature of the measures taken.118 The decision whether such an emergency
has arisen is not a unilateral decision of a state, but ultimately rests with the
treaty bodies that supervise the implementation of the treaty in question.119
In addition to international procedural requirements, intended to ensure
appropriate international oversight, the Human Rights Committee has noted
the need for domestic judicial oversight of derogation. It has noted that ‘con-
stitutional and legal provisions should ensure that compliance with Article 4
of the Covenant can be monitored by the Courts’.120
iii) Inalienable ‘non-derogable’ rights applicable in all situations
The universal and inalienable nature of certain human rights is well estab-
lished, as reflected in the derogation clauses themselves. As such, there is a
core of rights that must be protected at all times. As this includes situations
of armed conflict, the core of IHRL complements the often more specific applic-
able rules of IHL, which together provide the standard for treatment of persons
in conflict.121
The list of ‘non-derogable’ rights varies between treaties. However, common
to all these provisions are the rights not to be arbitrarily deprived of life,
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
freedom from slavery, rights relating to legality and non-retroactivity in
criminal matters.122 In any event, reference to these lists is somewhat mis-
117 A second notification must be completed as soon as the state of emergency has ended and
the measures are no longer necessary. The common failure to observe these duties under
Article 4(3) has been ‘deplored’by the HRC: Concluding observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Lebanon, CCPR/C/79/Add.78 (1997), para. 10.
118 N. Questiaux, UN Special Rapporteur on states of emergency, ‘Study of the Implications
for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege
or Emergency’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15.
119 ‘Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited discretion. It is for the Court to rule whether,
inter alia, the states have gone beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies” of
the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European super-
vision. In exercising this supervision, the Court must give appropriate weight to such
relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation and the circumstances
leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation.’ See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, supra
note 113, para. 68.
120 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Colombia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add 76 (1997), para. 38.
121 See 73A4 and 7B.3 below.
122 The ICCPR, as a binding widely ratified international convention deserves specific attention.
Among the rights that Article 4 of the ICCPR explicitly provides as non-derogable are the
right to life (Article 6), the prohibition on torture or cruel treatment (Article 7), slavery
(Article 8(1) and (2)), imprisonment due to contractual obligations (Article 11), legality in
the field of criminal law, including the requirement of ‘clear and precise provisions’ and
prohibition on retroactive penalties (Article 15), recognition before the law (Article 16) and
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leading, as international courts and bodies interpreting human rights treaties
have consistently noted that, in addition, certain aspects of other rights (which
are not non-derogable per se), are also applicable in all situations. Notably,
the right to habeas corpus, core fair trial guarantees or access to a remedy123
constitute core procedural guarantees which have been deemed to be non-
derogable, and to provide safeguards essential for the protection of other non-
derogable rights, such as freedom from torture and inhuman treatment.124
In addition, discrimination in respect of these rights is also generally con-
sidered non-derogable.125
iv) Consistency with other obligations
Any derogation from human rights treaties must not affect other international
obligations, whether treaty or customary. Derogation from one human rights
treaty does not signify derogation from another.126 As such, although a
European state may derogate from the ECHR for example, it remains bound
by the ICCPR (with its longer list of non-derogable rights), unless it similarly
derogates from that treaty.127
Likewise, derogation from treaty responsibilities does not affect customary
law obligations (discussed below). In practice, customary law is not likely to
be broader in scope than the non-derogable core of treaty rights, so an issue
is unlikely to arise. Critically, derogation from human rights treaties cannot
justify violations of the obligations enshrined in IHL, which do not permit of
any derogation.128 As such, the provisions of IHL relating to fair trial rights,
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18). The ACHR (Article 27) has a longer
list than the ICCPR, while Article 15 of the ECHR lists specifically as non-derogable norms
only Article 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman/degrading treatment),
4(1) (prohibition of slavery) and 7 (non-retroactivity in criminal law), but note below on
key aspects of liberty and fair trial and the right to a remedy.
123 The right to a remedy (Article 2(3)) has been described by the Human Rights Committee
as a right that remains effective in time of emergency. See HRC, General Comment No.
29 on States of Emergency, supra note 24, para. 14; see also General Comment No. 32, on
the Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/
32 (2007).
124 These and other specific rights are discussed below. See 8B.4.3, in this chapter, and 8B.4,
in Chapter 8 relation to the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay.
125 Although non-discrimination is not listed among the non-derogable rights, aspects of the
right cannot be derogated from in any circumstances. HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra
note 24 and HRC General Comment 32.
126 Thus, e.g., the UK as party to both the ECHR and the ICCPR but which derogated first
derogated from the ECHR, remained bound at that time by the ICCPR. [For UK derogations,
see the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3644), available
at: www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm]
127 The list of non-derogable rights in the ICCPR covers, for example, religious freedom and
discrimination.
128 See HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, para. 3.
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or the rights of detainees, will remain applicable, irrespective of derogation
from certain fair trial or liberty provisions of human rights treaties.129
v) Measures strictly necessary and proportionate
Where circumstances do justify derogation in principle, and where the rights
in question are not non-derogable, the question is whether each measure taken
pursuant to the emergency situation is ‘strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation.’130 Measures taken pursuant to derogation must be both strictly
necessary and proportionate to the emergency in question.131 As the Inter-
American Commission has noted, this requirement covers ‘the prohibition on
the unnecessary suspension of certain rights, imposing restrictions more severe
than necessary, and unnecessarily extending the suspension to areas not
affected by the emergency’.132
All prevalent circumstances are relevant to an assessment of necessity and
proportionality, but the nature of the right in question is a critical factor; the
European Court has noted for example that while liberty is a derogable right,
the fact that it is a ‘fundamental human right [involving] the protection of
the individual against arbitrary interference by the State’ is relevant to assess-
ing the lawfulness of measures taken.133 Where, for example, liberty is
restricted in a way not normally permitted, the question whether other safe-
guards are in place, including habeas corpus and legal representation, will also
be relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness of measures taken.134
vi) Non-discrimination in application of derogation
Moreover, any derogation must not be applied discriminatorily.135 As
reflected in the wording of the ICCPR derogation clause, measures that would
otherwise be justifiable will be impermissible where they are applied solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Finally, this section has focused on human rights treaty law obligations, given
the widespread nature of ratification of human rights treaties. Customary
international law136 also provides for exceptional rules to accommodate
129 See Chapter 8 and section B below.
130 ICCPR, supra note 27 at Article 4 and ECHR, supra note 7 at Article 15. See, e.g., A & Ors,
2009, supra note 109; Aksoy, supra note 113.
131 See HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 30, para. 4.
132 The Civilian Jurisdiction: The Anti-Terrorist Legislation, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev.,
2 June 2000, para. 70 ff.
133 Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note 113 at para. 76.
134 Ibid. at para. 81; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 1453/89 and 1454/
89, Judgment, 26 May 1993, ECtHR, Series A, No. 258-B, paras. 49-50.
135 See, e.g., ICCPR, at Article 4. See also HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, para.
8; Civilian Jurisdiction, supra note 132 at para. 70. Note also that the anti-discrimination
provisions of CEDAW and CERD are non-derogable.
136 Customary international law is not usually critical, given the scope and ratification of treaty
obligations in this field; see 7A.1, this chapter.
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emergency situations, with doctrines of ‘state of necessity’ and ‘force majeure’
providing that, in very exceptional circumstances, a state’s failure to comply
with its obligations is not unlawful.137 A ‘state of necessity’ may arise where
an act is ‘the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State
against a grave and imminent peril’,138 and ‘force majeure’ is ‘the occurrence
of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen external event beyond the control
of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform
the obligation’.139 However, the relevance of these doctrines in the human
rights context is limited, not least as certain key rights have jus cogens status
and must be respected at all times, without exception.140
7A.3.3 Flexibility III: Adjusting to Armed Conflict – the relationship between
IHL and IHRL
International humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law
intertwine and together form the body of law governing situations of armed
conflict.141 The interrelationship between these strands of international law
marks one of the ways in which the legal framework adjusts to the peculiarities
of the situation at hand, ensuring its universal relevance and effectiveness.
IHL comes into operation in times of armed conflict and applies beyond
the termination of hostilities to a general close of military operations. It is
designed specifically to regulate the conduct of armed conflict, and the parti-
cular issues that arise therefrom. By contrast, international human rights law
applies at all times. It is not directed specifically at the peculiarities of war,
but it enshrines minimum standards relevant to all situations, including armed
conflict. The genesis of modern international human rights law can be traced
to the egregious human rights violations of the Second World War and it is
137 Note that these ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ apply also with respect to obliga-
tions deriving from treaty law, but may not be invoked in respect of jus cogens norms. See
ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Article 25(2)(b).
138 See ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Article 25. Necessity may not be invoked as a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness where the act of the state ‘seriously impair[s] an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligations exists, or of the
international community as a whole’. Article 25(1)(b).
139 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Article 23. These customary rules do not, however,
affect the treaty obligations discussed above.
140 On the definition of jus cogens, see Chapter 1, para. 1.2; see also differences between com-
mentators and bodies on which rights have attained such status. See also, Lillich, ‘Civil
Rights’, supra note 24 at pp. 117; Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, supra note 25 at p. 67;
and HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 24 at para. 11.
141 On post-9/11 ‘armed conflicts’, see Chapter 6B.
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therefore unsurprising that international legal authority makes clear that the
two strands of law apply concurrently during armed conflict.142
In many respects, IHRL and IHL drive in the same direction. There is sub-
stantial overlap between them,143 most obvious in respect of torture or in-
humane treatment or fair trial, where provisions are very similar. Basic prin-
ciples of humanity and legality or non-arbitrariness may be seen to underpin
either framework.144
Caution is however due in overstating the convergence of these areas of
law. Fundamentally, whereas human rights are guaranteed to all persons,
without distinction, much of IHL depends upon the status of the individual.
Thus for example, rules of targeting are based on the cornerstone principle
of distinction, that protects civilians from the lethal use of force but not com-
batants, while certain detailed rights correspond to certain categories of person,
such as prisoners of war or civilians. In areas such as the right to life during
hostilities or the lawful grounds for detention in conflict, major substantive
differences remain as to starting points, processes and at least in some cases
outcomes.145 In certain circumstances, what amounts to prolonged arbitrary
detention may be seen as lawful detention of prisoners of war for the duration
142 This is now supported by the overwhelming weight of international legal opinion and
practice – e.g., international courts, UN treaty bodies and special procedures, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), most states, regional political bodies and the
United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226 (Adv. Op.), para. 25 [hereinafter ‘Nuclear
Weapons’]; The Wall, supra note 47 at paras. 105-6; Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Rep. of Congo v. Uganda), 2005 ICJ Rep. (2005), para. 216; Bámaca-Velásquez
v. Guatemala, Case No. 11/129 (Merits), IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), para. 207. For more
authorities and discussion of interplay in more detail, see H. Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?
The Interplay between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Fight Against Terror-
ism’, in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented
International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013).
143 ‘The Wall’, supra note 47, para. 106 and fn. 123; see also J. Pejic and C. Droege, in L. van
den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies, supra 142. In these areas the
development of IHL standards has drawn directly on human rights law, while even in
respect of classically different issues such as the application of the right to life in conflict
situations, human rights standards may have some bearing, as discussed in 7B3 below;
see also, e.g., L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international human-
itarian law provide all the answers?’, 88(64) (2006) International Review of the Red Cross, pp.
881-904, 897.
144 Pejic and Droege, ‘The Legal Regime’, supra note 142. See also part B.2.3 ‘“Wanted Dead
or Alive”: Kill vs Capturing’, below. Even in traditionally different areas there may be more
overlap and approximation of one area to another than is often acknowledged.
145 See ‘Interplay’ discussion of specific issues below, part B.3. The application of the two areas
in some scenarios may not lead to different results, while in others (notably genuine
‘battlefield’ scenarios) they will.
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of hostilities146 or internment of civilians for ‘imperative reasons of
security’,147 while extra-judicial execution may be seen as lawful acts of
targeting if considered through the prism of IHL rather than IHRL.
The co-application of IHL and IHRL raises sometimes complex issues regard-
ing the interplay of norms,148 the implications of which are explored in
Part B. As a starting point, all applicable law should be identified and read
together, so far as possible ‘harmoniously’.149 Norms that appear on their
face to diverge may, with some ‘adjustment’ (but without distortion), be
capable of being interpreted consistently, thus minimising normative
conflict.150 It is only in the event of irreconcilable conflict that the question
of lex specialis arises,151 whereby the more specific provision or the provisions
more directly focused on the particular situation will prevail. Notably, whether
there is such a conflict has to be determined norm-by-norm in the context of
particular situations, rather than on a legal regime-wide basis.152 The question
is not then whether IHL clashes with IHRL as a body of law, but whether
particular applicable norms, e.g., the rules governing lawful targeting or
detention, create irreconcilable conflict in the particular situation.
146 Combatants and fighters may be detained until the end of the conflict – members of the
armed forces, such as Taleban fighters in Afghanistan – would thus appear detainable and
entitled to POW status. Article 21, GC III.
147 GC IV Article 78(1); ‘absolutely necessary’ under GC IV Article 42(1).
148 ILC, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, finalized by
Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), paras. 88-89 (hereinafter, ‘ILC Report
2006’), para. 152, stating that ‘[n]o general, context-independent answers can be given to
questions.’ Among the commentary see Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?’, supra note 141;
F. Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body’, 90 (871) (2008) International
Review of the Red Cross, p. 549-72, pp. 560-61; Sassóli and Olson, ‘The relationship between
international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and
internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’, 90 (2008) International Review
of the Red Cross, 599-627, p. 615; Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented
Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74 Nordic J. Int’l. L. 27.’
149 On harmonious interpretation, see Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?’, supra note 141.
150 As the ILC has noted: ‘Of course in such case, it is still possible to reach the conclusion
that although the two norms seemed to point in diverging directions, after some adjustment,
it is still possible to apply or understand them in such way that no overlap or conflict will
remain. … [This] it may [] take place through an attempt to reach a resolution that integrates
the conflicting obligations in some optimal way in the general context of international law.’
ILC Report 2006, supra note 148, para. 43.
151 ILC Report 2006, supra note 148; see also Article 55 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibil-
ity. The ILC Commentary explains: ‘(4) For the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough
that the same subject matter is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual
inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude
the other. Some suggest that lex specialis can be understood either as applying where two
rules operate but one provides more specific content than the other, while it is more
commonly thought that it is applies only where two applicable norms conflict as set out
above.’
152 See practice discussed at 7B.3.
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In relation to targeting in the context of hostilities, for example, human
rights law may refer to more specific provisions (the lex specialis) of human-
itarian law.153 In such circumstances it is not that human rights law ceases
to apply, but that it must adjust to, and be interpreted in light of, the detailed
rules of IHL. As such, the protection from ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life and
‘arbitrary’ detention are non-derogable human rights that continue to apply
in armed conflict; but targeting or detention is not arbitrary, and the rights
are not violated, if permitted under the legal framework of IHL.154
Similarly, just as human rights law in armed conflict is informed by the
standards of IHL,155 many provisions of IHL are in turn interpreted in the
light of the fuller jurisprudence available from human rights law.156 Where
IHL does provide a specific norm, there may yet be a continuing role for IHRL
in informing the interpretation of applicable law, thereby minimising deviations
from generally applicable rules.157 Each strand therefore provides a tool in
the interpretation of the other.
One important difference between the two areas is that while IHL prin-
cipally binds parties to armed conflict (whether state or, for non-international
armed conflicts, non-state), international human rights law essentially imposes
obligations on states and confers rights on individuals. However, as discussed
at Chapter 4, serious violations of human rights and IHL may amount to crimes
under international law for which individuals may be held to account.
Another significant difference in practice is that while specific mechanisms
exist under human rights treaties, enabling individuals or states parties to bring
petitions alleging violations by states, no such judicial mechanisms exist under
IHL treaties.158 For states, there remains the option of bringing an inter-state
153 Derogation clauses in human rights treaties may explicitly reflect this (e.g., Art 15(2) ECHR
notes that the right to life is not violated where the deprivation is ‘a lawful act of war’)
but where this is not specified (e.g., Article 4 of the ICCPR does not so provide) it may
be implied.
154 See e.g., Nuclear Weapons, supra note 142 at para 25. The deliberate killing of a civilian, by
contrast, is likely to violate both IHL and HRL.
155 See, e.g., HRC General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, paras. 9 and 11; The Wall, supra note
47; Nuclear Weapons, supra note 142; Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note 142; Precaution-
ary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, IACommHR, supra note 64; Özkan v. Turkey, Appl. No.
21689/93, Eur. Ct. H.R, 6 Apr. 2004) para. 297 (citing Ergi v. Turkey), or see, e.g., Isayeva and
Others v. Russia, No. 1 and Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005, para. 191. For
more detail on human rights bodies’ approaches to IHL, see Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?’,
supra note 141.
156 The due process guarantees in Common Article 3 are an example of IHL provisions inter-
preted in the light of human rights provisions and jurisprudence.
157 Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?’, supra note 141. This corresponds with the rule of IHRL on
measures that derogate in emergency, which must be no more than necessary.
158 While human rights are often enforceable by victims through national and international
fora, IHL lacks comparable complaint mechanisms. Those mechanisms or procedures
anticipated in IHL treaties, such as the (effectively redundant) role of the ‘protecting power,’
and that of the ICRC, are non-judicial in nature.
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action to the International Court of Justice, but this is rarely invoked. The co-
applicability of IHRL and IHL, and the role of human rights courts and bodies
in adjudicating violations of IHRL in armed conflict (where appropriate by
reference to IHL), is therefore essential to the provision of a remedy for viola-
tions that would otherwise not exist.159
7A.4 TERRORISM, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY
7A.4.1 ‘Terrorism’ as a Human Rights Violation?
Non-state armed groups are generally not considered to have obligations under
international human rights law. The question therefore arises whether terrorism
should properly be referred to as a human rights violation at all.
On the one hand, the classification of acts of individuals or armed groups
as human rights violations as such sits uncomfortably with the international
legal framework governing responsibility, discussed in more detail in Chapter
3, which essentially binds states (usually through their ratification of treaties)
and confers rights on individuals. The mechanisms of human rights are also
essentially geared towards state enforcement with these obligations.160 On
the other, from a victim perspective, the harm is of course the same irrespective
of the state or non-state source. The direct and indirect effect of terrorism on
human rights, including on the most basic right to life, is indisputable, as is
the capacity and power of certain armed groups or networks which may
indeed in some scenarios be on a par with that of certain states. This de facto
‘diversification of the sources of violations of human rights’ has been described
as ‘a new disturbing phenomenon for the (international) protection of human
rights’ giving rise to challenges for the human rights framework.161
The traditional response would be that, while only states may be bound
by IHRL, there are different spheres of operation, with individuals and groups
bound by national law, and criminal law, national or international.162 This
was expressed by a judge of the IACHR, in the context of a terrorism-related
case against Peru, as follows:
159 On the differing approaches of human rights bodies, see Duffy, ‘Harmony or Conflict?’,
supra note 141. All bodies have some regard to IHL, though to varying degrees and effect.
It has been suggested that the capacity of human rights bodies to address IHL should be
enhanced.
160 M. Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, in Moeckli, International Human Rights Law, supra note 191 at 583.
161 Prison Castro Castro versus Peru, Case No. 11.015, Judgment, Separate Opinion J. Trindade,
2008, para 23.
162 See Chapter 4 for crimes under international law that may be committed in the context
of facts of international terrorism, principles of criminal law and fora of accountability.
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The victims of violations to human rights attributable to the State are protected
by the regulations of International Human Rights Law (along with the rights
enshrined in the constitution), which precisely determines the State’s international
responsibility, while the victims of terrorist acts attributable to non-state agents
or groups are protected by the regulations of criminal law, which precisely deter-
mines the criminal responsibility of individuals, and whose application must be
pursuant to the international human rights regulations binding to the State in
question. Thus, nobody is removed from the protection of the Law, even when
the applicable law may be different according to the circumstances of each specific
case.163
Going a step further, one former UN Special Rapporteur has stated that: ‘as
a non-state actor the [group] does not have legal obligations under the ICCPR,
but remains subject to the demand of the international community, first
expressed in the UDHR, that every organ of society respect and promote human
rights’.164 Perhaps more significantly than the labels imposed is the increasing
willingness to call on armed groups to respect human rights and to engage
with them to this end.165 In recent years there has been increasing engage-
ment by human rights mechanisms with such groups, which is likely to
contribute to further clarification and development with time.166
Whether or not terrorism by non-state groups should be understood as
a violation, victims of terrorism nonetheless have certain rights reflected in
IHRL.167 These correspond to the obligations of the state to take all feasible
steps to protect individuals on its territory from violations by private actors,
as described further below. In addition, there is growing international recog-
nition in recent years of a right of victims of serious crime, including where
appropriate serious acts of terrorism, to seek compensation from the state
(regardless of any legal responsibility of the state for that crime).168 Victims
163 Castro Castro, supra note 161 at para. 83.
164 Ibid. at p. 506.
165 See A. Clapham, ‘Non-state Actors’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah, et al. (eds.), International Human
Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 577; see also, examples and discussion
in Chapter 3.
166 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Executions Mission to Afghanistan, 2009, on
the importance of engaging with armed groups (cited in Clapham, ‘Non-State Actors’, supra
note 165 at p. 579). Clapham notes that the distinction has been ‘eroded’ for armed groups
as for corporations, p. 576.
167 On the nature of the states obligations vis-à-vis terrorism, see 7A.4.2 below.
168 See, e.g., the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes;
Recommendation N° R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers on the Position of the Victim
in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure; UN Office of High Commissioner on
HR, ‘Human Rights, terrorism and Counter-terrorism’, Fact Sheet No 32, p.10. The Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Crime, UN GA Res. 40/34, notes that a person
may be a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified. For the endorsement
by the Special Rapporteurs on Terrorism and Human Rights as set out under recent practice,
see section B.
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may also have a right to take legal action themselves against individuals or
groups under domestic law for damages, though the prospects of successful
enforcement may be questionable. More commonly, it will be the criminal law
framework discussed in Chapter 4 that will hold most promise as a forum
for justice for victims of terrorism vis-à-vis those directly responsible.
7A.4.2 Protecting human security: positive human rights obligations
General human rights conventions – like the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, African Charter
on People and Human Rights and European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms – enshrine the duty of states bound by the conven-
tions to ‘respect’ and ‘ensure’ or ‘secure’ the rights protected.169 This com-
prises both the negative obligation not to infringe the rights, and the positive
duty to guarantee their protection. These positive obligations have consistently
been interpreted by human rights courts and bodies as involving the duty
to prevent violations, to protect individuals from them, and, in the wake of
serious violations, to respond, by investigating, bringing to justice those
responsible where evidence supports prosecution, and providing reparation
to victims.170
i) ‘Due diligence’ to Prevent and Protect
A state cannot be strictly responsible for all violations on its territory, but it
has a sovereign duty to exercise ‘due diligence’ to protect individuals from
infringements of their rights.171 The state will fail in this duty where it knew
or ought to have known that there was a real risk of violations and failed to
take measures of prevention that were available to it.172 Implicit in the posit-
169 See Article 1 ACHR and ICCPR, supra note 21 at Article 2. ECHR, supra note 7 at Article
1 refers similarly to the obligation to ‘secure’ the rights under the Convention. The African
Charter reflects this by referring to the obligation to ‘recognise’ rights and to ‘undertake
to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect’ to them.
170 The leading case was Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, ¶ 162, 29 July 1988, which has been endorsed in many subsequent cases before the Inter-
American Court, and a similar approach to positive obligations has now emerged from
all major human rights bodies. See, e.g., Committee against Torture (Annual Report to the
General Assembly, 9 September 1996, UN Doc. A/51/44, para. 117), the Human Rights
Committee (e.g., General Comment No. 20: Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7) [1992], UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003)
at 151; HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 57); e.g. the ECtHR (e.g., Osman v. United
Kingdom, Appl. No. 23452/94, 28 October 1998, ECtHR, Reports 1998-VIII); and ACommHPR
cases Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. 241/2001, and Sabbah and Others v. Egypt,
Afr. Comm. 334/06 (2012).
171 See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 57 at para. 8.
172 Osman v. UK, supra note 170 at para. 103.
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ive nature of the obligations is that the state should take active measures to
ensure that it is aware of risks and can act to prevent them; a state cannot hide
behind lack of knowledge if it failed to make reasonable enquiries or to have
in place effective systems, for example for monitoring situations of real po-
tential risk. Notably, the state’s preventive obligation applies in respect of acts
of terrorism, and acts by foreign states or private actors against persons
accused of terrorism.173
ii) Investigation and Accountability
Where information comes to a state’s attention that may indicate violations
of rights involving the commission of crimes, whether by state agents or
private individuals, the state is obliged to investigate and where appropriate
hold those responsible to account.174 Human rights law provides some basic
benchmarks that an investigation must meet: it must be prompt, thorough,
effective, and be capable of leading to the identification of those respons-
ible.175 Those investigating ‘should have access to any information, including
sensitive information.’176
173 For an example, see Chapter 10 on rendition and the responsibility of a state for the acts
of other states on its territory.
174 See, e.g., UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly on 21 March 2006,
UN Doc. A/RES/60/147; UN Joint Study on Secret Detention, supra note 35. Jurisprudence
across all human rights bodies indicates the duty to investigate. In the IACtHR, see e.g.,
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 170; Barrios Altos v. Peru, Interpretation of the
Judgment on the Merits, 3 September 2001; Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Judgement, Inter-Am.
Ct. H. R., 26 May 2010, para. 116; Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 211, 24 Nov. 2009, paras. 130-1, and Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, 24 November 2010, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., Series C. No. 219.
In the ECtHR, see Musayeva et al. v. Russia, Merits, 26 July 2007, 47 E.H.R.R. 25; Aydin v.
Turkey, Merits, 25 September 1997, 25 E.H.R.R. 251; Assenov. et al. v. Bulgaria, Merits, 28
October 1998, 28 E.H.R.R. 652. In the African system, see e.g., Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum v. Zimbabwe, ACHPR No. 245/02; Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence &
INTERIGHTS / Cameroon ACHPR No. 272/03 and EIPR and INTERIGHTS (on behalf of Sabbeh
and Others) v. Egypt, ACHPR, No. 334/06 (2012).
175 Benchmarks include promptness, independence, thoroughness and effectiveness: see, e.g.,
UN Joint Study, supra note 29 at para. 292, and jurisprudence ibid. See also ICJ, Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 20 July 2012, available
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf.
176 See the UN Joint Study on secret detention on any credible mechanism for overseeing
security and intelligence agencies having such access, supra note 29 at para. 292(d). See also
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights, ‘Compilation of good
practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human
rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight’,
17 May 2010, A/HRC/14/46, para. 15 which recommended that bodies investiga-
ting human rights abuses should have ‘unhindered’ access to all confidential secret service
materials.
International human rights law 441
Where investigations reveal serious violations of rights, States Parties must
ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.177 As the UN Human
Rights Committee has noted: “As with a failure to investigate, failure to bring
to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant.178
In addition to the interpretation of obligations in general human rights
treaties, certain other treaties and instruments addressing specific human rights
(and, as noted above, humanitarian law)179 explicitly enshrine the duty to
investigate and, in some cases, to prosecute and punish with proportionate
penalties.180 There is considerable support for the view that there is also such
a duty under customary law, at a minimum in respect of violations that amount
to crimes under international law.181 The obligation to investigate or extradite
(aut dedere aut judicare) has been reaffirmed by the ICJ in the case of Belgium
177 CCPR General Comment 31, 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13.
178 CCPR, General Comment 31, ibid. at para. 18 on these obligations arising ‘notably in respect
of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law.’ See
also Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 175.
179 Within IHL there are obligations on states parties to seek out, prosecute and punish those
who commit ‘grave breaches’ of the Conventions, which cover crimes such as unlawful
killing, torture and inhumane acts; see, e.g., Article 1 of the the four Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 and ‘grave breaches’ provisions, e.g., Articles 147, 148 of GC IV and
Article 85 AP I.
180 See UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1465, p. 85 [hereinafter ‘CAT’]. Other examples include: Convention Concerning Forced
or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29), 39 U.N.T.S. 55, adopted on 28 June 1930, entered into
force 1 May 1932; UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277;
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 30 April 1957.; Inter-
national Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, UN
GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII)), 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, UN Doc. A/9030 (1974), 1015
U.N.T.S. 243, entered into force 18 July 1976;, and the Convention on Forced Disappearance,
supra note 11. As for non-binding instruments that reflect acceptance of this duty, see
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions, ESC Res. 1989/65, Annex, 1989, UN ESCOR supp. (No. 1) at 52, UN
Doc. E/1989/89 (1989).
181 For an early expression of this duty in respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
see, e.g., the ‘Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition,
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity’, adopted
by UN GA Res. 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973, UN Doc. A/RES/3074 (XXVIII). See,
generally, D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime’, 100 (1991) Yale Law Journal 2537, in particular at pp. 2592-3, 2600 for
customary international law. According to Orentlicher, by 1991 the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States considered customary law violated by impunity for
‘torture, extra-legal executions and disappearances’. pp. 2582-3. See also international
standards set out in the expert opinion to the Garzon v. Spain case before the ECtHR,
available at: interights.org/garzon.
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v. Senegal.182 Among the measures likely to be inconsistent with the obliga-
tions summarised above are the application of amnesty laws, which preclude
any criminal process, prescription that bars prosecution after a limited amount
of time, or immunities or defences, which provide impunity for serious viola-
tions.183
iii) Remedy and Reparation
Victims of rights violations have the right to a remedy and to reparation. This
is inherent in the positive obligation to ‘ensure’ the rights in question,184 and
the right to a remedy is also specifically enshrined in human rights instru-
ments.185 The right to a remedy reflects a basic principle of international law
that where there is a right there is a remedy (ubi ius ibi remedium),186 and
is recognised as an established principle of customary international law.187
This was recognised for example by the UN General Assembly when it adopted,
by consensus, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Prin-
ciples).188 More recently, important principles of reparation have been set
down in ICC jurisprudence.189
182 Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 175.
183 See, e.g., Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru), Merits, Judgment of 14 March
2001, IACtHR, Series C, No. 75 or Dos Erres, supra note 174, on the compatibility of amnesty
laws with the state’s duties in respect of justice and accountability. The HR Committee
has consistently condemned amnesty statutes in countries including Argentina, Bolivia,
Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Spain and Sudan; see Garzon expert
opinion, supra note 181.
184 See, e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 170, §187.
185 See, e.g., ICCPR, at Article 2(3) and ECHR, supra note 7 at Article 13. See also the analysis
of international law on reparation in INTERIGHTS’ third party intervention in Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., available at: http://www.interights.org/ document/127/index.html;
see also HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 57 at para. 16.
186 See, e.g., the 1928 holding of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the
Chorzów Factory case: ‘[I]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception
of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.’ Chorzów
Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (13 Sept.) (emphasis added).
187 See generally Ricardo Mazzeschi, ‘Reparation Claims by Individuals for State Breaches of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: An Overview’, 1 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 339, 347 (2003); M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’,
6 Human Rights Law Review 203, 218 (2006); and Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise
Doswald-Beck, ICRC Study of Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules,
Rule 150, 537-550 (2005).
188 Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, supra note 174.
189 Case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures
to be Applied to Reparations (Reparations), ICC-01/04-01/06, 7 August 2012, available at: http:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf. The ICC drew heavily on existing soft law
on reparations (including the UN Basic Principles approved in 2005) as well as on the
jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts, especially the Inter-American Court.
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While the precise content of the remedy depends on the nature of the
wrong and all the circumstances,190 the right to a remedy includes the right
to restitution, so far as possible, to the situation that existed prior to the
wrong,191 the investigation and prosecution of those responsible,192 and
compensation for damage flowing from the breach.193 Recognition has
emerged across international human rights of the ‘right to truth.’194 Victims
have the right to information concerning the nature of the violations, their
context, and those responsible,195 though some sources suggest that the right
to know corresponds to society more broadly, and relates to the need to learn
from violations of the past.196
So far as they serve to protect and ensure the protection of non-derogable
rights under treaty law, the obligations to take measures to prevent violations,
to investigate and hold to account perpetrators of serious violations, or the
right to a remedy and reparation are themselves non-derogable obligations
applicable at all times.197
190 See, e.g., Cordova v. Italy, Judgment, App. No. 40877/98, ECtHR, 30 April 2003, para. 58.
191 Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, supra note 174 at principle 19,
which specifies that a state ‘should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original
situation.’ Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human
rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration
of employment and return of property.
192 See above on duty to investigate; Article 13 ECHR has been held to imply obligations to
investigate, e.g., Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22535/93, ECtHR, 28 March 2000), torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment (Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note 113).
193 E and Others v. UK, App. No. 33218/96, ECtHR, 26 November 2002, para. 110; Keenan v.
UK, supra note 192, para. 130
194 See, e.g., Article 24(2), Convention on Enforced Disappearances; Principles for the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (1997) E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1997/20/Rev.1; UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/66, 20 April 2005;
Human Rights Council Resolution 9/11, 18 September 2008 and Resolution 12/12, 1 October
2009; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to Truth,
8 February 2006, E/CN.4/2006/91; Special Rapporteur’s report on ‘Framework Principles
for securing the accountability of public officials for gross or systematic human rights
violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorism initiatives’, UN Doc. A/HRC/
22/52, 1 March 2013. It is well recognised in the Interamerican system, e.g., Myrna Mack-
Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 25 November 2003, para. 274, Series
C. No. 101. More recently the ECtHR reflected the right to truth in el Masri v. Macedonia,
para 191..
195 Special Rapporteur’s Report on Accountability, ibid. at para 24.
196 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur 2013 report, ibid. at para 24-4; Myrna Mack Chang, ibid., refers
to the ‘right of society’ to know; and el Masri, para. 191: ‘In this connection [the Court]
underlines the great importance of the present case not only for the applicant and his family,
but also for other victims of similar crimes and the general public, who had the right to
know what had happened.’
197 See, e.g., Barrios Altos, supra note 183 at paras. 41-4; Sabbeh v. Egypt, supra note 170; Osman
v. UK, supra note 170; HRC, General Comment No. 29 on States of Emergency, supra note
24 at para. 14.
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iv) Inquiry and Onus of Proof
Linked to the positive nature of human rights obligations, is an onus that lies
with the state to demonstrate that it has met its obligations of due diligence
or response, as opposed to the onus resting solely with the individual to prove
the failure to do so. This is particularly so where – as is not infrequently the
situation in human rights cases, and all the more so in the shrouded world
of counter-terrorism – the facts lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive
knowledge of the authorities.
Human rights courts have therefore been willing to draw inferences where
information that could prove or refute an applicant’s allegations lies within
the control of the respondent state.198 Likewise, in the event that death or
injury occurs in situations that might reasonably be thought to fall within the
control of the state, presumptions of fact may arise with the burden on the
state to demonstrate that it was not the result of a violation of its human rights
obligations. These presumptions may arise for example where a counter-
terrorist law enforcement operation results in death, particularly where the
plans, orders and training are known only to the state,199 or where prisoners
suffer death or sustain injuries in a state’s custody.200 In such circumstances,
as the European Court of Human Rights has noted, ‘strong presumptions of
fact will arise in respect of injuries and death which occur. Indeed, the burden
of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory
and convincing explanation.’201
v) Positive obligations and the implications for Victims of Terrorism and Counter-
terrorism
These obligations clearly have implications for states in the context of inter-
national terrorism. The state has a responsibility to establish an effective
counter-terrorism strategy that couples ‘preventive’ measures to avoid terrorist
attacks, with thorough investigation and accountability after the event. The
duty to protect encompasses the obligation to provide timely information
concerning dangers to human security arising from terrorist threats.202 Seen
through the prism of human rights law, invoking the criminal law paradigm
198 Salman v. Turkey [GC], Merits, Grand Chamber, 27 June 2000, 34 EHRR 17 111 § 100; Varnava
and Others v. Turkey, 18 Sept 2009, § 184;. See also Magomed Musayev and Others v. Russia,
no. 8979/02, §§ 85-86, 23 October 2008.
199 See McCann, Farrell and Savage v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, 27 September 1995, Series A,
No. 324.
200 See McKerr v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 May 2001, ECtHR, Reports 2001-III. Varnava
and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90,
16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, §§ 182-184, 18 September 2009; Salman v. Turkey, supra
note 198; Toteva v. Bulgaria, no. 42027/98, § 50, 19 May 2004; Ireland v. the United Kingdom,
§§ 64-65, § 161 and Mathew v. The Netherlands, no. 24919/03, § 154, ECHR 2005-IX.
201 Salman v. Turkey, supra note 198 at para. 109.
202 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, Judgment, App. No. 48939/99, ECtHR, 18 June 2002; see also Osman
v. UK, supra note 170.
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to prevent serious terrorist attacks is not simply an option for a state, it is a
matter of legal obligation. On this basis alone, such measures are plainly not
interchangeable with others such as the use of military force.203
The same obligations of prevention, protection, investigation, accountability
and reparation apply in respect of violations that arise from acts of terrorism
or in the name of counter-terrorism.204 States are obliged under IHRL to take
all measures reasonably available to them to ensure that rights are not violated
within their territories or under their jurisdiction, whether by the state’s own
agents or by private actors or foreign states, and to investigate and where
appropriate hold to account. As practice in Part B indicates, recognition of
‘victim’ status and accountability are often more politically palatable in relation
to terrorism rather than counter-terrorism, but the legal obligation is the
same.205 States, and indeed on occasion international courts and bodies, have
often been reluctant to provide compensation to victims of counter-terrorism,
apparently on the basis of their alleged or perceived association with ‘terror-
ism.’206 As a matter of law, the right to a remedy corresponds to the parti-
cular human rights violations under international law and there is no prin-
cipled basis for a distinction between categories of victims as regards the right
to recognition and reparation.
7A.4.3 State Responsibility and human rights violations
7A.4.3.1 Agents and private actors
Under general international law, a state will be responsible for the acts of
organs of the state, whether or not they act within their authority, and for
agents in respect of acts under the ‘direction and control’ of the state.207 In
addition, as noted above, under human rights law the state will be responsible
for the conduct of private actors, or indeed foreign states, where the state fails
203 Those criminal law measures will themselves be subject to the constraints of the human
rights framework, whether or not arising in the context of armed conflict.
204 See, e.g., Asencios Lindo et al. (Case 11.182), Report No. 49/00, Annual Report of the IACHR
1999, para. 58; Kiliç v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93, 28 March 2000, ECtHR, Reports 2000-III;
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, UN Doc.
CCPR/CO/79/RUS (2003).
205 Indeed arguably the state’s obligations will be all the clearer where its own agents are
responsible; in such cases, it must respond to distance itself from the violation and restore
its credibility and the rule of law. See Terrorism as a Human Rights Violation? above.
206 McCann v. UK, supra note 199; see also discussion in Castro Castro, supra note 161 and the
request for referral to the ECHR Grand Chamber for clarification in the case of Maskhadovy
v. Russia, , Application 18071/05, 6 June 2013at: www.interights.org/maskhadov.
207 See the ILC Articles, and Nicaragua and Genocide Cases before the ICJ, discussed in Chapter 3.
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in its positive obligations to exercise due diligence to prevent or respond to
violations by them.208
A state may also, particularly where it is operating extra-territorially, act
in consort with non-state groups or with other states and its responsibility
may arise under international law, in accordance with the rules on state
responsibility set out at Chapter 3, or under IHRL specific rules.209 The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has noted for example that the state’s responsibil-
ity may be engaged through the acts of it own armed forces, or through a
‘subordinate local administration’ over which it exercises ‘decisive influ-
ence’.210 The ‘decisive influence’ test appears to differ from the agency test
under general international law which requires ‘direction and control’ of
conduct to give rise to an agency relationship and state responsibility for the
conduct of private entities. This may have implications for state responsibility
for human rights violations arising in relation to terrorism and counter-terror-
ism, in circumstances where the state exercises decisive influence over entities
active abroad, but which falls short of direction and control of their conduct.
It remains unclear whether such a standard could have a bearing on
responsibility under IHRL for terrorism or non-state actor engagement in
counter-terrorism. For example, where a state supports terrorist groups abroad,
which are subject to its ‘influence’ but which are not necessarily agents of the
state committing violations under the ‘instruction or direction’ of the state,
can the state be responsible under IHRL?211 Or, where private security com-
panies are active in the counter-terrorism field abroad at the state’s behest and
commit violations that were not specifically directed or controlled by the state,
can the state still be responsible under IHRL?212 These issues and others
require the legal framework of IHRL to be considered alongside the rules on
responsibility discussed in Chapter 3.
208 See Chapter 3 on the law governing attribution to the state of responsibility for the conduct
of private actors and the responsibility of non-state actors. See also ‘positive obligations’
above 7A.4.1.
209 For comment, e.g., on the responsibility of the UK for acts of the US in the conduct of the
Iraq war, see ‘Report of the Inquiry into the Alleged Commission of War Crimes by Coalition
Forces in the Iraq War During 2003’, 8-9 November 2003, commissioned by Peacerights,
pp. 14 and 15.
210 See, e.g., Loizidou judgment (preliminary objections), supra note 60; and the subsequent Cyprus
v. Turkey judgment, supra note 60, where ‘the Court added that since Turkey had such
“effective control”, its responsibility could not be confined to the acts of its own agents
therein but was engaged by the acts of the local administration which survived by virtue
of Turkish support’. Ilascu v. Russia, supra note 61; Catan & Others v. Moldova and Russia,
supra note 61. This test is distinct from that under general international law discussed in
Chapter 3.
211 See Catan & Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2012, supra note 61.
212 See Chapter 3 ‘International responsibility and terrorism’.
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7A.4.3.2 Collective responsibility and violations by others?
Human rights violations by other states, while potentially matters of concern
in policy terms, have traditionally not been considered matters of legal interest
and still less to create legal obligations. However, the shared responsibility
of several states may arise in various ways in the context of counter-terrorist
measures, notably from inter-state cooperation that may violate human rights.
States diverse contributions would have to be assessed to ascertain whether
they amounted to one of the forms of responsibility in international law, such
as aiding and assisting.213 In this area too, it has also been questioned
whether IHRL, with its underlying protective purpose, might embrace broader
forms of responsibility, such as ‘complicity’ in torture for example. These
issues, which are explored in more detailed in other chapters, may reveal areas
where the legal framework is likely to develop and be further clarified as a
result of developing practice in this field.214
Moreover, there is growing recognition of the community interest in the
prevention of serious rights violations and accountability for them. Notably,
the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, and judgments of the ICJ, recall that all states
may have an interest in raising a complaint against another regarding human
rights abuses, on the basis that the obligations to respect human rights are
owed to the international community as a whole, as obligations erga omnes.215
The ILC Articles go further, indicating that where the obligation breached
derives from a peremptory norm of general international law, and the breach
is ‘serious’216 all states have a duty to cooperate to end the wrong.217 The
213 States may be responsible for aiding and assisting under Art. 11 ILC Articles on State
Responsibility, among others, as noted in Chapter 3 and discussed in Chapter 10 on
Extraordinary Rendition.
214 Chapters 3 and 10.
215 See Article 48, ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, on ‘Invocation of responsibility by
a State other than the injured State’. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at p. 32, paras. 33-4, referring to obligations erga omnes
as including ‘the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.’
See also J. Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility (52nd session of the ILC (2000)),
UN Doc. A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4, p. 44, para. 92
216 See, generally, ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Part II, Chapter III ‘Serious breach of
obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.’ Article 40 states that
the chapter applies ‘to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach
by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of international law’ (para.
1) and that a breach is ‘serious’ if ‘it involves a gross systematic failure by the responsible
State to fulfil the obligation’ (para. 2).
217 See Article 41, ILC Articles on State Responsibility: ‘(1) States shall cooperate to bring to
an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of Article 40. (2) No
State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning
of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.’.
448 Chapter 7
Commentaries to the ILC Articles specify that the obligations under peremptory
norms of general international law:
arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be
seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of States and
to their people and the most basic human values.218
This development may be seen as part of a trend towards collective responsibil-
ity, of which the shift from viewing human rights as internal matters of state
sovereignty to matters of international concern, the ‘responsibility to protect’
doctrine,219 universal jurisdiction220 and, arguably, the movement towards
recognising a limited right of humanitarian intervention,221 also form part.
These obligations are relevant to comments regarding responses to Guantá-
namo and Extraordinary Rendition in subsequent chapters.
7A.5 SPECIFIC RIGHTS PROTECTED AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
The following are some of the rights protected in human rights law, which
may be implicated by acts carried out in the name of counter-terrorism. Their
application to international terrorism is considered in Section B below.
7A.5.1 Life: arbitrary deprivation, lethal use of force and the death penalty
The duty to protect human life is at the heart of a state’s obligations in relation
to terrorism: the duty to take measures to protect from terrorist attacks, as
well as the duty to protect life in responding to terrorism, are of paramount
importance.222 The right to life is a non-derogable right, and the prohibition
218 ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Article 40(3) which
lists among the examples of peremptory norms the prohibition of genocide, of slavery and
slave trade, of apartheid and racial discrimination, of torture and cruel and inhuman
treatment. Ibid. paras. 4-5.
219 See Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1,
para. 138-140, and Secretary General’s 2009 Report, UN Doc. A/63/677, on Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect, both available at: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/
adviser/responsibility.shtml; note that while these developments are important they do
not create legal obligations.
220 See Chapter 4 A.1.3 on universal jurisdiction. Where the violations are grave breaches, the
duty to seek out criminals and ensure their accountability is explicit in IHL; for other war
crimes or crimes against humanity, see the Preamble of the ICC Statute.
221 See Chapter 5, ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ noting that a right to use force on this basis
is not currently accepted in international law.
222 HRC, General Comment No. 6: Right to Life (Article 6) [1994], UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
(2003) at 127, para. 3.
International human rights law 449
of extra-judicial executions is prohibited in customary law223 and has attained
the status of a fundamental norm of jus cogens.224
It was noted above in relation to positive obligations that the state may
be responsible not only for unlawful killing by its own agents, but also by
private parties where it failed to take effective action to prevent the deaths.
The fact that a state possessed information as to terrorist threats and failed
to act on it could conceivably be sufficient to render the state responsible if
the threats are realised, although this would depend on there being clear
information indicating a ‘real and immediate risk’ in circumstances where the
state was in a position reasonably to prevent deaths and failed to do so.225
As borne out by the findings of the enquiries in the US and UK in the after-
maths of the September 11 and 7 July attacks, respectively, states will often
have lessons to learn ex-post facto regarding effective prevention, but this should
be carefully distinguished from failing to exercise due diligence to prevent
the loss of life.226
More commonly, the issue that arises is the nature of – and limits on –
the duty of the state to protect the right to life in action taken against suspected
‘terrorists’.227 This may emerge in the context of criminal law enforcement
operations that result in the lethal use of force,228 in hostage taking
situations,229 or through practices of targeted killings which have developed
exponentially in recent years.230
The right to life, which arises in these situations, belongs to the category
of non-derogable rights that must be respected at all times, including in
conflict.231 Under IHRL, persons can never be arbitrarily deprived of their
223 See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Armando Alejandre, Jr. et al. (Case
11.589), Report No. 86/99 (1999): ‘The forbidding of extrajudicial executions thus raises
to the level of imperative law a provision of international law that is so basic that it is
binding on all members of the international community.’
224 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), para.
102(2).
225 See, e.g., the case of Osman v. UK, supra note 170 at para. 121. In that case, the police did
not have such information and hence the failure to act on death threats was deemed
insufficient to render the UK responsible when the threats were carried out.
226 See 7.a.4.2. above. This implies that they state knew or had reason to know of a sufficiently
identifiable risk and that it failed to take measures reasonably within its power.
227 See Chapter 7B.3.3 on drones and inteprlay IHL and IHRL, and Chapter 9 on the killing
of Osama bin Laden.
228 See e.g., Guerrero v. Colombia, HRC Views on Communication 45/1979, 1982
229 See e.g., Finogenov & Ors. v. Russia (Appl. No. 18299/03 and 27311/03), 20 December 2011,
ECtHR; see also Tagayeva & Ors. v. Russia, Appl. No. 26562/07, 4 October 2012.
230 The application of the legal framework in these situations is addressed in Part B and in
Chapter 9 on the killing of Osama bin Laden. On the facts regarding drone killings and
targeted killings, see also Chapter 6.
231 The paramount importance of the right to life is constantly stressed by the monitoring bodies
of human rights treaties. See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 6, supra note 220. Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Abella v. Argentina (Case 11.137), Report No.
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life. The Human Rights Committee has condemned the use of lethal force,
even where the State faces ‘terrorist violence, which shows no consideration
for the most basic human rights’.232
Within the context of armed conflict, IHL applies alongside human rights
law,233 and what constitutes ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ must be interpreted
in the light of all applicable law, including IHL. Where IHL permits the killing
of a legitimate military target, the deprivation of life has a legal basis and is
not arbitrary.234 In the context of hostilities, human rights courts have also
accepted that killing of civilians by aerial bombardment, which was incidental
and proportionate to lawful military operation, could be considered justifi-
able.235 By contrast, the killing of persons in armed conflict in circumstances
where there is no IHL justification would amount to arbitrary deprivations of
the right to life.
Absent an armed conflict, the lethal use of force by a state is governed by
IHRL and strictly curtailed. It must be absolutely necessary to achieve a legit-
imate aim, such as protecting life or, possibly, effecting a lawful arrest or
detention.236 Certain human rights treaty provisions specifically so pro-
vide237 while the prohibition on ‘arbitrary’ (as opposed to lawful) deprivation
of life in others has been interpreted by the authoritative bodies as comprising
5/97, Annual Report of the IACHR 1997, para. 161.
232 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.8 (1992), para. 8. See also E. Gross, ‘Thwarting Terrorist Attacks by Attacking the
Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self Defence: Human Rights Versus the
State’s Duty to Protect its Citizens’, 15 (2001) Temple Int’l and Comparative Law Journal 195.
233 See discussion of interplay in practice, including in relation to the right to life and targeted
killings, in Chapter 7B.
234 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 142 at para 25. The ICJ held, with regard to the application
of the right to life during hostilities, ‘the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applic-
able in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities’.
235 See, e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, Appl. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 of 24 February 2005.
The Court did not specifically refer to IHL (the necessity test) but arguably interpreted
the requirements of IHRL in line with IHL standards. See also D. Kretzmer, ‘The Legal
Regime Governing the Use of Lethal Force in the Fight against Terrorism’, in L. van den
Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal
Order, supra note 142.
236 Article 2(2) ECHR notes that where employed in defence against unlawful violence, to effect
lawful arrest or detention or quell a riot or insurrection, lethal force will not constitute an
unlawful deprivation of life, provided action taken is no more than ‘absolutely necessary.’.
The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,
adopted at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders (Havana, 27 August-7 September 1990), UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1
at 112 (1990)) provides that ‘intentional’ lethal use of firearms may only be made when
‘strictly unavoidable in order to protect life’. See also Principles on the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 180; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 22 October
2002, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, para. 87.
237 Article 2(2) ECHR; no similar provision appears in the ICCPR or ACHR.
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a necessity and proportionality test.238 As underlined by the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, for example, IHRL tolerates the use of lethal
force against suspected terrorists only ‘where strictly unavoidable to protect
themselves or other persons from imminent threat of death or serious injury,
or to otherwise maintain law and order where strictly necessary and proportio-
nate’.239 The defence of the state from the threat of terrorism does not then
per se provide a justification for resort to lethal force. It is implicit in the
necessity test that the use of lethal force must be a matter of last resort, and
all non-lethal measures must have been exhausted. At least as regards
situations other than armed conflict, it is clear that lethal force may not be
used as an alternative to arrest and detention.240
The use of lethal force that may prove necessary in the course of a lawful
law enforcement operation must be distinguished from the specific targeting
and killing of an individual. Lawful targeting in the context of armed conflict,
or death inflicted pursuant to the appropriate legal process resulting in the
death penalty, are distinguishable from targeted killings or ‘shoot to kill’
policies241 which have been held to be impermissible and amount to extra-
judicial execution.242 The UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary,
or arbitrary executions, has likewise defined the policy of ‘targeted pre-emptive
238 The ICCPR and the ACHR refer to the prohibition on the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life
(Articles 6 and 4, respectively). Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man also provides for the right to life without any explicit qualification.
239 IACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, para. 87. Other human rights courts and
bodies follow suit. See also Principle 9 of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 236.
240 See Chapter 6 on the right under IHL to kill the adversary’s combatants, and the rules
governing targeting of those directly participating in hostilities. The ICRC Guidance suggests
the latter group should be captured where feasible. It has been increasingly argued that
even combatants should be captured rather than killed at least so far as capture causes
no risk to troops and military disadvantage. See below 7B3 on the interplay between IHRL
and IHL in this respect.
241 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
supra note 180, paras. 45 and 51, notes: ‘The rhetoric of shoot-to-kill serves only to displace
clear legal standards with a vaguely defined licence to kill, risking confusion among law
enforcement officers, endangering innocent persons, and rationalizing mistakes, while
avoiding the genuinely difficult challenges that are posed by the relevant threat.’
242 Such practices have often been condemned by international courts and bodies. See, e.g.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, supra note 232; and
McCann v. UK, supra note 199; Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on Israel;
Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial executions, Report on Targeted Killings (2009), Chapter
6. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the Israeli practice of extra-judicial executions
of terrorists under IHRL and IHL, see O. Ben-Naftali and K. R. Michaeli, ‘“We Must Not
Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings’,
36 (2003) Cornell Int’l Law Journal 233; and Kretzmer, ‘The Legal Regime Governing the
Use of Lethal Force’, supra note 235.
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killings’ of suspected terrorists as a ‘grave human rights violation’243 and
described arguments seeking to justify targeted killings and shoot to kill
policies as ‘suggest[ing] that it is futile to operate inside the law in face of
terrorism’.244
A critical aspect of the ‘necessity’ test requires that an operation must be
planned as well as carried out in a manner that strictly limits the danger of
recourse to the use of force.245 As the European Court of Human Rights has
noted, if lethal force is used absent ‘all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing
group with a view to avoiding and, in any event, minimising incidental loss
of civil life’, it will be deemed unnecessary, and amount to the arbitrary
deprivation of life.246 Human rights bodies have therefore found that there
should generally be an opportunity to surrender, unless doing so would itself
present an imminent danger to life.247 Moreover, extreme care is due when
relying on intelligence suggesting that the lethal force is necessary to ensure
that ‘only such solid information, combined with the adoption of appropriate
procedural safeguards, will lead to the use of lethal force.’248
It is part of states’ obligations to ensure that there is a clear and effective
legal framework in place providing guidance on the permissible use of force,
including for example, for dealing with suicide bombers or the preservation
of life in the context of counter-terrorism law enforcement operations.249
Subsequent action, such as denial of medical care to those affected by use of
force, may also give rise to a violation.250 As noted above, where death does
result from the lethal use of force, the obligation arises to ensure that ‘a
thorough, effective and independent investigation is automatically carried
out’.251
243 See ‘Civil and Political Rights, Including questions of Disappearance and Summary Ex-
ecutions’, 9 January 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/74.
244 Ibid.
245 See McCann v. UK, supra note 199 (the use of lethal force against suspected members of
the IRA amounted to a violation of Article 2(2) largely on what was found to be defective
planning of the operation); Finogenov & Ors. v. Russia, supra note 229; C. Warbrick, ‘The
Principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Responses of States to
Terrorism’, (2002) EHRLR 287, 292.
246 Ergi v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23818/94, Judgment, 28 July 1998, 32 (2001) EHRR 388, para. 79.
247 Ogur v. Turkey, supra note 236; Guerrero v. Colombia, supra note 228; Basic Principles on Use
of Force and Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Personnel, supra note 236.
248 P. Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execu-
tions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53, para. 51.
249 Ibid. at paras. 45 and 51.
250 Finogenov & Ors. v. Russia, supra note 229.
251 McBride, ‘Study on Principles’, supra note 105 at para. 18. See Semsi Onen v. Turkey, Appl.
No. 22876/93, Judgment, 15 May 2002, ECtHR, para. 87.
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Another right to life issue often arising in the counter-terrorism context
involves the application of the death penalty to terrorism related crimes.252
The death penalty is not per se prohibited by international law, although
particular instruments abolish or restrict the application of the penalty, and
the trend towards prohibition is gathering pace. For example, Protocol No.
6 and Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR,253 the Second Protocol to the ICCPR254
and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty255 impose an obligation on States parties to abolish the
death penalty.256 In addition, general instruments such as the ICCPR and
American Convention on Human Rights restrict the circumstances in which
the penalty may be applied.257
The imposition of capital punishment following a judicial process that does
not accord with the highest standards of justice will itself amount to an ar-
bitrary deprivation of life.258 As the Inter-American Court noted: ‘Because
execution of the death penalty is irreversible, the strictest and most rigorous
enforcement of judicial guarantees is required of the State so that those guar-
antees are not violated and a human life not arbitrarily taken as a result.’259
252 See Chapter 4 on the practice of imposing more severe (including capital) penalties to
terrorism.
253 Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Strasbourg, 28 April 1983,
ETS No. 114, entered into force 1 March 1985 (hereinafter ‘Protocol No. 6’); Protocol No.
13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Vilnius, 3 May 2002, ETS No.
187, entered into force 1 July 2003 (hereinafter ‘Protocol No. 13’).
254 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (UN GA Res. 44/128, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered
into force 11 July 1991).
255 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty,
Asuncion, 8 June 1990, OAS Treaty Series No. 73.
256 Note, however, that only Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR provides for absolute abolition, whilst
the other instruments allow for the retention of the death penalty as a criminal sanction
in times of war.
257 The Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, supra note 137, para.
16, noted that an expansion of the penalty ‘runs counter to the sense of Article 6, paragraph
2, of the Covenant’. Article 4(2) of ACHR specifically prohibits the reintroduction of the
death penalty where abolished and its expansion to cover new crimes.
258 See, e.g., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of the American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, September 8, 1983, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) No. 3 (1983); Sabbah v. Egypt, 2012, supra note 170.
259 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, IACtHR, Series A,
No. 16, para. 136. See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Article 4.2 and 4.4 of the
American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 8 September 1983,
IACtHR, Series A, No. 3 and the decision of the ECtHR in Öcalan v. Turkey, supra note 74.
In these circumstances, the death penalty may also amount to cruel or inhuman treatment.
See, e.g., Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
Communication 334/06, Judgment, African Commission, 13 February 2012, (hereinafter
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It has been affirmed that Council of Europe states could not transfer suspects
where there is a risk of the death penalty being imposed.260 Other states may
be similarly prohibited if the trial would not meet the strictest fair trial stand-
ards referred to above.261
7A.5.2 Torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
The prohibition of torture and other ill treatment enshrines one of the funda-
mental values of a democratic society.262 As such, the use of torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited both under conventional and
customary international law.263 In addition to the prohibition in general
international and regional human rights instruments,264 other conventions
specifically address torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, including the
widely ratified Convention against Torture.265 International humanitarian
law also contains this prohibition, which is applicable to all categories of
persons under IHL.266 The prohibition on torture constitutes a norm of jus
cogens.267 As an absolute norm, no exceptions or derogations from it are per-
missible even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the
nation.268
‘Taba case’).
260 See Chapter 4 on well-established refusal of European states to cooperate with the penalty
and long-established practice of judicial assurances that the death penalty would not be
sought.
261 This relates to the right to life violation referred to above. It is in addition to other obliga-
tions such as not transferring to a flagrant denial of justice referred to further below. 7.A.5.10
below
262 Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06, ECHR, Judgment, 28 February 2008, § 127.
263 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment of 16 November
1998, para. 517 on ill-treatment as jus cogens; Belgium v. Senegal, ICJ, 20 July 2012, in which
the International Court of Justice stated in para. 99 that ‘the prohibition of torture is part
of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)’.
264 Article 5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 ECHR, Article
5(2) ACHR and Article 5 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
265 See also, e.g., the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.
266 The prohibition against torture in humanitarian law is expressly found in Common Article
3, as well as the four Geneva Conventions including the grave breaches provisions, and
the First and Second Additional Protocols of 1977. See also Articles 12 and 50 GC I; Articles
12 and 51 GC II; Articles 13, 14, 87 and 130 GC III; Articles 27, 32 and 147 GC IV; Article
75 of AP I and Article 4 of AP II.
267 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, 22 February 2001,
para. 466, quoting the judgment of 16 November 1998 in Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para.
454. See also R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte 2 WLR 827 (House of Lords 1999). The Lords unanimously found that the prohibition
on torture had evolved into a prohibition ‘with the character of jus cogens or a peremptory
norm.’
268 See Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Appl. No. 36378/02, § 335, ECHR 2005-III.
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It has repeatedly been emphasised that the prohibition is unaffected even
in the most difficult circumstances such as the fight against terrorism.269 As
the Human Rights Committee for example has recalled:
The Committee is aware of the difficulties that the State Party faces in its prolonged
fight against terrorism, but recalls that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever can
be invoked as a justification for torture, and expresses concern at the possible
restrictions of human rights, which may result from measures taken for that pur-
pose.270
The prohibition likewise applies irrespective of a victim’s alleged conduct or
of the nature of any offence allegedly committed,271 and even in circum-
stances where the life of an individual is at risk.272 The purported reason
for the mistreatment, whether serving the ‘greater good’, ‘protecting commun-
ities from terrorist violence’ or extracting information concerning future terror-
ist threats for example, do not affect the illegality of TCIDT.273 While the sacro-
sanct nature of the prohibition on torture or ill treatment has been questioned
in the context of international terrorism (as outlined at Part B), the judicial
response constitutes a clear reaffirmation of the absolute nature of the torture
prohibition in this context.274 As one of the most basic human rights pro-
269 Saadi v. Italy, supra note 262, at § 137.
270 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, supra note 115, para.
4 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 20, supra note 170. See also
Committee against Torture, Summary account of the results of the proceedings concerning
the inquiry on Egypt, UN Doc. A/51/44, paras. 180 ff., in particular para. 222, and the
decision of the ECtHR in Chahal v. United Kingdom (Appl. No. 22414/93), Judgment, 15
November 1996, Reports 1996-V; Al-Skeini and Ors. v. Secretary of State for Defence for the
United Kingdom, App No. 55721/07, ECHR 7 July 2011.
271 See Chahal v. UK, ibid, § 79; Saadi v. Italy, supra note 262, at § 127; al Skeini v. UK, ibid.
272 See Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], No. 22978/05, 2010 ECHR 759, § 107, 1 June 2010.
273 Ibid. at para. 79. See also paras. 73-4: ‘Article 3 prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment and ... its guarantees apply irrespective of the
reprehensible nature of the conduct of the person in question’. The Human Rights Commit-
tee, in its Concluding observations on Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 93 (1998), para.
19, condemns guidelines authorising ‘“moderate physical pressure” to obtain information
considered crucial to the protection of life’.
274 The Israeli Supreme Court has found that torture cannot be authorized under any circum-
stances. While court controversially open to defence of ‘necessity’ being available in a
criminal case ex post facto, there is no ‘necessity’ justification for authorizing torture. ‘The
GSS does not have the authority to “shake” a man, hold him in the “Shabach” position
(which includes the combination of various methods, as mentioned in paragraph 30), force
him into a “frog crouch” position and deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that
which is inherently required by the interrogation. Likewise, we declare that the “necessity
defense,” found in the Penal Law, cannot serve as a basis of authority for interrogation
practices, or for directives to GSS investigators, allowing them to employ interrogation
practices of this kind.’ The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel,
HCJ 5100/94, Israeli Supreme Court, 1999. See also, Gäfgen v. Germany, supra note 272.
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tections, the application of the prohibition at all times, to all human beings,
is, as a matter of law, uncontroversial.
Both torture and inhuman and degrading treatment involve the infliction
of a certain threshold of serious physical or mental pain or suffering.275
Torture is characterised by a particular level of severity276 and by the addi-
tional requirements that it be imposed for a particular purpose277 and, gen-
erally speaking, that it involve a state official, directly or indirectly.278 Torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment have as their distinguishing feature conduct
that ‘violate[s] the basic principle of humane treatment, particularly the respect
for human dignity’.279
Whether the severity threshold is met will depend on the situation as a
whole and the circumstances of the victim.280 It is often the accumulation
of forms of ill treatment or adverse circumstances that will give rise to a
finding that the higher gravity threshold of torture has been met.281 While
there is no list of the treatment that may amount to torture or CIDT, human
rights treaties and ample jurisprudence of human rights bodies (and increasing-
ly domestic and international criminal tribunals), illustrate the sort of forms
of humiliation, coercive interrogation, sensory deprivation or other extreme
conditions of detention, for example, that are likely to fall foul of these obliga-
tions. For example, isolation and solitary confinement have at times been found
to amount to a violation, notably if sustained for a prolonged period of
time,282 and it is clear that solitary confinement should be exceptional283
275 On physical or mental suffering see, e.g., Loayza Tamayo Case, IACtHR, Judgment, 17 Septem-
ber 1997.
276 See, e.g., the ECHR torture case Selmouni v. France (Appl. No. 25803/94), Judgment, 28 July
1990, 29 (2000).
277 Article 1 of the CAT, for instance, defines ‘torture’ as ‘any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind’ (emphasis added).
278 Acquiescence would suffice for the state official link under the CAT. Differences between
torture as a human rights norm and as a norm of humanitarian law, which does not contain
such a requirement, were referred to in the Kunarac judgement before the ICTY, paras. 468 ff.
279 Celibici Judgment, para. 544; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT 95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March
2000, paras. 154-5.
280 Opuz v. Turkey, supra note 170, para. 158. ‘[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity … The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances
of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and
mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.’
281 In Ilascu v. Russia, supra note 61, the ECtHR found that it was the combination of methods
of treatment that amounted to torture under Article 3.
282 See Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, § 123 and § 136, ECHR 2006-IX. See also,
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Interim Report to the General Assembly of the UN, UN Doc. A/66/268, 5
August 2011, generally and at p. 19-20, available at: http://solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/
SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf. In Castillo Petruzzi, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
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and accompanied by procedural safeguards.284 Prolonged incommunicado
detention has itself been held to amount to torture or inhumane treatment
by several courts and human rights bodies.285 Secret detention and enforced
disappearance of persons have been considered to themselves constitute torture
irrespective of particular treatment of the individual in detention.286 The
application of certain penalties may, in certain circumstances, also give rise
to a violation.287
International law and practice also gives guidance on the nature of states’
positive obligations, and applicable safeguards, in respect of torture and ill-
treatment specifically.288 The state must ensure that through legislative,
judicial and administrative action, the prohibition is provided for in law and
effective in practice. Thus for example the TCIDT prohibition requires that
detainees must not be held incommunicado, but have access to a lawyer, to
courts,289 to medical personnel and examinations,290 and the right to contact
found that complete exclusion from the outside world for over a month and solitary
confinement for one year were cruel and inhuman treatment. Castillo Petruzzi and others
v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 30 May 1999, IACtHR, Series C, No. 52.
283 The authorities must assess all relevant factors before placing an individual in solitary
confinement: A.B. v. Russia, § 104, referring also to Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia,
no. 1704/06, § 83, 27 January 2009, and Onoufriou v. Cyprus, no. 24407/04, § 71, 7 January
2010.
284 These include monitoring and access to judicial review. See A.B. v. Russia, § 108 and § 110,
14 October 2010. See positive obligations and TCIDT below.
285 Yussef El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) Communi-
cation No. 440/1990; UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990, § 5.4, 23 March 1994, available
at: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1994.03.23_El_Megreisi_v_Libya.htm.
Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, Appl. No. 8320/04, para 121; El Masri v. the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, [GC], No. 39630/09, 13 December 2012, para. 203; see also Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 170, §187.
286 Defined in Art. 2 International Convention on Enforced Disappearance; see Chapter 10.
UN Joint Study, supra note 29, §§ 31-35. See María del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros et al.
v. Uruguay, HRC Communication No. 107/1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 138 (1990),
§14, available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts//undocs/newscans/107-1981.html;
also El-Megreisi v. Libya, §§ 2.1-2.5; Mojica v. Dominican Republic, HRC Communication No.
449/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (1994), 10 August 1994, § 5.7; Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 170, §187. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances suggests every disappearance itself constitutes ipso facto torture or ill-
treatment: UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/14, § 131
287 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989; and Öcalan v. Turkey. On life
imprisonment without any possibility of early release raising an issue under Article 3 of
the ECHR, see the Court’s final decision as to admissibility in Einhorn v. France, Appl. No.
71555/01, Admissibility decision, 16 October 2001.
288 See, e.g., CAT General Comment on the Implementation of Article 2 (prevention of acts
of torture) by States parties 2007.
289 See Principles, supra note 338. IACtHR, Habeas Corpus in Emergency situations; HRC GC 29
and 32
290 Akkoc v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22947/93 and 22948/93, Judgment 10 October 2000, ECtHR,
§ 118; Sabbeh v. Egypt ACPHR 2012.
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a third party.291 In addition, officials should be properly trained,292 and
effective systems for monitoring compliance and accountability are
required.293 The duty to investigate effectively, prosecute and punish appro-
priately, and provide reparation for victims of TCIDT is a key integral aspect
of the prohibition,294 as is the obligation not to transfer persons to a state
where there is a risk of ill-treatment (‘non-refoulement’).295
It is well established that the prohibition also includes the duty not to rely
on evidence obtained through such prohibited practices in legal proceed-
ings.296 Numerous decisions in recent years on the national, regional and
international levels have affirmed the prohibition on the admissibility of
evidence obtained through torture.297 The extent of any such prohibition of
reliance on such information for other (for example operational) purposes is
open to question and an area where the law may well be developing through
practice.298
It is sometimes questioned to what extent different obligations arise in
respect of torture as opposed to other forms of ill-treatment, in part as the
Convention against Torture makes explicit certain positive obligations in
respect of ‘torture’ specifically.299 However, the practice of the Committee
against Torture and other courts and bodies applying CAT and other human
291 Carabulea v. Romania, no. 45661/99, § 112, 13 July 2010. See Principles 15-19 of the UN Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprison-
ment (GA Res.43/173, 9 December 1988); see also CPT, 12th General Report, the CPT
Standards: Substantive sections of the CPT’s General Reports, CPT/Inf/E (2002) – Rev.
2003, para. 40, which also refers to the right to have the fact of one’s detention notified
to a relative or another third party of choice as well as access to a lawyer and a doctor.
See also Sabbah and Ors. v. Egypt.
292 Article 10 CAT.
293 Article 11 CAT.
294 Article 7 CAT.
295 ‘Non-refoulemnt’ below and 7B.10.
296 CAT, Article 15 specifically so provides, though it is also part of the general positive
obligations in respect of TCIDT; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8139/09,
Judgment, 17 January 2012, ECtHR.
297 These include Othman v. UK, ibid. Sabbeh & Ors. v. Egypt, ACHPR, or the Committee against
Torture’s Yousri Ktiti v. Morocco, 5 July 2011. CAT/C/46/D/419/2010; El-Haski v. Belgium,
Appl. No. 649/08, Judgment, 25 September 2012, 35 (2005) 41 EHRR 494. See also B.6.2 below
on practice in relation to this rule post-9/11.
298 See discussion in the context of Extraordinary Rendition in Chapter 10; see Special Rappor-
teur 2009 report on ‘High Value Detainees’; Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez,
identified this as a key issue for further legal development in 2012. See discussion of practice
in Part B and Chapter 11.
299 Under the CAT, that distinction affects the following duties: to exercise jurisdiction; not to
admit torture evidence; to non-refoulement; and to provide redress and compensation. The
UK argued this distinction before the ECHR but it was rejected in Case of Babar Ahmed and
Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and
67354/09, Judgment, 10 April 2012, ECtHR.
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rights provisions have held the same positive obligations to apply to other
forms of ill-treatment.300
7A.5.3 Liberty and detention
The right to liberty is routinely implicated through counter-terrorism measures
ranging from administrative, preventative or pre-trial detention, compulsory
questioning of suspects or others, the denial of bail and remand, control orders
or other measures.301 The rights of persons in detention are discussed more
fully in the context of the case study on Guantánamo in Chapter 8.302
In brief, as a basic starting point, any deprivation of liberty must be lawful.
Human rights treaties reveal two distinct approaches to the permissible
grounds for detention: the European Convention approach which lists permiss-
ible grounds of detention (those of relevance relate to detention pursuant to
the criminal process or to deportation), and the broader ICCPR approach which
simply prohibits ‘arbitrary’ detention. Relevant matters, of considerable contro-
versy, include whether – and if so in what circumstances – administrative
detention on ‘security’ grounds, or detention for the purposes of intelligence
gathering, can be justified under each of these schemes.303 Human rights
courts and bodies considering the legality of detention often tend to focus on
whether procedural safeguards in detention have been met, rather than tackling
head on whether it is per se unlawful to detain people on ‘security’ grounds,
but absent any intention to deport them or any suspicion of a crime having
been or being about to be committed there is reason to doubt the lawfulness
of such detention under IHRL.304
300 The ICCPR explicitly extends the three duties not to admit torture evidence; to non-refoule-
ment; and to provide redress and compensation to CIDT as well as to torture. See, e.g., HRC
General Comment 20. The only obligation that stands out as stemming exclusively from the
torture prohibition is the establishment of jurisdiction, which corresponds with the prohi-
bition of torture as a crime against humanity in international criminal law, discussed in
Chapter 4A.1 ‘Crimes, principles of criminal law and jurisdiction’.
301 See discussion of practice post-9/11 in Part B.
302 See, e.g., Article 9 ICCPR, Article 5 ECHR and Article 7 ACHR.
303 See, e.g., N. Rodley, ‘Detention as a Response to Terrorism’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel,
and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 472.
304 The Working group on arbitrary detention suggests that derogation would be necessary
to avoid arbitrariness. The Human Rights Committee has tended to focus on critiquing
the lack of safeguards than stating that administrative internment is inherently unlawful
under art 9 ICCPR. In light of the ECHR’s more restrictive approach, it would appear from
the normal wording of that security detention would be inconsistent with Art 5, and
therefore require derogation, though in practice the ECtHR has generally also focused on
the illegality through lack of safeguards: see, e.g., A & Others, supra note 131, paras. 140,
150, and 154. Cf Rodley above.
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In respect of the detention of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism
pursuant to a criminal law framework, there is a right to ‘trial within a reason-
able time or to release’ pending trial.305 While human rights bodies have
shown themselves willing to afford states certain flexibility, for example to
detain persons pre-trial for longer than would normally be permitted, in
response to the challenges of combating terrorism, this is not unlimited;
detention pending trial should not be the norm but the exception, where
necessary for example to protect society and the investigation of the
offence.306 Automatic resort to pre-trial detention, absent such a determination
of need on a case-a-case basis, may conflict with the right to liberty and
jeopardise the underlying presumption of innocence.307
In line with the fundamental right to liberty, detention is an exception,
which should be strictly construed. Even where there may be lawful grounds
for detention (such as pursuant to lawful deportation for example), detention
should only be used where necessary and less onerous alternatives are not
available.308
For any type of detention, certain procedural safeguards must be met.
While set out in more detail elsewhere, these include the prohibition on incom-
municado detention, access to a lawyer, to judicial review of the lawfulness
of detention and to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge such
lawfulness (implying certain basic due process guarantees), as well as ensuring
effective training of personnel and monitoring of places of detention.309
Courts have often called states to account on the necessity of detaining without
judicial oversight.310
305 Article 9(3) ICCPR, Article 7(5) ACHR and 5(3) ECHR.
306 ‘[P]re-trial detention shall be used as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings, with
due regard for the investigation of the alleged offence and for the protection of society
and the victim.’ Rule 6.1, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial
Measures, G.A. Res. 45/110, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), 14 December 1990.
307 Pre-trial detention – denial of bail or release pending trial – is common in terrorism cases
and sometimes legislatively mandated, as noted in Chapter 4.
308 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR’s Guidelines on
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, February
1999; Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, ECHR 2008 at para. 74; Directive 2008/
115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2008 on Common
Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country
Nationals, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98See A v. Australia, Communication no. 560/1993 para 9.2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants A/HRC/20/24, 2 April 2012, at para 9.
309 These safeguards are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, 8B.4. See, e.g. UN Joint Study,
supra note 29.
310 The ECHR showed the flexibility is not limitless and even in situations where the indi-
vidual’s activities were linked to a terrorist threat 20 days detention without judicial
oversight was held unnecessary and a violation of Art. 5. Sarikayaa v. Turkey, Appl. No.
36115/97, Judgment, 22 April 2004, ECtHR. See also Gaforov v. Russia, Appl. No. 25404/09,
Judgment, 21 October 2010, ECtHR.
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Particular flexibility arises in the event of national emergency leading to
derogation: the right to liberty is not a non-derogable right as such, and certain
states have derogated from human rights obligations in order to detain persons
perceived as posing a terrorist threat, other than pursuant to normal criminal
procedure. In particular, derogation may foreshadow ‘preventive’ or ‘admin-
istrative’ detention, which may otherwise be inconsistent with the lawful bases
for detention anticipated in human rights treaties.311 Detention would, how-
ever, still need to be necessary and proportionate to the emergency as
explained above.312 Moreover, as again discussed in the following chapter,
certain core aspects of the right to liberty remain protected at all times. De-
tention must not be arbitrary and to protect other non-derogable rights –
judicial guarantees and the prohibition on ‘unacknowledged detention’ are
themselves non-derogable.313 Indeed the prohibition on prolonged arbitrary
deprivation of liberty has been identified as a jus cogens norm.314
7A.5.4 Fair trial guarantees
Article 14 of the ICCPR, like its regional counterparts, sets out extensive fair
trial guarantees that are often under strain in the context of alleged terrorist
offences.315 The right guarantees a fair and public hearing before an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal.316 The law provides what might be described
as parameters or benchmarks for determining fair trial, not rigid prescriptions
on rules of procedure and evidence. Often a careful evaluation of all the facts
and circumstances is required to assess whether in the particular circumstances
the totality of the process met minimum standards of fairness.
311 In the UK for example, various challenges arose from the procedure adopted for detaining
persons in relation to the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, which found their way to
the European Court of Human Rights. McVeigh, O’Neill and Evans v. United Kingdom, Appl.
Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77, Report of the Commission, 18 March 1981, 25 DR 15;
Murray v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A, No. 300. Controversial
measures post-9/11 are highlighted in section B.
312 A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (A & Ors (Deroga-
tion)). See also Chapter 8.
313 HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 30, paras. 13 and 15. See also Judicial Guarantees
in States of Emergency, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion (OC-9/87)
and Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987, IACtHR, Series A, No.
8 (1987).
314 HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, para. 11; Human Rights Council, 22d sess.,
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/44, 24 December
2012, §§ 37-75, T. Meron, “On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights”, 80 (1986) AJIL 1.
315 On the scope and application of these rights, like those relating to detention, see also Chap-
ter 8.
316 See, e.g., Article 14(1) ICCPR.
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Special tribunals, such as military tribunals, have on numerous occasions
been found by human rights bodies not to meet the ‘independent and impartial
tribunal’ threshold.317 In particular, they have often been criticised as inappro-
priate for the trial of criminal offences involving civilian suspects, and in
certain circumstances for exercising jurisdiction over certain types of serious
human rights violations, whether the suspects are military or civilian.318
Commonly, resort to special courts also raises questions as to compatibility
with specific fair trial guarantees, such as access to counsel of choice and to
evidence;319 indeed the Human Rights Committee recognised that often ‘the
reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures
to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of justice’.320
317 See Incal v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22678/93, Judgment of 9 June 1998 (2000) 29 EHRR 449. Polay
Campos v. Peru (Comm. No. 577/1994), Views of 9 January 1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/
577/1994, where the Committee criticised the use of ‘faceless judges’ to judge persons
accused of terrorism, in part on the basis that ‘[i]n a system of trial by “faceless judges”,
neither the independence nor the impartiality of the judges is guaranteed, since the tribunal,
being established ad hoc, may comprise serving members of the armed forces. [S]uch a
system also fails to safeguard the presumption of innocence’. For more examples, see Grieves
v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 57067/00, Judgment, 16 December 2003, ECtHR; Sadak
et al. v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, Judgment 17 July
2001, ECtHR; and Öcalan v. Turkey, supra note 74. See also UN Commission of Human Rights
Resolution 1989/32, which recommends against ‘ad hoc tribunals ... to displace jurisdiction
properly vested in the courts’.
318 Similar concerns appear across human rights systems. From the African system: e.g. Sabbah
v. Egypt, supra note 170; Comm. No. 223/98 (2000) (Sierra Leone), and ‘Resolution on the
Right to Fair Trial and Legal Aid in Africa’, ACHPR 15 November 1999, 60. From the
European system: Othman v. UK, supra note 297; Demirel v. Turkey, Appl. No. 39324/98,
Judgment of 28 January 2003, paras. 68-71; and Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 60. For the
Human Rights Committee: e.g., Concluding observations: Slovakia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.79 (1997), para. 20, recommending that law be changed to ‘prohibit the trial of civilians
by military tribunals in any circumstances’; Concluding observations: Lebanon, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.78 (1997), para. 14, recommending transfer of ‘cases concerning civilians
and all cases concerning the violation of human rights by members of the military, to the
ordinary courts’. From the Inter-American system: e.g., First Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Chile, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.34, doc. 21 (1974)); Colombia (e.g., Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Colombia, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doc.
22 (1981)); Argentina (e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19 (1980)); Lino César Oviedo v. Paraguay (Case No. 12.013), Report
No. 88/99, 27 September 1999, para. 30. See also Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons, Article 9.The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
considered that military courts should not be used, inter alia, to try civilians, if the ‘victims
included civilians’ or the crimes ‘involved risk of jeopardising a democratic regime’, UN
Doc. E.CN/4/1999/63, 18 December 1998, para. 80. See also the Report on ‘Administration
of justice through military tribunals and other exceptional jurisdictions’, prepared by the
Special Rapporteur, Louis Joinet (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4).
319 See, e.g., Sabbah v. Egypt, supra note 170. See generally, D.A. Mundis, ‘Agora: Military Commis-
sions: The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts’,
96 (2002) AJIL 320. See specific guarantees referred to below.
320 HRC, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the Law (Article 14) [1984], UN Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) at 135, para. 4.
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Moreover, it has been suggested that even where ‘military justice’ is appro-
priate, it should not impose the death penalty in any circumstances.321
The fair trial right involves a trial in ‘public’, although this is not absolute
and may be limited in exceptional circumstances322 where there is pressing
need to do so, for example due to witness and victim protection.323 As
restrictions on public trials are an exception, and ‘the publicity of hearings
is an important safeguard in the interest of the individual and of society at
large’,324 the need to hold criminal trials completely in camera would be
difficult to justify.325
The accused has the absolute right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty,326 and reversing burdens of proof, or public statements by state
officials relating to suspected terrorists, may jeopardise this aspect of a fair
trial.327 International fair trial provisions also specifically provide for certain
specific ‘minimum’ due process guarantees that are detailed in, for example,
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR. The right to be informed in detail of the nature and
cause of the charges, and the rights to prepare one’s defence and to cross-
examine witnesses, make the use of, for example, secret evidence and anony-
mous witnesses (where witness identity is withheld from the accused), highly
controversial.328 The rights to consult counsel of choice on a confidential basis,
321 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63, 18 December 1998,
para. 80.
322 That trials in public should be restricted only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ is specified
in HRC, General Comment No. 13, para. 6. Article 14 ICCPR anticipates that exclusion of
the press or public may be permissible ‘for reason of morals, public order or national
security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circum-
stances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice’.
323 Article 14(1) specifies certain exceptional circumstances where the press and public may
be excluded. On permissible restrictions under the ECHR, see P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom,
Appl. No. 44787/98, Judgment of 25 September 2001, ECtHR, Reports 2001-IX, para. 29;
Lamanna v. Austria, Appl. No. 28923/95, Judgment of 10 July 2001; B. and P. v. United
Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 36337/97 and 35974/97, Judgment of 24 April 2001; Fejde v. Sweden,
Appl. No. 12631/87, Judgment of 29 October 1991, ECtHR, Series A, No. 212 and, at the
Human Rights Committee, Kavanagh v. Ireland (Comm. No. 819/98), Views of 4 April 2001,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998.
324 HRC, General Comment No. 13, para. 6.
325 See Warbrick, ‘Principles’, supra note 246, p. 302.
326 Article 14(2) ICCPR.
327 Allenet de Ribemont v. France, Appl. No. 15175/89, Judgment of 7 August 1996, ECtHR, Series
A, No. 308. Andrew Ashworth (2006), Four threats to the presumption of innocence. The
International Journal of Evidence & Proof: July 2006, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 241-278.
328 See Part B. For standards in the context of the ICC Statute and Rules, see Article 68(5) of
the Statute and Rule 81(4) suggesting that complete anonymity has been ruled out from
ICC proceedings, while other measures to protect the safety and well-being of witnesses
can and should be taken, and do not raise doubts as to incompatibility with the rights of
the accused. See F. Guariglia, ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International
Criminal Court: A New Development in International Adjudication of Individual Criminal
Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International
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to have time and facilities for the preparation of a defence, to an interpreter,
not to be compelled to testify against oneself, and to lodge an appeal, are all
further specifically provided for in these fair trial human rights provisions.329
There is no international human right to trial by jury, although this may be
provided for in national law, depending on the nature of the legal system.
The right to fair trial covers not only criminal processes but also the right
to access a court, and to have basic due process rights, in the determination
of one’s civil rights and obligations. This includes the right to challenge the
range of counter-terrorism measures – from administrative detention to listing
of individuals or organisations to freezing of assets and beyond – that restrict
liberty, private life, association, property or other rights on security grounds.
The question is often whether the procedures for such challenge, taken as a
whole, guarantee the requisite meaningful opportunity to confront the case
against you and to challenge lawfulness.330 In addition to practices, which
offer no opportunity to challenge at all,331 difficult issues often arise in re-
lation to measures taken in the name of preserving security in such proceed-
ings, such as withholding information or evidence from the affected person
or limiting access to counsel, and their compatibility with the overall fairness
test.332
The provisions relating to fair trial, like those rights relating to liberty and
detention, permit derogation. However, the Human Rights Committee has
noted that the right to an independent and impartial tribunal is ‘an absolute
right that is not subject to any exception’333 and that no circumstances justify
‘deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption
of innocence’.334 Even in emergency, ‘only a court of law may try and convict
a person for a criminal offence’.335 Other fundamental aspects of the guaran-
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1111 ff., at pp.
1125-6. For a different view see C. Kreß, ‘Witnesses in Proceedings Before the International
Criminal Court’, in H. Fischer, C. Kreß and S.R. Lüder (eds.), International and National
Prosecution of Crimes under International Law (Berlin, 2001), pp. 375 ff.
329 See Chapter 8.
330 These matters have been subject to considerable litigation post-9/11 in relation to detention.
See part B below and Chapter 10 ‘Exploring the Role of the Courts: Litigating the War on
Terror’.
331 The lack of challenge to UN terrorism lists is discussed in Part B.
332 See discussion of issues related to disclosure of evidence, burden of proof and procedural
safeguards at 7B73. Cases such as A&Ors, e.g. para 218, sought to ensure a balance between
disclosure and overall fairness, ensuring the individual has enough information to make
challenge effective, with the protection of security.
333 Miguel González del Rio v. Peru (Comm. No. 263/1987), Decision of 28 October 1992, UN
Doc CCPR/C/46/263/1987.
334 HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 24, para. 16 and General Comment No. 32 paras.
6 and 19. Core fair trial issues are discussed more fully at Chapter 8, in particular 8B.4.5.
335 See also, para. 11 on link between basic fair trial rights which can never be dispensed with
given link to torture and other explicitly non-derogable rights. See General Comment No.
32, supra note 123.
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tees contained in the fair trial provisions are likely to be considered a sine qua
non of fair trial that thus remain applicable at all times, such as the pre-
sumption of innocence or right of a person accused of serious offences to know
the charges against him or her and to independent legal advice. In many cases
however the appropriate assessment will not be the presence of particular
safeguards in isolation but rather whether the totality of the proceedings
amount, in the circumstances, to a fair trial.336
Finally, it should be noted that in determining international standards
relating to the rights of suspects and accused persons, regard may also be had
to the developing area of international criminal law, which generally reflects,
and may at times exceed, the minimum guarantees in human rights treaties.
Examples might be the right to remain silent without any adverse inference
being drawn from the same, and the prohibition on the admissibility of evid-
ence illegally obtained, which are both provided for unequivocally in the ICC
Statute.337 While it would go too far to assert that states are legally bound
to meet ICC standards in domestic proceedings, the standards that were ulti-
mately approved by 120 states for ICC purposes must lay some claim to being
relevant to informing the interpretation of human rights treaties, and to them-
selves embodying accepted fair trial standards.338
7A.5.5 Certainty and non-retroactivity in criminal law
The requirement of legality and certainty in criminal law enshrined in Article
15 of the ICCPR339 and other instruments340 is often referred to as the funda-
336 See McCallum v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 9511/81, Judgment of 30 August 1990, Series
A, No. 183.
337 Articles 55(1)(a), (2)(b), 67(1)(g) and 69(7). The European Court of Human Rights by contrast
has taken a more flexible approach, finding that there is no rule prohibiting the admissibility
of, for example, interceptions in violation of Convention rules, and that inferences may
be drawn from the decision of the accused to remain silent, provided the overall fairness
of proceedings is maintained. On the right to remain silent see Murray (John) v. United
Kingdom, Appl. No. 14310/88, Judgment of 7 April 1993, ECtHR, Series A, No. 300-A. On
the admissibility of evidence, see Austria v. Italy Appl. No. 788/604, 11 January 1961, 4
Yearbook of the European Convention of Human Rights 116 at 140.
338 In total, 120 states voted in favour of the Statute, with only seven against. See www.un.org/
icc/index.htm.
339 ‘No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission,
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than one that was applic-
able at the time when the criminal offense was committed. If, subsequent to the commission
of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.’ ICCPR, Article 15(1).
340 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11(2): Article 7(1) ECHR, Article 7(2)
African Charter and Article 9 ACHR; see also Articles 22 (Nullum crimen sine lege) and 23
(Nulla poena sine lege) of the ICC Statute.
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mental principle nullum crimen sine lege. It is one of the rights in respect of
which human rights treaties explicitly proscribe derogation.341 The European
Court of Human Rights has noted that the relevant provision ‘occupies a
prominent place in the Convention system of protection, as is underlined by
the fact that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 in time of
war or other public emergency’.342 Yet as will be seen they are among the
rights most often violated in the name of counter-terrorism.
These provisions prohibit prosecution for conduct that was not criminal
at the time carried out. Hence the Human Rights Committee has found viola-
tions of, inter alia, Article 15 in respect of convictions for terrorist offences
under legislation which did not exist at the time of the alleged offences, even
where the law in force at that time criminalised other relevant offences to
which similar penalties applied.343 The related provisions addressing the
principle nulla poene sine lege seek to ensure also that, where the conduct was
criminal, a heavier penalty cannot be imposed than the one in force at the time
of the commission of the offence. The temptation to increase penalties
retrospectively as policy imperatives shift, for example in the wake of a terror-
ist attack, must therefore be resisted.344
The provisions of Article 15 and comparable regional provisions are not
however confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the criminal
law, but enshrine more generally the requirements of legal certainty in respect
of criminal law. Specifically, offences must be clearly defined in law in a way
that is both accessible and foreseeable; it follows that, as only the law can
define a crime and prescribe a penalty, criminal law must not be extensively
construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy.345 Terrorist
legislation has not infrequently been subject to criticism as falling foul of the
requirements of legality, enshrined in Article 15, as a result of ill-defined, over-
broad definitions of terrorist offences in domestic law.346
341 Article 4, ICCPR, Article 15, ECHR and Article 27, ACHR all expressly proscribe derogation
from this right.
342 See S.W. v. United Kingdom and C.R. v. United Kingdom, Judgments of 22 November 1995,
Series A, No 335-B and 335-C, cited in Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Judgment of
22 March 2001, 33 EHRR 31, para. 50. The passage continues: ‘It should be construed and
applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective
safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.’
343 Gómez Casafranca v. Peru (Comm. No. 981/2001), Views of 19 September 2003, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/981/2001.
344 See Welch v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 February 1995, ECtHR, cited in McBride, ‘Study
on Principles’, supra note 105, para. 49.
345 For a reasoned discussion of these requirements, which have been set down in jurisprudence
for some time, see Kokkinanis v. Greece, Appl. No. 14307/88, Judgment of 25 May 1993,
ECtHR, Series A, No 260-A.
346 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, supra note 115,
para. 8; Concluding observations on the recent Israeli report (UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR
(2003)) and 7B.4 of this chapter.
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Notably, however, Article 15 expressly does not apply to preclude the
prosecution of conduct that was an offence under international (but not
national) law at the time committed.347 Thus this rule does not prohibit the
prosecution of, for example serious terrorist attacks that amount to crimes
against humanity, or other crimes under international law.348 As terrorism
is not clearly defined in international law, the ability to prosecute for terrorism
as such would depend on sufficient specificity and clarity in domestic law
to meet the requirements of nullum crimen sine lege.349
7A.5.6 Freedom of expression, association and assembly
The human rights to free expression, association and assembly are often called
into question in the presence of a perceived terrorist threat, whether by pro-
hibiting expression of opinion or dissent, or proscribing certain organisations
or forms of collective activity. Human rights law emphasises the importance
of these rights, not only in themselves, but because they are essential to a
functioning democratic system of government, which may itself be put under
strain by terrorist and counter-terrorist measures.350
These rights fall within the limitation or ‘claw back clauses’ referred to
above, which explicitly allow for their restriction, provided the three-fold
criteria are met: the restriction is provided for in clear and accessible law,
pursues a specified legitimate aim351 and is strictly necessary and proportion-
ate.352 These criteria must be strictly applied: the choice is not ‘between two
347 Article 15(2) ICCPR provides that: ‘Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was com-
mitted, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community
of nations’; Article 7(2) of the ECHR provides in similar terms: ‘This Article shall not
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.’ Prosecution on the basis of offences enshrined in inter-
national criminal law has been found by the ICTY, e.g., not to breach the nullum crimen
rules.
348 See Chapter 4 regarding crimes in international law committed on September 11.
349 See discussion on the contrary view of the Lebanon tribunal that terrorism is a crime under
customary law in Chapter 2. See also B. Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United
Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational
Terrorism’, 24 Leiden J. of Int’l L. 2011. On the human rights implications of national anti-
terrorism criminal laws, see Chapter 4.
350 See, e.g., Draft General Comment 19, 2010, CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5
351 According to Article 19 ICCPR these are national security, public order, public health or
morals.
352 The first requirement of being ‘provided for in clear and accessible law’ meets with the
difficulty of ill-defined concepts of terrorism. The second – the legitimacy of the aim of
combating terrorism – is less likely per se to give rise to controversy. The third – the
necessity of the measures, covering the ability of the measures adopted to meet that aim
and the reasonableness and proportionality of the measures taken in response – provides
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conflicting principles but with a principle of freedom of expression that is
subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted’.353
The freedoms of information and expression are described as ‘cornerstones
in any free and democratic society’,354 and political speech is broadly con-
sidered deserving of particular protection.355 Yet human rights jurisprudence
shows how the terrorism label has long been invoked against political oppo-
nents,356 or to suppress a free press.357 Freedom of expression applies to
those ideas that offend, shock or disturb, but ‘where such remarks incite to
violence … the State authorities enjoy a wider margin of appreciation when
examining the need for an interference with freedom of expression’.358 Like-
wise, hate speech would not be protected under the Convention.359 However,
care is due in preserving the line between virulent (or even offensive) criticism
the most common basis of successful challenge to a state’s justification for restrictions.
353 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), 29 March 1979, ECtHR, Series A, No. 30, para. 65.
354 Ibid. See also, e.g., Aduayom et al. v. Togo (Comm. No. 422-24/1990), para. 7.4. See also, Media
Rights Agenda et al. v. Nigeria, ACHPR, Communication Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96,
para. 52 and Lingens v. Austria, Appl. No. 9815/82, Judgment of 8 July 1986, ECtHR, Series
A, No. 103, para. 41: ‘freedom of expression ... constitutes one of the essential foundations
of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each indi-
vidual’s self-fulfilment’.
355 See the decision of the ECtHR in Castells v. Spain, Appl. No. 11798/85, Judgment of 23 April
1992, Series A, No. 236. On political speech, see also: ECtHR, Sener v. Turkey, Appl. No.
26680/95, Judgment of 18 July 2000; Human Rights Committee, Keun-Tae Kim v. Korea
(Comm. No. 574/1994), Views of 4 January 1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, para.
12.2; Lingens v. Austria and ACHPR, Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa
case, Comm. No. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, 13th Annual Activity Report 1999-2000.
356 See, e.g., Kenneth Good v. Botswana cited in Chapter 11 as an example of the use of security
language to justify violations against academic freedom in a context entirely unrelated to
terrorism.
357 The Court held that the imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence would be
compatible with journalists’ freedom of expression only in exceptional circumstances,
notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example,
in cases of hate speech or incitement to violence.
358 Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC] Appl. 26682/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-IV; also in Halis Doǧan v.
Turkey (no. 2), Appl. No. 71984/01, 25 July 2006, the ECtHR considered that the reasons
given by the Turkish courts could not be considered sufficient in themselves to justify the
interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. Although some particularly
acerbic passages in the articles painted an extremely negative picture of the Turkish State,
they did not exhort the use of violence or incite armed resistance or rebellion, and they
did not constitute hate-speech. It found the applicants’ convictions to be disproportionate
to the aims pursued. See also Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, Appl. No. 40984/07, Judgment 22 April
2010; Sener v. Turkey, supra note 356; see also Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23144/93,
Judgment of 16 March 2000, ECtHR, Reports 2000-III and Surek v. Turkey (No. 2) (Appl.
No. 24), Judgment of 8 July 1999, where there was no violation given direct incitement
to violence.
359 Ibid. Halis Doǧan v. Turkey (no. 2), Appl. No. 71984/01, 25 July 2006; Gündüz v. Turkey, no.
35071/97, § 41, ECHR 2003-XI.
International human rights law 469
on the one hand and hate speech and incitement on the other.360 The inter-
national expert report, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security,
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, suggests that expression
may be punished as a threat to national security only where intended to incite
imminent violence, likely to incite such violence and where there is a direct
and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or
occurrence of such violence.361
The right to association is closely linked with free expression, and plays
an important role in the democratic, cultural and social life of a state, but is
often under threat where the fear of terrorism prevails, and states seek for
example to ban organisations believed to support terrorism or to prosecute
certain forms of association of support. This right does not prevent
organisations that promote violence from being dissolved, provided there is
clear evidence362 and judicial control.363 Any limitation on this right must
however be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose and proportionate to
those aims and as with other rights, this framework must be protected with
appropriate safeguards against abuse. Restrictions on assembly, in turn, are
clearly contemplated where there are genuine risks to life, health or safety,
but efforts should be made to accommodate alternative arrangements that meet
those concerns while respecting the essence of the right.364
In time of emergency, as these rights are derogable, the state may rely on
a valid derogation, provided again it meets the conditions and constraints
already discussed above, including, again, the requirement that the particular
measures restricting rights be necessary in response to the emergency and
proportionate to it.
360 See Incal v. Turkey, supra note 318; Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note 113; Thorgeirson v. Iceland,
Appl. No. 13778/88, Judgment of 25 June 1992, ECtHR, Series A, No. 239, para. 63: ‘[F]ree-
dom of expression ... is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as matter of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb’. See also McBride, ‘Study on Principles’, supra note 105, para. 59. Surek
and Ozdemir v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, Judgment of 8 July 1999, para.
61. See also Erdogdu v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25723/94, Judgment of 15 June 2000, ECtHR, Reports
2000-VI and Ceylan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23556/94, Judgment of 8 July 1999, Reports 1999-IV.
The Court contrasted such messages with ‘texts [which] taken as a whole ... incite to violence
or hatred’.
361 See The Johannesburg Principles, supra note 12. These ‘soft laws’ elaborate international
treaty standards in the field of free expression. See also Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7
(1985) HRQ 3.
362 United Communist Party and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 19392/92, Judgment of 30 January
1998, ECtHR, Reports 1998-I, where dissolution was based on assumptions not facts, in
violation of the right to association.
363 See, e.g., Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 41340/98; 41342/98;
41343/98; 41344/98), Judgment of 13 February 2003.
364 See, e.g., Cisse v. France, Appl. No. 51346/99, Judgment of 9 April 2002, ECtHR, Reports 2002-
III.
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7A.5.7 Right to privacy
The right to privacy, or to ‘private life,’ protected in international legal instru-
ments,365 is often implicated by counter-terrorist practices. This arises most
obviously in relation to search and surveillance, data collection and storage,
and profiling, but also through myriad practices that label individuals as
terrorists or restrict liberty, movement or property for example and have a
serious impact on private lives, reputations and families in so doing. The right
embraces the basic notion of autonomy, the right to have a private sphere
without state interference, as well as a broader right to physical, psychological,
and moral integrity, and to develop one’s identity and personality, alone and
through relations with others and with society more broadly.366
In practice, an effective counter-terrorism policy will necessarily restrict
privacy to a degree. But the legal framework requires that any measure, which
has an impact on a person’s privacy, must be prescribed by law; thus any
search, surveillance or collection of data about a person for example must be
authorized by a law, which is just, predictable and precise as to the circum-
stances in which the interference is permitted.367 Restrictions on private life
must be justified as necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, and they
must be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, such that difference
of treatment based to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin will not
be ‘objectively justified’.368 As with other rights, restrictions – through sur-
veillance or otherwise – require appropriate safeguards including the sort of
independent supervision best provided through judicial oversight.369
One area where the law remains less developed relates to data protection.
The need for protection of personal information from unauthorised access or
illegitimate purpose is however increasingly recognised,370 including in the
365 See Article 17 (1) of ICCPR, Article 8 (2) ECHR and article 11 (2) ACHR. It is not specifically
protected in the African Charter.
366 See X and Y v. the Netherlands, § 22; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], Appl. Nos.
30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, 4 December 2008.
367 UN High Commissioner for HR, Fact Sheet 32, p. 45; Rotaru v. Romania, Appl. No. 28341/95,
4 May 2000, paras. 57-58.
368 Timishev v. Russia, Appl. No. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 13 Dec. 2005, paras. 54-57. See dis-
cussion on Profiling in Part B.
369 See, e.g., Klass and Others v. Germany, Appl. No. 15473/89, 22 September 1993, para. 55,
concerning safeguards regarding surveillance.
370 States must take effective measures to ensure that information concerning a person’s private
life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process
and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. HRC, General Comment No. 16 (1988); see also Rotaru v.
Romania, supra note 367.
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EU Charter of Fundamental Rights371 or the Council of Europe’s Guidelines
on human rights and the fight against terrorism.372 In principle the individual
should be aware of personal information retained by the state, which should
be processed or shared only for specified lawful purposes, and data protection
should be supervised by an independent external body as part of the safe-
guards against abuse.373
7A.5.8 Property rights
Certain human rights provisions also enshrine the right to property.374 Un-
doubtedly, the state may limit the enjoyment of property, and ultimately may
confiscate it, provided certain safeguards are in place. Substantively, conditions
for the confiscation of property should be provided for in law, and there
should be a fair process for determining whether those conditions have been
met in any particular case. The right to a fair hearing in determining one’s
civil rights and obligations applies to the confiscation of property.375 Where,
for example, there has been a criminal conviction involving a finding that
property was obtained through unlawful means involving links with terrorism,
the legitimacy of confiscation is unlikely to be controversial.376 However,
confiscation pursuant to sanctions or intelligence information, or assumptions,
as to the source of property, absent a fair procedure wherein the persons
affected are given an opportunity to be heard, may fall foul of the obligations
371 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Doc. No. C 364/01, 18 December
2000, Art. 8.
372 ‘Within the context of the fight against terrorism, the collection and the processing of
personal data by any competent authority in the field of State security may interfere with
the respect for private life only if such collection and processing, in particular: i(i) Are
governed by appropriate provisions of domestic law; i(ii) Are proportionate to the aim
for which the collection and the processing were foreseen; (iii) May be subject to supervision
by an external independent authority.’ Guidelines on human rights and the fight against
terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804th meeting
of the Ministers’ Deputies, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres /176C046F-
C0E6-423C-A039-F66D90CC6031/0/LignesDirectrices_EN.pdf.
373 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism on the Right to Privacy, UN Doc. A/HRC/
13/37, 28 December 2009.
374 Article 1, Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR; Article 14 African Charter; and Article 21, ACHR.
There is no such right in the ICCPR.
375 Article 6(1) ECHR, for example, provides for the right to a fair hearing in the determination
of civil rights, which applies to applicable property rights. Stran Greek Refineries and Statis
Andreadis v. Greece, Appl. No. 13427/87, Judgment of 9 December 1994, ECtHR, Series A,
No. 301-B, para. 72
376 It is noted that the SC Res. 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001)
calls on states to taking wide-ranging measures to seize property, without specifying
procedures and the legitimacy of measures taken may depend on the steps taken by the
state itself. See Phillips v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 41087/98, Judgment of 5 July 2001,
Reports 2001-VII, paras. 35 and 53.
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of the state in respect of property rights (as well as other violations).377 Again,
this right may be derogated from in the event of a national emergency, pro-
vided the derogation and the measures taken meet the tests, notably relating
to necessity and proportionality, set out above.
7A.5.9 Economic, social and cultural rights
While the rights most obviously implicated in the ‘war on terror’ are civil and
political rights, such as freedom from torture or the right to liberty, a range
of economic and social rights (ESRs) are also affected, directly and indirect-
ly.378 While the impact of counter-terrorism on ESRs is underexplored,379
the ICJ’s ‘Wall’ advisory opinion provides an example of judicial recognition
of violations of ESRs resulting from Israel’s construction of the ‘security’ fence
under the pretext of combating terrorism.380 Another obvious example, where
the right to health is directly implicated, is in the context of terrorism-related
incommunicado detentions and interrogation, while the economic implications
of those affected by sanctions regimes also clearly implicates a range of ESRs.
Other examples include the branding of union organisers or social movements
under the terrorism label, with varying effects on ESR advocacy and rights
protection.381 In addition, despite the historic neglect it is also increasingly
recognised that respect for ESRs are a significant element in addressing so-called
‘root causes’ of terrorism, or in the language of the UN Global Strategy, in
preventing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.382 Inter-
national law obliges states to respect, protect and fulfil the economic and social
rights of those subject to its jurisdiction. The nature of states’ obligations varies
and some rights relate to a ‘core minimum’ that states are obliged to guarantee
immediately, while other rights require ‘progressive realization.’ While their
377 For example, it may potentially infringe rights relating to the right to be heard and the
presumption of innocence, where the presumption of innocence was not violated as there
had been a criminal conviction. Ibid.
378 The systematic denial of economic, social and cultural rights is often cited as one of the
root causes of international terrorism: on the relationship between respect for these rights
and terrorism. See, e.g., A. Lieven, ‘The Roots of Terrorism, and a Strategy Against It’, 68
(2001) Prospect Magazine 13.
379 See, e.g., Report of Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism, UN Doc.
A/HRC/6/17, 21 November 2007, paras. 33-66.
380 ‘The Wall’, Advisory Opinion, supra note 47 at para. 111.
381 See Part B, below, for concrete examples.
382 UN GA Res. 60/288, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. There is similar recognition
elsewhere of the ‘social, economic and political factors … which engender conditions in
which organisations can recruit and win support’. OSCE Charter on Preventing and
Combating Terrorism, adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe on 7 December 2002 (hereinafter ‘OSCE Charter on Terrorism’),
para 9.
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precise content may be less well developed, ESR obligations on states are no
less binding than their civil and political counterparts.
7A.5.10 Transfer: Extradition, deportation and non-refoulement
The increasingly internationalised nature of terrorism has been the catalyst
to a huge increase in the number of persons transferred from one state to
another in the name of security and countering terrorism. At one end of the
spectrum, this takes the form of extradition of terrorist suspects, at the other
extraordinary rendition for interrogation and intelligence gathering purposes
outwith the legal framework,383 and – for the vast majority of cases in
between – the deportation of non-nationals on national security grounds.384
There is no right to enter or remain in a foreign state as such, and the state
therefore enjoys very broad discretion in matters of immigration, though its
laws and policies should be implemented in accordance with law and in a
non-discriminatory way.385 A key constraint imposed by the human rights
framework is the prohibition on surrendering or expelling someone to another
state (or another state’s authority386), where there is a foreseeable risk of that
person’s rights being violated.387 Often referred to as the obligation of ‘non-
refoulement,’ this rule applies irrespective of whether the transfer is pursuant
to the criminal process or under the more commonly invoked but much less
regulated umbrella of immigration laws and processes.
383 Rendition is addressed separately in Chapter 10; extradition and issues arising for the
criminal process against terrorism see Chapter 4.A.2.1
384 By contrast to the increasingly developed regime governing extradition and inter-state
criminal cooperation, immigration is an effectively unregulated in international law, there
being no right per se to enter or reside in another state and states have the discretion (which
they guard ever more jealously) to determine when non-nationals may enter their territory
and when to exclude them.
385 On the duty to comply with the framework generally, as Othman v. UK, supra note 296,
para. 184, citing Ismoilov and Others, §126. See also Kiyutin v. Russia, ECHR (regarding the
obligation to ensure explusion is non-discriminatory – this case specically concerned
discrimination on grounds of HIV status).
386 See, e.g., Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 61498/08, Judgment, 30 June
2009, ECtHR (concerning transfer in Iraq).
387 For discussion of nature and status of the rule, see: E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, ‘The
Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement (Opinion)’, 20 June 2001, updated
2003, §§ 244 and 250, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b3702b15.html.
See also discussion in C. Wouters, ‘Reconciling National Security and Non-refoulement:
Exceptions, Exclusion and Diplomatic Assurances’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and
N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), Ch. 22, p. 580.
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Certain human rights treaties or instruments, such as the United Nations
Convention against Torture,388 the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights (‘IACHR’),389 the Convention on Enforced Disappearance,390 the Euro-
pean Charter of Fundamental Rights,391 and other instruments,392 contain
specific provisions precluding transfer to serious violations of human
rights.393 These provisions are reflected, directly and indirectly, in multi-
lateral and bilateral extradition treaties, binding on parties to them.394 Treaties
such as the Inter-American Convention on Extradition395 or the European
Convention on Extradition396 contain provisions either prohibiting extradition,
or permitting states parties to refuse it (where they would otherwise be obliged
to extradite), where there is a real risk of specific human rights being violated
388 Article 3, Convention against Torture requires that ‘no state party shall expel, return or
extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’.
389 Article 22(8), I-ACHR.
390 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
(2006) Article 16(1).
391 Adopted in 2001, Article 19 of the Charter states that ‘(n)o one may be removed, expelled
or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to
the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.
392 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967, UN Doc.
A/RES/2312(XXII), Article 3(1); UN Commission on Human Rights, Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 28 February 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/1992/29, Article 8; Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 180, Principle 5; and The Council
of Europe Guidelines. Specific protections concerning the non expulsion of foreign nationals
are contained in provisions such as Article 13 of the ICCPR and Article 1 Protocol No. 7
to ECHR, which provide for example for the right to be given reasons for expulsion, to
have one’s case reviewed, and to be represented for these purposes before the competent
authority though these provisions contain express exceptions for ‘compelling reasons of
national security’.
393 See also Article 13 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, which
prevents extradition on the grounds of torture or inhuman/degrading treatment. In the
context of IHL, the Geneva Conventions also prohibit transfer of persons in particular
circumstances -see eg Article 12, GC III and Article 45 GC IV in Chapter 10.
394 On extradition treaties, see Chapter 4A.2.1. The extradition provisions are of course binding
only on states parties to them- a far smaller number of states than are party to the major
human rights treaties.
395 Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Caracas, 25 February 1981, reprinted in 20 ILM
723, which unconditionally prohibits the extradition of a person when that person will be
punished ‘by the death penalty, by life imprisonment, or by degrading treatment in the
requesting state’.
396 European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13 December 1957, ETS No. 24. Article 11 limits
extradition in the context of the death penaltyand where the requested state ‘has substantial
grounds for believing that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has
been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race,
religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced
for any of these reasons’.
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upon return.397 Non-refoulement is reflected also in other international instru-
ments addressing international cooperation and specific forms of terrorism.398
Although somewhat different in its scope and characteristics, the principle
is also reflected in refugee law.399 While persons may be denied ‘refugee
status’ because they are suspected of certain serious crimes – covering war
crimes, crimes against humanity and, according to the Security Council’s
Resolution 1373,400 acts of ‘terrorism’401 – the principle of non-refoulement
protects all persons from transfer, including terrorist suspects.402
By contrast, general human rights treaties do not themselves spell out the
obligation of non-refoulement. Yet as a result of consistent authoritative inter-
pretations finding the obligation not to transfer to violation to be implicit in
human rights protections, the rule of non-refoulement is now firmly established
as a rule of treaty law, as well as recognised as part of customary international
law.403 In the seminal Soering case, the ECtHR first identified non-refoulement
as an ‘inherent obligation’,404 reasoning that it would ‘plainly be contrary
to the spirit and intention’ of the Convention to enable states to transfer
individuals to violations, effectively circumventing their human rights obliga-
tions of protection.405 This has been elaborated upon across the jurisprudence
of human rights bodies,406 frequently in the context of international terrorism
cases. Indeed, through the expanded practice of expulsions and transfers, and
challenges thereto, the law has developed significantly in recent years. How-
397 These include the death penalty, torture or inhuman treatment, fair trial and discrimination
– see ‘scope of obligations’, below. See also UN Model Treaty on Extradition, UN Doc. A/
RES/45/116, 14 December 1990.
398 See, e.g., International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Article 9, and the Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Article 5, which contain general clauses
on non-refoulement.
399 The principle of non-refoulement under IHRL is complementary to that applicable where
there is a well-founded fear of ‘persecution’ under REFe law. The latter excludes those who
pose a danger to the security of the host State, while there are no exceptions to non-refoule-
ment under IHRL, whether of a refugee or any other person, when freedom from torture
and other ill-treatment is at stake. See Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees.
400 SC Res. 1373, supra 376.
401 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Article 1F.
402 See, e.g., M. B. B. v. Sweden, supra note 95.
403 See, e.g., Bethlehem, supra and part B.9 below.
404 Soering v. UK, supra note 287, § 88.
405 Ibid.
406 See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 20, at § 9; HRC, General Comment No. 31, §12. For
individual communications, see, e.g. Chitat Ng v. Canada, (1994, § 14.1); Cox v. Canada (1994);
and G.T. v. Australia (1997). ECHR cases include: Chahal v. UK; Öcalan v. Turkey; Saadi v.
Italy; Othman v. UK. The practice of the African Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is more limited in this particular matter,
but see, e.g., ACHPR Modise v. Botswana, and IACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights
(2004). See also the Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Third Committee of the GA
(2001, § 28).
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ever, as the evolution of the law has largely been on a piecemeal, case-by-case
basis, some aspects of the duty remain in flux and may yet lack clear para-
meters as illustrated below.
– Scope of Rights Protected? Non-refoulement to Serious Human Rights Violations
The obligation of non-refoulement in relation to the risk of torture and ill-
treatment is long established and deeply enshrined in law and practice. While
the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) is explicit in respect of non-refoule-
ment to torture, human rights courts and bodies have long interpreted general
human rights treaties as prohibiting transfer where there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in the other state.407
As law and practice have developed it has become clear that, by the same
rationale, the duty of non-refoulement may arise also where there are real risks
of other serious rights violations, though (as will be seen below) the precise
scope of this and whether it might potentially apply to all rights remains
subject to question.408 As regards the right to life, transfer to the risk of extra-
judicial execution would clearly be prohibited.409 Transfer to the death
penalty is not per se prohibited in general international law,410 but parties
to specific treaties prohibiting that penalty may be obliged not to extradite
in these circumstances; it is for example increasingly doubtful that European
states can lawfully transfer an individual to the death penalty.411 In any event,
407 On the scope of such treatment which may arise from, for example, the application of the
death penalty or life imprisonment with no possibility of early release, extreme prison
conditions or harsh interrogation techniques, see 7A.4.3.2, above. See also, Dugard and Van
den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’, 92 Am. J. of Int’l L., 2, 1998,
187-212, 200.
408 This is reflected in the examples below from IHRL, and to varying degrees in extradition
provisions – see Chapter 4. See, e.g. Article 3 of the Model Treaty precludes extradition where
the requested state has substantial grounds to believe human rights norms on (a) discrimina-
tion, (b) torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment, (c) minimum guarantees
in criminal proceedings would not be respected or (d) ‘the judgment of the requesting State
has been rendered in absentia, [and] the convicted person has not had sufficient notice of
the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his or her defence and he has not had or will
not have the opportunity to have the case retried in his or her presence’. Article 4 adds
additional optional grounds for refusing extradition including in relation to the death
penalty.
409 ‘[N]o one shall be involuntarily returned or extradited to a country where there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he or she may become a victim of extralegal, arbitrary
or summary execution in that country.’ Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investiga-
tion of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 180, Principle 5.
410 See supra Chapter 7, 7A.4.3.1.
411 In Al-Saadoon v. UK, supra note 386, where transfer of Iraqi detainees from British custody
to Iraqi authorities would put them at a real risk of execution by hanging, the Court
recognised evolving state practice in the Council of Europe which was now ‘strongly
indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circum-
stances’. As the Court found the death penalty also to constitute ‘inhuman or degrading
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as noted above, the imposition of capital punishment in certain circumstances,
may also amount to violations of the right to life or to cruel treatment, thereby
prohibiting extradition or transfer.412
Historically there was some hesitation as to whether human rights obliga-
tions preclude transfer to violations of fair trial rights, understandably perhaps
in light of the importance of facilitating inter-state cooperation in criminal
matters, and differing conceptions of fair trial across systems.413 However,
the European Court of Human Rights has taken the lead in clarifying that a
substantial risk of violation of fair trial rights, serious enough in all the circum-
stances to amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice,’414 would preclude lawful
transfer.415 This has been held to include transfer to military commission
proceedings, or to proceedings that would admit evidence obtained through
torture.416 The Inter-American Torture Convention for its part specifies that
treatment or punishment’ within the meaning of Article 3, it found a violation on that basis
and it was ‘not necessary’ to examine whether there was a separate violation of Article
2. See Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden (2005), 46 EHRR 1497(the Court found the deportation
of the applicants would breach Articles 2 and 3 because of the risk of the death penalty,
albeit in that case the death penalty was a result of an unfair trial).
412 On the prohibition of deportation in face of the risk of the death penalty following an unfair
trial, see Bader v. Sweden, ibid. See also 7A.5 on the Right to Life.
413 The Human Rights Committee declined to decide on the question in ARJ v. Australia, CCPR/
C/60/D/692/1996, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), 11 August 1997. See also Dugard
and Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’, supra note 407, p. 204, Noting that the
reluctance may reflect diverse visions of fairness.
414 On the nature of the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ which would render a deporting state in
breach of article 6, see Sir Nicolas Bratza, in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005) 41
EHRR 25, para. O-III14 referring to ‘a breach of the principles of fair trial guaranteed by
Art 6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very
essence, of the right guaranteed by that Article’.
415 See Othman v. UK, supra note 296, for the first time the ECHR has found transfer to amount
to a violation of Art 6 on fair trial grounds. Reliance on evidence obtained through torture
rendered any trial of the applicants in Jordan a flagrant violation of justice, and transfer
would therefore be unlawful. The principles were foreshadowed in other cases: Öcalan v.
Turkey, supra note 74, §§ 199-213; Tomic v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 17837/03, Admissibility
decision, 14 October 2003; Drozd and Janusek v. France and Spain, para. 110, discussed above.
See Chapter 4, 7A.4.2.i) on the nature and limits of the duty of an extraditing state to make
assessments as to another state’s judicial system. See also Soering v. United Kingdom, supra
note 287, which envisaged non-extradition in cases of ‘flagrant denial of a fair trial’, and
Einhorn v. France, Appl. No. 71555/01, Admissibility decision, 16 October 2001, where the
ECtHR considered extradition pursuant to trial in absentia absent the possibility of obtaining
a retrial as a potential violation. But the Court rejected the idea that an extremely hostile
media campaign in the requesting state would itself amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’
in that case. See also Article 3 of the 1990 UN Model Treaty on Extradition, which refers
explicitly to the fair trial guarantees of Article 14, ICCPR.
416 Othman v. UK, supra note 296.
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extradition to face trial ‘by special or ad hoc courts’ is prohibited,417 and recent
practice beyond the Americas may likewise suggest that transfers to special
ad hoc courts or military commissions may be unlawful under IHRL.418 In
principle, discrimination in criminal proceedings has also been recognised as
potentially giving rise to a duty not to extradite.419
Jurisprudence on the obligations of non-refoulement in relation to freedom
from arbitrary deprivation of liberty has developed in recent years, and the
rationale in respect of ‘flagrant denial of justice’ would appear to apply. The
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, among others, has suggested that
transfer to prolonged arbitrary detention would violate states international
obligations,420 with the ECtHR lending support to the prohibition on transfer
to violations of basic detention rights in certain circumstances. In El-Masri v.
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the Court found a violation of this
Article on account of the applicant’s removal despite the real risk of a fragrant
breach of his Article 5 rights,421 while in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the UK, the
Court acknowledged that: ‘A flagrant breach of Article 5 would occur if, for
example, the receiving State arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years
without any intention of bringing him or her to trial … [or] if an applicant
would be at risk of being imprisoned for a substantial period in the receiving
State, having previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair trial.’422
417 Article 13, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states that ‘extradition
shall not be granted nor shall the person sought be returned when there are grounds to
believe that his life is in danger, that he will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, or that he will be tried by special or ad hoc courts in the requesting
State’.
418 In the Othman case on the domestic level, UK courts applying the ECHR took the view
that deportation to a military commissions process was not necessarily unlawful, but may
be if the assessment was that on balance the proceedings were sufficiently unfair. On the
unfairness of such processes, see fair trial above, Chapter 4 (Criminal Justice) and 8 (Guanta-
namo Bay). See also Qatada, House of Lords, Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause,
Session 2008-09, [2009] UKHL 10, 18 February 2009, para. 249. See also Ahmad &Ors v. UK,
Judgment 12 April 2012, paras. 51-52 (in arguing that extradition of terror suspects to US
was permissible, the UK government emphasised that the individual would not be subject
to trial by military commission).
419 Extradition treaties reflect this obligation more clearly than human rights law.
420 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/40, 9 January
2007, para. 47-9
421 El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, [GC], No.39630/09, 13 December 2012,
para. 239. See also Tomic v. UK, no. 17837/03, decision on admissibility of 14 October 2003,
§ 3; F. v. UK, no. 17341/03, decision on admissibility of 22 June 2004, § 2. M.A.R. v. UK,
no. 28038/95, decision of 16 January 1997. For a national court acknowledging the principle
of non-refoulement precluding lawful transfer in face of a risk of arbitrary detention over
many years see Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah, House of Lords, (2004) UKHL 26, para. 43,
Lord Steyn.
422 Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom, no.8139/09, 17 January 2012, §233. The Court
noted that ‘it would be “illogical” for an applicant who faced imprisonment without a trial
to be bereft of protection under Article 5 to prevent his expulsion.’ Ibid., §232
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Transfer that would lead to the violation of other rights, such as private
or family rights, may also be precluded by IHRL in certain circumstances.423
It is a question of fact whether in the concrete case the implications for right
to private and family life would be sufficient to prevent extradition or ex-
pulsion.424
As the non-refoulement rule is inherent in and an extension of the asso-
ciated human rights protections, it follows that it enjoys the same status as
those protections. Non-refoulement to torture, like the prohibition on such
torture itself, is absolute, non-derogable and is considered by many a norm
of jus cogens.425 The jurisprudence of human rights bodies has long rejected
the notion that threats to national security, or the challenge posed by inter-
national or domestic terrorism, affect the absolute nature of the prohibition
on non-refoulement to TCIDT.426 Likewise the characteristics, conduct or crime
of which he or she may be accused, including allegations of terrorism, do not
affect the obligation of non-refoulement to TCIDT.427 It follows from their non-
derogable nature that transfers to violations of nullum crimen sine lege – or
fundamental denials of justice such as violations of core aspects of the rights
423 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also considered a number of risks which
would cause irreparable harm to transferred children, such as forced recruitment: Committee
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 10, p. 10. See al Nashif v.
Bulgaria, (Appl. 509/99) (2002), 36 EHRR 37; CG and Others v. Bulgaria, (Appl. No. 1365/07)
(2008) 47 EHRR 51, Maslov v. Austria 23/06/2008 (Grand Chamber); Kaushal and Others
v. Bulgaria of 02/09/2010, Gelerie v. Romania 15/02/2011 concerning violations of Articles
8 (private and family life) arising from transfer. In relation to rights that are subject to
limitation – such as private or family life or potentially freedom of expression – a high
threshold is likely to be applied, and the state would be entitled to balance the risk to
individual against counterveiling considerations in favour of transfer, such as the administra-
tion of justice or the risk to national security.
424 See, e.g., Aylor Davis v. France, Appl. No. 22742/93, ECHR, Admissibility Decision, 20 January
1994, DR 76-B, 164; and Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment, X. v. Bundesamt für Polizeiwesen
(1991) ATF 117 Ib 210, cited in Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’,
supra note 407, at 204.
425 See, e.g., the Inter-American Commission has described the ‘obligation of non-refoulement’
in situations where there is a risk of torture as itself a peremptory norm of international
law. Annual Report of the IACHR1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, Doc. 10, rev.1 1985, in F.A.
Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights No. 2 (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva,
2003), p. 246. Cf A Duffy Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International
Law, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 20, Issue 3, pp. 373-390, 2008.
426 Chahal v. UK, supra note 270 and Saadi v. Italy, supra note 262); CAT, Agiza v. Sweden (2005,
§ 13.8); Aemei v. Switzerland (1997, § 9.8); M. B. B. v. Sweden, supra note 95, §6.4; Arana v.
France, (2000, § 11.5), and CAT’s Concluding Observations on Germany (2004). The absolute
nature of the ban has been held to apply to a transfer to proceedings that would rely on
torture evidence, and amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ See Othman v. UK, supra note
296; Ahmed v. UK, supra note 299.
427 Chahal v. UK, supra note 270. (Indeed the fact that a person is suspected of terrorism, in
circumstances where a state is known to mistreat terror suspects, may be a factor relevant
to assessing the risk to the person upon transfer, and therefore precluding transfer on
grounds of non-refoulement.)
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to liberty and trial -should be refused, without any such ‘balancing’ of
interests.428
By contrast, in respect of those rights that can be restricted in the public
interest – such as the rights to free expression, association, private and family
life – the extraditing or immigration authorities may balance the risk of viola-
tion in the other state against the public interest in justice and crime prevention
or indeed national security.429 While jeopardy to these rights may preclude
transfer, and justify non-extradition, it does not necessarily always do so,
provided as always that the interference is necessary and proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued.
– Assessing (and proving) the ‘Real and Personal’ Risk?
The obligation of the non-refoulement rule takes effect where there are ‘sub-
stantial grounds’ for believing there is a ‘real risk’ of the relevant violations
arising in the receiving state.430 The risk has also been described as ‘foresee-
able’ and ‘personal’, as opposed to speculative or general.431
Difficult questions can arise as to whether a particular situation in a foreign
country, as applied to a particular individual, would constitute such a real,
foreseeable and personal risk, which can only be determined by a ‘rigorous’
examination of all relevant facts.432 An important part of this is an assessment
of the human rights situation in the receiving state433 and the existence of
428 See ibid.
429 See Dugard and Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition’, supra note 407, at 187.
430 The test according to the European Court, when considering the obligations of States in
transfer cases under Article 3, is whether ‘substantial grounds are shown for believing that
the person concerned, if expelled, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country’. E.g., N. v. Finland,
Appl. No. 38885/02, ECtHR, 26 July 2005; Ahmed v. Austria, 71/1995/577/663, ECtHR, 17
December 1996; Soering v. the United Kingdom, supra note 287, § 86; and Shamayev v. Russia,
supra note 268. This test is very similar to those established by other treaties or bodies, which
also refer to ‘substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger’ or ‘substantial grounds’
for believing there is a ‘real risk’ of the violation in question. See, e.g., UNCAT, Article 3;
HRC General Comment 31 (2004); Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (2002); Report on
the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Determination
System, (2000, § 154); CAT General Comment 1 (1997).
431 See, for instance, UN Committee Against Torture, E.A. v. Switzerland (28/1995), Decision
of 10 November 1997, CAT/C/19/D/28/1995, para. 11.5; S.C. v. Denmark (143/1999),
Decision of 10 May 2000, CAT/C/24/D/143/1999, para. 6.6; and Zare v. Sweden (256/2004),
Decision of 17 May 2006, CAT/C/36/D/256/2004, para. 9.3.
432 ‘In determining whether substantial grounds have been shown for believing that there is
a real risk of treatment incompatible with Article 3, the Court will take as its basis all the
material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu ...’. Saadi v. Italy,
supra note 262, at § 128.
433 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Kindler v. Canada (Comm. No. 470/1991), Views of 11
November 1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/45/D/470/1991; Ng v. Canada (Comm. No. 469/1991),
Views of 7 January 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991. See also ECtHR, Öcalan v.
Turkey. The Committee against Torture noted that, in deciding whether such danger exists,
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a ‘consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ will
provide a strong indicator of risk.434
While the risk must be ‘personal’, it may be inferred from all the circum-
stances, and need not be based on specific intelligence to the effect that the
individual has been identified or targeted by the authorities.435 The juris-
prudence of CAT for example notes that in assessing the ‘specific circumstances’
that render the individual personally at risk, particular attention will be paid
to any evidence that the applicant belongs, or is perceived to belong,436 to
an identifiable group – including a terrorist organisation – which has been
targeted for ill-treatment.437 States will therefore consider the full range of
facts – general and specific – in assessing whether, in practice, the individual
is at risk.438 In some cases they have considered whether ‘diplomatic assur-
ances’ are sufficiently specific and reliable to constitute an ‘additional factor’
of relevance to this factual evaluation of risk in particular cases.439
The onus is on the individuals challenging their transfer but if the indi-
vidual substantiates an arguable case based on ‘plausible allegations’ of such
a risk, it falls to the state to rebut these allegations.440 This is consistent not
the relevant authorities should consider ‘the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights’. Ayas v. Sweden, (Comm.
No. 97/1997), Views of 12 November 1998. Personal circumstances of the accused are also
relevant: see, e.g., the decision of the Human Rights Committee in Kindler v. Canada, above.
434 United Nations Convention against Torture (1984) Article 3(2) and International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006) Article 16(2) provide
in identical terms: ‘2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights.’ See also Othman v. UK, para 186
435 See briefs by human rights organisations, see Written Comments by Amnesty International,
the Association for the Prevention of Torture, Human Rights Watch, INTERIGHTS, the
International Commission of Jurists, Open Society Justice Initiative and Redress, submitted
to the European Court of Human Rights in Ramzy v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 25424/05,
Judgment, 20 July 2010, ECtHR.
436 It is not necessary that the individual actually is a member of the targeted group, if believed
to be so and targeted for that reason. See CAT, A. v. The Netherlands, (1998).
437 See CAT General Comment 1 (1997, § 8 (e)). For fuller elaboration, see INTERIGHTS’ brief
in Ramzy v. the Netherlands, supra note 435; see also Chahal v. UK.
438 See, e.g. Othman v. UK, para. 186.
439 The controversial practices of assurances as discussed at Part B.3.2 below. ‘There is an
obligation to examine whether assurances provide, in their practical application, a sufficient
guarantee that the applicant will be protected against the risk of ill-treatment.’ Othman v.
UK, para. 187. The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in
each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time (see Saadi v. Italy, § 148).
Factors relevant to assessing the practical application and weight provided at para. 189.
440 CAT General Comment 1 (1997, § 5): ‘“The burden of proving a danger of torture is upon the
person alleging such danger to present an ‘arguable case”. This means that there must be a factual
basis for the author’s position sufficient to require a response from the State party.’ (em-
phasis added). In Agiza v. Sweden (2005, § 13.7), the burden was found to be on the State
to conduct an ‘effective, independent and impartial review’ once a ‘plausible allegation’ is made.
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only with the practical difficulties individuals face in accessing evidence as
to the situation in another state, but also the positive duties incumbent on the
State to ensure that any transfer would not expose the individual to a risk
of serious rights violations.441
– Transfer, Refoulement and Due Process
It is a basic aspect of the principle of legality and non-arbitrariness that if the
protection against transfer to serious rights violations is to be meaningful it
must be accompanied by appropriate opportunities to challenge and prevent
transfer where rights are seriously at risk. Yet the extent to which transfer
procedures are subject to basic fair trial guarantees is contentious, revealing
an area where the law would benefit from further development.
The general provisions of human rights treaties guarantee due process
rights in respect of the determination of the individual’s ‘civil rights and
obligations.’ It would seem logical in light of the profound implications for
individuals concerned, that a decision to expel or deport must meet this
threshold. Several human rights bodies take this view, and suggest that the
fair trial provisions of Article 14 of the ICCPR are applicable to decisions con-
cerning transfer.442 By contrast, the ECtHR has generally considered the sister
provision in Article 6 of the ECHR not to apply to expulsion or extradition
proceedings,443 though there may be some indication of a shift of
(emphasis added). Similarly, in A.S. v. Sweden (2000, § 8.6) it was held that if sufficient
facts are adduced by the author, the burden shifts to the State ‘to make sufficient efforts to
determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger
of being subjected to torture’. (emphasis added). See also HRC, Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v.
Denmark, (2004, §§ 11.2-3); UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Resolution 2005/12 on Transfer of Persons, (2005, § 4); see similarly, European
Commission for Human Rights in the Cruz Varas case (1991).
441 See Positive Obligations and principles of interpretation supra 7A.4.1.
442 The Human Rights Committee, in its 2006 observations on the US Report criticised the
US for not providing judicial review, noting that ‘[t]he State party should … adopt clear
and transparent procedures with adequate judicial mechanisms for review before individuals
are deported …’ (Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America (2006), para. 16). The Committee against Torture’s Concluding Observations on
Italy’s fourth periodic report note notes “expulsion orders, without any judicial review”
and criticizes the fact “that this expulsion procedure lacks effective protection against
refoulement’ (Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, 16 July 2007, UN
doc. CAT/C/ITA/CO/4, para. 12). See also the view expressed by the UN Special Rappor-
teur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
Countering Terrorism in his 2007 Report, UN doc. A/62/263, 15 Aug. 2007, para. 53; UN
Committee Against Torture, Decision: Agiza v. Sweden, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, May
20, 2005, para. 13.7, available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/233-
2003.html.
443 The ECtHR’s refusal to consider deportation proceedings as falling within Article 6 sits
uncomfortably alongside the purposive approach that the ECtHR has long espoused, and
the criterion for the ECHR in deciding whether article 6 is engaged, namely ‘the nature
of the proceedings.’ See, e.g. Shamayev v. Russia, supra note 268.
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approach.444 In any event, despite differences of approach to the applicability
of the full range of fair trial provisions, it is clear across systems that the right
to challenge expulsion, and to do so meaningfully in accordance with certain
basic procedural guarantees, are inherent in the right of ‘non-refoulement’
and the right to a remedy in respect of the same.445 The UN Committee
Against Torture has required ‘an opportunity for effective, independent, and
impartial review of the decision to expel or remove’.446 Moreover, as any
transfer is preceded by the detention of the individual, that detention must
be in accordance with the procedural safeguards of the right to liberty
above.447
Some legitimate controversy remains as to the extent of due process guar-
antees inherent in the process, and as to whether the review must always be
‘judicial,’ as the HRC clearly sustains (‘clear and transparent procedures with
adequate judicial mechanisms for review before individuals are de-
ported …’448), or simply ‘effective, independent and impartial’ as the CAT
suggests.449
444 In Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, (Appl. No. 2947/06) (2009) 49 ECHRR 42 Article 6 was
engaged in extradition proceedings where the presumption of innocence was violated by
the extraditing authorities and in A & Others, supra note 109 (where the court found the
Art. 6 argument admissible, although it ultimately did not need to determine them as the
issue was addressed under Art. 5). See N. Mole, ‘Restricted Immigration Procedures in
National Security Cases and the Rule of Law: an Uncomfortable Relationship’, in A. Salinas
de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 738-39
445 It has noted for example that ‘the proper administration of justice requires that no irrepar-
able action be taken while proceedings are pending’ and that ‘[A]rticle 13 requires that
the concerned party have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect’. Affaire
Gebremedhin v. France, CAT, (Appl. No. 25389/05), Judgment of 26 April 2007, para. 66;
Shamayev v. Russia, supra note 268.
446 See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Italy’s fourth periodic report, the Committee expressed
concern ‘at the immediate enforcement of … expulsion orders, without any judicial review,
and … [at the fact that] that this expulsion procedure lacks effective protection against
refoulement’ (Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, 16 July 2007, note
489., para 12.
447 See Chapter 7A53 above on detention beign required to have an identifiable legal basis
and procedural safeguardsincluding the right to challenge the lawfulness of the basis for
detention and access to a lawyer, the basic elements of which are non-derogable.
448 The Human Rights Committee, in its 2006 observations on the US Report criticised the
US for not providing judicial review, noting that ‘[t]he State party should … adopt clear
and transparent procedures with adequate judicial mechanisms for review before individuals
are deported …’ (Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America (2006), para. 16). UNHCR requires judicial oversight and review prior to transfer
as a minimum guarantee against irregular transfer; see Report of the UNHCHR on the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/
HRC/4/88, 9 Mar. 2007, para. 22. See also the view expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
Countering Terrorism in his 2007 Report, UN doc. A/62/263, 15 Aug. 2007, para. 53
449 See CAT.
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– Obligation of Non-Cooperation Beyond the Transfer of Persons?
The human rights framework provides less clarity, at least as yet, as to whether
there can be said to be a more general obligation of non-cooperation. In other
words, just as serious rights violations will preclude transfer, do parallel
obligations arise in relation to the sharing of intelligence, or gathering of
evidence, or provision of other forms of support, where it is known that the
net result will be violations of human rights in another state?
One the one hand, as a matter of strict treaty construction, a person subject
to trial in another state is not within the requested state’s ‘territory’, and only
arguably subject to its ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of human rights
treaties.450 On the other, while the link between the cooperating state and
the violations is more remote than in extradition cases, it may be none the
less real in terms of impact if that state’s cooperation is instrumental in the
violation of the person’s rights. As the European Court of Human Rights has
pointed out, any interpretation of the scope of a human rights convention
should be consistent with ‘the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic
society’.451 The obligation to implement a treaty in good faith452 would
presumably preclude facilitating or encouraging other states to commit viola-
tions.453 Interpreting the underlying principles of non-refoulement as applic-
able to other forms of cooperation also finds support in those mutual assistance
treaties that reflect exceptional circumstances where human rights considera-
tions may constitute an exception to the duty to provide such assistance.454
450 As such, detention must have an identifiable legal basis, which triggers a particular legal
framework and procedure governing the detention and eventual transfer itself – for example,
it may be detention for the purposes of extradition, or pending deportation under immigra-
tion law. The procedural guarantees include the right to challenge the lawfulness of the
basis for detention and access to a lawyer, the basic elements of which are non-derogable.
450 On ‘the Jurisdiction Question’, see supra 7A.2.1, this chapter.
451 Soering v. United Kingdom, para. 87.
452 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties states that ‘[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.
453 See aspects of state practice post-September 11 discussed below, which may reflect the desire
of states not to cooperate with the US in circumstances likely to lead to human rights
violations, Chapter 4 on ‘Criminal Justice’ and state cooperation.
454 The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, for example, confirms in Article
8, that there is no obligation to afford mutual assistance if the requested State has substantial
grounds for believing that the request for mutual assistance has been made for the purpose
of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinion or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. See also
UN Mutual Assistance Treaty which envisages refusal to cooperate in case of persecution,
double jeopardy (non bis in idem) and unfair measures to compel testimony, Article 4(1)(c)-
(e). As noted in Chapter 4, part B, the principle may also be reflected to a degree in pre-
liminary state practice post-9/11.
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Moreover, as set out above455 and in Chapter 3, states may also be re-
sponsible under general international law where they aid and assist other states
in the commission of human rights violations, by the provision of direct and
concrete support.456 Likewise, in the exceptional circumstances where the
breach in the other state would be a gross or systematic breach of a peremptory
norm, further positive duties to cooperate to end the wrong may take effect,
inconsistent with cooperating with the wrongdoers.457 Considering the human
rights framework alongside broader developments in international law, there
is a compelling argument that certain forms of international cooperation and
support would be at odds with states’ international obligations, and give rise
to its responsibility, in a range of ways, as will be explored and illustrated
later in this study.458
7A.6 CONCLUSION
It is difficult to imagine human rights that are not affected by terrorism, or
by measures taken in the name of counter-terrorism. Other rights, not explored
here but often restricted in times of counter-terrorism, some of which will be
considered in the counter-terrorist practice in the following Section include
the fundamental right to equality,459 the right to family life, to thought,
conscience and religion460 and to seek asylum.461 What should be clear from
the foregoing is that IHRL is contained in a detailed body of human rights
455 Positive Human Rights Obligations, Terrorism and Responsibility, especially 7A.4.3.
456 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Article 11.
457 See Chapter 3; ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Article 41. As for the specific obliga-
tions to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions, see Chapter 6, part 6A.3.5.
458 Examples are discussed in relation to Guantanamo Bay (Chapter 8) and Extraordinary
Rendition (Chapter 10).
459 See CH 7.B.9 below on measures that may infringe this underlying right.
460 Interference with religious freedom can only be justified where there is a clear link between
the threat in question and the exercise of religious freedom, which may be difficult to
establish in the context of terrorism. See ECtHR, Agga v. Greece, Judgment of 17 October
2002. Moreover, necessary interference with religious practice must not be prolonged or
make religious observance impossible – see Cháre Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, Judgment of
27 June 2002. For an example of the insidious impact on religious freedom, see, e.g., reported
cases of prosecution for ‘anti-state activity’ and ‘religious extremism’ in Uzbekistan in see
Human Rights Watch, ‘In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses World-
wide’, Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, 25 March 2003, available at: http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.htm.
461 Article 40, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Refugee Convention, 1951. The right
to asylum is subject to limits, notably where the individual has committed a serious non-
political offence. One troubling effect of declaring that ‘terrorist offences’ are inherently
non-political is that the individuals deemed, without due process of law, to fall under this
broad rubric are then denied asylum. However, non-refoulement, supra applies to asylum
seekers and all other persons facing expulsion for whatever reason, and no matter what
offences they may be suspected of having committed.
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treaties and customary law, and developed jurisprudence, including in respect
of international terrorism specifically, which accommodate security concerns
and the challenges of international terrorism in several different ways.
Finally, the IHRL framework must also be interpreted and applied in light
of certain underlying principles – such as legality, universality, necessity and
proportionality, and equality, or the prohibition on arbitrariness or discrimina-
tion462 – which are reflected across the legal framework. Certain principles
of interpretation also inform the application of the rules, as reflected in human
rights jurisprudence.463 In particular, human rights treaties need to be inter-
preted as ‘living instruments’ that evolve over time in light of evolving human
rights practices,464 in light of their (protective) purpose,465 the principle
of ‘effectiveness’,466 and holistically, as part of a broader body of international
law.467 In this respect, human rights law cannot be understood in isolation
but mindful of the interplay between this body of law and international
humanitarian law, or the law governing states obligations in respect of peace
and security, or terrorism prevention.
The flexible restraint of the human rights rules and principles set out above
provides the framework for the analysis of the lawfulness, and legitimacy,
of states counter-terrorism policies and practices. The following section of this
chapter enquires into the application of this legal framework in practice in
the context of the fight against international terrorism.
7B HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE POST-SEPTEMBER 11
Tension between counter-terrorism and human rights is nothing new and many
questionable practices adopted in the name of counter-terrorism existed, like
terrorism itself, long before 9/11. One of the most insidious long-term effects
462 See generally McBride, ‘Study on Principles’, supra note 105.
463 In addition to the examples cited below, on human rights interpretative principles generally
see Murillo v Costa Rica, IACHR, 27 Nov 2012.
464 The content of human rights evolves over time, for example, practices that were once not
considered torture or ill-treatment may come to be so considered. See, e.g., Selmouni v. France,
supra note 276; see also the evolving recognition of gender rights in the ‘Transsexuals Cases’
before the ECHR, from Case of Rees v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 9532/81, Judgment,
17 October 1986, to Case of Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 28957/95,
Judgment, 11 July 2002.
465 ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’
VCLT, at Article 31.
466 Rights must be ‘practical and effective not theoretical and illusory’. Marckx v. Belgium, Appl.
No. 6833/74, ECtHR, 1979; Barrios Altos, supra note 183. The law should be capable of
offering real protection or it will not be effective; conversely obligations that cannot be
realized by states are unlikely to be considered effective either.
467 See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35763/97, Judgment, ECtHR, 21
November 2001.
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of the events of that day and the responses thereto may, however, have been
to clothe old practices in the new legitimacy of the ‘global’ fight against
international terrorism. In addition, practice in counter-terrorism has pro-
liferated, with a plethora of normative and political developments at the
national, regional and international levels.
This section seeks to illustrate some of the key questions that have arisen
recurrently, or are of particular significance, regarding the application of the
framework of human rights law in the context of counter-terrorism in recent
years. While the focus is on whether and how the law has been applied (or
disregarded), it touches on areas where the law may itself be subject to devel-
opment or require clarification.
Much of the practice described in this part reveals not specific violations
of the law but a wholesale disregard for law’s relevance and applicability –
to terrorism as a whole, to particular people who are seen as beyond law’s
protection, or to particular places or situations which are seen as out of bounds
for human rights protection. A fragmented approach to international law has
meant that other areas of law, notably IHL applicable in armed conflict or
obligations arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have been used in
an apparent attempt to trump human rights law in face of the challenge of
international terrorism.
This part therefore first looks at broad overarching issues that relate to
the relevance and applicability of IHRL, some of which raise at times difficult
questions regarding the interplay of legal regimes. These are: ‘security versus
human rights’ and the treatment of potentially conflicting obligations in respect
of peace and security and human rights; the extra-territorial scope of human
rights law in the war on terror; the ‘war’ and human rights and the inter-
relationship between IHL and IHRL. It then addresses specific human rights
issues arising from particular policies and practices and their impact. The scope
of ‘anti-terrorism’ laws and practices, and broad-reaching or amorphous
approaches to what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and those associated with or sup-
portive of it, has meant that the scope of those affected goes far beyond tar-
geted individuals, to broader groups, families and communities. The adverse
impact on human rights defenders or those rendering humanitarian assistance
is only beginning to be explored.468
The issues addressed in this chapter are supplemented by those addressed
in the case study chapters that follow, in relation to Guantánamo Bay de-
tentions, the killing of Osama bin Laden and extraordinary rendition. A
troubling feature of practice in recent years has been the imposition of
restrictions on judicial supervision of rights protecting, limiting the ability of
courts to contribute to a rule of law approach to countering terrorism and to
468 ‘Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian
Action,’ Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, July 2013, independent study commissioned
by ODHA and the Norwegian Refugee Council.
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provide a remedy in face of violations. Consideration of these challenges to
the judicial function and, in particular, an assessment of the role that the courts
have played in the protection of human rights post 9/11, is contained in
Chapter 11 on human rights litigation in the ‘war on terror.’
7B.1 SECURITY V. HUMAN RIGHTS POST-9/11
7B.1.1 From Conflict to Complementarity?
Security and Human Rights are dual ‘purposes’ of the United Nations,469
yet a dynamic and often tense relationship between the two pillars is nothing
new. When security is put under strain, rights are inevitably more vulnerable,
and vigilance in their protection is all the more critical. However, some perhaps
inevitable tension between security and human rights gave way to a fully-
fledged relationship crisis post-9/11, with the security agenda not only ob-
scuring human rights concerns, but being portrayed as fundamentally at odds
with them. Statements by state representatives, to the effect that the rulebook
was ‘thrown out the window’, or that ‘there was a before 9/11, and there was
an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves come off’,470 have given voice to, and
fuelled, this perception of conflict and incompatibility.
On the international level, the clearest manifestation of this phenomenon
was perhaps Security Council Resolution 1373.471 As discussed in Chapter 2,
the Security Council mandated states to take a broad range of action with
serious rights implications – including criminalising, limiting movement and
freezing of assets – against those who are involved in or ‘support’ terrorism,
without defining the terms or limiting, in time or scope, these broad reaching
obligations. Notably and critically, it did so without any reference to the
concurrent obligations to ensure that such action was taken within the frame-
work of human rights law.472 This was a calamitous rebuke to the relevance
of human rights law, and is often attributed with having spawned widespread
violations of international law, ironically in the name of compliance with
obligations under the UN charter.473
469 Article 1 of the UN Charter, supra note 18.
470 Statements by Cofer Black, former CIA head of counter-terrorism, in D. Priest and B.
Gellman, ‘U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations’, Washington Post, 26 December
2002,availableat:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/
AR2006060901356.html.
471 SC Res. 1373.
472 Human rights are mentioned only once in the specific context of asylum seekers.
473 States introduced widereaching measures that have violated human rights pursuant to
amorphous definitions of terrorism – see examples of the rights issues arising, including
violations of legal certainty- discussed later in the chapter.
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The myopic approach to human rights law has however shifted over time,
at least if one is to measure by the language of international instruments. In
counter-terrorism resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly and
regional organisations clauses providing that states must ensure that any
measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under
international law including international human rights, refugee and human-
itarian law have become commonplace.474 Moreover, gradually and belatedly,
there was also a further shift from considering human rights as a straightjacket
or even just a necessary constraint on states’ counter-terrorism armoury, to
seeing it as complementary to it, recognising human rights as inherently linked
to ‘respect for democracy and the respect for the rule of law,’ and as a critical
component of an effective long-term counter-terrorism strategy.475 A catalyst
to this may have been growing recognition of the counter-productivity of the
‘war on terror,’ and how abusive practices may have fomented radicalisation,
as seen for example in recognition of Guantánamo as ‘probably the number
one recruitment tool’ for fledgling terrorists476 or description of drone killings
as having ‘replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for
militants’.477 This was made clear in high level reports,478 including Secret-
474 An early example of the UN embarking on the return trip back to human rights law was
SC Security Council resolution 1456 of 20 January 2003, but this has been reiterated on
many occasions since. See, e.g., SC Res. 1624; ‘Protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism: Human Rights Resolution 2005/80’, 21 April 2005;
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288 of 8 September 2008). SC Res. 1963
(2010), fourth preambular paragraph.
475 See above, Human Rights Resolution 2005/80, ‘Recognizing that the respect for human
rights, democracy and the rule of law are interrelated and mutually reinforcing …’; see
also, e.g.. OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, PC.DEC/1063
(2012).
476 B. Obama, ‘News Conference by the President’ (Speech delivered at Eisenhower Executive
Office Building, 22 December 2012).
477 See, e.g., P. Alston, ‘United Nations, Special Rapporteur: UNAMA Press Conference, Kabul’,
Media Release, 15 May 2008, available at: unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details
&tabid=1761&mid=1892 &ItemID=3132>. See also Chapter 8 on the impact of Guantánamo
and Chapter 4 on the negative impact on criminal processes.
478 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A More Secure World,
Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. 1/59/656 (2004), at para. 21. See also 2005 World
Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement; see also
the Secretary General’s 2006 ‘Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global
counter-terrorism strategy’, UN Doc. (A/60/825). Secretary General Annan memorably
emphasised the ‘5 Ds’ of an effective counter-terrorism strategy: dissuade; deny terrorists
means; deter states from supporting terrorism; develop capacity and defend human rights:
Kofi A. Annan, The Secretary-General, United Nations, A Global Strategy for Fighting
Terrorism, Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Demo-
cracy, Terrorism and Security (10 Mar. 2005). See also Statement to the Security Council
at Meeting to Commemorate the One-Year Anniversary of the Committee on Counter-
Terrorism, 4 October 2002, UN Doc. SC/7523: ‘In places where human rights and democratic
values are lacking, disaffected groups are more likely to opt for a path of violence, or to
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ary-General Annan’s report In Larger Freedom (2005) which stated that: ‘While
poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to “cause” civil war,
terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability
and violence.’
The UN’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy epitomised the shift
to a holistic approach by including human rights and the related concept of
‘address[ing] conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism’ as pillars of an
effective strategy:
the promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential
to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism
measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but comple-
mentary and mutually reinforcing.479
Subsequent resolutions affirm this shift, such as SC Resolution 1963 (2010)
which was the first explicit recognition in a resolution that terrorism would
not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence
operations alone, underlining, inter alia, the need to strengthen the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.480
The fragmented approach to applicable law that early Council resolutions
reveal was also manifest on the institutional level. For example, the counter-
terrorism committee established under SC Resolution 1373 to monitor imple-
mentation of states’ counter-terrorism obligations originally emphatically
rejected any human rights dimension to its mandate.481 While multiple UN
and other entities sprang to action on the human rights implications of counter-
terrorism, significant among them the establishment of a dedicated special
rapporteur on terrorism and human rights,482 the message that was sent as
regards the marginalisation of human rights was troubling.483 Since then,
as part of the rule of law approach reflected in the global comprehensive
counter-terrorism strategy, a counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force
sympathize with those who do.’
479 The Preamble of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Doc. A/RES/60/288, 8
September 2008, notes: ‘Recognizing that development, peace and security, and human rights
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’. See pillars 1 and 4 of the Strategy.
480 SC Res. 1963 (2010), fourth preambular paragraph.
481 Statement by Sir Jeremy Greenstock denied a human rights role for the Committee on 18
January 2002, ‘Monitoring performance against international conventions, including human
rights law, is outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate.’ UN
Counter-Terrorism Committee – Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism,
available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html.
482 Established in April 2005 by the Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/80, and assumed
by the Human Rights Council (UN GA Res. 60/251). For details, see http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages/SRTerrorismIndex.aspx.
483 M. Scheinin, ‘Report by the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism to the Security Council’, UN
Doc. A/65/258, 6 August 2010, para. 72. Concern also related to lack of coordination
between branches of the UN. Ibid. at para. 74.
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has been established to coordinate efforts within the UN and externally which
should include human rights issues484 and the Security Council’s Counter-
Terrorism Committee is also now committed, in principle, to consider human
rights when reviewing state compliance with Council resolutions.485 The
Committee has, in fact, raised such concerns in its dialogues with states, though
whether it has done so sufficiently and effectively enough has been ques-
tioned.486
Despite inauspicious beginnings, the approach appears to have gradually
shifted from ignoring human rights law, to acknowledging it as a necessary
restraint and, in turn, to recognising human rights and counter-terrorism as
interrelated and mutually reinforcing.487 While these developments hold
important potential for more effective oversight in the future, challenges
remain, including how to address the many laws and practices enacted in
response to SC Resolution 1373 which remain in force, and how to fully imple-
ment the human rights approach across the practice of the UN, never mind
in individual state practice. It remains to be seen to what extent human rights
will be given the emphasis in practice that they are now given, albeit belatedly,
on paper.
7B.1.2 Igniting the Debate: Security Council Responsibility for Human Rights
Violations?
As foreshadowed in the previous section, the Security Council has assumed
an active and controversial role in the counter-terrorism agenda since 9/11,
with unusually direct and significant human rights implications for individuals.
This has given new impetus to an old debate: can the UN itself be considered
to have human rights obligations, and if so can it be held accountable for
violations?
484 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established
by the Secretary-General in 2005 to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the
counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system. CTITF consists of 25 United Nations
system entities and INTERPOL.
485 Conclusions for Policy Guidance regarding human rights and the Counter-terrorism
committee (S/AC.40/2006/PG2).
486 Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’, supra note 533, paras. 43-44. On positive
developments in the committees evidence gathering, see ibid. at para. 47, and on implementa-
tion assessments see para. 50.
487 Here we deal with UN bodies’ recognition of complementarity of HR and security but it
has been suggested that ‘too often human rights voices have conversely downplayed the
centrality of peace and security to the protection of human rights and this pitfall is to be
avoided also.’ K. Bennoune, ‘All Necessary Measures?: Reconciling International Legal
Regimes Governing Peace and Security and the Protection of Persons in the Realm of
Counter-terrorism’, in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies
in a Fragmented International Legal Order, supra note 166.
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Two groups of Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism have
impelled this debate. In different ways, they represent the Council moving
beyond its traditional role in determining threats to peace and security and
measures necessary to address them.488 The first are those resolutions, most
notably Resolution 1373 addressed above, which have been described as
embodying a new ‘legislative’ function for the Council – imposing new, broad-
ranging, general obligations, not linked or limited to a particular situation,
time or place.489 The Council has broad powers and discretion to identify
threats and to mandate particular measures that are ‘necessary’ in response,
but questions have arisen recurrently regarding the legitimacy of resolutions
that have found ‘terrorism’ in the abstract to constitute a threat to international
peace and security,490 and obliged states to take broad, unspecified and
unlimited measures in response.491 The human rights implications of these
broad resolutions, which have included the passage of terrorism laws that lack
specificity and clarity and their use to repress a range of legitimate activity,
are illustrated later in this chapter.492 Thus, for example, in his final report
to the Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism described the continued
existence of SC Res. 1373 as going beyond the powers of the Council, and as
itself a continuing threat to the protection of human rights.493
The second type of resolutions are those sometimes referred to as ‘quasi-
judicial’ resolutions which go beyond imposing obligations on states, to im-
488 Under Article 24, the Security Council has ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.’ Its powers to take non-coercive and coercive measures
are set down in chapters VI and VII. The Security Council has been referred to as an
‘executive of the international community’ in light of its most extensive powers under the
Charter. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, supra note 17, p. 702. As
explained here, the criticisms relate to an expansion into quasi-judicial and legislative
functions.
489 Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AJIL 901(2002), pp. 960-65; S.
Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislator’, (2005) 99 AJIL 175. See scope of resolu-
tions that prompted the assertion in Chapter 2.
490 The SC has repeatedly found that ‘terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes
one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are
criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever
committed …’: see SC Res. 1822 (2008).
491 ‘Pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council for the first time imposed on all
States Members of the United Nations a number of general, permanent obligations, not
connected to a specific conflict situation. In effect, this type of action amounts to the Council
establishing new binding rules of international law. The obligations laid out in resolution
1373 (2001) contain no end in time or geography and apply to any act of terrorism world-
wide. As a result, it has been contested whether it was the prerogative of the Council to
take this type of de facto legislative measure.’ Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’,
supra note 533, para. 34. See also e.g., M. Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and
the Constitution of the United Nations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of Int’l Law 593.
492 See, e.g , 7B.4 7.B.11.
493 Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’, supra note 533 at para. 39.
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posing sanctions on identified individuals and groups.494 Key resolutions
here are Res. 1267 and Res. 1390, both of which provide for ‘smart sanctions’
– in particular the freezing of assets and travel bans – on individuals desig-
nated by the UN Sanctions Committee as linked to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda
or the Taliban, while obliging states to adopt appropriate measures of enforce-
ment.495 Human rights controversies attending this ‘listing,’ ranging from
the uncertain criteria and process for inclusion on the lists to the lack of due
process to challenge inclusion, are discussed further below.496
A third terrorism-related resolution, although different in nature and
context, is worthy of note in this context. The Council’s precipitous and ulti-
mately mistaken ‘naming and shaming’ of ETA as the terrorist organisation
responsible for the 11/3 Madrid bombings in Resolution 1530 raised the
uncomfortable spectre of a somewhat gung-ho approach to terrorism by the
world’s most powerful international body.497 This has been described as
fuelling concerns regarding the capacity for manipulation of the Security
Council, its procedures and role as inquisitor and arbiter of evidence, as well
as raising questions regarding the consequences of a ‘glaringly incorrect
resolution’.498 It thus highlighted, and augmented, many of the concerns
emerging in relation to the ‘legislative’, and in particular the ‘quasi-judicial’,
resolutions highlighted above, and the corresponding lack of accountability
of the Council.
In this context, debate has been reignited as to whether the UN, or the
Security Council specifically, has a responsibility to respect human rights. The
UN, unlike states, is not a party to treaties or bound by them. Some note
however that it is bound by its own constituent instrument, the UN Charter,
which has both peace and security and human rights as purposes of the
UN.499 Others assert that it is bound by customary law,500 while the
494 While much invoked in recent practice, the term is not new: see, e.g., O. Schachter, ‘The
Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly’, 58 (1964).
495 See 7B.8 below.
496 Ibid. Part 7B.8, ‘Listing and De-listing’, below.
497 See T. O’Donnell, ‘Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution
1530’, 17 (2004) The European Journal of Int’l Law 5, 945-968.
498 O’Donnell raises questions regarding the Security Council’s role as inquisitor and arbiter
of evidence and the assumption of good faith on the part of members. Ibid. at p. 946.
499 See Arts. 1, 23 and 24, UN Charter, supra note 18. There are several bases upon which it
has been asserted in recent years that the Council must nonetheless respect human rights
law; see, e.g., Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’, supra note 533, para. 17, nn.
3-4, citing, inter alia, F. Mégret and F. Hoffman, ‘The United Nations as a human rights
violator? Some reflections on the United Nations changing human rights responsibilities’,
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25, No. 2 (May 2003), p. 317; and A. Bianchi, ‘Security
Council’s anti-terror resolutions and their implementation by Member States’, 4 (2006) Journal
of Int’l Crim. Justice 5, p. 1062. See also D. Akande, ‘The Security Council and Human Rights:
What is the role of Art. 103 of the Charter?’, EJIL Talk, 30 March 2009: ‘[T]he Council is,
as a general matter, bound by human rights law. This is because the Charter says so. Art.
24(2) of the Charter provides that in discharging its duties “the Security Council shall act
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minimalist position is that it is curtailed in the exercise of its powers by those
human rights obligations that amount to jus cogens norms.501 This has been
endorsed as a minimum by several courts and bodies post 9/11 that have
considered the relationship between Security Council resolutions and human
rights and noted that the Council’s Chapter VII powers are limited by jus
cogens,502 in accordance with the basic rule that no treaty, not even the Char-
ter, can conflict with peremptory norms.503
Beyond the legal debate is a broader discussion on the legitimacy of a
council that ‘claim[s] to represent the power and authority of the law, and
at the same time, claim[s] to be above the law’.504 As such, it has been sug-
gested that ‘it would be odd indeed to hold that the organization from which
the international protection of human rights originated and which still looks
at their protection as one of its fundamental goals, be exempted from the
obligation to respect them’.505 However, even if one accepts responsibility
in principle, the intractable reality remains that there is no forum to hold the
Council to account, or to provide individuals an opportunity to challenge
directly measures that may have a devastating effect on their rights.
Some fledgling acknowledgment of its responsibility for human rights may
be discerned from Resolution 1822 which suggests that the role of the United
Nations in leading the effort to combat terrorism should itself be in accordance
with human rights,506 fair and transparent.507 Later, the establishment of
an Ombudsperson with powers to review the al-Qaeda sanctions lists and
‘recommend’ delisting may provide further evidence of a degree of responsive-
ness to mounting pressure for a measure of Security Council accountability
in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”’
500 J. Paust, ‘The UN Is Bound by Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human
Rights, Remedies and Non-immunity: Responding to Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the
Standard of Effective Control Into a System of Effective Accountability’, (2010) 51 Harvard
Int’l Law Journal 301.
501 See Chapter 11
502 See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, Judgment, ECtHR, 7 July 2011; see also
Kadi I Case T-315/01.
503 VCLT, at Article 64.
504 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Provisional Measures, Order of
14 April 1992, [1998] ICJ Rep. 110 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings at 110)
in Bennoune. The full quote is: ‘[i]t is not logically possible to claim[s] to represent the
power and authority of the law, and at the same time, claim[s] to be above the law.’ From
Bennoune, ‘All Necessary Measures?’, supra note 487.
505 Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’, supra note 483, para. 17 (citing Bianchi,
‘Security Council’s anti-terror resolutions’, supra note 499 at p. 1062).
506 SC Res. 1822 (2008), Preamble, which notes that the effort by states and the UN ‘needs’
to conform to human rights, IHL and refugee law.
507 Ibid. at para. 28. States must take the measures to fully implement the resolution (including
in accordance with human rights), para 27. See also Part 7B.8.
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and some recourse for individuals whose rights are directly affected by its
actions.508
Moreover, in practice, an indirect form of oversight has emerged, as courts
and bodies have adjudicated the human rights effects of resolutions, albeit
quite explicitly not addressing UN responsibility as such but the responsibility
of states (in contributing to the UN sanctions lists509 or in the way they imple-
ment Council resolutions510). These human rights decisions may in turn
contribute to momentum towards respect for human rights by the Council
itself, and further improvement in its internal processes and safeguards where
the Council’s acts directly impact on individuals. In light of remaining gaps
and uncertainties in respect of UN accountability, emphasis must for now
remain on understanding the nature of states’ obligations, and ensuring that
individuals can seek justice for violations against states. Controversy in this
respect has been no less acute, as addressed in the following section.
7B.1.3 Obligations of States Implementing Security Council Resolutions and
Human Rights
Some of the most challenging legal issues to arise post-9/11 have involved
the question of the interplay of legal norms or legal regimes.511 Among them
is the question of the inter-relationship between states’ human rights obliga-
tions and their obligations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to implement
Security Council resolutions concerning the protection of international peace
and security. The issue has provoked considerable controversy post-9/11, and
given rise to numerous cases before national and international courts.512 Two
issues that have emerged in the context of states implementation of UN obliga-
tions are worth distinguishing. One is the question of attribution of acts carried
out by states pursuant to Security Council authorisation. Some states have
argued that certain measures taken pursuant to Security Council resolutions
were really attributable to the UN and not to member states acting under UN
508 The Office of the Ombudsperson created by SC Res. 1904 in 2009, and extended by Res.
1989 in 2011, provides for individuals or entities seeking to be removed from the Security
Council’s Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee List to submit their request to the Ombudsperson
who makes recommendations on delisting which will be followed unless the Committee
decides otherwise by consensus within 60 days: see Part 7B.8. Note other sanctions lists
(not relevant to this study’s focus on terrorism) have no such built-in process and less
accountability.
509 Nabil Sayadi and Partricia Vinck v. Belgium, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/
D/1472/2006, 29 December 2008 (‘Sayadi v. Belgium’).
510 Al-Jedda v. UK, supra note 502; Sayadi v. Belgium, ibid; Kadi I, and Case T-85/09 Kadi v.
Commission [2010] ECR II-5177 (Kadi II); Case of Nada v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 10593/08,
Judgment, ECtHR, 12 September 2012.
511 On the interplay between HR and IHL, see The ‘war’ and Human Rights, 7B.3 below.
512 See Chapter 11.
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mandate.513 This was argued for example in the al Jedda v. UK case before
the ECtHR concerning detentions by UK troops in Iraq and in the first Kadi case
before the European Court of Justice challenging the EU sanctions listing
regime.514 Courts have rejected these arguments, emphasising that it is a
question of fact whether the states, or the UN, exercised the necessary ‘effective
control’ over the conduct in the particular situation: in the context of the UK-
run prison in Iraq, for example, the de facto control clearly fell to the UK, not
the UN.515 Particularly given the lack of accountability of the UN itself, it is
important that States have not in practice been shielded from responsibility
on the simple basis that they were acting under a broad UN umbrella.
The second and more complex question is whether, and if so how, states’
human rights obligations apply when implementing Security Council resolu-
tions. Post-9/11, in relation to both the freezing of assets pursuant to the
Security Council ‘terrorist lists’,516 and the implementation of resolutions
considered to authorise detentions in Iraq,517 for example, states have argued
that they are not accountable for alleged infringements of their human rights
treaty obligations when giving effect to binding obligations arising from
Chapter VII resolutions. States have often invoked Article 103 of the Charter,
which provides that if there is a conflict between a state’s treaty obligations
and those under the Charter, the latter prevails.518 Whether this is an unjusti-
fiable attempt to evade human rights responsibility, or appropriate deference
to the Council’s role in the protection of peace and security, is a matter of hot
dispute.
The specific cases in which these issues have unfolded are discussed in
Chapter 11 on human rights litigation, but a few principles that emerge from
the consideration of these issues post-9/11 are worth highlighting. The first
is that the attempt to invoke Article 103 to completely preclude judicial con-
513 States have cited Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway,
45 EHRR SE10 (2007) (‘Behrami and Saramati’), both controversial cases in which the ECtHR
found that acts of KFOR in Kosovo were attributable to NATO and not to member states.
The Court found the UN and not states to be responsible, whereas the better view may
be that both states and the UN could have concurrent responsibility. See, e.g., M. Milanović,
Posting, 14 January 2008, Opinio Juris, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2008/01/14/is-the-
us-army-in-iraq-acting-for-the-un.
514 Al-Jedda v. UK, Kadi I, supra note 502.
515 Al Jedda, ibid.
516 In Sayadi v. Belgium, supra note 509, the acts of the state had lead to the individual being
listed in the first place; in Kadi, the acts in question related to the implementation of
sanctions. See also Nada v Switzerland, ECtHR, note 510. On the national level the ‘tension’
was noted
in, e.g., Abousfian Abdelrazik v. the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada,
2009 FC 580, at para.4
517 Al-Jedda v. UK, supra note 502.
518 Art. 103: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’
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sideration by courts and bodies giving effect to states’ human rights obligations
has been unsuccessful.519 Courts have been willing to look at the relevance
and inter-relationship of both sets of norms in the context of the particular
case. Although Article 103 cannot be (and has not been) ignored by courts
applying human rights law, neither does it end the enquiry. Rather, it consti-
tutes the starting point for an analysis in which states’ obligations in the two
fields have been read together.
Secondly, practice suggests that while states’ responsibility to implement
resolutions is beyond doubt, they must respect their human rights treaties
obligations in the exercise of their discretion as to how to implement them.
As one expert group noted, ‘[s]tates have a responsibility to implement Security
Council resolutions. In the exercise of their discretion in the choice of methods
of implementation, they should ensure conformity with human rights, inter-
national humanitarian law and other relevant bodies of international law.’520
Put differently, it may be said that their accountability is commensurate with
the extent of their discretion.521 In a similar vein, in cases concerning de-
tention in Iraq, or the implementation of sanctions against individuals without
judicial review, states have been found to fall foul of human rights obligations
that they could have met consistently with their obligations in respect of peace
and security.522
Thirdly, it has been suggested that in interpreting the obligations imposed
by the Council there should, in the words of the Human Rights Committee,
‘be a presumption that the Security Council did not intend that actions taken
pursuant to its resolutions should violate human rights’.523 Both the HRC and
ECtHR post-9/11 have indicated that resolutions must be interpreted in the
519 See Baroness Hale in the House of Lords in Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007]
UKHL 58, on appeal from [2006] EWCA Civ 327 (rejecting the idea of ending legal enquiry
by the invocation of Art. 103), and Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma’s joint declaration
in the Lockerbie case noting that, ‘it is not sufficient to invoke the provisions of Chapter
VII of the Charter so as to bring to an end ipso facto and with immediate effect all judicial
argument on the Security Council’s decisions’. Questions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United
States), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep. 115. See
discussion in Bennoune, ‘All Necessary Measures?,’ supra note 487.
520 ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-terrorism and International Law’, L. van den
Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counterterrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal
Order, supra note 142. para. 83 (hereinafter ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations’).
521 In Nada, the ECHR found the state had violated its obligations in its implementation of
the UN sanctions regime. On the controversy as regards the extent of any discretion in
this respect, see the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska
supra note 510. See also Chapter 11.
522 See, e.g., ECHR: Al-Jedda v. UK, supra note 502, and Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 510; ECJ:
Kadi v. Council, note 511.
523 Sayadi v. Belgium, supra note 510 at p. 36.
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manner most consistent with HR obligations.524 In most concrete cases, they
have come to the conclusion that there is in fact no necessary conflict between
Council obligations and their implementation consistently with human
rights.525 One open question is how the matter would be handled by the
Courts if the Security Council would, or could, clearly and explicitly oblige
states to take measures that did necessarily and unavoidably violate human
rights obligations.526Another such question may be the effect of the right to
judicial challenge on the domestic level, in the event that domestic courts find
that, for example, measures against an individual are unlawful but the Council
maintains the individual on its lists.527
In extending its approach to peace and security post-9/11, the Council has
‘individualised’ international obligations, with unprecedented direct affects
on the rights of individuals. Human rights courts have suggested that indi-
viduals must have the right to challenge measures that infringe their rights
domestically, whatever their provenance. In doing so they have refused to
drive a wedge between peace and security and human rights obligations, but
seek to apply them together and consistently. A number of questions remain
and practice in this area is unfolding. The precise parameters of the inter-
relationship between states’ obligations in this area, like the questions related
to the responsibility and accountability of the Council itself, may be areas
where law and practice are evolving under the influence of the ‘war on terror’,
524 See, e.g., most recently Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 510 at para 170, referring also to Al-
Saadoon v. UK, supra note 397, § 126; Al-Adsani, supra note 467, § 55; and Banković v. Belgium,
supra note 60, §§ 55-57; see also the references cited in the ILC study group’s report entitled
‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and ex-
pansion of international law’, para. 81.
525 Contrast the lack of explicit language requiring internment in Al-Jedda v. UK, to the explicit
language on travel restrictions in Nada v. Switzerland. The ECHR noted in Al-Jedda that:
‘it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used if the Security Council
intended States to take particular measures that would conflict with their obligations under
international human rights law’ (para. 102). The Court accepted that the presumption did
not operate due to the explicit language though it found that ‘Switzerland enjoyed some
latitude, which was admittedly limited but nevertheless real, in implementing the relevant
binding resolutions of the UN Security Council’. Ibid., para. 180. The Court found it in
violation, in light of this latitude, and did not have to consider whether there was a conflict
with 103; ibid. at para 197.
526 See part 7B1.2. At least as regards jus cogens, and in the view of some customary law,
resolutions mandating violations of these norms would be of doubtful validity. Nada v.
Switzerland, supra note 510.
527 See M. Milanović, ‘European Court Decides Nada v. Switzerland’, EJIL, 14 September 2012,
available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-nada-v-switzerland; see also
T. Thienel, ‘Nada v. Switzerland: The ECHR Does Not Pull a Kadi (But Mandates It for
Domestic Law)’, Weblog of the Netherlands School of Human Rights Research, 12 September
2012, available at: http://invisiblecollege.weblog.leidenuniv.nl/2012/09/12/nada-v-switzer-
land-the-ecthr-does-not-pu.
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and which undoubtedly deserve greater attention and emphasis at the inter-
national level.528
7B.2 THE GLOBAL ‘WAR ON TERROR’: LEAVING HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
AT HOME?
The ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT) has been executed in large part on the
international stage, characterised by an increased exercise in military,
intelligence gathering and/or law enforcement powers by states beyond their
national boundaries. This corresponds to the assertion by the United States
government that ‘known political boundaries ... do not exist in the war on
terrorism’.529 In this context, critical questions arise in relation to the applica-
tion of international human rights law extra-territorially,530 rendered more
pressing by the many reports of states violating human rights abroad.
Practice in the course of the so-called war on terror highlights the mani-
pulation of the ‘extra-territoriality’ issue to avoid the applicability of human
rights law. In its most extreme manifestation, detentions at Guantánamo were
predicated on the detainees being held in an ‘extra-territorial’ and hence –
for all intents and purposes – ‘extra-legal’ space.531 But the issue arises far
beyond Guantánamo, embracing for example other ‘off-shore’ detentions
around the world,532 the conduct of intelligence agencies and others engaged
in surveillance or intelligence gathering abroad,533 the activities of ground
troops overseas534 or targeted killings of suspected al-Qaeda operatives in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and, potentially, beyond.535
528 Leiden Policy Recommendations, supra note 520, para. 54; Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the
Security Council’, supra note 483. This reflected in Rule of Law discussions at the UN level.
529 ‘The President has made clear that we will fight the war on terrorism wherever we need
to fight the war on terrorism ... this is a different kind of war, with a different kind of
battlefield, where known political boundaries, which previously existed in traditional wars
do not exist in the war on terrorism.’ Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer, Aboard Air Force One,
5 November 2002, available at: http://georgewbush-www.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/11/20021105-2.html. See other manifestigations of this position in Chapter
6.1.1.2
530 See legal framework section in this chapter 7A.2.1.
531 See Chapter 8 on ‘Guantánamo Bay’.
532 See Chapter 10 ‘Extraordinary Rendition’.
533 Chapters 7B13 and 10.
534 See Chapter 9 ‘The Killing of Osama bin Laden’ and Chapter 10 ‘Extraordinary Rendition’.
535 For more information, see B.3.3 below and Chapter 6.B.2.2 on ‘Targeted Killings, ‘Drones’
and IHL’.
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7B.2.1 Detention or Interrogation of prisoners abroad?
The arrest, detention and interrogation of prisoners since 9/11 have led to
widespread allegations of arbitrary detention, torture and other
mistreatment.536 Does the human rights framework apply to these arrests
and detentions, or does it matter that they take place in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Italy, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, or on international waters?537 In this respect,
questions regarding the applicability of the human rights framework should
be straightforward, with previous decisions from, for example, the Human
Rights Committee, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
ECtHR having specifically decided that the human rights obligations of the state
under whose authority persons are arrested or detained apply, irrespective
of where, geographically, that authority is exercised.538
Despite this, it is noteworthy that the US has maintained before treaty
bodies that its obligations under the ICCPR did not or do not arise in respect
of Guantánamo, the rendition programme, and detentions in Afghanistan or
Iraq for example, on the basis of, inter alia, the ‘extra-territorial’ nature of the
states action.539 The US administration has also argued that its obligations
under the Convention against Torture were not applicable to operations against
non-nationals abroad, including in Guantánamo or in the CIA detention pro-
gramme, backing up its position by reference to a reservation to the territorial
536 See Chapter 6 on IHL generally, and specifically 6B.2.5 ‘Detentions, Terrorism and IHL’,
which discusses the multiple reports of mistreatment of prisoners in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
537 See Chapter 8 on Guantánamo Bay, discussing inmates who were detained in many states
around the world prior to their transfers to Guantánamo, and Chapter 10 on Extraordinary
Rendition which gives a sense of the diversity and range of locations where individuals
were first detained. Reports note individuals apprehended during the military operations
in Afghanistan have been detained in detention facilities in off-shore US Navy ships: see,
e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held
by US Forces’, 29 January 2002, available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/
usa/pow-bck.pdf; M. Chinoy, ‘Marines setting up detention center’, CNN.com, 15 December
2001, available at: http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/ 12/15/
ret.chinoy.otsc. See also P. Wolfowitz and Gen. Pace, DoD News Briefing, 18 December 2001,
where the US Deputy Secretary of Defense acknowledged the presence of five detainees
(‘one Australian, one American, and three Taliban/al Qaeda’) aboard the USS Peleliu,
transcript available at: http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2001/t12182001_t1218dsd.html.
538 Cases such as Ilascu v. Russia, Öcalan v. Turkey, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (HRC), and Coard
v. US and Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay (Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights) all concerned arrest and detention abroad and reiterated the principle of extraterri-
torial application of human rights obligations in this context, as noted in 7A2.
539 The US interprets the ICCPR as only applying within its own borders though human rights
bodies reject this approach: See its First Periodic Report: U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (18 Dec. 2006); Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports
of the United States to the UN Committee on Human Rights, supra note 21.
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scope of the CAT.540 In its 2011 submissions to the HRC for example the US
tone and approach changed slightly, and it ‘acknowledged’ in its response
that its position on the extra-territorial effect of the treaty obligations is at odds
with the position of the human rights treaty bodies and ICJ, though without
apparently committing to bringing its position into line with international legal
authority.541 Arguments on extra-territoriality have at times been accom-
panied by the broader argument, at odds with the most basic legal principles,
that its obligations under international law in this respect must be understood
by reference to its internal law.542
While the US maintains that the detention and interrogation of non-US
nationals abroad falls beyond the oversight of human rights bodies,543 this
view has been roundly rejected by the bodies themselves.544 As the Inter-
American Commission reaffirmed in this context:
The determination of a state’s responsibility for violations of the international
human rights of a particular individual turns not on the individual’s nationality
or presence within a particular geographic area, but rather whether under specific
circumstances, that person fell within the state’s authority and control.545
The issue was also contentious at least temporarily in the United Kingdom,
where the government’s approach shifted over time. When the issue of extra-
territoriality arose in the context of persons allegedly tortured and ill-treated
in UK custody in Iraq, the UK at first contended that the ECHR did not apply
540 See Ratifications and Reservations: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at:http://www.ohchr.org/english/
countries/ratification/9.htm#reservations. On the basis a reservation referring to the
understanding of cruel treatment under domestic law, the US Administration interpreted
the scope of Article 16 as covering acts committed within US territory or against a US
national abroad. See, e.g., Report of expert meeting on procedural safeguards for security
detention in non-international armed conflict, Chatham House and ICRC, London, 22-23
September 2008, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/security-de-
tention-chatham-icrc-report-091209.pdf 5 December 2012 and Chapter 10.
541 See US’ Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 21.
542 The Administration also argued that the Federal Torture Statute, which applies to acts
committed outside the United States, criminalises only torture and not other inhuman
treatment, so its law excluded criminal liability for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
See also interpretations of the scope of CAT above.
543 As discussed elsewhere, the rejection of the extra-territorial effect of IHRL is combined
with the argument that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees. See ‘Interplay’
discussion of specific issues below, part B.3; see also Duffy, ‘Harmony in Conflict?’, supra
note 141.
544 See the Committee’s responses in its periodic reports, above.
545 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay
(citing Coard et al. v. the United States, supra note 80, para. 37).
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to such persons (contradicting its earlier position),546 but it later conceded
that at least as regards persons within the physical custody of the state, its
human rights obligations under the Convention applied.547 As noted in Part
A this accords with a developed body of human rights jurisprudence, which
was affirmed by the European Court in the Iraq cases, that states’ human rights
obligations do apply the detention and transfer of persons abroad.548,549
Judicial practice post-9/11 therefore confirms what was clear before: that
where the state arrests or detains individuals abroad it exercises sufficient
power, authority or control over them that they fall within its power and are
protected by its human rights obligations.550 The real issue to be addressed
regarding arrest and detention is not, or should not be, whether human rights
law is applicable, but whether the arrests or detentions are lawful according
to the applicable legal framework.551
7B.2.2 Extra-territoriality and Lethal force
More controversial issues have arisen in relation to the extra-territorial applica-
tion of the IHRL framework where the individual is not taken into custody but
is killed by state agents abroad. Does use of force by military or other organs
of the state in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere fall to be assessed by reference
to the state’s human rights obligations? Are targeted killings through the use
of drones or otherwise beyond the purview of the state’s obligations due to
its extra-territorial locus?552
This issue arose squarely in relation to the disputed applicability of the
European Convention (ECHR) to the conduct of British troops in Iraq mentioned
in the previous section. The resulting litigation in the al-Skeini case (considered
in more detail in Chapter 11), both exemplifies a government seeking to draw
territorial lines around its human rights obligations, and the judicial rejection
546 This arose in al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 62. Its position contradicted pages 13 and 24 of
the UK Government’s pleadings in Banković v. Belgium, supra note 60, wherein the govern-
ment, then opposing the application of the ECHR in the context of aerial bombardment,
draw a sharp distinction between those facts and the ‘classic’ authority of the state to arrest
and apprehend.
547 See its position by contrast on lethal force, in al Skeini, discussed below and in Chapter 11.
548 See al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 62; Al-Saadoon v. UK, supra note 397; Al-Jedda v. UK.
549 Chapter 7A.2 for the legal framework.
550 See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’.
551 See rules on detention at 7A.5 above and in more detail in Chapter 8. In the context of armed
conflict, the lawfulness of detention under IHRL must be understood by reference to IHL,
see 7b.3 below.
552 See Chapter 6 on facts relating to drone killings, and Chapter 9 on the killing of Osama
bin Laden by Special Forces.
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of such artificial delimitations.553 The UK government argued in that case,
and domestic courts felt compelled to accept,554 that while the ECHR did pro-
tect individuals in the custody of the UK it did not protect persons killed or
injured by UK soldiers on the streets of Basra. It was argued by the government
that absent effective territorial control, UK troops could not be expected to
ensure respect for the full range of human rights under the Convention, and
as the Convention could not be ‘divided and tailored’, it was simply inapplic-
able in such situations.555 Thus it was argued and UK courts accepted, some-
what anomalously, that persons held in UK custody in Iraq were covered by
the Convention but persons killed on the streets of Basra were not.556 How-
ever, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR rejected this approach. In al-Skeini v.
UK, it held that the Convention applies extra-territorially where a state’s agents
exercise ‘physical power and control’ over individuals, including through the
lethal use of force.557
Drone attacks in Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya and potentially
beyond,558 involve the extra-territorial force on a growing scale that is giving
rise to mounting international concern. By the same principle employed in
the al-Skeini case in Iraq, individuals identified and targeted by lethal force
may be considered within the ‘exercise of physical power and control’ of the
attacking state in a direct and obvious way. While the applicability of IHRL
to this practice is questioned by the US,559 the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial Executions expressed concern about compliance with the IHRL frame-
work, rejecting any question as to the applicability of the human rights frame-
work arising from their extra-territorial location.560
553 Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, 13 June 2007. The case concerned
six appellants, the first five of whom had been killed by UK ‘patrols’ in occupied Basra:
while eating a family evening meal, during a raid on a family member’s house or while
driving a minibus; the sixth, Baha Mousa Baha, was tortured while in UK custody in Iraq.
In its judgment of June 2007, the UK House of Lords found the European Convention to
apply only to the sixth as he was in UK custody at time of death.
554 The Court felt compelled to follow the controversial Grand Chamber Banković v. Belgium,
emphasising the importance of ‘territorial control’ as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. See A.2.2.
above.
555 See UK arguments in al-Skeini v. UK, paras. 137, 142.
556 Ibid.
557 Ibid. at para. 136.
558 See ‘the war and human rights’ below on strikes and IHRL, and Chapter 6 ‘Drones’.
559 See, e.g. H. K. Koh, Legal Advisor, Department of State, ‘The Obama Administration and
International Law’, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (ASIL), 25 March 2010, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm (hereinafter ‘Koh ASIL Speech’). See also the US’ Second, Third and Fourth
Periodic Reports to the HRC.
560 See P. Alston, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Study
on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010,
available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.
24.Add6.pdf (hereinafter ‘Study on Targeted Killings’).
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Recent practice may confirm that when individuals are taken deliberately
within the power and control of states, whether through detention or the use
of force – by drone attack, ground troops or in a special operation consisting
of trained Navy SEALs (such as in the killing of Osama bin Laden, discussed
separately)561 – the human rights framework applies irrespective of the
geographic locus of the operation. The most contentious and difficult issue
in relation to killings in Pakistan or Yemen, of Osama bin Laden, or of other
use of force in the WOT is generally not whether IHRL is applicable or excluded,
but, as discussed in the next section, whether IHL also applies, and whether
the attack in question is justified according to applicable law.562
7B.3 THE ‘WAR’ AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The misleading overuse of the language of ‘war’ and the consequent jeopardy
to the integrity of international humanitarian law was noted in the previous
chapter. The impact on human rights law, and on human rights protections
in practice, may be all the more profound. On one level, an emphasis on the
armed conflict paradigm may contribute to the erroneous notion that terrorism
should, or can, be defeated militarily.563 The fight against terrorism post-9/11
has been characterised by the persistent conceptualisation of terrorists as
abstract ‘enemies,’ which focuses on pursuing their ‘defeat’, sometimes at any
cost, rather than seeing them as human beings with rights and responsibilities,
subject to the penalty of law, but also the protection of it. This in turn risks
undermining the perceived relevance of regular criminal law enforcement
responses to terrorism and its potential to reinforce the rule of law.564 An
‘enemy-focused’ or ‘law of the enemy’ approach to law565 can only undermine
the fundamental principle of universality, and the legitimacy of a rule of law
response to the challenges of international terrorism.
In practice, the ‘war’ has at times been invoked post-9/11 in an apparent
attempt to suggest that human rights are simply inapplicable to all matters
related to the detention, treatment or killing of terrorist suspects anywhere
561 Chapter 9.
562 Chapter 7A.2.
563 On growing recognition, in particular on the international level, that terrorism will not
be ‘defeated’ militarily, see SC Res. 1963 in 7B.1 ‘Security v. Human Rights Post-9/11’.
564 Introduction Chapter 4 on the role and potential of criminal law.
565 See the ‘law of the enemy’ approach – a criminal law doctrine posited by Gunther Jakobs
(1985) whereby groups of (potentially dangerous) individuals are identified as ‘enemies’
by the criminal justice system, and singled out for differential treatment within the criminal
law, involving, for example, prospective punishment and procedural irregularities, as in
the war on terrorism discussed in Chapter 4. M. Tondini, ‘Beyond the Law of the Enemy:
Recovering from the Failures of the Global War on Terrorism through (Criminal) Law’,
in Processi Storici e Politiche di Pace / Historical Processes and Peace Politics, Vol. 3, No. 5, 2008,
pp. 59-81 describes the GWOT as ‘a form of law of the enemy on a global scale’.
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in the world.566 From a legal point of view this can be straightforwardly
dismissed as a misunderstanding of the human rights framework’s continued
relevance in situations of emergency, and the co-application of IHL and IHRL
in armed conflict.567 The impact on the perceived relevance and applicability
of human rights law is nonetheless insidious.568 Even on a correct under-
standing of the interplay between IHRL and IHL, a precise appreciation of when
‘war’ is really an armed conflict as opposed to a rhetorical device, may in
certain situations have a profound impact on applicable law, and is therefore
critical to the shape of human rights protection, as discussed below.569
The correct identification of the legal framework matters for other reasons
too, as practice illustrates. Even where the areas of law enjoy substantive
coherence,570 they are characterised by a procedural imbalance on the inter-
national, and perhaps the national, level.571 The lack of an international
complaints mechanism to give effect to IHL contrasts to an intricate network
of international and regional human rights courts and bodies where individuals
566 See the US position – that its obligations under the ICCPR or IADHR do not apply to
detention, rendition or lethal use of force in armed conflict – discussed below in this section.
See also the US’s Second and Third Periodic Reports to HRC, supra note 27; and the US’
Fourth Periodic Report to HRC.
567 See discussion 7A.3.4 and more fully in Duffy, ‘Harmony in Conflict?’, supra note 164.
568 See by way of example the discussion on the impact of the ‘war on terror’ and global
‘securitiation’ in various Latin American states in ‘Terrorism and anti-terrorism in South
America with a special consideration of Argentina, Chile and Colombia’, Böhm González-
Fuente y Sandino, in Sistema Penal y Violencia, Porto Alegre, Volume 4 – Número 1 – pp.
46-74 – Janeiro/Junho 2012.
569 Ibid. While the focus here is on applicable international law, it is noted that the existence
of war may also change applicable domestic law. One example may be the domestic law
of the United States relating to the ‘assassination’ of foreign nationals prohibited during
peacetime since 1975, while during wartime a different (and more permissive) body of law
is used to define assassination; see M.N. Schmitt, ‘State Sponsored Assassination in Inter-
national and Domestic Law’, 17 (1992) Yale Journal of Int’l Law 609.
570 This arises most obviously in respect of torture or inhumane treatment or fair trial, while
basic principles of non-arbitrariness, due process and humane treatment of persons are
guaranteed under any framework; see, e.g., Pejic and Droege, ‘The Legal Regime’, supra
note 167. But, as noted below, even in respect of classically different issues such as the
application of the right to life in conflict situations, while the starting points may be
different, there may be some convergence; see below and e.g., L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The right
to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the answers?’,
88(64) (2006) Int’l Review of the Red Cross, pp. 881-904, at 897.
571 On the national level, access to courts may depend upon one or other applicable area of
law. For example, in al-Skeini the object of the litigation was to compel the UK government
to carry out an investigation into the alleged violations in Iraq as required by the ECHR,
incorporated via the UK Human Rights Act. See also e.g. Presidency of the Council of Ministers
v. Markovic and ors, Application for preliminary order on jurisdiction, no 8157; ILDC 293
(IT 2002), 08 February 2002, para. 117 where Italian law implementing IHL treaties did
not confer upon individuals the right to seek compensation.
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may pursue their right to a remedy.572 Governments arguing that human
rights treaty obligations did not apply in particular situations (such as the UK
in Iraq or US in Guantánamo) have cited the continued application of IHL to
negate the notion that this creates a ‘legal vacuum.’573 In practice the effect
(and perhaps aim) of their positions would be to put their actions beyond the
oversight of international or regional courts and mechanisms.574 Clarity as
to which bodies of law apply, and how that legal framework operates in
particular situations therefore matters, leading to potentially different rules,
to decisive differences for victims seeking remedies and accountability and
to implications for those charged with implementing the law on the
ground.575
For these reasons, and in the interest of legal certainty, it is critical to have
clarity as regards two questions addressed below: whether IHL in fact applies
and, if so, what is the nature of the interplay between the legal regimes in
particular situations? As noted below, practice in the war on terror has ob-
fuscated both questions. This section therefore sketches out as well as having
a broader significance for legal certainty some of the more challenging issues
regarding applicable law and interplay of IHL and IHRL that have arisen in
practice.
7B.3.1 Armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associates and the approach to
Interplay in the War on Terror
As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the key issue around which much of the
legal and policy debate has revolved in recent years is whether or not there
can be a global armed conflict with terrorist organisations, specifically ‘al
Qaeda and associates’, triggering the application of IHL. In brief, while success-
ive United States administrations have asserted the existence of such a war
with al-Qaeda and associated groups, to which the ‘law of war’ paradigm is
572 IHL supervisory systems such as the Protecting Power mechanism, the enquiry procedure
and the International Fact-Finding Commission (Article 90 Protocol I) have been little used
in practice. The role of the ICRC may be important in assisting victims of IHL violations
such as detainees, but it is not an individual complaints procedure and communications
are confidential. Cf.human rights mechanisms, see 7A.1 above.
573 See, e.g., UK government’s arguments in R (al Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, paras.
11-25 and al Skeini v, UK at para. 119 (citing the applicability of IHL in support of the
inadmissibility of the human rights case); or the US Government’s Response to the Inter-
American Commission’s Request for Precautionary Measures in relation to Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, denying the jurisdiction of the Commission in respect of acts covered
by IHL: U.S. Response to IACHR, Precautionary measures ILM 1015 (2002).
574 The role of international courts and bodies is particularly important where national remedies
are blocked, due to e.g. state secrets, national security laws or immunities: see B.14 below
and Chapter 10.
575 Duffy, ‘Harmony in Conflict?’, supra note 141.
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said to apply,576 by stark contrast, most other states appear to reject the war
paradigm and with it the notion of al-Qaeda as per se a party to an armed
conflict.577 The test for an ‘armed conflict’ and the applicability of IHL is a
legal one,578 not dependent on the position of those engaged,579 and under
the current framework of IHL it is highly doubtful that there can be an armed
conflict with a loose ideological network of entities such as ‘al-Qaeda and
associates’, still less a ‘global’ one that is limitless in time and space.580 While
there have been and remain armed conflicts (such as in Afghanistan),581 state
practice outside the US provides an ever more resounding rejection of the
notion of a broader global war on terrorism or against al-Qaeda and associated
groups.582
It bears emphasis that for the vast majority of action against terrorism, IHL
standards are not therefore applicable and have no bearing. It may be that
inflated resort to the war paradigm in relation to counter terrorism over a
period of years since 9/11 has distorted popular perception of human rights
standards, of the relevance of IHL, or of the significance of some of the ques-
tions around interplay. For most of the measures against terrorism discussed
in this chapter, international human rights law provides the appropriate legal
framework for assessing lawfulness.
Where measures are taken in association with a genuine armed conflict,
what impact does that have on human rights law? As a matter of international
law, as set out above,583 it is beyond reasonable controversy that human
rights law continues to be applicable in times of armed conflict. Yet in practice,
576 While Bush famously coined the phrase the ‘global war on terror’, the Obama administration
contains to assert that it is at war with al-Qaeda and associated groups. The normative
battle on whether there is or can be a global conflict with al-Qaeda shows no sign of ceding.
See Chapter 6, including Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on National Security’, The White
House Office of the Press Secretary, 21 May 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09; see also, Obama,
‘Inaugural Address’, 20 January 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
inaugural-address: ‘Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and
hatred.’ Koh ASIL Speech, supra note 559.
577 See Chapter 6B.1.1 ‘Armed conflict with al Qaeda, associates and “terrorist groups of global
reach”?’
578 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 7 May 1997, 35 ILM
(1996) 32;. Garraway & Dinstein, ‘The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed
Conflict: With Commentary’, 36 (2006) International Institute of Humanitarian Law, pp. 71.
579 States may deny the application of IHL for many reasons, including in order not to confer
legitimacy on insurgents. In practice, in litigation applicants may not invoke it as it does
not assist their case. It thus falls to the court to invoke IHL propio motu which it may be
particularly reluctant to do. See F. Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty






the ‘war’ has been invoked post-9/11 in an attempt to marginalise the rel-
evance of human rights.584 The absence of IHRL from legal justifications
presented by successive US administrations, in relation to what the US Legal
Adviser to the State Department has referred to as ‘the law of 9/11’, is note-
worthy.585 Likewise, in public statements and responses to international
bodies in relation to a range of issues concerning detention, treatment or killing
terrorist suspects, the US has explicitly rejected the applicability of human rights
treaty protections to such issues, in part on the basis that such measures are
or were taken as part of conducting an armed conflict to which the laws of
war apply.586 While some slight shift in the US position has emerged over
time, towards acceptance in principle that IHRL is not suspended in its entirety
in armed conflict, on all relevant issues related to US conduct abroad referred
to above, the US government denies the relevance of IHRL.587
In support of its position, the US has generally cited IHL as ‘lex specialis’
on relevant issues from detention, treatment of persons to the killing of terrorist
suspects, to the effective exclusion of IHRL.588 This suggests an apparently
monolithic approach to the inter-relationship between IHL and IHRL, with the
former replacing wholesale the latter on all issues related to the conflict, which
denies several aspects of the symbiotic relationship between the two branches
of law set out in Part A.589
It fails to recognise that the inter-relationship between IHL and IHRL has
to be determined norm-by-norm in the context of particular situations and
not on a regime wide basis. By denying the relevance of IHRL, it fails to pursue
a harmonious approach to the bodies of law where possible, or to acknowledge
584 See, e.g., U.S. Response to IACHR, supra note 573;. See also, e.g., Koh ASIL Speech, supra
note 559, which justifies detentions and lethal force by reference to the existence of a conflict
(and self defence), without any reference to the applicability of IHRL.
585 Ibid.
586 See, e.g., U.S. Response to IACHR, supra note 573 and; the US Periodic Reports to the HRC,
supra note 21.
587 See shifted in the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States the UN Committee on Human
Rights, supra note 21: recognises that ‘a time of war does not suspend the operation of the
Covenant to matters within its scope of application,’ citing the rights to adopt a religion or belief
of one’s choice or the right to vote (para. 506). It distinguishes these from a ‘state’s conduct
in the actual conduct of hostilities’, to which it apparently takes a very broad approach,
determining that covers all relevant issues related to detention, treatment of persons and
the use force (para. 507). On these, it appears to continues to deny the applicability of
ICCPR, though in less explicit terms than previously.
588 Statements by US officials notably ignore or discard the relevance of IHRL: see, e.g., Koh
ASIL Speech, supra note 559; the US Second and Third Periodic Report to HRC, and the
marginal shift of position in the Fourth Periodic Report to HRC, supra note 21.
589 For a more detailed discussion, see Duffy, ‘Harmony in Conflict?’, supra note 141. In the
Fourth Periodic approach that reflects some movement in principle by noting some difficult
issues arise and that it should be a fact specific determination, but the net effect on its
position remaisn the same – that it denies the applicability of IHRL to the various issues
of detention, treatment and use of force discussed below. It may show some potential for
future development of approach. US’ Fourth Periodic Report to HRC, supra note 21.
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any ongoing role for IHRL as an interpretative tool even where there are norms
of lex specialis.590 Critically, as the examples below highlight, a simplistic
approach to displacement of IHRL by IHL by reference to ‘lex specialis’ denies
any difficulty in the identification of applicable norms. Lex specialis arises where
there is a norm more appropriately directed towards (or in the views of some
more precisely or specifically addressing) the conduct in question.591 While
in many armed conflict situations this will be IHL, particularly in conduct of
hostilities situations which IHL is particularly directed towards, and in inter-
national conflicts where a detailed normative framework may be more likely
to provide the required legal clarity and specificity, this may not be the case
in non-international armed conflict situations, where IHL may well not specify
binding norms, or ones that provide clear specific parameters for particular
action.592 Moreover, within either type of armed conflict, the particular
scenario or issue may in all the circumstances be more akin to the sort of
situations to which IHRL was in fact directed.593 There may then be many
situations where it is doubtful that IHL provides legal rules at all, or ones that
do in fact appear more precisely directed to the situation in hand, sufficient
to displace IHRL.594
While the issue of interplay is contentious, what is clear is that there is
no legal basis for the wholesale displacement of IHRL by IHL on a regime wide
basis, or for the refusal to even consider IHRL norms as applicable to issues
related to the conduct of an armed conflict.595 This section highlights three
issues that illustrate different aspects of this interrelationship between human
rights and IHL, which have arisen in practice post-9/11. They highlight the
implications of the disregard of IHRL in favour of an exclusive approach to
IHL, but also, in places, some of the more genuinely challenging legal issues
regarding interplay.
590 On harmonious interpretation, see A.3.3 above and Duffy, ibid, ILC Report 2006, supra note
21, para. 43.
591 See 7A.3.3 ibid. as to how the notion has been used in practice to embrace at least two broad
conceptually different ideas of a) contextual relevance or appropriateness on the one hand,
and b) clarity and precision on the other.
592 See, e.g., ‘Review of Lawfulness of detention’ below; acknowledgement that NIACs within
one state’s borders raise complex issues in US’ Fourth Periodic Report to HRC, supra note
21, para. 206, but this would not appear to apply to the cross border conflict it purports
to be engaged in with al-Qaeda.
593 The issue of which norm is more appropriately or specifically directed to the issue at hand
depends on a broader range of contextual factors than simply the existence of armed conflict;
e.g., situations of occupation, hostage taking, in the many situations beyond active hostilities.
The situation may be closer to one IHRL was directed towards..
594 Put differently, absent a lex specialis, the lex generalis of IHRL continues to apply at all times.
595 As noted above, the US’s Fourth Periodic Report talks of IHL applying without IHRL in
conduct of hostilities, but appears to take an expansive view, considering detention, inter-
rogation, rendition and treatment of persons as falling under that rubric.
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7B.3.2 Interplay 1: Detention in non-international armed conflict?
As recalled at the start of this section, the grounds for detention in IHL and
IHRL differ substantially. IHL provides detailed rules for international conflict,
essentially allowing for the detention of persons taking part in hostilities for
the duration of the conflict, or of civilians where imperative while reasons
of security so demand.596 The IHRL rules, addressed above, strictly circum-
scribe detention without criminal charge.597 While in the context of an armed
conflict, limited in time and place, the IHL rules provide a lex specialis that
justifies detentions that would otherwise be arbitrary, that have been relied
upon in the context of an uncertain war on an undefined enemy that is
potentially global, and which may never end598 to justify the potentially in-
definite detention of persons on security grounds.
The question of the procedural safeguards to which ‘security detainees’
are entitled, particularly in non-international conflict, raises particular
challenges concerning the interplay of IHL and HRL.599 Human rights and
IHL again differ considerably on this point. IHRL sets down in some detail
procedural guarantees which include the right – applicable at all times – to
access to a court to challenge the lawfulness of detention, as well as surround-
ing rights concerning access to a lawyer and to a core of the underlying
evidence.600 The question of whether all detainees, wherever detained, are
entitled to this basic review of the lawfulness of detention, and specifically
to judicial review as required by human rights law, has provoked serious
controversy.601
596 J. Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force’,
ICRC, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
597 Ch 7A.5.3 Liberty and Detention; see also B.6 ‘Restricitng Liberty in Liberty’s Name’.
598 Chapter 6 B.1.1.1 ‘The “Global” War’, and 6B1.1.2 ‘War without End?’
599 Sassóli and Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights
law’, supra note 148, p. 616. The legal source of any power to detain in NIAC is itself
controversial, though it may be considered implicit, and the alternative would be great
loss of life, this could not be consistent with the principles of IHL of humanity and military
necessity. The focus here is however on procedural guarantees. Pejic, ‘Procedural principles
and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other
situations of violence’ 87(858) (2005) International Review of the Red Cross 375.
600 See Part A on detention, and Chapter 8 on Guantánamo Bay: the lawful bases for detention
differ between IHL and IHRL and a more limited right of judicial oversight exists under
the former. Under IHRL, while some detailed due process guarantees are derogable, it has
been held that the ‘core’ in non-derogable and specifically that access to a court is a right
applicable at all times, even in situations of crisis and emergency. Regarding evidence, this
can be limited under IHRL as long as there is a meaningful opportunity to challenge and
sufficient information to this end.
601 The US position is that there is no right to habeas for ‘enemy combatants’ as clear from
litigation discussed below. Human rights jurisprudence suggests otherwise as noted below.
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It is also a subject of acute importance in practice. While the US Supreme
Court has found persons detained at Guantánamo Bay pursuant to a non-
international armed conflict entitled to habeas corpus,602 the application of
habeas to detainees elsewhere, including many in custody in Afghanistan, has
thus far been denied on the basis that they are detained in a zone of armed
conflict.603 In an interesting twist, as discussed in Chapter 11, the litigation
seeking the right to habeas corpus for Bagram detainees reveals that some
of those detained at Bagram had not been captured in Afghanistan at all, but
elsewhere around the globe and transferred into the zone of conflict for de-
tention purposes.604 The federal district court judge therefore ruled that as
these detainees were not captured in an area of war, they had the right to
challenge their detention; the appeals court overturned, finding that as the
site of their detention was in an ‘active theatre of military combat,’ the detainees
held at Bagram had no right to challenge their detention in a US court.605
As a matter of international law, according to which legal framework (and
by reference to which approach to the inter-relationship) do we begin to
answer the question of the extent and nature of a detainee’s entitlement to
review of the lawfulness of detention in a non-international armed conflict
such as Afghanistan?606 Is it IHRL, with its clear right to challenge lawfulness
before an independent court of law, or is there a conflicting norm of IHL?607
602 Lakhdar Boumediene, et al., Petitioners v. George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.
553 U.S. For a discussion of US and other litigation, on Guantanamo Bay or Bagram,
Afghanistan see Chapter 11. For the habeas right in practice in Guatánamo, see Chapter 8.
603 The US administration denies the applicability of habeas, invoking the ‘law of war’ paradigm
as purported justification (without accepting that the standards of review under GCIV apply
either). See the unfolding litigation, referred to further below, in this section, see, e.g., Al-
Maqaleh, et al., v. Gates et al, US Court of Appeals for District of Columbia, Case No. 09-5265
decided 21 May 2010. Some detainees continue to be held by the US without access to a
lawyer or other procedural safeguards. On current review processes in Afghanistan, see
Goodman, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence Value, 85 International
Law Studies (Naval War College, 2009).
604 Petitions for habeas relief were brought in April 2009 by a Tunisian and two Yemenis who
allege that they were captured outside Afghanistan (in Thailand, Pakistan and another
locations beyond the Afghan border, all far from hostilities), mistakenly identified as
terrorists and transferred for imprisonment to the Bagram Air Base military prison in
Afghanistan..
605 Al-Maqaleh, et al., supra note 603. The Court stated that ‘the Boumediene analysis has no
application beyond territories that are, like Guantanamo, outside the de jure sovereignty
of the United States but are subject to its de facto sovereignty’. The Supreme Court has
declined to exercise jurisdiction.
606 The key issue is whether the entitlement is to review by a court, thought fundamental in
human rights law, by contrast to IHL’s provisions (in international conflict only) providing
for other forms of review.
607 See, e.g., Öcalan v. Turkey, paras. 103-5; Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts.
27(2), 25 and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87,
6 October 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 9 (1987). UN Joint Study on Global Practices,
at para. 47, in relation to secret detention; General Comment No. 29 on States of Emergency,
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If the conflict were international, there would be specific provisions on
POW protections, including limited review of their status by an Article 5 GC
III tribunal, or on periodic review of the detention of civilians on imperative
security grounds by an ‘appropriate court or administrative body’, and a right
of appeal, under GC IV.608 But for a non-international armed conflict, such
as that in Afghanistan, the situation is very different:609 while the prohibition
on arbitrary detention in general has been described as customary law in either
type of conflict,610 there are no specific IHL rules on challenging lawfulness
in non-international conflicts at all.
Where IHL makes no specific provision, several approaches can be identi-
fied. One approach that has been suggested is the application by ‘analogy’
of law applicable in international armed conflict.611 Another suggests that
there is a ‘gap’ to be filled, and proposes a new document setting out basic
standards and procedures for administrative detention in armed conflict.612
However, if there is no norm of IHL on one side, and a norm of IHRL on the
other, it may be doubtful whether there is normative conflict, or a gap to be
filled that might justify such application by analogy.613 If we accept that IHRL
applies in armed conflict, and there is no lex specialis to supersede IHRL, then
the rules of that body of law should, presumably, apply. In this vein, it is
noteworthy that for example a group of UN experts concluded in the context
of the war on terror that the right to habeas corpus and other main elements
of the rights to detention and fair trial ‘must be respected even in times of
emergency, including armed conflict’.614
supra note 30 at para. 14.
608 See Chapter 6 ‘Detention’ and Chapter 8, referring to Article 5, GC III; Articles 43 and 78
of GC IV. By providing for such review by an ‘appropriate court or administrative body’
GC IV accepts that judicial review is not always required though it may imply there should
be such review where it is feasible.
609 NIAC is the most relevant scenario now in respect of Afghanistan for example (and more
broadly if one were to take the minority view, as the US administration has and the
Supreme Court may have done in the Hamdan case – of accepting the existence of a broader
NIAC with al-Qaeda and associated forces. See 6B.2.5.
610 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 187 at p. 344, though for NIACs, it is human
rights law that the Commentary cites in support of the view of customary IHL.
611 Sassóli and Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights
law’, supra note 602, p. 623; see Goodman, supra note 661, on the application of GC IV review
board in Afghanistan.
612 Pejic, ‘Procedural principles’, supra note 658. Both approaches emphasise IHL principles,
motivated by a desire to ensure that applicable law is realistic and feasible and that it will
ultimately be complied with. See also Sassóli and Olson, ibid, pp. 617-18.
613 One question is whether binding law can be displaced by principles applied by analogy,
and whether that would that be beneficial to the end of securing rule of law in any event;
Duffy, ‘Harmony in Conflict?’.
614 UN Joint Study, para. 47. ‘In short, the main elements of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant,
namely the right to habeas corpus, the presumption of innocence and minimum fair trial
guarantees, as well as the prohibition of unacknowledged detention, must be respected
even in times of emergency, including armed conflict.’
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Some question whether IHRL can adapt to the realities of detention in
conflict situations, most often citing intense battlefield scenarios or situations
where courts may be unavailable, though these may not often be the situations
that have arisen in the so called war on terror.615 A certain degree of flexibil-
ity is inherent in the application of the IHRL framework in light of particular
contextual realities, and while judicial review of the lawfulness of detention
is not a right that can be dispensed with,616 it remains to be seen how human
rights courts would apply that rule in the context of, for example, short term
delayed judicial access in the oft-invoked genuine battlefield detention
scenario.617 But certainly over time and with distance from such a scenario,
there is less legitimate claim to the need for flexibility.618 A fortiori, where
the individuals have been transferred into conflict situations by their captors,
as has transpired to be the case in the ‘Bagram cases’ for example, it would
seem highly unlikely that arguments concerning the exigencies of the situation
would be viewed sympathetically.619 Caution may be due to ensure that an
unduly broad recourse to ‘battlefield’ scenarios is not allowed to justify the
absence of human rights protections in situations where individuals could in
fact be brought before a court.
The nature of procedural rights governing detention in non-international
armed conflict is clearly an area where there are reasonable differences of
615 Pejic, ‘Procedural principles’, supra note 658.
616 See UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Human Rights and the
Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers
at Chapter 5, 4.2; IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, 30 January 1987, Ser. A, No.9
(Advisory Opinion on Emergency Situations); Brogan v. United Kingdom (1988) Ser. A, No.
145-B, 11 EHRR 117; HRC, General Comment 29, supra note 30 at para. 16. Other aspects
of the right to liberty can be derogated from: e.g., the ECHR has recalled in the context
of military detention in Iraq that the right to detain under IHL on grounds that would be
impermissible under IHRL required derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR: Al-Jedda v.
UK. The court was critised for refusing, however to consider IHL as regards other lawful
bases of detention; J. Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment: the
oversight of international humanitarian law’, 93(883) 2011 International Review of the Red
Cross 837.
617 The ‘battlefield’ scenario has often been used loosely and abstractly in the war on terror..A
distinction is due between a genuine battlefield scenario and this broader notional ‘battle’.
Courts are likely to consider whether regularly constituted courts were genuinely unavail-
able and for how long – see, e.g., Medvedyev and Ors. v. France, supra note 78, and perhaps
whether temporary alternative independent but non-judicial review were provided immedia-
tely.
618 In such circumstances the IHRL framework – and maybe even also the principles of IHL –
would require that judicial review be provided; see Sassóli and Olson, ‘The relationship
between international humanitarian and human rights law’, supra note 602, on ‘harmonious’
interpretation in this context.
619 As noted in Chapter 11, the DC Circuit Appeals court referred to ‘pragmatic obstacles’
stemming from the detention being within the sovereign territory of another state, but noted
the ‘speculation’ as to the government avoiding oversight by using the base in this way.
Al-Maqaleh, et al., at p. 25.
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approach to the question of interplay, and as regards the nature of the review
to which detainees are entitled. While many questions remain, what is clear
is that invoking armed conflict and IHL as a lex specialis governing detainee’s
rights in non-international armed conflict, to the exclusion of IHRL, cannot
provide all the answers.
7B.3.3 Interplay 2: Drones and Targeted Killings: Armed Conflict or Assassina-
tion?
The classic scenario in which the lex specialis of IHL has been long recognised
as applying is in relation to the lethal targeting of persons who are combatants
or take a direct part in hostilities.620 The rules of IHRL and IHL are different
on this issue, as are the assumptions on which the rules are based. Notably
the fundamental principle of distinction that underpins IHL – protecting the
immunity of certain persons from attack, while others are legitimate targets –
is foreign to IHRL, which emphasises instead the universality of human rights
protections, as well as the prevention of loss of life and minimisation of harm.
By resort to IHL and the permissibility of attacking ‘legitimate objectives’
in conflict, the US seeks to justify one of the most controversial practices of
the war on terror: the widespread targeted killings of allegedly high-level
members of al-Qaeda.621 When, on 3 November 2003, US authorities carried
out an aerial attack on Yemeni soil resulting in the death of Qaed Senyan al-
Harithi – a suspected high-level member of al-Qaeda – and five other suspected
al-Qaeda associates,622 it began a campaign of lethal attacks that has dramatic-
ally increased in scale and intensity – with media reports indicating that drone
strikes killed 2,525-3,613 people in Pakistan from June 2004 through mid-
October 2013623 – and in geographic scope, having reportedly spread to
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond.624 In this way a policy
620 See Kretzmer, ‘Rethinking the Application of International Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts’, (2009) 42 Israel Law Review 1.
621 For more detail see Chapter 6.
622 ‘CIA missile kills al-Qaida suspects’ The Guardian, 5 November 2002, available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/05/alqaida.terrorism.
623 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organisation,
reports that drone strikes killed 2,525-3,613 people in Pakistan from June 2004 through mid-
October 2012; http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones; see
generally, Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 561; ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury,
and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan’, Stanford Law School and
NYU Law School, September 2012, available at: http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf (hereinafter ‘Living Under
Drones’). For more detail see Chapter 6.
624 See, e.g., Living Under Drones, ibid.; see also P. Harris, ‘ACLU takes CIA to court as agency
denies existence of drone programme’, The Guardian, 19 September 2012, available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/19/aclu-us-drone-programme-court (hereinafter
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of assassinations, long rejected by the US,625 has been de facto re-introduced,
reflecting similar practices long used by some other states against alleged
terrorists (and condemned internationally).626 Information continues to
emerge that raises or deepens concern as to the frequency of attacks, nature
of the targets (as well as reliability of information and intelligence on which
targeting decisions are made) and sheer scale of the number of victims.627
These attacks have, however, been justified as military operations related
to an armed conflict, governed by the laws of IHL and by reference to the right
of ‘self defence’.628 The self defence referred to is not the immediate pro-
tection of the life of individuals carrying out an operation or others, which
IHRL might recognise as justifying the lethal force in exceptional circumstances
where strictly necessary.629 It is, rather, the right to use lethal force in self
defence of the state (jus ad bellum) discussed at Chapter 5, which is independent
of the question whether the force is employed lawfully (jus in bello), which
must be assessed by reference to the framework of IHL or IHRL discussed here.
The IHL justification depends primarily on the intractable threshold question
of whether there is an armed conflict and whether any particular attack is
‘ACLU takes CIA to court’).
625 The ban, originally contained in an Executive Order adopted by President Ford in 1975,
is now in force as Executive Order No. 12,333 (Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1982),
reprinted in 50 USC § 401 (1982)), though it has been noted that there are ‘so many options
... to get around the ban that the Order should not be viewed as a practical ban, but instead
as a preventive measure to stop unilateral actions by officials within the government and
a guarantee that the authority to order assassinations lies with the President alone’; N.
Canestaro, ‘American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality
of Maintaining the Status Quo’, 26 (2003) Boston College International and Comparative Law
Review 1, p.24. See for more detail M.N. Schmitt, ‘State Sponsored Assassination’, supra note
569 at p. 616.
626 As noted in Chapters 5 ‘Peaceful Resolution of Disputes and Use of Force’ and 9 ‘The Killing
of Osama bin Laden’, related ‘counter-terrorist’ policies by Israel and Russia have met with
condemnation. See, e.g., European Council statement condemning the Israeli strike on Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin, March 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 9048/04.
627 See Chapter 6.B.2.2 Targeted Killings, ‘Drones’ and IHL.
628 Official justifications for such killings have been set out in speeches over time: see, e.g.,
J. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Terrorism, The Ethics
and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Address at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 30 April 2012, available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/04/brennanspeech; E. Holder, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Address at
Northwestern University School of Law, 5 March 2012, available at: http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html; J. C. Johnson, General Counsel,
Department of Defense, National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama
Administration, Address at Yale Law School, 22 February 2012, available at: http://
www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-
lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448; Koh ASIL Speech, supra note 559. Obama’s
speech of 13 May 2013 on US drone and counterterror policy, in Chapter 6, purported to
set new policy guidelines. Legal justifications refer to IHL (discussed in Chapter 6) and
to self defence (see Chapter 5) but not to IHRL.
629 See 7A.5.1 and Chapter 9.
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carried out in the context thereof. If one rejects the assertion of a global war
against al-Qaeda and associates, a determination falls to be made case-by-case
as regards whether particular attacks targeted persons who were combatants
or persons taking an active part in another (genuine) armed conflict in
Afghanistan or possibly Pakistan.630 If, as seems more likely for many indi-
viduals targeted in Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia or beyond, they are targeted
in what is considered an efficient way of removing would be ‘terrorists’,631
but not in relation to an armed conflict to which IHL applies, their killings fall
to be assessed exclusively under IHRL. Under IHRL the use of force may be
lawful in exceptional circumstances, but it is subject to extremely strict
limits.632 As explored elsewhere, the use of lethal force may be lawful where
‘strictly unavoidable to protect themselves or other persons from imminent
threat of death or serious injury’ and provided operations were carefully
planned and executed to prevent and to minimise the use of lethal force.633
While difficult issues of necessity and proportionality may arise in capture
operations gone-wrong, as highlighted by the questions around the killing
of Osama bin Laden in Chapter 9, this is distinct from planned killings, where
the use of force is not based on an imminent threat and no attempt is made
(or, given the technology, could be made) to apprehend the suspected criminal.
As such, human rights bodies have long condemned the practices of targeted
killings as a violation of IHRL, irrespective of the threat of terrorism that the
state may seek to confront.634
Viewed through the prism of human rights law, then, targeted killings
constitute a violation of the internationally recognised right to life, amounting
to extra-judicial executions, an international legal norm that has been described
630 On the strong basis to doubt the compatibility of many of the strikes with IHL, see 6B.2.2.
IHL questions include whether the particular individuals targeted were directly participating
in hostilities at the time of the attack, whether they could and in the circumstances should
have been captured rather than killed, and whether rules regarding proportionality were
respected. The nature of some of the targets, including mosques, schools, funeral processions
and meetings, have been criticised as having disproportionate civilian casualties; see, e.g.,
Living Under Drones, supra note 623.
631 When Leon Panetta admitted to using drones in October 2011, he referred to them as ‘the
only game in town’. ‘Panetta admits to Employing Drones in Pakistan’ The Tribune, 8
October 2011, available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/269384/panetta-admits-to-employ-
ing-drones-in-pakistan. Several public statements have spoken to the efficiency and effective-
ness of drones; see, e.g., Living Under Drones, supra note 623.
632 See. 7A.4.3.1.
633 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, paras.
87, 107. See Chapter 7A.4.3.1 and 9 on the immediacy requirement for self-defence in the
context of the Bin Laden operation.
634 See Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.8 (1992), para. 8. E. Gross, ‘Thwarting Terrorist Attacks by Attacking the Perpetrators
or Their Commanders as an Act of Self Defence: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty
to Protect its Citizens’, 15 (2001) Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 195.
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as having attained jus cogens status.635 Among the growing critics of the
Obama administration’s policy of targeted killings and the failure to investigate
in their wake are the UN Special rapporteur on extra-judicial executions who
has noted that if other states invoked the same practice and justifications the
result would be ‘chaos’, as well as the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
academic institutions and NGOs.636 Attention is also increasingly focused on
the broad ‘terrorising impact’ of drones on communities beyond those
targeted,637 which may violate several other rights beyond the right to life,
as well as having broader implications for security and recruitment to terror-
ism.638
So far as IHL does apply, a question of relevance that has arisen increasingly
post-9/11 is whether and in what circumstances there is also an obligation
under IHL to capture instead of kill the adversary, and whether there are
implications for the question of interplay? This was the subject of a well-known
judgment on the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists in the Israeli
Supreme Court’s ‘Targeted Killings’639 case of 2006. The Court decided that
despite the existence – in the court’s view – of an armed conflict,640 where
arrest of an adversary was in all the circumstances a feasible alternative to
lethal killing and posed no risk to the opposing party, the army was bound
635 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, para. 102(2). There
can be no derogation from the right to life under human rights treaties, and ‘necessity’
cannot justify violations of jus cogens norms..
636 Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 614; O. Bowcott, ‘Drone Strikes Threaten 50 Years
of International Law, Says UN Rapporteur’, The Guardian, 21 June 2012, available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/drone-strikes-international-law-un#start-of-
comments; ‘US Drone Strikes “Raise Questions”-UN’s Navi Pillay’, BBC News, 8 June 2012,
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18363003; Letter from Amnesty
International et al. to Barack Obama, President of the United States, 31 May 2012, available
at: http://www.madre.org/index/resources-12/madre-statements-57/news/letter-to-admin
istration-pressing-for-transparency-on-drone-strikes-805.html; ‘US: Transfer CIA Drone
Strikes to Military’, Human Rights Watch, 20 April 2012, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/04/20/us-transfer-cia-drone-strikes-military; M. E. O’Connell, ‘Lawful Use of
Combat Drones’, Subcomittee on Natonal Security and Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2010.
637 Living Under Drones, supra note 623, pp. 73-103.
638 Ibid. at pp. 131-138. Rights implications may include for the right to private life, family
life, an adeaquate standard of living, housing and health. On concerns regarding counter-
productivity, see B.1 above.
639 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (Supreme Court of Israel,
HCJ 769/02, December 2006) (hereinafter ‘Targeted Killings’), available at: http://elyon1.
court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM.
640 This determination is controversial. See, for example, M. Milanović, ‘Lessons for human
rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror: comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted
Killings Case’ (2007) 89(866) International Review of the Red Cross 373, at 383.
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to capture, not kill.641 More recently, the ICRC has adopted a broadly similar
approach in its Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities.642
These developments are often cited as demonstrating the relevance of
human rights standards (on the use of lethal force as a last resort) in armed
conflict contexts. The developments may, alternatively, indicate that in certain
situations the outcome of the application of IHL and IHRL are not as dissimilar
as is sometimes assumed. The rationale underpinning the decision by the Israeli
Court, and certainly the ICRC Guidance, was based on principles of respect
for military necessity and humanity, which are underlying IHL principles.643
The mutual influence of IHRL and IHL is undoubtedly seen, however, in the
Supreme Court’s adoption of language drawn over from the human rights
world, which may reflect implicit recognition that, even in the broad context
of what was understood as an international armed conflict, there are certain
factual scenarios where IHRL principles are particularly relevant to the inter-
pretation of IHL.644 These developments may suggest that the gulf between
the areas of law is gradually narrowing, in line with the evolution and ‘human-
isation’ of IHL, influenced by the parallel development of IHRL.
So far as this approach is reflected elsewhere and continues to evolve, the
issue of normative conflict in this field, and the vulnerability of individuals
to gaps in the legal framework, may become less significant. While interplay
raises complex issues, what is clear from war on terror practice is that invoking
a war paradigm does not provide carte blanche for the lethal use of force. Still
less can a putative global conflict with an ill-defined ideological enemy provide
legal justification for sidestepping the right to life on a potentially global scale.
7B.3.4 Interplay 3: Investigating and remedying violations
One issue that has provoked controversy in the context of drone killings, which
also raises interesting issues of interplay, is the duty to investigate and to
provide a remedy for violations. States need to make assessments based on
information that will not always be in the public domain, and intelligence or
the decisions based on it cannot be readily second-guessed, yet the limited
information available regarding the drone programme, and the history of the
war on terror, may provide an unlikely basis for confidence that the correct
legal determinations can be left entirely in the hands of government.645 The
641 Targeted Killings, supra note 639.
642 Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under IHL’,
ICRC, Geneva, 2009 (hereinafter ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’), pp.991-1047. See Chapter 6, 6A.1.
643 The ICRC commentary refers to the principle of humanity.
644 This reflects e.g., Guerrero v. Colombia HRC decision, supra note 228, albeit the current case
is more controversial as it concerns a clear rule of IHL on targeting combatants in IAC.
645 On attempts to access information concerning the drones programme, see, e.g., ‘ACLU takes
CIA to court’, supra note 624.
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lack of official information on drones compounds growing concerns regarding
the limitless power that is being afforded to the president to decide who lives
and who dies, absent oversight, and the inability for individuals or family
members of those on the CIA hit list to challenge wrongful inclusion.646 In
principle, the onus lies on the state carrying out an attack to demonstrate its
legitimacy, and to investigate promptly, effectively and independently where
there are plausible allegations of criminality.647
In relation to the duties to investigate and provide a remedy, there are
examples of emerging practice that encourage the co-application and har-
monious interpretation of IHRL and IHL, interpreting one body to give content
and detail to the other.648 The then Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Ex-
ecutions pointed out that the duty of states to investigate alleged unlawful
killings does not cease in time of conflict (and indeed the duty is reflected
in IHL provisions too), though it must be applied sufficiently flexibly that it
takes account of contextual realities.649 In turn, in relation to the right to a
remedy, IHL may be less clear but the rights elaborated in the context of human
rights law have been drawn across as tools to interpret and put flesh on the
skeletal approach of IHL. This is seen for example in the United Nations ‘Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’.650
646 See, e.g., litigation that sought information regarding the grounds for putting someone on
a ‘kill-list’ and the lawful basis for this asserted authority to use lethal force in Al-Aulaqi
v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 1469) in Chapter 6. Related cases
have been brought in Pakistani and UK courts.
647 Multiple crimes may be committed depending on each context: the war crime of unlawful
killing of protected persons or disproportionately affecting civilians; extra-judicial executions
as a form of crime against humanity or simply various forms of unlawful killing common
in domestic law; see Chapter 4A. On duty to investigate see Chapter 7A.3.
648 IHRL has detailed rules on these matters, ibid., whereas IHL arguably reflects these rules
but does not provide the same level of detail as to their content IHRL may help to clarify
the precise nature of states obligations to, e.g., carry out a prompt, thorough, effective and
independent investigation into serious violations of IHL. For more detail see Duffy,
‘Harmony in Conflict?’, supra note 141.
649 Alston, 2006 Report, supra note 290 at para. 26: ‘36. Armed conflict and occupation do not
discharge the State’s duty to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses. ... It is un-
deniable that during armed conflicts circumstances will sometimes impede investigation.
Such circumstances will never discharge the obligation to investigate – this would eviscerate
the non-derogable character of the right to life – but they may affect the modalities or
particulars of the investigation. In addition to being fully responsible for the conduct of
their agents, in relation to the acts of private actors States are also held to a standard of
due diligence in armed conflicts as well as peace. On a case-by-case basis a State might
utilize less effective measures of investigation in response to concrete constraints. For
example, when hostile forces control the scene of a shooting, conducting an autopsy may
prove impossible. Regardless of the circumstances, however, investigations must always
be conducted as effectively as possible and never be reduced to mere formality.’
650 Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, supra note 174.
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These examples show the role of the United Nations in the cross-fertilisation
and harmonisation between the two areas of law, through the elaboration of
(in this case ‘soft law’) standards.651 They certainly support the suggestion
that resort to IHL as a purported basis for setting aside human rights obliga-
tions is inconsistent with the international legal framework.
7B.3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the attempt to justify as lawful the alarming increase in the
number of targeted killings in recent years is the clearest example of how resort
to the ambiguous language of war may be invoked to avoid responsibility
under IHRL. The relevance of IHL in the post-9/11 terrorism context is limited.
Counter-terrorism should pursue criminal accountability and prevention within
a rule of law approach, which involves strict adherence to IHRL. It is important
to resist the erroneous reshaping of legal standards to accommodate an IHL
component to the legal framework that simply does not apply outside genuine
armed conflict. Where IHL does apply, it does so alongside IHRL, creating a
more comprehensive and adaptable legal framework that falls to be applied
norm by norm in the particular scenarios.
If a state does seek to rely on ‘wartime’ standards, it may be reasonable
to expect that the consequences of the application of the IHL framework be
taken on board in their entirety. Yet it is this attempt to suspend one set of
legal protections, without acknowledging the application of another, that leaves
rights particularly vulnerable.652 While targeted killings are justified as
military operations against persons engaged in an armed conflict, governed
by the laws of IHL, the consequences that flow from the corresponding IHL
status of captured individuals, whether as a combatant/prisoner of war or
a civilian taking part in hostilities, are denied.653 Many other examples of
selectivity, and exploitation of putative gaps between legal regimes, can be
found in practice, where detainees have been denied IHRL protections,
purportedly as they are detained in relation to an armed conflict, and then
651 Mutual influence in the drafting of international standards is well recognized. E.g. art. 75
API is often cited as incorporating directly Art. 14 ICCPR fair trial standards, while the
development of human rights law of forced disappearance including the Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006, UN GA Res. 61/177, 20
Dec. 20 2006, has been cited as showing the influence of IHL standards on the right to
information for example.
652 Note that IHL itself enshrines protections of the human person that in some cases go beyond
those of IHRL – see, e.g., Prisoners of War discussion in Chapter 8, Guantánamo Bay.
653 If combatants for targeting purposes, the detainees should entitled to be treated as POWs
if captured. If, on the other hand, they are considered ‘unprivileged’ belligerents, they are
for IHL purposes ‘civilians’ entitled to the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention
upon capture. See Article 50, GC IV; see generally, Chapters 6 and 8.
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subsequently denied IHL safeguards on the basis that they were ‘dangerous
terrorists’ or ‘enemy combatants,’ beyond the protection of the Geneva Conven-
tions.654
The anomalous situation in which individuals are transferred into an armed
conflict situation, which is then used to justify the non-applicability of human
rights protections on detention, is another example of the pernicious approach
to carving out gaps in individual protections and undermining the effective-
ness, credibility and legitimacy of the legal framework.655 The ongoing lack
of procedural guarantees for Bagram detainees and creation of other Guantá-
namo-esque detention black holes beyond the reach of judicial oversight,656
like the extent of targeted killings, highlight how a lax approach to armed
conflict and a simplistic approach to lex specialis has marginalised human rights
law in the war on terror to grave effect.
7B.4 DEROGATION AND EMERGENCY POST-9/11
It has occasionally been suggested that a state of ‘global emergency’ arose
following the 2001 terror attacks.657 While legally there can be no such thing
as an international state of emergency, states individually can, and occasionally
have, legitimately derogated from some of their human rights obligations on
the basis of a terrorist threat alleged to constitute an emergency threatening
the life of the nation.658
As the human rights framework set out above makes clear that not all
rights are derogable,659 attempts to invoke ‘emergency’ as relevant to torture
or ill-treatment or the right to life have thus been rejected.660 But among the
most controversial of the measures adopted post-9/11 are those that relate
to the rights to liberty and fair trial,661 as highlighted by this and other
654 Denying legal protections to Guantánamo inmates were coupled by assertions by Defence
Secretary Rumsfeld that they were ‘terrorists, trainers, bomb makers, recruiters, financiers
… would be suicide bombers, probably the 20th 9/11 hijacker’; Though White House Press
Secretary Scott McClallan noted ‘These detainees are dangerous enemy combatants … They
were picked up on the battlefield, fighting American forces, trying to kill American forces’.
See http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/opening-argument-falsehoods-about-
guantanamo-20060204.
655 As highlighted by the situation of the Bagram detainees discussed above.
656 See Chapter 7B7 Restricting Liberty in Liberty’s Name below.
657 See, e.g., N. Norberg, ‘Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a
Future Together’, 8 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 11 (2010), p. 35.
658 See limited state practice post-9/11,7B4.3.4 below.
659 Chapter 7A3 for the legal framework.
660 See 7B.5 on questioning the absolute nature of that prohibiton; e.g., Saadi v. Italy; Othman
v. UK.
661 See 7B.7.6. below.
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chapters.662 While certain core aspects of the rights to liberty and fair trial
cannot be derogated from in any circumstances,663 much of the content of
these rights can be restricted, provided there is a public emergency and certain
conditions are met. This section addresses some of questions that arise in
relation to derogation post-9/11.
7B.4.1 The Practice of Derogation post-9/11
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of practice in relation to derogation post-
9/11 is its scarcity. When the UK derogated from certain obligations under
the ECHR and the ICCPR following the September 11 attacks, this provoked
controversy on a range of levels, some of which will be highlighted below.664
Perhaps greater controversy should surround the fact that it was in such slim
company; as the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism noted in 2010, only Israel,
Nepal, and UK have derogated from human rights obligations on account of
the threat of terrorism, and the UK was the only state to do so post-9/11.665
By contrast, the United States has not formally sought to derogate from
its obligations under the ICCPR,666 though the fact that the administration
considers itself in a situation of emergency is plain (not least as reflected in
the internally declared state of emergency).667 As a matter of international
law, the US would appear to be either accepting that the full range of human
rights apply, or disregarding its obligations in respect of the operation of the
human rights procedures. The failure to notify derogation by states relying
on supposed situations of emergency and crisis to justify infringing rights post-
9/11 may reveal contempt for international legal process.668 It raises questions
662 See 7B.6 below and Chapter 8.
663 Those aspects – such as the right to habeas corpus and the right to access counsel – are
discussed in relation to the application of the legal framework to the Guantánamo detainees,
in Chapter 8.
664 Note Verbale from the Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom, dated 18 Decem-
ber 2001, registered by the Secretariat General on 18 December 2001: the text of the note
is available at: http://conventions.coe.int.
665 M. Scheinin and M. Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions to International Law: Systematic
Legal Analysis and Critique of Doctrines that Seek to Deny or Reduce the Applicability
of Human Rights Norms in the Fight against Terrorism’, EUI Working Papers, 2010, p. 23.’
666 Immediately after the attacks of 9/11, the US President declared a state of national emerg-
ency. See Proclamation No. 7453, Declaration of a National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Terrorist Attacks, 14 September 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 48, available at: http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010914-4.html. However, as Scheinin and Vermeulen,
ibid., note the US ‘has resorted to a number of other arguments or constructions but not
the formal mechanism of derogation’ under human rights treaties.
667 See US Declaration of National Emergency, ibid. The Patriot Act of 2001 was extended by
the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, which extends the validity of provisions of
the PATRIOT Act until 1 June 2015.
668 Scheinin and Vermeulen, supra note 665.
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at least as to how seriously states take the obligation to notify the human rights
court or body of derogation,669 and perhaps the need to clarify whether
derogation notification is a genuine prerequisite to be taken seriously.670
7B.4.2 An emergency threatening the life of the nation?
As explained in Part A, states have long been afforded broad, but not
unlimited, discretion to assess their own security situations and whether there
is in fact an emergency threatening the life of their nation.671 Thus, had a
derogation clause been invoked by the United States in the immediate after-
math of September 11, this issue would almost certainly not have been subject
to dispute. The appropriateness of derogation did, however, give rise to
controversy – and was the subject of legal challenge672 – in the context of
the United Kingdom, which derogated from its obligations despite the fact
that at the relevant time it had not been the subject of any related terrorist
attack in the UK.673 The fact that no other European states, and almost no
other state worldwide, saw the need for derogation (post-9/11 or indeed in
the context of other ‘terrorist’ threats) compounded doubts as to the reality
of the ‘emergency’ and the necessity of derogation.674
This spawned an interesting debate on whether and at what point the threat
of terrorism constitutes an ‘emergency threatening the life of a nation’, and
who decides. The result was a challenge in domestic courts to the UK govern-
ment’s derogation, the first prong of which was to argue that there was no
669 As the framework in Part A of this chapter notes, a valid process of derogation involves
notification of derogation, which itself ensures a degree of transparency and accountability,
and despite great deference afforded to the state’s assessment,the body charged with
oversight of the treaty determines whether the derogation is valid.
670 The HRC has on occasion found measures impermissible on account of the lack of notifica-
tion but in 2008, in Sayadi v. Belgium, supra note 509, it cast some doubt on the proposition
noting that lack of notification is not necessarily evidence of no derogation.
671 On the state’s discretion to determine whether there is in fact an emergency threatening
the life of the nation in the context of the ECHR, see, e.g., Brannigan and McBride v. the United
Kingdom (App 1453/89 and 1454/89), Judgment, 26 May 1993, Series A, No. 258, para. 43-7;
Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 18 January 1978, ECtHR, Series A, No. 25, pp. 78-9,
para. 207 and A & Ors v. UK, supra note 109.
672 A challenge to the lawfulness of the UK’s derogation to the ECHR was denied by the Court
of Appeal in A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 359. The
issue eventually went ot the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in A & Ors. v. UK, ibid. See also
Chapter 11.
673 The threat was described as speculative, although the attack of 7 July 2005 changed this.
D. Pannick, ‘Opinion on the derogation from Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights to allow for detention without trial’, on file with author. It remained ques-
tionable thereafter whether that threat could be described as an ‘emergency threatening
the life of the nation as such,’ see A & Ors v. UK, supra note 109.
674 See B.4.4. below.
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real emergency threatening the life of the British nation.675 In the House of
Lords judgment, the majority was typically deferential to the state’s determina-
tion of the nature of the terrorist threat, and the point at which it becomes
an emergency.676 A strident dissent by one of the Law Lords questioned
whether the threat of terrorism could really constitute a threat against ‘our
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community’ in the follow-
ing terms:
Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no doubt that
we shall survive Al-Qaeda … Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten
our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community ... The real
threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with
its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws
such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve.677
However, when the case made its way to the ECHR, the court took a more
flexible view of the threat than Lord Hoffman had suggested. It stated that
it must have regard to a ‘broader range of factors’ in determining the nature
and degree of the ‘actual or imminent’ threat to the nation, and noting that
emergency situations have been held to exist in other contexts ‘even though
the institutions of the State did not appear to be imperilled to the extent
envisaged by Lord Hoffman’.678
While derogation from human rights treaties may be scarce, resort to states
of ‘emergency’ on the national level, including in relation to allegations of
‘terrorism’, is not,with several states having been under state of emergency
for decades with no meaningful oversight of the legitimacy of that classifica-
tion.679 The experience of Arab states living under prolonged emergency laws
that gradually began to lift as part of the ‘Arab Spring’ are a reminder of the
danger of the threat of terrorism being used to institutionalise a state of ‘emerg-
ency’, and the importance of ensuring that such situations are carefully cur-
675 A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 109.
676 Ibid. at para 180. See Chapter 11 on Human Rights Litigation.
677 Ibid., Lord Hoffman, paras. 95-97.
678 A & Ors v. UK, supra note 109 at para. 179. See generally paras. 75-79
679 See generally the ‘List of States which have proclaimed or continued a state of emergency’
contained in the paper on ‘The Administration of Justice and Human Rights: Question of
Human Rights and States of Emergency’ prepared by the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 5 July 1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/31.
An example is the state of emergency declared by Israel in 1948 which remained in force
unexamined until 1996, when the Knesset replaced it with the Basic Law. Since then, the
Knesset has routinely extended the state of emergency without seriously considering
whether Israel’s situation warrants such an extension (see Consideration of reports submitted
by States parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2
(2001); Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add.93 (1998), para. 11). See other examples, notably from the Middle East, set out in
the Framework section.
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tailed.680 This concern resonates with criticism of the Security Council for
its determination that international terrorism may be an open-ended and
potentially endless ‘threat to international peace and security’.681 Open-ended-
ness is particularly troubling in the context of a ‘war’ without obvious end
against an enemy that can never be entirely vanquished.682 If, as has been
suggested, the struggle against terrorism post-9/11 is a war or an emergency
the duration of which ‘is measured by the continuing existence of terrorism,
or persistence of fear that the enemy retains the capacity to fight’,683 there
is a real risk of seeping into a state of perceived ‘permanent emergency’,
wherein exceptional measures become the norm.684
Emergencies are, by definition, exceptional and temporary, allowing for
measures that could never be justified under normal circumstances, but which
are permitted in genuine situations of crisis. As human rights courts and bodies
have, in different ways, made clear post-9/11, this makes review of the exist-
ence of an emergency on an ongoing basis (including judicial oversight), and
the lifting of the derogation as soon as it is no longer strictly required, absolute-
ly essential.685
Finally, practice post-9/11 has also raised the question whether states can,
or should, be able to derogate from their obligations when active extra-
territorially. Thus, for example, the UK did not purport to derogate from its
detention obligations in respect of detentions in Iraq, and was ultimately found
in violation of relevant ECHR provisions by the ECtHR.686 Some experts suggest
it may not be possible under current IHRL to do so, in part as there would not
be an emergency threatening at least the life of the state’s own nation as noted
680 Egypt and Algeria are both examples. The Egyptiam states of emergency was lifted on
31 May 2012 (after 31 years of security forces using sweeping powers to detain and try
in special courts), but even afterwards, up until the time of writing, the state continued
to rely on special courts and emergency powers. Algeria maintained a state of emergency
for 17 years until it was lifted in 2011. See, e.g., ‘Counter-terrorism against the background
of an endless state of emergency’, FIDH, 2010, available at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
Egyptantiterro534UK.pdf.
681 See Part 7B.1.
682 See Chapter 6, B.1.2.3.
683 J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’,
14 (2003) E.J.I.L. 2, 241-262, 251.
684 See HRC, General Comment No. 29, supra note 30, p. 186, para. 2 noting that derogating
measures must be ‘exceptional and temporary’ and para. 4: ‘[A] fundamental requirement
‘limited to the extent strictly required [which] relates to the duration, geographical coverage
and material scope of the state of emergency and any measures of derogation’.
685 HRC GC29, ibid. at para. 2. The ECHR in A & Others did ‘not consider that derogating
measures put in place in the immediate aftermath of the al’Qaeda attacks in the United
States of America, and reviewed on an annual basis by Parliament, can be said to be invalid
on the ground that they were not “temporary”’, at paras. 178; 175-89.
686 In Al-Jedda v. UK, the UK relied on attribution to the UN, and Security Council authorisation
as effectively trumping IHRL obligations on the other.
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above.687 However, the Court’s observation that the UK did not purport to
derogate implies that it could have done so.688 This has been highlighted
as an area where the law may be ripe for development, or perhaps simply
for clarification through practice,689 to ensure that the legal framework can
adjust appropriately to the realities of situations in which the state finds itself,
including situations of genuine emergency, whether at home or abroad.690
7B.4.3 Linkage between measures taken and the emergency?
While governments are often shown considerable deference by courts, in
particular international courts, as regards what constitutes ‘emergency’, there
is greater rigour in the critique of the necessity and proportionality of parti-
cular measures of derogation taken in response. Post-9/11, given its unique
decision to derogate, the UK was again the setting for controversies to play
out in this regard. On one level concern related to the scope of the anti-terrorist
law, covering, for example, persons suspected of having ‘links’ with a terrorist
organisation (including organisations not involved in 9/11 and that posed
no threat to the United Kingdom but rather to other states), with measures
against such individuals arguably not being linked to the events of September
11 or the ‘emergency’ that was deemed to arise in its wake. It was therefore
questioned to what extent these legislative measures could be said to be
responsive to, still less ‘strictly required’ by, the emergency in question in the
United Kingdom.691
687 Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment’, supra note 676 at p. 850,
stating that ‘It is unclear[] whether an ECHR member state could successfully invoke Article
15 based on the plain language of the text’, referring to the life of the nation and questions
as to which state should derogate from which obligations. See also Chatham House, supra
note 540. Government’s Arguments in Al-Jedda v. UK, supra note 553 at p. 54 rejecting the
applicant’s argument that the Convention recognised limits through the power of derogation
under Article 15.
688 Al-Jedda v. UK, supra note 553 at p. 58, para. 100 (the Court notes that ‘The Government
does not contend that the detention was justified under any of the exceptions set out in
subparagraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, nor did they purport to derogate under Article
15.’) This suggests derogation would have been possible.
689 See Leiden Policy Recommendations, supra note 520 at para. 29; Pejic, ‘The European Court
of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment’, supra note 676 at p. 850 (noting that no European
state has ever derogated in respect of military operations abroad).
690 The ECtHR has consistently adopted a ‘living instrument,’ evolutive interpretation of the
Convention, to ensure rights are ‘effective’ in practice and in context, not ‘theretical and
illusory’: see Conclusion, Part A. Its interpretation on this matter should also be consistent
with its approach to extra-territoriality. See, e.g., al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 62. See part B.1.2.3,
above.
691 D. Anderson and J. Statford, ‘Joint Opinion on Proposed Derogation from Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Clauses
21-32’, on file with author.
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When the matter was before the UK House of Lords, the Court famously
determined that potentially indefinite detention of non-UK nationals could not
be justified as strictly necessary pursuant to the emergency. It did so on the
basis that ‘if derogation is not strictly required in the case of one group
[nationals], it cannot be strictly required in the case of the other group [non-
nationals] that presents the same threat’.692 There are many other examples
of measures affecting detention and fair trial rights post-9/11 that raise doubts
as to the requirements of necessity and proportionality, including the limitation
on or denial of access to lawyers, or interference with lawyer-client con-
fidentiality and severe limitations on access to evidence.693
The requirement of the necessity of each measure of derogation also opens
up broader questions as to the need to carefully scrutinise effectiveness; if a
rights restrictive counter-terrorism strategy is counterproductive,694 it cannot
reasonably be considered effective to achieve the stated aim and logically
cannot be necessary or proportionate to it either.
7B.5 THE ‘TERRORISM’ LABEL AND THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE
7B.5.1 The scope and impact of the ‘terrorism’ label post-9/11
It has been noted that in the wake of 9/11, the Security Council called on states
to take wide-ranging ‘counter-terrorist’ measures, including against ‘any person
who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of
terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts’,695 despite the lack of an accepted
definition of what constitutes terrorism under general international law.696
What has been described as ‘opening the hunting season on terrorism’, without
692 A & Ors (Derogation), by 8 votes to 1, found a violation of the rights to liberty and non-
discrimiantion on this basis; see Lord Bingham, para. 73.
693 See International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism, ‘International
Terrorism: Challenges and Responses’ (2003) (‘IBA Task Force Report 2003’), pp. 132-3.
694 See 7B1.on growing recognition – in, e.g., the UN High Level Panel and UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, statements by the UN Secretary General as well as by government officials
(including president Obama in respect of Guantanamo) – of the terrorism ‘recruitment’
potential of certain violations. See Chapter 4B4 on the impact of ‘war on terror’ violations
on international cooperation, evidence and the criminal process more broadly.
695 SC Res. 1373, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and imposing a legal obligation
on member states of the UN, including to ensure that ‘terrorist acts’ are criminalised in
domestic law.
696 See Chapter 2. The closest to a definition is perhaps SC Res. 1566 which does not provide
a binding definition but was intended as a guide for states; the Special Rapporteur on
Terrorism suggests that states ensure that definitions meet the elements set out in that
definition. See Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (Interlocutory
Decision), STL-11-01-I, 16 February 2011, and criticism thereof in Saul, ‘Legislating from
a Radical Hague’, supra note 349.
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providing guidelines as to the target, provided the basis for a proliferation
of broad anti-terrorism laws on the national level. The Counter-Terrorism
Committee for its part was criticised for its failure to even record its interest,
at an early stage, in ‘curtailing politically inspired over-inclusive national
definitions of terrorism that pose both a threat to human rights and to the
efficiency of proper counter-terrorism measures’.697 In turn, international
and regional definitions that were advanced have themselves been criticised
as falling short of the legality requirements.698
The work of human rights courts and bodies is replete with criticism of
definitions couched in ambiguous language in states as diverse as Australia,
Estonia and Sudan, and many others in between.699 The Human Rights
Committee for example has frequently criticised numerous times the ‘exceed-
ingly broad scope of ... proposed legislation’, and specifically for the adoption
of ‘broad and vague definition[s] of acts of terrorism.’700
Such laws have provided the framework for a broad range of conduct to
be drawn under the terrorism rubric, encompassing serious and less serious
offences, and conduct not properly culpable at all.701 Yet the terrorist label
is often invoked precisely to connote a degree of gravity, thereby purportedly
justifying measures not otherwise considered acceptable.
Terrorism legislation, and the exceptional measures it authorises, have had
a creeping reach – once enacted they have been used in other contexts, to
embrace conduct not in fact linked to terrorism in any way. The Special
Rapporteur on Terrorism has noted how the ‘failure to restrict counter-terror-
ism laws and implementing measures to the countering of conduct which is
truly terrorist in nature also pose the risk that, where such laws and measures
restrict the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, they will offend the principles
of necessity and proportionality that govern the permissibility of any restriction
697 Scheinin, ‘2010 Report to the Security Council’, para 44. See B1 for the development of its
mandate.
698 International or regional definitions of terrorism, proposed or adopted post-9/11, have
been subject to criticism, for example, for their extreme breadth and lack of specificity. See
above Chapter 2.
699 See, e.g.. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Estonia (above), para.
8; Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on Australia, CCPR/C/AUS/
CO/5 7 May 2009 noting inter alia ‘the vagueness of the definition of terrorist act.’ Chapter
4. See infra in this section examples from Australia, Sudan, Phillipines, United States, UK,
Chile (e.g., below 7B11 proscribing dissent).
700 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Philippines, UN Doc. CCPR/
CO/79/PHL (2003), para. 9, and Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Egypt, supra note 137 at para. 9; Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/75/NZL (2002), para. 11.
701 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the HRC, Egypt, ibid. at para. 8.
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on human rights’.702 There are numerous examples among the practice
referred to in this book of ‘terrorism’ being invoked against those engaged
in activity far removed from what we would ordinarily understand as terror-
ism, or exceptional executive powers introduced in the terrorism context being
carried across into other areas.703
At times, the problem relates not only to the amorphous nature of ‘terrori-
sm’ itself, but to a lax approach to those deemed to be ‘associated’ with terror-
ism, or ‘supportive’ of terrorist organisations or their aims.704 Several
examples are found in United Kingdom anti-terror legislation. The early Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,705 like the United States Military
Order of 13 November 2001,706 extends to persons considered to have un-
defined ‘links’ with organisations deemed to constitute a ‘terrorist’ threat;707
the 2006 Act added crimes such as ‘encouragement’ of terrorism; and the 2011
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Act adds broadly defined ‘involvement
in terrorism,’ which includes support and assistance to those that ‘encourage’
terrorism for example.708 Illustrations on the international plane include
broadly defined ‘participation’ in terrorist activities,709 the ‘public
702 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, ‘Ten areas of best
practices in countering terrorism’, 22 December 2010, A/HRC/16/51, para. 26 (hereinafter
‘Best Practices’).
703 See, e.g., 7B11 on measures taken against indigenous rights or labour organisers, or womens
groups. See also Chapter 11 for litigation examples and the extension of special powers to
non-terrorism cases in Chapter 4.
704 See Chapter 4 ‘Criminal Justice’ on broad reaching crimes and modes of liability.
705 See www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm.
706 Military Order relating to ‘Detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war
against terrorism’, issued 13 November 2001 by the President of the United States.
707 Both go well beyond persons associated with al-Qaeda. See also, for example, concern
expressed by the Human Rights Committee in relation to the broad definition of terrorism
and of ‘belonging to a terrorist group’ in Estonia’s penal code: see Observations finales du
Comité des droits de l’homme: Estonia (15/04/2003), UN Doc. CCPR/CO/77/EST, para. 8.
708 Art. 4 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 defines such involvement
as including ‘conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such
acts, or which is intended to do so; (c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission,
preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (d) conduct which
gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual
concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraphs (a) to (c)…’. It adds that
‘it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or
acts of terrorism in general’.
709 See European Council, Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific
measures to combat terrorism, 27 December 2001, OJ L 344, 28 December 2001, p. 93, Article
2(3)(k): ‘participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying informa-
tion or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the
fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group’. See also
the European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/
475/JHA), OJ L 164/3 of 22 June 2002, which includes various forms of association and
other links with terrorist groups.
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provocation’ and ‘indirect incitement’ endorsed by the EU,710 or the ‘support’,
‘justification’ or ‘glorification’ referred to in Security Council resolutions.711
Illustrations from the criminal law sphere and their implications are discussed
in Chapter 4, which shows the expansion of criminal laws within a preventat-
ive paradigm to draw an ever-broader range of acts and omissions, and
affected individuals, within the sphere of criminality.712 This is epitomised
by the crime of providing ‘material support’ of any type for terrorism, and
the decision by the US Supreme Court that even those teaching humanitarian
law to proscribed organisations might fall within its scope.713 Another
illustration is found in Sudanese penal legislation, reported to the Security
Council post-9/11,714 where a very broad definition of terrorism, which
involves threats aimed at ‘striking terror or awe upon the people’,715 is
matched by a definition of terrorist organisation which includes anyone who
‘abets, attempts, participates or facilitates, by word of mouth, deed or
publication the operation of an organised and planned network for the commis-
sion of any terrorist offence’.716
Despite the lack of clarity as to its meaning, the terrorism label has been
applied with grave effect post-9/11. It has been invoked to justify a wide array
of measures, some of which are highlighted below in this chapter or others,
including denial of citizenship or expulsion, ‘preventive’ detention, criminal
trial by special ‘anti-terrorist’ tribunals, the application of unduly onerous
penalties, interference with privacy, freedom of religion and free expression.
The Sudanese law mentioned above, for example, stipulates that any person
deemed to fall into the extremely elastic group covered by the terrorism law
710 European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2008/919/JHA of 28
November 2008, amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA.
711 SC Res. 1624 (2005).
712 Offences removed from the harm caused, e.g,, possession of information, expression of
opinion, or other broad forms of contribution, membership of or support for prohibited
organisations, coupled with serious penalties, raise tensions in respect of consistency with
the primordial principal that criminal law should only address (and punishment should
be commensurate with) the responsibility of the individual. See Chapter 4. See, e.g., Report
of Special Rapporteur on terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 14 December 2006, A/HRC/4/26/
Add.3, para. 40.
713 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. __ (2010) (regarding the USA PATRIOT Act).
Further discussed in Chapter 4B2 on the changing face of criminal law.
714 This legislation, the Terrorism (Combating) Act 2000, was reported to the Security Council
after 9/11 in support of Sudan’s claim to have met its international obligations; see Sudan’s
Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1373,
UN Doc. S/2001/1317, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/
submission_list.html.
715 Terrorism includes threats ‘aimed at striking terror or awe upon the people by, inter alia,
hurting them or exposing their lives or security to danger ... or exposing one of the native
or or national strategic resources to danger’. Ibid. Sn. 2.
716 Ibid. Sn. 6. The definition requires also that the act ‘may constitute a danger to persons
or property or public tranquillity’.
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will be prosecuted by an ad hoc combating terrorism court and if convicted
‘shall be punished with death or life imprisonment’.717 Obvious tension arises
in respect of the principle of legality, a requirement for any restriction of rights,
even in time of emergency.718 Specific issues relate to the particularly
stringent requirements of nullum crimen sine lege, requiring clarity and precision
in criminal law.719 The obligations of the state in respect of the legality prin-
ciple are non-derogable and generally unaffected by national security concerns,
or states of emergency. To the extent that laws enshrining vague and imprecise
definitions of terrorism or related offences purport to criminalise conduct,
concerns clearly arise regarding compatibility with Article 15 of the ICCPR.
As discussed in Chapter 4 they may also raise issues concerning individual
criminal responsibility and the presumption of innocence, as well as impli-
cating a range of other rights from freedom of expression or association.720
Some levels of impact are less apparent and remain uncertain. More and
more individuals, families and arguably whole communities have been brought
under the ever-broader terrorism (and ‘association’ with terrorism) umbrella,
impacting lives and reputations, as well as arguably the effectiveness of
counter-terrorism strategies.721 Terrorism laws on support and financing
terrorism and sanctions regimes also have a serious impact further afield, on
the work of humanitarian organisations that is impeded, or indeed criminal-
ised, by national laws and sanctions regimes.722 Conversely, as noted further
elsewhere, the equally ambiguous mantra of ‘counter-terrorism’ has been relied
on to afford enhanced powers, to reduce protections to victims or to grant
717 Ibid.
718 See McBride, ‘Study on Principles’, supra note 105; J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis,
supra note 25, pp. 46-47. Some of the other human rights issues emerging from or related
to the definitional ambiguity and the ‘doubts and the opportunity for abuse of power’
(Castillo Petruzzi, supra note 282 at para. 121) created thereby are highlighted later in this
section.
719 See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these principles in the criminal law context.
720 See Chapter 4 and 7B11 on criminalising association and expression, through ‘material
support,’ ‘glorification’ or ‘apology’ for terrorism for example.
721 See generally, C. Campbell, ‘Beyond Radicalization: Towards an Integrated Anti-Violence
Rule of Law Strategy’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-
Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
722 ‘Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian
Action,’ Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, July 2013, independent study commissioned
by ODHA and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The report describes it as practically
impossible for such organisations to avoid interaction with prohibited groups, even if that
were desirable or compatible with the requirements of e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution
46/182 and other UN resolutions that require humanitarian actors to treat state and non-
state parties to an armed conflict on an equal basis. The report looks at the adverse impact
of national laws and sanction regimes on humanitarian assistance.
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impunity, to those that violate human rights, in certain contexts of counter-
terrorism operations.723
7B.5.2 Retroactivity of Criminal Prosecutions
Concerns regarding consistency with other aspects of Article 15 beyond the
requirements of legality and certainty have also, less frequently, demanded
attention, such as the prohibition of retroactive application of criminal law
or the extension of criminal law by analogy. An early reaction came from the
Indonesian constitutional court, which struck down new anti-terror legislation
based on its retroactive effect.724 Another example of note is the overturning
of one of very few US military commission convictions on grounds of the
retroactive application of criminal law regarding the conviction for ‘material
support for terrorism’ as a war crime.725
As Article 15(2) acknowledges, the legality principle does not prevent
prosecution for serious crimes established as such under international law –
such as crimes against humanity of the type committed on 9/11.726 It may
however preclude prosecution for other acts that did not amount to such
crimes, unless penalised in domestic law at the time committed; as discussed
above, prosecution for ‘terrorism’ on the basis of its status as a crime under
international law would be controversial, given definitional dilemmas, while
inchoate offences such as membership of or support for terrorist organisations
may lay still less claim to international criminal status.727
7B.5.3 Punishing Terrorism
Finally, Chapter 4 also discusses how terrorism and associated offences have
been invoked to justify exceptional penalties of greater severity than those
that would attach to the conduct if differently classified. So far as greater
penalties are imposed retroactively, a violation of the ‘nulla poena sine lege’
723 See, e.g., Maskhadovy v. Russian Federation, ECtHR 2013, on the Russian law refusing to return
the body of those killed in counter-terrorism operations, in Chapter 11.
724 Law No. 16 of 2004 was relied upon in the convictions in respect of the ‘Bali bombings’.
See, e.g., Bali terrorism conviction violates constitution, Indonesian court rules, 23 July 2004,
available at: http://www.cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/WarOnTerrorism/2004/07/23/
553317-ap.html.
725 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (2005), reversing the decision of the Court of Military
Commission Review and direct that Hamdan’s conviction for material support for terrorism
be vacated.
726 Chapter 4.A.1
727 Depending on the treaty in question, certain forms of support may constitute ‘treaty crimes’;
see, e.g., the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9
December 1999, UN Doc. A/Res/54/109 (1999).
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principle may clearly arise.728 Issues also arise regarding the proportionality
of the penalties attaching to ‘terrorist’ offences.
Although IHRL is not as developed on the proportionality of penalties as
on many other issues, the basic principle reflected in criminal law that ‘punish-
ment should fit the crime’ is increasingly recognised as an element of the nulla
poena rule under IHRL.729 This principle is reflected more fully in practice
in the work of international criminal tribunals.730 The issue is acutely relevant
in the war on terror context in which terrorism is emphasised as the gravest
of crimes to be repressed with the firmest of penalties, yet – given the potential
scope of vague definitions – in reality the conduct may not be nearly as grave
as the terrorist epithet suggests.
One of the effects of burgeoning terrorism laws post-9/11 has been to
‘increase the number of offences attracting the death penalty’.731 The Human
Rights Committee has recalled post-9/11 that an expansion of the penalty ‘runs
counter to the sense of [the right to life in] article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant’.732 There are also examples of onerous mandatory sentences in-
cluding the death penalty being prescribed for terrorism,733 such as under
728 The principle of nulla poena sine lege is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 11(2): ‘Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applic-
able at the time the penal offence was committed’, as in Article 7(1) ECHR, Article 9(2)
ACHR, Article 7(2) African Charter and Article 23 (Nulla poena sine lege) of the ICC Statute.
Note that the principle of legality is recognised also by the main instruments of IHL: see
Article 99(1) GC III; Article 75(4)(c) AP I; Article 6(2)(d) AP II. Legality requirements
expressly do not preclude prosecution for acts which, at the time, were ‘criminal according
to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations’, such as crimes
against humanity, despite the fact that no penalties are specified in international law. It
would, however, apply to other acts labelled ‘terrorist’ but which are not established crimes
under international law.
729 See, e.g., D. van Zyl Smit and A. Ashworth, Disproportionate sentences as human rights viola-
tions, Modern Law Review, July 2006, Vol. 67 No.4, 541-560. See also Recommendation No.
R(92) 17 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning Consistency in Sentenc-
ing (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 October 1992 at the 482nd meeting of
the Ministers’ Deputies): ‘Whatever rationales for sentencing are declared, disproportionality
between the seriousness of the offence and the sentence should be avoided.’
730 The ICTY and ICTR have repeatedly stated that e.g., ‘[T]he penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the wrongdoing, in other words, that the punishment be made to fit the
crime’: Todorovic, ICTY Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2001, 29. See also Plavsic ICTY Trial Chamber
III, 27 Feb. 2003, 23; Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December 1998, 290 on ‘pro-
portionality between the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the
offender’; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, ICTY, Case No. IT-02-61, Trial Chamber II, 30 Mar. 2004,
para. 154; Jelisić Decision of the Appeals Chamber, para. 96.
731 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, supra note 115, para. 16.
732 Ibid. See A.5.1 on the lack of general prohibition on capital punishment in international
law has been noted supra but e.g. the expansion of the death penalty is a direct violation
of other treaty obligations, notably the ACHR, Article 4(2).
733 On the mandatory death sentence in terrorism cases, see applicants’ arguments in EIPR
and INTERIGHTS (on behalf of Sabbeh & Ors.) v. Egypt, ACHPR, No. 334/06 (2012) before
the ACHPR, available at: www.interights.org/taba.
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Egypt’s security laws, which falls foul of the obligation to ensure that penalties
are commensurate with the offence and take into account all the circumstances
of the crime and the individual convicted.734 Moreover, to the extent that
the death penalty is being imposed in circumstances that do not meet the
highest standards of justice – which must include clarity and precision in the
definition of the crime as well as respect for fair trial rights – there is a real
risk of violation of the right to life itself.735
7B.6 TORTURE AND INHUMAN TREATMENT: ABU GHRAIB AND (FAR) BEYOND
– Torture as an Instrument of the WOT
The images of torture inflicted on prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq that
ricocheted around the world provided perhaps the most graphic evidence of
human rights violations committed in the broad context of the ‘war on
terror’.736 Since an official enquiry confirmed the abuse of detainees by
military police in Iraq, particularly those deemed of ‘intelligence value’,737
it has become apparent that the US administration has used torture and ill
treatment extensively, of which Abu Ghraib was a manifestation rather than
an aberration. While this section focuses principally on examples from United
States practice, anti-terrorist fervour has been said to have created ‘an atmos-
phere conducive to torture’ in other states,738 and the use of torture or ill
treatment by many states in the name of counter-terrorism is notorious.739
The prevalence of torture and ill-treatment, despite universal acceptance of
734 See Francisco Juan Larranaga v. The Philippines (Comm. no. 1421/2005), Human Rights
Committee, 24 July 2006, para. 7.2: ‘[T]he automatic and mandatory imposition of death
penalty constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation of Article 6 (1), in circum-
stances where the death penalty is imposed without any possibility of taking into account
the defendant’s personal circumstances or the circumstances of the particular offence.’
735 See, e.g. International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa)
v. Nigeria (Comm. nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97) and 7A.5.1 ‘Life’.
736 P. Carter, ‘The Road to Abu Ghraib’, 35 Wash. Monthly 20, 29 (2004), cited in J.W. Smith
III, ‘A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military
Justice System’, 27 Whittier L. Rev. 671, 677, 693 (2006).
737 See Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Official Military Inquiry
into Abu Ghraib, May 2004, p. 17 et seq. (hereinafter ‘Taguba report’), noting different rules
for ‘[t]he rest of the wings [where there] are regular prisoners and 1A/B [where there] are
Military Intelligence (MI) holds’. Ibid. at p. 19. On CIA approach to high value detainees,
see Chapter 10A.1.
738 V.S. Ganesalingam, ‘Case study of custodial torture survivors’ Beyond the Wall: Home for
Human Rights Quarterly Journal on Human Rights News and Views, Colombo, Sri Lanka,
January-March 2005, at 21.
739 For example, the UK official inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa by UK military personnel
in Iraq, published in 2011, documented horrific abuses and systemic failures: Hon. W. Gage,
The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, Vols. I-III, (The Stationary Office, 2012), available
at: http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/report/index.htm.
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the prohibition under international law, is one of the paradoxes that impugns
the effectiveness and credibility of the international legal order.740
A deluge of reports in recent years document abuses by the United States,
from Afghanistan741 to Guantánamo,742 Thailand to Morocco,743 and else-
where across the globe.744 While much information remains secret,745 a flood
of revelations have emerged through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) re-
quests,746 official enquiries,747 insiders’ testimonies,748 NGO749 and aca-
demic750 reports, and direct testimony from those detainees who were re-
740 ‘[T]orture is reported with growing frequency from all regions of the world ... .’ United
Nations, Press Release, Joint Statement on the Occasion of the United Nations International
Day in Support of Victims of Torture, by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on the question of torture and the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
26 June 2005.
741 See, e.g., Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, United States Assist-
ance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
October 2011, Kabul, Afghanistan, p. 49, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/documents/
countries/ AF/UNAMA_Detention_en.pdf. UNAMA found a ‘compelling pattern and
practice of systematic torture and ill-treatment’.
742 See Chapter 8, including e.g., UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees
at Guantánamo Bay, 27 February 2006, E/CN.4/2006/120, available at: http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377b0b0.html; ‘Guantanamo Record Contradicts Claims
that Prisoner Abuse Was Isolated’, The Guardian, 19 May 2004, reporting that ‘the abuse
at Abu Ghraib was systematic, part of a policy instituted at US military detention centres
from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq.’
743 See, e.g., torture and ill-treatment of Abu Zubaydah at these locations, in Zayn al-Abidin
Muhammad Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. The Republic of Lithuania, and Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. The Republic of Poland, Applications to the ECtHR at: http://
www.interights.org/document/181/index.html (hereinafter ‘Abu Zubaydah Application’).
744 See Chapter 10 on extraordinary rendition; e.g., UN Joint Study, supra note 35 and leaked
confidential 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in
CIA Custody, 14 February 2007, WAS07/76, available at: http://wlstorage.net/file/icrc-
report-2007.pdf ) (hereinafter ‘ICRC High Value Detainee Report’).
745 See, e.g., ‘Government Withholds Key Torture Documents In ACLU Lawsuit’, American
Civil Liberties Union press release, 1 September 2009, available at: http://www.aclu.org/
national-security/government-withholds-key-torture-documents-aclu-lawsuit.
746 Ibid.
747 ‘Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody’, Report of the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate (hereinafter ‘Levin Report’), 20 November 2008, available
at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_
April%2022% 202009.pdf ; see also Taguba Report, supra note 755.
748 See, e.g., M. Isikoff, ‘“We Could Have Done This the Right Way”: How Ali Soufan, an FBI
agent, got Abu Zubaydah to talk without torture,’ Newsweek, 24 April 2009, available at:
http://www. newsweek.com/id/195089 (hereinafter ‘Ali Soufan Statements’).
749 See, e.g., ‘Getting Away with Torture: the Bush Administration and Mistreatment of De-
tainees’, Human Rights Watch, July 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0711 webwcover.pdf (hereinafter ‘Getting Away with Torture’).
750 J. Paust, ‘Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment,
Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims Unchecked Executive Power’, 2007 Utah
L. Rev. 345 (2007) (hereinafter ‘Above the Law’).
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leased and able to tell their stories.751 Specific officially recognised incidents,
such as the ‘waterboarding’752 of one detainee 183 times in a single month,
detailed in the CIA Inspector General’s Report,753 or the interrogation of one
individual for 18 to 20 hours a day for 54 consecutive days,754 leave little
doubt as to the extent to which human beings were transformed into objects
of potential intelligence value. Numerous reports provide appalling lists of
accepted CIA ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ or practices commonly in-
voked by military police in Iraq, involving the most serious physical, sexual,
and mental torture or ill-treatment755 as a ‘standard operating technique’.756
It is clear that these recurrent practices of torture have involved a broad
range of actors, raising questions as to the institutional and individual respons-
751 Note that some of those still in detention cannot communicate with the outside world –
see, e.g., Abu Zubaydah and others who are banned by a court order from any communica-
tion with the outside world; Abu Zubaydah ECHR Applications.
752 For the ICRC definition of waterboarding, see ICRC Report, supra note 744, at § 1.3. It has
been described as torture by several Special Rapporteurs and others; see eg former advisor
on terrorism to the US departments of Homeland Security, Special Operations and In-
telligence, L. Doyle, ‘Waterboarding is torture – I did it myself, says US advisor’, The
Independent, 1 November 2007, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/waterboarding-is-torture--i-did-it-myself-says-us-advisor-398490.html.
753 CIA Inspector General Special Review, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Detention and Interrogation
Activities, September 2001-October 2003’, 7 May 2004, available at: http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/released/052708/052708_Special_Review.pdf, on the waterboarding of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammad. Reports also acknowledge that Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded 83
times. See Abu Zubaydah ECHR Applications, note 760.
754 B. Woodward, ‘Guantanamo Detainee Was Tortured Says Official Overseeing Military
Trials’, Washington Post, 14 January 2009, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html.
755 See the examples of CIA ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in Chapter 10. See similar
official military report on military police abuse in Iraq states included physical abuse, rape
and sexual violence: ‘... the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel
included the following acts: a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their
naked feet; b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; c. Forcibly
arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing; d. Forcing
detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear; f. Forcing groups of male
detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped; g. Arranging
naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; h. Positioning a naked detainee
on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and
penis to simulate electric torture; i. Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee
alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him
naked; j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female
Soldier pose for a picture; k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee; l. Using
military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at
least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee; m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi
detainees.’ Taguba report, supra note 737 at p. 16-17.
756 The ICRC report refers to the ‘“systematic” ill-treatment or torture of detainees with
‘intelligence value’ as ‘part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence
personnel to obtain confessions and extract evidence.’ ICRC High Value Detainee Report,
supra note 744, para. 24.
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ibility of many. A critical factor for increasing resort to torture has been said
to be the role of intelligence agencies in interrogation and detention,757 though
there have also been egregious cases of abuse at the hands of the military.758
Government lawyers’ legal advice provided cover for techniques prohibited
under international law by advising (apparently upon request) that the basic
protections against torture did not apply, or that defences of necessity or self-
defence would be available to agents engaged in ‘enhanced interrogation
techniques’.759 Medical personnel are also reported as having been directly
involved in interrogations.760 Private companies have played a critical facilita-
ting role, as demonstrated by the role of aviation companies in the rendition
programme explored more fully elsewhere.761 While in many cases the torture
occurred at the hands of US personnel, in others it was conducted by ‘proxy’,
by other states at US behest, or with the direct involvement or facilitation of
foreign authorities.762
The picture that emerges suggests a pattern and policy of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment (‘TCIDT’) potentially orchestrated at the highest
levels of government.763 Then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld is re-
ported to have ordered certain techniques, including the use of dogs, enforced
757 See, e.g., ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel, 2009
(hereinafter ‘Eminent Jurists Report’); see also M. Scheinin, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while counter-
ing terrorism, ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development’, 4 February 2009, UN Doc.
A/HRC/10/3 (detailing intelligence agencies’ involvement in detainee abuse).
758 See Taguba report, supra note 737.
759 See, e.g., Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (December 30, 2004); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
(1 August 2002) (hereinafter ‘Bybee Memo’). See all of the infamous ‘torture memos’ along
with a detailed timeline here: N. Lewis et al., ‘A Guide to the Memos on Torture’, New
York Times, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html
(hereinafter ‘Torture Memos’). See also Phillipe Sands, ‘Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty
and the Compromise of Law’ (2008).
760 The ICRC High Value Detainee Report, supra note 819, records the involvement of medical
personnel in torture and ill-treatment.
761 See Chapter 10 and litigation against companies such as Jeppesen International for their
involvement in the rendition programme: e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d
1108 (9th Cir. 2008).
762 Chapter 10 and the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism’s 2009 report, supra note 832, which
outlines reports of many other states’ involvement in interrogations of CIA detainees and
those held at Guantánamo. See also K. Sullivan, ‘Role of British Intelligence in Alleged
Torture To Be Examined’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 27 March 2009, available at: http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/26/AR2009032601335.html.
763 See Getting Away with Torture, supra note 74; Paust, Above the Law, supra note 750; Levin
Report, supra note 747; see generally Ali Soufan statements, supra note 823.
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nudity, stress positions, and food deprivation.764 Then President Bush and
Defence Secretary Rumsfeld publicly supported ‘tough’ interrogation tech-
niques and ‘enhanced methods of interrogation’,765 and they and other high-
level officials have now openly admitted to authorising waterboarding.766
Bush’s Legal Adviser John Yoo talked of a ‘common, unifying approach’ to
coercive interrogation techniques across the administration.767 Reports also
indicate how personnel engaged in interrogations were used across locations,
with some personnel moving between Guantánamo, Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib,
and vice versa.768 Statements from high-level officials and politicians – reject-
ing, explicitly and implicitly, the need to be constrained by the law in the
treatment of terrorist suspects – littered political discourse around the treatment
of detainees.769 Indeed, objections were raised from those at the highest levels
that a prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would affect
applicable interrogating procedures.770
Under both IHRL and criminal law, there are obligations on those in posi-
tions of responsibility to take all feasible measures to prevent torture by
subordinates.771 Some questions relate to the orders, or high-level authorisa-
764 See Paust, Above the Law, supra note 750, p. 348.
765 G. W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Random House, 2010); Sands Torture Team, supra.
766 Bush, ibid., p. 169. ‘I would have preferred that we get the information another way. But
the choice between security and values was real. Had I not authorized waterboarding on
senior al Qaeda leaders, I could have had to accept a greater risk that the country would
be attacked ... . I approved the use of the interrogation techniques.’ See also Jose Rodriguez,
the former head of the CIA’s Clandestine Service, discussing his authorization of water-
boarding in his book, J. Rodriguez, Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11
Saved American Lives, (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012), p. 64.
767 J. Yoo, War by Other Means: an Insider’s Account of the War on Terror, (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2006), p. ix.
768 Paust, Above the Law, supra note 825, p. 347.
769 See, e.g., Vice-President Cheney publicly referring to the need to work on the ‘dark side’
in handling of al-Qaeda suspects and not to ‘tie the hands’ of intelligence communities:
Interview with U.S. Vice President Cheney on Meet the Press (16 September 2001) Chapter
10. See also Senator Graham’s famous public statement: ‘And when they say, “I want my
lawyer,” you tell them, “Shut up. You don’t get a lawyer.”’ C. Savage, ‘Senate Declines
to Clarify Rights of American Qaeda Suspects Arrested in U.S.’, New York Times, 1 December
2011.
770 Vice President Cheney objected vociferously to Senator McCain’s amendment to prohibit
ill treatment and President Bush expressed his dissent in a signing statement, while it may
be seen as an admission of the practice of ill treatment, then Director of the CIA noted that
it would affect procedures. See, e.g., ‘Goss Says CIA “Does Not Do Torture,” but Reiterates
Need for Interrogation Flexibility’, Frontrunner, 21 November 2005, cited in Paust, Above
the Law, supra note 825, p. 352. See also Paust, Above the Law, supra note 825, p. 353-54
(citing Editorial, ‘Director for Torture’, Washington Post, 23 November 2005.
771 See Chapter 4A on Superior Responsibility. On positive obligations to prevent see 7A.4.1.
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tion,772 of torture or ill-treatment, while others relate less directly to the
messages that were sent, explicitly and otherwise, and the impact on the
commission of abuses.773 Evidence given to the US official enquiry into abuses
in Iraq indicates that individual soldiers had both the perception that such
abuses were authorised, or at least condoned, and confidence in the lack of
accountability (based on impunity in other cases).774
The allegations of abuse are coupled with others concerning the tardiness
and feebleness of the authorities’ response to information exposing torture
and ill-treatment, including the lack of action to stop or prevent torture,
including in Abu Ghraib where concerns were drawn to the state’s attention
some time before the scandal became public.775 Questions arise as to the
sufficiency of measures taken to act upon this warning to ensure the prevention
of acts of torture, and to respond immediately to ensure that they cease, as
required by the law. Such doubts are likely to continue until they are con-
firmed, or dispelled, by the thorough and independent investigation and
accountability required by international law.776
The US government’s decision, shortly after the Obama administration came
to office in 2008, to reject torture777 and revoke the memoranda that had
purported to justify it, was one of the most significant repudiations of these
practices.778 While the US government no longer justifies acts of torture or
ill-treatment, there are allegations of the continued abuse at the behest of the
772 See, e.g., instructions to interrogators in 12 October 2003 memorandum from Lt. Gen. Ricardo
S. Sanchez, US Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force in Iraq, at http://
www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/october%20sanchez%20memo.pdf, or those recorded in
the Taguba report, supra note 737 at p. 19.
773 Public positions and statements adopted by those at the highest levels of government would
be a key contributor to to such messages, as would the approach to investigation or ex-
perience of impunity ex-post facto. Taguba, ibid.
774 Taguba report, supra note 812 at p. 19-20.
775 ‘Report of the ICRC on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other
Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during Arrest, Internment and
Interrogation’, February 2004 refers to several occasions during 2003 when the issue of ill-
treatment was brought to the Coalition Forces’ attention (para. 34). See para. 45 on the
‘systematic’ ill-treatment or torture of detainees with ‘intelligence value’ as ‘part of the
standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and
extract evidence,’ para 24.
776 See 7B14 Justice and Accountability below; see Chapter 7A.4.1. on the states’ obligations.
777 Obama prohibited waterboarding and other forms of torture and ill-treatment by executive
order on day two of his presidency. See ‘Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interroga-
tions’, The White House, 22 January 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/ EnsuringLawfulInterrogations; See also V. Buschschluter, ‘The Obama approach




US by the hand of other states’ officials however.779 Among the criticisms
of the states policies and failures the sharpest relates to the dearth of reparation
and accountability, whereby a policy of torture is said to have given way to
a policy of impunity.780 Some of the other paradigmatic issues arising from
WOT practice and the protection against TCIDT are highlighted below, in relation
both to US practice in the WOT and more broadly.
7B.6.1 Justifying Torture? Redefinitions, ‘Executive Privilege’ and the un-
defusable ‘Ticking Bomb’
During the war on terror, the US has employed a panoply of justifications and
legal constructions in an attempt to avoid scrutiny of allegations of TCIDT.
Among them are the arguments that its international obligations do not apply,
given its rejection of the extra-territorial scope of its obligations under the CAT
or the ICCPR, particularly in light of its reservation to the scope of the CAT.781
Likewise, at odds with the most basic legal principles, it has suggested that
its obligations under international law must be understood by reference to
internal law.782 This selective approach ignores the fact that the torture pro-
hibition cuts across IHRL, IHL, and customary law and has the status of jus
cogens norms,783 such that no reservation or exception could justify conduct
that violates the prohibition on TCIDT.
The notorious torture memos revealed another exceptionalist approach
which sought to undermine the protection against torture by redefining torture
in a way that might lend themselves to desired outcomes and permit certain
779 See, e.g., A. McCoy, ‘Impunity at Home, Rendition Abroad’, Huffington Post, 14 August 2012,
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alfred-w-mccoy/extraordinary-rendition-
torture_b_1775438.html: ‘In July 2009, for example, Kenyan police snatched an al-Qaeda
suspect, Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, from a Nairobi slum and delivered him to that city’s
airport for a CIA flight to Mogadishu. ... While Somali guards (paid for with U.S. funds)
ran the prison, CIA operatives, reported the Nation’s Jeremy Scahill, have open access for
extended interrogation.’ Reports of other US-run secret detention centers continue to emerge,
amidst allegations of torture and also of UK involvement. See I. Cobain, ‘British personnel
reveal horrors of secret US base in Baghdad’, Guardian 1 April 2013 accessed at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/01/camp-nama-iraq-human-rights-abuses.
780 See Chapter 7.A.4.1 on positive obligations and 7.B.14 below.
781 See ‘Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Reservation made by United States of America’, United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/5d7ce66547377
b1f802567fd0056b533. The US Senate’s reservation on Article 16 limits the scope to such
acts are committed within US territory or when the acts are committed against a US national
abroad.
782 The administration also argued that the Federal Torture Statute which applies to acts
committed outside the United States criminalizes only torture and not other inhuman
treatment.
783 See Part A.5.2 above.
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interrogation techniques. This is evident for instance in a leaked memo from
the US Assistant Attorney General that advised, for example, that the severity
threshold for torture required ‘injury so severe that death, organ failure or
permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function will likely
result.’784 These contortions of the elements of torture find no support in
international law or the extensive practice set out in Part A.785
In addition, concerns about the practice of torture and degrading treatment
have been compounded by what is broadly perceived as official attempts to
justify it in a variety of ways. One manifestation of this in relation to the US
practices of torture was the statement that torture might be ‘justified by the
executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from
attack’.786 Suggestions were made from within the US administration shortly
after 9/11 that the possibility of resorting to torture in the context of interroga-
tions is a matter of ‘executive privilege’, to be determined under ‘the Pres-
ident’s ultimate authority’ and that criminal courts prosecuting torturers might
be held to be interfering unlawfully with this power of the US President.787
Assertions were also made that torture or ill-treatment might on occasion be
justified by reference to ‘self defense or necessity,’ directly questioning the
absolute nature of the prohibition.788 Likewise, the legal advice given in re-
lation to interrogation in Afghanistan was that it was not illegal to threaten
imminent death to detainees or their families, on the basis that it was not
‘intentional’ and there was a ‘compelling governmental interest’.789
The sacrosanct nature of the prohibition on torture or ill-treatment has also
been rendered vulnerable through reopening of the old debate as to whether
784 See Bybee Memo, supra note 759 at p. 13. Other qualifications included that death threats
would not suffice unless the death was threatened ‘imminently’, and that the mental element
for torture would not be satisfied unless the defendant acted with the ‘express purpose
to disobey the law’ (p. 3), that knowledge that the severe physical or mental harm would
result from his or her actions would not suffice if this was not ultimately his ‘objective,’
but instead he was committing the acts of torture in ‘good faith’ (pp. 4 and 8).
785 See Part A.5.2.
786 See Bybee Memo, supra note 759 at p. 46. Cf. definition of torture in the Convention against
Torture.
787 ‘Enforcement of the [torture] Statute would represent an unconstitutional infringement of
the President’s authority to conduct war.’ Bybee Memo, supra note 834, p. 2; Cf pp. 36-38.
See H.C.J. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al., Judgment
of 6 September 1999, supra note 274, where the Israeli Supreme Court disregarded any
‘necessity’ justification for torture.
788 ‘. . [I]t seems to me that if something is necessary for self-defense, it’s permissible to deviate
from the principles of Geneva.’ ‘Frontline: The Torture Question, Interview with John Yoo’,
PBS television broadcast, 19 July 2005, available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html.
789 Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Judge Advocate Weaver, 11 October
2002, p. 6, para. f, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf.
Cf., e.g. the case of Maritza Uruttia v. Guatemala, 27 November 2003 (Merits, Reparations
and Costs), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 103, para. 92 on threats as “psychological
torture.”’
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torture can ever be justified by a hypothetical ‘ticking bomb’ scenario in which
the use of torture or ill-treatment purports to be required to save lives from
terrorism.790 Provocative proposals regarding the introduction of torture
warrants, to ensure accountability in light of the perceived inevitability of the
practice,791 ride roughshod over perhaps the most fundamental prohibition
in IHRL.792 Although much of the debate in response focuses on the fallacious
nature (or ‘vanishing unlikelihood’) of the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario,793 its
corrosive presence lingers on in political discourse. Its rejection as a legal
justification for authorising torture can however be seen for example from
decisions of courts before and since 9/11.794
Much has been made, in the same vein, of the utility of information
obtained through ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, such as that which
allegedly led to finding Osama bin Laden, as purported justification for resort
to prohibited forms of treatment.795 Others, including insiders and former
interrogators, have refuted the utility of torture as reaping useless results,
unreliable evidence, and providing a recruiting tool for terrorism that ex-
acerbates the problem.796
790 For examples of the extensive debate, see A. Dershowitz, ‘The Case for Torture Warrants’,
2002,availableat:http://www.alandershowitz.com/publications/docs/torturewarrants.html
and D. Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb’, 91 Virginia L. Rev. 1425 (2005).
The scenario where torture might be justified by such life-saving intentions was rejected
in principle, even where a concrete child’s life may have been in danger, in Gäfgen v.
Germany, supra note 273.
791 Juan Mendez alerts to a culture shift or ‘resignation’that perceives torture as inevitable
in light of internaitonal terrorism is many countries. See statement at Chatham House http:/
/www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/General/100912Mendez.pdf.
792 See, e.g., Essay by A. Dershowitz titled ‘Tortured Reasoning’, appearing in S. Levinson,
‘Torture: A Collection’ (USA: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 257. See also Dershowitz,
The Case for Torture Warrants, supra note 790.
793 See Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, supra note 790. The scenario does
not appear to have arisen in practice in the WOT although the rationale has been referred
to often, directly and indirectly.
794 For example, the Israeli Supreme Court has found that torture cannot be authorized in any
circumstances:Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al., supra note 274.
See also, e.g., Gafgen v. Germany, ECtHR, supra note 272 and above Chapter A.5.2.
795 See e.g., S. Joseph, ‘The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: his right to life and the new torture
debate’, Castan Centre, 5 May 2011, available at: http://castancentre.com/2011/05/05/the-
killing-of-osama-bin-laden-his-right-to-life-and-the-new-torture-debate, on the claim that
torture led to the identification of bin Laden.
796 See, e.g., M. Fallon, ‘Interrogators Speak Out: Torture is Illegal, Immoral and Ineffective,’
Human Rights First, 30 April 2012, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/04/
30/interrogators-speak-out-torture-is-illegal-immoral-and-ineffective ; Press Release, ‘Inter-
rogators: Torture Undermines U.S. Intelligence,’ Human Rights First, 26 April 2012, available
at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/04/26/interrogators-torture-undermines-u-s-
intelligence ; M.A. Costanzo and E. Gerrity, ‘The Effects and Effectiveness of Using Torture
as an Interrogation Device: Using Research to Inform the Policy Debate’, 3 Social Issues
& Policy Rev. 179, available at: http://www.cgu.edu/pdffiles/sbos/costanzo_effects_of_
interrogation.pdf. On the consequences of, for example, Abu Ghraib on the terrorist threat,
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Whatever the respective strengths of the utilitarian arguments, the debate
jars with the philosophical underpinnings and the letter of international human
rights law. As noted at the outset of this chapter, human dignity is not at the
disposal of the state, and the structure of the legal framework in which some
rights are non-derogable, in which some norms (including torture) have
attained jus cogens status, is designed to ensure limits to law’s flexibility and
that no circumstances or conditions can justify acts such as torture. As one
of the most basic human rights protections, the mandatory application of the
torture prohibition at all times, to all human beings, remains – at least as a
matter of law – uncontroversial. The continued and renewed reiteration of
the absolute nature of the prohibition in response to those practices in the
context of international terrorism put this beyond doubt.797 The prevalence
of recourse to it in the war on terror, however, and the legal and political
positions surrounding it at least at the early stages, provides a striking example
of the extent of disregard for that legal framework in the war on terror.
7B.6.2 Undermining the Absolute Nature of Safeguards against Torture and
the Exclusionary rule
The absolute nature of the prohibition on torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (TCIDT) has also been questioned in other contexts and
in other ways. Notably, while most governments would not claim the right
to torture, and even condemn it unreservedly, many have eroded safeguards
against torture and the positive obligations long recognised as essential to give
meaningful effect to the prohibition.
It is well recognised as a matter of law that evidence obtained through
torture should not be admitted in any proceedings, reflected explicitly in
Article 15 of the Convention against Torture.798 However, in many states,
evidence or confessions obtained through torture have been used as a basis
to detain, convict, or otherwise take action against persons suspected of terror-
ism. Prominent examples emerge from the UK,799 Egypt,800 Sri Lanka,801
see Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib, supra note 736. See Chapter 4B4 for the impact on the
criminal process.
797 See, e.g., United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, U.N. CCPR 44th
Sess., 1138th mtg. (1992) (replacing General Comment 7); Sabbah v. Egypt; Gäfgen v. Germany,
para. 107 (not concerning terrorism but asserting that ‘[t]orture, inhuman or degrading
treatment cannot be inflicted even in circumstances where the life of an individual is at
risk.’); Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, ‘Protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, A/58/266, 8 August 2003, para.
55; Paez v. Sweden, Committee against Torture, no. 39/1996, 28 April 1997, para 14.5; Chahal
v. UK, para. 76.
798 CAT, Art. 15.
799 A & Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 359.
800 Sabbah v. Egypt, supra note 170.
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and Belgium,802 where states have sought to justify reliance on such evidence
in the purported basis of international terrorism.
In general, courts and human rights bodies have responded by seizing the
opportunity to reassert the absolute nature of this prohibition, but the devil
may lie in the detail. The suggestion that evidence may be relied upon where
the individual cannot prove conclusively that it was obtained through torture,
creates a potentially impossible burden for the applicant that risks rendering
the right illusory.803 Likewise, it has been suggested that, consistent with
the principle of the exclusionary rule, evidence may be taken into consideration
where there is some doubt in this respect, albeit while affording that evidence
less weight.804 The real challenges that stem from increased international
cooperation in intelligence gathering and criminal enforcement make some
determinations as to the provenance of evidence much more difficult, and the
implications for intelligence gathering and sharing give legitimate cause for
concern. At the same time, there is a danger that unduly ‘flexible’ approaches
to the application of the exclusionary rule in practice, albeit alongside its
principled reassertion, erode the absolute nature of the prohibition.805 The
Special Rapporteur on Torture has highlighted the importance of clarifying
and reasserting the exclusionary rule as a fundamental safeguard against
torture.806
Basic guarantees during detention – such as access to a court, lawyer, or
medical assistance – have also consistently been found to be part of the states’
obligations to protect against torture, before and since 9/11.807 The denial
of such guarantees to detainees has however been a notorious feature of the
WOT. This includes the denial of access to courts to determine lawfulness of
detention, as set out in relation to Guantánamo detainees in Chapter 8, or the
refusal to allow access to lawyers, epitomized by the public exhortation of
a US senator: ‘When they say, “I want my lawyer,” you tell them, “Shut up.
You don’t get a lawyer. You are an enemy combatant, and we are going to
801 Section 17 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979
overrides the provisions of the Evidence Ordinance which render confessions extracted
by torture or while a person is in custody inadmissible
802 El-Haski v. Belgium, Appl. No. 649/08, Judgment of 25 September 2012, 35 (2005) 41 EHRR
494.
803 Ibid. Belgium argued that a defendant would have to prove without reasonable doubt that
torture or inhuman treatment had been used in gathering evidence for the evidence to be
inadmissible. See also CAT, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Perioidc report of the
U.K., 31 May 2013.
804 See A & Others case in Chapter 11A.2.
805 See the response of the courts in Chapter 11A.2.
806 Juan Mendez, Enforcing the Absolute Prohibition Against Torture, Chatham House, 10
September 2012 at http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/185367 last accessed 27
April 2013.
807 Part A.5.2.
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talk to you about why you joined Al Qaeda.”’808 Denial of access to a lawyer
upon detention has been repeatedly found not only to constitute a breach of
fair trial or detention rights, but also as contributing directly to the incidence
of TCIDT.809 Incommunicado detention has been reported as a common feature
of exceptionalist terrorism regimes in many states in recent years, contributing
to the incidence of TCIDT. Although the prevalence of this practice is troubling,
it has lead to a positive reassertion and in some cases expansion of the nature
of the scope of positive obligations. This is exemplified in cases such as Sabbah
and Others v. Egypt before the African Commission which built on the juris-
prudence of other courts and bodies and upheld the state’s obligations to afford
terrorism suspects prompt access to courts, lawyers, and medical personnel
as an essential aspect of the right to be free from torture or ill-treatment.810
Attempts to undermine the prohibition are also seen in the context of the
transfer of individuals to states where they risk TCIDT, as discussed under
‘refoulement’ below.811
Finally and critically, the legal framework requires prompt, thorough, and
impartial investigation of allegations of even a single act of torture or cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. It requires that those responsible be held
to account, and punished with appropriately severe penalties, and that victims
of torture have a right to a remedy and to reparation. Yet practice in this area
falls alarmingly far short of the law. As explored further in relation to ‘Justice
and Accountability’ below,812 while the Obama administration rejection of
torture was an important reassertion of values, its failure to meet its obligations
of investigation and accountability have provoked widespread criticism, and
lead to the allegations of a culture of torture having been replaced by a culture
of impunity for torture.813 Beyond the US, the search for criminal account-
ability for torture by other states, while ongoing, has also been a faltering
808 C. Savage, ‘Senate Declines to Clarify Rights of American Qaeda Suspects Arrested in U.S.’,
supra note 769.
809 This is true across regional human rights systems; see, e.g., Chapter A.5.2
810 See Sabbah v. Egypt, supra note 170.
811 See 7.B.10 below.
812 7B.14, Justice and Accountability.
813 See The Baltimore Sun, ‘The Truth about Torture’ 21 April 2013 viewed at: http://www.balti
moresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-torture-report-20130421,0,3618443.story. For
a discussion of the disparity between punitive measures against soldiers who are subject
to court-martial, and impunity for officers who are involved in acts of misconduct either
as principals, accessories, or through the doctrine of command responsibility, who are
allowed to either retire, resign their commissions, or receive administrative reprimands,
see Smith III, ‘A Few Good Scapegoats’, supra note 736, p. 671. See also S. Murphy, ‘Contem-
porary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 2, April
2000, p. 348-81, and S. Murphy, ‘U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison’, 98
Am. J. Int’l L. 3, July 2004, p. 591-96. See also ‘Justice Accountability’, Part B.12, below. The
Abu Ghraib soldiers were discharged but no commanding officer was punished. See ‘Justice
and Accountability’ in Part B.12, below, and Chapter 10 ‘Extraordinary Rendition’.
546 Chapter 7
process.814 The recognition of the rights of torture victims, long hailed as
paramount for the international community, has been completely neglected
by states in the counter-terrorism context.815 In this way, it may well be that
a critical aspect of the legal framework, the positive obligations to prevent
and protect from torture through investigation and accountability, has been
eroded through the practice of the war on terror.
In conclusion, torture and the debate that has unfolded around it provide
a chilling illustration of the extent to which legal standards that were once
taken for granted have been questioned and rendered vulnerable in the name
of counter-terrorism. While this section singles out the United States’ practice
and policies, torture and ill-treatment of terrorist suspects is a growing problem
around the world. Although torture is not a novelty of the WOT, it is a defining
feature of it. One may question whether such notorious practices, and attempts
to relativize terror and torture, have legitimised such practices by others.
Reports of billboards of photos of Abu Ghraib in Tehran and Cuba are a
reminder of how it is used to undermine the authority and moral leadership
of those that engage in it.816 One may speculate as to whether the war on
terror will in the longer run be seen as undermining the universal condem-
nation of torture, or as having been a catalyst to a more determined reassertion
of it.
The practical implications also remain uncertain. As Chapter 4 suggests,
as criminal prosecutions for ‘terrorist’ offences continue to unfold, the extent
to which the mistreatment of prisoners will impact on the viability of pro-
secutions and accountability for such offences, and on admissible evidence,
are becoming apparent.817 States may have eroded not only their own legit-
imacies, and fundamental norms, but also, paradoxically, the prospects of
securing and achieving justice in respect of international terrorism.
814 See, e.g., UK failure to prosecute in respect of the Baha Mousa torture in Iraq. ‘Former
Attorney General Baroness Scotland granted the troops immunity against criminal prosecu-
tion based on their own evidence to the inquiry.’ J. Bingham, ‘Baha Mousa inquiry: innocent
father died due to Army’s failings’, The Telegraph, 8 September 2011, available at: http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8749250/Baha-Mousa-inquiry-innocent-father-
died-due-to-Armys-failings.html. See also the failure to criminally prosecute Binyam Mo-
hamed’s torturers in Pakistan due to potential exposure of U.S. State secrets. C. Savage,
‘Court Dismisses a Case Asserting Torture by C.I.A.’, New York Times, 8 September 2010,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/us/09secrets.html?pagewanted=all.
815 On efforts by individual victims to seek redress through courts which have been blocked
or impaired by a range of obstacles from state secrecy to immunities, see B.14 below and
Chapters 10 and 11.
816 On billboards in Tehran, see, e.g., Administrative Evil, and Moral Inversion: The Value of
“Putting Cruelty First”, Public Administration Review, September |October 2006, p.60.
In Cuba, see e.g.. Cuba Erects Iraq Abuse Billboards Near US Mission http://www.common
dreams.org/headlines04/1218-04.htm.
817 See 4B4 and 7B.10 in this chapter.
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7B.7 RESTRICTING LIBERTY IN LIBERTY’S NAME: PREVENTATIVE DETENTION AND
CONTROL ORDERS
7B.7.1 Detention
Broad-reaching indefinite detention of persons on the basis of ‘terrorism’ has
long been common practice in many parts of the world, but since 9/11 pro-
longed detention of persons perceived by government as dangerous and the
limitation of judicial guarantees has become widespread, including through
adoption of new – or resort to existing – terrorism laws and ‘creative’ use of
immigration laws. Questions regarding the lawfulness of detention are there-
fore coupled with the defining feature of the lack of procedural safeguards.818
The most notorious case, of detentions at the military base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba became the ‘ugly face’ of the war on terror, provoking strident
international reaction, as well as judicial rebuke, as discussed separately in
Chapter 8. As noted above in relation to the significance of the ‘war’ paradigm,
new Guantánamo-esque black holes have arisen elsewhere, such as in
Afghanistan,819 and by or at the behest of the US in other countries around
the world.820 The notorious CIA detention centres have been closed, though
more recent allegations suggest that individuals continue to be abducted and
transferred and held by other states but at US behest, pay and with US involve-
ment.821 In addition, creative use of existing immigration laws822 and the
USA Patriot Act823 have been described as providing the basis for prolonged
818 See discussion of legal challenges in Chapter 11. While the US supreme court has found
GB detainees have such right, not so security detainees in situations of conflict as in Bagram,
Afghanistan.
819 See discussion on Bagram litigation above under ‘War and Human Rights’.
820 See, e.g.. A. McCoy, ‘Impunity at Home, Rendition Abroad’, Huffington Post, 14 August 2012,
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alfred-w-mccoy/extraordinary-rendition-
torture_b_1775438.html on rendition of Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan by Kenyan police toa Somali
prison where guards are paid with U.S. funds and the CIA has ‘open access for extended interroga-
tion’; see also Chapter 6, section B on detentions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Chapter
10 on ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ and secret detention abroad. UN Joint Study, supra. See
also R. Brody, ‘What about the Other Secret U.S. Prisons?’ International Herald Tribune, 4
May 2004.
821 McCoy, ibid.
822 See Human Rights First, In Liberty’s Shadow – U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers in the Era
of Homeland Security (New York, 2004), in particular at pp. 7-16.
823 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (26 October 2001) (hereinafter ‘USA
PATRIOT Act’). On the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on civil liberties and on the specific
issue of indefinite detention of certain aliens authorised by the Act, see W.A. Aceves,
‘Arbitrary Detention in the United States and the United Kingdom. Some post-9/11 Develop-
ments’, in P. Hoffman (ed.), ACLU International Civil Liberties Report 2003, available at: http:/
/sdshh.com/ICLR/ICLR_2003/ICLR2003.html, ch. 3, at pp. 4-6.
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detention of many within the US, absent normal procedural safeguards.824
A joint study of global practices in relation to secret detention conducted by
UN Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups in 2010 concluded that ‘secret
detention … is widespread and has been invigorated by the “global war on
terror.”’825
The US is far from being the only state to adopt such measures.826 In the
UK for example, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act permitted long-
term detention under immigration laws of persons the Home Secretary sus-
pected of being terrorists, members of a terrorist organisation or otherwise
linked to terrorism, where there was neither evidence to prosecute nor the
possibility of deportation.827 Although the UK scheme benefitted from com-
parison to that of its US partner in Guantánamo Bay, in that there was at least
some limited judicial review, it also gave rise to serious due process con-
cerns.828 This scheme of ‘potentially indefinite detention’ was ultimately
rejected by the courts as a violation of the rights to liberty and to non-dis-
crimination and revoked as described in Chapter 11.
In many other states indefinite detention is nothing new, but September
11 and international response thereto provides a pretext for hitherto unaccept-
able practice. One of many from South Asia is found in Sri Lanka, where the
Prevention of Terrorism Act – long criticised for permitting prolonged incom-
municado detention829 – was suspended prior to September 11, but proposals
were floated by the government to effectively reintroduce it post-September
11, representing a potentially serious setback for rights protection in that
country.830 Another is the widespread preventative detention without judicial
review of a broad range of alleged terrorists (reportedly including political
opponents, activists and others) under the old Malaysian Internal Security Act
of 1960, justified by broad reference to the security imperative of the war on
terror.831 Across Africa and the Middle East also, the use of arbitrary de-
824 Minor immigration irregularities have often been relied upon for detention in the US: see,
e.g., ‘Muslim Cleric Held in US’, The Guardian, 15 January 2004, concerning ‘a senior Muslim
cleric ... arrested ... for allegedly making false statements when applying for American
citizenship more than ten years ago’.
825 UN Joint Study, supra note 35.
826 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 16 December 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
2003/8, para. 61.
827 See www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm, Sn 21. 5 December 2012
828 A & Others case in Chapter 11.
829 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka, UN Doc. CCPR/
CO/79/LKA (2003), para. 13. See also the decision of the Committee in Sarma v. Sri Lanka
(Comm. No. 950/2000), Views of 31 July 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000.
830 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka, supra para. 13.
831 C. Landa, ‘Executive Power and the Use of the State of Emergency’, in A. Salinas de Frías,
K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch. 8, p. 224.
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tention, particularly in the terrorist context, is a matter of serious ongoing
concern, exacerbated by the putative mandate of the war on terror.832
7B.7.2 Control Orders
Another mechanism of control, short of administrative detention, which has
had a direct impact on, inter alia, the right to liberty is the institution of control
orders. Such orders have been used, notably in UK and Australia, in circum-
stances where surveillance is deemed insufficient, detention has been set aside
by the courts or rejected on policy grounds and criminal prosecution is not
considered feasible for whatever reason.833
A preliminary question regarding lawfulness that emerged in the UK was
whether control orders amount to ‘deprivations of liberty’ under the human
rights instruments. Courts in the UK found it to be a question of fact and
degree, in terms of the nature and extent of control over the individual,
whether the orders constitute ‘detention’ as opposed to limits on freedom of
movement.834 Orders that allowed for persons to be confined to specified
areas for up to 18 hours per day and cut off from contact with the outside
world were held to amount to detention, by any other name, and required
derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR to be permissible on security
grounds.835 Lesser restrictions, while still significant and requiring justification
as necessary and proportionate interferences with rights – including freedom
832 By way of example, see, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Yemen,
UN Doc. CCPR/CO/75/YEM (2002), para. 18: on the ‘security forces, including Political
Security, proceeding to arrest and detain anyone suspected of links with terrorism, in
violation of the guarantees set out in the Covenant (Article 9).’
833 See Chapter 11 noting they emerged when offending legislation on security detention was
held to be a violation of human rights and withdrawn, though they were also challenged.
On control orders in the UK authorised by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and their
operation, see ‘Control Orders Update (11 March 2008 – 10 June 2008)’ 12 June 2008 by Tony
McNulty Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing (The Rt Hon Tony
McNulty): Section 14(1) of the 2005 Act available at: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/
news-publications/news-speeches/control-orders-update-0608. The act authorized both
derogating control orders where the government recognized that derogation from the ECHR
was required and non derogating orders, where in the government’s view, it was not. See
Chapter 11 noting they emerged when offending legislation on security detention was held
to be a violation of human rights and withdrawn. In Australia see Thomas v. Mowbray [2007]
HCA 33 (High Court of Australia, 2 August 2007).
834 Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. JJ and others (FC) (Respondents), House
of Lords, [2007] UKHL 45, decided 31 October 2007 in the UK.
835 See also ‘kettling’ cases in the ECtHR: in Austin v. UK, the Grand Chamber found holding
a demonstrator and passers-by in a police cordon for several hours during a protest did
not amount to detention; cf earlier protest cases which did give rise to violations of liberty,
e.g., Steel and Others v. UK (1998) and Schwabe and MG v. Germany (2011). In Gillan and
Quinton v. UK (2010) concerning stop and search powers, the Court considered it unneces-
sary to determine the issue as it found a violation of private life, Article 8.
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of movement or private and family life – did not amount to deprivations of
liberty as such, and did not therefore require derogation.836
Control orders led to extreme infringements on a range of rights of many
people, beyond those directly targeted. In many cases, they included in-
voluntary relocation while most involved extended ‘curfews ... confinement
within a geographical boundary, tagging, financial reporting requirements
and restrictions on association and communication.’837 Ultimately in the UK,
control orders laws were repealed and replaced with terrorism ‘prevention
and investigation measures’ (TPIMs).838 While the language has transformed,
TPIMs have been described as ‘control-orders lite’ and the controversy around
the extent of the restrictions of liberty, imposed outside the criminal process
and with limited opportunity to challenge inclusion, continues.839
Where control orders have been used following a criminal sentence, when
the criminal conviction would normally be considered spent, it has been
suggested that they may also raise the question of double jeopardy.840 This
was the case in respect of the Australian former Guantánamo detainee David
Hicks, who was convicted by military commission, served out his sentence
in Australia and was then subject to a control order.841
7B.7.3 Deprivations of Liberty: Burden of Proof and Procedural Safeguards
Among the most contentious issues to arise in practice has been the burden
of proof required to impose restrictions on liberty (as on other rights) and the
836 Note that restrictions on, e.g., private life on grounds of security are allowed under the
claw back clauses in the legal framework, whereas the right to liberty does not entail such
a clause, and therefore requires derogation.
837 ‘Final Report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Measures’, 2012, noting also that
23 of the 52 controlled persons were subject to involuntary relocation to a different town
or city in the UK.
838 The TPIMs empower the Secretary of State to impose a broad range of restrictions on travel,
movement, property, association, financial and other activity, on a broad range of indi-
viduals. While temporary, they can be extended. On the scope of those covered, see ‘Terror-
ism and Legality’ 7.B.5 above.
839 The PTA 2005 was replaced by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act
2011. The Final Report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Measures, 2012, at http://
www.statewatch.org/news/2012/mar/uk-terr-rev-control-orders-2011.pdf, notes that ‘The
TPIMs, as the replacement measures are known, are similar to control orders in many
respects’ but with changes motivated by ‘civil liberties concerns’. In addition to TPIMs,
comparable restrictions to those imposed by control orders can still be imposed by the
executive under asset freezing and immigration powers: p.4.
840 2006 Report of Special Rapporteur on terrorism Martin Scheinin, supra note 712 at para.
40; B. Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White
(eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 167.
841 See Saul, ibid., and Chapter 8 on Guatanamo more broadly.
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extent of the right of challenge. While restrictions have generally been applied
according to a civil standard of proof of ‘balance of probabilities’, it has been
suggested that given the implications for the individual’s rights – including
loss of liberty for the individual concerned and other human rights con-
sequences – a higher standard should be applied.842 Given the inherent
flexibility they provide, there is a risk of deprivations of liberty, or control
or preventative orders, being used as an alternative to criminal law, with
similarly serious consequences for the person ‘accused’ but far less safe-
guards.843 As such, the UK House of Lords, looking at the extent of disclosure
to the individual required in such cases, found the procedural protections
normally applicable in criminal law should apply also in control order proceed-
ings,844 a view that was endorsed by the ECtHR.845
Likewise, particular concerns have attended the lack of due process by
which such decisions are made and notably lack of access to evidence. It has
to be acknowledged that full disclosure is sometimes not possible,846 but
courts have noted that there must, at a minimum, be a ‘meaningful opportun-
ity’ for the individual affected to know the evidence against him and to ‘effect-
ively challenge’ the restrictions.847 In this context, the UK like other states
has offered various schemes to protect information within the legal process,
such as in camera to closed proceedings or the use of ‘special advocates,’ both
of which have been roundly criticised as undermining principles of open
justice, the effective functioning of the lawyer-client relationship and the
integrity of the justice process more broadly.848 The question remains whether
in all the circumstances the process was such that the individual had enough
842 2008 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, M. Scheinin, 6 August 2008, para 42.
843 Saul, supra note 840, discussing the measures as a way to circumvent procedural protections
due in criminal law.
844 SS v. AF [2009] UKHL 28 [2010], para. 57.
845 Moreover, in the circumstances of the present case, and in view of the dramatic impact
of the lengthy – and what appeared at that time to be indefinite – deprivation of liberty
on the applicants’ fundamental rights, Article 5 § 4 must import substantially the same
fair trial guarantees as Article 6 § 1 in its criminal aspect: A & Ors., supra note 109, para.
217.
846 This is reflected in cases post-9/11, such as A & Ors., ibid at para. 220, and previously e.g.,
Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 469, para. 131.
847 A & Ors., ibid, at para. 218: ‘Where full disclosure was not possible, Article 5 § 4 required
that the difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant
still had the possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him.’
848 See, e.g., ‘Secret Evidence’, E. Metcalfe, Justice (2009) which describes special advocates
as ‘merely the most common and most visible symptom of the unfairness caused by the
decision to allow evidence to be withheld from the defendant.’ The UK Justice and Security
Act 2013 expanded the categories of cases in which ‘closed material’ proceedings – in which
evidence is hear without one of the parties and a judgment may be open only to one of
the parties – can be employed in UK courts. It also employs a ‘special advocate’ scheme
much criticized in the context of immigration detention proceedings before the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).
552 Chapter 7
information and sufficient opportunity to provide instructions to his lawyer,
information to the court, and a meaningful right to challenge.849 Notably,
these initiatives that represent exceptions to the normal principles of due
process have gradually been extended to apply in a broader range of proceed-
ings.850
7B.8 LISTING AND DE-LISTING: RIGHTS SANCTIONED
Terrorism ‘lists’ have sprung up on various levels post-9/11. At one extreme
are the CIA ‘kill lists’, which, although still not officially recognised, have long
been acknowledged by officials and others.851 At another, are the myriad
‘watch lists’, such as one secret US list reported to have swollen to 875,000
people by 2013.852 On the international, regional and national levels, official
‘lists’ are kept of individuals and organisations considered to be linked in some
way with terrorism, with varying but often wide-reaching human rights
implications.
The best known on the international level is ‘the Al-Qaida and Taliban’
list overseen by the UN ‘Sanctions Committee’, established originally under
SC Res. 1267,853 to designate individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda,
Osama bin Laden and/or the Taleban wherever located for inclusion on the
‘Consolidated List’.854 The EU also maintains lists – both to implement Council
849 A & Ors., supra note 109 at para. 220.
850 ‘Once the special advocate system became functional, it quickly spread to other legal
settings, including the Information Tribunal, the High Court, the Parole Board and the
Employment Tribunal’. Special Advocates: The Face of Secrect Justice, FBIJ, 1 Nov 2012. See
also Justice and Security Act 2013 which expanded the categories of cases in which a ‘closed
material’ proceeding- in which evidence is heard without one of the parties and a judgment
may be open only to one of the parties – can be employed in UK courts (see Chapter 11).
It also employs the special advocate scheme adopted in the SIAC detention cases.
851 See, e.g., the Aulaqi case wherein the ACLU Challenged to the Secrecy surrounding the
existence of the targeted killing programme in 7B.3 ‘War and Human Rights’.
852 The US National Counter-Terrorism Center, which manages the database, made public
in May 2013 that 875,000 people are on that list; ‘Terror watch list grows to 875,000’,
Washington Post, 3 May 2013.
853 Although the sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and the Taleban was a pre-9/11 invention
(SC Res. 1267 (1999)), it was modified and expanded post-9/11 by SC Res. 1390 (2002),
16 January 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002), which creates an open-ended sanctions regime
of a potentially global nature. Resolution 1267 established a Security Council committee,
known as ‘the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’ (hereinafter, ‘the Committee’).
Resolution 1267 has been modified and extended by numerous subsequent resolutions..
854 SC Res. 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999), paras. 4(a), 4(b) and
6. The sanctions regime has successively been extended to cover ‘individual and entities
associated with [Osama bin Laden], including those in the al-Qaida organisation’. See SC
Res. 1333 (2000), 19 December 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000), para. 8.
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resolutions and separately.855 Commonly these lists provide a basis to freeze
assets, preclude travel and limit movement, though they may involve the
imposition of other restrictions, and have broader human rights implica-
tions.856
Identifying those engaged in and providing financial support to inter-
national terrorism, and prompt cooperation to freeze assets, impede operations
and drain the financial lifeblood from terrorism, are essential to effectively
combat terrorism.857 Such preventative measures must be available to states
as they act in the interest of national security and protection of their popula-
tions from terrorism, which, as noted above, is itself a human rights obligation.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the human rights framework does not
proscribe listing as such, but it constrains it within rule of law limits. To be
lawful, measures that restrict qualified rights, such as private life, movement
or property, must be prescribed by law and pursue a legitimate aim – require-
ments that are likely to be met where for example measures are mandated
by the Security Council, as borne out by litigation.858 The listing and
measures taken in response must also be necessary and proportionate, which
is an assessment to be made case-by-case in light of the specific circumstances
of the individual. Any interference must be minimised.859 Thus the ECHR
has found a state to have violated the right to private life of an individual
who was not allowed to enter the state on the basis of the travel ban arising
from the Security Council lists, where there were measures within the state’s
discretion that it could have taken to avoid or limit the interference with the
rights.860
While many human rights concerns have arisen in relation to lists, it is
however the lack of an effective opportunity for individuals and entities to
know the basis for their inclusion and to challenge their listing that has been
855 Some EU sanctions give effect to Security Council resolutions while others are separate
EU lists. EU sanctions have been taken against third states, individuals and organsiations
under Art. 215, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU2007 (in force 2009). They involve trade
embargoes, financial sanctions and transport bans and often have direct effect, as noted
in e.g. Abousfian Abdelrazik v. the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada,
2009 FC 580, at para.53. A. Rosas, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Issues of Judicial
Control’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: Inter-
national Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch. 4; and Kadi v. Council,
supra note 511.
856 Member States are required to take the following actions with regard to individuals and
entities on the Consolidated List: (1) freeze their assets; (2) ban their entry into and travel
through their territories; and (3) impose an arms embargo.
857 See, e.g., the Terrorist Financing Convention.
858 Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 511.
859 Ibid. at paras. 195-96.
860 See Chapter 11 on Human Rights Litigation for further discussion of Nada v. Switzerland,
where the state could have taken action to have the individual removed and failed to do
so, the measures it took pursuant to the lists was considered a disporporitonate interference.
Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 511.
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at the heart of much of the human rights critique.861 Basic procedural safe-
guards, involving an opportunity to meaningfully challenge inclusion on the
list, are required for all persons whose rights are restricted, consistent with
the underlying principle of legality and prohibition on arbitrariness.862 This
includes, in principle, knowledge that one is listed, and access to at least
sufficient information to know the basis of the allegations and an opportunity
to refute them before an independent arbiter according to basic due process
guarantees. While Security Council action in including individuals on its lists
may not itself be reviewable,863 courts have found that individuals must have
this right to challenge particular states’ actions against them that fall foul of
human rights obligations.864
The failure to respect basic due process in the listing schemes has given
rise to virulent criticism. For example, a Council of Europe Special Rapporteur
described the ‘flagrant injustice’ of Security Council listing865 while the UN
Special Rapporteur alerted to accountability and fundamental human rights
issues arising.866 A Canadian Federal Court judge went further, condemning
the regime as ‘untenable under the principles of human rights’, noting that
the ‘situation for a listed person is not unlike that of Josef K in Kafka’s The
Trial, who awakens one morning, and for reasons never revealed to him or
the reader, is arrested and prosecuted for an unspecified crime’.867 Indeed,
as discussed in Chapter 11 on human rights litigation, successive courts,
including the European Court of Justice, the UN Human Rights Committee,
the ECtHR and national courts, have found that measures taken against indi-
viduals on the basis of Security Council or other lists haven fallen foul of legal
human rights requirements. In the cases before the ECJ, EU implementing
legislation giving effect to Security Council sanctions lists was struck down,
861 Ibid. at 4-5.
862 See the principles set out in relation to ‘control orders’ above should be applied in the
particular context and in light of the type of measures taken against the individual.
863 See UN and Human Rights, above.
864 See Chapter 11, ‘Human Rights Litigation.’
865 On 25 April 2007, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) investigator Dick
Marty (Switzerland, ‘strongly deplored’ the UN Security Council for the «flagrant injustice»
of blacklisting individuals suspected of having links to terrorism without evidence of any
wrong-doing, flouting its own principles.
866 In August 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, Martin Scheinin, called for proper procedural due process
safeguards for the UNSC targeted economic sanctions regimes. UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A61/27 (2006), at para. 34. As noted supra the
2005 reports followed the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Changes, A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. 1/59/656 (2004), at
para. 153, which noted that ‘the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious
accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conven-
tions’.
867 Ibid, para 51 and 53; see Rosas, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’, supra note 855,
p. 100.
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preventing 27 states from implementing the Security Council sanctions on
human rights grounds.868
In face of these criticisms and challenges, the Security Council process has
itself evolved over time. A rudimentary ‘de-listing’ procedure869 existed early
on, allowing states to challenge on behalf of individuals (as first invoked in
a Swedish challenge that led to the removal of two individuals who had been
included on the list despite no apparent evidence of terrorist links in 2002),870
but this secret, rare and selective procedure served to highlight the dangers
for the majority of organisations or persons who could not count on state
willingness to represent them. The momentum towards change was impelled
by the indirect judicial oversight through the judicial review of states’ actions
mentioned above, but an important additional catalyst may have been the High
Level Report of 2005, wherein UN member States ‘call[ed] upon the Security
Council with the support of the Secretary-General to ensure that fair and clear
procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for
removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions’.871 The
‘Fassbender’ report and recommendations followed,872 and the Security Coun-
cil adopted several resolutions making minor and gradual amendments to
the listing procedure.873
The more significant shift institutionally, and certainly if one is to judge
by results, was the Security Council’s Resolution 1904 of December 17, 2009,
since extended, establishing the Office of the Ombudsperson to deal with
868 Yassin Abdullah Khadi v. Council and Commission, 5656/02, and Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/
05 P, Judgment of Grand Chamber, 3 September 2008 (Kadi I).
869 See Resolution 1333 (2000), allowing for a ‘de-listing’ of the organisations designated by
the 1267 Committee (para. 3). See also Security Council Committee Established Pursuant
to Resolution 1267 (1999), Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work (adopted
on 7 November 2002 and amended on 10 April 2003), available at: http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees /1267/1267_guidelines.pdf (hereinafter, ‘1267 Committee, Guidelines’).
870 Sweden contested the US designation of three Swedish citizens of Somali origin as terrorist
accomplices and two of the men were removed from the UN list in August 2002. See
‘Human Rights Committee Takes Up Sweden’s Fifth Report on Compliance with Inter-
national Covenant On Civil, Political Rights,’ HR/CT/616 21 March 2002.
871 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 478, para. 109.
872 On the report commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, see Bardo Fassender,
‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’, Study Commissioned by the United Nations Office
of Legal Affairs, p. 3. It recommended that individuals be informed wherever possible,
have a right to be heard by the Security Council or subsidiary body, with the right to
representation, and the right to an effective remedy. Ibid.
873 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1730, Preface, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730, 19 December 2006, paras. 1-8 which
allowed in principle for challenge through a focal point process or through their state of
residence or citizenship. S.C. Res. 1735, Preface, UN Doc. S/RES/1735, 22 December 2006,
para. 5 required more information from states by way of a ‘statement of case’ for listing,
provided non-exhaustive factors for the committee to consider when determining removal
(para 14). S.C. Res. 1822, Preface, UN Doc. S/RES/1822, 30 June 2008 imposed basic
notification procedures and annual review of names that had not been reviewed in three
years or more. Ibid., paras. 25-26.
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requests from individuals or entities seeking to be removed from the Security
Council’s ‘1267’ Al-Qaida Sanctions List.874 The Ombudsperon interviews
applicants, interacts with states and the Council and ‘recommends’ de-
listing.875 While her powers are limited, and she can neither compel states
to share information nor the Council to delist, there are assumptions built into
the process whereby her delisting recommendations will be followed auto-
matically after 60 days unless the Committee decides otherwise. In practice,
up until August 2013, 32 cases had been reviewed and 26 individuals delisted,
and the Council has never refused to delist.876 The transparency afforded
is also starkly improved in contrast to previous procedures, with greater
information being made available to the applicant and where possible
publicly.877
However, the procedure has obvious limitations. An Ombudsperson
undoubtedly falls far short of affording the right to a remedy or to judicial
challenge required by human rights law. Moreover, in at least one case, the
effectiveness of the procedure has been cynically undercut by a delisting being
swiftly followed by a relisting of the individual under another listing scheme
with less oversight.878 Nonetheless, this new procedure is the most significant
step yet in the process of reform, which may reflect a ‘willingness by the
Security Council to make incremental adjustments that allow petitioners to
engage in dialogue with the Ombudsperson and possibly receive more detailed
information concerning their designation’.879 The evolving situation of listed
individuals forms part of a broader debate on the need for a measure of
Security Council accountability and the need to ensure recourse for individuals
whose rights are directly affected by its actions.
874 The mandate was created by SC Res.1904, 17 December 2009 and extended by SC Res. 1989,
17 June 2011.
875 Under SC Res. 1904 (2009) the ombudsperson had jurisdiction with respect to Al-Qaida
and the Taliban all of whom/which were in a Consolidated List, though with Resolutions
1989 (2011) and 1988 (2011) the lists were separated; she now addresses only the Al-Qaeda
list.
876 On the current status of delisting, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/delisting.
shtml.
877 See ibid for updated information on the exercise of the mandate.
878 Ali Ahmed Jumale (aka Ji’male) remains on the Somali list after being removed from the
Al Qaida list – the delisting and listing happened on the same day. The Ombusperson’s
mandate is limited to 1267 and does not cover the other sanctions lists. See Security Council,
SC/10549, Statement of 17 Feb 2012 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/
sc10549.doc.htm
879 D. Cortright and E. de Wet, Human Rights Standards for Targeted Sanctions, Report by the
Sanctions and Security Research Program, Policy Brief SSRP 1001-01 (2010), at 10.
International human rights law 557
7B.9 IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE EXCLUSION
Strict immigration procedures have been adopted in many states in recent
years, for reasons that go beyond (but are doubtless affected by) the context
of international terrorism.880 A particularly loose approach to the ‘terrorist
label’, and some of the most potentially serious consequences of its application,
are seen in relation to immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Although
none of those directly involved in the September 11 attacks were refugees or
asylum seekers,881 with the London bombings as one example among many
of ‘home grown terrorism’, unjustifiable linkages with the threat of terrorism
have provided a pretext for broad-reaching measures providing for the de-
tention, and ultimately removal, of immigrants and asylum seekers.882
Deportation and exclusion have been the methods of choice for govern-
ments, which do enjoy very broad (while not unlimited) discretion in the
immigration context as to who should be allowed to enter and remain in their
state.883 It is perhaps unsurprising then that definitions of those suspected
of being associated with terrorism for the purposes of exclusion are often far
broader than for other purposes. In the US for example, reports chronicle the
vast impact of deportation and exclusion on persons who have lived their lives
and established their families in the US, who are not on any vetted terrorist
list nor suspected of themselves having participated in terrorist (or necessarily
unlawful) acts.884 Rather they are banned on the basis of their support for
or association with groups that have engaged in violence, irrespective of
whether the groups may have legitimately engaged in force, consistent with
IHL in an armed conflict for example, or of the nature of the support or asso-
ciation.
In other states, the state has assumed the power to strip individuals of their
nationality on national security grounds, with sometimes devastating
880 See, e.g., European Union ‘Returns’ Directive, ‘Directive 2008/115/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures
in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals’, 328 Official Journal
of the European Union 98, 24 December 2008; see also ‘EU rules on illegal migrants anger
human rights groups’, Thursday 19 June 2008, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/
mobility/eu-rules-illegal-migrants-anger-human-rights-groups/article-173477.
881 Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power’, supra note 683, pp. 258-60.
882 The use of immigration laws to detain persons considered potentially dangerous has been
a common feature of the human rights landscape post-9/11. For a detailed survey of the
current situation in the US, see Human Rights First, In Liberty’s Shadow.
883 Subject to certain parameters, including the refoulement rules set out in Part A and
addressed as regards developing practice in the terrorism field below.
884 Political controversy surrounds exclusion of persons once affiliated with organisations that,
e.g., took up arms against the Sudanese government, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq or
Fidel Castro’s in Cuba. See Friends of U.S., Terrorists in Eyes of Law, September 19, 2011.
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effects.885 Reports from the UK indicate that the stripping of nationality has
preceded drone strikes in one case,886 and led to individuals being left state-
less in another.887 The UK Supreme Court has found that such an order that
leaves an individual without a nationality is unlawful.888
The groundwork for measures that unduly impact on the rights of refugees
was laid by Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which required states
to refuse refugee status to those who have participated in or planned terrorist
acts,889 as reflected in subsequent resolutions of other bodies890 and the
EU Common Position 2001/930 which is binding on EU member states. As
noted above, given the amorphous concept of terrorism, and a gung-ho
approach to it that is particularly apparent post-9/11, the label can encompass
serious crimes, offences of lesser gravity, and potentially conduct not criminal
at all. This may mean that refugees are in effect excluded from protection in
circumstances that go far beyond the serious crimes that may justify exclusion
under the Refugee Convention.891
The risk resulting from this ‘flexible’ approach to excluded categories is
compounded by ‘truncated status determination processes’,892 leading to
concern ‘that persons might be excluded without reliable proof of their per-
sonal involvement in genuine exclusionary conduct’.893 In the European
‘Returns’ Directive for example, the limited procedural safeguards do not apply
to ‘national security’ cases, providing a further and troubling manifestation
of the procedural exceptionalism that attends national security and terrorism
matters. Particular concerns arise as to asylum seekers being returned to their
country of origin in circumstances where their rights in respect of non-refoule-
ment are not adequately protected, as discussed below.
885 See, e.g., HR Council resolution on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, A/HRC/20/L9
(2012).
886 See, e.g., ‘Former British citizens killed by drone strikes after passports revoked’, 27 Feb
2013, available at: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/02/27/former-british-
citizens-killed-by-drone-strikes-after-passports-revoked.
887 Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. Al-Jedda (Respondent) [2013]
UKSC 62 On appeal from [2012] EWCA Civ 358, 9 October 2013.
888 Ibid. See also, e.g., African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Resolution 234 (2013)
on the right to nationality and obligation to prevent statelessness.
889 SC Res. 1373, para. 3(f).
890 See, e.g., EU Common position 2001/930 of 27 December 2001; in S. Kapferer, ‘Ends and
Means in Politics’, at 124-5. See also Resolution 2003/37 of the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism,’ 23 April 2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.11/Add.4.
para. 8.
891 See Article 1F of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, which excludes person where
there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed ‘a crime against peace,
a war crime, or a crime against humanity, ... a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge ... acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’
892 Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power’, supra note 683, p. 259.
893 Ibid.
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7B.10 DISPATCHING THE PROBLEM: REFOULEMENT POST-9/11
The deportation of individuals considered a threat to national security has
been one of the most common tools in the ‘war on terror’. In this context,
human rights courts and mechanisms have often acknowledged that, as noted
in Part A, there is no human right to enter or remain in a foreign state, and
indeed that ‘as part of the fight against terrorism, States must be allowed to
deport non-nationals whom they consider to be threats to national security’.894
To be lawful, however, deportation or transfer must conform with the principle
of legality and be subject to certain human rights constraints, among them
the non-refoulement rule which obliges states not to transfer an individual
where there are real risks of rights violations in the state of transfer.895 Per-
haps more than any other issue, it is this practice of transfer of persons, in
apparent disregard of the non-refoulement obligations, that has given rise to
most voluminous challenges by individuals and expressions of concern by
human rights bodies post-9/11.896 Restrictions on the state’s ability to deport
individuals, on human rights grounds, have also been one of the most polemic
issues in political discourse in a number of states.897
While these issues have most commonly arisen in the context of the de-
portation under immigration laws of persons deemed a threat to national
security, serious tensions arise also in the context of extradition and inter-
894 Othman v. UK, supra note 296, para. 184. It continued: ‘It is no part of this Court’s function
to review whether an individual is in fact such a threat; its only task is to consider whether
that individual’s deportation would be compatible with his of her rights under the Conven-
tion’.
895 Chapter A.5.10.
896 See, e.g., Cases before the ECtHR include Saadi v. Italy; Daoudi v France, 3 Dec 2009; Ismoilov
and Others v. Russia, No. 2947/06, §§ 96-100; 24 April 2008; Othman v. UK, para. 186-89.
Before CAT see Agiza v. Sweden (comm. 233/2003, decision of 20 May 2005, Pelit v. Azerbaijan,
comm. no. 281/2005 decision of 29 May 2007; See also, Brada v. France, CAT/C/34/D/195/
2002, 24 May 2005. Before the HRC see, e.g., Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/
1416/2005, 10 November 2006, and Concluding Observations: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/
74/SWE (2002), para. 12; Concluding Observations: New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/75/
NZL (2002), para. 11; Concluding Observations: Portugal, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/PRT
(2003), para. 12; Concluding observations: Egypt (UN Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (2002), para.
16.
897 A particularly divisive debate has unfolded in the UK on account of the length of proceed-
ings prior to the deportation of terrorist suspects from the UK. See, e.g., the Bill introduced
by a Conservative MP to allow the UK to temporarily withdraw from the ECHR to deport
Abu Qatada (subject of the Othman case) to Jordan. see eg also ‘Withdraw from human rights




national criminal cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 4.898 International
cooperation in criminal matters, or in the prevention of terrorism more broadly,
are themselves international obligations, which pursue human rights aims.
In recent years great emphasis has therefore been placed on enhancing and
streamlining this cooperation in the counter-terrorism context, which has
spurred important regional and international developments and substantial
state practice. However the legitimacy – and arguably effectiveness – of such
measures depends on them unfolding within a rule of law framework, in-
cluding respect for the obligations of refoulement.899 While the US has taken
a radically restrictive view on the issue of refoulement, denying the existence
of such obligations,900 in a number of other ways, states have sought to
relativize, redefine or to work around the prohibition on refoulement in the
war on terror, as illustrated below.
7B.10.1 Refoulement: Absolute Ban or Balancing in the Public Interest?
State practice has occasionally sought to regress from well-established juris-
prudence on the absolute nature of the prohibition on certain transfers, notably
where there is a risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. For
example, a collection of European governments, led by the UK, argued before
the ECtHR that in the context of terrorism, the obligation not to transfer to TCIDT
should not be ‘absolute’ but a test that ‘balances’ the risk of transfer to the
898 See A.5.10. The rule of non-refoulement is are relevant to any form of transfer of persons,
whether within the immigration or criminal law frameworks, or outside any legal framework
as characterized by ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ discussed at Chapter 10. Although it has been
suggested that particular ‘tensions’ arise in relation to extradition and that standards should
be higher in these cases – see UK government arguments in Ahmad v. UK, para. 167, but
the Court found that ‘whether there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in
another State cannot depend on the legal basis for removal to that State. The Court’s own
case-law has shown that, in practice, there may be little difference between extradition and
other removals.’ (para 168).
899 While this section focuses on non-refoulement, note that other cooperation- related concerns
arise from e.g., cooperation with drone strikes in violation of the right to life (see, e.g., ‘Drone
Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies’, R. Somaiya, NY Times, 30 Jan 2013), or
in relation to unlawful and excessive surveillance practices and the exchange of personal
data (B.11).
900 The US denies that its nonrefoulement obligations arise under the Conventions, despite
contrary jurisprudence. See the US’s Second and Third Periodic Reports to HRC; and the
US’ Fourth Periodic Report to HRC. For the Committee’s response, see UN Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18 Dec. 2006. UN Human Rights Comm.,
Comments by the Government of the United States of America on the Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/REV.1/ADD.1,
2 Feb. 2008.
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individual against the national security risk.901 However, consistent with
the duty of non-refoulement as linked to the nature of the protected rights
themselves,902 the ECtHR has reaffirmed the absolute nature of the ban on
transfer where there is a risk of absolute rights being violated.903 This
approach has held fast in relation to transfer to proceedings that would rely
on torture evidence, and those that would amount to a ‘flagrant denial of
justice’, in line with the non-derogable nature of the safeguards against torture,
or of core fair trial guarantees.904
Attempts to ‘balance’ in this way were followed by attempts to argue that
while the ban on torture may be absolute, not so in relation to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, where broader ‘policy objectives’ could be taken into
consideration.905 These arguments too were ultimately rejected, with the ECtHR
upholding an ‘indivisible’ approach to the ban on torture and cruel or inhuman
treatment,906 in line with the approach of other international bodies.907
While the question of whether the minimum threshold of TCIDT has been met
in all the circumstances is the difficult one, it has been reaffirmed that, where
it is met, the ban on transfer is absolute.908
7B.10.2 ‘Diplomatic Assurances’
One of the most uncertain areas of practice in relation to the transfer of persons
in the terrorism context relates to the practice of seeking ‘diplomatic
assurances’ from states that they would not violate the rights of those returned
to them.909 A range of states, including the US, UK, Germany and Sweden
have negotiated assurances or ‘memoranda of understanding’, at times with
901 See Chapter 11 ‘Litigating the War on Terror’ on the development of Ramzy v. the Netherlands
and Saadi v. Italy.
902 Part B.9.
903 See Saadi v. Italy, supra note 262.
904 See Othman v. UK, supra note 297.
905 Ahmad v. UK, supra note 418, para. 162 on the UK arguments that: ‘… in the extradition
context, a distinction had to be drawn between torture and other forms of ill-treatment...
it was legitimate to consider the policy objectives pursued by extradition in determining
whether the ill-treatment reached the minimum level of severity required by Article 3…’.
906 ‘The Court therefore concludes that the Chahal ruling ... should apply without distinction
between the various forms of ill-treatment which are proscribed by Article 3. Ahmad v.
UK, ibid, para. 176.
907 See, e.g., Committee’s General Comment No. 20, which makes clear that Article 7 prevents
refoulement to a real risk of torture or other forms of ill-treatment; Article 19 of the Charter
on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, cited in Ahmad, supra note 418, para. 167.
908 See, e.g., conditions of detention which in some cases are found to meet the threshold and
in others not. This is a case-by-case determination. See, e.g., Ahmad v. UK, regarding the
high threshold for Article 3 in transfer cases – in that case transfer to a US supermax prison
conditions did not meet the threshold.
909 See discussion in C. Wouters, ‘Reconciling National Security and Non-refoulement’, p. 580.
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states known for their poor human rights records, which have then been relied
upon in court as a justification for transfers that would otherwise be unlaw-
ful.910
As the practice has grown so too have expressions of wide-reaching sceptic-
ism as to whether assurances can effectively alleviate risk in the way they
purport to.911 The UK House of Lords encapsulated some of this criticism
as ‘the “Catch 22” proposition that if you need to ask for assurances you
cannot rely on them. If a State is unwilling or unable to comply with the
obligations of international law in relation to the avoidance and prevention
of inhuman treatment, how can it be trusted to be willing or able to give effect
to an undertaking that an individual deportee will not be subject to such
treatment?’912 Monitoring reports by NGOs have fuelled concerns regarding
ineffectiveness, by pointing out cases where risks have became realities post-
transfer, despite assurances to the contrary.913 Likewise, concern was
expressed by a former Special Rapporteur on Torture who noted that ‘diplom-
atic assurances are not legally binding, therefore they carry no legal effect and
no accountability if breached; and the person whom the assurances aim to
protect has no recourse if the assurances are violated ...’ while ‘post-return
monitoring mechanisms have proven to be no guarantee.’914
Despite this, a range of national, international and regional courts have
shown increasing willingness to have regard to such assurances in making
910 See e.g. Letter to German Government regarding Diplomatci Assurances, available at: http://
www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/21/letter-german-government-regarding-diplomatic-assur-
ances; Joint report of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International
Commission of Jurists, 2 December 2005, vol 1, pp. 179-223; Human Rights Watch, ‘Not
the Way Forward: the UK’s Dangerous Reliance on Diplomatic Assurances’, October 2008,
available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files /reports/uk1008web.pdf; and ‘Empty
Promises enabling torture’, 6 October 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/
10/06/diplomatic-assurances-empty-promises-enabling-torture.
911 Ibid. See also, e.g., ‘Viewpoint’ of 27 June 2006 of the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg; Special Rapportuer on Turure, below, the United
Kingdom Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights Report of 18 May 2006 and the
House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs report of 20 July 2008; Othman
v. UK, supra note 297, para. 145; Cf. respected British human rights lawyer Lord Anthony
Lester defends the courts’ regard to such agreements: see ‘Letter from Lord Lester’, The
Guardian, 20 February 2009, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/20/
abu-qatada-jordan.
912 The House of Lords in Qatada, supra note 341, para 15.
913 HRW, ‘Empty Promises enabling torture’, supra note 911; HRW, ‘Not the Way Forward’,
supra note 911.
914 Report to the UN General Assembly of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (UN Docu-
ment A/59/324), 1 September 2004. The paragraph continues: ‘The Special Rapporteur
is therefore of the opinion that States cannot resort to diplomatic assurances as a safeguard
against torture and ill-treatment where there are substantial grounds for believing that a
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment upon return.’
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factual evaluations of risk.915 Over time, courts have looked more closely
at the assurances, discarding some as inherently unreliable, while affording
some weight to others in differing circumstances.916 It was in the Othman
case that the ECHR set down in detail factors relevant to assessing whether
assurances should be considered of ‘practical application’, as well as the weight
to be afforded to assurances in the particular case.917 These included whether
they are specific, binding, by whom they are issued, if the court has seen them,
the record of the state, whether the conduct is illegal in the receiving state,
and whether there are effective systems both for monitoring and for rights
protection more broadly.918 Where the state is a systematic violator, human
rights practice certainly suggests that assurances should rarely, if ever, be
admitted.919
Where assurances are taken into consideration, they are not a panacea,
but ‘a further relevant factor’ in an overall assessment of the real risk in a
particular case.920 The question therefore remains one of fact as to whether,
in light of all the facts and circumstances, including the situation in the state
and the circumstances of the applicant, there is a real and reasonably foresee-
able risk in the receiving state.921 It remains to be seen whether some factors
that have been given particular emphasis by courts and bodies in other cases,
such as whether there will be follow-up and monitoring, can really be made
effective,922 or whether assurances will essentially constitute a judicially
915 ECtHR – Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, §§ 96-100; 24 April 2008; Othman v.
UK, para. 186-89. CAT – Agiza v. Sweden (comm.. 233/2003, decision of 20 May 2005, Pelit
v. Azerbaijan, comm. no. 281/2005 decision of 29 May 2007); HRC – Mohammed Alzery v.
Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, 10 November 2006. Examples from the national level
include Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 1503, Suresh
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3, the Supreme Court of
Canada.
916 See, e.g., Othman v. UK, para. 187. The assurances have no legal effect and do not themselves
remove risk but are a factor in its evaluation.
917 Ibid.
918 Ibid. at para. 189.
919 Othman v. UK, para. 188. ‘A preliminary question is whether the general human rights
situation in the receiving State excludes accepting any assurances whatsoever.’
920 Ibid. at para. 187; see also Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, 10
November 2006, para. 11.3:the HRC found ‘The existence of diplomatic assurances, their
content and the existence and implementation of enforcement mechanisms are all factual
elements relevant to the overall determination of whether, in fact, a real risk of proscribed
ill-treatment exists.’).
921 On the standards for evaluating risk, see A.5.10 in this chapter.
922 The Human Rights Committee has suggested that any reliance on assurances depends on
‘serious efforts to monitor the implementation of those guarantees’ and ‘institute credible
mechanisms for ensuring compliance of the receiving State with these assurances from
the moment of expulsion’. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002), para. 12. See also Concluding observations
of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand, Un Doc. CCPR/CO/75/NZL (2002), para.
11. Others question whether such transnational monitoring mechanisms are inherently
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endorsed way in which states can, in practice, circumvent their responsibilities
in respect of non-refoulement.
7B.10.3 The Scope of Affected Rights and Refoulement: Wavering Standards
in Instruments and Jurisprudence
As noted in Chapter 4, international standards elaborated since 9/11 have not
always been clear or consistent as regards the duty to cooperate and to refrain
from cooperating in accordance with the obligation on non-refoulement.923
Specifically, degree of confusion and inconsistency has attended the scope of
the non-refoulement obligation: risks to which rights in the receiving state
give rise to the obligation of non-refoulement?924 An early example of a
selective approach was the Protocol to the European Convention against
Terrorism of 2003925 which excluded the obligation to extradite where there
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be subjected to
torture or the death penalty926 but omitted reference to refusal to cooperate
where there were risks of inhuman and degrading treatment, denial of funda-
mental principles of justice, enforced disappearance or extra-judicial execution,
for example, where human rights law would also require states to refuse to
extradite.927 Indeed, the Protocol fell short of the Council of Europe’s own
guidelines passed only months before,928 leading to fumbling attempts to
ineffective or insufficient. See, e.g., HRW, ‘Not the Way Forward’, supra note 1006.
923 On SC Res. 1373 see B.2 above; see Chapter 4 on the fitful evolution of extradition law and
its relationship with human rights exceptions.
924 Inconsistencies are not new, reflecting the piecemeal development of the law. However
the concerted focus on these issues post-9/11 provided an opportunity to introduce greater
coherence in the approach to standard setting; as indicated in the European example, that
opportunity may have been missed: see Chapter 4 B.
925 Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg,
15 May 2003, ETS, No. 190 Article 4 (hereinafter ‘Protocol amending the European Conven-
tion against Terrorism);’ see also Council of Europe Resolution 1271 (2002), para. 8.
926 Article 4(2) and (3), Protocol amending the European Convention against Terrorism. It
includes where the law of the requested State does not allow for life imprisonment.
927 See this chapter, section A. See also Art. 16 Convention on Enforced Disappearnace; and
Principle 5 of the ‘Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions’, Recommended by ECOSOC Res. 1989/65 of 24 May
1989, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89.
928 The Council of Europe ‘Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism’
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002, (‘Council of Europe Guidelines
on Human Rights and Terrorism’) do not cover the full range of Convention rights either,
but go beyond the Terrorism Convention and Protocol in covering, e.g., the right to fair
trial. Subsequent cases, e.g., Othman v. UK, may have clarified the legal position however.
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remove apparent inconsistencies, clarifying that ‘Article 5 … is not, however,
intended to be exhaustive as to the possible grounds for refusal’.929
Considerable practice has unfolded since then in the context of particular
terrorism cases, as a result of which the body of applied law has been devel-
oped considerably in recent years. While written standard setting documents
tend to refer to torture or ill-treatment and limited additional criteria, juris-
prudence has evolved considerably, indicating that for example, flagrant
violations of fair trial rights, or arbitrary detention, or potentially other serious
violations that affect the essence of the enjoyment of a broader range of rights,
may preclude the lawful transfer of an individual.930 While decisions as to
whether there is such a risk in particular cases and whether the individual
should be transferred have often provoked controversy, the increasing accept-
ance and consolidation of the scope of the non-refoulement principle as going
beyond a few core human rights, is an important development of principle
to have emerged from the war on terror.931
7B.10.4 Undermining Procedural Safeguards
In practice, the role of the judiciary in protecting against refoulement has been
limited in various ways in recent years.932 The most notorious example is
of course the complete sidestepping of judicial review through practices such
as extraordinary rendition of persons, in some cases despite extradition pro-
ceedings being pending or having been dismissed.933 Alongside such crude
examples of circumvention are other developments, purportedly designed to
enhance international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, that limit the
ability of individuals to challenge the basis for the extradition request, or the
existence of underlying evidence.934 These moves to ‘streamline’ the extra-
929 Para. 32, Draft Explanatory Report on the European Convention on Terrorism, text available
at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/090-rev.htm, para. 69, noting ‘this
article is not intended to be exhaustive with regard to the circumstances in which extradition
may be refused.’
930 See, e.g., Othman v. UK, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and other
sources in A.5.10.
931 See, e.g., Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah, House of Lords, (2004) UKHL 26; Othman v. UK.
932 See, e.g., in this chapter, Part B.8 and Chapter 4, Part. B.2.
933 See cases concerning cooperation between Bosnia and the US, and Malawi and the US, where
despite extradition cases having been dismissed and pending (respectively), the executive
reportedly interfered to transfer the individuals in question to the US, discussed in Chap-
ter 4, Part B.2.3.3.
934 See Chapter 4, Part B.2.3.3, noting that measures such as the European arrest warrant or
bilateral extradition treaties restricts judicial involvement in transfer decisions, e.g., limiting
the extent to which judges can look behind the extradition request and asses human rights
concerns that may arise from its nature, motivation or effect, eroding the ‘double criminality’
principle and lowering normal requirements regarding exchange of evidence. The European
Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedure
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dition procedure – towards a more speedy, or some would say perfunctory,
procedure – risk undermining the essential judicial safeguard against violation
of human rights and jeopardising the principle of non-refoulement.
Procedural concerns arise most acutely however in relation to deportations
on national security grounds. One example of controversial expedited pro-
cedures appears in the French system, which provides expedited procedures
intended for emergency deportations where there is a real risk to national
security (but which are allegedly used more broadly).935 Among the problems
with the system, which have been roundly criticised, including by the
ECtHR936 and CAT,937 is the refusal to suspend deportation pending the out-
come of appeal proceedings. While the right to a meaningful opportunity to
challenge transfer is recognised in human rights law, there is a risk that
expedited or summary procedures that lack normal fair trial protections or
effective appeal may render this right, and the protection against refoulement,
illusory. As noted in Part A, the legal framework would benefit from greater
clarity, and consistency across human rights bodies, as regards the nature of
applicable due process rights to transfer cases;938 this may with time be
provided as practice of transfers and challenges in the field of counter-terrorism
continue to unfold.939
In conclusion, increased resort to unlawful transfer, attempts to erode
standards of protection and to minimise if not entirely bypass judicial scrutiny,
have been central matters of concern for human rights and the rule of law
in the counter-terrorism context. Even in areas where the legal obligations were
previously uncontroversial – notably in respect of the transfer to states where
there was a risk of torture – states have argued explicitly for an exception to
the continued application of the principle in the terrorism context. However,
courts and treaty bodies have reasserted the core principles, and had some
between Member States, 13 June 2002 (2002/584/JHA), OJ L 190/5, 18 July 2002 (hereinafter
‘European Arrest Warrant’) has drawn particular criticism in this respect. See Article 8
‘European Arrest Warrant’ and Article 8(3)(c) US-UK Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the UK and Northern Ireland and the Government of the USA (Washington,
31 March 2003).
935 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘In the Name of Prevention,’ 2008, available at: http://www.
hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/05/name-prevention on French ‘national security exceptions
to the legal protections against forced removal.’
936 See, e.g., Affaire Gebremedhin v. France, no. 25389/05, available at: www.echr.coe.int, paras.
65-66; see also Conka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I, available at: www.echr.coe.int,
paras. 82-83, in which the EctHR found that Belgium had violated Article 13 of the Conven-
tion because national law allowed authorities to carry out an expulsion while an appeal
was pending. See also, ibid.
937 UN Committee Against Torture, Decision: Brada v. France, CAT/C/34/D/195/2002, 24
May 2005, available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/195-2002.html.
938 Part A.5.10, above. Questions on which approach of various courts and bodies is less
consistent include whether such review must always be judicial, and as to the applicability
of the range of fair trial guarantees to this process.
939 Part A.5.10, above.
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effect in precluding unlawful transfer, such that these features of practice are
unlikely to have changed the legal landscape as such. Several governments
have sought to use diplomatic assurances on a scale hitherto unknown to
provide a ‘veneer of legality’ to transfers that would otherwise be unlawful,
though over time these too have found a greater level of judicial scrutiny.
Indeed through case-by-case practice, as the principle has come to be analysed
and applied, there has been broader application of the principle than previous-
ly, with the prohibition on transfer being applied also to flagrant denials of
justice that are a regrettable part of the counter-terrorism landscape in recent
years.
7B.11 PROSCRIBING DISSENT AND CONTROLLING OPINION
Since September 11 legislative measures have conferred wide-ranging powers
on the executive to control information and act preventively against emerging
threats in a manner that has serious implications for rights such as freedom
of thought, expression, association, assembly and political participation.940
The terrorism label has been used to justify crackdowns on political oppo-
nents in diverse contexts and many ways post 9/11, just as it has throughout
history where political opponents have been labelled ‘terrorist’ in the effort
to de-legitimise them.941 A flagrant attempt to invoke the terrorism label to
justify the legally unjustifiable arose in the context of the Syrian conflict, where
violent crackdowns by the Syrian authorities against protesters, lawyers, human
rights defenders, opposition members and activists resulting in hundreds of
deaths, disappearances and arbitrary detentions were dismissed by the govern-
ment as ‘a legitimate counter-terrorism campaign’.942 While readily dismiss-
ible, such claims are a reminder of the currency that has been afforded the
terrorism label that is persistently invoked, and that blatantly unlawful
crackdowns on political opposition have come to be attributed to a global
counter-terrorism effort.
Several examples of prosecutions for expressions of opinions supportive
of terrorism, by way of ‘glorification of terrorism’, ‘apology for terrorism’ or
other provisions, discussed in Chapter 4, bring into sharp focus how the
940 In addition to the examples below, see, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Russian Federation, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/79/RUS (2003), para. 19: ‘The Commit-
tee is concerned that the proposed amendments to the law “On Mass Media” and the law
“On Combating Terrorism”, adopted by the State Duma in 2001 in the aftermath of Septem-
ber 11, are incompatible with article 19 of the Covenant.’.
941 See The Terrorism Label’ 7B.4 and Chapter 4 on criminalisation of terrorist organisations,
noting that Mandela, Arafat and the current president of the Maldives were all accused
of terrorism.
942 Syria: Abusive crackdown of protesters continues on pretext of terrorism, Amnesty Inter-
national Report, 2012, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/syria/report-2012.
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legitimate desire to prevent terrorism, by acting before violence occurs, can
curtail freedom of expression. In this context, allegations of prosecutions of
political opponents on terrorism grounds have arisen commonly.943 The
silencing of a broader range of political opposition, through bans on expression
of support or apology for terrorism or dissolution of political parties, have
also been criticised by human rights bodies.944
Journalists, and the public interest role they perform, are particularly
vulnerable where laws prohibit or criminalise publishing information deemed
to promote terrorism; practice is replete with examples of journalists prosecuted
under anti-terrorism legislation, including across several parts of Europe.945
An extreme example may be found in the Ugandan Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002,
which provides for the death penalty for journalists found guilty of this
offence.946
Many examples have also emerged of ‘terrorism’ prosecutions that appear
on their face to be prosecutions of human rights activists, adding a further
dimension to the impact of such prosecutions on human rights protection
around the world. In Bahrain for example the trials of human rights defenders
as ‘terrorists’ under broad reaching terrorism legislation have provoked wide-
reaching concern.947 This is, however, only one example among many. In
a range of states, civil society groups – women’s rights groups,948 labour
943 See, e.g., the multiple cases concerning publication of statements by PKK leaders which,
as the Court emphasized, did not incite violence and could not be justified as necessary
and proportionate: e.g., Falakaoglu and Saygili v. Turkey, 2006; Gozel and Ozur v Turkey, 2010,
and Belek & Ozkurt v. Turkey, Appl. 1544/0 (ECtHR, 13 July 2013). Cf no violation was found
for cartoonist prosecuted for complicity in Leroy v. France (2008), in light of modest fine
imposed.
944 Ibid.; Turkish cases thwarting publication of dissenting voices. Courts have considered the
nature of the speech, or the political party, and found, e.g., in cases including Batasuna &
Batasuna v. Spain, 30 June 2009, there was no violation on free association by banning
organsiations found to represent a threat to Spanish democracy.
945 See, e.g., D. Banisar, ‘Speaking of terror: a survey of the effects of counter-terrorism legis-
lation on freedom of the media in Europe’, 2008, available at: at: http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/SpeakingOfTerror-en.pdf; see also Terrorism and Legality,
above.
946 D.O. Balikowa, ‘The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002: the Media and Free Speech’, 8.1 (2003) The
Defender, 6.
947 For example, thirteen political activists and human rights defenders, including Abdulhadi
Al-Khawaja, were convicted by a military court in 2011. See ICJ Bulletin on Terrorism and
Human Rights, September 2012, available at: http://www.icj.org/september-icj-e-bulletin-on-
counter-terrorism-and-human-rights-no-65. See also Amnesty International, ‘Bahrain must
free prisoners of conscience after “travesty of justice”’, 9 August 2012, available at: http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news/bahrain-must-free-prisoners-conscience-after-travesty-justice-
2012-08-09.
948 M. Scheinin, Special Rapporteur’s report on the Gender Perspective when countering
Terrorism, at A/64/211, paras. 18-54.
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activists949 and indigenous organisations – have had their work stymied,
or indeed have also been prosecuted, under counter-terrorism legislation.
Prosecutions in Chile of indigenous leaders under anti-terrorism laws has been
criticised by the Inter-American Commission both for breadth of the laws (and
their incompatibility with the principle of legality), and the failure of the
authorities to distinguish legitimate revindication of concerns (even if involving
acts of violence of a small minority) from terrorism.950 Other reports suggest
similar use of terrorism laws in this way elsewhere in Latin America.951
Prosecution for mere possession of information – such as in the case of
the so-called ‘lyrical terrorist’ in the UK where the fact of downloading al-
Qaeda manual from internet and writing poetry was considered supportive
of terrorism – have raised questions as to whether the line between thought
and action really is thin enough to justify the intervention of the criminal law
in these circumstances.952
While the principal source of the threat to the rights to express legitimate
dissent may be broad-reaching ‘terrorism’ and ‘security’ laws, another is found
in the entrenchment of the notion of ‘patriotism’ and ‘national unity’. The best-
known example may be the United States Patriot Act of 2001,953,954 or
another the Jordanian decree proscribing the publication of ‘information that
can undermine national unity or the country’s reputation’ or ‘undermine the
949 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 472, pp. 62-3, noting the tension between the Algiers Terrorism
Convention which includes ‘disturbances at public utilities’ within the definition of terrorism
and restrictions on legitimate trade union activity.
950 IACHR Report 176/2010, see, e.g., para 5.
951 Amnesty International, ‘“So that no one can demand anything”; Criminalising the right
to protest in Ecuador?’, 17 July 2012, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AMR28/002/2012/en/0861616e-16e7-47a8-9c05-db5661e4fa6d/amr280022012en.pdf
(detailing the criminal prosecution of 24 indigenous leaders for their role in public protests
in 2009 and 2010, and a total of twenty charges of terrorism, many of them ultimately
dismissed by the courts as groundless).
952 On, e.g., the prosecution of Samina Malik in the UK in 2007 see, e.g., I. Bunglawala, ‘Don’t
even think about it’, The Guardian, 6 December 2007, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/commentisfree/2007/dec/06/donteventhinkaboutit; S. Dent, The Times, 6 December
2007 who notes: ‘... no plot revealed. No terrorist network uncovered. Just some embarrass
ing and juvenile fantasies about jihad and beheadings, laid bare to the world ... nihilism
isn’t a crime and there’s a lot of it about nowadays – not just among wannabe jihadists.
.... In all of this we are being sold the lie that there’s a thin line between thought and action.
It’s a thick line … To lock her up because you don’t like what she thinks and says ... is
an affront to society.’ The accused was ultimately convicted and given a suspended sentence
of 9 months, though the act allowed for up to 10 years imprisonment; see Sec. 58 of the
UK Terrorism Act 2000.
953 See www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html. On 26 May, President Barack Obama
signed into law the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, which extends the validity
of some provisions of the PATRIOT Act until 1 June 2015
954 See Patriot Act 2001, Substitute B, Sec. 411(bb); T. Mendel, ‘Consequences for Freedom of
Statement of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11’, paper presented at the Symposium
on Terrorism and Human Rights, Cairo, 26-28 January 2002.
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king’s dignity’.955 In this context, the global ‘counter-terrorism’ focus is being
taken advantage of to repress free speech and stifle pluralism, while embracing
opinions or activities with no apparent linkage to even broad notions of
‘terrorism.’956
As the framework above indicates, human rights provisions relating to
the rights to free expression or association explicitly allow for the rights to
be restricted for the protection of certain aims, such as national security or
public order.957 It does however depend on the restriction being provided
for in clear and accessible law, and necessary and proportionate to the parti-
cular ‘legitimate aim’ that it purports to serve. In respect of the examples given,
and countless others, doubts emerge recurrently as to the clarity and scope
of the prohibitions and the legitimacy of their objectives, and the necessity
and proportionality of these measures as a vehicle to address any genuine
security concerns.958 While laws restricting free speech are hardly new, and
have long been the hallmark of autocratic regimes around the world, an
international landscape in which thought, expression, association or peaceful
protest are increasingly met with the imposition of the ‘terrorism’ label may
threaten to legitimise such restrictions.
7B.12 PROFILING, EQUALITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Discrimination on a range of grounds (and often on multiple intersecting
grounds) – including race, ethnicity,959 religion,960 nationality961 or gen-
der962 – has been a common feature of policy, practice and discourse post-’
policies, many more have been prejudiced by the racial and religious tensions
955 The law grants the government sweeping powers to close down publishing houses that
contravene the ban. See amendment to the Jordanian Penal Code and Press Law, issued
October 2001, reported in J. Stork, ‘The Human Rights Crisis in the Middle East in the
Aftermath of 11 September’, Symposium on Terrorism and Human Rights, Cairo, 26-28
January 2002, available at: www.cihrs.org.
956 See Chapter 4, and example of the Kenneth Good v Botswana case in Chapter 11.
957 See A.3 on the Flexibility of IHRL
958 Necessity has often been the key question in determining that terrorism measures fall foul
of the human rights framework in respect of freedom of expression or political participation:
see, e.g. the Turkish ECHR cases above, or
959 See, e.g., Profiling in this section.
960 See, e.g., T. Choudhury, ‘Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background
Report’, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, highlighting measures including stop and search,
border control, surveillance, policing operations, detention, preventative or control measures,
investigation and others, their impact on religious minorities and the construction of ‘suspect
communities’. Available at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/UK_paper_SF_FINAL.pdf.
961 See infra, but see also 7B7 and 9.
962 Equality issues arising in less obvious ways include the gender dimension of counter-
terrorism; see eg. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Gender Perspective when
countering Terrorism, supra note 951.
International human rights law 571
that have erupted or been fuelled in the context of terrorism and counter-
terrorism in many parts of the world since 2001. This has demonstrated the
fragility of respect for equality in practice, but also served to clarify the import-
ance and nature of states’ international equality obligations. For example, the
Human Rights Committee has addressed the positive obligations of states in
respect of countering intolerance and discrimination by private actors.963
The steps states have been found obliged to take include for example ‘an
educational campaign through the media to protect persons of foreign ex-
traction, in particular Arabs and Muslims, from stereotypes associating them
with terrorism, extremism and fanaticism’.964
The increasingly widespread practice of ‘profiling’ individuals as inherently
suspicious raises some of the greatest concerns regarding compatibility with
the ‘absolute prohibition on discrimination’.965 ‘Profiling’ describes the use
of race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin, rather than individual behaviour,
as the basis for identifying individuals, for purposes ranging from data mining
to ‘stop and search966’ operations. Profiling policies and practices may identify
and target particular groups directly, or they may very often be facially
‘random’ yet in practice have a vastly disproportionate impact on particular
groups, and amount to ‘indirect discrimination’.967
Many reports document the indirect impact of profiling on particular ethnic
and religious groups and communities in various parts of the world since
963 On positive measures to eliminate discrimination by private actors see A.A4, and Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), New York, 21
December 1965, 660 UNTS 195, Article 2(1)(d) and Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), New York, 18 December 1979, 1249
UNTS 13, Article 2(e). See, in general, HRC General Comment 18: Non-discrimination [1989],
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) at 146.
964 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE
(2002), para. 12.
965 See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, GAOR Fifty-
seventh session, Supp. 18 (UN Doc. A/57/18), paras. 429 and 338; analysis of law and
practice by the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights at A/HRC/4/26, 29
January 2007, paras. 32-62, 83-89; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,
“General policy recommendation N° 8 on combating racism while fighting terrorism” (CRI
(2004) 26).
966 On the lawfulness of ‘stop and search’ operations more broadly, and the requirements that
the restriction on private life be justified by clear powers, sufficiently circumscribed and
subject to legal safeguards, see Gillan and Quinton v. UK, 4158/05 [2010] ECHR 28, 12 January
2010.
967 For more detail, see generally, D. Moeckli, ‘Anti-Terrorism Laws, Terrorist Profiling, and
the Right to Non-Discrimination’, in A. Salinas de Frías, K. Samuel, and N. White (eds.),
Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),
Ch. 23.
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9/11.968 Examples include Germany, where the state authorised a programme
of massive data collection based on young Muslim men from certain national-
ities,969 or the UK where reports indicate that the use of the police’s general
‘stop and search’ powers against Asian people rose in the two years following
9/11 by a striking 302 percent.970
While the importance of equality as a cornerstone right under IHRL is clear,
the application of the non-discrimination rule in practice is not always straight-
forward. Certain distinctions – for example identifying membership of
organisations as relevant criteria for further investigation – are an expected
part of an investigative strategy. However, the law requires that any such
distinctions must have a real, objective justification, that measures taken must
be proportionate to it, and accompanied by adequate safeguards. It has been
suggested that reliance on race, religion or nationality alone as a basis of
suspicion cannot be objectively justifiable. Rather, where support for a parti-
cular ideology may in certain exceptional circumstances constitute a rational
basis for identifying persons as worthy of further investigation, taking parti-
cular measures against such persons, such as detention for example, is likely
to fall foul of the proportionality rule.971
The extent to which practices post-9/11violate this legal framework is
apparent from the work of courts and monitoring bodies, including the Com-
mittee on Racial Discrimination.972 The effects of profiling have also been
found unconstitutional by the German courts, which found that while profiling
could be used in the face of a ‘concrete’ identifiable risk to particular rights,
it could not be used to avert a general threat of terrorism.973 The programme
in question involved the collection of records from databases in respect of
968 See, e.g., Addressing Ethnic Profiling by Police, OSJI, 2009, onpractices in Bulgaria Hungary
and Spain;. S. Ellmann, ‘Racial Profiling and Terrorism’, 46 (2002-03) New York Law School
Law Review 675 and P. L. Hoffman, ‘Civil Liberties in the United States after September
11’, available at: http://www.frontlinedefenders.com/en/papersweb/p3en.doc, 5 December
2012, at p. 11 on US practices; see more broadly, Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and
Human Rights at A/HRC/4/26 (29 January 2007), ibid, paras. 32-62, 83-89.
969 The Rasterfahndung programme is discussed in Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160 at
p. 595.
970 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/26, 29 January 2007,
para 37.
971 See IBA Task Force Report 2003, supra note 760, pp. 114-15, para. 4.4.2.
972 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion: Moldova, UN Doc. CERD/C/60/Misc.29.Rev.3 (2002), para. 15, where the Committee
expressed concern that inquiries into potential terrorist activities of students of Arabic
origins might raise ‘suspicion of an attempt at racial profiling’. See also Concluding Observa-
tions of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Canada, UN Doc.
CERD/C/61/CO/3 (2002), para. 24; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Russian Federation, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/7
(2003), para. 24, and the analysis of law and practice by the Special Rapporteur , ibid. paras.
32-62, 83-89.
973 Bundessverfassungsgericht, 1BvR 518/02, 4 April 2006.
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millions of people; with approximately 32,000 more considered as deserving
further investigation, yet which lead to not a single prosecution.974
Experiences of this nature have prompted the suggestion that profiling
is not only incompatible with non-discrimination principles, it is also ineffect-
ive, and may indeed be counter-productive.975 Concerns include the extent
to which discrimination, and the perception of discrimination, spawn alienation
and run counter to effective prevention of terrorism and other criminal activity,
as well as that they distract law enforcement officials from more effective
investigative techniques.976 Strengthening the hand of law enforcement offi-
cials to investigate and combat international terrorism is an important rule
of law imperative. The role of profiling within it will not disappear, but it may
be that its true utility, and the requirements for compatibility with the basic
rule of non-discrimination, will continue to be given perspective and clarified
through practice.
The political attention that has surrounded nationality as a criteria for
targeting individuals – from the furore around drone killing of US nationals,
to detention policies focused only on non-nationals or defensive protestations
that mass surveillance was only targeting foreigners – have no basis in IHRL
and threaten the universality of rights protection.977 In this context, such
policies have on occasion been found by courts and bodies to constitute dis-
crimination.978
Analysis of the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, as deriving increas-
ingly from home-grown terrorism and not from non-nationals as has perhaps
often been assumed in the war on terror, underscores the lack of the ‘objective
justification’ for discrimination on nationality grounds.979 It has been noted
that ‘we are all foreigners somewhere, but we are human beings everywhere
…’980 Yet the basic principles of non-discrimination and universality of
974 Ibid.; Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160.
975 Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160, p. 595.
976 See, e.g., Open Society Justice Initiative report on Profiling in Europe May 2009 available
at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/ethnic-profiling-european-union-
pervasive-ineffective-and-discriminatory, p 16; Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 192, p. 595-
96.
977 Chapters 6 and 8 on US drone strikes and detentions. See also, e.g., reassurance by Presidetn
Obama that the massive foreign surveillance programme PRISM only targets non-nationals:
Obama Administration On PRISM Program: ‘Only Non-U.S. Persons Outside The U.S. Are
Targeted,’, Huffington Post, 6 June 2013
978 See, e.g., A and Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and another v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (A & Ors (Derogation)). See IACommHR
Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, supra note 81.
979 See, e.g., President Obama’s references to home grown terrorism in ‘Remarks by the Pres-
ident at the National Defense University’, 23 May 2013. The London bombings of 2007
attacks were also all conducted by UK residents.
980 Statement by I. Sankey of the UK NGO Liberty, on the surveillance, at http://www.liberty-
human-rights.org.uk/news/2013/a-breach-of-trust-on-the-grandest-scale.php.
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human rights protections have been rendered elusive in the practice of counter-
terrorism post-9/11.
7B.13 RESTRICTING PRIVACY
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it seemed almost petty to talk about the
right to privacy. In the slew of counter-terrorism measures that spilled across
the globe since, states have increased their powers and their reach in the
gathering, retention and sharing of personal information, often establishing
new entities charged with information gathering on terrorism and associated
activities (with the now familiar breadth and ambiguity as regards the scope
of these terms). There can certainly be little doubt that some encroachment
into privacy rights, to meet the challenges of counter-terrorism, is appropriate
if not essential. But over time, analyses of the extent of information gathering
and data retention in the name of counter-terrorism have led to serious con-
cerns as regards compatibility with legal requirements.981 These have included
revelations of massive surveillance programmes operated by the US, both at
home982 and abroad,983 and qualitatively if not quantitatively comparable
programmes – as well as active cooperation – by other states.984
Absent derogation (and very few states have ever derogated from their
rights in this respect), the legal framework requires that particular measures
that infringe on privacy must be provided for by law, necessary and pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim that they pursue, and that there are attendant
safeguards. The sheer scale of reported surveillance practices suggest a broad
reaching as opposed to targeted approach, at odds with the necessity and
proportionality test. Meanwhile, safeguards have not kept pace with the
accumulation of information-gathering powers. In some cases it has become
clear that the normally applicable legal framework and judicial review function
has been cut back for terrorism-related information. An example is the US
Terrorist Surveillance Program under the National Security Agency, which
permits surveillance of al-Qaeda and affiliated organisations outside the US
981 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism on Privacy, ibid. paras. 11-74, on the
applicable test and the nature of concerns emerging in practice.
982 See, e.g., ‘As US cities step up surveillance, privacy fears increase,’ NY Times, 13 Oct 2013.
983 See, e.g., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, NY Times, 6 June 2013; ‘Ex-
Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked Data on Surveillance’, NY Times, 9 June 2013; see also I.
Sankey, A Breach of Trust, Liberty, available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/
news/2013/a-breach-of-trust-on-the-grandest-scale.php.
984 See, e.g France: ‘Revelations on the French Big Brother’, Le Monde, 4 July 2013, and ICJ
bulletin July-August 2013. UK: ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s
communications’, The Guardian, 21 June 2013; and I. Shankey, supra note 983.
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without a warrant.985 Numerous other states that are reported to have intro-
duced similar powers also have limited judicial supervision domestically.986
The increased sharing of information between states raises many questions
around the right to privacy, and ultimately the infringements of other rights
of individuals flowing from the gathering and sharing of information that
maybe of doubtful veracity and which the individual may never be aware
of, still less have the right to challenge. The challenge of securing the
accountability of the multiple states cooperating in this massive industry is
obvious.987 The limited territorial scope of privacy protections increases the
importance of ensuring that the international legal framework applies to states’
actions abroad.
The necessity of data retention in the terrorism context has also been
questioned.988 For example, when a working group of the German Parliament
considered the ‘Compatibility of the EU Data Retention Directive with the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights’,989 it opined that the EU Data Retention
Directive measures are disproportionate to the pursued aim and difficult to
reconcile with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.990 This reflects growing
readiness to question, and perhaps to doubt, the extent to which such data
retention is in fact justified by security objectives,991 and underscored the
985 ICJ Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 757, p. 69 noting that if one end of the communication
is outside the US no warrant is required, and FISA legislation 2008 makes clear that the
previous requirement of judicial oversight does not apply.
986 Ibid. refers to laws and practices in the Russian Federation, Bangladesh, Egypt and Sweden,
p. 69. The Special Rapporteur cites to the Swedish Government’s bill on adjusted defence
intelligence operations, adopted in June 2008, p. 83.
987 Difficult issues arise as to the individual’s right to a remedy, which depends on a certain
level of information which s/he cannot be provided with consistent with the objectives
of the surveillance operation but when the operation ends it has been suggested that s/he
should be informed. ICJ Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 757, p. 72. On intelligence
cooperation and issues arising see Chapter 10, ‘Extraordinary Rendition’.
988 Data protection is covered by the right to privacy: see HRC General Comment16, and the
Special Rapporteur on Terrorism’s report on privacy suggesting it is also emerging as a
distinct human right, para. 13.
989 On 26 April 2011, the Working Group on Data Retention published an opinion prepared
in February 2011 by the Legal Services of the German Parliament. ‘Germany: Parliamentary
Committee criticises EU Data Retention Directive’, ICJ E-Bulletin on Counter-Terrorism
and Human Rights – May 2011.
990 The Working Group expressed concerns and issued recommendations that the governments
and parliaments of Austria, Germany, Romania, Sweden and the Czech Republic refrain
from imposing or permitting the indiscriminate collection of information on telephone calls,
text messages, e-mails and internet communications. ICJ Bulletin, ibid.
991 For example, within the EU a 2011 paper on ‘emerging themes and next steps’ in reforming
the Data Retention Directive noted that ‘strong qualitative evidence of the value of historic
communications data in specific cases of terrorism, serious crime and crimes using the
internet or by telephone’ had been received from only 11 of 27 Member States; see http://
www.statewatch.org/news/2012/aug/04eu-mand-ret.htm.
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need to curtail the use of data for purposes other than that for which it is
initially retained.992
7.B.14 JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATIONS – FOR TERRORISM AND
COUNTER-TERRORISM
Investigating and securing justice and accountability for serious rights viola-
tions are human rights obligations in themselves, and they safeguard the
protection of other human rights.993 An enormous amount of normative and
political attention, as well as resources, have been dedicated to combating
impunity in recent decades, on the basis of a shared international commitment
to the view that how states respond to violations of the past is critical, not
only to victims of the crimes but to deterrence for the future and the restoration
of the rule of law.994 What role then has there been for criminal accountability
and for justice for victims in the war on terror?
7B.14.1 Investigation and Criminal Accountability - for Terrorism and Security-
related offences
At the early stages of the war on terror in particular, there was a sense that
the criminal process was neglected as a response to 9/11 itself, as discussed
in Chapter 4B. While questions still arise regarding the priority afforded to
criminal law, in so far as some states invoke the use of lethal force, detention
or terrorists lists as if interchangeable policy ‘alternatives’ to the criminal
process for example, undoubtedly in recent years there has been a boom in
recourse to criminal law.995 The challenge – which has often not been met
in practice – is to ensure that these investigations and prosecutions unfold
within the rule of law framework (as set out in Chapter 4), including by
respecting legality and certainty, fair trial and other rights.996 Additional
challenges arise from the fact that policies and practices that violate human
992 See proposals for reform in the Data Retention Directive, ibid.
993 Chapter 7A.4.1 ‘Protecting human security: positive human rights obligations’.
994 See, e.g , 7A.4.1 and the development of international criminal law Chapter 4.
995 Chapter 4 B notes how expansive criminal laws have been drafted to respond to and notably
to prevent terrorism, and practice shows many prosecutions for a broad range of terrorist
and associated offences.
996 Challenges flagged in Chapter 4 include ensuring that courts meet the essential requirements
of independence and impartiality (special courts and security or military commissions
raising serious doubts in this respect), respect for criminal law principles (such as pre-
sumption of innocence and that responsibility must be individual strained by criminal law
developments) and that due process guarantees are met including prompt access to a lawyer,
time and facilities for preparation of defence and access to sufficient evidence to know the
charges being defended against. See also A.5.4, A.5.5 and Chapter 8.
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rights at preliminary stages may themselves impede the criminal process.
Terrorism prosecutions post-9/11 have commonly given rise to challenges to
the admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained through torture or ill-treatment,
increasingly to ‘abuse of process’ objections to the legitimacy of the process
itself, and they have encountered obstacles to securing extradition, cooperation
and evidence from abroad as a result of human rights concerns.997
These features combine with at times excessive – and sometimes man-
datory – penalties for terrorism in disproportion to the gravity of the indi-
vidual’s conduct.998 Alongside prosecutions of terrorism that raise doubts
as regards respect for the legal framework are what have been deemed excess-
ive responses and unduly onerous penalties imposed on ‘whistleblowers’ or
persons who have leaked information, including concerning human rights
violations, in the war on terror.999 Where the process of criminal investigation,
trial and punishment does unfold within the rule of law framework, it may
serve to discharge states’ obligations to investigate, prosecute and hold to
account those responsible for serious violations by non-state actors. It may
make an important contribution to meeting the rights of victims of terror-
ism,1000 and – in stark contrast to the ‘alternatives’ of choice involving ar-
bitrary detention, targeted killings or listing for example – the rights of the
accused, providing the opportunity to refute, accept or explain allegations,
as borne out by the unusual step of Guantánamo detainees begging to be
criminally prosecuted.1001 The increased reliance on the criminal process
in the years that have unfolded since 9/11 has the potential to contribute
directly and indirectly to meeting the state’s human rights obligations, to
prevent and respond to terrorism, and to uphold the rule of law more broadly.
997 See B.9 regarding refoulement, and Chapter 4B4 on the impact of violations on the criminal
process.
998 See A.
999 See, e.g., on 28 August 2013, Bradley Manning who leaked military and diplomatic details
of allegedly unlawful conduct in Iraq was sentenced to 35 years; prosecutors sought a
60-year sentence. His treatment has given rise to considerable international concern; see
ICJ Bulletin on Terrorism and Human rights, August 2013. Edward Snowden who leaked
information regarding the extent of NSA surveillance is in hiding in Russia at time of
writing.
1000 See further infra in this section.
1001 See, e.g., Op-ed by US legal counsel for Abu Zubaydah calling for trial – even by military
commission – as the lesser evil for a client held in indefinite detention in the Guantánamo
detention facility. J. Margulies, ‘Abu Zubaydah, the man justice has forgotten’, L.A. Times,
16 May 2012, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/16/opinion/la-oe-
margulies-guantanamo-torture-zubaydah-20120516.
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7B.14.2 Investigation and Criminal Accountability – for Counter-Terrorism
The reinvigorated role of criminal law in preventing and responding to terror-
ism contrasts strikingly with the dearth of criminal justice responses to acts
carried out in the name of counter-terrorism. It is beyond reasonable dispute
that some of the measures taken in the name of the GWOT or counter-terrorism
discussed in this and other chapters amount the most serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law, among other norms, and also to crimes
under international law.1002
The duty to conduct an investigation that is prompt, thorough, independent
and effective in response to plausible allegations of serious human rights
violations and, where appropriate, to prosecute, is set out in detail in human
rights law.1003 Facts in the public domain on a range of allegations of torture,
inhumane treatment, disappearance, prolonged arbitrary detention, unlawful
killing, and others involving criminal activity, more than meet the threshold
triggering these obligations. While inevitably prosecutorial choices must be
made, as regards who to prosecute and for what, in principle where the
investigation reveals criminal activity prosecutions should proceed, including
of those at the higher echelons of power, and appropriate punishment
imposed.1004
The US’ obligations to investigate and prosecute are clearly engaged by
the nature and extent of allegations of criminality in the war on terror,1005
and US courts provide the natural forum for investigation and accountability
in respect of the conduct of its officials and agents. Yet, despite evidence of
criminal responsibility of many up to highest levels of government, there have
been almost no investigations or prosecutions for torture or other crimes
committed in the war on terror. Nor has commitment been expressed by
successive US administrations to investigate or to ensure justice or
accountability. The most promising sign was perhaps the commitment in the
immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal that ‘wrongdoers will be
brought to justice’.1006 No less than seven investigations were conducted,
with various degrees of independence, rigour and effectiveness,1007 and
several individuals were convicted by courts-martial.1008 Notably, those pros-
1002 Chapter 4B.
1003 See 7A.4.2 above.
1004 Ibid.
1005 See Chapter 4 on Criminal Justice and Chapter 10 on Extraordinary Rendition.
1006 Statement by President Bush following the disclosure of the Abu Ghraib torture, in R.
Brody, The Road to Abu Ghraib, in ‘Torture,’ New Press 2005, p. 150.
1007 Brody, ibid, p. 151.
1008 See generally, ‘Introduction: The Abu Ghraib files’, Salon, available at: http://www.salon.
com/2006/03/14/introduction_2/. 11 members of the military police were convicted and
discharged. Among them was Private First Class Lynndie England who was charged with
of one count of conspiracy, four counts of maltreating detainees and one count of com-
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ecuted were of relatively low military rank,1009 and the investigation did
not appear to embrace the possibility of prosecuting those at higher ranks or
addressing broader questions of institutional policy.1010 Ironically perhaps
(when contrasted to the prosecution of terrorist suspects tortured for years
then put on trial),1011 charges against the highest-ranking official were
dropped as he was not read his rights before being questioned about prisoner
mistreatment in Abu Ghraib.1012 In the context of military operations in
Afghanistan, the US was criticised for its reluctance to investigate and to
provide information to those affected by its policies, which a UN Special
Rapporteur has described as a ‘public relations disaster’1013 as well as a viola-
tion of obligations under IHRL and IHL.1014 It has since responded with some,
albeit selective, investigations into allegations of unlawful activity in
Afghanistan – generally focusing on isolated (albeit serious) cases where
individuals were believed to have acted without authority rather than allega-
mitting an indecent act. She was sentenced to three years confinement, forfeiture of pay
and allowances, a dishonorable discharge, and a reduction in rank. ‘Abu Ghraib soldier
sentenced to three years in jail’ The Guardian, 28 September 2005, available at: http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/28/iraq.usa. She served 1.5 years before being released
on parole. ‘What happens in war happens’, The Guardian, 3 January 2009, available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/03/abu-ghraib-lynndie-england-interview.
1009 Ibid. Their ranks varied, but none were high-ranking.
1010 While the investigations found evidence that the incidents were ‘not limited’ but derived
from ‘pressure for additional intelligence’ and linked to policies elaborated at high levels,
did not order investigation however. Brody, p. 152. For a discussion of the disparity
between punitive measures against soldiers who are subject to court-martial, and impunity
for officers who are involved in acts of misconduct either as principals, accessories, or
through the doctrine of command responsibility, who are allowed to either retire, resign
their commissions, or receive administrative reprimands, see Smith III, ‘A Few Good
Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System’,
supra note 736, p. 671.
1011 See, e.g., Chapter 4B and Chapter 8, ‘Trial by Military Commission.’.
1012 Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan. C. Flaherty, ‘Abu Ghraib officer acquitted of not
controlling soldiers’, JURIST, 28 August 2011, available at: http://jurist.org/thisday/2011/
08/abu-ghraib-officer-acquitted-of-not-controlling-soldiers.php.
1013 P. Alston, ‘Press Statement’, UNAMA Press Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 15 May 2008,
available at: http://unama.unmissions. org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=1761&mid
=1892&ItemID=3132.
1014 On interplay between IHLR and IHL as regards the duty to investigate and provide a
remedy in the context of armed conflict, see B3 ‘War and Human Rights’ above and Duffy,
‘Harmony or Conflict?’, supra note 164.
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tions of systematic abuse.1015 No known convictions have been secured des-
pite details of egregious cases of prisoners being tortured to death.1016
Beyond the genuine armed conflict situations of Iraq and Afghanistan,
however, even this thin veneer of accountability disappears. In 2009, President
Obama famously pledged to ‘look forward as opposed to looking back-
wards’,1017 though he left open the possibility that prosecutions would pro-
ceed if there were evidence that laws had been broken.1018 Since then there
have been no criminal investigations or indictments in response to the informa-
tion that has come to light concerning, for example, the extraordinary rendition
programme, allegations of torture in other contexts, or indeed prolonged
arbitrary detention at Guantánamo or arbitrary killings. A number of ‘prelim-
inary reviews’1019 and ‘probes’1020 into crimes committed by CIA officials
have been conducted, but closed without being made public.1021 In August
2012, the Justice Department confirmed that the only two cases that had
proceeded to formal criminal investigation in respect of CIA detention and
1015 See, e.g., ‘Ringleader of US army “kill team” sentenced to life for murder of Afghans’,
The Telegraph, 11 November 2011, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/8883384/Ringleader-of-US-army-kill-team-sentenced-to-life-
for-murder-of-Afghans.html; ‘Military prosecution faces major hurdles in massacre case’,
CNN News, 23 March 2012, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/23/justice/
afghanistan-legal-hurdles/index.html 5 (concerning Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, charged with
17 counts of homicide in Afghanistan for a shooting spree against civilians); ‘US troops
escape criminal charges for incidents that outraged Afghanistan’, The Guardian, 28 August
2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/us-troops-burning-
qurans-urinating-on-corpses (concerning US troops who urinated on corpses and burned
Korans).
1016 See, e.g., the notorious case of two individuals tortured to death in Bagram, one of whom
was a 22 year old taxi driver reportedly not believed to be under any suspicion, but there
for intelligence gathering purposes. ‘U.S. Army Inquiry Implicates 28 Soldiers in Deaths
of 2 Afghan Detainees’, NY Times, 15 October 2004, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/10/15/politics/15abuse.html.
1017 D. Johnston and C. Savage, ‘Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs’, NY Times,
11 January 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/
12inquire.html.
1018 Ibid.
1019 ‘The Justice Department has initiated a “preliminary review” of certain cases of detainee
abuse by the CIA, but years after its initiation, the exact scope of that investigation remains
unclear.’ ACLU, available at: http://www.aclu.org/national-security/torture.
1020 C. Strohm, ‘Holder: Justice to Drop Investigations Into CIA Officials Involved in Torture’,
National Journal, 30 June 2011, available at: http://www.nationaljournal.com/holder-justice-
to-drop-investigations-into-cia-officials-involved-in-torture-20110630.
1021 The CIA cites a ‘variety of grounds for keeping all 12 of them secret, including that they
are classified on national security grounds, that their disclosure will expose CIA intellig-
ence-gathering techniques, and that disclosure could expose confidential sources.’ J.
Gerstein, ‘Detainee deaths prosecutor backs secrecy of CIA files’, POLITICO, 3 July 2012,
availableat:http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/03/detaineeabuse-
prosecutor-backs-secrecy-of-cia-files-116732.html.
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torture would be closed without prosecutions.1022 This was criticised, inter
alia, as the completion of the ‘full-scale whitewashing of the “war on terror”
crimes’.1023 Notably, there is no apparent commitment to changing course,
or to recognition of the anti-impunity principles that have been for so long,
and continue to be, espoused by the US in other contexts.
Beyond the US, pressure has been growing for investigation and pro-
secutions, both in relation to violations by US officials and those of other states.
That practice is highlighted in the chapters dealing with extraordinary
rendition (Chapter 10) and Guantánamo Bay (Chapter 8). They include invest-
igations opened in France, Spain and Finland, for example, into the alleged
torture and/or illegal detention of prisoners either in Guantánamo or CIA
detention around the world,1024 and the convictions of CIA officials in
Italy.1025 While challenges abound, there may be a shift afoot internationally
to hold US officials to account abroad, at least for as long as they are not being
held to account at home.1026
The pressure continues to grow for the investigation of alleged crimes
committed in the war on terror by the officials of other states, or on other
states’ territories, many of which are also discussed in the case studies on
Rendition or Guantánamo in subsequent chapters.1027 Beyond these scenarios,
in the UK for example, the government has launched multiple enquiries and
investigations into a range of allegations: the torture and death in custody
of Baha Mousa and others in a UK prison in Iraq,1028 Iraqi civilians unlaw-
fully killed at another British army base in Iraq,1029 and more broadly into
the growing numbers of allegations of prisoner abuse and civilian killings in
1022 See Chapter 10 on Extraordinary Rendition. Two of 101 cases of suspected detainee abuse
proceeded to criminal investigation but were dropped; see, e.g., ‘US justice department
rules out prosecutions over CIA prison deaths’, 31 August 2012, The Guardian, available
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/31/us-cia-detainee-prison-deaths.
1023 G. Greenwald, ‘Obama’s justice department grants final immunity to Bush’s CIA torturers’,
The Guardian, 31 August 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
2012 /aug/31/obama-justice-department-immunity-bush-cia-torturer. The ACLU stated
it was ‘nothing short of a scandal’. ‘US justice department rules out prosecutions over
CIA prison deaths’, 31 August 2012, The Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2012/aug/31/us-cia-detainee-prison-deaths.
1024 See, e.g., two sets of investigations were opened in Spain; one deferred to US for investiga-
tion while the other is is pending considerations, in Chapter 10.
1025 Ibid. These have resulted in convictions in absentia in Italy with further prosecutions
pending: see Chapter 10.
1026 Where the US takes the lead, other states are likely to defer: see the Spanish cases in
Chapter 10.
1027 See in Chapter 10 including the inadequacies of national investigations that led to litigation
before the ECHR; see, e.g., Abu Zubaydah v. Poland and al Nashiri v. Poland.
1028 The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report, 31 December 2011, available at: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk.
1029 The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry, ongoing, details available at: http://www.alsweadyinquiry.
org.
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Iraq.1030 Similar allegations, and some investigations, are also underway in
respect of the conduct of British troops in Afghanistan.1031 Inquiries address-
ing the role of the intelligence agencies have, however, had less traction. One
such inquiry considered M16’s role in interrogating a detainee within the CIA
led Rendition programme,1032 and at Bagram,1033 but both concluded that
there was insufficient evidence to pursue criminal charges.1034 The potentially
broader inquiry into the UK’s role in the ‘improper treatment of detainees’ post-
9/11 has repeatedly been suspended.1035
The enquiries sought to respond to pressure and legal challenges de-
manding that the state meet its human rights obligation to investigate.1036
Public enquiries perform a useful informative function and if properly inde-
pendent and effective can constitute a critical first step towards meeting the
procedural obligations incumbent on a state in face of serious allegations. But
they are unlikely to be sufficient in themselves, particularly in face of serious
criminality that has characterised much of the practice in question. In practice,
proceeding from inquiry, or even criminal investigation, to prosecution has
been stymied in all but very exceptional cases. The Baha Mousa inquiry which
1030 On the IHAT (‘Historical Allegations’) investigation see ‘UK investigations into torture
and rendition – a guide’ (hereinafter ‘UK investigations guide’), The Guardian, 13 February
2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/13/uk-investigations-
torture-rendition-guide. 169 other men who allege they were tortured or mistreated while
detained in Iraq by British forces: ‘Royal Military Police removed from Iraq prisoner abuse
inquiry’, The Guardian, 26 March 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/
mar/26/royal-military-police-removed-iraq-inquiry.
1031 ‘Afghanistan: list of investigations and prosecutions of British troops’, The Guardian, 29
March 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/mar/29/
afghanistan-british-army-crimes, which describes ‘at least 126 investigations.’
1032 On the interrogation of Binyam Mohamad and Operation Hinton, see, ‘UK investigations
guide’, supra note 1030, After an investigation of two and a half years, during which
detectives attempted to trace responsibility for Witness B’s actions up the chain of com-
mand, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded there was insufficient evidence to press
charges.
1033 See, ‘UK investigations guide’, supra note 1030, for details on Operation Iden. MI6 itself
referred one of its officers to the attorney general and US intelligence officers who were
present reportedly refused to give statements. Police were criticised for not taking other
steps, e.g., interviewing Guantánamo detainee eye witnesses. The investigation concluded
there was insufficient evidence to proceed to charge.
1034 See, ‘UK investigations guide’, supra note 1030.
1035 In July 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced an inquiry to ‘look at whether
Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees, held by other countries,
that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11’; available at: http://www.detainee
inquiry.org.uk/. It was criticized by NGOs for its lack of independence and secrecy, and
ultimately suspended pending the inquiry and Scotland Yard police investigations into
UK-led rendition of individuals and their families to Libya.
1036 See, e.g., ‘High Court Challenge over Iraqi Civilian Deaths’, The Guardian, 28 July 2004,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1270930,00.html, reporting
the case brought by the families of Iraqi civilians allegedly killed by British troops,
challenging the UK Government’s refusal to order independent inquiries.
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addressed the notorious death in custody by UK troops in Iraq concluded that
Mousa had been beaten and tortured to death, which it found was not an
‘isolated’ event.1037 While Court Martial proceedings were brought against
several soldiers,1038 with charges ranging from negligently performing a duty
to inhuman treatment of a person protected under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion,1039 charges against four of them were dismissed and two others were
found not guilty.1040 Only one Corporal who pleaded guilty to the charge
of inhumane treatment at the outset of the trial was convicted, and he was
sentenced to one-year imprisonment.1041 While the cases are a reminder of
the challenges in ensuring accountability in this field, practice continues to
unfold in many states and the extent and scope of investigations and justice
remains undetermined. International oversight by human rights bodies con-
tinue and the possibility remains of ICC engagement should the state ultimately
prove unwilling or unable to act.
Questions also arise as regards impediments to effective prosecution,
including immunity, prescription or the application of defences that afford
impunity to those responsible, which are impermissible under human rights
law in respect of serious violations of human rights.1042 Despite this, an early
executive branch report suggested, for example, that ‘the defense of superior
orders will generally be available for US Armed Forces personnel engaged in
exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be
patently unlawful’.1043 Likewise, the grant of wide ‘immunities’ to foreign
personnel – including private contractors – in Afghanistan and in particular
Iraq purport to protect from legal action even those responsible for serious
rights violations.1044 Concerns have been expressed regarding the invocation
1037 Nor did it ‘amount to an entrenched culture of violence.’ W. Gage, ‘The Baha Mousa Public
Inquiry Report: Volume I’, London: The Stationery Office, 8 September 2011, available
at: http://www.bahamousainquiry.org, para. 1.29.
1038 Ibid.
1039 Ibid.
1040 Ibid. at para. 1.30.
1041 Ibid. Charges were brought for war crimes under the International Criminal Court Act
(ICCA) 2001, the first time the Act has been used.
1042 See 7.A. 4.
1043 See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, 4 April 2003,
availableat:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/040403.pdf.
1044 See, e.g., the June 2003 Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority, available at: http://
www.cnn. com/2004/LAW/06/17/mariner.contractors. See also Marie Woolf, ‘Legality
of Iraq Occupation “Flawed”’, Independent, 5 May 2004, citing former senior UK civil
servant Elizabeth Wilmshurst’s criticism of the unprecedented breadth of immunities
granted to US and British civilians by the occupying powers.
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of such immunities in relation to the rendition programme and beyond.1045
Questions regarding the compatibility of immunity and other measures with
the human rights framework may well become critical if attempts to ensure
accountability at the highest levels gather momentum.
The dearth of accountability in relation to war on terror crimes has been
identified increasingly as a growing matter of international concern.1046 The
elaboration by the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights of
‘Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for
gross or systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State
counter-terrorism initiatives,’ for example, provides an important reminder
of states’ obligations in the face of crimes committed in the name of the war
on terror, the gulf between law and practice in this area.1047
7B.14.3 Reparations – for Victims of Terrorism
Victims of terrorism have often been referred to in public statements by UN
entities, states and others. Unfortunately, as has been noted, this has more
often been in the context of justifying human rights restrictive measures against
terrorism suspects, than addressing the rights and the needs of victims of
terrorism as such.1048 Surprisingly little attention was in fact paid inter-
nationally to terrorism victims’ rights as human rights in the early years of
the war on terror.
1045 See Chapter 10. The impact of immunity on impunity was addressed in the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe’s investigation on secret detention and rendition.
Secretary-General, ‘Follow-Up to the Secretary General’s reports under Article 52 ECHR
on the question of secret detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts,
notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies’, (SG/Inf (2006)5 and SG/Inf(2006)13)
at para. 17. It calls for the adoption of an instrument which establishes ‘clear exceptions
to State immunity in cases of serious human rights abuses’. See also, e.g., Greenwald,
‘Obama’s justice department grants final immunity to Bush’s CIA torturers’, The Guardian,
31 August 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/31/
obama-justice-department-immunity-bush-cia-torturer. However, when immunities were
invoked in the Abu Omar case, they were rejected by Italian cases. See Chapter 10.
1046 UN Doc. A/HRC/22/52; the focus of the CTITF Working Group on Protecting Human
Rights while Countering Terrorism on implementing the right to truth and the principle
of accountability for human rights violations in the counter-terrorism context in meber
states (para 51);
1047 Framework Principles for accountability, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013.
1048 M. Scheinin, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, UN Doc. No. A/HRC/10/3,
4 February 2009, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/106/
25/PDF/G0910625.pdf. See, e.g. ‘Ban urges world to recall terrorism’s victims in wake
of Osama bin Laden’s death’, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp? NewsID=38245#.UIiQQPkiH_Q.
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There may, however, have been a very significant shift in this respect. First
the World Summit Outcome and then the UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy recognised the ‘importance of assisting victims of terrorism’1049 and
of ‘international solidarity in support of victims’,1050 respectively. More sub-
stantively, two Special Rapporteurs on Terrorism dedicated reports to bringing
the matter to prominence and to giving content to those exhortations.1051
These have built on existing international standards on reparation and treat-
ment of victims of crime,1052 and regional Guidelines drawn up by the Coun-
cil of Europe on the rights of victims of terrorism.1053 They embrace the rights
to emergency and continuing assistance, investigation, prosecution and access
to justice, compensation, protection and information as aspects of victims’
rights. Among the victims’ rights given emphasis there, and across these initiat-
ives, are truth, justice and accountability – linking directly to the obligations
discussed in the previous section. An OSCE handbook on Terrorism notes that
‘from the perspective of victims’ rights, therefore, impunity is a key issue,’
and describes impunity for those alleged to have committed serious violations
of human rights standards as ‘an affront to the victims of those viola-
tions’.1054 The renewed focus on the rights of victims of terrorism is an im-
portant step towards a rights focused and rule of law compatible approach
to the fight against international terrorism.
7B.14.4 Reparation and Remedy for Victims of Counter-Terrorism
The slew of attention, at least on paper, that has been directed to recognising
the legal rights of victims of terrorism in recent years provides another point
of stark contrast to the approach to victims of counter-terrorism. Perhaps the
1049 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 478, para. 89.
1050 UN Action to Counter Terrorism, ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’,
March 2009, available at: http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/CT_Background_March_
2009_terrorism2.pdf.
1051 See Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160; and first Report of Ben Emmerson, 11 August
2011, UN Doc. A/66/310, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ea143f12.
pdf.
1052 UN GA Res. 40/34, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, 29 November 1985, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
40/a40r034.htm; Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, supra note
174.
1053 The Council of Europe Guidelines, ‘Human rights and the fight against terrorism’, March
2005, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/176C046F-C0E6-423C-A039-
F66D90CC6031/0 /LignesDirectrices_EN.pdf. call for: emergency assistance; continuing
assistance; investigation and prosecution; effective access to the law and to justice; admin-
istration of justice; compensation; protection of the private and family life of victims;
protection of the dignity and security of victims; information for victims; and specific
training for those responsible for assisting victims of terrorism.
1054 OSCE Handbook on Terrorism, Chapter 2, p. 27 et seq.
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first step towards remedy and reparation is simple recognition, yet there has
been scarce willingness to recognise those subject to torture, disappearance,
secret and arbitrary detention as bearers of rights and ‘victims’ of violations.
Even where facts around mistaken identities and erroneous assessments having
led to their rendition are known, the picture on acknowledgement of wrong-
doing and reparation remains bare.1055 The notable exception is Maher
Arar,1056 a Canadian who was publicly exonerated by his government,
received a government apology, compensation and commitment to implementa-
tion of reform to ensure non-repetition. In some other cases, payments which
might be seen as ‘compensation’ have occurred, but have not been accom-
panied by any sort of recognition or acknowledgement of responsibility, still
less any apology.1057
The same provisions requiring investigation, prosecution and remedy, and
the same rule of law perspective that demands satisfaction of the rights of
victims of terrorism, applies to violations in the name of counter-terrorism.
The extreme selectivity in the approach to victimisation in the war on terror
is a reminder of how elusive, in the context of counter-terrorism, are the basic
notions of equality before law and the universality of rights protection, where-
by no one is above, or beneath, the law.
In face of a lack of political remedies or criminal prosecutions, victims have
sought to pursue civil remedies, but have encountered legal, practical and
political obstacles as discussed elsewhere.1058 An extreme and explicit
example is the Russian Federation’s law ‘on countering terrorism’ which
exempts law enforcement and military personnel from liability for harm caused
during counter-terrorist operations.1059 In the US, despite the obligation to
1055 See discussion in Chapter 10 on the treatment of rendition victims; their right to reparation
is clear yet its neglect is stark.
1056 As discussed in Chapter 10, the Canadian and Syrian national was detained at JFK on
transit on way home from holiday, interrogated by US authorities for one week and
rendered to torture in Syria.
1057 Mamdouh Habib, an Australian national, was reportedly paid an ex gratia award on
condition that he did not bring legal action against the government, with no recognition
of responsibility. P. Karvelas, ‘Mamdouh Habib to drop case against Canberra’, The
Telegraph, 8 January 2011, available at: http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/archive/
national-old/mamdouh-habib-to-drop-case-against-canberra/story-e6freuzr-1225984020294.
Binyam Mohamad, the UK resident allegedly tortured in Pakistan with the UK having
provided information and facilitated interviews was paid compensation by the UK, which
did not accept responsibility or apologise. P. Wintour, ‘Guantánamo Bay detainees to be
paid compensation by UK government’, The Guardian, 16 November 2012, available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16 /guantanamo-bay-compensation-claim.
1058 See, e.g., Chapters 8 and 10.
1059 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, UN Doc.
CCPR/CO/79/RUS (2003), para. 13.
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‘allow victims to follow suit’ for damages,1060 the record of remedy is as
poor as that of criminal accountability. Chapter 8 records the legislative and
political obstacles facing Guantánamo detainees, who have had no right of
access to US courts in respect of their damages claims concerning torture or
other illegal acts. Chapter 10 notes that when released victims of extraordinary
rendition have sought to bring action, these have been thrown out by courts,
for example on the basis of the state secrets doctrine,1061 or invocation of
broad immunities,1062 with the effect of entirely precluding access to justice.
Victims of abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan have also failed to secure justice
through US courts.1063 While in some cases damages claims by US nationals
or on US soil have at least resulted in settlements,1064 there has been no such
movement for those victimised abroad. This has been described as giving rise
to a ‘harsh rule’ whereby ‘citizens and US resident aliens get damages from
someone at some level, [a]liens abroad – even though they may have suffered
appalling deprivations of liberty and egregious affronts to their human dig-
nity – get nothing’.1065
Obstacles encountered in national level litigation1066 underline the import-
ance of international and regional remedies, which are currently being pursued
in a number of regional and international fora as discussed in Chapter 11.1067
While those processes bring their own challenges and limitations, it may be
hoped that they can afford some measure of recognition and perhaps com-
pensation, while catalysing more effective domestic investigation, prosecution
and reparation by offending states.
1060 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on United States of America,
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev/1, 18 December 2006, para. 16, available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/459/61/PDF/G0645961.pdf. ‘[The Committee’s]
concern is deepened by the so far successful invocation of State secrecy in cases where
the victims of these practices have sought a remedy before the State party’s courts (e.g.:
the cases of Maher Arar v. Ashcroft (2006) and Khaled Al-Masri v. Tenet (2006)).’
1061 See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 532-4 (Eastern District of Virginia, 2006),
in Chapter 10.
1062 Rasul, in Chapter 10; in re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007),
aff’d sub nom.; Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178 (D.C. Cir. 21 June 2011). See E. Wilson,
‘“Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene Constitution and Compensation for Human
Rights Violations After 9/11’, 41 Seton Hall Law Review 4, 1491-1517 (hereinafter ‘Damages
or Nothing’).
1063 Wilson, ‘Damages or Nothing’, supra note 1062.
1064 For example, Al-Kidd and Iqbal settled their claims against lower-level officials, and claims
against cabinet-level officials were ultimately dismissed. Ibid at pp. 1502-03, 1506-07, and
Elmaghraby’s case at p. 1514.
1065 Ibid. at p. 1516.
1066 Efforts to pursue justice beyond US shores have met the additional obstacle of failure
of cooperation: Chapter 4.
1067 There has been a wave of transnational and international justice initiatives in foreign and
international courts by victims of rendition, arbitrary detention and other war on terror
crimes, as noted in Chapters 8,10 and11.
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In conclusion, recent practice illustrates the challenges to securing justice
for crimes committed in the name of counter-terrorism, whether in the form
of remedy or reparation for victims or criminal accountability. It highlights
also the persistence of the demand for justice and growing momentum in its
direction. While there is little palpable commitment to accountability in the
US, and many obstacles in its way, prosecutions underway at the time of
writing for crimes committed in Argentina, Guatemala and Cambodia in the
seventies and eighties are reminders of the persistence of demands for justice
and the long arm of the law. The pursuit of justice elsewhere for many of these
crimes, themselves catalysts to justice at home, also serve as a reminder of
the alternatives that may exist to ensure accountability where the offending
state does not assume this responsibility.1068 It remains to be seen where
the justice and accountability initiatives are underway will ultimately lead,
and whether they can contribute to a measure of truth and justice for victims
and a lasting reassertion of the much-neglected human rights principles of
remedy and accountability.
7B.15 CONCLUSION
Part A of this chapter explored the legal framework of IHRL that governs states’
responses to international terrorism. While there are areas where the law may
be less clear and others where it is developing, there is a detailed legal frame-
work, elaborated through long experience of addressing the challenges of
terrorism and counter-terrorism both before 9/11 and since, with the flexibility
to continue to respond to new challenges and situations.
As the war on terror post-9/11 has unfolded, that framework has been
challenged and strained in many ways. The plethora of specific questions
regarding compliance with human rights obligations, of which the foregoing
is a selection, have led to questions of a more general nature relating to human
rights law post-9/11. Have the events of September 11, as Egypt’s President
Mubarak suggested shortly thereafter, ‘created a new concept of democracy
that differs from the concept that western states defended before these events,
especially in regard to the freedom of the individual?’1069 Are human rights
marginalised, or just plain out of date? Has the clock been turned back sixty
years to before human rights were matters of concern for the international
community?1070 Have we witnessed a subordination of human rights law
to security imperatives or to the inter-state relationships?
1068 See Chapters 8 and (in particular) 10 for more detail.
1069 Statement by President Mubarak of Egypt, in Stork, ‘Human Rights Crisis in the Middle
East’.
1070 Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160, p. 600.
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There is much in post-9/11 practice to tempt us to such a conclusion. In
various ways, the state practice explored in Part B questions whether the human
rights framework is applicable at all – rather than how it applies – to certain
classes of individuals or offshore locations in a ‘war’ on terror, or in security
challenged situations more broadly. This exceptionalist approach, questioning
the ‘applicability’ of the human rights framework, has challenged fundamental
premises of the universality of human rights law. The notion that some people
are beyond the protection of the law has been described as an attempt to turn
the clock back not sixty but two hundred years, to a pre-Kantian era1071 when
the human person could be used as a means to an end, not treated ‘always
as an end’ in his or her own right.1072
The dominance of the security agenda to the neglect of the human rights
framework, and a touting of the inevitability of human rights violations in
the face of state of emergency, have at times – particularly in the first few years
following 9/11- juxtaposed human rights and security as irreconcilable alternat-
ives, sacrificing the former at the altar of the latter.1073 The myopic approach
of the Security Council at an early stage sent a message regarding the
marginalisation of human rights, which was rolled out through regions and
states.1074 Questions asked as to whether certain acts such as torture can
be ‘justified’ are not really a debate as to the lawfulness of particular acts in
particular situations (as the unqualified prohibition on torture is legally incon-
trovertible at this stage), but as to whether the rule of law should be applied
at all.1075
Likewise, the pervasiveness of the ‘war’ paradigm has purported to displace
human rights, in clear disregard for the normative framework governing that
interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in armed conflict. The gradual seepage
of the mentality of war into our human rights analysis has pervasive effects,
1071 E. Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs (1785), Paris, Libr. Delagrave, 1999, stating
that human beings ‘existe comme fin en soi, et non pas simplement comme moyen dont telle
ou telle volonté puisse user à son gré; dans toutes ses actions, aussi bien dans celles qui
le concernent lui-même que dans celles qui concernent d’autres êtres raisonnables, il doit
toujours être considéré en même temps comme fin ...’, p. 148.
1072 Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, supra note 160, p. 600.
1073 Such an approach is illustrated throughout the war on terror. See, e.g. declaration by the
CIA agent, questioned on the allegations of ill-treatment of terrorist suspects by US
officials: ‘If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably
aren’t doing your job’. See Priest and Gellman, ‘U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interroga-
tions’, supra note 471.
1074 See UN and human rights supra including discussion of SC Res 1373 as the clearest
example: unlike earlier (and later) resolutions on terrorism, it notoriously omitted any
reference to human rights.
1075 See, e.g., Dershowitz, The Case for Torture Warrants, supra note 790, or ‘Is Torture Ever
Justified?’, The Economist, 11-17 January 2003, Vol. 366. As a matter of law, as noted above
the prohibition is clear and incontrovertible, and permits of no exception or excuse.
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and has paved the way to the justification of a policy of widespread targeted
killings as a lawful response to acts of terrorism.
While practices such as targeted killings of terrorist suspects perhaps
provide the clearest current illustrations of complete disregard for the human
rights framework, many other practices strain the framework from within.
Overbroad definitions of terrorism and association with it have often provided
the starting blocks from which repressive measures have sprung, affecting
the full range of civil and political, as well as economic and social, rights. In
addition to the direct impact on the rights of many people suspected of being
associated in some way with terrorism, practice has illustrated that the indirect
impact goes much further: on families and communities, ethnic or religious
groups, or human rights defenders.
Some of the most notorious or flagrant violations, even if not themselves
ultimately accepted or endorsed by others, create a space in which ‘lesser’
violations are tolerated or even assume relative respectability, and make
complaints about less egregious human rights violations appear almost petty.
The gradual shifting of the goalposts and erosion of rights protections that
affect us all may be more difficult to discern, but no less real.
However, despite countless troubling developments, other emergent
responses cast a more positive light on the perceived relevance of human rights
law in this field and its future potential. As regards the inter-relationship
between security and human rights, the decisive shift from the rhetoric of
conflict to one of complementarity has been noted on the international and
regional levels.1076 The UN comprehensive strategy’s focus on the centrality
of human rights to an effective counter-terrorism strategy provides a starkly
different tone and framework for cooperation in counter-terrorism thereafter.
This is reflected to a large extent in domestic political discourse which has
also evolved in many states over time, with few openly asserting the right
to discard the human rights framework.1077 Rejection of the dichotomy
between human rights and security, in favour of the complementarity of
respect for human rights and an effective counter-terrorism strategy, is now
commonplace.
Likewise, there appears also to be some acknowledgement of the price that
has been paid, in security as well as rule of law terms, for human rights
violations. The negative impact of some serious human rights violations on,
for example, terrorism recruitment, legitimacy of counter-terrorism measures,
1076 Chapter 7B.1.
1077 The centrality and urgency of the repudiation by the new US administration in 2008 and
2009 of the denial of civil liberties by the Bush administration was noteworthy in sending
human rights message; however, the compatibility of policies of targeted killings, rendition
and continued arbitrary detention remain difficult to reconcile with the official posture.
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and on cooperation, in intelligence matters and in the criminal law context
is increasingly recognised.1078
The extent of states’ reactions in the face of violations by other states has
varied. A passive approach in the years since 9/11 appears to have given way
to an increasingly robust response by states, organisations, courts and others
in the repudiation of violations such as torture and arbitrary detention.
Notably, states have on numerous occasion indicated their unwillingness to
cooperate where there were clear human rights concerns in the practice of
other states,1079 marking a shift of approach from some of the notorious
examples of international cooperation in relation to rendition or Guantánamo
at earlier stages.1080 In the face of abusive practices, statements and guidelines
of international bodies, like decisions of courts – national and international
– may also have contributed in many areas to a reassertion and clarification
of international human rights standards.1081 These provide perhaps some
hope that lessons have been learned, and that IHRL may be less likely to be
discarded in the future.
At the same time, practice continues to unfold. Muted responses to the
growth in targeted killings by the US, notably by European states that have
long condemned such practices by other states, raise concerns regarding the
impact on the practice of other states, and on international standards.1082
The extent of these counter-reactions to reactions to terrorism may ultimately
influence the extent to which the practice explored in this chapter and others
will have an impact on the legal framework itself.
While violations continue and challenges remain, it may however be
doubted that, viewed with some distance from the events of 9/11, there can
be said to have been profound substantive changes in international human
rights law, or that there has been a lasting sea change in attitude to the applica-
tion of human rights law in the counter-terrorism context.
Rights cannot however be unviolated, and damage done to the culture of
human rights is not readily undone. The vague anti-terror laws that spread
across the globe post-Resolution 1373 cannot be unwritten and are not easily
repealed. Real commitment and oversight is needed if policies and practices
are to be re-directed. A rigorous approach to remedy and accountability, thus
far so neglected in the war on terror, are critical to addressing effects of these
1078 See, e.g., Chapters 7B1 and 4
1079 See, e.g., UK ‘Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on
the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt
of Intelligence Relating to Detainees,’ July 2010, and e.g.s in Chapters 8 and 10.
1080 See Chapters 8 and10.
1081 See Chapter 11 on the role of the courts and human rights litigation.
1082 See, e.g., Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position, A Dworkin, European
Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR/84, July 2013. There are also allegations surfacing
of cooperation between European states and the US drone programme: see Chapter 6B2.2.1.
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wrongs on individuals as well as restoring the rule of law framework and
affording real priority to human rights in practice as well as on paper.
An eminent jurist’s report noted how little the international community
had learned from previous experiences, in treating 9/11 as entirely new
threat.1083 One of the real challenges ahead is to show that we have learned
from mistakes from the war on terror. The excesses of the ‘war on terror’, and
the readiness with which human rights standards were set aside in the name
of security, may have served to highlight the importance of holding more
tenaciously to legal standards in time of crisis, and perhaps in some respects
to strengthening those standards. If so, the international community may
emerge stronger to effectively meet dual threats of international terrorism and
of the ‘war on terror’ which, somewhat paradoxically, has been described as
the most serious threat yet to the system of human rights protection drawn
up post-WWII.1084
The human rights framework, the extent of the violations of human rights
and international reactions can be analysed in more detail by reference to the
topics addressed in the case study chapters that follow. They relate to the
particular situation of individuals detained in Guantánamo Bay (Chapter 8),
those subject to extraordinary rendition (Chapter 9), and the killing of Osama
bin Laden (Chapter 10), before an assessment of the role of the courts in the
defence of human rights since 9/11 (Chapter 11).
1083 ICJ Eminent Jurists Report, supra note 757.
1084 Ibid.
P A R T III

8 Case study I – Guantanamo Bay detentions
under international human rights and
humanitarian law
‘The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its
prisons.’1
Fyodor Dostoyevsky
‘To deny violent extremists one of their most potent recruitment tools,
we will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay’.
US National Security Strategy 20102
A defining feature of practice since 2001 has been the large scale detention
of persons ‘for reasons related to the conflict’ that the US purports to be waging
against al-Qaeda and associated groups. While people have been detained in
many centres across the world, by the US or by proxy, a major repository for
detainees, and symbol of the ‘war on terror’, has been the United States Naval
Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since early January 2002, an estimated total
of nearly 800 people, including nationals of at least forty states, have at some
point been transferred to and held in detention facilities at Guantanamo.3
The location of the detention centre on Guantanamo Bay, which the United
States authorities claimed was beyond US sovereign territory, was an acknow-
ledged attempt to circumvent the application of human rights protections in
the United States constitution and access to United States courts.4 The
detainees were labelled ‘enemy combatants’, in support of the view that normal
criminal and human rights law do not apply, though the epithet was simul-
taneously relied upon to justify the non-application of the protective aspects
1 Fedor Mikhailovich Dostoyevesky (1821-1881) in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quota-
tions Requested from the Congressional Research Service, ed. Suzy Platt (1989), available at http:/
/www.bartleby.com/73/1527.html.
2 U.S. National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 2, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
3 One year after 9/11 Bush referred to 550 detainees held at Guantanamo, and at its peak
it was 800. As of early 2013, 166 detainees remain in Guantanamo. See breakdown in Human
Rights First, ‘Guantanamo by the Numbers’, 3 October 2012, available at: http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Gitmo-Numbers.pdf.
4 See, e.g., legal arguments made in Al Odah et al. v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (DC Cir.-2003)
hereinafter ‘Al Odah’); John Yoo Interview, PBS, 19 July 2005, available at: http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html.
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of international humanitarian law. They came to be held in what has cor-
respondingly been described as a ‘legal black hole’5 or ‘legal limbo.’6
Guantanamo Bay promptly came to symbolise the war on terror and it’s
‘flouting of the rule of law’.7 International condemnation was slow but
gathered momentum over time, culminating in perhaps unprecedented levels
of state and international criticism of US policy.8 Superlatives abound, with
the Guantanamo regime having been condemned variously as a ‘shocking
affront to democracy’,9 a ‘stain’10 or ‘horrendous blot’11 on the US reputation,
and ‘the gulag of our times’.12
Within the US itself, over time reflections have emerged on the implications
of the camp, including that it has ‘shaken the belief the world had in America’s
justice system.’13 The administration has repeatedly acknowledged that it
threatens national security by constituting a ‘potent recruitment tool’ for
terrorists14 and an obstacles to international cooperation.15
5 See Lord J. Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 1. See likewise, the English Court of Appeal R (Abbasi and
another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, (2002) EWCA Civ. 159
(hereinafter ‘Abbasi’), para. 64.
6 L. Dembart, ‘Old Laws Hard to Apply to Modern Terrorism: For Afghans in Cuba, Untested
Legal Limbo’, International Herald Tribune, 25 January 2002, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/01/25/news/25iht-legal_ed3_.html. On the development of the
right to habeas and its effect over time, see below.
7 ‘GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law.’
B. Obama, speech at National Defense University, 23 May 2013, transcript available at: http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-
policy.html.
8 Chapter 8C on responding to Guantanamo.
9 Lord Falconer in C. Dyer, ‘Falconer accuses US of affront to democracy’, The Guardian, 13
September 2006, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/sep/13/politics.usa.
10 U.S. Colonel Morris Davis, chief prosecutor of the Guantanamo military commissions who
resigned in protest: ‘Guantánamo is a stain on our reputation. The only way we can end
that chapter is to close it’. E. Pilkington, ‘Guantánamo: still a part of America’s conscience,
a decade on’, The Guardian, 11 January 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/jan/11/guantanamo-bay-10-years-on.
11 South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu inT. Shipman, ‘Blair under pressure to condemn
Guantanamo camp’, Daily Mail, 16 February 2006, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-377562/Blair-pressure-condemn-Guantanamo-camp.html.
12 I. Khan, former Secretary General of Amnesty International ‘Amnesty International Report
2005: The state of the world’s human rights’, para. 9, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/info/POL10/001/2005/en. See a more thorough discussion of the international
reaction to Guantanamo 8C2 below.
13 Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Meet the Press, 10 June 2007, available at:
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19092206 and Obama, 23 May speech, note 13.
14 National Security Strategy, supra note 2, p. 22. During a press conference President Obama
explained that ‘the reason for wanting to close Guantanamo was because my number one
priority is keeping the American people safe. One of the most powerful tools we have to
keep the American people safe is not providing al Qaeda and jihadists recruiting tools for
fledgling terrorists. And Guantanamo is probably the number one recruitment tool that
is used by these jihadist organizations. And we see it in the websites that they put up. We
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Around 2008, the tide seemed to be turning on Guantanamo. Ground-
breaking US Supreme Court cases recognised the rights of detainees to chal-
lenge the legality of their detention before a neutral arbiter.16 There were
political pledges to ‘clean up the mess,’17 recognitions of the ‘failure of the
entire system’18 and promises to relegate a ‘sad chapter in American history’
to the past.19 Incoming President Barack Obama issued an executive order
concerning the closure of Guantanamo and has reiterated his pledge many
times since then;20 as will be seen, however, deadlines have come and gone
and the camp remains active, with some one hundred and sixty increasingly
see it in the messages that they’re delivering.’ B. Obama, ‘News Conference by the Pres-
ident’, South Court Auditorium, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 22 December 2012,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/22/news-conference-
president. Janet Napolitano, the United States Homeland Security Chief, ‘Guantanamo
became a recruiting tool for terrorism: Napolitano’, AFP News, 6 November 2009; Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that “Guantanamo … has been a symbol, and
one which has been a recruiting symbol for those extremists and jihadists who would fight
us,’ M. Mullen, ‘Military Chief: Gitmo “Needs to Be Closed”’, ABC News, 24 May 2009,
available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/05/military-chief/; Obama’s
Director of National Intelligence told the Senate Committee on Intelligence in January 2009
that Guantanamo is ‘a rallying cry for terrorists and harmful to our international reputation,
and so closing it is important for our national security’. Nomination of Admiral Dennis
Blair to be Director of National Intelligence: Hearing before Senate Committee on Intellig-
ence, 109th Cong. 7, 22 January 2009, available at: http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/20090122_transcript.pdf.
15 In April 2013 Obama described Guantanamo as ‘inefficient’ and noted that ‘it hurts us in
terms of our international standing, it lessens co-operation with our allies on counter-
terrorism efforts, it is a recruitment tool for extremists, it needs to be closed.’ ‘Barack Obama
says Guantanamo Bay Prison must close’, BBC News, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-us-canada-22358351. See also, Obama speech, 23 May 2013, supra note 7.
16 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (hereinafter ‘Rasul’); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229
(2008) (hereinafter ‘Boumediene’).
17 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on National Security’, 21 May
2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
18 Retired Admiral Dennis Blair, the former Director of the US National Intelligence, noted
that it was a ‘failure of the entire [political] system’ that Guantanamo remained open. ‘Ex
US intelligence chief talks Guantanamo Bay, China, East Timor’, Radio Australia, 9 August
2012, available at: http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/connect-
asia/ex-us-intelligence-chief-talks-guantanamo-bay-china-east-timor/996384.
19 President Obama’s description of Guantanamo while campaigning in 2008. A. Spillius,
‘Barack Obama “proposes to move terrorists suspects from Guantanamo Bay”’, The Telegraph,
10 November 2008, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/3417913/Barack-Obama-proposes-to-move-terrorists-suspects-from-
Guantanamo-Bay.html.
20 B. Obama, ‘Executive Order 13492 – Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at
the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities’ (hereinafter ‘Executive
Order 13492’), 74 Fed. Reg. 16, 4897, 22 January 2009; ‘Barack Obama says Guantanamo
Bay Prison must close’, supra note 15; Obama speech, 23 May 2013, supra note 7.
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‘desperate’ inmates as at early 2013 and an administration coming to terms
with the fact that some monsters, once created, are not readily slain.21
The facts regarding detentions at Guantanamo Bay, from the early period
of the black hole epithet to the situation more than a decade later, will be
sketched out in the first part of this chapter. The second part highlights the
application of the legal framework of international human rights and human-
itarian law to the Guantanamo detainees; while a litany of legal issues and
rights violations arise, the emphasis here is on the relevant rights in relation
to detention and fair trial, the denial of which, in various forms over time,
has characterised the Guantanamo scheme. The third part explores the rights
and duties of third party states to respond to violations such as those arising
at Guantanamo, and the reaction of the international community thus far,
before concluding with questions on the potential implications and re-
percussions of the Guantanamo Bay situation for the US, for other states, and
for the rule of law more generally.
8A GUANTANAMO BAY AND ITS DETAINEES: THE BASIC FACTS
Guantanamo Bay was let to the United States by the Republic of Cuba in 1903
under an agreement that provides in relevant part:
While on the one hand the United States recognises the continuance of the ultimate
sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over [Guantanamo Bay], on the other hand
the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of occupation by the United
States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the United States shall
exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas.22
Guantanamo Bay occupies a substantial area of more than 45 square miles
and is ‘entirely self sufficient, with its own water plant, schools, transportation,
and entertainment facilities’.23 It has been described – by Legal Counsel of
21 Practical hurdles and political obstacles have impeded closure, notably congressional
opposition. See generally C. Savage, ‘Closing Guantánamo Fades as a Priority’, The New
York Times, 25 June 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/
26gitmo.html; International Bar Association, ‘The future of Guantanamo Bay’, January 2009.
The ICRC is reported as having described ‘unprecedented levels of desperation’ at the camp
in April 2013.
22 Article III, Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for
Coaling and Naval Stations, 16-23 February 1903, T.S. No. 418. The lease was continued
by a subsequent treaty in 1934, and the United States has indicated its intention to continue
that lease indefinitely.
23 G.L. Neuman, ‘Surveying Law and Borders: Anomalous Zones’, 48 (1996) Stanford L. Rev.
1197, n. 5.
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the Justice Department24 and the United States Navy,25 respectively – as
‘under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction’ of the United States, and as
‘a Naval reservation, which, for all practical purposes, is American territory.’
A US court in 1992 described it as ‘a military installation that is subject to the
exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States’.26 Despite this, the
US government chose the Guantanamo site partly because of its offshore
location and the avoidance of legal oversight.27 The United States government
has consistently asserted that Guantanamo lies beyond its sovereign territory,
and beyond the reach of the Constitution and the jurisdictional purview of
US courts.28 Paradoxically, however, US officials argued that it is within US
jurisdiction for the purposes of excluding the application of the Torture Victim
Protection Act29 which gives US courts jurisdiction over torture committed
in foreign jurisdictions.
8A.1 THE DETAINEES AND THEIR TREATMENT IN GUANTANAMO BAY
At the early stages, absolute secrecy surrounded the Guantanamo detainees,
and controversy and confusion has surrounded the reasons for their detention,
their status, and the rights, if any, to which they are entitled.30 At first, no
information was available even as to who was detained, which was
24 Opinion of Assistant Attorney General Olsen, 29 March 1982, in 6 (1982) Opinions of the
Office of Legal Counsel of the Dept. of Just. 236, 242.
25 The US Navy website describes ‘a Naval reservation which, for all practical purposes, is
American territory. Under the [Lease] agreements, the United States has for approximately
[ninety] years exercised the essential elements of sovereignty over this territory, without
actually owning it.’ M.E. Murphy, The History of Guantanamo Bay 1494-1964, 5 January 1953,
quoted by US Navy, available at: http://www.cnic.navy.mil/guantanamo/About/History/
GuantanamoBayHistoryMurphy/Volume1/Chapter3/index.htm.
26 Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F2d 1326, 1342 (2nd Cir.-1992).
27 John Yoo, former deputy assistant Attorney General and Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel,was asked why the site of Guantanamo Bay was chosen. He answered that
one issue ‘was whether the federal courts were going to get involved in trying to manage
how the facility worked. …. you don’t want to have, I think, the judiciary getting involved
while the war is going on …. I don’t think that was the primary reason to pick Guantanamo,
but certainly an ancillary reason why Guantanamo was picked’. John Yoo Interview, PBS,
19 July 2005, available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/
yoo.html.
28 See e.g. positions in litigation in US courts, including in Al Odah, supra note 4 available
at: http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/al-odah-v.-united-states.
29 See, e.g., ‘Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations’, 6 March 2003,
available at: http://www.npr.org/documents/dojmemo30020306.pdf.
30 See para. 8B.3 and 8B.4 in this chapter.
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purportedly justified on national security grounds. Families were abruptly
refused information about the identities of detainees.31
The detainees were referred to collectively as dangerous ‘enemy com-
batants’,32 and the ‘worst of the worst,’33 but over time the secrecy has been
peeled back to expose the identities and the circumstances of the human beings
behind the labels.34 It is now clear that children as young as thirteen have
been among those detained and ill-treated,35 which has prompted particularly
strident condemnation36 in light of special international legal obligations of
31 See blunt response in the letter from the US London Embassy to families of detainees
requesting information, cited in the Abbasi case, supra note 5. ‘[W]e are not in a position
to address the particular circumstances of any of the individuals detained at Guantanamo
Bay’. According to a lawyer for some of the UK national detainees, in some cases journalists
informed the UK families of the detentions.
32 See Abbasi, supra note 5, para. 9, citing a letter from the First Secretary at the US Embassy
in London to solicitors acting for the claimants in the Abbasi case which states that ‘The
United States Government believes that individuals detained at Guantanamo are enemy
combatants’, 2 July 2002, in ‘Skeleton Argument of the Claimants’, para. 6, on file with
author. The term was defined in 2004. See ‘Categories of Detainees’ below.
33 ‘Former Vice President Dick Cheney said Monday that the only alternative the Bush
administration had to creating the Guantanamo Bay naval prison was to kill the terror
suspects who are incarcerated there, and “we don’t operate that way.” The 240 prisoners
left at Guantanamo, he said, are “the worst of the worst.”’ ‘Cheney: Gitmo holds ‘worst
of the worst’: Former vice president says killing suspects was only other option’, NBC News,
6 January 2009, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31052241/ns/world_news-
terrorism/t/cheney-gitmo-holds-worst-worst.
34 See generally, ‘The Guantánmo files: Guantánamo leaks lift lid on world’s most controversial
prison’, The Guardian, 25 April 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
apr/25/guantanamo-files-lift-lid-prison.
35 Most of the ‘younger’ juveniles detained in Guantanamo (i.e. those aged between 13 and
15 years) were reported to have been released in 2004. See, e.g., ‘Transfer of Juvenile
Detainees Completed’, U.S. Dept. of Defense, News Release No. 057-04, 29 January 2004,
available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7041. However, see
the three cases of Omar Khadr, Jawad Mohammed and El-Gharani highlighted in note 36.
36 See, e.g., The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child report, New York, 6 June 2008,
noting the cases of three detainees in Guantanamo who were apprehended as juveniles.
Omar Khadr was 15 when detained, convicted by military commission and served ten years
in Guantanamo before being returned to Canada in 2012 to complete his sentence. Moham-
med Jawad who his lawyers say was 12 when detained though the Pentagon questions
this, who a US military judge appeared to accept had been tortured, whose habeas applica-
tion was successful but the US continued to detain him for years while considering criminal
charges for throwing a grenade, was ordered released and returned to his family in Afghan-
istan in 2009. Mohammad El-Gharani was held in Guantanamo since age 15 and reportedly
tried to commit suicide at least seven times.
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protection.37 Also among the detainees are elderly people as old as eighty-four
and others suffering from serious mental illnesses.38
Despite the emphasis on the circumstances of detention being justified by
the fact that ‘these are bad people’,39 it is now clear, even from official state-
ments and reports, that many of the detainees were no more than ‘victims
of circumstance,’40 detained on the ‘flimsiest’ of pretexts.41 Despite the enemy
combatant nomenclature, reports based on the government’s own documenta-
tion suggest that 92 percent of the men that have been held in Guantánamo
are not in the government’s view ‘Al-Qaeda fighters’.42 Most have been ack-
nowledged, often many years after their detention, as not being enemy com-
batants and not having posed a threat to the United States, even according
to the broad reaching approach to the definitions of these concepts in the war
37 See, e.g., the special guarantees provided for juvenile defendants and detainees by e.g.
Articles 10(2)(b) and 10(3) and Article 14(4) of the ICCPR; see also ‘Convention on the Rights
of the Child: Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict’, G.A.
Res. 54/263, 25 May 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000). The US ratified the Optional
Protocol on 23 December 2002.
38 See, e.g., ‘IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over New Revelations about Guantanamo’
(hereinafter ‘IAHCR Press Release’), IAHCR Press Release No. 37/11, 29 April 2011,
available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/037.asp.
39 Press Conference of President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 17 July 2003,
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/
20030717-10.html.
40 K.Q. Seelye, ‘A Nation Challenged: Captives; An Uneasy Routine at Cuba Prison Camp’,
The New York Times, 16 March 2002, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/16/
world/a-nation-challenged-captives-an-uneasy-routine-at-cuba-prison-camp.html,quoting
the deputy camp commander, Lt Col Bill Cline acknowledging that some were ‘victims
of circumstance’ and probably innocent.
41 Leaked documents in April 2011 demonstrate the ‘indicators’ used as a basis to detain,
such as wearing the same type of Casio watch used by some members of al-Qaeda, or
staying in the same guesthouses as members of al-Qaeda. See, e.g., ‘Leaked Guantánamo
files highlight need for fair trials and accountability’, Amnesty International, 26 April 2011,
available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/leaked-guantanamo-files-
highlight-need-fair-trials-and-accountability-2011-04-26. See also, ‘Guantánamo files: How
interrogators were told to spot al-Qaida and Taliban members’, The Guardian, 25 April 2011,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/apr/25/guantanamo-files-
interrogators-al-qaida-taliban. Reports describe 150 ‘innocent Afghans or Pakistanis, inclu-
ding farmers, chefs and drivers who were rounded up or even sold to US forces and
transferred across the world’.
42 ‘Guantánamo by the Numbers: What You Should Know & Do About Guantánamo’, The
Center for Constitutional Rights, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/
GTMObyTheNumbers; also‘ACLU Guantánamo Infographic,’ 4 May 2012, available at:
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/guantanamo-numbers. In several cases, official
documents show there was often ‘no reason recorded for transfer’ to Guantanamo. C. Hope,
R. Winnett, et al., ‘WikiLeaks: Guantanamo Bay terrorist secrets revealed’, The Telegraph,
25 April 2011.
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on terror.43 The vast majority have since been released, just as they were held,
at the discretion of the US government.44
However, more than a decade after its inauguration, one hundred and sixty
six men remained imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay.45 The US government has
identified forty six of them46 as subject to on-going, potentially indefinite
detention, on the grounds that they cannot be prosecuted (either for lack of
evidence or because the evidence could not be admitted, for example),47 but
are considered too ‘dangerous’ (on unspecified grounds) to be released.48
A striking 86 have been cleared for release,49 yet they continue to languish
in Guantanamo sometimes many years later, as the government remains
unwilling or in some case unable to release them.50 The then President of
the United States stated early in the war on terror that ‘to the extent appro-
priate and consistent with military necessity’ the detainees would be treated
‘in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of
1949’.51 Upon arrival at Guantanamo Bay, the detainees were initially shackled
and hooded, and photographs of them were published widely around the
globe.52 Early reports by human rights groups and the press questioned
43 CCR Guantánamo by Numbers, supra note 42; ACLU Guantánamo Infographic, supra note
42. Decisions on habeas corpus and to a lesser extent the task force review provides insights
as to the lack of a basis to detain in some cases. ‘Final Report, Guantanamo Review Task
Force’ (hereinafter ‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’), Dept. of Justice, Dept. of Defense,
Dept. of State, Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 January 2010, available at: http://www.justice.gov/ag/guanta-
namo-review-final-report.pdf.
44 CCR Guantánamo by the Numbers, supra note 42; ACLU Guantánamo Infographic, supra
note 42.
45 166 remain imprisoned as at June 2013. For updates, see CCR Guantánamo by the Numbers,
supra note 42 and ACLU Guantánamo Infographic, supra note 42.
46 Ibid.
47 See ‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’, supra note 43, p. 22; ‘CCR Guantánamo by the
Numbers, supra note 42; ACLU Guantánamo Infographic, supra note 42.
48 Ibid.
49 CCR Guantánamo by the Numbers, supra note 42; ACLU Guantánamo Infographic, supra
note 42
50 A variety of factors have been cited as preventing the release of those slated for transfer
or release including inaction on the part of the Obama and Bush administrations, a mora-
torium placed on transfers to Yemen due to the security situation in that state generally,
and restrictions placed by Congress on transfers from Guantanamo in December 2010. Seee.g.
‘Why can’t cleared prisoners leave Guantánamo Bay?’, Reprieve, 10 July 2012, available
at:http://reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/2012_07_10_Guantanamo_public_education.
51 Presidential Memo, 7 February 2002 and ‘Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,’ 20 September
2002.0
52 See, e.g., ‘Prison camp pictures spark protests’, BBC World News, 20 January 2002, available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1771687.stm. The ICRC criticised the
dissemination of these photos as violations of the duty under Article 13 of the Third Geneva
Convention not to subject prisoners of war to public curiosity. See, e.g., M. Meyer and K.
Studds, ‘Upholding Human Dignity and the Geneva Conventions: the Roles of the Media
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whether conditions of detention were acceptable, signalling cramped con-
ditions, excessive heat, poor sanitation and measures in contravention of the
prisoners’ religious beliefs, such as forcibly shaving prisoners’ beards.53
It was with the release of a small group of detainees in 2003, that serious
allegations of torture and ill treatment began to emerge.54 Allegations of
torture in Guantanamo have now been confirmed by multiple sources, in-
cluding NGO reports,55 the ICRC56 and official documents.57 Information on
in Protecting Prisoners of War and Civilian Security Internees against Insults and Public
Curiosity’, ICRC, 14 July 2006, p. 1, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/amic_kevin_studds_final.pdf.
53 See, ‘Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghan-
istan and Guantanamo Bay’, Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 51/053/ 2002 15/04/
2002, April 2002, p. 22, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/
053/2002/en/c92423a1-d868-11dd-9df8-936c90684588/amr510532002en.pdf ; S. Left, ‘Guanta-
namo Bay: What are the conditions at Guantanamo?’, The Guardian, 10 October 2002,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/22/afghanistan.qanda.
54 See S. Goldenberg, ‘Guantanamo abuse same as Abu Ghraib, say Britons’, The Guardian,
14 May 2004, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/14/iraq.guanta
namo; see also Chapter 7B5, above.
55 Among many reports of torture and ill treatment see: L. E. Fletcher and E. Stover, ‘Guanta-
namo and its Aftermath: U.S. detention and interrogation practices and their impact on
former detainees’, November 2008, available at: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/
Guantanamo_and_Its_Aftermath.pdf ; ‘Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’, CCR, July 2006, available at:
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf; ‘Getting Away with Torture: the
Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees’, HRW, July 2012, available at: http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover.pdf ‘The Guantanamo Testimo-
nials Project’, The Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas at the University
of California, Davis, available at: http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-
testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-the-red-cross/icrc-analysis. On reports of
forced injections see, e.g., A. Worthington, ‘All Guantánamo Prisoners Were Subjected to
“Pharmacological Waterboarding”’, 2 December 2012, available at: http://www.andy
worthington.co.uk/2010/12/02/all-guantanamo-prisoners-were-subjected-to-pharmaco
logical-waterboarding. Official reports are discussed in R. Brody, ‘The Road to Abu Ghraib’,
HRW, June 2004, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf.
56 ‘ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody’, ICRC,
February 2007.
57 The U.S. Government kept a log of interrogation techniques used on detainees. One log,
for Detainee 063, al Qahtani, describes sleep deprivation, painful stress positions, physical
and sexualabuse, physical, psychological and religious humiliation, use of dogs, sensory
overstimulation and severe isolation, inter alia. ‘Interrogation Log Detainee 063’, U.S.
Government, available at: http://wlstorage.net/file/mohamed-al-kahtani-gtmo-log-2002.pdf.
On techniques approved in 2002 and 2003 by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, see:
D. Rumsfeld, ‘Counter-Resistance Techniques’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2 Decem-
ber 2002, made available by the National Security Archives; and Rumsfeld, ‘Counter-
Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (S)’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16
April 2003, made available by the National Security Archives. See also ‘[S]tudies of publicly
available CSRT transcripts in e.g. ‘Public Declaration of Mohammed al Qahtani’ which
reportedly indicate that ‘18 percent of the detainees alleged torture’ available at: http://
www.ccrjustice.org/files/Publication_DeclarationonAlQahtani.pdf.
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cases at Guantanamo are coupled with information, now widely publicised,
concerning the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ that were authorised for
use on ‘high value detainees’ by the US government.58 Information on con-
nections between Guantanamo and other detention facilities (including the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq59 and various CIA ‘black sites’),60 where evidence
of torture and ill treatment is now a matter of public record,61 presents a
picture of a broader policy and practice of which Guantanamo’s purportedly
law-free characteristics were only a part.
More recent reports would suggest that allegations of torture and ill-treat-
ment appear to have ceased, and that although conditions of detention remain
strict, the treatment of detainees has substantially improved over time.62 Some
questionable practices continue to receive attention however, notably in parts
of the camp where the so-called ‘high value detainees’ are held, such as
hooding detainees when they are transferred from the prison to meet with
their lawyers or for other purposes and some areas remaining off-limits to
58 See, e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General of the United States of America,
Jay S. Bybee, ‘Standards for Conduct of Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A’
(hereinafter ‘First Bybee Memo’), 1 August 2002; Memorandum from Assistant Attorney
General of the US Jay S. Bybee, ‘Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative’ (hereinafter ‘Second
Bybee Memo’), 1 August 2002; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo, ‘The Torture and Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held
Outside the United States’, 14 March 2003. The techniques are discussed in Chapter 10 on
extraordinary Rendition.
59 See, e.g., S. Goldenberg, ‘Guantanamo Record Contradicts Claims that Prisoner Abuse was
Isolated’, The Guardian, 19 May 2004. See also Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military
Police Brigade (hereinafter ‘Taguba report’), Official Military Inquiry into Abu Ghraib, May
2004, available at: http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf. ‘Administration
of Torture,’ ACLU, suggests that abuse of prisoners was pervasive in U.S. detention facilities
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
60 See Chapter 10. On links between the two, see Goldenberg, ‘Guantanamo Record’, supra
note 59; Taguba report, supra note 59. Detainees held in rendition sites were often flown
in and out of Guantanamo at various stages. See, e.g., Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania Application
No. 46454/11, ECtHR, 27 October 2011 and Abu Zubaydah v Poland Application No. 7511/13,
ECtHR, 26 March 2013. The CIA is reported to have held a separate site at Guantanamo
at the early stages.
61 See Chapters 7B7 and 10 which explores those techniques in more detail.
62 Reports include among the conditions for some prisoners as at 2009 lack of access to natural
light, fluorescent lights 24-hours-a-day, feeding through a metal slot in the door and
prisoners eat alone, ban on communication and aggressive disciplinary tactics by ‘immediate
response teams.’ ‘Current Conditions of Confinement at Guantánamo: Still in Violation
of the Law’ (hereinafter ‘CCR Current Conditions’), CCR, 23 February 2009, p. 5, available
at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Report_Conditions_At_Guantanamo.pdf.
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outsiders.63 Concerns also emerged as to the forced feeding of detainees on
hunger strike.64
Contact between detainees and the outside world has been extremely
limited, and the lack of outside access to parts of the camp and to the detainees
themselves has limited effective assessment of the conditions of detention.65
For the first few years, even the ICRC was denied access,66 while other human
rights bodies initially denied any access were later granted it subject to
agreeing not to communicate with detainees – conditions which have led the
Inter-American Commission and Special Rapporteur on Torture to decline to
visit.67 With few exceptions, detainees continue to be denied access to their
families and correspondence is heavily censored.
A particular concern arises from measures imposed specifically on high
value detainees regarding the ‘presumptive classification’ of everything said
by certain detainees, until the government decides to declassify.68 This means
that some detainees are completely precluded from communicating with the
63 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania and Poland, supra note 60. Lawyers for some of the detainees who
faced charges before the Guantánamo military commissions have been allowed inside, but
only after volunteering to wear the same hoods the detainees wore. CCR Current Con-
ditions, ibid. See also ‘“Platinum” captives held at off-limits Gitmo camp’, The Miami Herald,
7 February 2008, available at: http://www.miamiherald.com/2008/02/07/930542/platinum-
captives-held-at-off.html.
64 The ICRC considered force-feeding hunger-striking detainees as a violation of Common
Article 3, which is supported by CAT and the World Medical Association (WMA). Some
100 of the 166 detainees held byApril 2013 were on hunger strike and some force fed;
‘Barack Obama says Guantanamo Bay Prison must close’, supra note 15. Aamer v Obama
is a legal challenge to force feeding brought in US courts in 2013.
65 Limited access of monitoring bodies is referred to below. Counsel are also denied access
to some parts of the camp, notably camp 7. See, e.g., ‘“Platinum’ captives held at off-limits
Gitmo camp’, supra note 63.
66 The 22 January 2009 Executive Orders issued by President Obama directed all agencies
of the US Government to provide the ICRC with timely access to any individual detained
by the United States in an armed conflict. B. Obama, ‘Executive Order 13491 of January
22, 2009 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, Vol. 74 Fed. Reg. No. 16, p. 4893, 4894, Sec.
4. Since August 2009, official sources indicate that the ICRC has been notified of persons
detained by the U.S military in situations of armed conflict within 14 days of their capture.
Left, ‘Guantanamo Bay: What are the conditions at Guantanamo?’, supra note 53.
67 IAHCR Press Release, supra note 35. See ‘UN Rapporteur Awaiting Access to Prisoners
in Guantanamo’, Carribean Analysis, 9 March 2012, available at: http://www.caribbean
analysis.com/un-rapporteur-awaiting-access-to-prisoners-in-guantanamo. Several UN
independent human rights experts previously denied full access : see, ‘Letter to Obama
Asking for Access to Guantanamo Detention Center’, 30 January 2009, Joint-Letter from
ACLU, Amnesty International, HRW, and Human Rights First, available at: http://www.
hrw.org/news/2009/01/30/letter-obama-asking-access-guantanamo-detention-center.
68 It applies to the defendants before the military commissions and was challenged in this
context. C. Currier, ‘Classified in Gitmo Trials: Detainees’ Every Word’, ProPublica, 17 July
2012, available at: http://www.propublica.org/article/classified-in-gitmo-trials-detainees-
every-word. It also applies to other detainees who remain detained without charge, such
as Abu Zubaydah. See Zubaydah v Lithuania, supra note 60.
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outside world, and requests for declassification of even innocuous drawings,
writings while in detention or simple affidavits to bring legal action are
routinely refused. One such detainee is described in his application to the
European Court as ‘a man deprived of his voice, barred from communicating
with the outside world or with this Court and from presenting evidence in
support of his case’.69
8A.2 OVERVIEW OF MILITARY PROCEDURES GOVERNING DETENTION
Since 2004, several sets of procedures have been put in place by the US military
in Guantanamo Bay that purported to provide some form of ‘review’ of the
prisoners’ detention: the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) and the
Administrative Review Boards (ARBs),70 which in 2011 were replaced by the
Periodic Review Board (PRBs).71 Although the Department of Defense stated
at various stages that these processes would, for example, ‘provide an ex-
peditious opportunity for non-citizen detainees to receive notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard,’72 as noted below the substantive scope of what exactly
they could be heard on, and what the boards could consider, has always been
very limited. The review procedures have not considered, for example, the
correct legal classification of the detainee, whether there is any legal basis for
his detention at all, or whether he is being afforded the rights to which he
is entitled under international law.
69 See Zubaydah v Lithuania, supra note 60. The author is part of the applicant’s legal team
before the ECtHR. See also In re. Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Case no. 1:08-cv-
01360, Amended Protective Order, 9 January 2009. The U.S. media organisation ‘Truthout’
filed an unsuccessful Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requesting release of Abu
Zubaydah’s drawings, poetry and writings in detention. ‘Torture Diaries, Drawings and
the Special Prosecutor’, Truthout, 29 March 2010, available at: http://archive.truthout.org/
torture-diaries-drawings-and-special-prosecutor58108.
70 Both sets of procedures followed challenges to the lack of judicial oversight at Guantanamo,
that would ultimately lead to the Supreme Court decision in Boumediene, supra note 16.
See the ‘Long Quest for Habeas’, below.
71 ‘Executive Order: Periodic Review Of Individuals Detained At Guantánamo Bay Naval
Station’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 7 March 2011, available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-
individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava.
72 ‘Combat Status Review Tribunals’, Department of Defense Press Release, July 2004, available
at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.pdf. See also, Memorandum
from Deputy Secretary of Defense, ‘Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’
(hereinafter ‘Implementation of CSRT Procedures’), 14 July 2006, available at: http://
www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
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The first set of procedures to be introduced were the CSRTs,73 whereby
three officers of the US armed forces were charged with determining whether
particular detainees meet the US’ definition of ‘enemy combatant’.74 Their
decision was then approved by the CSRT Legal Advisor and the Director,75
who notified the Tribunal and the detainee if further hearings were necessary
or if the decision was final.76 As has been acknowledged, the CSRT proceed-
ings lacked independence and the procedural protections necessary for mean-
ingful review,77 including lack of access to a lawyer,78 little or no access to
evidence used against detainees,79 and no provision for the exclusion of evid-
ence extracted under torture or coercion.80 Such restrictions rendered rebuttal
notoriously difficult if not in some cases impossible.81 While providing a very
73 The procedure was established by the Order of the Deputy Secretary of Defense of 7 July
2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf. The procedure is further detailed in a memo regarding ‘Implementa-
tion guidance for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for enemy combatants
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’, Secretary of the Navy, 29 July 2004, available at: http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
74 The definition of ‘enemy combatant’ see Order of the Deputy Secretary of Defense of 7
July 2004, supra note 73. See ‘Categories of Detainees’, para. 8B.3 below; and Chapter 6B.1.
75 ‘Implementation of CSRT Procedures’, supra, p. 9, (I)(7).
76 Ibid., (I)(10).
77 See e.g. ‘Guantánamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit of unchecked executive power’,
Amnesty International, 13 May 2005, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AMR51/063/2005/en/0e3f8b95-d4fe-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr510632005en.pdf;
M. Denbeaux and J. Denbeaux, et al., ‘No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: The Modern Habeas
Corpus? An Analysis of the Proceedings of the Government’s Combatant Status Review
Tribunals at Guantánamo’ (hereinafter ‘Seton Hall CSRT Report’), (2006). The U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed that the CSRT hearings were inadequate to protect detainees’ rights to
judicial review of their detention.
78 See ‘Security Detainees/Enemy Combatants’, Human Rights First, available at: http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/military-commissions/security-
detaineesenemy-combatants. There was a non-legal appointed representative but detainee-
representative communications were not in any sense confidential. See Seton Hall CSRT
Report, ibid, p. 3.
79 Brief summaries of classified evidence were available, but they were conclusory rather than
persuasive or informative. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Office for the Administrative
Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at the U.S. Naval Base Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, ‘Summary of Evidence for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Husayn, Zayn
Al Abidin Muhammad (Abu Zubaydah)’, 19 March 2007, available at: http://www.defense.
gov/news/ISN10016.pdf.
80 ‘Guantánamo and beyond’, supra note 77, p. 64.
81 See, e.g., House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, UK Parliament, ‘Visit to Guantá-
namo Bay – Second Report of Session 2006-07’, 10 January 2007, p. 31, para. 96, available
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf.
‘Amnesty cited a case where a detainee was informed by his Tribunal hearing that an alias
allegedly used by him had been found on a computer hard drive associated with an alleged
senior al Qaeda member. Neither his own alias, nor the name of the senior al Qaeda
member, nor the location where the computer hard drive was found were revealed to him.
He was thus unable to rebut the charge.’
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slim veneer of procedural regularity, in the vast majority of cases the CSRTs
confirmed the DOD’s assessment.82 The review was conducted once only,
unless the individual was determined not to be an enemy combatant in which
case the process was reportedly repeated, sometimes on several occasions.83
The second procedure introduced was an annual ‘Administrative Review’
procedure, whereby a board of military officers assesses whether the ‘enemy
combatant’ poses a threat to the United States, or its allies, or whether there
are other factors bearing on the need for continued detention, such as the
‘intelligence value’ of the detainee.84 Based on that assessment, it could recom-
mend release, transfer or continued detention, but again only rarely was a
‘recommendation’ made for release.85
In 2009, the annual Administrative Reviews were temporarily suspended86
pending the comprehensive interagency review of the status of detainees
ordered by incoming President Obama.87 When that review was completed,
in March 2011, President Obama replaced the CSRT and ARB mechanisms for
review of detention authority with a new set of procedures administered by
Periodic Review Boards.88
82 Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, responsible for overseeing the CSRTs, emphasised
that the CSRT system ‘is only to determine, again, if you’re an enemy combatant ...there’s
already been prior determinations... so I would expect that most would indeed be enemy
combatants, just because of prior reviews’. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Special
Defense Department Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, 1 October 2004, transcript
available at: http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2242. 59
out of 539 were found to be no longer classified as enemy combatants: ‘Combatant Status
Review Tribunal Summary’, U.S. Department of Defense, 10 February 2009, available at:
http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf.
83 One U.S. Army Major who sat on 49 CSRT panels indicated in an affidavit that in six of
those hearings, ‘there was a unanimous decision that the detainee was a Non-Enemy Com-
batant (NEC). In all of those NEC cases, the Command directed that a new CSRT be held
or the original CSRT was ordered reopened’. Affidavit filed in Hamad v. Gates, No. 07-1098,
(D.C. Cir. 2007), declaration available at: http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-
guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-csrt-officers/testimony-of-an-
army-major-in-mr-hamads-csrt.
84 See ‘Final Administrative Review Procedures for Guantanamo Detainees’, Department of
Defense News, 18 May 2004, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=3042. The rules of procedure are outlined in ‘Implementation of Admin-
istrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba’, Department of Defense, 14 September 2004, available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914adminreview.pdf.
85 See ‘Combatant Status Review Tribunals/Administrative Review Boards’, Department of
Defense, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_Tribunals.html.
86 See ‘Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary’, supra note 82.
87 Executive Order 13492, supra note 20.
88 Executive Order 13567, ‘Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval
Station Pursuant to Authorisation to Use Military Force’, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277, 10 March 2011,
availableat: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-
periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava.
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This latest form of review appears similar to the ARBs. Although there are
positive changes – the review occurs every six months and is now an inter-
agency review rather than only by the Department of Defense89 – most of
the concerns that attached to the former reviews processes continue to apply.
The ostensible purpose of the boards is to confirm whether continued detention
‘is necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United
States’.90 The PRB review process is explicitly discretionary, its purpose being
to ‘review on a periodic basis the executive branch’s continued, discretionary
exercise of existing detention authority in individual cases’.91
8A.3 THE LONG QUEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Among the vast amount of litigation that has been conducted by or on behalf
of Guantanamo detainees over the years were the volumes of cases asserting
the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to habeas corpus,
before a court. This litigation, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter
11, began with a series of cases brought during 2002 on behalf of British and
Australian detainees, and on behalf of twelve Kuwaiti detainees.92 The govern-
ment moved to dismiss these actions for want of jurisdiction, given the location
of the detention facilities outside United States sovereign territory, and the
fact that the detainees are not US citizens.93 The court of first instance accepted
this, ruling that it had no jurisdiction to entertain claims from aliens held
89 Executive Order 13567, ibid.
90 ‘Executive Order: Periodic Review Of Individuals Detained At Guantánamo Bay Naval
Station’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 7 March 2011, available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-
individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava. One break from the prior ARB system is that
‘potential intelligence value is not a ground for continued detention’. See lawfulness of
detention above.
91 ‘This order is intended solely to establish, as a discretionary matter, a process to review
on a periodic basis the executive branch’s continued, discretionary exercise of existing
detention authority in individual cases.’ Executive Order 13567, supra note 88.
92 The first cases were Rasul et al. v. George Walker Bush et al., No. 02-5288, 2002, a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed before the District Court for the District of Columbia by
the families of an Australian and two British citizens held by US forces in Guantanamo
Bay, and Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-5251, 2002 brought by relatives of twelve Kuwaiti
nationals detained at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment and injunction ordering that they be informed of any charges against them and
requiring that they be permitted to consult with counsel and meet with their families. The
complaints were consolidated and treated by the court as an application for habeas corpus.
93 Ibid.
610 Chapter 8
outside the sovereign territory of the United States94 and the appeal court
upheld this decision.95
However, during 2003 the prospect of a different approach emerged.
Another first instance court, hearing a similar case, found that:
[W]e simply cannot accept the government’s position that the Executive Branch
possesses the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign
citizens including, on territory under the sole jurisdiction and control of the United
States without permitting such prisoners recourse of any kind to any judicial forum,
or even access to counsel, regardless of the length or manner of their confine-
ment.96
When the matter was finally before the United States Supreme Court, it was
asked to determine the ‘narrow but important question whether the United
States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the
detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities
and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba’.97 In an historic
judgment supported by six of nine judges of the Supreme Court bench in
2004,98 the Court found that ‘federal courts have jurisdiction to determine
the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals
who claim to be totally innocent of wrong doing’.
In response, the US Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,99
explicitly eliminating any such possibility by stating that federal courts did
not have statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims by aliens challenging their
detention at Guantanamo Bay. However, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rums-
feld,100 the Supreme Court interpreted the provision eliminating federal habeas
jurisdiction as being inapplicable to cases that were pending at the time the
DTA was enacted, thereby permitting the Court to review Hamdan’s case.101
Congress again responded, passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006,102
94 The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
95 An appeal against the decision in Rasul was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia on 11 March 2003. Al Odah et al. v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
96 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F. 3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2003)
97 Certiori was denied in Gherebi v Bush, above. Rasul v. Bush, Al Odah v. United States (Cases
03-334 and 03-343), Supreme Court Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, 28 June 2004, p. 1. On grant of certiorari: Rasul v. Bush, Al Odah
v. United States (Cases 03-334 and 03-343), 10 November 2003, 72 USLW 3327.
98 Rasul, supra note 16.
99 Detainee Treatment Act 2005, P.L. 109-148, Title X; P.L. 109-163, Title XIV.
100 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
101 In addition to the habeas issue, it questioned the validity of the military commissions
established pursuant to President Bush’s military order (see military commission below)
leading to legislation governing the commissions.
102 The Military Commissions Act of 2006, P.L. 109-366.
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which eliminated court’s jurisdiction over all pending and future habeas
applications (or other causes of action) by detainees of the war on terror.
On 12 June, 2008, the Supreme Court, in the case of Boumediene v. Bush,103
ruled that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 unconstitutionally limited
detainee’s access to judicial review and that detainees have the right to a
‘meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to
detain’.104 Since late 2008, habeas hearings have been heard in D.C. District
Court. In the first few years, a striking majority of applications were granted
(37 successful applications of the 57 total submitted by 2010105). This under-
scored both the importance of the habeas right, and the extent and gravity
of the errors that had lead to such detentions in the first place. The black hole
was finally being closed, detainee by detainee.
However, in 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the first decision to grant habeas,106 rebuking the
lower court’s lack of deference to the government and finding that the level
of correction was ‘intolerable’.107 Since then, the standards and approach
being applied by the courts, and the results, have changed sharply: between
2010 and mid-2012, only one application had been successful.108
103 Boumediene, supra note 16.
104 Ibid., at 2269.
105 By 2010, the majority of habeas applications were successful. See ‘Guantanamo Habeas Score
card’, Center for Constitutional Rights, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/GTMOscorecard.
‘Habeas Grants after Appeals Decisions: 32; Habeas Denials after Appeals (and Remand)
Decisions: 27; Habeas Granted and Released: 26; Habeas Granted and Still Detained: 4;
Current Guantanamo Population: 169.’
106 The process began with Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) wherein Bou-
mediene’s promise of robust review of the legality of the Guantanamo detainees’ detention
is said to have been ‘effectively negated’: see M. Denbeaux, ‘No Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit
Restricts Meaningful Review’ (hereinafter ‘Seton Hall Habeas Report’), Seton Law School,
2012, p. 1, available at: http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policy
research/upload/hearing-habeas.pdf, and Chapter 11.
107 The DC Circuit Court has determined that the habeas court’s evaluation of the facts should
be more limited and more deferential to the government’s evaluation. The D.C. Circuit
is said to have ‘prevented district judges from closely evaluating the government’s evidence
but mandated that they give a presumption of accuracy to certain evidence (interrogation
reports) submitted by the government, even though district courts had previously found
that evidence unreliable’. Ibid., p. 4.
108 Ibid.
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8A.4 THE GUANTANAMO TASK FORCE REVIEW AND CONTINUING INDEFINITE
DETENTION
The Obama administration came to office a foremost critic of Guantanamo
and ordered its closure. As part of this process, it established, by Executive
Order 13492, a task force to review the files of all Guantánamo prisoners.109
The task force issued a final report in January 2010.110 It concluded that
156 of 240 detainees held at Guantánamo when President Obama took office
were not a threat to the US and were cleared for transfer.111 Only 36 detainees
of the 240 would be referred for prosecution.112 A further 48 detainees would
be held indefinitely.113 The reasons purporting to justify the continued and
potentially indefinite detention of this ‘remainder’ group of detainees were
various, included that they were too dangerous to transfer but not feasible
for prosecution, because the US did not have evidence against them, that
evidence that was available could not be admitted or they had not violated
US criminal law.114 These 48 detainees will remain in detention pursuant to
the government’s discretion under the AUMF.115 While the US government
has not disclosed the category to which it assigned particular individuals, it
would seem that many of them have still not had the lawfulness of their
detention reviewed.116 In some cases it is known that they were subject to
the gravest forms of torture with allegedly devastating effects; whether this
109 Executive Order 13492, supra note 20. It allowed counsel to make representations to the
task force.
110 Where the Review Panel was not able to reach a consensus oradditional review was thought
appropriate the heads of agency met to determine the proper disposition. ‘Guantanamo
Review Task Force’, supra note 43.
111 ‘26 detainees were approved for transfer ... and 30 detainees from Yemen were approved
for “conditional” detention based on present security conditions in Yemen.’ Ibid., p. 9-10.
112 Ibid., p. 9.
113 Ibid., p. 12. ‘48 detainees were unanimously approved for continued detention under the
AUMF based on a finding that they pose a national security threat that could not be
mitigated sufficiently at this time if they were to be transferred from U.S. custody. The
Task Force concluded as to all of these detainees that prosecution is not feasible at this
time in either federal court or the military commission system. At the same time, the Task
Force concluded that there is a lawful basis for continuing to detain these detainees under
the AUMF.’
114 Ibid.
115 The Detention Guidelines provided that a detainee should be considered eligible for
continued detention under the AUMF if ‘(1) the detainee poses a national security threat
that cannot be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures;
(2) prosecution of the detainee by the federal government is not feasible in any forum; and
(3) continued detention without criminal charges is lawful’. Ibid., p. 8. The import of the
lawfulness restraint is questionable, and somewhat circular, as the government has been
afforded complete discretion to detain.
116 See, e.g., Zubaydah v Lithuania and Poland, supra note 60. Zubaydah is thought to be one
of the 48.
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is a factor in their continuing detention is likely to remain the subject of
speculation.117
8A.4.1 Limbo within Limbo: Detainees ‘Cleared’ but Not Released
A further category of detainees is worthy of note. Many detainees at Guanta-
namo who have, despite the obstacles, been cleared for transfer by the govern-
ment still remain in detention for prolonged periods of time.118 For example,
59 of the 240 detainees subject to the task force review had been approved
for transfer or release by the prior administration but remained at Guanta-
namo.119 Twenty-nine of the detainees subject to review had been ordered
released by a federal district court as the result of habeas litigation, to little
effect.120 The detention of individuals ‘cleared’ for transfer has been described
as Guantanamo’s current ‘moral bankruptcy’.121
The reasons for such failure to release are many, including slow processes
and inefficiency, resistance on the part of government,122 and, strikingly,
congressional obstacles imposed by the 2012 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA), whereby military funds cannot be deployed to relocate Guanta-
namo prisoners.123
In respect of a number of those cleared yet still detained, there was a real
risk of torture in another state. In some such cases, the US has been criticised
for returning them anyway: the Courts have narrowly upheld the government’s
argument that the judiciary must accept the executive branch’s determination
as to whether it is ‘more likely than not’ that individuals would be tortured
117 Ibid.
118 See A. Worthington, ‘Guantánamo Scandal: The 40 Prisoners Still Held But Cleared for
Release At Least Five Years Ago’, 6 June 2012, available at: http://www.andyworthington.
co.uk/2012/06/06/exclusive-guantanamo-scandal-the-40-prisoners-still-held-but-cleared-for-
release-at-least-five-years-ago/. ‘One of the greatest injustices at Guantánamo is that, of
the 169 prisoners still held, over half – 87 in total – were cleared for release by President
Obama’s interagency Guantánamo Review Task Force.’
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Joe Margulies, counsel to Guantanamo detainee Abu Zubaydah, notes that ‘[w]hile the great
moral bankruptcy of the base was once its conditions, today it is the shameful fact that
scores of prisoners who have been cleared for transfer by two administrations remain in
custody’. J. Margulies, ‘Trapped in Guantanamo’, LA Times, 29 September 2011, available
at: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/29/opinion/la-oe-margulies-gitmo-20110929.
122 Eg. the case of juvenile M. Jawad, note 36.
123 President Obama’s power to release Guantánamo detainees is limited by the NDAA, signed
in January 2012, which is described as ‘amounting to an effective prohibition on the use
of military funds to transfer detainees’. On limited executive exceptions, not invoked, see
‘Why can’t cleared prisoners leave Guantánamo Bay?’, supra note 50.
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or abused.124 For one group of detained Uighers from China, the US accepted
that they could not be returned for fear of persecution.125 The detainees there-
fore asserted their right to be released into the US rather than held at Guanta-
namo, but the government refused, and successfully challenged the courts’
power to order their release into US soil.126 This, despite the fact that as the
Supreme Court noted, ‘Petitioners have been held for several years in custody
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba – a detention that the Government agrees was
without lawful cause’.127
In addition, detainees from Yemen cleared as not posing sufficient risk
to justify detention were then slated for ‘conditional’ detention based on the
current security environment in that country.128 Their situation was given
tragic voice in September 2012 when a detainee committed suicide by hunger
strike, some ten years after being detained at Guantanamo and six years after
the administration reportedly acknowledged he did not pose a threat justifying
continued detention.129 On the sole basis of their nationality, not their specific
conduct, these detainees continue to be held at Guantanamo.
8A.5 TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
On 13 November 2001, a Military Order was issued by the President of the
United States, relating to ‘Detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens
in the war against terrorism’.130 It provides, inter alia, that the trial of any
124 See Kiyemba II, the decision of the District Court en banc, split six to five, confirming the
earlier refusal to consider the claim of the risk of refoulement, and long dissenting decisions.
There is speculation that the case will be heard before the Supreme Court but at time of
writing it had not arisen. The US also relies on a more restrictive standard than the ‘real
and personal risk’ under international law: see Ch 7A.5.10 ‘Refoulement.’
125 Ibid.
126 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F. 3d 102 D.C. Cir. (2009). Certiori before the Supreme Court was
ultimately denied as the government was committed to finding alternative solutions to
the detainees, notably relocation to Palau in the South Pacific.
127 Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 10-775, 563 U. S. ____ (2011), cert denied. p. 1.
128 ‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’, supra note 43.
129 See, e.g., ‘Death at Guantánamo Bay’, The New York Times, 15 September 2012, available
at:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/opinion/sunday/death-at-guantanamo-bay.html.
Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Yemeni citizen was sent to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in January
2002, and died there ten years later. He was cleared but not transferred to Yemen due to
the security situation in that country. He was described as ‘detained for his passport not
his conduct’. ‘Adnan Latif – the Face of Indefinite Detention – Dies at Guantánamo’, CCR,
available at: http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/adnan-latif-face-of-indefinite-
detention-dies-guantanamo.
130 ‘Presidential Military Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism’, issued by President Bush, 13 November 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
57833 (2001), (hereinafter ‘Presidential Military Order’).
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individual subject to it,131 will be by a military commission. The Order
specifically excludes from the jurisdiction of the Commissions citizens of the
United States.
Making the commissions operational has been a slow and faltering process
on many levels. In July 2003 President Bush designated the first group of
alleged al-Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo Bay for trial before the
Military Commissions,132 and during 2004 the first charges were brought133
and hearings got underway.134 But before long their legitimacy was chal-
lenged, and proceedings stalled, culminating in the Supreme Court decision
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, finding that ‘the military commission convened to try
Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate
both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions’.135
In response to the finding that the president did not have the power to estab-
lish such commissions, the Bush administration promptly announced its
decision to seek Congressional approval,136 which it obtained in the form
of the Military Commissions Act.137 The Act authorized the trial by military
commission of alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against
the US for violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by military
commission. Under the 2006 Act, several detainees were tried and convicted
between 2006 and 2008.138
131 The Order provided that those subject to it were persons with respect to whom the President
determines that there is reason to believe (1) that s/he is a member of al-Qaeda or (2) that
s/he was engaged in international terrorism, or (3) that it is in the interests of the United
States that s/he should be subject to the Order. Ibid. Sec. 2(a)(1).
132 Six detainees were so designated. ‘President Determines Enemy Combatants Subject to
His Military Order’, Department of Defense, News Release, 3 July 2003, available at: http://
www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html.
133 In February 2004, the first detainees (of Yemeni and Sudanese nationality), were charged
with ‘violat[ing] the laws of war and engag[ing] in terrorism’. See N.A. Lewis, ‘Qaeda
suspects face first military trials’, International Herald Tribune, 25 February 2004.
134 See ‘First Military Commission Convened at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’, Department of
Defense, News Release, 24 August 2004, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
2004/nr20040824-1164.html on ‘the first U.S. military commission in more than 50 years
being convened [in Guantanamo Bay] today in the case of U.S. vs. Salim Achmed Hamdan
who is accused of conspiracy to commit violations of the law of war’. The second of four
military commissions was convened for David Hicks, an Australian citizen, accused of
conspiracy, attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent, and aiding the enemy. See
‘Australian Citizen is the Second Commissions Case’, DoD News Release, 25 August 2004,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040825-1169.
135 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 100, and Chapter 11.
136 ‘President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists’, 6
September 2006, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2006/09/20060906-3.html.
137 Military Commission Acts 2006 (HR-6166) and 2009 (HR-2647).
138 Salim Hamdan was convicted and sentenced to 66 months for material support for terrorism
but acquitted of conspiracy. In November 2008 he was transferred to Yemen to serve out
the remainder of his sentence and released on 8 January 2009. As noted below, his convic-
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Two days after being sworn into office in 2009, President Obama issued
an executive order halting the military commissions at Guantanamo, pending
the work of the Guantanamo ‘Task Force’ which would determine inter alia
who should face criminal prosecution.139 Meanwhile, while keeping an open
position on Military Commissions,140 the Attorney General announced that
several detainees would be transferred to the US for trial before federal
courts.141 An attempt seemed to be afoot to bring Guantanamo within the
regular legal process, though enormous controversy and debate ensued.142
The US Congress proceeded to block the possibility that Guantanamo detainees,
including those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, would be tried by a US civilian
tion was quashed in 2012 as ex-post facto application of criminal laws. Hamdan v. United
States, No. 11-1257, p. 26, (D.C. Cir. 2012). David Hicks pleaded guilty and was also convic-
ted of providing material support for terrorism and sentenced to seven years confinement.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, his sentence was reduced to nine months and he was
transferred to his native Australia to serve his sentence. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul was convicted of solicitation, conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
139 Executive Order 13492, supra note 20.
140 In 2009 Obama appeared to support the commissions, though he had previously opposed:
‘Military commissions have a long tradition in the United States. They are appropriate for
trying enemies who violate the laws of war, provided that they are properly structured
and administered’. ‘Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions’, The
White House, May 15, 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
statement-president-barack-obama-military-commissions. (For later expressions, see 23 May
2013 speech, note 9.) In October 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a). The Secretary of Defense approved the 2010 Manual for
Military Commissions, which implements the 2009 MCA.
141 On 9 June 2009 Ahmed Ghailani was the first non-American citizen brought to the U.S.
for trial in federal court from Guantanamo. On 13 November 2009, Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that the United States government will pursue prosecution in federal
court in the Southern District of New York against five detainees charged in military
commissions: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin ‘Attash,
Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi. ‘Departments
of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Bay Detainees:
Decisions on Accused 9/11 Plotters, Alleged Mastermind of USS Cole Attack & Others’,
Department of Justice, 13 November 2009, available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2009/November/09-ag-1224.html. Other individuals have been transferred from overseas
directly to the US, rather than to Guantanamo as previously; e.g. Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-
Ruqai captured by special forces from Libya in October 2013.
142 See, e.g., ‘Trial by Military Commission or Article III Court? The Debate Rages On’, New
York State Bar Assoication, 27 July 2010, available at: http://nysbar.com/blogs/
ExecutiveDetention/2010/07/trial_by_military_commission_o.html. In March 2013, the
debate remerged as al-Qeada spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, reportedly one of Osama
bin Laden’s sons in law, was transferred to New York for trial. See ‘Suleiman Abu Ghaith
to be tried in New York’, BBC News, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-21706645 last visited 14 May 2013.
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court.143 In April 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder referred five high profile
9/11 related cases against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his four co-con-
spirators to military commission.144 Several cases got underway in the course
of 2012,145 consolidating the role of the Commissions in American history.
The decision to submit to trial by military commission in itself, and the
specific Rules of Procedure of the Commissions, have given rise to profound
criticism within the United States and internationally.146 Since the rules were
first published in March 2002, they have been amended, and somewhat
improved, several times.147 Despite this, at all stages they have provoked
concern ‘still failing to provide many of the fundamental elements of a fair
trial found in federal civilian courts and a court martial system’.148 While
concerns are many, as illustrated in relation to ‘prosecution-fair trial’ below,
they may be encapsulated, in the words of the Chief Prosecutor of the Military
Commissions, as revolving around the ‘five uns’:
[T]hat the law of the commissions is unsettled because the system is new and
untested; that the new rules are unfair because they deviate from the tried-and-true
procedural protections of the courts-martial and federal courts; that the commissions
are unnecessary because our federal courts are open and expert in handling terrorism
prosecutions; that the commissions are unknown because they permit too much
secrecy, particularly with respect to allegations of torture; and that the scope of
military jurisdiction is unbounded in our government’s claim of a geographically
and temporally unconstrained conflict with al-Qaeda and undefined ‘associated
forces.’149
143 Senate and the House of Representatives passed a Defense Spending Bill on December 22,
2010 blocking the use of funds to transfer Guantanamo detainees. National Defense Author-
ization Act of Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 6523; extended for 2012 with the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2012, H.R. 1540.
144 ‘The Guantanamo Trials’, HRW, available at: http://www.hrw.org/features/Guantanamo.
145 Ibid. The proceedings are discussed further in relation to ‘fair trial’ below.
146 For a discussion of the legality of the Military Commission under IHRL and IHL, see, inter
alia, H.H. Koh, ‘The Case Against Military Commissions’, 96 (2002) AJIL 337; R. Wedg-
woood, ‘Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions’, 96 (2002) AJIL 328; J. Paust,
‘Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality’, 23 (2002) Michigan J. of Int’l Law
1 and Chapter 4B2.3 and 7A.5.4.
147 The rules set forth in the Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1 were
detailed by the Military Commission Instructions Nos. 1-8, issued by the Department of
Defense on 30 April 2003 and on October 28, 2009, President Obama signed into law the
Military Commissions Act of 2009, which was included in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (NDAA).
148 The MCA 2009 was the third attempt at creating a military commissions system and brings
various reforms. See, e.g., ‘Military Commissions’, Human Rights First, 2012, available at:
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/military-commissions.
149 A. Abso, ‘Reporting from Guantánamo: The five uns’, ACLU, 23 July 2012, available at:
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-human-rights/reporting-guantanamo-five-uns
based on discussion between Brigadier General Mark Martins, the Chief Prosecutor of the
military commissions, with NGO observers.
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With the first military commission conviction being quashed on the basis of
retroactive application of criminal law, with uncertain implications for other
cases, the controversy does not look set to abate.150
At the same time, the impact of the commissions should be kept in per-
spective. Of the 800 ‘dangerous enemy combatants’ who have been subject
– in some cases for several years – to detention at Guantanamo, only 10% have
even been identified as subject to trial by military commission, and far fewer
cases have actually proceeded to prosecution in military commissions.151
For the greater number held in indefinite detention, even the prospect of
flawed criminal justice is better than no justice at all. The unusual plea from
defence attorneys to submit their client (apparently slated for indefinite de-
tention without trial) to trial by military commission epitomises the Catch 22
plight of the Guantanamo detainees.152
8B APPLICATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW TO DETAINEES IN GUANTANAMO BAY
So far as the prisoners are detained by the United States in the context of or
in relation to an armed conflict, they are subject to the legal framework set
out in international humanitarian law.153 The United States is bound by IHL
as a party to the armed conflict in Afghanistan, in respect of persons detained
in association with that conflict. In addition, it remains bound, in the context
150 Hamdan v. United States, supra note 138. The US appeals court quashed the conviction of
Osama bin Laden’s former driver, who served a five-and-a-half-year prison sentence for
‘material support for terrorism,’ which was unanimously found not to have been a war
crime under international law at the relevant time. See Chapter 4; Hamdan v. United States,
supra note 138.
151 The Obama administration identified 36 such detainees, three of whom have already pleaded
guilty. In 2010, Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi pleaded guilty to providing material
support for terrorism and conspiracy and was sentenced to 14 years’ confinement, reduced
to 2. He returned to his native Sudan on July 10, 2012. Omar Khadr pleaded guilty to
various war crimes charges and was sentenced to 40 years’ confinement, which pursuant
to a plea agreement was reduced to 8. In 2011, Noor Uthman Mohammed pleaded guilty
to conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism and was sentenced to 14 years’
confinement, reduced to 34 months. In February 2012, Majid Khan pleaded guilty to various
war crimes charges and been sentenced and seven convicted, several with plea agreements:
‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’, supra note 43, p. 13. By 2013, proceedings were pending
against Khalid Sheik Mohammed, his four alleged co-conspirators in the 9/11 attacks and
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged orchestrator of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole off
the coast of Yemen.
152 J. Margulies, et al., ‘Request for Immediate Commencement of Abu Zubaydah’s Military
Commission Proceedings’, 20 May 2012, copy available at: http://www.emptywheel.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Letter-to-Convening-Authority-May-10-2012.pdf.
153 Chapter 6, including para. 6A.1 on ‘Where and When IHL Applies’.
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of armed conflict, by international human rights law.154 To the extent that
at least some detainees are held, not because of engagement in an armed
conflict against the US but pursuant to a broader ‘war on terror’ which, as
discussed at Chapter 6, section B, does not constitute an armed conflict in any
legal sense, or if they are detained on suspicion of activities committed before
the conflict or unrelated to it, then IHL does not apply. In this case, the situation
is subject only to applicable rules of IHRL.
The plight of the Guantanamo detainees as highlighted by the facts above
raises myriad human rights concerns, foreshadowed in the law and practice
discussed in Chapter 7. Not least the torture and ill-treatment that is now
known to have occurred at Guantanamo violates the most basic inviolable
norms of the international legal order. A regime that applies only to non-
nationals without objective justification for such a distinction is inherently
discriminatory, in violation of the right to equality.155 The right to religious
freedom is plainly vitiated by some of the methods of treatment and interroga-
tion, with obvious question arising with regard to the right to health. The rights
to private and family life are eviscerated by decades of incommunicado de-
tention and the Guantanamo regime. The right to free expression is flouted
by an overreaching ban on communication that fails to carefully assess the
need for restrictions in the concrete situation. Short shift is made of the
essential right to a remedy, where individuals are denied access to a court
and released after years of acknowledged wrongful detention with no compen-
sation or even apology.
The Guantanamo scenario embodies a litany of violations of these and other
international norms discussed throughout this book. The focus of this chapter
is however on the procedural rights to detention and fair trial that would
normally be afforded to persons in detention, the denial of which have
characterised the Guantanamo anomaly and lead to its identification as a ‘legal
black hole’ characterisation.
8B.1 THE FRAMEWORK AND REACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
For present purposes, key provisions of IHL are those relative to the treatment
of persons detained during an international armed conflict, embodied in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in the First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions of 1977. The United States, like Afghanistan, is party to
154 Chapter 7A3.4 on interplay between the two regimes and 7B3 on difficult issues arising
in practice.
155 See, e.g., Chapter 7B.12 and the A &Ors case in UK courts, discussed in Chapter 11, where
detention of non-nationals only could not be justified and was held to be discriminatory.
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the four Geneva Conventions, which are therefore binding as treaty law.156
Treaties to which the United States is not party remain relevant so far as they
reflect customary law, and the bulk of the provisions of AP I are generally
recognised, by the United States and others, as so doing.157 Specifically,
Article 75 of AP I – an elaboration of the principles set forth in Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions, which have been described by the International
Court of Justice as ‘beyond doubt’ customary in nature,158 – has itself been
recognised as customary law in a report prepared for the US Chiefs of Staff.159
As described in Chapter 6, international humanitarian law does not apply
merely on the zone of battle, nor within a state’s own borders.160 In the con-
text of prisoners of war, the ICTY has noted that ‘with respect to prisoners of
war, the convention applies to combatants in the power of the enemy; it makes
no difference whether they are kept in the vicinity of hostilities’.161 The key
question is whether persons fall under the power or control of one of the
parties to the conflict – in this case whether the Guantanamo detainees are
under US control, which is clearly the case.162
Provided the detainees are held pursuant to an armed conflict, it does not
matter to the application of IHL whether such persons are held in the territory
of the United States, in Afghanistan, or elsewhere. The issues in dispute
regarding the territorial or sovereign status of Guantanamo Bay are therefore
irrelevant to IHL obligations.
156 The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by the US and by Afghanistan on 2 August
1955 and 26 September 1956, respectively.
157 The United States has not ratified AP I, but it signed it on 12 December 1977. On AP I as
customary law, see T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 67, suggesting that the US has accepted the
bulk of AP I as customary law. On the current administration’s acceptance of API as custom,
see ‘Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee Policy’, The White House, 7
March 2011, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-
sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy. The ICTY has noted that ‘it is not
controversial that major parts of both Protocols reflect customary law’. Prosecutor v. Kordic
and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Indictment, 2 March 1999, para. 30.
158 According to the International Court of Justice, Common Article 3 reflects customary
international law applicable in all situations of conflict. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, pp.
14 ff., para. 218.
159 Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, p. 65, refers to a study of IHL prepared for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff which states that Article 75 is one of the provisions of IHL that
is ‘already part of customary law.’ See also Remarks of M. J. Matheson (Deputy Legal
Adviser, US Department of State) at a panel on ‘The United States Position on the Relation
of Customary International Law to 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions’ at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference
on International Humanitarian Law, 2 (1987) Amer. Uni. J. of Int’l Law and Policy 415, 425-6.
160 Tadic, Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70.
161 Ibid., para. 68.
162 See ICRC Commentary to AP I, para. 2910.
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8B.2 THE FRAMEWORK AND REACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Although neglected in much of the official discourse, the United States is also
bound to observe both human rights treaties to which it is party163 and
customary international human rights law.164 As a State Party to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,165 this treaty provides the
clearest source of human rights obligations binding upon the United States,
which is bound also by for example the CAT166 and the American Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of Man.167 It has signed (but not ratified) the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights,168 thereby expressing its willingness to
act consistently with its provisions.169
States can derogate from certain treaty obligations, including under the
ICCPR, on the basis that they face a ‘public emergency threatening the life of
[the] nation’.170 However, the United States has not chosen to avail itself of
this procedure in respect of Guantanamo. In principle, the ICCPR therefore
remains binding in its entirety. In any event, permissible derogation is subject
to certain conditions, as explained in Chapter 7, of relevance to the Guanta-
namo detainees.171 First, even in case of a valid derogation, there can be no
suspension of the core ‘non-derogable’ human rights. Treaties explicitly include
freedom from torture or ill-treatment and retroactive application of criminal
law for example in the non-derogable group, while it has become well estab-
163 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976; UN Convention against Torture (CAT), adopted 10
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987.
164 See, e.g., ‘Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay’, Report of the Chairperson of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Ms Leila Zerrougui; the Special Rapporteur on
the independence of judges and lawyers, Mr Leandro Despouy; the Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred
Nowak; the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ms Asma Jahangir and
the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, Mr Paul Hunt, 15 February 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/
2006/120 (the ‘UN mandate-holders’ report’). But see, H. Koh, Speech at Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law, 25 March 2010, available at: http://www.state.
gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. Koh discusses detentions under the ‘law of 9/11’,
referring only to IHL and self-defence as relevant areas of law.
165 The ICCPR was ratified by the US on 8 September 1992.
166 The United States ratified the CAT on 21 October 1994.
167 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, adopted in 1948
by the Ninth International Conference of American States. It is also bound by the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
New York, 10 December 1984, 23 ILM 1027, but this is not developed, given the focus of
the chapter.
168 The United States signed the ACHR on 1 June 1977.
169 Article 18, VCLT 1969 provides that signatory states must not defeat the object and purpose
of the treaty.
170 See, e.g., Article 4 ICCPR; Article 27 ACHR and Article 15 ECHR.
171 Chapter 7A32, including Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31.
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lished that a core of fair trial rights, and procedural rights in detention, must
also be respected at all times.172 In short, most of the key rights at issue in
Guantanamo relate to rights that apply even in situations of emergency.
Additional requirements for derogation set out in Chapter 7 would also
have to be met, including that derogating measures be ‘strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation and proportionate to it.’173 Finally, measures
of derogation must not be contrary to other obligations,174 and they must
not be discriminatory. The latter is particularly germane in a context where
US citizens arrested under similar circumstances to the Guantanamo detainees
are not held on Guantanamo Bay, and are subject to a different legal regime
– that allows for prompt access to a court – and are specifically excluded from
being subject to trial by military commission contained in the Presidential
Order.175 In all of these circumstances, it is doubtful that the US could justify
the violations of the rights in question on the grounds of derogation.
In addition to its treaty obligations, the United States is also bound by
customary human rights law in respect of many of the rights in issue in
relation to Guantanamo Bay detainees. Moreover, certain of the norms
addressed, notably the prohibition of torture or ill treatment, or prolonged
arbitrary detention, are generally recognised as jus cogens norms of inter-
national law.176 No circumstances (and of course no derogation), could ever
justify violating rights and obligations that have attained this status.177
172 While an emergency will impact upon the rights to liberty and fair trial, it does not set
them aside; see e.g. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987, IACtHR, Series
A, No. 8 (1987), para. 27: ‘since not all ... rights and freedoms may be suspended even
temporarily, it is imperative that “the judicial guarantees essential for (their) protection”
remain in force.’ See also e.g. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998), para. 21: ‘... a State party may not depart from
the requirement of effective judicial review of detention..’ See Report of the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention (hereinafter ‘Arbitrary Detention Report’), 26 December 2011, A/
HRC/19/57, at 63(3); UN mandate-holders’ report supra note 164, para 14.
173 E.g., Article 4 ICCPR.
174 Derogating measures must also be consistent with other international obligations. See
General Comment No. 31, supra note 171.
175 See Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). See E. Lichtblau, ‘U.S., Bowing
to Court, to free “Enemy Combatant”’, The New York Times, 23 September 2004, available
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/politics/23hamdi.html. On the differential
treatment of other states nationals, see para. 8C.7, ‘The International Response to the
Guantanamo Detentions’, below.
176 See Chapter 7A53. Arbitrary detention is often qualified as a jus cogens rule, i.e. as a rule
belonging to that very restricted set of norms from which no derogation is ever admitted
under international law. See, e.g., Report WGAD, supra,para. 69. It is interesting to note
that the authoritative Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States among
the authorities that support the qualification of the prohibition of arbitrary detention as
a jus cogens rule.
177 The nature of the obligations varies in time of conflict: what amounts to arbitrary detention
in international law is different in armed conflict than in time of peace, as discussed below.
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While Guantanamo is in many ways an exceptional and unprecedented
flouting of international legality, it is in other ways not novel. The issues raised
– torture through interrogation, detention rights, fair trial rights and trial by
military commissions – are issues upon which international law is developed,
and which human rights courts and bodies have had to interpret and apply
in countless other cases arising in relation to terrorism since before 9/11 but
with greater regularity since then. There is therefore an ample body of law
from which to draw, supplemented by relevant non-binding international
instruments,178 that give more detailed expression and content to treaty
provisions and reflect customary law.
As regards the geographic scope of IHRL, as discussed in Chapter 7 human
rights obligations apply in respect of all persons in a state’s territory or subject
to its jurisdiction, which may extend beyond the borders of the state where
it exercises its authority or de facto control abroad.179 However the US official
position is to deny that human rights law applies, in part on grounds that
Guantanamo lies beyond its sovereign territory.180 Both the territory of
Guantanamo Bay, and its detainees, are within the exclusive de facto control
of the United States. In respect of any of the approaches to the standards under
IHRL set out in Chapter 7, whether on the basis of effective control of territory
on which individuals are present or control by US agents over the individuals
themselves, the Guantanamo detentions would meet the test whereby the US’
obligations apply. The location of the detention centres on land that may not
be United States ‘sovereign’ territory is therefore of no significance for IHRL.
Confirming this, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in
a request to the government of the United States to take certain ‘precautionary
measures’ to protect the detainees, noted that:
The determination of a state’s responsibility for violations of the international
human rights of a particular individual turns not on that individual’s nationality
or presence within a particular geographic area, but rather on whether, under the
specific circumstances, that person fell within the state’s authority and control.181
178 E.g. The Helsinki Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards, 1990, on core human
rights that must be preserved in every situation and at all times. GA Res. 43/173, ‘Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprison-
ment’, 9 December 1988, UN Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988).
179 The apprehension and detention of suspects plainly constitutes exercising such authority
abroad: see e.g. Reinette v. France (1989) 63 DR 189 and 7B2.1.
180 See US official position that these obligations do not apply to the Guantanamo detainees
in e.g. letter dated 31 January 2006, addressed to the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, ibid, Annex 2, 43-4.
181 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, 13 March 2002.
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8B.3 STATUS OF DETAINEES
The US authorities categorise the detainees, collectively, as enemy combatants:
The United States Government believes that individuals detained at Guantanamo
are enemy combatants, captured in connection with an on-going armed conflict.
They are held in that capacity under the control of US military authorities. Enemy
combatants pose a serious threat to the United States and its coalition partners.182
Although the term has been used since the beginning of detentions at Guanta-
namo Bay it was defined by the US Department of Defense in an order in July
2004:
An enemy combatant ... shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy
armed forces.183
As discussed in Chapter 6, as a matter of international law, this ‘enemy com-
batant’ classification does not, however, denote the legal status of prisoners.184
In armed conflict, the particular status of persons captured by a party to the
conflict, and the corresponding rights to which they are entitled, is determined
by IHL. Detainees are either wounded, sick or shipwrecked armed forces
(protected by the First or Second Geneva Conventions), prisoners of war
(protected by the Third Geneva Convention) or civilians (protected by the
Fourth Geneva Convention).
All persons subject to detention have some status under IHL. This general
principle is embodied in all four Geneva Conventions, described by the auth-
oritative ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention thus:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he
is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian
covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel
of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no inter-
mediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.185
182 Letter from the First Secretary at the US Embassy in London to solicitors acting for the
claimants in the Abbasi case, supra note 5, 2 July 2002, in Skeleton Argument of the Claim-
ants, para. 6, on file with author.
183 Combatant Status Review Tribunals Order of the Deputy Secretary of Defense of 7 July
2004, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
184 ‘Enemy combatants’ may cover privileged combatants, entitled to POW status, or other
fighters who have the legal status of civilians, as discussed below and in 6A.2.1.
185 ICRC Commentary to GC IV, p. 51.
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Moreover, as will be seen, residual provisions of IHL also ensure by way of
safeguard that any person not afforded greater protection – under provisions
applicable to the above categories of detainees – remains subject to basic
minimal protections under IHL.186
The detainees have been described, on many occasions, as ‘unlawful
combatants’. While this term is not an international legal one either, and does
not denote the status of persons under IHL as described above, it has some
legal significance which is better captured by the alternative term ‘unprivileged
combatant’. Under IHL,187 certain persons enjoy what is known as ‘com-
batant’s privilege’ which entitles them to engage in hostilities and protects
them from prosecution for the mere fact of participation. As opposed to these
‘legal’ combatants who enjoy immunity from prosecution for mere participation
in hostilities, other persons who take a direct part in hostilities may be crim-
inally prosecuted for doing so.188 Once captured, however, such persons
remain entitled to the protection of IHL as ‘civilians’, or at a minimum to the
above-mentioned residual protection under IHL, as discussed further below.
8B.3.1 Entitlement to POW status
Early on in the life of the Guantanamo camp, one of the questions that pro-
voked much controversy was whether detainees were entitled to POW status.
Under IHL, ‘combatant’s privilege’, mentioned above, entails three important
consequences.189 First, the privileged combatant is allowed to conduct hostil-
ities and as such cannot be prosecuted for bearing arms or attacking enemy
targets, unless the conduct amounts to a war crime.190 Second, he or she is
a legitimate target to the opposing forces. Third, in the event of capture, such
combatants are afforded POW status, and a range of rights that go beyond the
basic protections provided for in IHL or the core non-derogable IHRL rights.191
186 This may arise because they fail to satisfy the nationality requirements of GC IV. See para.
8B.3.2 on civilians, below.
187 See eg Chapter 6A2.1 and 6B1.
188 See ‘POWs‘, para. 8B.3.1, below. While IHL does not expressly prohibit persons from taking
part in hostilities, they do not have the ‘privilege’ of not being prosecuted for doing so.
189 The distinction between privileged and unprivileged combatants is reflected in the US
Supreme Court’s distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants in the decision ex
parte Quirin (1942) 317 US 1 at 30-1.See Chapter 6B.2.1 ‘enemy combatants’.
190 Privileged or lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war,
and can be prosecuted only for serious crimes such as war crimes or crimes against human-
ity, whereas unprivileged or unlawful combatants can, in addition, be subject to trial and
punishment ‘by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful’. Letter
from the US Embassy in London in Abbasi, supra note 5, n. 109.
191 These include the right to be ‘protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation
and against insults and public curiosity’ (Article 13 GC III), to ‘complete latitude in the
exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith’ (Article
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The group of persons entitled to combatant’s privilege, and in the event
of capture to prisoner of war status, is defined in GC III, Article 4(A). Prin-
cipally, these include members of the armed forces of another party, though
it also includes irregulars such as members of militia or volunteer corps that
fight alongside a party to the conflict, provided they satisfy four conditions:
being ‘commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed
distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; carrying arms openly; and con-
ducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.’
POW status is therefore automatically due to persons who fought in the
armed forces of a state – in this case as members of the Taleban armed forces.
The fact that the government was not the recognised representative of the State
is not relevant for present purposes, as the Taleban undoubtedly were the de
facto government and the de facto armed forces of the state of Afghanistan.192
Some of the individuals designated ‘enemy combatants’ by the US, which
includes the Taleban, may therefore be POWs.
However, although the US recognised that the Third Geneva Convention
could, in principle, apply to the members of the Taleban army,193 it justified
the continued denial of POW status across all detainees on the basis that ‘Tale-
ban combatants have not effectively distinguished themselves from the civilian
population of Afghanistan’ and that they are ‘allied’ with a terrorist group.194
However, these criteria, set forth by Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention,
apply to irregulars that fight alongside a party to the conflict and not to the
armed forces of a party to the conflict itself. The fact that armed forces may,
for example, have been ‘armed militants that oppressed and terrorized the
people of Afghanistan’, or that they did not conduct operations in accordance
with the laws of war does not affect their entitlement to POW status.
The position is different as regards other ‘irregulars’, including al-Qaeda
fighters, whose entitlement to POW status depends on their meeting the four-
34 GC III), and to be treated with due respect for rank and age, to be allowed to send and
receive communications, and to keep personal property and effects (Article 18 GC III).
192 No party to the conflict denies that the Taleban were the de facto government of Afghanistan
given that they controlled 90 per cent of the State’s territory prior to the conflict.
193 ‘Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Convention. Although the United States does not
recognize the Taliban as a legitimate Afghani government, the President determined that
the Taliban members are covered under the treaty because Afghanistan is a party to the
Convention’. See ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention’, 7 May 2003,
transcript available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-
18.html.
194 White House Press Secretary, after having recognised the potential applicability of GC III
to members of the Taleban, decided that Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status
as they failed to satisfy the ‘four conditions’ of Art 4 GCIII intended to determine the status
of irregulars fighting alongside a party. See also ‘Decision re application of the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taleban’, White
House, 25 January 2002, p. 3, available at: http://pegc.no-ip.info/archive/White_memo_
20020125.pdf. See ibid.
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part test in Article 4(A). With respect to those who were considered members
of al-Qaeda fighting alongside the Taleban, US authorities justify the decision
not to recognise them as POWs on the basis that, since ‘al Qaeda is an inter-
national terrorist group and cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva
Convention ... , its members ... are not covered by the Geneva Convention’.195
It is a question of fact, but must be seriously doubted, whether those detainees
who were considered members of al-Qaeda and not Taleban forces would meet
the four-part test, by being distinguishable from the civilian population, and
being capable of conducting military operations in accordance with IHL (as
distinct from the question whether they have committed violations).196 While
Taleban fighters would then appear to be entitled to POW status,197 other
detainees most probably would not. As noted further below, any doubt as
regards entitlement to POW status should be resolved by a competent tri-
bunal.198
8B.3.2 ‘Civilian’ detainees
If not treated as POWs, the detainees must be protected as civilians, ‘who, at
a given moment and in any given manner whatsoever, find themselves in case
of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict ... of which
they are not nationals’.199 Such persons are protected by the Fourth Geneva
Convention. Following the position adopted by the authoritative ICRC Com-
mentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention,200 the ICTY has noted:
195 Ibid.
196 It is insufficient for the detaining power to note that violations of the laws and customs
of war have occurred – an allegation routinely made by one side against the other in the
context of conflict.
197 See A. Neier, ‘The Military Tribunals on Trial’, New York Review of Books, at http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/15122. Neier argues that ‘[i]n Afghanistan, neither Taleban fighters
nor members of the Northern Alliance have worn uniforms. Therefore the requirement
of a “fixed distinctive sign” can’t be met literally; but since most of these combatants were
not attempting to disguise themselves as civilians pretending to be other than what they
were, the lack of uniforms should not prevent those captured in combat from being recog-
nised as prisoners of war.’
198 See Article 5(2) GC III on the independent tribunal that must be established in case of doubt.
See also ‘determining status’ below on the US refusal to concede that there was even any
‘doubt’ in this respect.
199 Article 4 GC IV.
200 See ICRC Commentary to GC IV, p. 51: ‘Every person in enemy hands must have some
status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the
Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of
the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There
is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.’
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there is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual
is not entitled to the protection of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war or
of the First or Second Convention, he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of
[the Fourth Convention], provided that its Article 4 requirements are satisfied.201
The question arises whether persons who have taken up arms and fought with
the opposing party in Afghanistan, as unprivileged or unlawful combatants,
should still be entitled to civilian status upon capture. Such persons certainly
lose their status as protected civilians for the purpose of conduct of hostilities
law and can legitimately be targeted for as long as they take up arms.202
However, once captured, they have ‘civilian’ status, and are entitled to the
protections afforded to that category of detainees. The ICRC Commentary thus
explicitly notes that resistance fighters, for example, who do not fall within
the GC III, Article 4 criteria required for POW status, are entitled to be treated
as civilians under GC IV.203 Other commentators likewise note that un-
privileged combatants are entitled to be treated as civilians upon capture, and
afforded the procedural and substantive protections of GC IV.204
Unlike POWs, who were privileged combatants entitled to fight, those who
took up arms without meeting the criteria for privileged combatant can be
prosecuted for their belligerent acts.205 They must, however, in this respect
as in others, be afforded the protections of GC IV which include due process
rights, discussed below. As the ICRC Commentary notes, the fact that persons
may be entitled to protection as civilians ‘does not mean that they cannot be
punished for their acts, but the trial and sentence must take place in accordance
with the provisions [on due process] of Article 64 and those that follow it.’206
While GC IV appears on its face to exclude ‘nationals’ of co-belligerent states
and neutral states,207 the ICTY Appeals Chamber has determined that, rather
than imposing a strict nationality test, GC IV should be understood to protect
persons ‘who do not have the nationality of the belligerent in whose hands
they find themselves’.208 To the extent that persons held at Guantanamo were
201 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 16 November 1998,
para. 271.
202 See Chapter 6A.2.1.2 ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’.
203 ICRC Commentary to GC IV, pp. 50 ff.
204 W.T. Mallison and S.V. Mallison, ‘The Juridical Status of Combatants Under the Geneva
Protocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts’, 42 (1978) Law and Contemporary Problems
4 at 5.
205 Some commentators refer to a duty to prosecute : see, e.g., L. Vierucci, ‘What judicial
treatment for the Guantanamo detainees’, 3 (2002) German Law Review, available at: http://
www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=190.
206 ICRC Commentary to GC IV, p. 50, and Article 126 GC IV.
207 Article 4 GC IV.
208 See also ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,
20 February 2001, para. 56, citing Tadic Appeal Judgment, para. 164, 73. Prosecutor v. Dusko
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999 (hereinafter ‘Tadic
Appeal Judgment’), para. 165: ‘already in 1949 the legal bond of nationality was not
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arrested for their allegiance, or perceived allegiance, to ‘enemy’ forces, and
are not US nationals, they fall into the group that GC IV was intended to protect.
8B.3.3 Persons not covered by GC III or GC IV
If any of the detainees are for any reason deemed excluded from both cat-
egories protected by GC III and GC IV,209 they are nonetheless protected by
customary IHL, binding on the United States. As noted, Common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the
Four Geneva Conventions, 1977 (AP I) are binding in this context as customary
law and provide a minimal level of protection for all persons falling into the
hands of a party to the conflict.210
Common Article 3, which protects persons taking no part in hostilities
(including persons who once did but who are hors de combat or have otherwise
laid down their arms), articulates the core principles that are elaborated upon
throughout the Geneva Conventions, and as such has been described as a
‘convention in miniature’.211 It provides a ‘compulsory minimum’212 and
has been referred to by the Appeals Chamber of ICTY as the ‘quintessence of
the humanitarian rules found in the Geneva Conventions as a whole’.213 It
guarantees humane treatment, but also protects against, inter alia, ‘the carrying
out of sentences without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as
indispensable by civilised peoples’.
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, entitled ‘Fundamental Guarantees’,
applies to persons ‘who do not benefit from any greater protections’. It is
applicable to persons ‘who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons
related to the armed conflict ... until their final release, repatriation or re-
establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict’.214 As the authoritat-
ive ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I notes: ‘there can be no doubt
that Article 75 represents a minimum standard which does not allow for any
regarded as crucial ... the lack of allegiance to a State ... was regarded as more important
than the formal link of nationality’. The tribunal’s caution – that ‘an approach, hinging
on substantial relations more than on formal bonds, becomes all the more important in
present-day international armed conflicts’ (ibid., para. 166) – has resonance in this context.
209 If, e.g., the nationality/allegiance requirements of GC IV were considered not met, an
individual unprivileged combatant may be deemed not to fall under either GC III or GC
IV. See, however, ‘Civilian Detainees’ above.
210 On the customary character of Common article 3 and some of the provisions of AP I, see
above.
211 See, e.g., ICRC Commentary to CG IV, Commentary to Common Article 3, p. 48.
212 The ICRC refers to it as a minimum and an ‘invitation to exceed the minimum’. Ibid., p. 52.
213 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 143.
214 See Article 75(1) and (6), reinforced by Article 45 AP I.
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exceptions’.215 Article 75 includes a number of safeguards specifically directed
towards ensuring that detention is governed by a framework of legality, and
maintaining basic due process rights, as discussed below in relation specific
rights. This provision represents the most basic level of protection under IHL
due to any human being detained for any reason related to the conflict.
8B.3.4 Determining Detainees ‘Status’ and Implications?
As discussed above, determining the status of the detainees is a process upon
which the application of the correct framework of legal protection of rights
depends. Status determinations are legal questions to be determined according
to the rules of international law. Contrary to the approach manifest in relation
to Guantanamo detainees, the decision to afford particular status to prisoners
is not itself a matter for executive, or military, discretion: there can, of course,
be no discretion to go beyond or discard the law.216
These determinations of status (and closely related to it, the lawfulness
of detention addressed below) must be made on an individual case-by-case
basis. As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights emphasised, in
a letter to the United States government concerning the Guantanamo detainees:
the importance of ensuring the availability of effective and fair mechanisms for deter-
mining the status of individuals falling under the authority and control of a state,
as it is upon the determination of this status that the rights and protections under
domestic and international law to which those persons may be entitled depend.
The Commission therefore requested that the United States “take the urgent
measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay determined by a competent Tribunal.”
The requirement of ‘fair and effective mechanisms’ to determine funda-
mental questions that affect individual rights is reflected throughout human
rights law,217 and manifest in IHL.218 Of particular note in the Guantanamo
context is Article 5 GC III, which provides that in case of doubt as to whether
detainees might be entitled to be treated as POWs, the matter must be deter-
215 ICRC Commentary on AP I, para. 3032 (emphasis added).
216 See above for a statement by the US President that ‘to the extent appropriate and consistent
with military necessity’ the detainees would be treated ‘in a manner consistent with the
principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’. Letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate, 20 September 2002.
217 The Commission referred to ‘numerous international instruments, including Article XVIII
of the American Declaration’ by which the United States is bound. See judicial oversight,
below.
218 See e.g. Art 5GCIII, and Arts 46 and 78 GC IV.
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mined by a ‘competent tribunal’. This customary principle of international
law219 has been long recognised by United States officials,220 as well as in
United States military regulations221 and practice.222 Yet the US position
was to deny that there was any ‘doubt’ as to the status of detainees or the
question whether any of them have been wrongfully denied POW status.
Somewhat paradoxically, it supported this proposition on the basis that ‘the
President’s determination that Taleban detainees do not qualify as POWs is
conclusive ... and removes any doubt that would trigger the application of
the Convention’s tribunal requirement’.223 As with any legal standard, the
existence of doubt must be assessed with a degree of objectivity and not
according to the exclusive determination of the potentially affected power.224
The widespread debate and speculation around status,225 and conflicting
views even from within the US administration itself as to POW entitlement,
leaves little doubt about one thing and that it that there was, indeed, ‘doubt’
as to the correct status of certain detainees, which should have been resolved
by a ‘tribunal’ in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention.226
While Article 5 relates only to determinations regarding prisoner of war
status, it may be seen, not as a provision in a vacuum, but as a manifestation
of a general principle that fair mechanisms are essential if the rights contained
219 Most of the provisions of GC III are considered to be reflective of customary international
law. See ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, paras. 79, 82. See also R. Baxter, ‘Multi-
lateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’, 41 (1965-66) BYIL 275, at p.
286.
220 Matheson, ‘United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law’, supra
note 159, p. 1.
221 Joint Service Regulation on Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees
and Other Detainees (1 October 1997), Chapters 1-6 (a) and (b), in Department of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps, Washington DC (1997) at p. 2.
222 See Directive Number 20-5 of 15 March 1968, ‘Inspections and Investigations – Prisoners
of War – Determination of Eligibility’, in C. Bevans (Assistant Legal Adviser, Department
of State) and Sibler J (Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense), Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 62 (1968) AJIL 754 at 768.
223 Argument of the United States government before the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
(Case 03-6696), Supreme Court Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, 28 June 2004, referred to in the partially dissenting opinion of Souter J and
Ginsburg J p. 12.
224 The official US view that the question of status is not susceptible to external oversight, is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of the idea that matters which are essentially
‘military’ are therefore beyond supervision: ‘the allowable limits of military discretion and
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case are judicial questions’. Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, supra note 175, at 28.
225 The Inter-American Commission has referred to ‘well-known ... doubts ... as to the legal
status of the detainees’ in its Request for Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
addressed to the Government of the United States of America on 13 March 2002.
226 IHL is not prescriptive as to the precise process to be followed in determining status. A
‘tribunal’ implies impartial determination and unilateral executive or military determination
of status is insufficient. ICRC Commentary on AP I, Part III, Section II: Combatant and
prisoner-of-war status, paras. 1745-6.
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in IHL are to be given meaningful practical effect.227 Indeed, the request from
the Inter-American Commission suggested that objective mechanisms should
be invoked where any dispute as to status arises.228 The Guantanamo ex-
perience may illustrate the need to clarify when such tribunals for resolving
doubt should be established and how to make them effective.
By contrast, the military review mechanisms outlined above, which allow
individuals limited opportunity to challenge whether they fall within the
‘enemy combatant’ category, have never been mechanisms to determine their
correct status under international law. As a result of the amorphous scope
of the enemy combatant label, covering a range of persons, some entitled to
POW status and others civilians, including some who may have committed
crimes for which they should lawfully be detained and prosecuted, these
processes are of little legal significance.
The determination of status is important, not least as it is linked to the
legal basis for detention and applicable law with significant consequences for
detainees.229 However, as the foregoing demonstrates, basic rights relating
to detention and fair trial apply to the Guantanamo detainees whether they
are to be considered POWs, civilians or unlawful combatants not entitled to
any greater protection under IHL. POW status, while undoubtedly significant
in terms of the added protections that GC III affords to individuals, is not
therefore essential to the protection of the basic rights in question, such as
the right to know the reasons for one’s arrest, to access counsel at an early
stage of detention, to have recourse to judicial oversight of the detention and
ultimately the right to a fair trial. In some ways, it is perhaps surprising then
that the debate on affording POW status to the majority of the detainees was
considered so significant, and from a US administration point of view so
potentially problematic in light of the broader objectives of the war against
terror.
This emphasis may have been influenced by fears as to the denial of POW
status and enhanced vulnerability of US armed forces abroad. Another appeared
to be the desire to preserve ‘interrogation’ rights in light of special rules of
227 See Articles 43 and 78 GC IV (the latter applying to detentions during occupation): decisions
to detain civilians for imperative security reasons must be ‘made according to a regular
procedure’. Such procedure ‘shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned’
and ‘Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay.’
228 The right to be heard by a competent impartial tribunal where one’s rights are at stake
is part of international human rights law. See Article 14, ICCPR, Article 8 American Declara-
tion on the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 8 American Convention on Human Rights
and Article 6 ECHR.
229 Notably, if denied POW status they may be prosecuted for mere participation as opposed
to only for crimes under international law. They also lose their entitlement to the enhanced
rights protections due to POWs under GC III which in some respects go beyond those
guaranteed by IHRL.
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interrogation under GCIII.230 However, there is no prohibition on questioning
POWs per se or seeking to secure information from them; the prohibition is on
coercing a response, prohibited under IHL and IHRL for all detainees. The rules
on repatriation were also discussed as potentially relevant and limiting to the
US.231 Article 118 of GC III provides that ‘POWs shall be released and re-
patriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities,’ though this
does not apply to persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offence.232
As one commentator noted: ‘if the captives are POWs, they must eventually
be returned ... the Taleban fighters may be too dangerous ever to be released
... which ... commits the US to detaining them indefinitely’.233 Concern about
affording POW status may thus have revealed an insidious assumption that
if GC III does not apply there is no legal framework to limit the power to detain
indefinitely. Whether or not GC III applies, at a certain point hostilities, and
any conflict that is a real conflict, will cease and reasons ‘related to the conflict’
that may justify detention under IHL, will also cease to exist.
In conclusion, the POW debate was in some ways a distraction. Considered
through a legal lens, most detainees were probably not POWs, but they were
nonetheless entitled to protections under IHL and IHRL. The denial of POW status
was a first step towards a selective approach that invoked a war paradigm
to displace human rights protections, without accepting the IHL protections
that follow. It formed part of a process of putting the detainees beyond the
protection of the law and the treatment of them beyond its restraint. The failure
to think of the detainees as either criminal suspects or POWs has been described
by someone involved in prisoner abuse as a significant step to the way captors
saw, and ultimately treated, their captives.234
230 According to GC III, POWs need only provide their name, date of birth, rank and serial
number, and no ‘form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatsoever’. Article 17.
231 The English Court of Appeal in the Abbasi cases described this assumption as follows:
‘Furthermore, whereas in a conventional war prisoners of war have to be released at the
end of hostilities, there is the possibility that, by denying the detainees captured during
the war against terrorism the status of prisoners of war, their detention may be indefinite.’
Abbasi, supra note 5.
232 Article 119 provides an explicit exception to the duty to repatriate in these circumstances
where proceedings are pending, or where the detainee has been convicted and is serving
a sentence.
233 M. Dorf, ‘What is an “unlawful” combatant and why does it matter?’, FindLaw Forum,
23 January 2002, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/columns/fl.dorf.
combatants.01.23. See also J. Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to De-
tention and the Use of Force’ (hereinafter ‘Conflict Classification’), ICRC, in E. Wilmshurst
(ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press, 2012).
234 Quoted in Brody, ‘The Road to Abu Ghraib’, supra note 55.
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8B.4 SPECIFIC RIGHTS OF DETAINEES UNDER IHL AND IHRL
The following section explores particular rights in relation to detention and
fair trial owed to the detainees under applicable IHL and IHRL. It will consider
the rights that correspond to particular categories of prisoners under IHL, as
well as the minimal rules of IHL applicable to all prisoners held in relation
to the conflict and IHRL applicable to all prisoners, and the extent to which
these rights have been respected in relation to the Guantanamo detainees.
8B.4.1 Existence of a lawful basis for detention
In accordance with the rule of law, the liberty of individuals cannot be
restricted other than on grounds – and in accordance with procedure – pro-
vided for in clear and accessible law. This ‘principle of legality’ is explicitly
provided for in applicable human rights law,235 but it is a fundamental prin-
ciple that underpins any system of law, national or international.
This principle of legality applies no less in time of armed conflict than in
time of peace, although the legal justifications for detention differ. During
conflict, IHL permits, for example, the detention of combatants to preclude
further participation in hostilities and, in extreme circumstances, the detention
of civilians where imperative reasons of security so demand.236 In time of
conflict, the prohibition on ‘arbitrary detention’ in human rights must be
understood by reference to these permissible grounds of detention in IHL.237
Outside armed conflict where IIHRL is the primary source of applicable238
law, treaties do not generally specify permissible grounds for detention (with
the exception of the ECtHR239), but instead they prohibit ‘arbitrary de-
tention.’240 It is clear that arbitrariness connotes substantive as well as pro-
235 See, e.g., Article 9(1) ICCPR. ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law’. See also Article V,
ADRDM.
236 Although these treaty provisions apply to IACs, the ICRC has suggested that the imperative
reasons of security should provide a baseline standard for any detention in any type of
conflict. Moreover, Additional Protocol II explicitly mentions internment. It is generally
considered that a power to detain fighting forces and where reasons of security so require,
even for NIAC. See ICRC institutional position, set out in J. Pejić, ‘Procedural Principles
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87(858) International Review of the Red Cross 375, and Pejic,
‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 233.
237 See Chapter 6B2.4 on war of detentions and 7B3 on the interplay of IHRL and IHL..
238 Preventive detention is permissible under IHRL only exceptionally and for a limited
duration, and where safeguards such as judicial oversight are respected. See Chapter 7A5.3.
See also UN mandate-holders’ report, supra note 164.
239 Under Art. 5 ECtHR, grounds for detention are set out, which include for example the
commission of crime, deportation, education of a minor, and public health reasons, but
notably not ‘administrative’ or so-called ‘security’ detention or ‘intelligence gathering’.
240 Art. 9 ICCPR, like the ACHR, refers instead to ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of liberty.
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cedural elements, and not just any ‘ground’ enshrined in domestic law will
justify detention. It is well established that in time of conflict or of peace,
detentions may be justified where persons have committed a crime for which
they may be punished,241 exceptionally upon reasonable and specific sus-
picion that the individual involved has committed an offence,242 and on
certain other grounds such as with a view to deportation, of less immediate
relevance to the present situation.243
Less clarity and more controversy attend the permissibility of ‘security,’
‘preventive’ or ‘administrative’ detention, as alleged in relation to the Guanta-
namo detainees.244 The Working Group on Arbitrary detention for example,
in the context of detention by the US on the war on terror, has held that such
detention cannot be justified, absent a derogation under article 9.245 Other
bodies, while not specifically endorsing its lawfulness, seem to implicitly accept
that in certain circumstances such administrative or security detention does
happen, and focus on clarifying the requirements that it be exceptional, legally
clear and subject to strict safeguards.246 While differences of approach appear
to surround the question whether preventative detention can ever be justified,
what is clearer is that if it is permissible this is only in exceptional circum-
stances and subject to stringent safeguards, and could certainly never be
justified in the long term still less indefinitely.247 As regards the requisite
241 As noted above, unprivileged combatants can be prosecuted for involvement in hostilities
whereas privileged combatants can be prosecuted only for war crimes.
242 ‘The “reasonableness” of the suspicion ... presupposes the existence of facts or information
which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed
the offence... [T]he exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the
notion of “reasonableness” to the point where the essence of the safeguard ... is impaired.’
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/8),
Judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A, No. 182, para. 32.
243 See, e.g., detention pending deportation made explicit in Art. 5 ECHR and implicit in e.g.
the prohibition on arbitrary detention in Art. 9 of the ICCPR. Transfer must however be
in process and reasonably imminent to justify detention; where deportation is precluded
or ruled out (see, e.g. 82.4 above in relation to those subject to the moratorium), such
persons cannot be held indefinitely on the basis of possible future transfer.
244 Some assert that there is no such right, others that it is limited. The ECHR itemized grounds
for detention do not include ‘administrative’ or ‘security’ detention, and any such detention
would at a minimum require derogation. See N. S. Rodley, ‘Detention as a Response to
Terrorism’, in Salinas de Frias, White and Samuel (eds.), Counter-terrorism: International
Law and Practoce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
245 See ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights, including the right to development’, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
2 March 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/30/Add.1, para. 33. This is in line with the ECHR
approach. For a parallel case under the ECHR, see A & Ors Derogation, (2009) 49 EHRR
29, discussed in Chapter 11.
246 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations USA, (2006) para 17(c), HR Council,
Res 6/4 ‘Arbitrary Detention’ (28 Sept 2007) UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/6/4 para 5 (e); See
discussion in Rodley, supra note 244, p. 472-75.
247 Ibid.
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safeguards, the Human Rights Committee has noted: ‘if so-called preventive
detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be controlled by these
same provisions [of Article 9, ICCPR], i.e., it must not be arbitrary, and must
be based on grounds and procedures established by law (para. 1), information
of the reasons must be given (para. 2), and court control of the detention must
be available (para. 4)’.248
There must therefore be a lawful basis for detention, whether found in
IHL or consistent with the framework set down in IHRL, and this must be
determined in relation to each individual at the outset of detention and on
an on-going basis. If at any point in the course of detention there is no clear
legal basis for the detention of any individual,249 then that detention is not
governed by the principle of legality and is arbitrary. If persons have been
detained en masse, absent individual assessments as to the existence of a lawful
basis of detention as discussed below, this detention is necessarily arbitrary.
The US position has long been based on the status of the individuals as
dangerous ‘enemy combatants,’ though as noted above this is not a legal
classification established in international law. It has been asserted that: ‘The
law of war allows the United States – and any other country engaged in
combat – to hold enemy combatants without charges or access to counsel for
the duration of hostilities.250 While it was suggested at an early stage that
most were detainees from the Afghan conflict, other accounts (including former
Pakistani President Musharref’s memoirs), indicate that many were detained
in Pakistan,251 and it is known that others were detained much further afield
and with less plausible connections to the Afghan conflict.252 Moreover, as
noted above, more than 90% of the detainees are not, on the government’s
own view, opposition ‘fighters’ at all. IHL may provide basis for some of the
248 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8: Right to liberty and security of the
person (Article 9) [1982], UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) at 130, para. 4.
249 As noted in Chapter 6B.2.4, if persons are detained pursuant to an international armed
conflict and that conflict then ceases, or becomes a non-international conflict, the original
lawful basis for detention may no longer exist. Persons must be released unless there is
another lawful basis for continued detention.
250 See, e.g., ‘Response of the United States of America dated 21 October 2005 to Inquiry of
the UNHCR; Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania and Poland brief, Chapter 10: the US continues to
assert the right to detain on broad unspecified law of war grounds. See above on the 48
detainees were identified for long term detention. Special Rapporteurs dated 8 August 2005,
Pertaining to Detainees at Guantánamo Bay’, p. 3, available at: http://www.asil.org/pdfs/
ilib0603211.pdf.
251 See accounts by Rumsfeld and Musharaf, In the Line of Fire, in Stafford Smith, Federal Courts
Reject Virtually All Habeas Petitions from Gitmo: Study, 14 May 2012. http://www.reprieve.
org.uk/blog/2012_05_14_federal_courts_reject_hc_petitions_gtmo/.
252 Eg Boumediene and Others, Algerians detained in Bosnia. See Chapter 10 – many of the
rendition victims picked up around the globe ended up in Guantanamo at some point on
their journeys.
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battlefield detainees but the generic and broad reaching ‘war on terror’ makes
this more difficult to assess.253
Various explanations have been provided by the US authorities at various
stages, justifying continued detention by reference to perceived threats,254
or as in the task force review published in 2010, explaining that certain cat-
egories of individuals could not be transferred and could not be pro-
secuted.255 But none of these reasons constitute a legal basis for detention.
The determination that some of the detainees are still considered ‘dangerous’
provides a controversial basis per se for lawful detention, and one that likely
depends on derogation, and which is certainly subject to the stringent requires
of temporariness and procedural safeguards (below). While it could on one
view have provided justification for some detentions around the time of 9/11,
it is highly questionable to what extent the case for such preventative detention
can be said to be necessary now.256 Other justifications advanced at earlier
stages, for example the CSRT’s findings that ‘factors’ such as intelligence value
might justify detention, lay still less claim to legitimacy and have no support
under either IHL or IHRL. Despite the flexibility afforded under the ICCPR,
possible preventive effect, the potential utility in solving other crimes, or other
(unspecified) factors, cannot be reconciled with the constraints of the inter-
national legal framework highlighted above, including its emphasis on clear
grounds for detention prescribed in law.
Finally, it is trite to note that once individuals are cleared for release
following applicable national procedures, on the basis that none of the bases
in national law apply, they must be released. The continued detention of many
detainees months and years after their release has been ordered or authorised
may well amount to arbitrary detention.
There would appear to have been a lawful basis for detaining at least some
of the Guantanamo prisoners on the bases set out above, for example as regular
combatants (Taleban) detained during a real armed conflict in Afghanistan
(as opposed to the metaphorical ‘war on terror’), as unlawful combatants
charged with unlawful conduct of hostilities, or as persons detained on reason-
able suspicion of having committed a crime, properly understood as such
according to criminal law applicable at the relevant time, including war crimes
or crimes against humanity. However, the lack of clarity as to the law pursuant
to which they are held and its application to any individual, coupled with
253 The IHL justification does not last forever. See ‘Repatriation’, below.
254 See the PRB process discussed above, and previously the broader justifications under the
‘Administrative Review Implementation Directive Issued’, DoD News Release, 15 September
2004 which included intelligence value.
255 As noted above the reasons were various – ranging from lack of evidence to inadmissibility
of evidence (which would appear to relate in some cases to the incidence of torture in the
past).
256 The onus is on the state detaining on such exceptional grounds to show that each particular
detention is strictly necessary and proportionate.
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the lack of procedural oversight (discussed below), is an anathema to the
fundamental principle that detention can be justified only when pursuant to
clear and accessible law.
8B.4.2 Information on reasons for arrest and detention
It follows from the requirement that there be clear reasons for an arrest,
provided in law, and from the duty to determine the prisoners’ status, that
information concerning these matters should be conveyed to the prisoners
themselves. Only once this has happened can they assert the precise rights
that correspond to them under international law. The right to such information
is enshrined as one of the minimal standards of protection due to persons in
the hands of the enemy under IHL and in human rights law.257
Article 75(3) of AP I provides that:
Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict
shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these
measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences,
such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event
as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have
ceased to exist.258
The right to be informed promptly of the reasons for detention under IHL thus
applies to persons detained for any reason related to the conflict.
There is no precise time frame associated with the requirement of ‘prompt-
ness’, as account must be taken of all the circumstances including (for as long
as relevant) military considerations arising out of the detention of persons in
the zone of battle.259 However, as the ICRC Commentary to the Additional
Protocol itself makes clear, ‘even in time of armed conflict, detaining a person
for longer than, say, ten days, without informing the detainee of the reasons
for his detention would be contrary to this paragraph’ (Article 75(3)).
Under IHRL also, all detainees must be informed promptly of the reasons
for their arrest and detention, as set forth in Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.260The
257 Article 9(2) ICCPR.
258 Emphasis added.
259 This requirement should be interpreted in the light of human rights law; see the flexibility
afforded and limits to it in e.g. Medvedyev &Ors v France 2010, at 7B3 and below.
260 As with the IHL protection in Article 75(3), this applies to all detainees, not only those
held pursuant to the suspected commission of a criminal offence. The Human Rights
Committee has noted that ‘if so-called preventive detention is used ... information of the
reasons must be given’. Article 75(3), para. 2. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment
No. 8: Right to liberty and security of the person (Article 9) [1982], UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.6 (2003) at 130, para. 4. The Paris Standards, for example, include the right to know
the reasons for the detention within seven days as a ‘minimum right’ of the detainee. The
UN Body of Principles similarly includes this right, as one guaranteed to persons under
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detainees therefore have a right to be informed of the reasons for their arrest
under the minimum rules of IHL protection applicable to all persons and under
human rights law.
In Guantanamo, neither individual detainees nor their families were
informed of the reasons for their detention, beyond a general statement con-
cerning enemy combatants and dangers to the national security of the United
States or its allies. The US justified this approach on grounds of security, and
enquiries seeking information were met with abrupt responses to this effect.261
Although the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were thought to be a promis-
ing step at least in this respect, as they were described by the Department of
Defense as providing the detainee with ‘an opportunity to review unclassified
information relating to the basis for his detention’, in fact the information
provided was so cursory and conclusory (e.g. that detention was ‘based on
the US Authorisation for the Use of Military Force and informed by the laws
of war’262) as to be meaningless.263 Likewise, the Task Force review that
has identified a group of 48 detainees for continuing detention does not
indicate to the individuals into which category they fall. The failure to provide
basic information as to the legal basis and reasons for detention is another
manifestation of the disregard for the obligations to provide prompt, timely
and adequate information concerning reasons for detention.
8B.4.3 Judicial oversight of detention
IHRL enshrines the rights to be brought promptly before a court upon arrest
and to challenge the lawfulness of arrest and continued detention. Under that
body of law, judicial review of all forms of detention by a judicial body is
guaranteed as a fundamental right in itself, and as a safeguard against violation
of other rights. The Human Rights Committee has noted accordingly that
procedural protections including ‘judicial guarantees’264 and the right to ‘a
any form of detention (Principle 10). See also UN mandate-holders’ report, supra note 164.
261 See, e.g., the letter from the United States Embassy in London to solicitors acting for Abbasi,
supra note 31.
262 See Respondent’s Memo Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
memo-re-det-auth.pdf. Annex 4: Husayn v. Gates, Case no. 1:08-cv-1360, Factual Return for
Abu Zubaydah (ISN 10016) (29 July 2009), pp. 1-2. ‘As described below, and based on the
materials submitted with this Factual Return, Abu Zubaydah [eight lines redacted] Conse-
quently, for these and other reasons, Zubaydah is lawfully subject to detention pursuant
to the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force and the laws of war.’
263 For example, indications were that the detainee is held pursuant to ‘laws of war detention’.
264 General Comment No. 29, paras. 11, 13 and 15.
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remedy’ in respect of violations,265 remain effective notwithstanding serious
security concerns or the existence of a national emergency.266
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is instructive
in this respect, given its experience in considering the compatibility of counter-
terrorist measures with fundamental human rights standards under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (which for present purposes is substantive-
ly the same as the ICCPR).267 With regard to promptness of judicial super-
vision, for example, the European Court of Human Rights has shown some
flexibility in allowing longer lapses of time in extreme security situations than
would otherwise be permissible. In this respect battlefield logistics and the
need to transfer detainees from one location to another268 may be compelling
factors contributing to delay immediately following arrest, but presumably
not to the on-going denial of judicial supervision several thousand miles away
and several years later.
The flexibility of the human rights framework is subject to limits and
premised on the satisfaction of certain conditions. First, the state has to demon-
strate valid reasons as to why it cannot ‘process’ suspects any earlier. Second,
the permissibility of extended periods without judicial oversight a) depends
on the existence of other attendant safeguards absent in the present case, and
b) has never been deemed permissible for such prolonged (still less indefinite)
periods of detention as are involved in the present situation.269 There is no
precise formula for the length of time as all the circumstances must be taken
into account, but the question is usually whether hours or days constitute an
acceptable period within which detainees must be brought before a judge.270
265 Article 2(3) ICCPR.
266 UNHRC General Comment No. 29, para. 14; UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Dliberation 9 on arbitrary detention under customary law, A/HRC/22/44, 24 December
2012, para. 47; Advisory Opinion on Judicial Guarantees in Situations of Emergency, IACtHR..
267 On several occasions it has acknowledged that ‘the investigation of terrorist offences
undoubtedly presents the authorities with special problems,’ and as noted below affords
some flexibility in this respect. Aksoy v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment of 18
December 1996, ECtHR, Reports 1996-VI, para. 78.
268 In Koster v. The Netherlands (Appl. No. 12843/87), Judgment of 28 November 1991, ECtHR,
Series A, No. 221, in light of the claim that military maneuvers prevented the detainee from
being brought before a military court, the Court noted that some allowance should be made
for the military context; however in the circumstances of that case five days was rejected
as the military court could in fact have sat sooner, if necessary on Saturday or Sunday (para.
25). See also J. McBride, ‘Study on the principles governing the application of the ECHR
during armed conflicts and internal disturbances and tensions’, Council of Europe, Steering
Committee for Human Rights CDDH), Committee of Experts for the Development of Human Rights
(DH-DEV), DH-DEV (2003)001, para. 45; Medvedyev v France, 2010.
269 See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996,
ECtHR, Reports 1996-V, paras. 131, 132.
270 Twelve to fourteen days and for 4 days and 6 hours have been deemed excessive. Aksoy
v. Turkey, supra note 267, para. 78. See also Sakik and Others v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 23878/94-
23883/94, Judgment of 26 November 1997, ECtHR, Reports 1997-VIII; Brogan v. United
Kingdom, Appl. No. 11209/84, Judgment of 29 November 1988, ECtHR, Series A, No. 145.
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Where states have derogated, and afforded other safeguards (including the
essential right to access counsel, discussed below),271 flexibility for a week
has been permitted for example, but in another case terrorism concerns have
been found not to justify holding individuals for 20 days without judicial inter-
vention.272
With regard to the right to challenge the lawfulness of arrest, or the right
of habeas corpus, as noted above human rights jurisprudence from national
and international courts and bodies confirms straightforwardly that this is
a fundamental right that must be respected at all times. The English Court
of Appeals noted in relation to the Guantanamo detainees, ‘the recognition
of this basic protection in both English and American law long pre-dates the
adoption of the same principle as a fundamental part of international human
rights law’.273 The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that ‘the prin-
ciples of legality and the rule of law require that ... in order to protect non-
derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the
court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention must not be
diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant’.274
As the Committee noted, it is precisely in exceptional emergency situations
that judicial supervision assumes greatest importance.275 The Inter-American
Court on Human Rights has recognised that habeas corpus is one of ‘the judicial
guarantees essential for the protection of [non-derogable] rights’, and as such
is itself non-derogable.276
Prompted in part by the war on terror, and in particular by Guantanamo
as the flagship of arbitrary detention, the nature of the procedural rights of
detainees have been underscored and clarified through standards setting and
judicial practice.277 This includes in relation to the judicial oversight of de-
tention specifically, and the requirements of promptness, effectiveness and
In one case seven days was found permissible. Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom,
Appl. Nos. 14553/89; 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, ECtHR, Series A, No. 258, but
there was a valid derogation in force. In Medvedyev v France 2010, the “wholly exceptional
circumstances” and ‘inevitability’ of the delay in bringing persons detained on the high
seas before a court meant that a 13 day delay before judicial supervision was not unreason-
able (para 105).
271 Brannigan, supra note 270.
272 Case of Sarikaya v. Turkey, Appl. No. 36115/97, 22 April 2004. Case of Yurttas v. Turkey, Appl.
Nos. 25143/94 and 27098/95, 27 May 2004.
273 Abbasi, supra note 7, para. 63.
274 General Comment No. 29, para. 16.
275 General Comment No. 29, above, note 70, para. 12. See Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention supra.
276 IACtHR, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, paras. 35-6. Report of the WGAD, ibid.,
at 63(3)(h).
277 See e.g., Deliberation No. 9 concerning the definition and scope of arbitrary deprivation of liberty
under customary international law (Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/
22/44 (24 December 2012). The jurisprudence of all human rights bodies has addressed these
issues in the terrorism context; see e.g. Chapter 11.
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accessibility.278 The fact that IHL also recognises the principle of independent
oversight of essential questions concerning rights protection in conflict was
discussed above, in the context of the right to have one’s status determined
by a competent tribunal and review of administrative detention.279 IHL does
not provide a right to access judicial review of lawfulness of detention, and
so long as the individual is detained pursuant to an international armed
conflict this right does not automatically arise. In non-international conflicts,
the legal situation is controversial as discussed in Chapter 7.280 On one view,
the right to habeas corpus under IHRL continues to apply in such circumstances,
where there is no overriding rule of IHL.281 The ICRC has suggested that, at
a minimum, review must be independent and effective in practice.282 It is
submitted that while genuine exigencies of conflict require a flexible approach
to judicial review of detention, this must be limited, and persons should be
subjected to judicial review when they are removed physically and temporally
from the zone of conflict and it is possible to afford judicial oversight. In any
event for the vast majority whose detention was not, or is no more, pursuant
to a genuine armed conflict this right to habeas corpus clearly applies.
Where there is a right to challenge, the right must be rendered effective
in practice, by adequate access by the detainee to information and evidence
against him and legal support. The Guantanamo detainees were for many years
expressly denied the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. The Pres-
idential Military Order authorising their detention specifically excluded the
right to judicial challenge, declaring that ‘the individual shall not be privileged
to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal’.283 With the seminal Boume-
diene case in 2008, referred to above, the US Supreme Court judgment provided
278 Ibid., at para. 63(3).
279 See Article 5 GC III and Articles 42 and 78 GC IV. While the ‘regular procedure’ for handling
decisions on administrative detention involves a right to be heard, this is not necessarily
by a judicial body. However the duty of periodic review and the right to appeal must be
to a court or independent administrative body; see Gasser, ‘Protection of the Civilian
Population’, p. 289.
280 See Chapter 7B3.
281 Ibid on the difficult issues regarding inter-relationship that arise.
282 Pejic, describing the ICRC position, states that ‘mounting an effective challenge will pre-
suppose the fulfilment of several procedural and practical steps, including: i) providing
internees with sufficient evidence supporting the allegations against them, ii) ensuring that
procedures are in place to enable internees to seek and obtain additional evidence, and
iii) making sure that internees understand the various stages of the internment review
process and the process as a whole. Where internment review is administrative rather than
judicial in nature, ensuring the requisite independence and impartiality of the review body
will require particular attention. Internees should also benefit from expert legal assistance
in the internment review process’. Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification’, supra note 233.
283 Presidential Military Order, supra note 130, Sec. 7(b)(i).
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a critical reassertion of the detainees’ rights to habeas corpus and some hope
for detainees.284
However, many still await their habeas proceedings years, and now in
some cases more than a decade, after their detention, bringing into sharp relief
the discussion above as to whether the right must be afforded within days
or weeks.285 Moreover, while early habeas reviews showed careful judicial
scrutiny, and a high level of findings that there was no basis for detention,286
more recently questions have also arisen as to how ‘meaningful’ the review
of lawfulness of detention has become, with Courts almost always deferring
to the government or being overturned on appeal.287 Some have questioned
whether the promise that Boumediene v. Bush provided of ‘meaningful’ judicial
review has been ‘effectively negated’.288 The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) recently noted that although Guantánamo detainees
have a theoretical right to judicial review of their detention ‘the US courts
appear consistently to defer to the Executive in a manner that renders this
right illusory’.289
8B.4.4 Prosecution – fair trial rights
This section highlights some of the fair trial rights to which the detainees are
entitled and compares briefly these standards and the military commission
procedures in operation in Guantanamo Bay.
As noted above, the legal status of a prisoner impacts on the legitimacy
of prosecuting that detainee for crimes related to the conflict. Specifically, if
detainees were formerly privileged combatants (entitled to be treated as POWs),
they may not be prosecuted for acts of war, while those unprivileged com-
batants, who fought absent the right to do so, may. All categories of prisoner,
however, may equally be prosecuted for the commission of international crimes
such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.290 GC III provides that any
POW subject to judicial proceedings is entitled to a fair trial.291 So seriously
284 Boumediene, supra note 16.
285 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania and Poland, supra note 60.
286 By 2010, 57 cases (56%) were successful, then only 1 was cleared in more than the year
thereafter: Seton Hall Habeas Report, supra note 106, p. 1; Smith, ‘Federal Court Rejects
Virtually all Habeas Petitions’, supra 251.
287 Smith, ‘Federal Court Rejects Virtually all Habeas Petitions’, supra 251.
288 Seton Hall Habeas Report, supra note 106, p. 1.
289 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 2/11, Regarding the Situation
of the Detainees at Guantánamo Bay (hereinafter ‘IACHR Report’), United States, MC 259-02,
22 July 2011, available at: http://www.cidh.org/resolutions/Resolution%202-11%20Guanta
namo.pdf.
290 Indeed international law recognises the obligation on states to prosecute for such egregious
crimes. See Chapter 4.
291 See Articles 82-8 and 99-107 GC III.
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are these rights taken that ‘wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights
of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention’ is a grave breach, which
states parties are obliged to prosecute.292
For civilians who are subject to penal sanction, GC IV requires respect for
the basic ‘judicial guarantees generally recognised as indispensable’293 and
notes that ‘the trial and sentence must take place in accordance with the
provisions [on due process] of Article 64 and those that follow it’.294 By way
of minimum standard for any person not falling into the above categories,
Article 75(4) AP I provides:
(a) ... for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence
alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all
necessary rights and means of defence.295
Basic due process rights are therefore provided for under IHL for all categories
of detainee. The interpretation of certain of these rights, such as the content
to be associated with the right to ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’
should be interpreted in the light of human rights law, which provides, in
greater detail, the fair trial rights to be afforded to any person who may be
subject to criminal proceedings.296
Under IHRL, the right to a fair trial contained in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights297 was fleshed out in notable detail by Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Certain aspects of the
right – for example the right to a ‘public’ trial – are explicitly subject to re-
striction to the extent that genuine reasons of public security or protection
of witnesses so require.298 Others – such as the right to trial without ‘undue
delay’ – enshrine an inherent flexibility that has regard to all circumstances,
292 Article 130 GC IV.
293 Article 72 GC IV.
294 ICRC Commentary on GC IV, p. 50, and Article 126.
295 Common Article 3 further provides that persons taking no part in hostilities (including
persons who once did but who are hors de combat, or have otherwise laid down their arms),
are ‘entitled to certain judicial guarantees generally recognised as indispensable’.
296 Fair trial has been recognised as one of the areas of substantive coherence between the
two bodies of law where there is no conflict between IHL and IHRL and ‘harmonious
interpretation’ is possible. Chapter 7B3.
297 Article 10 provides that ‘[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him’.
298 The ECtHR has found that security considerations do not justify a failure to hold a trial
in public, particularly as measures can be taken to accommodate security concerns, such
as preventing the identity of witnesses becoming known to the public. See, e.g., Doorson
v. Netherlands, ECtHR judgment of 26 March 1996 and Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, ECtHR
judgment of 23 April 1997.
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including peculiarities of armed conflict.299 However, the ‘principles of legal-
ity and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must
be respected during a state of emergency,’300 and ‘minimum due process
rights’ are recognised to apply at all times.301 A plethora of issues arise
regarding the compatibility of the military commissions with the requirements
of IHRL, a few of which are highlighted below.302
8B.4.4.1 Military commissions and the right to trial before an independent and
impartial tribunal
Resort to military commissions to prosecute the Guantanamo detainees has,
in and of itself, raised considerable controversy, on account of apparent incon-
sistency with various aspects of applicable IHL and IHRL.
A preliminary issue arises under IHL emerges from the rules governing
prisoners of war. According to GC III, POWs ‘can be validly sentenced only if
the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same
procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of this present chapter have been
applied’. The Military Order explicitly excludes US citizens from the juris-
dictional reach of the Military Commissions, and US armed forces would be
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provides in some detail
for the protection of rights denied to the detainees in the current situation.303
As controversy surrounds the status of at least certain detainees, and they are
entitled as a matter of law to be presumed POWs until their status has been
determined by the requisite competent tribunal,304 it would appear that
recourse to such tribunals is a violation of the GC III obligations.
299 ‘The difficulty in bringing someone to trial because of conflict and disturbance would be
a legitimate consideration in assessing the reasonableness of the length of any pre-trial
detention but there would still be a need to demonstrate that continued efforts were being
made to hold the proceedings.’ Council of Europe Expert Study, para. 45. However (as
discussed above), the relevance of factors such as battlefield logistics have diminished, if
not vanished, years and miles from the original zone of battle.
300 See General Comment No. 31, supra note 171.
301 See, e.g., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987, IACtHR, Series
A, No. 9 (1987); Joint mandate Holders report, above.
302 Many other concerns have arisen over time, not addressed here, such as the right to an
appeal protected in IHRL but denied in the Military Commission’s earlier Rules.
303 For a comparison of the procedural guarantees in the US Uniform Code of Military Justice
and by the Rules for Court-Martials with those afforded to the defendants before the first
round of Military Commission established after 9/11, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Due Process
Protections Afforded Defendants: A Comparison between the Proposed U.S. Military
Commissions and U.S. General Courts-Martial’, 17 December 2001, available at: http://
www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/miltribchart1217.htm. The current procedure is monitored
and analysed by ACLU, available at: www.aclu.org.
304 Article 5(2) GC III.
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The question of more broad-reaching effect is whether the Commissions
are ‘competent independent and impartial tribunal[s] established by law’, that
meet the fair trial guarantees to which all prisoners are entitled. There are
examples from across international practice of military commissions being
found to lack the necessary independence from the executive branch and from
the military.305 Human rights bodies have consistently found the use of
military courts to try civilians in Guatemala,306 Peru,307 Chile,308 Uru-
guay,309 Egypt,310 and elsewhere to violate fundamental due process
rights.311 In other contexts the US itself has criticised the use of military courts
on the basis that ‘they do not ensure civilian defendants due process before
an independent tribunal’.312 In addition to concerns regarding the inappro-
priateness of special or military jurisdictions as such, are more specific ones
regarding the ‘special’ procedures that almost inevitably flow from resort to
special jurisdictions, to the detriment of fair trial rights.313
305 Ibid. See, e.g., Art. 8 (1), American Convention on Human Rights. States are not to create
‘[t]ribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process ... to displace
the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals’: Castillo Petruzzi and
others v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 30 May 1999, IACtHR, Series C, No. 52, paras. 130-1;
see also Öcalan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 46221/99, ECtHR, Merits, Judgment of 12 March 2003,
para. 114. Human Rights Committee: see e.g., HRC General Comment 13; Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Uzbekistan, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/71/UZB
(2001), para. 15. ECtHR: Incal v. Turkey, Appl. No. 825/1031 (1998); Ocalan v. Turkey. African
Commission: see EIPR and INTERIGHTS (on behalf of Sabbeh & Ors) v. Egypt, ACHPR, No
334/06 (2012).
306 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in the Republic of Guatemala (1983), OEA/Ser.L./V/II. 61, Doc. 47, at 96.
307 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Peru (2000), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev; see also Castillo Petruzzi and others v. Peru,
supra note 306.
308 See Comision Inter-Americana de Derechos Humanos; Segundo Informe sobre la Situacion
de los Derechos Humanos en Chile (1976), OEA/Ser.L./V/II.37, Doc. 19.
309 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Uruguay (1978), OEA/Ser.L./V/II.43, Doc. 19; see also Human Rights Committee, Moriana
Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay , Comm. No. 5/1977, Views of 15 August 1979,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/7/D/5/1977.
310 Sabbeh & Ors, supra note 306.
311 See generally F.A. Guzman, Fuero Militar y Derecho Internacional (International Commission
of Jurists, Bogotá, 2003).
312 See, e.g., the criticism of the use of military tribunals contained in the report of the State
Department on the human rights record of Peru. US Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
25 February 2000.
313 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention for example has expressed concern that
‘virtually none of them respects the guarantees of a fair trial’. UN Doc. E/N.4/1996/40,
p. 107. See also HRC GC 13.
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In the context of the Guantanamo detainees, various independent inter-
governmental experts and bodies,314 academic commentators315 and
NGOs316 have expressed concern that use of military commissions jeopardises
essential fair trial rights under human rights law. In the words of British law
lord, Lord Steyn: ‘The military will act as interrogators, prosecutors, defence
counsel, judges, and when death sentences are imposed, as executioners’, a
situation he described as a ‘monstrous failure of justice’.317
8B.4.4.2 Scope of Crimes Prosecuted
Some of the questions that have generated controversy relate not to the com-
missions or their process as such, but to the substantive scope of their juris-
diction. Consistent with the principle of legality, individuals can only be
prosecuted for acts that constituted, at the time of their commission, crimes
clearly defined in law.318 The jurisdiction of the military commissions, by
contrast, has been criticised for its breadth and uncertainty in several respects.
Firstly, the Commissions are prosecuting ‘war crimes’, despite serious doubts
as to the ‘armed conflict’ threshold having been met.319 Moreover, the juris-
diction over ‘material support for terrorism’ provided for in the Military
Commission Act 2006, despite such a crime not having formed part of inter-
national law at the time of the commission of the alleged offences, highlighted
the additional questions regarding retroactivity of criminal law, as discussed
in Chapter 4. On this basis, in 2012 US courts quashed an early military com-
mission conviction for ‘material support’ on the basis that it did not amount
to a war crime at the relevant time.320
314 See, e.g UN mandate-holders’ report, supra note 164; IACHR Report, supra note 290; Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, letter dated 16 November 2001
to the United States, available at: http://www.unog.ch/ unog01/files/002_media/f2_
cmq.html.
315 See R. Goldman and D. Orentlicher, ‘When Justice goes to War, Prosecuting Persons before
Military Commissions’, 25 Harvard J. of Law and Pub. Policy 653, 659, concluding that ‘[b]y
their very nature, military commissions do not satisfy this basic test’, at 659-60.
316 Reports and commentary have been issued by ACLU, CRR, HRW, AI, and Human Rights
First.
317 Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, supra note 5.
318 See, e.g., Art. 15 ICCPR and Chapter 7A.5.5.
319 See Chapter 6B.1.1. Even on the US expansive view of the global conflict, the Commission’s
jurisdiction has been criticised as ‘overbroad’ and as lowering the threshold of armed conflict
to cover isolated incidents: see ‘Trials Under Military Order’, Human Rights First, updated
August 2004, p. 2, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/
trials_under_order0604.pdf. Note also the potential scope of crimes such as ‘aiding the
enemy’, charged in the case of Australian David Hicks. p.13.
320 The US Appeals Court found that ‘[t]here is no international-law proscription of material
support for terrorism’. Hamdan v. United States, supra note 138, at 22.
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8B.4.4.3 Right to Access Evidence and Present a Defence
The minimal IHL standard set out in Article 75(4) provides that an accused
shall: ‘(a) ... to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence
alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial
all necessary rights and means of defence’.321 The ICCPR provides for the right
to ‘have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence …. to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance … and to examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him’.322 One constant source of concern has been, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the use of secret evidence and the very limited access by the
accused to information and evidence against him. There can be little doubt
that, as human rights courts have recognised, ‘there may be restrictions on
the right to a fully adversarial procedure where strictly necessary in the light
of a strong countervailing public interest, such as national security, the need
to keep secret certain police methods of investigation or the protection of the
fundamental rights of another person’.323 A key baseline question is however
whether ‘sufficient information’ is available to enable the accused to know
the nature of the evidence and to defend himself fully, and whether any
prejudice is ‘counterbalanced’ by safeguards to ensure fair trial.324
The right of Guantanamo detainees to access ‘relevant and material’ evid-
ence has been recognised by US courts in habeas proceedings.325 Particular
care is due in the context of criminal trials where the standards are higher
than for certain other types of civil proceedings where secret evidence has
been considered,326 and all the more so where the death penalty is con-
sidered. Counsel engaged in the military commission process and comment-
321 Article 75(4).
322 Article 14, ICCPR.
323 A & Ors Derogation, supra note 245; Botmeh and Alami v. the United Kingdom, No. 15187/03,
Judgment, 7 June 2007, sec. 37.
324 See, e.g., ‘The Use of Secret Evidence in Judicial Proceedings: A Comparative Survey’
(hereinafter ‘Oxford Study’), Research Paper prepared for the Joint Committee on Human
Rights, October 2011, University of Oxford, available at: http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/
events_files/Secret_Evidence_JCHR_27_October_ 2011_final.pdf. An evaluation of sufficiency
involves numerous factors, including the significance of the evidence to the accused’s case:
Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, §§ 46-48, ECHR
2004-X.
325 Eg Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2009).The Court found that individuals
had the right to access ‘relevant and material’ secret evidence. The Court of Appeals left
open the possibility that ‘alternatives to disclosure’ might ‘effectively substitute for un-
redacted access.’ Ibid., at 547.
326 See discussion of e.g. UK closed material proceedings in Chapter 7B7.3.
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ators criticise the extent of the government’s reliance on secret evidence,327
the lack of a right to full access to exculpatory evidence,328 and the lack of
resources enabling the accused to himself gather and present evidence in his
defence.329 Particular procedural requirements, such as seeking the prosecu-
tion’s approval for the presentation of witnesses, are seen to belie respect for
the ‘equality of arms’ principle.330
In addition, specific rules of evidence, while they have improved over time,
continue to pose challenges to the right to fair trial. Notable among them is
the admissibility in certain circumstances of coerced statements and evidence
derived from cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.331 A strident attack
on the system by the Commissions’ former chief prosecutor, who accused his
superiors of pressing ahead with politically motivated trials, singled out the
use of evidence obtained through torture as destroying the trials’ credibil-
ity.332 The reliance in legal proceedings of such evidence falls foul of the well-
established prohibition, explicit in Article 15 of CAT and implicit in the pro-
hibition against torture across international law, as discussed in Chapter 7.333
327 Evidence may be shared with counsel but withheld from the accused: see, e.g., US v. Omar
Khadr, details available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsKhadr.html ; Oxford
Study, supra note 325; A. Worthington, The Guantanamo Files: Stories of the 774 Detainees
in America’s Illegal Prison (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007).
328 See ‘Fact Sheet: Military Commissions’ CCR, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/
faqs/factsheet:-military-commissions.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid. ‘[T]he prosecutor can unilaterally veto a defense attorney’s decision to call a witness.
A defense lawyer who wishes to summon a witness must first get the prosecutor’s consent.
If the prosecutor says no, the lawyer must argue its merits with the prosecutor in front
of the judge. This unfair allocation of power between prosecution and defense directly
violates an essential fair trial principle, known as “equality of arms”, and locks in a prosecu-
torial advantage that undercuts a vigorous and effective defense.’ R. Dicker, ‘Guantánamo’s
perversion of justice,’ The Guardian, 3 September 2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/03/guantanamo-perversion-justice.
331 Such evidence can be admitted if ‘use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent with
the interests of justice’. 2010 Manual for Military Commissions, supra note 140, Rule 304
(a)(5)(A)(ii).
332 Col. Morris Davis, ‘Guantánamo Exclusive: Former Chief Prosecutor, Ex-Prisoner Call on
Obama to Close Prison’, Democracy Now, 10 January 2012, available at: http://www.demo
cracynow.org/2012/1/10/guantnamo_exclusive_former_prisoner_chief_prosecutor[sic].
333 Evidence obtained through torture or inhuman treatment is inadmissible in all circum-
stances. Whereas, for example, evidence obtained in breach of other rights to respect for
private life under Article 8 may still be used in a prosecution so long as, in all the circum-
stances, this would not make the trial unfair. See e.g., Singharasa v. Sri Lanka, Communication
No. 1033/2001, Human Rights Committee, Views of 23/08/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/
1033/2001; A & Ors, supra note 245; Sabbeh & Ors, supra note 306.
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8B.4.4.4 Access to Counsel
The assistance of a defence lawyer is a primary means of ensuring the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of people suspected or accused of criminal
offences, protected both under IHL and IHRL. IHL provides, explicitly and
implicitly, for access to counsel for persons suspected of having committed
a criminal offence, irrespective of their status as POWs, civilians or persons
entitled to the basic minima of human rights protection. The detailed rights
afforded to POWs under GC III include the right to legal representation.334
Likewise, among the due process rights afforded to civilians protected by GC
IV is the right ‘to be assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel of their own choice,
who shall be able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities
for preparing the defence’.335The ICRC Commentary to AP I notes that the
right in Art 75(4) API to ‘all necessary means of defence’ must be interpreted
to include the right to communicate with a ‘qualified defence lawyer’.336 The
right to ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’ provision explicitly applies
‘before and during ... trial’, and should be interpreted in the light of human
rights law which, as explained below, includes access to counsel from the early
stages of detention as one of the core protections against abuse and arbitrar-
iness.
The right to consult counsel is explicit in the fair trial provisions of Article
14(d) ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee, like other human rights courts
and bodies applying other international instruments, has recognized that the
right operates from the earliest stages of detention and is a particularly im-
portant at the time of interrogation.337 The right under human rights law,
reflected in some of the IHL provisions, is to counsel of choice,338 safeguarding
the essential relationship of trust between lawyer and client. There is no
objection in principle to restrictions requiring for example security clearance
for lawyers providing advice and representation, provided their independence
334 Article 84 GC III.
335 Article 72 GC IV.
336 ‘[H]e must be able to understand the assistance given by a qualified defence lawyer. If these
conditions were not fulfilled, the defendant would not have the benefit of all necessary
rights of defence.’ ICRC Commentary on AP I, para. 3096.
337 The Human Rights Committee has stated that ‘all persons who are arrested must immediate-
ly have access to counsel’. See Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Georgia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.74 (1997), para. 28; Brannigan, supra note 270, paras.
62, 64 (notwithstanding the declared state of emergency in that case); Sabbeh & Ors, supra
note 306. Article 5. Paris Standards Principle 11. UN Body of Principles.
338 Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR. See also Principle 1 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers;
Article 8(2)(d) of the ACHR; Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR; Article 7(1)(c) of the ACHPR,
Article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute; Article 20(4)(d) of the ICTR Statute, Article 67(1)(d)
of the ICC Statute. Under IHL, the right to choose one’s defence lawyer is guaranteed by
Article 105 GC III.
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is not compromised and the right to a lawyer of choice is not entirely under-
mined, for example by exclusive use of lawyers from the armed forces.339
The determination to deny access to counsel was apparent from the outset
and integral to the decision to house detainees in Guantanamo. The Guanta-
namo experience testifies to the importance of such access, as a safeguard
against torture and exorbitant public allegations, such as those levelled against
‘high value detainees’340 but dropped once detainees had access to counsel
and were able to challenge.341
There has been little or no right to consult or be represented by a lawyer
as part of the ‘review mechanisms’ at Guantanamo..342 While there is access
to counsel for habeas proceedings and the military commission trials,343 the
government has sought to restrict access to counsel in 2012, arguing that once
habeas petitions are filed, it should control subsequent access to counsel.344
The effective implementation of the right to consult counsel requires that
counsel can ‘communicate with the accused in conditions giving full respect
339 See Chahal v. United Kingdom, supra note 269, p. 3.
340 See, e.g., the case of Abu Zubaydah publicly proclaimed by President Bush and others to
be in al Qaeda’s ‘top three’. President Bush, ‘Remarks by the President at Thaddeus Mc-
Cotter for Congress Dinner’ 14 October 2002, available at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2002/10/20021014-3.html ; President Bush,
‘Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon’ 9 April 2002,
available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/2002
0409-8.html ; President Bush, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’ 6 June
2002,availableat:http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020606-8.html (describing him as ‘al Qaeda’s chief of operations’). See, e.g., S. Benen,
‘Another Al Qaeda Number 3’, Guest Posting, The Washington Monthly, 31 January 2008,
available at: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2008_01/013025.
php.
341 When he obtained access to lawyers and prepared to challenge his detention, after more
than 6 years of incommunicado detention, these allegations were withdrawn. The U.S. no
longer alleges he was a member of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s senior lieutenant, or had
any role in any al Qaeda operation – including 9/11. Annex 3: Respondent’s Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and Petitioner’s
Motion for Sanctions, Husayn v. Gates, (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009) (No. 08-1360). See also Zubaydah
v Lithuania, supra note 60.
342 See Chapter 8A2 supra. See, e.g., B. Mears, ‘Military limiting Guantanamo detainee access
to lawyers’, 7 August 2012, available at: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/07/military-
limiting-guantanamo-detainee-access-to-lawyers. ‘Executive Order 13,567 does not provide
detainees who undergo PRB review with a judicially enforceable right to counsel, or any
justification for asking the Court to impose a counsel-access regime on the PRB process
other than the one developed, per the Order’s direction, by the Secretary of Defense’.
343 The rules of procedure provide that every accused shall be assigned a defence counsel,
chosen by the Chief Defense Officer among the Judges Advocate of the United States Armed
Forces. See Military Commission Instruction No. 4, ‘Responsibilities of the Chief Defense
Counsel, Deputy Chief Defense Counsel, Detailed Defense Counsel, and Civilian Defense




for the confidentiality of their communications’.345 Confidential consultation
with his or her defence lawyers is as an essential aspect of the right of every
defendant and integral to the preparation of a defence.346 Yet Military Com-
mission Order No. 3 of 5 February 2004 provided explicitly for the regulation
and monitoring of lawyer-client communications.347 Persistent concerns have
since been expressed by attorneys before the military commissions as to the
lack of confidentiality of lawyer-client communications, with a senior military
defence lawyer reportedly stating that attorneys were ‘ethically obliged’ not
to follow the rules.348
8B.4.4.5 Transparency and Public Trial
The right to a public trial is protected in human rights law, though it is not
an absolute right and the right to close proceedings temporarily to protect
national security is well recognised. Limitations on the right to be present at
parts of the accused’s own trial have been a feature of the military commis-
sion’s proceedings from the start. The exclusion of the accused was criticised
during the earlier proceedings,349 and the MCA continues to allow a trial
to continue in the absence of the accused in certain circumstances.350
Controversy also surrounds the extent of the exclusion of the public.
Measures have been taken in Guantanamo to ensure that public can monitor
the trials, a time lapse enables court to ensure that no statements that may
jeopardise security can be released. This may an example of a measure that
provide a balance between open justice and protection of national security
in exceptional situations, but concerns have been expressed as overuse of the
mechanism. Notably the protection of information concerning allegations of
torture or ill-treatment by US personnel is reportedly a common feature of
345 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, para. 9.
346 See, e.g., Article 8(2)(d) ACHR, Article 67(1)(b) of the ICC Statute; Principles 22 and 8 of
the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principle 18 of the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
347 Military Commissions Order No. 3, Department of Defense, 5 February 2004, on ‘Special
Administrative Measures for Certain Communications Subject to Monitoring’, available
at: http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/milcomord3.pdf.
348 Marine Col. J.P. Colwell, the chief military defense counsel for the commissions, is reported
to have written to all military commission defense lawyers hat that they were ethically
obligated to refuse to follow rules which required screening by the dept of defence of all
communication from lawyer to client. ‘Guantánamo Chief Military Defense Lawyer Orders
His Attorneys Not to Agree to Communication Monitoring’, ACLU, 11 January 2012,
availableat:http://www.aclu.org/national-security/guantanamo-chief-military-defense-
lawyer-orders-his-attorneys-not-agree.
349 Secret evidence can be employed, during which time the accused cannot attend his trial,
though his military lawyer may do so. See Military Commission Instruction No. 1, ‘Military
Commission Instructions’, Department of Defense, 30 April 2003, Sec. 7 (B), available at:
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/milcominstno1.pdf.
350 MCA 2009, H. R. 2647-397, § 949d.
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commission’s proceedings,351 and serves no apparent legitimate purpose.
This feeds broader allegations that “the commissions are best understood not
as a legitimate forum for trying war crimes, but as an avenue for short-cir-
cuiting legal processes that might hold us accountable for our wrongs.”352
8B.4.4.6 When Fair trial is a Matter of Life or Death
Finally, it is recalled that the military commissions may impose the death
penalty, which has in fact been sought in relation to proceedings which are
pending at time of writing. The death penalty, while not illegal per se under
international law, is strictly regulated by it, as set out in Chapter 7. Under
IHL, persons subjected to criminal proceedings during any type of armed
conflict may not be sentenced to death except pursuant to a conviction pro-
nounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and
impartiality. Under IHRL, it can only be applied to the most serious crimes
and cases, taking into account all mitigating personal circumstances. As recog-
nized in IHL and IHRL, it should not be applied to minors or the elderly.353
Critically, a trial that leads to the death penalty must meet the highest
standards of fair trial under IHRL354 or constitute an arbitrary deprivation
of the right to life. As the Inter-American Court noted:
‘Because execution of the death penalty is irreversible, the strictest and most
rigorous enforcement of judicial guarantees is required of the State so that those
guarantees are not violated and a human life not arbitrarily taken as a result.’355
351 Ibid. ‘[I]f the 9/11 defendants speak up about torture in custody, or their lawyers try to,
the audio feed from the courtroom is immediately cut off and the information will never
appear in the public record.’ Dicker, ‘Guantánamo’s perversion of justice’, supra note 330.
352 D. Cole, ‘Military Commissions and the Paradigm of Prevention’, in O. Gross, and F. Ni
Aolain (eds.), Guantanamo and Beyond: Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions and Policy
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013).
353 ‘Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of the American Convention on Human
Rights)’, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 8 September 1983, IACHPR, (Ser. A) No. 3 (1983),
para. 93.
354 This true under the American Declaration (binding on the US). See IACHR Terrorism Report,
OEA/Ser.L/V/116, Doc. 5, Rev. 1, para. 94. See generally Juan Raul Garza, Report No. 52/01,
IACHR, Case 12.243, 4 April 2001, paras. 88-96, citing Report No. 57/96, Andrews v. United
States, Annual Report of the IACHR 1998, paras. 175-77, and I/A Comm. H.R., James Terry
Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Res. 3/87, 22 September 1987, Annual
Report 1986-87, paras. 46-49.
355 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, IACtHR, Series A,
No. 16, para. 136. See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Article 4.2 and 4.4 of the
American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 8 September 1983,
IACtHR, Series A, No. 3 and the decision of the ECtHR in Öcalan v. Turkey, supra note 305.
In these circumstances, the death penalty may also amount to cruel or inhuman treatment.
See, e.g., Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
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If the death penalty is applied, as provided for in the Military Order, a viola-
tion of fair trial rights may also give rise to a violation of the detainee’s right
to life.356
8C RESPONDING TO GUANTANAMO
8C.1 THE OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER STATES
This chapter has focused on the obligations of the United States, as the detain-
ing power, under IHL and IHRL. It is pertinent to reflect however on the obliga-
tions incumbent on other states to respond in the face of flagrant violations
as in the situation at hand.
As we have seen in Chapter 6, under IHL, states parties to the Geneva
Conventions have positive obligations to ensure respect for the Conventions,
described as meaning that they should ‘do everything in their power’ to ensure
that they are respected universally.357 Several points are worthy of emphasis
in the context of the on-going Guantanamo experience. First, states are not
simply entitled, but are obliged, to take measures to respond to violations of
IHL, and as authoritative commentary has noted, the proper working of the
system under the Geneva Conventions demands that they do so.358 Secondly,
the obligation is both a negative and a positive one. It requires states to refrain
from committing violations, facilitating violations or cooperating with an
offending state, for example by arresting and transferring detainees to a power
that is believed to be violating the rights of those prisoners under IHL. It also
involves positive measures of prevention, without prescribing what measures
the state may deem necessary or effective.359
The action that states should take is not prescribed, and available options
may include invoking the under-utilised inter-state judicial mechanisms that
Communication 334/06, Judgment, African Commission, 13 February 2012, (hereinafter
‘Taba case’).
356 Article 6(1) ICCPR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life and Article 6(2) explicitly
requires that any imposition of the death penalty is subject to certain requirements, inter
alia, that it is imposed by a competent court in a manner that is ‘not contrary to the pro-
visions of the present Covenant’. See Chapter 7A5.1. It may also amount to inhuman or
degrading treatment. See Öcalan v. Turkey, supra note 305.
357 Article 1(1) of AP I paraphrases this positive obligation set forth in Article 1 of the 1949
Conventions. See Chapters 3.1.2 and 6.A.2.7
358 ICRC Commentary GC I, p. 18.
359 See Chapter 6, IHL, references to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions; see also
Nicaragua, paras. 220 and 255 and Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC’s Articles on State Respons-
ibility.
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exist,360 or, at a minimum, it may be expected that states would make
meaningful diplomatic representations that the violations should stop. As
‘observance of humanitarian law transcends the sphere of interest of any
individual state’,361 representations should not be limited to the protection
of nationals of the state but reflect the role of states parties to the Geneva
Convention system as guardians of the protections contained therein.
Finally, a specific positive obligation under IHL is the obligation, in the
event of grave breaches of the Conventions – such as wilfully depriving
prisoners of war of the rights of defence – to seek out and prosecute those
individuals responsible.362 The obligations of individual accountability
referred to above (and the rights of individuals to redress) thus coincides with
states’ obligations under IHL.
The obligations of states under human rights law are cast differently, and
while there is a duty to ‘ensure’ that the right of those within the state’s control
are respected, there is no general duty to ensure that other states refrain from
violations. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, where the state itself exercises
its authority or control abroad, IHRL is invoked. Moreover, under IHRL states
may not transfer persons within their jurisdiction to another state where there
is a significant risk of rights violations in the other state, such as torture or
inhuman treatment, or a ‘flagrant denial of justice’, which may be implicated
if states were asked to extradite or transfer persons to Guantanamo Bay for
detention and/or prosecution.363 Finally, the basic obligations to give effect
to the object and purpose of a treaty to which a state is party, in good faith,
presumably generally precludes facilitating or encouraging other states to
commit violations of it. In this respect, questions arise as to whether other
forms of state cooperation with the process of Guantanamo detentions or the
trials by military commission, such as through intelligence sharing or evidence
gathering,364 would breach the spirit, if not the letter, of IHRL.
Developments in relation to state responsibility are also relevant to this
assessment of the interests and obligations of third states in face of the sort
360 Recourse to the ICJ is available between states, and although rarely utilised in practice,
human rights bodies such as the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR are available
and could be invoked by one state against another.
361 H.P. Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law, an Introduction’, in H. Haug (ed.), Humanity
for All: the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, Geneva, Haupt 1993),
p. 22.
362 See ‘Grave Breaches’, Chapter 6.
363 See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture which precludes extradition
wherethere are ‘grounds to believe’ that, among other things, the person ‘will be tried by
special or ad hoc courts in the requesting state’. Article 13, Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture, Cartagena de Indias, 9 December 1985, in force 28 February
1987, OAS Treaty Series No. 67. See Chapter 7A.5.10.
364 See discussion of evolving understanding of obligations of non-cooperation, beyond in cases
of extradition in Chapters 4 and 7.
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of basic violations of human rights and IHL that Guantanamo Bay
epitomises.365 States may incur responsibility where they aid and assist other
states in the commission of international wrongs such as those arising at
Guantanamo.366 The prohibition on arbitrary detention and denial of basic
fair trial guarantees, as well as torture, have been authoritatively described
as peremptory norms of international law;367 as the International Law Com-
mission has indicated, where such obligations are breached, any state has an
interest in acting to invoke the responsibility of the offending state, stopping
the violation and ensuring that the wrong is put right.368 Moreover, gross
or systematic breaches of such norms arise, which is likely to be met in the
Guantanamo scheme, the ILC Articles shift from permissive to mandatory
language, requiring that states ‘shall’ cooperate to end the breach.369 In an
interesting endorsement of these rules and their potential relevance in this
context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution on
Guantanamo calls on states ‘to respect the erga omnes nature of human rights
by taking all possible measures to persuade the United States authorities to
respect fully the rights under international law of all Guantánamo Bay detain-
ees’.370
In short, the obligations to ensure respect for IHL, the more contained
obligations of IHRL and developments in relation to state responsibility in
international law together reflect an important principle that certain egregious
violations are not matters for the state itself, but for the international commun-
ity as a whole. The legal imperative for states to take action to address the
Guantanamo situation is plain, even if they are left considerable scope to
decide how best to do so. They should not take steps, whether in military or
criminal matters, that directly or indirectly facilitate or contribute to the
violation and they should invoke effective means, through diplomatic or other
channels, to end the violations of rights of all detainees and restore the rule
of law.
365 See Chapters 3 and 7.
366 Art. 16 ILC Articles.
367 See, e.g. General Comment 29, para. 11 and ILC Commentaries to Articles on State Respons-
ibility, Introductory Commentary to Part Two, Chapter 3. Commentators include human
rights, from the non-derogable rights common to the ‘three major human rights treaties’
to longer lists. See Chapter 7A., ‘International Human Rights Law’, Framework.
368 Article 48, ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility.
369 Ibid., Art. 41.
370 Resolution 1433 (2005), Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay,
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe.
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8C.2 THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE GUANTANAMO DETENTIONS
The situation of the Guantanamo detainees has provoked an unusual level
of condemnation of the international community. Serious concerns expressed
by international human rights mechanisms and non-governmental organisa-
tions were perhaps predictable.371 But opponents have been vociferous,
coordinated and diverse, illustrated by an unusually vocal statement of concern
from the ICRC372 and strident criticism being levelled not only from NGOs
and international human rights bodies, but also from quarters not usually asso-
ciated with international human rights advocacy. Examples from the UK, the
US’s foremost ally in the ‘war on terror’, may illustrate the point. The UK Court
of Appeal took the unusual step of commenting on what it viewed as the
‘objectionable’ lack of oversight by another country’s courts.373 Breaking with
the convention that Law Lords do not speak out on politically sensitive issues,
still less criticise another state’s government, a distinguished English Law Lord
condemned publicly the ‘monstrous failure of justice’, describing the military
commissions as ‘kangaroo courts’ which ‘convey the idea of a pre-ordained
arbitrary rush to judgment by an irregular tribunal which makes a mockery
of justice’.374 A total of 175 members of both houses of the UK parliament,
crossing party lines, took the unprecedented step of lodging an amicus brief
with the US Supreme Court, adding to the many other briefs submitted to the
Court.375 The media have been similarly critical, including those otherwise
sympathetic to controversial aspects of the ‘war on terror’.376
Official inter-state reactions, for their part, are generally less transparent
and more difficult to measure meaningfully. As regards the protection of
nationals, initially, protracted negotiations between the US and certain govern-
ments (notably the UK and Australia) were widely reported, but apparently
focused on the situation in respect of their own nationals detained in Guanta-
371 International organisations having criticised the situation include the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See Report
of WGAD, supra. Reports of the HR Committee, HR Council, UN mandate-holders’ report,
IACHR and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly are among those to criticise
Guatanamo.
372 See, e.g., ‘Guantanamo Bay: Overview of the ICRC’s work for Detainees’, ICRC, 30 January
2004, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5qrc5v.htm.
373 See Abbasi, supra note 5.
374 Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, supra note 5. Lord Steyn declared also
that the trials before the military commissions would be ‘a stain on United States justice’.
375 Many other briefs were filed from jurists and organisations around the world. They can
be found at www.ccr-ny.org.
376 See, e.g., ‘Unjust, Unwise, Unamerican: America’s plans to set up military commissions for
the trials of terrorist suspects is a big mistake’, The Economist, 12 July 2003, which notes
the support offered by that publication to military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, while
condemning the proposed military commissions as ‘illiberal, unjust and likely to be counter-
productive’.
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namo.377 Presumably as a result of this quiet diplomacy, a few of the
detainees were returned to their country of origin, while in respect of others
special arrangements were made for the application of better standards than
those applicable to detainees of other nations, including undertakings that
the death penalty would not be applied.378 This is exemplified by the case
against David Hicks, the Australian national who is one of the first four
detainees to be tried by military commission, but on the basis of different
arrangements than apply to the other accused of Yemeni and Sudanese nation-
ality.379As regards UK nationals remaining in Guantanamo, the UK Foreign
Secretary stated that ‘our position remains that the detainees should either
be tried in accordance with international standards or they should be returned
to the UK.’380 Ultimately, their return to Britain was formally requested by
the government on this basis,381 and almost all have been returned.382
Over time, public condemnation emerged at governmental level. It was
2006 when German Chancellor Angela Merkel was clear, if restrained, in
stating that ‘an institution like Guantanamo in its present form cannot and
must not exist in the long term’.383 In the U.K. the Attorney General for Eng-
land and Wales described the camp’s existence was ‘unacceptable’384 and
‘not meeting acceptable fair trial standards,’385 while the Lord Chancellor
377 See e.g.‘Guantanamo deal for Australia duo’, BBC on-line, 26 November 2003, available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3238302.stm. Reports of the British
government negotiating agreements with the Pentagon so that British prisoners would not
receive the death penalty have been criticised: ‘This gives a new dimension to the concept
of ‘most-favoured nation’ treatment in international law. How could it be morally defensible
to discriminate in this way?’ Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, supra note
5.
378 Ibid.
379 See ‘Guantanamo Detainee Charged’, Department of Defense News Release, 10 June 2004,
available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040610-0893.html. on special
protections afforded to David Hicks.
380 ‘Foreign Secretary statement on return of British detainees’, 19 February 2004, available
at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page5381.asp.
381 See J. Lovell, ‘Blair asks Bush to return Guantanamo detainees’, Reuters AlertNet, 26 June
2004, available at: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26579540.htm.
382 As at September 2013, only one British resident, Shaker Aamer, remains in Guantanamo.
383 Angela Merkel, interview on September 1, 2006, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/
international/spiegel-interview-merkel-guantanamo-mustn-t-exist-in-long-term-a-394180.html.
384 Attorney General for England and Wales, Lord Goldsmith added that ‘[t]he historic tradition
of the United States as a beacon of freedom, liberty and of justice deserves the removal
of this symbol’. ‘UK told US won’t shut Guantanamo’, BBC News, 11 May 2006, available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4760365.stm.
385 At a speech to the International Criminal Law Association annual conference, ‘Terrorism
and the rule of law’ in London on 25 June 2004, Lord Goldsmith stated: ‘While we must
be flexible and be prepared to countenance some limitation of fundamental rights if properly
justified and proportionate, there are certain principles on which there can be no com-
promise. Fair trial is one of those – which is the reason we in the UK have been unable
to accept that the US military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantanamo Bay
offer sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in accordance with international standards.’ See
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condemned it as ‘shocking affront to democracy’.386 The Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution statement that ‘the United States Govern-
ment has betrayed its own highest principles in the zeal with which it has
attempted to pursue the “war on terror”. These errors have perhaps been most
manifest in relation to Guantánamo Bay’387 is one example among others
of criticism at the regional level.388
Less clear, however, has been the willingness of states to bring their full
weight to bear, individually and collectively, beyond the protection of their
own nationals.389 Indeed questions remain as to the extent of state cooperation
with the Guantanamo regime. While governments appeared publicly to be
agitating on behalf of their nationals, allegations of collusion with the Guanta-
namo system of detention continue to emerge.390 The Special Rapporteur
on Terrorism and Human Rights has reported that ‘[m]any countries (Bahrain,
Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Spain, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan) have
sent interrogators to Guantanamo Bay’.391
One way in which states have however become more robust, beyond public
criticism, is in relation to international cooperation. As discussed in Chapter
4B, there have been growing indications by states as to their unwillingness
M. Tempest, ‘“No compromise” on Guantánamo trials’, The Guardian, 25 June 2004, available
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/25/september11.usa.
386 Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer stated Guantanamo is a ‘shocking affront to democracy’.
‘Top-level plea for detainees’, The Argus, 14 September 2006, available at: http://www.
theargus.co.uk/news/indepth/justiceforomar/justiceforomar/922087.toplevel_plea_for_
detainees/.
387 Resolution 1433 (2005), Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay,
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe.
388 See also Resolution 1340 (2003), Rights of persons held in the custody of the United States
in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe; and
Resolution 1539 (2007), The United States of America and international law, Parliamentary
Assembly Council of Europe.
389 Doubts also arise as to the sufficiency of interventions on behalf of nationals. Eg. on German
government interventions and criticism see, e.g., interview with Interior Minister Otto Shilly.
Süddeutschen Zeitung, March 2004, available at: www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/
764/28736/; cf see M. Kreickenbaum, ‘German resident incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay
for two-and-a-half years: The case of Murat Kurnaz’, 28 May 2004, available at: http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004/gua1-m28.shtml. The UK has been criticised for
failing to do enough for the one remaining UK resident in 2013, Shaker Aamer.
390 MI5 and MI6 officers carried out around 100 interrogations at the US prison on Cuba
between 2002 and 2004. This account suggests that in secret memos, UK ministers said
in early 2002 that their ‘preferred option’ for British nationals was to transfer them to
Guantánamo Bay, rather than to secret detention. I. Cobain, Cruel Britannia: A Secret History
of Torture, (Portobello Books Ltd., 2012).
391 See M. Scheinin, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, U.N. Doc. No. A/
HRC/10/3, 4 February 2009, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G09/106/25/PDF/G0910625.pdf, p. 19. Legal issues arising from cooperation of this
type are touched upon in Chapter 10.
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(or inability, given the constraints of IHRL) to cooperate with the US in respect
of Guantanamo detentions, and specifically a military commission process
that may lead to the death penalty, unfair trial, or other serious violations of
human rights. In this respect, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
(PACE) resolution is pertinent in quite explicitly calling on member states to:
‘… refuse to comply with United States’ requests for extradition of terrorist
suspects liable to detention at Guantánamo Bay; vi. to refuse to comply with
United States’ requests for mutual legal assistance in relation to Guantánamo
Bay detainees, other than by providing exculpatory evidence, or unless in
connection with legal proceedings before a regularly constituted court…’.392
In a case concerning extradition to face terrorism trials and detention on US
soil, it is noteworthy that both the UK government (arguing that there was
no impediment to extradition) and the ECHR (in agreeing and allowing extra-
dition) noted that there was no prospect of the individual being transferred
to Guantanamo or subjected to military commission, in which case transfer
would by implication have been problematic.393 Indeed within the US, the
US president, and the Guantanamo task force, have explicitly recognised the
impediment to international cooperation that Guantanamo and the commis-
sions process entailed.394
Thus, criticism has been voiced by states, representations have been made
and non-cooperation has been threatened. While practice may develop as the
military tribunal process unfolds, potentially into death penalty, the focus of
concerted state action has to date been on the protection of the state’s own
nationals. Perhaps as a result all Western detainees have now left Guanta-
namo.395 While defence of a state’s nationals is wholly appropriate, by so
limiting interventions the approach has been to rely on different rather than
equal treatment in respect of the protection of universally applicable human
rights standards. This falls considerably short of the requirements of inter-
national law referred to in the previous section. Interestingly, the Council of
Europe resolution on Guantanamo alludes to this obligation when it calls on
all states ‘to respect the erga omnes nature of human rights by taking all
possible measures to persuade the United States authorities to respect fully
the rights under international law of all Guantánamo Bay detainees’.396
392 Resolution 1433 (2005), Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay,
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe.
393 Ahmad & Ors v. United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and
67354/09 (2012).
394 ‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’, supra note 43. Obama 23 May 2013 speech, note 9, where
he states categorically that partners will not cooperate with Guantanamo.
395 Juvenile Canadian detainee Khadr was reportedly the last Western detainee to leave
Guantanamo.
396 Resolution 1433 (2005), Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay,
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe.
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8C.3 SEEKING JUSTICE FOR GUANTANAMO?
Of the hundreds of individuals who have been detained on dubious legal bases
in Guantanamo, some have been released, some slated for indefinite detention,
others for trial by military commission and some for release – but held in the
limbo within a limbo397 pending release. One thing they have in common
is that none have been afforded compensation. And no one has been invest-
igated and held to account for crimes committed against them at Guantanamo
Bay. The lack of accountability for ‘war on terror’ crimes described elsewhere
in this study applies with equal force to the allegations of torture or other
crimes having been committed in Guantanamo. As US governments have
changed and attitudes on key issues related to Guantanamo shifted, one
description is of a ‘legacy of torture’ giving way to a ‘legacy of impunity’.398
In the absence of a political solution, detainees have inevitably sought legal
and judicial solutions, in the US and elsewhere. The habeas litigation is dis-
cussed above and in Chapter 11. Attempts to secure damages from US courts
have thus far proved fruitless. Firstly, as noted above detainees are specifically
precluded by legislation from seeking any damages before US courts.399 While
the ban on habeas proceedings has been lifted, this ban on the right to a
remedy remains in place, representing a manifest violation of victims’ right
to a remedy under international law. For those victims that have left and
sought remedies, among the obstacles on the national level has been a finding
that those accused of responsibility for their torture or ill-treatment enjoyed
official immunities from civil suit. This was illustrated by one claim for
damages brought by former Guantanamo detainee where torture was held
397 See ‘A.1.X Limbo within Limbo’.
398 ‘Demand U.S. Torturers be Held Accountable’, CCR, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/get-
involved/action/demand-accountability-u.s.-torture.
399 Presidential Military Order, supra note 130, Order, Sec 7(b)(2): ‘(2) the individual shall not
be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or
to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court
of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any
international tribunal.’ Detainee Treatment Act 2005: ‘... [N]o court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement
of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.’ It has been made explicit that ‘a military commission may not adjudge the
payment of damages ...’: 2010 Manual for Military Commissions, supra note 141. Cases
of former detainees have been dismissed by a D.C. District Court because of a lack of
jurisdiction as ‘The Congress has spoken with particular clarity on the matter’: al Jenko v.
Gates, Civil Case No. 10-1702 (RJL), (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2011), dismissed, p. 11-12.
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by a US court to fall within the scope of the employment of government
officials, who were as a consequence immune from liability.400
Attempts in other countries to seek redress for the detainees are on-going.
Some legal actions sought to force foreign governments to intervene in Guanta-
namo. A case brought before the English courts by family members of one
of the seven UK nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, for example, was
ultimately unsuccessful as English courts were found not to have jurisdiction
to provide a remedy directly to persons held by another state on the sole basis
of their nationality. Nor, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, was there
held to be any duty incumbent on the Secretary of State to make diplomatic
representations on behalf of the detainee. The court noted, however, its ‘deep
concern that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, Mr
Abbasi may be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the United
States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy
of his detention before any court or tribunal’.401
Others cases seek to advance accountability for criminal conduct arising
in relation to Guantanamo. Various attempts to bring charges in France or
Germany against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA
director George Tenet, and former White House Counsel and Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales and legal advisers, in respect of torture at Guantanamo and
elsewhere, have thus far proved unsuccessful.402 Other initiatives have had
greater traction, however, such as criminal investigations opened in Spain into
the alleged torture and abuse of Guantanamo detainees by ‘possible material
and instigating perpetrators, necessary collaborators and accomplices’.403
400 Rasul v Myers 512 F.3d 644, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rasul I), vacated Rasul v Myers 129 S.Ct.
763 (2008), aff’d Rasul v. Myers 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam). According to the
Court of Appeal: ‘The plaintiffs concede that the torture, threats, physical and psychological
abuse inflicted on them, which were allegedly approved, implemented, supervised and
condoned by the defendants, were intended as interrogation techniques to be used on
detainees... . While the plaintiffs challenge the methods the defendants used to perform
their duties, the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants acted as rogue officials or
employees who implemented a policy of torture for reasons unrelated to the gathering
of intelligence. Therefore, the alleged tortious conduct was incidental to the defendants’
legitimate employment duties.’ Rasul, at 858-59 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
401 Abbasi, supra note 5, para. 107. At paras. 66-7 the court noted that the treatment of detainees
was ‘objectionable’, and had given rise to ‘serious concerns internationally’.
402 The claims alleged a conspiracy that authorized the torture program in Guantanamo, Iraq,
secret CIA sites, and elsewhere: ‘Donald Rumsfeld Charged with Torture During Trip to
France: Complaint Filed Against Former Defense Secretary for Torture, Abuse at Guantá-
namo and Abu Ghraib’, CCR, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/
donald-rumsfeld-charged-torture-during-trip-france; see also M. Ratner, ‘The Trial of Donald
Rumsfeld: A Prosecution by Book’, (The New Press, 2008).
403 Decision to open a preliminary investigation into the alleged torture and abuse of four
former Guantánamo detainees (Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed, Ikassrien Lahcen, Jamiel
Abdul Latif Al Banna and Omar Deghayes), Juzgado Central de Instrucción No 5, Audiencia
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Having apparently had no response to letters rogatory to the US and UK
inquiring whether any investigations are currently pending into the individual
cases of the four plaintiffs,404 the Spanish courts decided there was juris-
diction over these cases in Spain405 and reactivated the investigation.406
In a second case known as the ‘Bush Six’ case,407 a criminal complaint
was filed against six administration lawyers for participating in or providing
assistance to the torture and abuse of persons detained at Guantanamo Bay.408
In that case the US did respond409 and the case was ‘temporarily stayed’ –
transferred it to the US Department of Justice ‘for it to be continued, urging
it to indicate at the proper time the measures finally taken by virtue of this
transfer of procedure’.410 One might well question whether, in light of US
inaction, such deferral was unwarranted or at a minimum precipitous, but
Nacional, Madrid (Spanish High Court), decision (auto) of 27 April 2009, Preliminary
Investigations (diligencias previas) 150/09-N, at 9.
404 On 15 May 2009, J. Garzón issued Letters Rogatory to which reportedly neither country
responded. D. W. Krohnke, ‘Spain’s Criminal Case Over Alleged U.S. Torture of Guanta-
namo Detainees’, available at: http://dwkcommentaries.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/spains-
criminal-case-over-alleged-u-s-torture-of-guantanamo-detainees.
405 In June 2010, Judge Ruz took over this case. Ibid. See also, A. Worthington, ‘Spanish Torture
Investigation into Gitmo to Continue’, 28 February 2011, available at: http://www.fff.org/
comment/com1102n.asp.
406 Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 5, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid (Spanish High Court),
decision (auto) of 3 January 2012, Preliminary Investigations (diligencias previas), 150/2009-P,
available at: http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2012/01/13/17/35/Xfe8u.So.56.pdf
(Spanish Only).
407 The ‘Bush six’ are: Alberto Gonzales, former US Attorney General and White House
Counsel; John Yoo, of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (author of many
of the ‘torture memos’); Douglas Feith, former undersecretary of defense for policy; William
Haynes II, former general counsel for the Department of Defense (chief counsel to Donald
Rumsfeld); Jay Bybee, of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (another author
of the ‘torture memos’); and David Addington, former Chief of Staff to the Vice President.
408 Case no. 134/2009, filed 17 March 2009 by the Association for the Dignity of Male and
Female Prisoners of Spain. alleged ‘the creation, approval and execution of a judicial
framework that allowed for the deprivation of fundamental rights ...torture ... the establish-
ment of impunity for all ... in the detention centre at Guantánamo;’ ‘Spanish Investigation
against the “Bush Six”: Judge Velasco, Central Tribunal of Instruction No. 6’, Center for
Constitutional Rights, available at: http://ccrjustice.org/spain-us-torture-case. See also, J.
Borger and D. Fuchs, ‘Spanish judge to hear torture case against six Bush officials’,
Guardian, 29 March 2009, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2009/mar/29/
guantanamo-bay-torture-inquiry. For allegations of crimes committed by the Bush Six, see
P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law (Allen Lane, 2008).
409 Response of U.S. Department of State, ‘Re: Request for Assistance from Spain in the Matter
of Addington, David; Bybee, Jay; Feith, Douglas; Haynes, William; Yoo, Joohn; and Gon-
zalez, Alberto; Spanish Reference Number: 0002342/2009-CAP’, 1 March 2011, on file with
author.
410 Decision, 13 April 2011 at http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/spanish-investiga-
tion-us-torture.
664 Chapter 8
it remains to be seen whether the investigation will be reopened if inactivity
persists in the US.411
Proceedings have also sprung up in response to torture allegations else-
where,412 Despite pressure from the United States,413 there may therefore
be some indication that a shift may be afoot internationally to hold US officials
to account abroad, at least for as long as they are not be held to account at
home; leaked cables reveal the Spanish Prosecutor describing a US investigation
as ‘‘the only way out’ for the US government.414 Until then, those accused
of serious crimes may well be vulnerable to arrest if they travel outside the
US, leading to what has been described as ‘their own legal black hole’.415
8D CONCLUSION
The anomalous situation in which the Guantanamo detainees are held, without
basic legal protections, is not a casualty of any ‘legal limbo’ or ‘black hole’
in international law. The Guantanamo detainees are entitled, under inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law, to certain core human rights
protections irrespective of who they are, where they are detained, or their
nationality.
Guantanamo does not therefore challenge the weakness of the legal frame-
work as such, and nor is it likely to change it. In certain circumstances toler-
ance or acquiescence by third states may contribute to a shift in customary
law – and state reactions are therefore important not only to the enforcement
of law, but to the maintenance of international standards. Even if the particular
norms at issue in Guantanamo were susceptible to change, the extent of
international opposition to the Guantanamo regime, as highlighted above, may
well have guarded against the law being directly affected in this way. It is
411 See challenge to the decision. at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2012-09-25%20CCR%20ECCHR%
20Amicus%20Brief. The Judge is free to reopen the case as it was suspended not closed.
412 Eg. on 2 January 2012, French investigating magistrate Sophie Clement requested access
to documents as part of an investigation into allegations of torture of three former French
prisoners. H. Stemple, ‘France judge requests access to Guantanamo to probe torture
allegations’, The Jurist, 17 January 2012, at: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/01/france-
judge-requests-access-to-guantanamo-to-probe-torture-allegations.php. A. Makhoul, ‘French
judge seeks access to Guantanamo amid torture probe’, France 24, 18 January 2012: http://
www.france24.com/en/20120118-france-judge-guantanamo-bay-prison-investigation-torture-
rape-clement-usa-afghanistan.
413 Leaked cables reveal how US officials met with the Spanish chief prosecutor and judges,
who described prosecution as ‘the only way out’ for the US Government. ‘US embassy
cables: Spanish prosecutor weighs Guantánamo criminal case against US officials’, The
Guardian, 1 December 2010, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-
cables-documents/200177.
414 Ibid.
415 J. Meyer, ‘The Bush Six’, The New Yorker, 13 April 2009, available at: http://www.newyorker.
com/talk/2009/04/13/090413ta_talk_mayer.
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also doubtful to what degree Guantanamo demonstrates a compelling need
for such development of legal standards, though it may, of course, highlight
areas where the law could be clarified, developed or at least better understood,
to prevent manipulation of the legal framework in the future.
While Guantanamo may not challenge the law, it may challenge its per-
ceived relevance and compelling effect. The continued existence of Guantanamo
more than ten years on certainly highlights the weakness of international
enforcement. International legal mechanisms have played their part in monitor-
ing, responding and condemning, the cumulative impact of which is difficult
to determine. Their role has been curtailed by limited access of victims to the
mechanisms (for lack of acceptance of jurisdiction by the US),416 and limited
access of the mechanisms to detainees. Ultimately their impact depends on
political will to stand up for international law (and most critically in this
context to stand up to the US). While the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights was prompt to request that the US take precautionary measures
to protect the detainees’ fundamental rights,417 for example, the US response
was predictably dismissive, and little apparent weight was attributed to the
decision thereafter. In this respect, Guantanamo serves as a reminder of the
need to strengthen those mechanisms enshrined in IHRL and IHL, and the
international community’s commitment to them.
It is however the role of states that is critical. States have been unusually
condemnatory, at least eventually, and international reactions perhaps serve
to clarify that Guantanamo has no place within a rule of law approach, and
to resist the erosion of legal standards through practice. The reaction of states
may also have contributed to making Guantanamo so unsustainable, a
recognised international affront. While not all ways in which states exert
influence are public and readily assessable, it is must be asked whether enough
was done to ensure the basic rights of all detainees in a timely manner. Many
were tortured during the years it took for states to overcome their hesitation
to condemn the arbitrariness of Guantanamo. The following has been said
of Guantanamo Bay:
At present we are not meant to know what is happening at Guantanamo Bay. But
history will not be neutered. What takes place there today in the name of the United
416 See Chapter 7A1 on mechanisms, and Chapter 11 on human rights litigation for victims.
The US has not ratified the ICCPR Optional Protocol on which the right of individual
petition to the Human Rights Committee depends, nor accepted the jurisdiction of the
IACtHR. However, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction in
respect of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, binding on the US.
417 See IACHR, Precautionary Measures, supra note 181. While the potential impact was under-
mined by the refusal of the US to do as requested by the Commission, it remains significant
as a reassertion of the role of international law in this context. It has followed up since
with statements of concern that the situation has not been remedied. IAHCR Press Release,
supra note 38.
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States will assuredly, in due course, be judged at the bar of informed international
opinion.418
The US may well be judged harshly. But it will not be judged alone. Other
states, and the international community more broadly, stand to be judged for
their determination, or their failure, to protect not only their own nationals,
but other Guantanamo detainees and the rule of law.
To paraphrase the Nuremberg judgment, it may be that international law
will only be given meaningful effect in relation to Guantanamo when the
individuals who ordered and gave effect to these violations, and not only the
‘abstract entities’ through which they act, are held to account.419 Account-
ability may yet arise in respect of Guantanamo Bay for crimes of torture and
inhuman treatment, wilfully depriving prisoners of war of fair trial rights,
or arbitrary prolonged detention.420 While legally possible on the international
level, the more conceivable prospect is of individual accountability enforced
nationally, if not in the state of territory, in the courts of another state exercis-
ing universal jurisdiction or passive personality jurisdiction.421 It remains
to be seen whether there will be, in the fullness of time, any meaningful
individual or state accountability in respect of the Guantanamo situation.
The implications of Guantanamo detentions for detainees held without
legal protection, and without a remedy, and for their families, are immediate
and apparent. Less so perhaps are the broader long-term implications for the
rule of law and its respect in the future. While as noted above the widespread
condemnation of Guantanamo as unlawful minimises the risk of a shift in legal
standards, the Guantanamo experiment may give credence to the insidious
notion of legal limbo (that certain persons fall entirely outside the framework
418 Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, supra note 5.
419 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals:
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (Lon-
don, 1950), p. 447.
420 The crimes may be war crimes for those detained in relation to a conflict, or crimes against
humanity given the nature of some of the wrongs, and the widespread and systematic
nature of Guantanamo, detentions and ill-treatment. Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war
of fair trial rights is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Arbitrary detention was
not included, for example, in the ICC Statute, though it may amount to a crime against
humanity.
421 On the national level, states may exercise universal jurisdiction or passive personality
jurisdiction for those states with such bases of jurisdiction in their domestic systems. As
noted, the conferral of jurisdiction (unlike criminal responsibility) can be ex post facto. ICC
jurisdiction is unlikely as most detentions were before its entry into force and, in any event,
it would only have jurisdiction if a national of a state party to the ICC Statute (not an
American) was responsible, or the offences arose on the territory of a state party, or a state
decided to accept jurisdiction over the offences retroactively. An ad hoc tribunal could be
set up, but the Security Council route would be vetoed leaving the Nuremberg model of
several states collectively establishing a body. While this may be legally possible, it is hardly
conceivable politically, at least at this stage.
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of international legal protection) or contribute to the perceived inevitability
of human rights as the first casualty of counter-terrorism, conflict and security-
sensitive situations. It may give cover to other states detaining arbitrarily,
seeking to circumvent basic legal obligations by crude manipulation of the
principle of territoriality or applying the law only ‘to the extent appro-
priate.’422 Evidence already exists of the practice other states, many of whom
are not new to human rights repression, relying on Guantanamo to justify
arbitrary detention of alleged terrorists or resort to military commissions to
try civilians.423
Unsurprisingly, an additional by-product of this role for the US is that its
credibility to act as the restraining force it once was on human rights issues
is seriously undermined,424 with its condemnation of military commissions,
arbitrary detentions or impunity,425 ringing hollow and hypocritical when
juxtaposed alongside the notoriety of Guantanamo Bay.426
While numbers are dwindled, Westerners are gone, and the public per-
ception may be of a Guantanamo-era drawing to a close, that is far from the
case. Much remains uncertain as to the nature of the long term impact of
Guantanamo. Will the ad hocary and violations of the military commissions
give way to a reinforcement of the importance of regular criminal law and
422 Presidential Memo of 7 February 2002, supra note 194 ‘As a matter of policy, the United
States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appro-
priate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles
of Geneva.’ See also, G. W. Bush, ‘Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate’, supra note 216.
423 See, e.g., statement by President Mubarak of Egypt that resort to military commissions
‘prove[s] that we were right from the beginning in using all means, including military
tribunals’ to curb terrorism, in J. Stork, ‘The Human Rights Crisis in the Middle East in
the Aftermath of 11 September’, paper presented at the Symposium on Terrorism and
Human Rights, Cairo, 26-28 January 2002, on file with author.
424 Guantanamo is the most flagrant example of US exceptionalism on human rights issues.
Others include the increased resort to targeted killings and other counter-terrorism measures
highlighted in this book, the position on establishment of an ICC, banning of child soldiers,
creation of mechanisms for individual redress for torture, environmental protection that
had already diminished the standing and authority of the US internationally.
425 See Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Released by the Bureau of Demo-
cracy, Human Rights, and Labour of the Department of State.
426 This has been exploited by critics of the US such as Fidel Castro who criticized the U.S.
for its ‘concentration camp’ at Guantanamo Bay. ‘Castro blasts Guantanamo “concentration
camp”’, ABC News, 20 April 2004, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-04-20/
castro-blasts-guantanamo-concentration-camp/173218. More recently, the Russian Parliament
(Dumas)’s human rights report which lambasts the US with particular focus on Guantanamo,
noting that ‘Washington’s pretentions of being a leader in the defence of human rights
and democratic values were not justified’. ‘Russian report censures US human rights record’,
Press TV, 23 October 2012, available at: http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/10/23/268224/
russia-deplores-us-human-rights-record.
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mechanisms,427 or will death sentences executed absent fair trial guarantees
darken the ‘stain’ on American justice?428 Will the US judiciary be able to
deliver on the Supreme Court’s promise of ‘meaningful’ judicial oversight and
ensure effective implementation?429 What will be the long term fate of those
slated for indefinite detention?430 Will Guantanamo close in form and sub-
stance, and with it a chapter of arbitrariness, or will it metamorphose into new
ways of achieving the same thing – military commission on US soil or arbitrary
detention by proxy, further off-shore and under the radar?431 Will policy
in other areas, such as targeted killings, recognise and avoid the many errors
of mistaken identity, and dangers of discarding the rule of law, that Guanta-
namo illustrates? Will states which have negotiated the release of nationals
continue to insist respect for international law for all detainees? Will the
principle of non-cooperation with Guantanamo and military commissions
extend to other states and other contexts? Will they recognize as victims the
detainees emerging from Guantanamo, provide them necessary assistance and
a measure of justice? Will the violations of the past be ignored, or will
accountability be pursued, as the law requires and the years and lives lost
in Guantanamo deserve? What measures will be taken to ensure that the
violations, much lamented across political and national barriers, will not
happen again? What will the world have learned from Guantanamo, and at
what cost?
427 President Obama indicated the possibility of moving military tribunals to US soil in May
2013, supra note 7.
428 Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, supra note 5.
429 On meaningful opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention and practice, see
Boumediene, supra note 16; ‘[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President’. Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, supra note 175, p. 28. Although perhaps somewhat less robustly, it reached
the same conclusion in respect of non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay in Result. Rasul, supra
note 16. On non-implementation, see ‘A.1.X Limbo within Limbo’, above.
430 Forty-eight detainees were determined by the 2010 Guantanamo Review Task Force to be
too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution. ‘Guantanamo Review Task Force’,
supra note 43. Obama announced a lifting of the moratorium on transfers to Yemen in May
2013 but there was no clear plan for their release.
431 See also Chapter 10 on detention and torture ‘by proxy’ at the hands of other states. As
oversight of Guantanamo (and other sites) increased in the course of the habeas litigation,
some detainees were moved on to alternative sites.
9 Case Study II: Osama bin Laden: ‘Justice
Done’?
9.1 INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE FACTS
On 1 May 2011, 25 highly trained US Navy SEALs1 raided a compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan where bin Laden, some of his family and his bodyguard
had been hiding. The SEALs overwhelmed the compound, and shot bin Laden
and another five individuals dead. Hours later, President Obama announced
that ‘justice had been done’.2
Analyses and opinion promptly followed. While many applauded – in-
cluding notably UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon3 – dissenters lamented
the decision to kill rather than capture and prosecute bin Laden as an ‘assass-
ination’4 or, in the words of former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, ‘quite
1 The United States Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land Teams are known as SEALs.
2 D. Walsh, E. MacAskill and J. Burke, ‘Osama bin Laden killed in US raid on Pakistan
hideout’, The Guardian, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-pakistan.
3 Secretary General Ban Ki Moon stated: ‘The death of Osama bin Laden... is a watershed
moment in our common global fight against terrorism.... Personally, I am very much relieved
by the news that justice has been done’. Statement by the Secretary-General Following the
News of Osama Bin Laden’s Death, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.un.org/sg/
statements/?nid=5235. See M. Milanovic, ‘Was the Killing of Osama bin Laden Lawful?’
EJIL Talk, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/was-the-killing-of-osama-bin-
laden-lawful; R. Chesney, ‘The Legality of the UBL Operation: Responding to the Der Spiegel
Criticism’, Lawfare Blog, 3 May 2011, available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/05/
the-legality-of-the-ubl-operation-responding-to-the-der-spiegel-criticism; M. Lewis, ‘The
Boundaries of the Battlefield’, Opinio Juris, 15 May 2011, para. 5, available at: http://
opiniojuris.org/2011/05/15/the-boundaries-of-the-battlefield; B. Saul, ‘Delivered from Evil…
to a minefield of law and consequence’, ABC, 6 May 2011, available at: http://www.abc.
net.au/unleashed/1433114.html. See description of the operation as President Obama’s
‘greatest success’ in the war on terror. J. Yoo, ‘Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11’,
56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 57, p. 59
4 Geoffrey Robertson QC stated to the Australian Broadcasting Corp: ‘It’s not justice. It’s
a perversion of the term. Justice means taking someone to court, finding them guilty upon
evidence and sentencing them. This man has been subject to summary execution, and what
is now appearing after a good deal of disinformation from the White House is it may well
have been a cold-blooded assassination’. E. Kirschbaum and J. Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised
over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, Reuters, 4 May 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/05/04/us-binladen-legitimacy-idUSTRE74371H20110504. See also critiques
by other academics and practitioners in O. Bowcott, ‘Osama bin Laden: US responds to
questions about killing’s legality’, The Guardian, 3 May 2011, available at: http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/03/osama-bin-laden-killing-legality.
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clearly a violation of international law’.5 Slower to emerge, as well as erratic
and inconsistent, were details of the nature of the operation6 upon which,
as explained below, legality in fact depends.
Different versions of the facts have ‘evolved’ over time. The earliest reports
suggested that bin Laden was armed and ‘engaged in a firefight with those
that entered the area of the house’ and that he had used a woman as a human
shield.7 Shortly thereafter, a spokesperson stated that they ‘expected a great
deal of resistance and were met with a great deal of resistance,’ describing
a ‘highly volatile fight out’ in the compound.8 By other official accounts neither
bin Laden nor anyone else in the room with him when he was killed was
armed, while the Press Secretary noted somewhat obliquely that ‘resistance
does not require a firearm’.9 There were indications at one point that bin
Laden’s wife may have ‘rushed’ the SEALs,10 though other accounts question
5 Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt told German TV that the operation could
have incalculable consequences in the Arab world at a time of unrest there. ‘It was quite
clearly a violation of international law.’ Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised over
shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, ibid.
6 The Navy SEAL operation to capture or kill bin Laden was code-named ‘Operation Neptune
Spear’. See e.g., P. Sherwell, ‘Osama bin Laden killed: Behind the scenes of the deadly raid,’
The Guardian, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/
8500431/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-Behind-the-scenes-of-the-deadly-raid.html.
7 Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan on
2 May 2011 appeared to have said bin Laden was armed, noting ‘[h]e was engaged in a
firefight with those that entered the area of the house he was in. And whether or not he
got off any rounds, I quite frankly don’t know.’ See White House Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-
terrorism John Brennan, The White House, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-assistant-
president-homela. See also ‘Bin Laden hid behind women in firefight: White House’, Reuters,
2 May 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-binladen-usa-
women-idUSTRE74166F20110502. ‘After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took
custody of his body.’ Obama, ‘President Obama on Death of Osama bin Laden’, The White
House, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-
laden-dead.
8 See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, The White House, 3 May 2011, available
at:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/03/press-briefing-press-secretary-
jay-carney-532011. ‘We expected a great deal of resistance and were met with a great deal
of resistance.’ Carney noted that ‘there were many other people who were armed in the
region -- I mean, in the compound. There was a firefight ... a highly volatile firefight’.
9 In a ‘new narrative’ later on the same day (Telegraph, 3 May 2012) Carney noted: ‘There
was concern that bin Laden would oppose the capture operation -- operation rather, and,
indeed, he did resist. In the room with bin Laden, a woman -- bin Laden’s -- a woman,
rather, bin Laden’s wife, rushed the U.S. assaulter and was shot in the leg but not killed.
Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed.’ Cf. Press Briefing by Press Secretary
Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
John Brennan, supra note 7.
10 Ibid.
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this.11 When pressed regarding uncertainty as to the nature of the force the
SEALs had met, the authorities were reluctant to provide details clarifying
versions of events.12
Subsequently, accounts have emerged from ‘insiders’ and investigative
journalists, which suggest that an unarmed bin Laden was shot in the head
while in the corridor of his apartment.13 He retreated to a room where SEALs
entered and found him lying on the floor ‘twitching’ and apparently ‘fatally
wounded,’ with two unarmed women bent over him, and ‘fired several more
shots into his chest’.14
Facts regarding the purpose and planning of the operation have also been
slow to emerge. While official statements initially suggested that the objective
had indeed been to kill bin Laden, they subsequently suggested a policy that
could have seen him captured or killed.15 In an interview, then-CIA Director
Leon Panetta confirmed that the ‘authorities’ were to kill bin Laden, but added
that the rules of engagement were such that ‘if he had thrown his hands up’
the ‘opportunity’ to capture may have arisen.16 There can be little doubt that
killing bin Laden had long been a goal of the US administrations.17
11 M. Owen and K. Maurer, No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama
Bin Laden (Dutton Adult, 2012), pp. 235-36.
12 The following day, when asked to clarify, the Press Secretary invoked security concerns
as a basis for not doing so. See ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney’, The White
House, 4 May 2011, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/04/
press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-542011
13 Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, pp. 235-36.
14 ‘According to one of the Seals, the first man up spotted a tall, bearded, swarthy man ...
One or more of the Seals fired at him. The man retreated quickly into a bedroom and the
Seals followed. In the bedroom they found two women leaning over a fatally wounded
Bin Laden, who had been shot in the head. The first Seal violently moved the women out
of the way and the other two stood over him and fired several more shots into his chest.’
M. Bowden, The Finish: The Killing Of Osama Bin Laden, (New York: Atlantic Books, 2012),
p. 230. See similarly, Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, p. 236.
15 Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan,
stated: ‘If we had the opportunity to take bin Laden alive, if he didn’t present any threat,
the individuals involved were able and prepared to do that. We had discussed that extens-
ively in a number of meetings in the White House and with the President. The concern
was that bin Laden would oppose any type of capture operation. Indeed, he did. It was
a firefight. He, therefore, was killed in that firefight and that’s when the remains were
removed. But we certainly were planning for the possibility, which we thought was going
to be remote, given that he would likely resist arrest, but that we would be able to capture
him.’ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan, supra note 7.
16 ‘CIA chief Leon Panetta admits ‘if Osama bin Laden surrendered we wouldn’t have killed
him”’, The Telegraph, 4 May 2011, interview available at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gYvu8Wuddp4.
17 As a Presidential candidate, Obama had said. “We will kill bin Laden. We will crush al-
Qaida. That has to be our biggest national security priority.” Transcript of Second Presid-
ential debate, 7 Oct.2008, at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/trans
cripts/second-presidential-debate.html. See also ‘Bush: bin Laden “Wanted Dead or Alive”’,
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As regards the instructions and direction given to those involved in the
operation, one of the SEALs involved records that, when asked, a White House
lawyer indicated to those carrying out the raid that ‘[i]f he is naked with his
hands up, you’re not going to engage him ... I am not going to tell you how
to do your job. What we’re saying is if he does not pose a threat, you will
detain him’.18 Another account by an officer involved in the operation contra-
dicts this, stating his understanding of the position in no uncertain terms:
‘There was never any question of detaining or capturing him – it wasn’t a split-
second decision. No one wanted detainees’.19
A detailed account by a journalist who interviewed President Obama on
the matter lays out in detail how in the months leading up to the operation,
plans were made around three options, which remained on the table until close
to the time of the operation.20 These options were a bombardment of the
compound, a drone attack on bin Laden when engaged in his regular pattern
of ‘pacing’ the courtyard, or the ground operation.21 The account also makes
clear the level of doubt as to whether the target identified was indeed bin
Laden, described by Obama as ‘50-50’,22 with the CIA deputy director reported
to have told the President that ‘the case for WMDs wasn’t just stronger, it was
much stronger’.23 The many men, women and children who would have been
killed in an aerial attack, against a ‘50-50 chance of also killing Osama bin
Laden,’ was said to give the President ‘pause’ and may have contributed to
the decision to engage ground troops.24 Other reported reasons included the
need to ensure the identification of bin Laden, if killed, the risk of a drone
CNN, 17 September 2001, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-17/us/bush.powell.
terrorism_1_bin-qaeda-terrorist-attacks, and the bounty on Bin Laden’s head, Chapter 6B.2.3
18 Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, p. 177.
19 J. Swaine, ‘Osama Bin Laden: mission was to shoot to kill from the start’, The Telegraph,
1 August 2011, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/
8676157/Osama-Bin-Laden-mission-was-to-shoot-to-kill-from-the-start.html.
20 Bowden notes ‘Planning for either an air or a ground assault on the compound proceeded
through February 2011...’ while noting that several options were on the table during that
time from bombardment to other methods of execution. Bowden, The Finish, supra note
14, p. 155.
21 Ibid.
22 ‘“This is 50-50,” [Obama] said. “Look, guys, this is a flip of the coin. I can’t base this
decision on the notion that we have any greater certainty than that.”’ Bowden, The Finish,
supra note 14, p. 163.
23 Morell, CIA deputy director’s advice to President Obama, Ibid., p. 161.
24 ‘Obama asked how many people were living at the compound and was informed that there
were four adult males, five women and nearly twenty children. He asked about the houses
that were close to the compound in the neighborhood. Those, too, would be completely
destroyed, along with every resident man, woman and child. This really gave the president
pause. America was not going to obliterate them on a 50-50 chance of also killing Osama
bin Laden.’ Ibid., p. 164.
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missing the target and target fleeing, and the importance of seizing material
from the compound.25
The truth is difficult to ascertain Reports regarding the preparatory stage,
the official statements in relation to the event and the immediate response of
declaring the mission accomplished,26 all appear consistent with the SEALs
published account that purpose of the operation was to kill bin Laden.27 Many
details of the exact orders issued and the plans and preparations have not,
however, been made public. References to the desire to take bin Laden ‘dead
or alive’ have been made by successive US presidents,28 according to earlier
statements. The statement that no one wanted detainees resonates with those
of commentators on the undoubted political ‘difficulties’ that would have arisen
from his capture, regarding where to detain him, whether to prosecute him
and, if so, where to do so. These issues have blighted US counter-terrorism
policy since 9/11.29 Those factors can have no legitimate bearing on a deter-
mination of the lawfulness of resort to lethal force, addressed in the following
section.
Official reports indicate that bin Laden’s body was removed from the
compound, washed and prepared in accordance with Islamic traditions and
religious rites were read by US army personnel.30 Bin Laden was then dropped
from US aircraft carrier Carl Vinson into the North Arabian Sea.31
25 On the drone possibility, Bowden notes, ‘What if it worked and you dropped the Pacer
in his tracks? How would you know that you had killed Osama bin Laden? And it was
strictly a one-shot deal. If you missed, the Pacer and his entourage would vanish ...’. Ibid.,
p. 175. As regards the President’s decision the night before the raid, see p. 206.
26 It has been noted that if the forces were in fact prepared to capture, with the intelligence
value, prosecution, and propaganda benefits said capture would have entailed, the mission
would have been a considerable failure as a result of bin Laden’s death. Saul, ‘Delivered
from Evil’, supra note 3.
27 Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11.
28 Obama interview cited in Bowden, The Finish, supra note 14, p. 206. As noted in Chapter
6, President George W. Bush on September 17, 2001, when responding to the press question
‘Do you want bin Laden dead?’, said ‘There’s an old poster out West, as I recall, that said,
“Wanted Dead or Alive”’. ‘Bush: bin Laden “Wanted Dead or Alive”’, CNN, 17 September
2001, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-17/us/bush.powell.terrorism_1_bin-
qaeda-terrorist-attacks.
29 ‘If bin Laden had been captured, rather than killed, the US would have become entangled
in a plethora of legal issues. If he had been taken alive, issues would have been raised about
would he have been subject to prosecution? Would it be before the US courts? Would he
have been taken to Guantanamo? It clearly would raise a whole series of legal issues,
ultimately not that dissimilar confronted with many of these people who have captured
in recent years and taken to Guantanamo’. Prof. Rothwell cited in A. Jamieson, ‘Crikey
Clarifier: was it legal to kill Osama?’, Crikey, 4 May 2011, available at: http://www.crikey.
com.au/2011/05/04/crikey-clarifierwas-it-legal-to-kill-osama. See also Chapter 6B22.
30 S. Kneezle, ‘Official E-mails Detail Osama bin Laden’s Sea Burial’, TIME, 22 November
2012, available at: http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/22/official-e-mails-detail-osama-bin-
ladens-sea-burial last visited at 22 November 2012.
31 Ibid.
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The bin Laden killing raises several issues from intersecting areas of inter-
national law from previous chapters, which are addressed in turn in Part A
below. One is the legitimacy of the use of force itself, and whether the inter-
vention on Pakistani soil was justified by state consent or, as Attorney General
Eric Holder argued at the time, self-defence. Another issue is whether the bin
Laden killing can, as the US authorities suggested at the time, be justified by
reference to IHL. The third, notably neglected in the US analysis, is whether
the human rights framework was applicable and, if so, whether its require-
ments in relation to the strict necessity of the use of force were met.32 Finally,
although ignored in official justifications and most of the analysis surrounding
the killing, the relevance of criminal law is considered. The treatment of OBL’s
corpse after the killing and legal issues that arise from the framework are
highlighted in Part B.
9.2 THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
9.2.1 Use of Force against the Territorial Integrity of Pakistan: the sovereignty
question?
A preliminary legal question relates to the lawfulness of a forceful intervention
on another sovereign state’s territory, in light of the rules on force set out in
Chapter 5. Did the operation, as former President Musharraf suggested shortly
thereafter, amount to an unlawful use of force against the state in violation
of Article 2(4) of the Charter?33 As explored in Chapter 5, the basic rule
against the use of force on another state’s territory is enshrined in Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter, which represents one of the most basic rules of the legal
order.34 According to the prevailing view of the law as it currently stands,
even incursions which are limited temporally, geographically and purposively,
as was the bin Laden operation, may in principle violate the territorial integrity
of another state. Lawfulness therefore depends on the existence of one of the
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under international law.
Firstly, if the state of Pakistan in fact consented there would of course be
no violation. The facts surrounding Pakistani-US relations, and specifically what
the Pakistani state knew, authorised or forbade, are almost as murky as those
32 See standards in Chapter 7A Life, and 7B3 for interplay between IHL and IHRL
33 J. Bacon, ‘Musharraf: U.S. violated Pakistan’s sovereignty’, USA Today, 3 May 2011, available
at: http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/05/musharraf-us-
violated-pakistan-sovereignity/1.
34 The nature of the rule and the exceptions to it have been discussed in Chapter 5A.
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in relation to the covert operation itself.35 By most official accounts, both
Pakistani36 and American,37 it would appear that Pakistan was not informed
of the operation nor was its consent sought. It has been noted that President
Zardari, while noting that the operation was not joint, nonetheless applauded
it.38 To some, this amounted to an indication that ‘there may have been tacit
consent ex-ante, that there is at least tacit consent post-hoc’.39 Such an argu-
ment is undermined, however, by the authorities expressing ‘deep concerns
and reservations on the manner’ of the operation.40 Nevertheless, it did not
condemn the attack as a violation of its sovereignty or territorial integrity as
former President Musharraf had, settling instead for emphasising that such
incursions should not occur in the future.41 It is a question of fact whether
there was in fact consent, authorisation or approval, whether tacit or explicit,
prior to the operation or, perhaps, ex post facto.
Secondly, had the intervention been authorised by the Security Council
under its Chapter VII powers, there would naturally be no violation of Art
2(4). However even with the broad reaching resolutions against terrorism that
have been passed post 9/11, there is little suggestion that these could be
35 Numerous commentators note the state indications of consent or lack of it may be politically
motivated; in relation to Pakistan, one commentator notes often have to be taken ‘with
a grain of salt’. M. Schmitt, Essays on Law and War at the Fault Lines (The Hague: T.M.C.
Asser Press, 2011), p. 74.
36 ‘The Government of Pakistan recognizes that the death of Osama bin Laden is an important
milestone in fight against terrorism and that the Government of Pakistan and its state
institutions have been making serious efforts to bring him to justice. However, the Govern-
ment of Pakistan categorically denies the media reports suggesting that its leadership, civil
as well as military, had any prior knowledge of the US operation against Osama bin Laden
carried out in the early hours of 2nd May 2011.’ ‘Death of Osama bin Ladin-Respect for
Pakistan’s Established Policy Parameters on Counter Terrorism’, press statement by the
government of Pakistan, PR. NO. 152/2010, Date: 03/05/2011, available at: http://
www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/Printer_Friendly/2011/May/PR_Print_152.htm(MOFA
Statement’). It also notes that the ‘CIA exploited the intelligence leads given by us to identify
and reach Osama bin Laden, a fact also acknowledged by the US President and Secretary
of State, in their statements’.
37 ‘We didn’t contact the Pakistanis until after all of our people, all of our aircraft were out
of Pakistani airspace’. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan, supra note 7.
38 Chesney, ‘The Legality of the UBL Operation’, supra note 3, citing A. Zardari, ‘Pakistan
did its part’, The Washington Post, Opinions, 2 May 2011, available at: http://www.washing
tonpost.com/opinions/pakistan-did-its-part/2011/05/02/AFHxmybF_story.html.
39 Ibid.
40 ‘Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and
reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this
operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan’.
MOFA Statement, supra note 36.
41 ‘This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government
of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any
state, including the US. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime
constitute threat to international peace and security.’ Ibid.
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construed as authorizing a state to use force against another state to kill or
indeed apprehend terrorists suspects without that state’s consent.42
Thirdly, the attack would not be illegal if it could be justified as an act
of self-defence, as indeed US Attorney General Eric Holder argued in the wake
of the attack.43 While some controversy continues to surround the use of force
in self-defence against non-state actors, the stronger view of the law is that
self-defence may arise whether or not the armed attack emanates from a state
or non-state actor.44 This is more readily established where the state – which
might otherwise be expected to take the necessary action in accordance with
its own international obligations towards terrorism45 – proves unwilling or
unable to do so.46
The lawfulness of resort to self-defence would however depend on certain
critical conditions being met. It depends first on bin Laden representing a real
concrete and imminent threat to the US. Second, the force used must be a
necessary and proportionate response to avert that threat. In this particular
scenario (unlike that posed in respect of the use of force in Afghanistan post-
9/11 for example47) it may be the first element that gives greatest pause for
reflection. Was there reliable information concerning the extent to which bin
Laden posed a direct, concrete and imminent threat to the US at the time of
the operation? In this respect, the relevant question is not his role and influence
at the time of 9/11, but as a fugitive a decade later.48 The symbolic signific-
ance of bin Laden, even at that stage, is beyond doubt, but the legitimacy of
self defence depends on his contribution to an actual or imminent armed
attack. Nor is the question whether he posed any threat at all, as many no-
torious criminals do, but whether he posed a threat of a nature and degree
sufficient to constitute an ‘armed attack’ by non-state actor against the United
States.49 The nature of the threat posed by bin Laden, from his apartment
in Abottabad in 2011, is the subject of considerable controversy.50 This factual
42 See Chapters 2 and 7B1 on the broad reach of resolutions against terrorism generally, though
these fall short of authorizing the use of force on another states territory
43 Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, supra
note 4.
44 See Chapter 5, para. 5.A.2.
45 See Chapter 2, para. 2.2.
46 See generally Chapter 5.
47 Chapter 5B.2; in the wake of the 9/11 attack questions of necessity and proportionality
were perhaps more difficult and more critical to lawfulness than the existence of the attack
or the threat itself.
48 See e.g., P. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden--from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New
York: Crown Publishers, 2012).
49 On the nature of the threshold, which applies only to non-state actor, is not uncontroversial.
Some consider only states can conduct armed attacks, others that there is no threshold.
See discussion in Chapter 5.
50 See e.g., T. Darnstädt, ‘Was Bin Laden’s Killing Legal?’, Spiegel Online, 3 May 2011, available
at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/justice-american-style-was-bin-laden-s-
killing-legal-a-760358.html.
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assessment would have to have been made by the authorities, based on avail-
able intelligence, much of which is not in the public domain.
To meet the necessity test required for the use of force on another state’s
territory, there must be no alternative way of neutralising the threat; thus, for
example, consulting or engaging the national authorities in international
cooperation must not be a feasible route, and there are certainly shades of this
in statements made by the US since the operation. A determination of whether
Pakistan could be trusted not to jeopardize the operation against bin Laden,
or indeed whether it was able and willing to cooperate with the US, entails
undoubtedly complex political and pragmatic questions which fall to the state
to determine based on available information.51
If the use of force met the ‘necessity’ test, the nature of the operation lends
itself favourably to a ‘proportionality’ analysis. The use of ground forces –
rather than aerial bombardment as has been used elsewhere and as was
reportedly seriously countenanced as an alternative for the Abottabad operation
– limited the use of force. While the action led to five deaths (including bin
Laden’s) and other injuries,52 some seventeen or eighteen other persons living
in the compound apparently survived.53 Had the operation led to a fire fight
with Pakistani authorities, which the US acknowledged was one of the potential
outcomes of the operation,54 the level of force could have escalated, leading
to a very different scenario. But, as the operation was conducted, the forceful
incursion onto Pakistani territory was relatively limited in both time and effect.
Sovereignty cannot be used as cloak to shield terrorists from the reach of
legitimate defensive measures. While facts remain elusive, if bin Laden was
assessed to make a decisive contribution to an imminent threat of armed attack,
and the Pakistani authorities could not be relied upon to cooperate to meet
51 See e.g., Saul, ‘Delivered from Evil’, supra note 3. During the Presidential debates, Obama
stated openly that had they informed Pakistan the operation would not have happened.
The unwillingness and inability of Pakistan is relevant to the necessity of the use of force
in self defence, where other criteria is met, rather than as is sometimes suggested providing
a broader pretext for lawful use of force See Chapter 5.B.2.1.
52 A. Brown, ‘Osama Bin Laden’s death: How it happened’, BBC, News South Asia, 10 Septem-
ber 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13257330; see generally
Bowden, The Finish, supra note 14.
53 Ibid.
54 Statement by White House Advisor Mr. John Brennan who, while replying to a question,
said: Clearly, we were concerned that if the Pakistanis decided to scramble jets or whatever
else, they didn’t know who were on those jets. They had no idea about who might have
been on there, whether it be US or somebody else. So, we were watching and making sure
that our people and our aircraft were able to get out of Pakistani airspace. And thankfully,
there was no engagement with Pakistani forces. This operation was designed to minimize
the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and
thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there were no other individuals who were
killed aside from those on the compound.’ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney
and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan,
supra note 7.
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that threat, there may well be a compelling argument that the incursion onto
Pakistani territory was a necessary and proportionate response under the law
on the use of force.
This question of the lawfulness under jus ad bellum must be distinguished
from the entirely separate questions of whether the particular operation, and
bin Laden’s killing and the disposal of his body, were lawful under jus in bello,
if applicable, or under international human rights law, to which we now turn.
9.2.2 International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Lawful Killing of a Legitimate
Target?
As with the drone strikes, addressed in Chapter 6, the killing of bin Laden
was justified by the US authorities by reference to IHL and the right to kill
“enemy combatants in the field” (as well as self-defence).55 As has frequently
been noted in the chapter on IHL, a key question is whether he was targeted
as part of an armed conflict to which IHL applies. According to the US, the
applicability of IHL stems from his participation in the global armed conflict
it considers itself to be waging with al-Qaeda and associated groups around
the globe.56 If one rejects this view, as the author and most others seem to,
for the reasons discussed fully in Chapter 6,57 could he be said to have been
participating in another armed conflict, and if so which?
The non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Afghanistan for example,
may have spilled over into parts of Pakistan (though not Abottabad), and the
question arises whether he could be considered to be participating in that
conflict and if so in what capacity at the time of his death? Or could there
be said to be a separate conflict in Pakistan to which the US is a party, such
that the IHL framework applies? Doubts regarding the existence of such
separate conflict in Pakistan have been expressed in relation to drone attacks,
though some contend in the specific context of Pakistan there may be such
55 Attorney General Eric Holder told a U.S. Senate Committee: ‘He was the head of al Qaeda,
an organization that had conducted the attacks of September the 11th ... . The operation
against bin Laden was justified as an act of national self-defense. It’s lawful to target an
enemy commander in the field. We did so, for instance, with regard to Yamamoto in World
War II, when he was shot down in a plane.’ Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised
over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, supra note 4.
56 See e.g., H. Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), 25 March 2010, available
at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (hereinafter ‘ASIL Speech’).
See Chapter 6.B.1.1.
57 See Chapter 6B.2, for the resounding international rejection of the notion of a ‘Global War
on Terror’ on grounds, inter alia, that al Qaeda and associated groups lack the organisational
structure to constitute parties to an armed conflict, that the intensity threshold for armed
conflict may not be met, occasionally based on concerns regarding the possibility of a ‘war
of global reach,’ or a combination of the above.
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a conflict.58 Notably, there is no suggestion that bin Laden was targeted in
relation to any such Pakistani or Afghan conflict and the case has never
therefore been made out in these terms.
If conceivably there were a conflict between the US and al-Qaeda, in
Pakistan or beyond, it is on almost all views a non-international conflict.59
Assuming for argument’s sake, that there could be and was such an armed
conflict with the US, what then was bin Laden’s status for targeting purposes?
The relevant factual question is not what role he had played in past events
such as 9/11, but what his role was at the time of his death. Publicly available
information on the nature of his activities during the six years leading up to
his death, which is necessarily incomplete, may cast some doubt on the com-
mon assertion that he was targeted as the leader of a party to an armed
conflict.60 He was living in an apartment in Abottabad with no phone or
internet, emitting occasional videos intended to inspire and incite violence61
– criminal activity most likely, but a doubtful basis to establish leadership in
an armed conflict.
Bin Laden could be targeted if he was ‘directly participating in hostilities’,
as explored in Chapter 6. If allegations that he was actively involved in
planning additional attacks are well founded, then it may well be justifiable
to consider him an active participant in hostilities, despite his reclusive lifestyle.
He may indeed on this basis be considered as having a ‘continuous combat
function,’ as a result of which – if one accepts the approach of the ICRC Guid-
ance on ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ – means that he could, in principle,
be attacked at any time, even if at that moment he was not engaged in hostil-
ities. Once again the extent of any participation in hostilities depends on an
assessment of the facts.
Assuming he could be targeted on this basis, the next question (of consider-
able controversy) is whether, under IHL, such an individual should be captured
rather than killed, where this proves feasible. While some dispute this standard,
according to the ICRC Guidance, a person in a ‘continuous fighting function’
in a NIAC who surrenders, or if in all the circumstances it is feasible to capture
instead of kill, this route should be taken.62 Such an approach finds additional
support if one takes the view that in interpreting IHL in this context, the terms
of IHRL – with its clear obligation to capture rather than kill and to plan and
58 See Chapter 6, para. 6B.2.2.1 on the lawfulness of drone killings in Pakistan under IHL.
Cf. Saul, ‘Delivered from Evil’, supra note 3.
59 See Chapter 6A.1.1 on characterisation of conflicts.
60 See, e.g., Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan, supra note 7.
61 The US alleges that he was ‘planning further attacks’. Crimes may well have been committed
during this period (see below). But whether he could be said to have been actively partici-
pating in a conflict is more questionable.
62 See Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under IHL’,
ICRC, 2009 (hereinafter ‘ICRC DPH Guidance’).
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carry out operations to minimise any loss of life – should also be borne in
mind.63 Questions may then arise as regards the necessity of the use of lethal
force, depending on which version of the facts one considers. If, as some
accounts suggest, bin Laden was shot and incapacitated on the floor when
the SEALs entered the room, there would seem little basis for firing additional
multiple rounds into his chest.
A few commentators seem to have suggested that bin Laden should be
seen as a ‘combatant’ who could therefore be killed unless and until he was
‘hors de combat’.64 First, these categories apply in IAC and few (including
those in the US administration) would assert he was a combatant in an IAC.65
If he were, the question to be assessed on the facts would appear to be whether
he was ‘hors de combat’ or already ‘in the power of the enemy’ when the
special forces raided the compound and found him.66 While some have sug-
gested this requires the individual to have ‘completed’ surrender before he
was killed,67 it must surely be the better view in light of the clear wording
of the provision as well as the objectives of IHL, that the ‘intention to surrender’
would suffice to render him ‘hors de combat’.68 Moreover if he was firmly
under the control of the troops, in the hands of the enemy, and no longer
posing an active threat the lawfulness of his killing under IHL would be doubt-
ful whatever his status. The rules of IHL that prohibit giving no quarter,
63 As noted in Chapter 7, even if IHL applies, it does not do so to the exclusion of IHRL. On
intersection in the context of the bin Laden killing, see Milanovic, ‘Was the Killing of Osama
bin Laden Lawful?’, supra note 3.
64 US Attorney General Eric Holder testified before the House Judiciary Committee: ‘[I]f
someone is an enemy combatant, it does not matter if he is unarmed or not, because lethal
force is permitted against enemy fighters and commanders in the course of an ongoing
armed conflict, and sometimes in cases of self-defense.’ ‘Justice Department Oversight, Part
1’, C-Span, 3 May 2011, available at: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/299299-1. Prof.D
Rothwell states: ‘He has combatant status as he is the head of al-Qaeda, an organisation
involved in armed conflict with the US, not only because of the events of 9/11 but because
it continues to be at conflict with the United States.’ Jamieson, ‘Crikey Clarifier: was it legal
to kill Osama?’, supra note 29. CF legal standards Chapter 6A.2.1.
65 See Chapter 6 B.2.1 for discussion on the US justification of ‘self-defence or IHL’.
66 If ‘hors de combat’ he must not be made the object of attack. A person is ‘hors de combat’
if: (a) in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender;
or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or
sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself; provided that in any of these
cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.’ Article 41 of Addi-
tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. See also C. Mallat, ‘The Geneva Conventions
and the Death of Osama Bin Laden’, JURIST, 4 August 2011, available at: http://jurist.org/
forum/2011/08/chibli-mallat-bin-laden.php ; but see G. Rona, ‘Was killing Osama bin Laden
legal?’, Human Rights First, 5 May 2011, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
2011/05/05/was-killing-osama-bin-laden-legal.
67 S. Pezzi, ‘The Legality of Killing Osama bin Laden’, National Security Journal Blog, 16 May
2011, available at: http://harvardnsj.org/2011/05/killing-osama-bin-laden-and-the-law.
68 ‘[T]he only way OBL could immunize himself from targeting would be if clearly announced
his intention to surrender.’ Milanovic, ‘Was the Killing of Osama bin Laden Lawful?’, supra
note 3.
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deemed customary for either type of conflict,69 support the view that had
the orders effectively been to kill bin Laden and avoid another complicated
detainee scenario, this would conflict with long established rules of IHL.
In conclusion, the applicability of the IHL framework to this operation is
questionable. It is premised on his participation in a conflict that most of the
world believes does not exist. While the US reliance on IHL is entirely unsur-
prising, in light of its position on the ‘global war,’ the fact that much comment-
ary in the wake of his killing revolved around considerations of IHL of doubtful
application is perhaps less readily comprehensible in legal terms. The key
question for the bin Laden killing, like that of the many other individuals
subject to targeted killings at a growing pace,70 is whether they were parti-
cipating in an armed conflict as defined in international law. If the armed
conflict paradigm were to properly apply, there may well be a compelling
case for the view that this particular individual was engaged as an active
participant in the conflict, though this depends on the intelligence as to his
role at the time of death, not previously. Even on this analysis unanswered
questions remain: was he hors de combat or under the control of the enemy
before he was killed?71 Could he have been detained and prosecuted instead
of killed, without losses to those carrying out the raid? Did the circumstances
of operation make it militarily necessary to kill rather than capture him, or
was that the plan from the outset?
9.2.3 The Killing of Osama bin Laden under the Neglected Framework of
International Human Rights Law?
How does the killing of bin Laden measure up against the framework of IHRL?
As has been discussed in Chapter 7, if the scenario arose within an armed
conflict, IHRL should be interpreted in light of IHL, with a view to determining
whether the violation of the right to life was ‘arbitrary’.72 If however, as
would appear to be the most likely case, the situation was not one of armed
conflict, IHRL applies without reference to IHL.
A preliminary issue that has arisen relates to the extra-territorial reach of
IHRL.73 The US position is that its ICCPR obligations do not arise where it oper-
69 Rule 46, ICRC Study on Customary Law “Rule 46. Ordering that no quarter will be given,
threatening an adversary therewith or conducting hostilities on this basis is prohibited”
70 See Chapter 62.2.1 ‘Targeted Killings, Drones and attacking al-Qaeda’, noting that drones
in Pakistan targeted more than 3000 individuals between 2004 and 2010 and the numbers
are increasing, as is the geographic reach of the programme expanding.
71 As noted, it is implausible that bin Laden was a combatant in an IAC to which this legal
characterisation applies, but even as regards this category which allows greatest leeway
as regards targeting, questions remain.
72 See Chapter 7B3 on interplay between IHL and IHRL.’
73 Chapter 7A.2.2 for legal standards and 7B.2 for issues arising in practice post 9/11.
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ates outside its own territory.74 However the international legal framework
dictates otherwise: where the state exercises sufficient ‘authority and control’
abroad, its human rights obligations apply.75 It has been held on repeated
occasions that this de facto control can arise in many ways, some of which are
comparable to the present situation: notably where individuals were briefly
subject to the state’s physical control through kidnapping,76 where they were
subject to the lethal use of force by troops in occupied territory,77 or where
they were subject to extra-judicial executions abroad.78 There can be little
doubt in light of the current state of the law, as elaborated through ample juris-
prudence, that the armed US forces were exercising sufficient de facto control
of the particular situation and individuals, triggering its human rights obliga-
tions, by entering the compound heavily armed and resorting to lethal force.
The more interesting question is whether the operation meets the standards
enshrined in that body of law.
Despite the fundamental nature of the right to life, the use of lethal force
is not necessarily unlawful under human rights law. It is however strictly
curtailed, as IHRL is geared towards the protection of life, and the prevention
so far as possible of the loss of life.79 Under IHRL, to be lawful the use of force
must therefore be ‘absolutely necessary’80 or ‘strictly unavoidable’81 pursuant
74 See US reports to international human rights bodies where it asserts its position, while,
most recently, recognizing that it is out of step with international legal authorities. See,
e.g., Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee
on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
30 December 2011, available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm last visited
22 November 2012.
75 See, e.g., HRC General Comment No. 31 and fuller sources, Chapter 7A2.
76 See e.g. Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 52/1979), Views of 29 July 1981, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, and other cases discussed at Chapter 7A2. Many relate to deten-
tion, but some to other forms of ‘power or control’ over the individual.
77 Case of al-Skeini v. The United Kingdom, ECHR Grand Chamber, Judgment, 7 July 2011.
78 See eg. Letelier v Chile, Report No. 167/10, Petition 402-03, Chile, 1 November 2010 (con-
cerning the killing of Orlando Letelier by Chilean forces in Washington DC).
79 See Chapter 6A.5.1 on the fundamental non-derogable nature of the right to life and states’
obligations to take positive measures to protect life.
80 Article 2(2) of the ECHR notes that where employed in defence against unlawful violence,
to effect lawful arrest or detention or quell a riot or insurrection, lethal force will not
constitute an unlawful deprivation of life, provided action taken is no more than ‘absolutely
necessary’; but see, e.g., interpretation in, Ogur v Turkey (App. 21594/93), Judgment of 20
May 1999, ECtHR, Reports 1999-III. The ICCPR and the ACHR refer to the prohibition on
the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life (Articles 6 and 4, respectively). Article 1 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also provides for the right to life without any
explicit qualification. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, adopted at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, 27 August – 7 September 1990), UN
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990)) (hereinafter ‘UN Basic Principles on the Use
of Force’) provides that ‘intentional’ lethal use of firearms may only be made when ‘strictly
unavoidable in order to protect life’ See also Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, recommended by ECOSOC
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to a lawful purpose – which may include self-defence or defence of others
from imminent harm. The necessity test implies that if non-lethal measures
are available, they must be exhausted first, and the risk of loss of life ‘mini-
mised’ wherever possible.82 Moreover, the operation must be ‘planned and
carried out’ so as to strictly limit the danger of recourse to the use of force.83
The operation must take ‘all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods’ with a view to avoiding loss of life,84 which has implications for
the instructions, preparation, training, equipment and execution of an operation
such as the one at hand.
– The Critical Question of Goals
Several elements of the test for establishing the legality of the operation under
IHRL are worth considering in turn. The most critical questions, factually and
legally, relate to starting positions. Factually, what was the goal of the
Abottabad operation from the outset? Was it in fact to kill, or to capture, bin
Laden? In this respect, the starting points of IHL and IHRL vis-à-vis the use of
lethal force are radically different. Under IHL, an operation that has as its
primary objective the killing – or killing or capturing – of a legitimate military
target may well be lawful. Under IHRL it is not. Not all lethal force is unlawful
as noted above, but there is a distinction between the use of lethal force that
may prove strictly necessary in the course of an operation aimed at a legitimate
purpose on the one hand, and the specific targeting and killing of an individual
on the other. On this basis, targeted killings, which by their very nature fall
into the second category, have been stridently condemned by international
courts and bodies in a range of situations.85 Similarly, if this operation had
Res. 1989/65 of 24 May 1989 (hereinafter ‘ECOSOC Principles’), and Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 22 October 2002,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, para. 87 (hereinafter ‘IACHR Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights’).
81 IACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 2002, para. 87; see also Principle 9 of the UN
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra
note 80.
82 See McCann, Farrell and Savage v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 September 1995, Series
A, No. 324.
83 See ibid. The Court held that the standard of absolute necessity in the defence of persons
from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) had not been met. The use
of lethal force against suspected members of the IRA amounted to a violation of Article
2(2) based largely on what was found to be defective planning of the operation. The question
of whether the killing of a Brazilian national, misidentified as a suicide bomber, by the
police in the London underground was ‘absolutely necessary’ is currently pending: Armani
da Silva v. the UK (no. 5878/08), communicated on 28.09.2010.
84 Ergi v. Turkey (App. 23818/94), Judgment of 28 July 1998, 32 (2001) EHRR 388, para. 79.
85 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, E/CN.4/
2006/53, paras. 45 and 51 condemning ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies. See also Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.8 (1992); McCann
v. United Kingdom, supra note 82. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the Israeli
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the use of lethal force as a goal from the outset – rather than as an unavoidable
outcome in face of the particular situation presented in the compound at the
point in time – it would be difficult if not impossible to reconcile with IHRL.
– The Requisite Planning and Preparation
Assuming for argument’s sake that the mission had the goal of capturing bin
Laden, if possible, IHRL requires that the operation be planned and organised
so as to meet this goal and minimise the risk of loss of life. This requires clear
instructions, suitable guidance, training, preparation and appropriate equip-
ment. The preparation must be geared to the particular situation, and in the
context of a raid such as this one would expect the forces executing the mission
to be prepared to use lethal force if necessary. In the seminal McCann case,
where the killing of terrorist suspects was deemed unlawful, the ECtHR was
critical of the fact that the soldiers had not been adequately trained or
instructed in order to assess whether the use of firearms to wound, rather than
kill their targets, might have been warranted by the specific circumstances
that confronted them. As a result, the Court found that the soldier’s reflex
reaction in this vital aspect lacked the necessary caution in the use of firearms
expected in a democratic society, even where dealing with dangerous terrorist
suspects. By contrast, in a case where Dutch or Cypriot forces had been
instructed and trained in use of lethal force, but instructed and trained only
to shoot where lives were in danger, the lethal use force was found to be
lawful.86
– Necessity: legitimate grounds and split second decisions
However legitimate the aim of a dangerous counter-terrorist operation, and
however well planned and prepared it is, the possibility of circumstances in
practice of extra-judicial executions of terrorists under IHRL and IHL, see O. Ben-Naftali
and K. R. Michaeli, ‘“We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of
the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings’, 36 (2003) Cornell International Law Journal 233; D.
Kretzmer, ‘Use of Lethal Force Against Terrorist Suspects’, Counter-Terrorism, International
Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 618.See e.g., ‘Civil and Political
Rights, Including questions of: Disappearing, and Summary Executions’, 9 January 2002,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/74, noting that such killings amount to suggesting that it is futile
to operate inside the law in face of terrorism.
86 In Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus (Appl. No. 25052/94), Merits, 9 October 1997, 25
(1997) EHRR 491, the Court held that although the officers were trained to shoot to kill
if fired at, they were instructed only to use proportionate force if lives were in danger. See
also Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria (Appl. Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98), Grand Judgment,
6 July 2005, 42 (2006) EHRR 43. Likewise, in Case of Ramsahai v. The Netherlands, (Appl.
No. 52391/99), Grand Judgment, 15 May 2007, the Grand Chamber found that the arrest
operation was planned correctly, that the officers acted in conformity with instructions
intended to minimise the danger from the use of firearms, that the firearms and ammunition
issued to them were specifically designed to prevent unnecessary fatalities, and that the
police officer who fired the fatal shot had been adequately trained in the use of his service
firearm for personal defence.
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which the lethal use of force might prove absolutely necessary and appropriate
must always be evaluated. Was such an evaluation made by those carrying
out the operation against bin Laden? On what grounds and in what particular
circumstances did the use of force prove necessary in the compound? As the
US fails to justify its actions by reference to its HR obligations, which it would
appear to consider simply absent from the equation, it seems unlikely that
it would maintain that the operation fell into one of the exceptional scenarios
in which the use of lethal force might be justified under IHRL. However, the
most relevant would appear to be self-defence.87
In the immediate aftermath of the operation, the US invoked IHL and also
‘national self-defence’.88 Self-defence is a concept that appears in several guises
in international law, offering different legal standards by way of answer to
different legal questions. Self-defence under IHRL is not necessarily the same
as self-defence under criminal law (Chapter 4), and it is certainly different
from self-defence that may justify the use of force against a state’s territorial
integrity (Chapter 5). At least for the purposes of HRL, it is clear that a
‘national’89 or general threat to a state is not the sort of threat that is en-
visaged as resulting in the right to self-defence.90
Rather, the use of lethal force by law enforcement officials may be justified
on this basis only ‘where strictly unavoidable to protect themselves or other
persons from imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to otherwise
maintain law and order where strictly necessary and proportionate’.91 An
essential question is whether there were alternative ways to overwhelm bin
Laden or others who may have posed a threat? Was there an alternative to
shooting repeatedly in the head and chest, such as shooting in the legs to
incapacitate the suspect?
It is noteworthy though, that in the application of this necessity test, courts
have shown due flexibility in recognising the extremely difficult split-second
assessments that need to be made in precisely these sort of situations. Where
an operation is appropriately planned and prepared for, and an on-the-spot
assessment is made that force is necessary and proportionate in self-defence
or defence of others, based on an ‘honest belief’ which is perceived for good
87 Other issues possibly arising, such as national security more broadly, or difficulties relating
to the detention or criminal processes that would have followed capture, cannot justify
the use of lethal force.
88 Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, supra
note 4.
89 Ibid.
90 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.8 (1992), supra note 85, para. 8; see also E. Gross, ‘Thwarting Terrorist Attacks by
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self Defence: Human Rights
Versus the State’s Duty to Protect its Citizens’, 15 (2001) Temple Int’l and Comparative Law
Journal 195.
91 IACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 81, n. 36; See also ECOSOC
Principles, supra note 81, Principle 9.
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reason to be valid at the time, there will be no violation, even where that
assessment subsequently turns out to be mistaken.92 In McCann the court
noted that ‘to hold otherwise would impose an unrealistic burden on the state
and on its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of their duties, perhaps
to the detriment of their lives and the lives of others’.93 Inevitably, such real
time assessments in charged and dangerous situations are difficult and the
true necessity of the force may only be effectively assessed with the benefit
of hindsight. But what is required is an honest and reasonable assessment,
based on adequate training and preparation, and in light of all the circum-
stances as they presented themselves in the compound, that no measures short
of resort to lethal force were possible.
– Positive State Obligations vs. the Onus of Conspicuous Surrender?
It is clear from the above discussion that the state is under a human rights
obligation to detain rather than use lethal force wherever possible. The state
has positive obligations to take all feasible measures to ensure that the indi-
vidual can be captured, while being prepared for the alternative if unavoidable.
It follows that ‘kill or capture,’ ‘dead or alive’, cannot be equally rated alternat-
ives, as some of the discussion in relation to the bin Laden operation perhaps
suggests.94
The debate on ‘surrender’ in this context also may be somewhat confusing.
Naturally, part of the state’s positive obligation to protect life in operations
of this nature is ensuring that the person has a meaningful opportunity to
92 ‘The use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in para-
graph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention may be justified under this provision where it is
based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but
which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an
unrealistic burden on the State and its law enforcement personnel in the execution of their
duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others […].’ McCann v. United
Kingdom, supra note 83, pp. 177-78; see also Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (Appl. No. 23458/02),
Chamber Judgment, 24 March 2011, concerning the police killing of their son and brother
during ‘anti-globalisation’ demonstrations on the fringes of the G8 summit in Genoa. Given
the extremely violent nature of the attack on the vehicle, it was concluded that the officer
acted in the honest belief that his own life and physical integrity, and those of his colleagues,
were in danger, and that he was, therefore, entitled to use appropriate means to defend
himself and the colleagues. The Court found the use of lethal force justifiable See also
acceptance of necessity in Gül v. Turkey, (Appl. No. 4870/02), Judgment, 14 December 2000.
93 Ibid.
94 See, e.g., PBS Frontline, Kill/Capture, ‘Interview: General David Petraeus’, available at: http:/
/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/kill-capture/interview-general-
david-petraeu. Petraeus stated that kill/capture is ‘a very important tool – by the way,
quite a surgical tool. The ones conducted by the U.S. Special Mission Unit have a very,
very high rate of success. Way over half of the operations actually detain the individual,
or in some cases kill the individual that they are after. And, by the way, we normally want
to detain, because we want to be able to interrogate – humanely.’ See Obama and Bush’s
use of ‘dead or alive’, supra notes 26 and 29. Sometimes the term is ‘capture or kill’ and
sometimes vice versa.
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surrender, unless doing so would itself present an imminent danger to life.95
It may be questioned how meaningful the opportunity to surrender was in
the current situation: what form might this opportunity have taken between
the time the SEALs entered the room and the time they riddled bin Laden’s
body with bullets.96 The Navy SEALs’ account suggests that bin Laden was
shot dead before he was even identified.97
Moreover, ‘surrender’ at the victim’s initiative is not the only possible
scenario, and in the current situation it was presumably an extremely unlikely
eventuality (given what we think we know about bin Laden). The state none-
theless has positive obligations under IHRL to overwhelm the individual and
take him into custody; this applies whether or not the individual himself might
have preferred the kill rather than the capture option.98 The accounts and
analyses that have been most favourable to the US in this context have sug-
gested that had bin Laden ‘offered to surrender’,99 or ‘conspicuously sur-
rendered’,100 ‘thrown up his hands’ or waved a white flag in the extremely
short time before the forces shot him in the head and chest, he may have
avoided the lethal use of force. Positive obligations are such that it is not
enough to put the onus on the individual to wave a white flag on time before
bullets riddle his head and chest,101 but rather the opportunity to surrender
should be meaningful. It is doubtful whether the accounts of the facts, or the
95 Ogur v Turkey, supra note 81; Guerrero v. Colombia, Views on Communication 45/1979, 1982;
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force, supra note 81; Code of Conduct for Law Enforce-
ment Officials, adopted by UNGA Res. 34/169 of 17 December 1979.
96 Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, pp. 235-36.
97 Ibid., pp. 235-36 and 245-47.
98 See, e.g., Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (Appl. No. 4762/05), Judgment, 17 December 2009, paras.
99-100. noting the prohibition on taking life “intentionally,” through force disproportionate
to the legitimate aims referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) “but also to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.” The obligation is to “... take
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been
expected to avoid that risk.”’
99 The White House press secretary stated that ‘[t]he team had the authority to kill Osama
bin Laden unless he offered to surrender; in which case the team was required to accept
his surrender if the team could do so safely’. Carney, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary
Jay Carney’, supra note 13.
100 First-hand account in Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, pp. 235-36. See also Bowden, The
Finish, supra note 15. Bowen indicates that bin Laden was killed before being identified,
and not given an opportunity to surrender. See interview with Peter Bergen, author of
Manhunt,
101 A. Silverleib, ‘The killing of bin Laden: Was it legal?’, CNN World, 4 May 2011, available
at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-04/world/bin.laden.legal_1_al-qaeda-leader-bin-cia-
director-leon-panetta/2?_s=PM:WORLD. UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of human
rights and counter-terrorism, Martin Scheinin, stated ‘[t]he United States offered bin Laden
the possibility to surrender, but he refused. Bin Laden would have avoided destruction
if he had raised a white flag’
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ways in which comments around surrender have been made in this context,
as mentioned above, might meet this test.102
– Clarifying the Facts and the Duty to Investigate
The operation illustrates the factual uncertainties that so often attend operations
in the GWOT, making assessment of lawfulness infinitely more challenging.
Information concerning goals and instructions, on which there has been much
speculation, shifting responses and conflicting accounts,103 represents a critical
factor for determining lawfulness in the present case. Less consistent still are
accounts of the dangers that presented themselves to the SEALs carrying out
the operation, which may have justified resort to lawful use of force. Yet such
additional information104 has not been forthcoming. In particular, two UN
Special Rapporteurs have asked for information as to the extent to which the
mission ‘allowed for capture.’105 Clearly states have the right to protect
genuinely sensitive operational information. But where death results from the
lethal use of force, there is an obligation to investigate and to clarify. Such
investigation should be thorough, effective, and independent,106 and insofar
as possible public.
102 ‘Bin Laden clearly didn’t conspicuously surrender’. Peter Bergen, ‘“Manhunt” Author
Reviews Navy SEAL’s “No Easy Day”’, Transcript, NPR, available at: http://www.npr.org/
2012/08/30/160322677/manhunt-author-reviews-navy-seals-no-easy-day.
103 See Scheinin, supra note 103; Cf. Owen, No Easy Day, supra note 11, pp. 235-36, suggesting
bin Laden was never offered the possibility to surrender, but had been shot dead while
peeking out of his bedroom door.
104 Pillay first noted, in gentle terms, that ‘This was a complex operation and it would be
helpful if we knew the precise facts surrounding his killing. The United Nations has
consistently emphasized that all counter-terrorism acts must respect international law.’
‘U.N. rights boss asks U.S. for facts on bin Laden killing,’ Reuters, 3 May 2011, available
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-binladen-un-rights-idUSTRE7425PR20
110503. On 6 May, special rapporteurs on Terrorism and Extra-judicial Killing called
somewhat more clearly for information. ‘Independent UN human rights experts seek facts
on Bin Laden killing’, UN News Centre, 6 May 2011, available at: http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38293. ‘In respect of the recent use of deadly force against
Osama bin Laden, the United States of America should disclose the supporting facts to
allow an assessment in terms of international human rights law standards,’ Osama bin
Laden: statement by the UN Special Rapporteurs on summary executions and on human
rights and counter-terrorism’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
News and Events, 6 May 2011, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10987&LangID=E.
105 ‘For instance it will be particularly important to know if the planning of the mission allowed
an effort to capture Bin Laden,’ Heyns and Scheinin noted, Ibid.
106 On independence, see e.g., Hugh Jordan v. The United Kingdom (Appl. No. 24746/94), ECHR
Chamber, Judgment, 4 May 2001; on rigour and effectiveness, see Case of al-Skeini, supra
note 78; Finucane v. The United Kingdom (Appl. No. 29178/95), ECHR Chamber, Judgment,
1 July 2003.
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9.2.4 The Role of Criminal Law?
Osama bin Laden was a notorious criminal. He had been indicted by the US
before 9/11.107 In notable contrast, he was not indicted by the US after-
wards.108
Bin Laden could presumably have been prosecuted for various crimes,
under national and international law.109 The most obvious are murder or
crimes against humanity, with possible modes of liability ranging from incite-
ment to participation as highlighted in Chapter 4. The extent to which he
would have had sufficient overall control of those conducting the attacks at
the material time, or could have been shown to have ordered the attacks as
such, may be questionable, but it would appear beyond dispute that his role
amounted to one of the several forms of criminal contribution discussed in
Chapter 4. Likewise, he could, in principle, have been prosecuted before a
range of international or national fora.110 Multiple national courts could have
exercised jurisdiction in respect of their nationals killed on 9/11 (passive
personality jurisdiction) or under universal jurisdiction. Conceivably, given
the unparalleled isolation of bin Laden and al Qaeda internationally, there
would have been little difficulty in finding the required consensus to establish
an ad hoc international criminal tribunal if that had proved necessary or
desirable. The most natural forum would however have been regular US courts.
The failure to detain bin Laden may indeed have been influenced by
political ‘difficulties’ that would have resulted from his capture, regarding
where to detain, and whether and if so where to prosecute.111 Such difficulties
can have no legitimate bearing on the use force (and certainly do not provide
107 ‘[B]in Laden was indicted for the embassy bombings there in 1998’ and ‘placed on the Ten
Most Wanted list in June 1999 after being indicted for murder, conspiracy and other charges
in connection with the embassy bombings.’ D. Eggen, ‘Bin Laden, Most Wanted For Embassy
Bombings?’, The Washington Post, 28 August 2006, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/27/AR2006082700687.html.
108 This was perhaps consistent with the shift from law enforcement to conflict paradigm,
though an FBI spokesperson reported stated there was ‘no hard evidence’ linking bin Laden
to 9/11 as a basis for this. http://www.globalresearch.ca/fbi-says-no-hard-evidence-connect-
ing-bin-laden-to-9-11/2623.
109 See Chapter 4A.1.1, ‘Crimes under International or National Law’.
110 See Chapter 4A.1.3, ‘Jurisdiction to prosecute’.
111 Professor Rothwell stated: ‘If bin Laden had been captured, rather than killed, the US would
have become entangled in a plethora of legal issues. If he had been taken alive, issues would
have been raised about would he have been subject to prosecution? Would it be before
the US courts? Would he have been taken to Guantanamo? It clearly would raise a whole
series of legal issues, ultimately not that dissimilar confronted with many of these people
who have captured in recent years and taken to Guantanamo.’ Jamieson, ‘Crikey Clarifier:
was it legal to kill Osama?’, supra note 30. See also interview with Obama by Bowden,
referred to ‘hard’ issues that would have arisen if he had been captured, though Obama
noted the advantages of this prosecution route for the rule of law. Bowden, The Finish, supra
note 15, p. 191.
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a legal justification). It is however noteworthy that one extreme impact of the
controversies around detention and criminal justice policy may ultimately be
to jeopardise the right to life.
Bin Laden’s killing provoked comments reminiscent of discussions on the
expressive function of criminal law in Chapter 4.112 It is a matter of specula-
tion what the effect of a criminal trial would have been on bin Laden or his
followers: whether it would have demythologised bin Laden, recast him as
common criminal rather than warrior;113 as one commentator has noted,
serving a prison sentence in a New York jail would presumably have been
the last thing he would have wanted.114 It may have been, as Obama
reportedly reflected at one point, ‘that displaying due process and rule of law
would be our best weapon against al-Qaeda, in preventing him from appearing
as a martyr’.115 Bin Laden was subject to one of the most intensive and
ultimately successful manhunts in history. Finding, capturing, and subjecting
him to a criminal trial could have provided a compelling international symbol
of the long arm of the law, something which would arguably have been more
valuable than another show of military strength.
9.3 DISPOSAL OF BIN LADEN’S CORPSE AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
Legal issues also arise in respect of the subsequent disposal of bin Laden’s
body in the North Arabian Sea.116 While the US has not provided a detailed
explanation or justification for these measures, from the information provided
it appears that this choice of burial was an attempt to avoid the propaganda
advantage that al-Qaeda might otherwise have enjoyed.117 On the other hand,
112 Chapter 4, para. 4A.1.
113 ‘If he had been imprisoned for life then, like Sheikh Omar, [bin Laden] would also have
been denied the status of martyr’. R. Lambert, ‘What if Bin Laden had stood trial?’, The
Guardian, 3 May 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/
03/osama-bin-laden-trial-al-qaida.
114 Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, supra
note 4.
115 Obama reportedly stated: ‘But, frankly, my belief was if we had captured him, that I would
be in a pretty strong position, politically, here, to argue that displaying due process and
rule of law would be our best weapon against al-Qaida, in preventing him from appearing
as a martyr’. Bowden, The Finish, supra note 15, p. 191.
116 L. Sweet, ‘Osama Bin Laden Buried in the North Arabian Sea off the USS Carl Vinson’,
Chicago Sun-Times, 2 May 2011, available at: http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2011/05/
osama_ bin_laden_buried_in_the.html
117 ‘ ‘Akbar Ahmed, the chairman of the Islamic studies department at American University,
[added that] the sea burial prevented Bin Laden’s resting place from becoming a focus for
discontent. “Shrines of controversial figures in Muslim history become centers to attract
the angry, the disenchanted. The shrine bestows powers of religious charisma. If they
allowed Osama bin Laden to be buried in Pakistan, his followers would show up, plant
flowers, and women will say the shrine has healing powers, especially among the un-
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serious concern has been raised regarding the decision to immediately dispose
of a corpse in this way,118 with the method of disposal of the body having
been described by at least one Muslim authority as causing greater offence
than the killing itself.119 It has been used as an argument to further delegitim-
ize the US’ authority to hold individuals to account for terrorism, while itself
violating international law.120
IHL provides rules on the return and disposal of the dead. As a general
rule, under IHL applicable in international and perhaps also non-international
conflicts,121 states must ‘endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains of
the deceased’.122 In situations such as this in which the state may have con-
cerns that allowing a burial site may lead to fanaticism and support for bin
Laden,123 there appears to be little practice indicating what reasons for not
returning the dead might be considered to relieve the state from this obligation.
The right of family members to claim the remains of those who have died in
conflict, and to transfer and bury them has been recognised in various con-
educated. His myth would continue to grow.”’ J. Leland and E. Bumiller, ‘Islamic Scholars
Split Over Sea Burial for Bin Laden’, 2 May 2011, The New York Times, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03burial.html.
118 Saudi Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Al-Obaikan, an adviser to the Saudi Royal Court, said: ‘That
is not the Islamic way. The Islamic way is to bury the person on land (if he has died on
land) like all other people.’ Amidhan, a member of Indonesia’s Ulema Council (MUI), went
so far as to say he was more concerned about the burial than the killing: ‘If the U.S. can’t
explain that, then it appears just like dumping an animal and that means there is no respect
for the man ... and what they did can incite more resentment among Osama’s supporters.’
Kirschbaum and Thatcher, ‘Concerns raised over shooting of unarmed bin Laden’, supra
note 4. See also Leland and Bumiller, ‘Islamic Scholars Split Over Sea Burial for Bin Laden’,
supra note 119.
119 Amidhan, a member of Indonesia’s Ulema Council, ibid..
120 Statement by K.S. Mohamad at the opening of his military commission proceedings included
the following: ‘The president can take someone and throw him into the sea under the name
of national security and so he can also legislate the assassinations under the name of
national security for the American citizens ... Your blood is not made out of gold and ours
is made out of water. We are all human beings.’ ‘Alleged 9/11 mastermind: America killed
more people than hijackers did’, Reuters, 17 October 2012, available at: http://
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE89G1EJ20121017.
121 Under NIAC, there is no written rule though a ‘trend’ and applicable principles suggest
that the same rules may apply in NIACs as in IACs. J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck,
‘ICRC Study of Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules’, Rule 114
(hereinafter ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’).
122 ‘Return of the Remains and Personal Effects of the Dead: Parties to the conflict must
endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased upon request of the party
to which they belong or upon the request of their next of kin. They must return their
personal effects to them.’ Ibid.
123 Leland and Bumiller, ‘Islamic Scholars Split Over Sea Burial for Bin Laden’, supra note
119.
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texts.124 Where the dead cannot be returned, customary law also provides
for the disposal of the dead in accordance with religious principles.125
Although the US has sought to justify the killing by reference to IHL, this aspect
of the operation has been explained in legal terms.
As regards IHRL, several rights are potentially implicated in the decision
to dispose of bin Laden’s corpse in this way. The Human Rights Committee
has specifically addressed the refusal to return the bodies of two persons
subject to the death penalty for terrorism as potentially giving rise to ill-treat-
ment against family members under Article 7 ICCPR.126 An argument of ill-
treatment can only be sustained however in exceptional circumstances where
the totality of the circumstances led to an extreme level of distress, and in the
present circumstances, the high threshold of ill-treatment may not be met.127
But the argument is more compelling in relation to other human rights provi-
sions. The right to private and family life of family members has been found
to be violated by the refusal to allow – or the delay in allowing – family
members to bury their dead.128 Funeral rites are also closely related to the
exercise of the right to one’s religion and belief,129 a right which notably the
US acknowledges as one of the few it considers plainly applicable in armed
conflict.130 Islamic religious traditions dictate procedures in connection with
death, incompatible with summary disposal of the body.131 The UN Human
Rights Committee has noted the importance of these religious rituals in life
124 Colombia, Administrative Court in Cundinamarca, (Case No. 4010), view of the Attorney
General given before the House of Representatives; UN General Assembly, Res. 3220 (XXIX);
27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Res. I (adopted by
consensus); ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 123, Rule 114.
125 ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’, supra note 123, Rule 115.
126 See e.g., Shukurova v. Tajikistan, no. 1044/2002, para. 8.7; see also Human Rights Committee
Concluding Observations on Tajikistan, CCPR/CO/84/TJK 18 July 2005, para. 9.
127 Some reports indicate that the US did inform the family promptly of the circumstances
of death.
128 In Ploski v Poland, no. 26761/95, 12 November 2002, paras. 35-39, on the right to attend
parents’ funerals; annullo and Forte v. France, no. 37794/97, 30 January 2001, para. 31-40,
concerned a violation of private and family life on account of the French authorities’ delay
in returning the body of the child to the family for burial.
129 E.g., Article 18 of the ICCPR.
130 See Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee
on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 74.
131 See e.g., H. Granqvist, Muslim Death and Burial (Helsinki, 1965): ‘Muslims are required to
bury their dead as soon as possible, ideally before the nightfall on the day of death ... [The
deceased’s] eyes and mouth are closed, its limbs straightened, and the body covered by
a sheet. Relatives should be present to pray for the dying person ... the body is then
committed to the grave ... It is preferred that the body be laid on its right side, facing Mecca,
in a niche hollowed out of the grave wall. The head rests on a support and the grave clothes
are loosened. A relative should pronounce the Shahadah in the deceased’s ear.’ See also
Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Customs and Behavioral Laws (Lahore: Daru’l-Ishraq, 2001).
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and death,132 and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion has called
for family members to be allowed to ‘bury their dead’.133
The rights in question regarding the disposal of the corpse are generally
not absolute rights but ones that allow limitations.134 The refusal to deliver
the body may be justifiable, if it can be shown to constitute an interference
which is both necessary and proportionate and to have been the result of a
legitimate aim by the state. Determining whether this test is met requires
considering whether there are less intrusive means of meeting any legitimate
objective, such as limiting the circumstances of burial to avoid security risks
or propaganda-inciting violence. The US concerns may have been a legitimate
aim, had the case been convincingly made. Their actions may have been
necessary and there may well not have been feasible alternative. The lack of
willingness to submit to human rights framework or to provide accountability
within its terms means that we may never know.
The facts and the rationale for withholding the body and burying it at sea
are reminiscent of broadly similar arguments advanced in the Russian Feder-
ation for withholding the bodies of persons killed during terrorist opera-
tions.135 The Russian Parliament (Duma) adopted controversial amendments
to anti-terror laws in 2002,136 which provided that the bodies of terrorists
would not be returned to their families.137 Part of the rationale was to prevent
shrines and martyrdom, though the transcript of the Duma session describes
the law’s purpose as ‘of a general preventive nature’ noting that ‘it says to
a terrorist: if you commit a terrorist attack and there are grave consequences,
then you are outside the law even when you are dead’.138 In cases before
132 It stated that the ‘observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only
ceremonial acts but also such customs as ... participation in ritual associated with certain
stages of life ...’. UN CCPR General Comment 22, para. 4.
133 United Nations Distr. General A/51/542, 23 October 1996).
134 See Chapter 7, para. 7A.3, ‘The Flexible Framework of Human rights Law’.
135 Mashkhadov v Russia (no. 18071/05), and Sabanchiyeva and Others v. Russia (no. 38450/05),
where violations of Article 8 private and family life were found.
136 The amendments were introduced on 1 November 2002, shortly after the incident in the
Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, in which approximately 129 hostages and 60 alleged terrorists
were killed.
137 ‘On Countering Terrorism’ 25 July 1998 ã. N 130-ÔÇ, adopted on 21 February 2002 by
Federal Law N 144-ÔÇ. On Burial and Internment’ of 12 January 1996 N 8-ÔÇ, adopted
on 11 December 2002 by Federal Law N 170-ÔÇ. Bother provision state in similar terms
that: ‘The interment of terrorists who die as a result of the interception of a terrorist act
is carried out in accordance with a procedure established by the Government of the Russian
Federation. Their bodies are not handed over for burial, and the place of their burial is
not revealed.’
138 Statement of the MP A.I. Gurov, supported by the President’s representative A.A. Kotenkov.
See transcript of the Russian Parliament (ÃîñÄóìà / Duma) session of 1 November 2002,
p. 5, in Applicants’ Submissions, Application no 18071/05, Maskhadovy v Russia. Relevant
papers on file with author, who is one of the counsel for the applicant in the case. See
www.interights.org/maskhadov.
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the ECtHR, including one brought by the family of former Chechen rebel leader
Aslan Maskhadov, killed by a special operation by security service in 2005,139
the Court found the refusal to return the bodies of ‘terrorists’ to be a violation
of the family members right to private and family life, just as the Human
Rights Committee has in the context of alleged terrorists sentenced to death
in Tajikistan.140 Like these cases, the bin Laden situation raises significant
human rights concerns that should at least be addressed and explained.
9.4 CONCLUSION
Few who approach these issues through a rule of law lens would grieve the
passing of a criminal of the notoriety of bin Laden. But the measure of the
rule of law must surely be how it is respected, and insisted upon, to protect
the least and the worst in any society. Questions continue to arise as to whether
the legal framework was respected – questions that need to be asked and
answered in this situation just as in the other situations where victims are more
‘sympathetically’ received. Moral and political factors inevitably influence
reactions to the bin Laden operation. These include feelings towards the
individual targeted and what he ‘deserves’,141 the policy complexities sur-
rounding law enforcement alternatives,142 and even an acute awareness that
the bin Laden operation – with its limited use of force and civilian casualties
– compares favourably in many respects to other operations in GWOT. It could,
of course, have been so much worse. But, while this may lead to an inevitable
sigh of relief, does it mean that the rule of law was respected and ‘justice’
could really be said to have been done?
An assessment of lawfulness depends on the applicable framework,
and ultimately the facts, only some of which we have. But from information
available, it appears the operation raises doubts as to some aspects of its
139 Ibid. The case is brought by the family of Aslan Maskhadov – elected in 1997 as president
of the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria – who was killed on 8 March 2005 in
Chechnya during the course of a special operation by Russia’s internal security services,
the FSB. His body was not released for burial.
140 ‘Tajikistan sentences 34 alleged Islamist terrorists’, UNHCR, 19 April 2012, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f9e7c65c.html last visited 22 November 2012.
141 ‘We’ll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve.’ Remarks
by Vice President Dick Cheney to the US Chamber of Commerce, 14 November 2001, http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114-
1.html.
142 The detention and trial policy debacle in the US regarding Guantanamo vs. detention in
the US, and trial by military commission vs. the regular court route which were blocked
by Congress have been highlighted above and in more detail in Chapter 8. In addition,
international criminal law enforcement poses undoubted challenges. These are all of doubtful
legal relevance (except as potentially relevant to the specific question of the necessity of
measures of self-defence on the basis of lack of alternatives, as discussed above and in
Chapter 5).
Case Study II 695
legality which deserve to be investigated and clarified. Whether the operation
should be seen as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty is somewhat doubtful:
the Pakistani authorities have not condemned it, and it may be that there was
a reasonable basis for arguing that informing or involving Pakistan would
have jeopardised the mission. As regards the applicable framework for assess-
ing the mission itself, the assertion that it forms part of an armed conflict with
al-Qaeda, and that bin Laden was a legitimate target as someone participating
in that conflict, is legally very doubtful. Even if it were correct that IHL applies,
and a fortiori if it does not and only IHRL governs, the question of the necessity
and appropriateness of the use of force remains.
The marginalisation of human rights law, despite its applicability to oper-
ations of this nature here (just as it has in the past143), is one of the greatest
causalities of the war on terror. Under IHRL, the assessment of legality depends
on two sets of facts which require clarification, concerning the plans and
purpose of the mission and what transpired in the compound. If the operation
was in fact focused on killing bin Laden or taking him out ‘dead or alive,’
it would not be lawful. Lawfulness depends on the operation being planned,
prepared and conducted with a view to avoiding and minimising the use of
force if possible. Legality also depends on the use of lethal force having proved
necessary in the compound in self-defence. On the emerging facts it is at least
questionable why numerous highly trained and well-armed US special forces
could not have incapacitated and overpowered an unarmed Bin Laden, rather
than shooting in the head and chest.144 Such situations present difficulties
and immediate assessments cannot be second-guessed after the fact, but the
onus is on the state to justify conduct by reference to the legal framework.
Statements to the effect that the killing of bin Laden is clearly and uncontro-
versially legal are, like the premature endorsement of the killing by the UN
Secretary General, misplaced.145 The dismissal of such questions of legality
as ‘pointless moral posturing’146 is a regrettable but common feature of some
of the political debate and media reporting of the killing of bin Laden and,
143 Human rights bodies have considered many comparable cases in light of the legal frame-
work applicable in security sensitive situations: e.g., for a raid on a terrorists hiding place,
see Guerrero v Columbia, supra note 95; for the use of lethal force against terrorists, see, e.g.,
McCann v. United Kingdom, supra note 82.
144 Saul questions why well-armed, highly trained special forces found it ‘necessary to shoot
him, instead of simply overpowering an unarmed man who was not taking a direct part
in hostilities. That there was armed resistance in other parts of the compound is irrelevant
to what happened to those people, in that room. Humanitarian law requires positive identifica-
tion of a person taking direct participation in hostilities, not eyes wide shut assumptions
about what one might expect to find there.’ Saul, ‘Delivered from Evil’, supra note 3.
145 On self-defence, relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness of the use of force, see Chap-
ter 4.




more generally, the role of law in the war on terror. As the Special Rapporteur
on Extra-judicial killings noted in relation to arbitrary killings, this debate may
not really be about the law, but about whether the legal framework should
be applied at all in ‘exceptional cases’.147
While bin Laden may indeed be an exceptional character, the issues raised
by his demise and disposal are not in fact exceptional but arise with increasing
regularity on a global scale. In this respect, the immediate context is of course
the practice of widespread and systematic targeted killings by the US: the
figures indicating several thousand casualties of that policy148 undermine
any perception that the goal of killing bin Laden involved the use of lethal
force on anything like an exceptional basis.149 But such a policy is not unique
to the US, as the Russia anti-terrorism law – permitting the Russian president
to order the killing of broadly framed categories of ‘terrorists or extremists’
in whichever corner of the globe they are found – graphically reminds us.150
Protecting against the lethal use of force must surely be one of the greatest
challenges posed by the war on terror.
The bin Laden operation and reactions to it, by discarding or minimising
the importance of right to life protections for those we disdain, may have
contributed to further undermining the relevance of human rights and the
rule of law for all. Reflection may be due in this context on what meaning
has been given to ‘justice’ in the ‘war on terror.’
147 P. Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary ex-
ecutions, E/CN.4/2006/53, para. 51.
148 See, e.g., ‘Living Under Drones’, Report by Stanford University and New York University,
available at: http://livingunderdrones.org/report/ last visited 22 November 2012.
149 Yoo notes that ‘the ultimate goal of the bin Laden operation was identical to that of prior
operations: to kill a specific individual because of their leadership role in al-Qaeda’. Yoo,
‘Assassination or Targeted Killings’, supra note 3, at p. 59.
150 S. T. Bridge, ‘Russia’s New Counteracting Terrorism Law: The Legal Implications of Pur-
suing Terrorists Beyond the Borders of the Russian Federation’, 3 (2009) Colum. J. E. Eur.
L. 1. On the potential scope and implications, see, e.g., S. Eke, ‘Russia law on killing “extrem-
ists” abroad’, BBC News, 27 November 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6188658.stm. As noted in Chapter 7B, the law also expands the categories of
‘terrorists’ that may be targeted, including those seeking to overthrow the Russian govern-
ment, “those causing mass disturbances, committing hooliganism or acts of vandalism”
and “those slandering the individual occupying the post of president of the Russian
Federation.” Killings of terrorist suspects in Chechnya, for example, have been common
practice for many years and there are several examples in practice of alleged killings abroad,
e.g. Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006, or former Chechen separatist
president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, who was blown up by a car-bomb by Russian special
forces in Qatar in 2004.
10 Case study III: Extraordinary Rendition
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. … That’s
the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to
use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.… It
is a mean, nasty, dangerous dirty business out there, and we have to
operate in that arena. I’m convinced we can do it; we can do it success-
fully. But we need to make certain that we have not tied the hands, if
you will, of our intelligence communities in terms of accomplishing their
mission.”
US Vice President Dick Cheney, 16 September 20011
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government
decided that a key component of its ‘war on terror’ would include covert
international CIA action targeting ‘high value targets’ they would be subject
to lethal use of force or detention for intelligence gathering purposes. On 17
September 2001, President Bush signed a classified Presidential Memorandum
of Notice granting the CIA authority to detain terrorist suspects and to set up
secret detention facilities (sometimes known as ‘black sites’) outside the US
where it could subject ‘high-value detainees’ to ‘enhanced interrogation tech-
niques’.2 The result was an innovative, systematic and complex programme
of ‘extraordinary rendition,’ operated by the CIA, designed and authorized
1 Interview with U.S. Vice President Cheney on Meet the Press (16 September 2001), quoted
in Human Rights Watch, ‘Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the
U.S. Abuse of Detainees’ (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/
us0405.pdf.
2 Classified 17 September 2001 Presidential Memorandum of Notice: See Statement of Michael
F. Scheuer, former Chief of bin Laden Unit of the CIA, at United States House of Represent-
atives – Committee on Foreign Affairs Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism
Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations, Serial No. 110-28, 17 April 2007, p. 12,
available at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34712.pdf (last accessed 7 November 2012)
and ‘The CIA’s Secret Detention Program’, Human Rights First, 1 May 2008, available at:
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2008/05/01/the-cias-secret-detention-program.
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at the highest levels of the Bush administration, and made possible by a global
network of cooperation and support.3
‘Extraordinary rendition’ involved the state-sponsored abduction from one
country, with or without the cooperation of the government of that country,
and the extra-judicial transfer to another country for detention and abusive
interrogation outside the normal legal system.4 Several characteristics of the
extraordinary rendition programme (ERP) make it worthy of special considera-
tion as a case study. Firstly, extraordinary rendition may represent the nadir
of the descent into international illegality of the ‘war on terror’. It not only
involved serious illegality, but a scheme specifically designed and meticulously
carried out to nullify the effect of the law – removing entirely its protection,
avoiding oversight and leaving no trace, and permitting no prospect for
accountability. It was shaped around a policy of systematic torture, a violation
of the most firmly enshrined prohibitions in international law. The ERP
embodied and epitomised the dehumanisation of individuals and their re-
duction to objects of ‘intelligence’ value, pursuant to the all-consuming end
of intelligence gathering.
Secondly, although the programme was largely operated by the CIA, and
designed and authorised at the highest levels of the Bush administration,5
it is now a matter of public knowledge that it was carried out with, and
3 ‘Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering
terrorism’ of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’,
A/HRC/13/42, 19 February 2010, § 103, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf (last accessed 7 November 2011)
(hereinafter ‘UN Joint Study on Secret Detention); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (hereinafter PACE), ‘Alleged Secret Detention and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers
of Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States’, PACE, Doc. 10957, 12 June 2006,
available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc06/edoc10957.pdf (first
CoE Rendition Report 2006). Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe
member states: second report’, 7 June 2007, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/
CommitteeDocs/2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf (Second ‘CoE Rendition Report
(7 June 2007)’).
4 Various working definitions are used; e.g. the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
adopted the definitions of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee, taking ‘extraordinary
rendition’ to mean the extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to
another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system,
where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment: Babar
Ahmad and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, and 36742/08 (ECtHR
6 July 2012), at para. 113).
5 See, e.g., ‘Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of De-
tainees, Human Rights Watch, July 2011, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0711webwcover.pdf.
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depended upon, a multitude of other states as well as private actors.6 As such
it exposes unique levels of inter-state cooperation and with it interesting
questions concerning state and individual responsibility.7
Thirdly, the ERP is not an atrocity that can be relegated to history. It is a matter
of speculation to what extent the programme is on-going: while the CIA ‘black
sites’ that housed rendition victims have been closed, and the US has committed
itself not to torture,8 as noted further below the rendition programme is re-
ported to continue in other forms. Notably, extra-legal transfers to foreign
states for unlawful detention and intelligence gathering are said to have
reduced the US fingerprint, but not necessarily stopped extraordinary
renditions. Moreover, it is in relation to this programme that the demands
for justice discussed elsewhere in the book are most strident and concerted,
and perhaps where the greatest resistance to accountability is encountered.
This chapter is in five parts. The second provides a brief factual overview
of extraordinary rendition, and illustrates the practice by reference to a few
of the many victims behind the ERP programme. The third highlights briefly
aspects of the international legal framework discussed in previous chapters
– in particular use of force, IHL and IHRL, and issues regarding state and
individual responsibility – as they apply to the ERP. The fourth considers how
the law applies in various scenarios which arose in the ERP, from states that
housed secret prisons to those that provided or received intelligence informa-
tion for example, and issues of state and individual responsibility arising. The
fifth sketches out limited progress towards justice and accountability, as well
as some of the challenges arising in this respect.
10.2 FACTUAL OVERVIEW
Facts concerning the extraordinary rendition programme are predictably
untransparent. It was designed as a secret detention programme, was driven
by the CIA and targeted those detainees deemed to be of the highest intelligence
value (High Value Detainees or ‘HVD’s). Its modus operandi, and the wall of
secrecy that has surrounded it since, reveals the resolute determination to
ensure that no information would ever come to light. It concerns serious
criminality, apparently at the highest levels. It is no surprise then that the
6 ‘CoE Rendition Reports, above, note 3; Report of the European Parliament Temporary
Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and
illegal detention of prisoners(2006/2200(INI)), 30 January 2007 (hereinafter ‘Fava Report
(30 January 2007)’). Open Society Justice Initiative Report, Globalising Torture: CIA Secret
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, 2013.
7 See Parts 10.3.4 and 10.3.5 below.
8 ‘Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, The White House, 22 January 2009,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations.
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elucidation of ‘facts’ relating to the practice of extraordinary rendition has been
a slow, painstaking and faltering process.
However, due to determined and systematic research by a range of actors
– NGOs,9 journalists,10 academics,11 certain governments and national parlia-
ments,12 prosecutors’ offices,13 and regional and international institutions
(notably the Council of Europe and the European Parliament reports) and
ultimately insiders’ revelations,14 considerable and consistent information
has come to light on the nature of the US led rendition programme. President
Bush confirmed in September 2006 that, while he would not reveal ‘the
specifics of this programme, including where detainees have been held and
the details of their confinement’,15 the CIA held captives in secret detention
for interrogation using ‘tough’ and ‘alternative sets of procedures’.16 By 2007
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Rapporteur began his ground-
9 See, e.g., ‘U.S.A: Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and “Disappearance”’, Amnesty
International, 4 April 2006, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/
051/2006/en/b543c574-fa09-11dd-b1b0-c961f7df9c35/amr510512006en.pdf ; ‘The Road to
Abu Ghraib’, Human Rights Watch, June 2004, available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf.
10 For one of the earliest accounts to grasp public attention, see D. Priest and B. Gellman,
‘U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations’ Washington Post, 26 December 2002, available
at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060
901356.html.
11 See, e.g., M. Satterthwaite, ‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule
of Law’, 75 (2007) George Washington Law Review 1333, 1336; L.N. Sadat, ‘Ghost Prisoners
and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law’, 309 (2006) Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law 320; L.N. Sadat, ‘Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and
Other Nightmares from the War on Terror’, 75 (2007) George Washington Law Review 1211-15.
12 ‘Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar – Analysis and Recommendations’, Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (hereinafter
‘Arar Commission’), available at: http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca; UK Parliamentary Joint Committee
On Human Rights, ‘Nineteenth Report’, 18 May 2006, available at: http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/185/ 18502.htm ; German Bundestag, ‘Report




13 See e.g. trial of those responsible for the Abu Omar abduction, in F. Messineo, ‘“Extra-
ordinary Renditions” and State Obligations to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the
Light of the Abu Omar Case in Italy’, 7 (2009) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1023.
14 See information from former interrogators, e.g. A. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story
of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda (W.W. Norton & Co., 2011).
15 Id.
16 ‘President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists’, Pres-
ident G.W. Bush, The White House, 6 September 2006, available at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. See further, ‘Declaration
of Ralph S. DiMaio’ (21 April 2008), Amnesty International et al v. CIA et al, Case 1:07-cv-
05435-LAP, Southern District of New York (9 August 2007), at pp. 114-6; Bush: “We’re
fighting for our way of life”’, CNN Politics, 6 September 2006, available at: http://www.cnn.
com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/bush.transcript/index.html.
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breaking second report on extraordinary renditions by announcing that ‘[w]hat
was previously just a set of allegations is now proven’.17
In light of the Presidential authorization of 17 September 2001,18 , the CIA
developed and tested a set of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)’ with
a view to the extraction of information from ‘high value detainees.’19 At first
these were authorized orally, but on 1 August 2002, the US Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a memorandum authorising in writing
the use of ten identified ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ that provided
general guidelines for determining the lawfulness of additional EITs.20 Deputy
Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz reportedly issued a directive removing the
requirement that detainee treatment adhere to the Nuremburg Directives for
Human Experimentation.21 The ERP was put into practice when the first so-
called ‘high value target’, Abu Zubaydah, was captured and flown to a secret
prison in Thailand; he was described by a former national security officer as
‘an experiment, a guinea pig’ for the enhanced interrogation techniques and
their limits.22
According to an FBI special agent present during CIA interrogations, who
subsequently resigned,23 the purpose of such interrogations ‘was to make
[the detainee] see his interrogator as a god who controls his suffering’ through
17 Second ‘CoE Rendition Report’ (7 June 2007), above, note 3, p. 6.
18 Presidential Memorandum of Notice, 17 September 2001, note 2.
19 ‘Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody’, US Senate Armed Services
Committee, 20 November 2008, available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/
Detainee Report Final April 22 2009.pdf.
20 ‘U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A’, 1 August 2002, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-
aug2002.pdf. The CIA began EITs on the basis of verbal legal authorisation from the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC): Interview with John Helgerson, ‘Ex-
CIA Inspector General on Interrogation Report, “The Agency Went over Bounds and Outside
the Rules”’, Spiegel Online, 31 August 2009, available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,646010,00.html.
21 ‘U.S. Department of Defence Directive, Number 3216.02’ (cancelled 8 November 2011) (25
March 2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf
; see J. Leopold and J. Kaye, ‘Wolfowitz Directive Gave Legal Cover to Detainee Experi-
mentation Program’, Truthout, 14 October 2010, available at http://www.truth-out.org/
wolfowitz-directive-legal-cover-human-experimentation-detainees64184; see also ‘U.S.
National Institutes of Health, Office of Human Subjects Research, Directives for Human
Experimentation, Nuremberg Code’, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/
nurcode.html.
22 J. Leopold, ‘Torture Diaries, Drawings and the Special Prosecutor’, Truthout, 29 March 2010,
available at http://archive.truthout.org/torture-diaries-drawings-and-special-prosecutor
58108. See ‘Practice Illustrated’ below. Author is counsel for Abu Zubaydah before the
ECtHR.
23 A. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda (W.W.
Norton & Co., 2011). Ali Soufan is a former FBI agent who first interrogated Zubaydah
shortly after he was captured. He reportedly resigned over the introduction of a cramped
‘confinement box’ in May 2002.
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the use of coercive techniques.24 Exorbitant claims have been made by the
government as to the utility of intelligence that was achieved from certain
detainees or pursuant to certain methods,25 while the FBI agent present at
the time, like others, claims that ‘actionable intelligence’ was in fact achieved
by traditional methods and the torture was counterproductive.26
As set out in memorandum from the US Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, the authorised treatments comprised ‘conditioning’, ‘corrective’,
and ‘coercive techniques.’27 The list of methods of interrogation, approved
and employed, is chilling. The list stems not from allegations, but from official
and publicly available US government documents, including the CIA’s Inspector
General Report and a report by the US Senate Armed Services Committee,
among others, which specify in some detail the nature and effect of the torture
and ill-treatment authorized and employed by the CIA.28 Among the standard
techniques referred to in US government documents are the following:
whipping by the neck into concrete walls; chaining to a chair for a period of
weeks; the use of the ‘box’, including forcing into a small box for up to 18
hours; stripping and hanging naked from the ceiling; sleep deprivation, in-
cluding keeping detainees awake for 11 consecutive days; exposure to extreme
24 Ibid, p. 394.
25 Dick Cheney’s memoir, published 30 August 2011, claims that the CIA’s ‘enhanced inter-
rogation techniques’ on Abu Zubaydah led to a ‘fount of information’ and saved ‘thousands
of lives.’ D. Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, 2nd ed. (Threshold Editions,
2012), pp. 357-58.
26 Soufan, The Black Banners, above. Other professional interrogators, Matthew Alexander of
the Air Force and Glenn Carle of the CIA, have publicly stated that torture was counter-
productive to the intelligence gathering aim: see M.D. Davis, ‘Consign Bush’s “torture
memos” to history’, LA Times, 30 July 2012, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
jul/30/opinion/la-oe-davis-torture-memos-bybee-20120730.
27 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA, on Application
of 18 §§2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High
Value al Qaeda Detainees, 10 May 2005 (hereinafter ‘OLC Combined Techniques Memo’),
p. 12-14. Conditioning techniques were to ‘demonstrate to the [detainee] that he has no
control over basic human needs,’ including nudity, dietary manipulation and sleep depriva-
tion. Corrective techniques ‘dislodge expectations that the detainee will not be touched’
and instill fear and apprehension. Coercive techniques impose “more physical and psycho-
logical stress” including walling, cramped confinement and the waterboard.
28 Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities Report, CIA Office
of Inspector General, 7 May 2004, available at: http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/
052708/052708_Special_Review.pdf (hereinafter ‘CIA OIG Special Review (2004)’); ‘Investiga-
tion into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists’,
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, 29 July 2009,at: http://
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_20100719_
declassifications.pdf ; ‘Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody’, Report
of The Senate Committee on Armed Services, 20 November 2008, at: http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf.
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noise;29 exposure to cold until the victim turned blue;30 denial of pain med-
ication for injuries;31 ‘waterboarding’ or simulated drowning, constituting
a ‘threat of imminent death.’32 An ICRC Report documents the extent to which
rendition victims were cut off from the outside world, with:
‘no knowledge of where they were being held, no contact with persons other than
their interrogators or guards. Even their guards were usually masked and, other
than the absolute minimum, did not communicate in any way with the detainees.
None had real – let alone regular – contact with other persons detained… None
had any contact with legal representation... None of the fourteen had any contact
with their families …As such, the fourteen had become missing persons….’33
The authorised conditions of detention and transfer applicable at the relevant
time also provide an insight into the mistreatment of the detainees.34 Official
guidelines and subsequent legal reviews reveal certain “standard conditions
of confinement,” including the following: hooding to disorient the detainee
and keep him “from learning his location or the layout of the detention facil-
ity”; shackling to a chair and shaving the head upon arrival at the detention
facility; solitary confinement for years35; continuous noise in cells and
29 ‘ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody’ (in
public domain as of 30 April 2009), International Committee of the Red Cross, February
2007, pp. 28-31, available at: http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ICRC_Report_
TreatmentOfFourteenHighValueDetainees_CIACustody.pdf (hereinafter ‘ICRC Report on
CIA Detainees’); CIA OIG Special Review (2004), ibid. at § 15; J. Leopold, ‘Zubaydah’s
Torture, Detention Subject of Senate Inquiry’, Truthout, available at http://archive.truthout.
org/zubaydahs-torture-detention-subject-senate-intelligence-inquiry58666.
30 K. Eban, The War on Terror, Rorschach and Awe, Vanity Fair, 17 July 2007, available at:
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/07/torture200707.
31 D. Priest, ‘CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold’, Washington Post, 27 June 2004, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8534-2004Jun26.html.
32 CIA OIG Special Review (2004), above, note 32 at § 223; A CIA memo makes clear that
through waterboarding ‘any reasonable person undergoing this procedure ... would feel
as if he is drowning ... due to the uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing
... .’ Legal Adviser Bybee’s memo noted that ‘[i]t constitutes a threat of imminent death.’
Davis, ‘Consign Bush’s “torture memos” to history, above, note 28.
33 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody’ 2007,
28-31
34 The conditions of detention at CIA detention facilities were officially governed by the
Guidelines signed by the CIA Director, George Tenet on 28 January 2003: Guidelines on
Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Appendix D of CIA OIG Special Review (2004),
above, note 32 available at http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc11.pdf. The actual conditions and techniques may have been more
abusive than those prescribed in law.
35 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Re:
Application of the Detainee Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelli-
gence Agency Detention Facilities (31 August 2006) (released 24 August 2009), p. 17,
available at: http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-rizzo2006.pdf (hereinafter ‘OLC DTA
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walkways; continuous light such that ‘each cell [was] lit by two 17-watt T-8
fluorescent tube light bulbs, which illuminate the cell to about the same bright-
ness as an office’; use of leg shackles ‘in all aspects of detainee management
and movement,’ in some cases for 24-hours per day.36 These conditions have
been described as ‘unrelenting and, in some cases, hav[ing] been in place for
several years,’ and as having exacted, over time, ‘a significant psychological
toll.’37
In turn, the conditions of transfer of victims during rendition contain evid-
ence of comparable abusive treatment.38 The ICRC report refers to ‘a fairly
standardised’ transfer procedure which included photographing the detainee
clothed and naked; dressing the detainee in a diaper; denying access to the
toilet (if necessary, the detainee was obliged to urinate or defecate into the
diaper); blindfolding, putting on goggles, earphones or taping ears, shackling
by hands and feet; transportation in semi-reclined position or lying flat on
the floor of the plane with hands cuffed behind their backs, causing severe
pain and discomfort.
Support for the regime came from many states and non-state entities and
took many forms. NATO states apparently agreed in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 to a series of measures that have been described as providing ‘per-
mission’ and ‘protection’ to CIA operational activity under the guise of the
provisions on ‘collective self defence’ in Article 5 North Atlantic Treaty 1949.39
The extent of collaboration from particular states is also uncertain, but has
been estimated that some 54 states have participated in various ways.40 In
some cases, foreign authorities have been involved in the arrest, detention,
and transfer of individuals into US custody.41 Others have taken custody of
rendered individuals following their abduction and transfer.42 Some have
housed CIA-operated ‘black sites’ for interrogation and detention, including
Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, Lithuania, Morocco, Poland, Romania, and
Thailand.43 Additional states, including many outside Europe such as Syria,
Memo (31 August 2006)’) notes that ‘the solitary confinement of detainees continued for
years and may have altered their ability to interact with others’.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 ‘Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques’, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 30 December 2004, available at: http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/
082409/olcremand/2004olc97.pdf.
39 ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’, above, note 3, paras. 85-90.
40 Globalizing Torture OSJI 2013, note 6. See e.g.s below in 10.4.
41 UN Joint study note 3.
42 ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights’, ICJ (Geneva, 2009), p. 81 (hereinafter ‘ICJ Eminent
Jurists Report’), available at: http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf.
43 For a report on European states’s involvement see e.g.‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’,
above, note 3, para 117, EU Parliament Resolution 11 Sept 2012, and for a map of the states
alleged to have been involved by Amnesty International at http://www.unlockthetruth.org/
l/en/.
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Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco are now known to have received prisoners from
the US for the purpose of using interrogation techniques amounting to tor-
ture.44 Many others are alleged to have provided airports and military bases
for ‘staging’ or ‘stopover’ by aircraft carrying detainees.45 Some states are
accused of allowing agents to participate in interrogations on foreign soil,46
of providing intelligence to those carrying out this programme, or of system-
atically relying on intelligence information extracted under it.47 In addition
to state partners, the programme appears to involve a range of private com-
panies, including those that have disguised flight plans, and provided and
operated the aircraft for rendition flights.48 This multiple-actor global system
led the Council of Europe to refer to the rendition programme as a ‘spider’s
web spun across the globe.’49
An unparalleled level of secrecy has surrounded the rendition programme,
from the outset up to the present time.50 The detainees were flown to multiple
‘black sites’ and moved on repeatedly to ensure they could not be traced, and
sites were closed if information concerning their existence threatened to come
to light.51 The CIA at times operated in unmarked planes, and filed false flight
plans showing erroneous destinations, or flew without the flight plans al-
44 UN Joint Study (2010), above, note 3.
45 ‘CoE Rendition Report (12 June 2006)’ above note 3; Statement by T. Lloyd to OSCE parlia-
mentary assembly on the adoption of OSCE resolution, reminding parliamentarians that
there were 1,245 CIA flights from European territory to countries where suspects faced
torture. ‘6 July 2012 OSCE PA Annual Session in Monaco 3rd Committee Meeting’, YouTube,
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?list=UUThKCTu7zkfJn0KgaYufK9g&v=ovjAw
3GRM94&feature=player_detailpage#t=900s. See also http://www.unlockthetruth.org/l/en/
For a discussion of legal obligations see Part 3, and Part 4, ‘Keeping them Airborne.’
46 See, for example, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on The Protection and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin’,
UNHRC, (hereinafter ‘Scheinin Report 2009’), 4 February 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/10/3.
See below Part 4 for legal issues arising and examples.
47 Id. at paras 51-57.
48 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), available at: http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ datastore/opinions/2010/09/08/08-15693.pdf.
49 CoE Rendition Report (12 June 2006), above, note 3.
50 The Presidential memo was reportedly not made public or provided to members of Con-
gress, and CIA attorneys argued that the level of classification was so exceptional that even
the font is classified. Eighth Decl. of Marilyn A. Dorn ¶ XX, Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Dep’t of Def., No. 1:04-CV-4151 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 12 May 2003), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/20070105_Dorn_Declaration_8.pdf.
51 On 4 December 2002, the secret detention facility in Thailand was closed down, reportedly
as information on its existence had come to light: D. Priest, CIA holds terror suspects in
secret prisons, Washington Post, 2 November 2005, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_pf.html
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together.52 The widely reported use of ‘front companies’ made it possible
to more effectively obscure the programme’s activities.53
Despite information firmly entering into the public domain, a broad reach-
ing approach to national security and state secrets continues, at time of writing,
to seek to suppress information about the programme. As noted below, the
US and other states have used secrecy or national security laws to obstruct
both judicial and parliamentary proceedings.54 Individuals that were subject
to the programme and remain in detention at Guantánamo are under court
orders that render any comment from them ‘classified.’55 Any reference to
CIA detention or torture leads to immediate censoring of the military commis-
sion’s proceedings.56
Other states are described as being under ‘enormous pressure from
Washington’ and ‘instructions from the CIA, with the support of the White
House,[] not to give any facts on this ...’.57 The US has refused to cooperate
with foreign processes related to the rendition programme;58 the extent of
its determination to avoid disclosure is illustrated by a case before the UK Court
of Appeals in which the US ‘threatened’ the British government to withhold
intelligence information in the future if any information concerning the pro-
52 See, e.g., official documents disclosed by the Polish government through FOIA requests
in Poland revealing “dummy” and false flight plans, or no flight plans at all, and the
collaboration of aviation authorities. ‘Explanation of Rendition Flight Records Released
by the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency’, Open Society Justice Initiative, p. 3, available
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201203/20120326ATT41895/
20120326ATT41895EN.pdf.
53 Id.; S. Shane et al., ‘C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights’, New
York Times, 31 May 2005, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/national/
31planes.html ; C. Bollyn, ‘“Ghost Planes” Make Suspects Disappear, Pentagon has new
secret weapon in “war on terror”’, American Free Press, 14 January 2004, available at: http://
www.americanfreepress.net/html/ghost_planes.html.
54 ‘PACE, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers’, above, note3, at 1, refers to U.S., Poland,
Romania, Macedonia, Italy, Germany, and the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucuses
as having used national security or state secrecy to obstruct judicial or parliamentary
scrutiny aimed at ascertaining responsibility for renditions. See Part 5 below on victims
pursuing justice in U.S. courts who have had their proceedings wholly vacated on the basis
of the ‘state secrets’ doctrine.
55 See Abu Zubaydah’s case below and in the chapter 8 on Guatánamo Bay (where he con-
tinues to be detained).
56 Chapter 7A, ‘Fair Trial.’
57 T. Hammarberg, European Commissioner of Human Rights stated that there was ‘enormous
pressure from Washington to keep all this secret. In fact, instructions from the CIA, with
the support of the White House, are not to give any facts on this ... .’ ‘Who takes the rap
for rendition?’, RT News, 8 September 2011, available at: http://rt.com/news/hammarberg-
cia-prisons-guantanamo-861.
58 See examples of refusal to cooperate with investigations, eg al Nashiri v Poland, Abu Zubaydah
v Poland, recognsied by the governments in ECtHR litigation, though there are many other
examples: 10.5 below and 7B.14.
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gramme emerged.59 The information in question – a few passages written
by the Court itself summarizing the treatment of one rendition victim – was
considered by the Court to be of genuine public interest on the one hand, and
not to have any national security significance on the other.60 This lead to
unusually stinging condemnation by the Court:
‘it was, in our view difficult to conceive that a democratically elected and account-
able government could possibly have any rational objection to placing into the
public domain such a summary of what its own officials reported as to how a
detainee was treated by them and which made no disclosure of sensitive intelligence
matters. Indeed we did not consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law
would expect a court in another democracy to suppress a summary of the evidence
contained in reports by its own officials or officials of another State where the
evidence was relevant to allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, politically embarrassing though it might be.’
While the US approach to state secrecy may stand apart, other states have also
been criticized for unsurpassed levels of secrecy and obfuscation. European
states have been found to have been involved in ‘carefully and deliberately’
covering up facts related to the programme.61 The ‘cult of secrecy’ that made
the rendition programme possible in the first place seeks to obscure the truth
and access to justice ex-post facto.62
On his second day in office President Obama signed executive orders to
end secret detention and ensure ‘lawful interrogations’.63 The President
ordered an end to torture by the US, withdrawing the infamous ‘torture
memos’, and the closure of CIA detention sites.64 He qualified the latter com-
mitment in a footnote by noting that ‘short term’ or ‘transitory’ detention is
59 R (Binyam Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 4) [2009]
EWHC 152 (Admin), available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/
152.pdf.
60 In the end the Court did not make public the passages, having found the public interest
in their disclosure was outweighed by the national interest – not in protecting the substance
of the information, but in preserving the on-going intelligence relationship with the U.S.
Mohamed, above, note 65 at 33-34.
61 ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’, above, note 3; See also Hammarberg who notes that
crimes led by the U.S. have been ‘carefully and deliberately covered up’ by European states.
‘Rights chief: Europe “complicit” in U.S. torture’, CBS News, 1 September 2011, available
at: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20100368.html.
62 D. Marty, Report to PACE, ‘Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations’, p. 6, available at: http://
www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2011/State%20secrecy_MartyE.pdf. He describes
resort to secrecy laws to shield intelligence agencies from accountability within the Council
of Europe states as ‘simply unacceptable.’ See the Pursuit of Justice, 10.5 below.
63 See ‘Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, above, note 8; for the
Executive Order on Guatanamo see Chapter 8.
64 Id.
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not covered by the ban,65 and it appears to indicate that it may resort to
rendition in the future under certain, unspecified, circumstances.66 It is a
matter of on-going speculation to what extent similar ends to those pursued
by the ERP are achieved through other means, notably the use of other states
as ‘proxies.’ This has come to the fore for example in relation to reports ex-
posing US rendition to sites in Somalia, where local authorities detain at US
behest and the US has unfettered access to detainees for interrogation pur-
poses.67 While not CIA-run sites, true to the letter of the President’s commit-
ment, the consequences for detainees is no less grave, the sites no less ‘black’,
and US responsibility no less real than under CIA-run facilities.68 Alternative
Department of Defence operated detention sites are also reported in
Afghanistan raising comparable if less egregious concerns.69
– The Practice Illustrated: Victims of the ERP
While information on the number of victims subject to these abusive tech-
niques, and the true scale and nature of the extraordinary rendition programme
continues to unfold, a senior US official has acknowledged that the CIA held
approximately 100 persons in its extraordinary rendition programme.70 This
appears in light of subsequent reports to be an underestimate,71 and some
65 ‘The terms “detention facilities” and “detention facility” in ... this order do not refer to
facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.’ ‘Executive Order 13491
– Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, above, note 8, at Sec. 2 (g).
66 ‘Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations
to the President’, Department of Justice, 24 August 2009, available at: http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html; D. Johnston, ‘U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but
With More Oversight’, New York Times, 24 August 2009.
67 See A. McCoy, ‘Impunity at Home, Rendition Abroad’, Huffington Post, 14 August 2012:
‘In July 2009, for example, Kenyan police snatched an al-Qaeda suspect, Ahmed Abdullahi
Hassan, from a Nairobi slum and delivered him to that city’s airport for a CIA flight to
Mogadishu. There he joined dozens of prisoners grabbed off the streets of Kenya inside
“The Hole” -- a filthy underground prison buried in the windowless basement of Somalia’s
National Security Agency. While Somali guards (paid for with U.S. funds) ran the prison,
CIA operatives, reported the Nation’s Jeremy Scahill, have open access for extended
interrogation.’
68 Id.
69 H. Andersson, ‘Afghans “abused at secret prison” at Bagram airbase’, BBC, 15 April 2010,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8621973.stm. Unlike in the CIA programme,
however, the ICRC was aware of the facility and was notified of the names of detainees
within fourteen days of their detention. See H. Andersson, ‘Red Cross confirms “second
jail” at Baghram’, BBC, 11 May 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8674179.stm.
On the lack of any due process surrounding their detention, see Chapters 7B.3 and 11.
70 M.V. Hayden, ‘Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden
at the Council on Foreign Relations (as prepared for delivery)’, 7 September 2007, available
at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/dcia090707.html.
71 See Globalizing Torture, OSJI (2013), supra note 6, which details 136 known cases.
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estimates put the figure significantly higher into hundred or even thousands.72
Whatever the number of victims, the practice of extraordinary rendition, and
the legal issues it gives rise to which will be explored in the next section, are
perhaps best illustrated and understood by brief reference to the experiences
of real individual victims. Prominent among them are Abu Zubaydah, Binyam
Mohamed, Khalid El-Masri, Abu Omar, and Maher Arar, whose situations
are summarised below.
– Abu Zubaydah, the First ‘High Value Detainee’, Still Detained without Charge
Abu Zubaydah, the first so-called ‘high value detainee’ in the ERP was captured
in Pakistan in March 2002,73 and transferred to a secret CIA facility in Thai-
land.74 From Thailand he was transferred to the site characterised as ‘the most
important’ secret prison by the Executive Director of the CIA at the time, in
northern Poland.75 From there he was sent to secret detention in several undis-
closed facilities believed to include Lithuania, Morocco and Afghanistan, from
where he was later transferred to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The US authorities
have publicly acknowledged inflicting extreme physical and psychological
coercion, including a battery of waterboarding, on Abu Zubaydah76 and the
ICRC report indicates that he was subject to all of the EITs referred to above.77
In an attempt to justify the detention and ill-treatment of Abu Zubaydah, the
US originally publicly asserted that he was the ‘third or fourth man’ in al
72 See ‘CoE Rendition Report (12 June 2006),’ note 3, noting ‘hundreds’ while M. Satterthwaite
and A. Fisher, ‘Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice, Extraordinary Rendition, and Human
Rights Law’, 6 (2006) The Long Term View 4, 52-71, available at http://www.mslaw.edu/
MSLMedia/LTV/6.4.pdf refer to thousands.
73 The author is one of the applicant’s counsel in the case. On capture, see CIA OIG Special
Review (2004) note 32; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania Application 46454/11, ECtHR, 27 October
2011 and Abu Zubaydah v Poland Application No. 7511/13, ECtHR, 26 March 2013 at http://
www.interights.org/abu-zubaydah/index.html. While Zubaydah was the first ‘HVD’, other
victims, such as Agiza and el-Zari, had been detained from December 2011.
74 ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’, above, note 3, para 70; Abu Zubaydah ECHR litigation
ibid.
75 See S. Shane, ‘Inside the Interrogation of a 9/11 Mastermind’, New York Times, 22 June 2008.
76 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Interrogation
of al Qaeda Operative, 1 August 2002, available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/
2041/70967/00355_020801_004display.pdf (hereinafter ‘OLC Abu Zubaydah Memo (1 August
2002)’); Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques, 30 Decem-
ber 2004, at: http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc97.
pdf (hereinafter ‘CIA Background Paper on Combined Techniques (2004)’); CIA OIG Special
Review (2004), above, note 32. Interrogator James Mitchell is reported to have described
Zubaydah’s interrogation as ‘like an experiment, when you apply electric shocks to a caged
dog, after a while he’s so diminished, he can’t resist.’ J. Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside
Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (Doubleday, 2008), p. 156.
77 ICRC Report, note 33.
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Qaeda, with a role in every major al Qaeda terrorist operation, including
9/11,78 though upon access to a lawyer such claims were dropped.79 He
is currently held in Guantánamo and has been detained, for reasons which
are not publicly known,80 without charge or even habeas review, for over
a decade.81 He appears to be one of those designated for indefinite de-
tention.82 Abu Zubaydah is also one of those on whom the US courts have
placed a ban on communication with the outside world through the ‘pre-
sumptive classification’ of all information from or about him.83 Requests for
the release of basic information have thus far been unsuccessful.84 His ex-
perience of the ERP may therefore never be heard. Applications concerning
his secret detention and other violations in Lithuania and Poland are currently
pending before the ECtHR.85
– Maher Arar
A dual Canadian and Syrian citizen, Maher Arar was detained at John F.
Kennedy airport in New York while changing planes on his way home from
78 See, e.g., President Bush, Remarks by the President at Thaddeus McCotter for Congress
Dinner, 14 October 2002 (describing Zubaydah as ‘one of the top three leaders’), available
at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021014-3.html;
see likewise Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon,
9 April 2002 at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020
409-8.html; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation, 6 June 2002 (describing
Zubaydah as ‘al Qaeda’s chief of operations’), at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html. See, e.g., S. Benen, ‘Another Al
Qaeda Number 3’, Guest Posting, The Washington Monthly, 31 January 2008 (questioning
how many ‘number three’ men one terrorist organization could have) at www.washington
monthly.com/archives/individual/2008_01/013025.php.
79 See Respondent’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Petitioner’s
Motion for Discovery and Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions, Husayn v. Gates (D.D.C. October
27 2009) (No. 08-1360) and Chapter 8.
80 See Respondent’s Memo Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
81 Husayn v. Gates, Case no. 1:08-cv-1360, Factual Return for Abu Zubaydah (ISN 10016), 29
July 2009, at pp. 1-2 (‘As described below, and based on the materials submitted with this
Factual Return, Abu Zubaydah [eight lines redacted]. Consequently, for these and other
reasons, Zubaydah is lawfully subject to detention pursuant to the Authorisation for the
Use of Military Force and the laws of war.’)
82 Chapter 8A.4.
83 Re: Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Case 1:08-cv-01360, Amended Protective Order
(9 January 2009).
84 This includes drawings and writings by him during his period of detention and torture,
an affidavit and even a simple power of attorney form for proceedings before the ECtHR.
See eg. ‘Abu Zubaydah and the Silencing of Guantánamo’s “High-Value Detainees,” as
the CIA Censors His Drawings’, available at: http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011/10/
09/abu-zubaydah-and-the-silencing-of-guantanamos-high-value-detainees-as-the-cia-censors-
his-drawings.
85 Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, and Abu Zubaydah v Poland,. above, note 73.
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a family holiday. He was detained and interrogated by US authorities for one
week before being transferred to Syria, via Jordan, despite assertions of the
risk of torture, a risk which materialized during his year-long detention,
interrogation and torture in Syria.86 As noted below, a Canadian commission
of enquiry investigating his case found him to have no alleged al Qaeda links
and to be free of wrong-doing, and that Canadian authorities had provided
inaccurate information to the US authorities which, it could reasonably be
inferred, had lead to his capture and torture.87 Attempts at justice in US courts,
or individual accountability for wrongdoing have, however, yet to bear fruit.88
– Khalid el Masri
Khalid el Masri is a German national, detained by Macedonian officials at the
border in 2003. He was held and interrogated there before being transferred,
on a ‘private’ plane to Afghanistan, where he was interrogated and tortured,
and eventually sent on to Albania.89 There his detention followed a similar
pattern for five months, until his mistaken identity was revealed and he was
released, without support in finding his way home or re-establishing his life.
His family, having not heard from him for many months had since left Ger-
many. Efforts to secure justice in US courts have been blocked,90 and efforts
at accountability elsewhere have floundered. However, on 12 December 2012,
a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights found Macedonia in
violation of multiple rights and ordered compensation.91
– Binyam Mohamad
Binyam Mohamad is an Ethiopian national and UK resident who was captured
in Pakistan and held incommunicado at secret undisclosed locations for 2 years
before being rendered to Morocco. There he was tortured, before being
returned to US custody in Afghanistan and on to Guantánamo. Unlike the other
cases mentioned, Mohamed was eventually charged under the Military Com-
86 ‘Testimony of Maher Arar, Joint Oversight Hearing: Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher
Arar, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight’, United States House of Representatives, 18 October 18 2007, available
at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ara101807.pdf.
87 A separate report found collaboration between the Canadian police and Syrian officials
contributed to torture.
88 Arar’s attempts to secure justice in U.S. courts have been dismissed on ‘state secrets’
grounds. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), paras. 162-3. No-one has been pro-
secuted for his torture and secret detention.
89 See D. Weissbrodt and A. Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: a Human Rights Analysis’,
19 (2006) Harvard Human Rights Journal 123, p. 124 describes the plane, arriving from Majorca
as belonging to ‘a CIA front company’. See his case set out in the application before the
ECtHR al Nashiri v Poland, www.osji.org
90 See Chapter 11 on human rights litigation, highlighting the obstacles to litigation in this
area.
91 El Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, [GC], No.39630/09, 13 December 2012.
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mission Act, though these proceedings were later dropped and the case was
not referred for trial.92 UK intelligence services are alleged to have facilitated
interviews by or on behalf of the US, in the knowledge of the allegations of
ill treatment, and to have been present in his interrogation while in secret
detention overseas. There has been no accountability in respect of his case.93
– Abu Omar
Hassam Osama Mustafa Nasr (known as Abu Omar), is an Egyptian national
with political refugee status in Italy. He was abducted from the centre of Milan
in 2003 and flown, via Germany, to Egypt where he was interrogated and
tortured.94 The second applicant, his wife, had no information as to what
had happened to her husband. As discussed further below, his case has led
to intense litigation through Italian criminal courts, part of which culminated
in the convictions in absentia of numerous CIA agents and Italian officials,
though other cases are on-going.
Although each victim’s story is unique, their stories demonstrate numerous
obvious similarities.95 Each was captured by US and local authorities, rendered
to US and/or proxy detention, often under the control of the CIA, and inter-
rogated under torture. In several cases foreign agents, including in some cases
agents of their own states, are alleged to have been present and involved at
some point in interrogations. They suffered similar forms of ill treatment and/
or torture, various combinations of the standard conditions of detention,
transfer and ‘EITs’.96 They were transferred to multiple locations for interroga-
tion, in a manner that caused physical and psychological harm and dis-
orientated them as to time or location. No information was provided to families
or to independent third parties including the ICRC. In many cases the secret
detentions that followed lasted several years. Today, only Abu Zubaydah
remains in US detention. All others have sought redress from courts in the
US, in other countries that participated in their abuse, and increasingly inter-
nationally. While they have had limited success to date, as discussed in Part
92 The U.S. authorities had agreed in the context of UK court proceedings that, should his
case proceed to trial, the information would be revealed. The UK court had found that
‘the necessity of a fair trial inevitably defeats a claim for public interest immunity’ (para.
29 at p. 11), and noted the concession by the U.S. in the course of proceedings that 42
documents which it wished to keep secret would be disclosed if the charges were referred
for trial before a military commission. In the event, whether for this reason or another,
his case was not referred for trial.
93 See Part 5 on UK enquiries and refusal to prosecute. Mohamad has been given an ex gratia
award, as noted below and lives again in the UK.
94 CoE Rendition Report (12 June 2006), above, note 3, para 162.
95 Some examples of the cases are discussed in the text below. See also ‘ICRC Report on CIA
Detainees’, supra note 33.
96 Some eg. Maher Arar and Abu Omar were tortured by other governments, others apparently
only by the US.
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5, their pursuit of justice is on-going and momentum may be gathering, at
least outside the US97
It may be no coincidence that many of the stories to gain greatest promin-
ence concern nationals or residents of Germany, Canada, UK and Australia,98
and an abduction in Italy, while other cases continue to gradually emerge.99
10.3 EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
10.3.1 Wronging Other States: Territorial Integrity of States, Extradition
Treaties and Consular Relations
While this chapter focuses on violations of human rights, IHL, and individual
criminal responsibility, abduction by state agents within the territory of another
state may also constitute a violation of obligations owed towards other states
discussed in Chapter 5. The duties of non-intervention in the internal and
external affairs of another state and respect for territorial integrity are relevant
to incursions onto another state’s territory without its consent, to effect an
arrest or abduction operation for example. As noted in Chapter 5, at least the
predominant view is that incursions by one state onto the territory of another
without its consent violate the principles set down in Article 2(4).100
There are several examples in international practice of such abductions
beyond the state’s boundaries having been deemed to engage the international
responsibility of the abducting state. The most notorious example is the Eich-
mann case, where Argentina challenged the abduction of the former Gestapo
official on its territory by Israeli agents; the operation was condemned as a
violation of Argentina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by Israel.101
The ERP may also fall foul of applicable rules under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations 1963,102 which are aimed at ensuring that individuals
in states of which they are not nationals (as was the case in each of the
examples named above), are afforded consular protection.103 It has been the
subject of criticism, for example, in the case of Maher Arar, that the Canadian
consulate was not informed of Arar’s detention, and became aware of it only
97 See 10.7 below.
98 Mammdouh Habib was another rendition victim, tortured in Egypt, and given compensation
by the Australians reportedly in exchange for not pursuing legal action; his is not one of
the cases highlighted above.
99 Globalizing Torture, OSJI 2013 identifies 139 cases.
100 On the rules governing the use of force see Chapter 5.
101 SC Res. 138 (1960), 23 June 1960, UN Doc S/RES/748 (1960).
102 Adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967 (hereinafter ‘Vienna Consular
Convention’).
103 Vienna Consular Convention Art. 36.
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through his family. The US also allegedly refused to acknowledge Arar’s
transfer even after inquiries by Canadian consular officials.104
Also potentially relevant are the rules governing the circumstances in which
civil aircraft may fly through or land in another State’s territory, enshrined
in the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.105 It has been
suggested that the use of civil aircraft for extraordinary rendition would be
a breach of the Convention, which excludes state aircraft.106 A rendition flight
landing on a state’s territory absent prior agreement, or concealing the nature
of the flight, would violate of the Chicago Convention.
Finally, it has been suggested that extra-legal abduction contravenes the
spirit if not the letter of other legal arrangements which are put in place to
regulate situations where persons suspected of involvement in international
terrorism are found on one state’s territory but are wanted by another state.107
Extraordinary rendition flies in the face of the existing international framework
for international cooperation, including extradition treaties and mutual legal
assistance arrangements, which states may reasonably be expected to rely on
in such situations.
As these rules, unlike human rights law, are primarily obligations due to
the territorial state, a critical question is whether the operations on other states’
territories – abductions, detentions or landing/flight of aircraft – were preceded
by the consent of the territorial states. This is a question of fact that in some
situations remains uncertain. In most of the cases that have come to promin-
ence, it would certainly seem to be the case that such consent was forth-
coming.108 This is patently so for abductions conducted jointly, and almost
certainly the case for establishment of detention sites that depended on state
104 Arar v. Ashcroft Complaint 60 18 CA No 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP (EDNY 2004) (hereinafter
‘Arar Complaint’ paras 39-40. See also D. Weissbrodt and A. Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary
Rendition’above note 99, at 146
105 See Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 December
1944, and Richard Gardiner, Working paper: EEDP 04/07: Blair’s foreign policy and its
possible successors www.chathamhouse.org.uk 12.
106 The convention facilitates the entry of civilian aircraft – Art 3 – while State aircraft are
excluded from the Chicago Convention regime and may only enter the airspace of another
State if authorized under special (ad hoc or standing) agreements concluded with that State
– Article 4. State flights include military or police flights and would appear to cover
rendition flights. As regards the sometimes unclear distinction between state and civilian
aircraft, 3 possible approaches based on command and control, use and purpose, and
registration, or a combination thereof explored by Gardner, ibid. In practice, some but not
all rendition flights were logged as ‘state’ flights.
107 See extradition arrangements, discussed in Chapter 4. As reflected in SC Res. 1373 (2001),
28 September 2001, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001), states are obliged to provide (and presum-
ably to seek) this sort of cooperation in criminal matters, with the use of force not acting
as an optional alternative.
108 The act of state consent is often murky and states may never acknowledge consent that
is given, as illustrated e.g. by the killing of Osama bin Laden.
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engagement in one form or another.109 In respect of flights landing for
refuelling, for example it may be less clear. If there were no consent, the acts
of CIA agents on foreign territory would appear to give rise to responsibility
on the part of the US (or any accompanying foreign state).
10.3.2 International Humanitarian Law
As in relation to other practices in the ‘war on terror’, international human-
itarian law (IHL) has been invoked as an apparent panacea to the unlawfulness
of the ERP and to preclude oversight by human rights bodies. The Bush admin-
istration asserted, in the face of the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) recom-
mendation to close secret detention sites and grant access to the ICRC, that it:
‘... is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their
supporters [and as] part of this conflict, the United States captures and detains
enemy combatants, and is entitled under the law of war to hold them until
the end of hostilities. The law of war, and not [human rights law], is the
applicable legal framework governing these detentions.’110 As set out in Chap-
ter 6, the Obama administration also continues to assume that the US is
engaged in a non-international armed conflict against al Qaeda, and to question
the relevance of the human rights framework in this context.111
The applicability of IHL to the issue of ERP should be treated with particular
reserve. First, it governs only those detentions and transfers carried out in
association with a genuine armed conflict, international or non-international.
While successive administrations claim to be at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and associated groups,112 Chapter 6 explores the reasons why the concept
of an armed conflict does not encompass a conflict with a loose ideological
network and all those individuals who form part of or support it.113 The
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere could provide such a link; some
109 See Abu Zubaydah v Poland, note 83 – allegations that a document was drawn up agreeing
to the site, and the state actively removed the normal processes of law. Less information
is available in some other cases. Marty report considers there were ‘operating agreements’
for black site detention in Romania.
110 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant,
United States of America, Addendum, Comments by the Government of the United States
of America on the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee’, UNHRC,
1 November 2007, UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, available at: http://
www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/usa_ccpr_2008_govresponse.pdf.
111 ‘Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, above, note 8; Al-Bihani v. Obama
(Al-Bihani II ), 590 F.3d 866, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hamlily v Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63
(D.D.C. 2009). This is a proposition that all three branches of the US government have
accepted. See R. Goodman, ‘The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, 103(2009)
American Journal of International Law 48.
112 Al-Bihani v. Obama, id.
113 See Chapter 6B1 on the nature of armed conflict and applicability of IHL.
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of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, discussed in Chapter 8, were detained
in the broad context of the conflict in Afghanistan or arguably its ‘spillover’
into Pakistan.114 However, it is far more doubtful that individuals detained
on the streets of Milan,115 Bosnia,116 Djibouti117 or Macedonia118 could
plausibly be said to be engaged in that conflict at the relevant time.119 As
the documentation makes clear, they were targeted for their perceived intel-
ligence value and there is little in the facts known in relation to the individuals
rendered, including the specific examples highlighted in Part A, to support
the suggestion that their detention and transfer had any direct and meaningful
association with an armed conflict.
Second, as regards the few individuals to whom IHL may in principle be
relevant, no lawful basis for ERP can be found in the letter or spirit of IHL.
Although specific provisions vary depending on the status of the detainee,
as set out fully in Chapter 8, all detainees in the context of armed conflict are
entitled to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment, and to some degree of oversight and procedural guarantees in respect
of their detention.120 Several provisions of the Geneva Conventions also
impose specific requirements in relation to registration of detainees and access
by, among others, the ICRC, that are at odds with an extra-legal detention and
transfer system.121
Some specific provisions of IHL explicitly prohibit the transfer of detainees
from the territory on which they were detained. These prohibitions apply
irrespective of whether that transfer is across borders or from the control of
one state to another – the critical question is whether there is a transfer
between detaining powers, to which the IHL protections apply.122 If entitled
to be treated as prisoners of war, the detainees are protected under Geneva
Convention III, which allows transfer only into the hands of a party to the
114 The existence of conflict does not mean individuals were in fact detained in connection
with that conflict, but some of them may well have been.
115 Abu Omar, above.
116 E.g. Boumediene, whose case eventually went to the Supreme Court – see Chapter 8.
117 See the case of Mohammed al-Asad v. Djibouti filed before the ACHPR, where the author
is one of the legal team before the Commission. Mr. Asad is a Yemeni national who alleges
he was detained in Djibouti in December 2003 and January 2004 as part of the CIA’s secret
detention and rendition program and transferred into ‘black site’ detention where he spent
some sixteen months in secret detention. In May 2005, al-Asad was transferred to Yemen
where he now lives. See al-Asad v Djibouti, INTERIGHTS, available at: http://www.
interights.org/al-asad/index.html.
118 El Masri v. Macedonia judgement, above note 91.
119 See Chapter 6B1 on the ‘Global’ nature of the purported ‘war with al Qaeda and associates’
120 Chapter 8. See J. Pejic, ‘Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative
detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence’, 87 (2005) International Review
of the Red Cross 375 (hereinafter ‘Safeguards for Armed Conflict’).
121 ‘ICRC Report on CIA Detainees’, above, note 33.
122 Pejic, ‘Safeguards’, above, note 120.
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conflict where the transferring power has satisfied itself ‘of the willingness
and ability of such transferee Power to apply the convention.’123
Specific rules also preclude transfer of civilians unless the detaining power
is satisfied that their rights will be protected by the transferee power.124 If
it transpires that this is not so measures must be taken to request their
return.125 In situations of occupation, such as post-invasion Iraq, ‘forcible
transfer as well as deportation of protected persons’ is ‘prohibited, regardless
of their motive.’126 Violations, inter alia, of Article 49 concerning forced trans-
fers constitute a ‘grave breach’ of the Geneva Conventions, a serious war crime
carrying individual criminal responsibility, which all states are obliged to
repress. Although US Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith advised that
transfer of illegal aliens in Iraq or temporary transfers of nationals of the
occupied state to facilitate interrogation are not prohibited under IHL,127 it
is difficult to see any legal basis for such exceptions in the wording or literature
surrounding Article 49.128
Although there are no comparable explicit rules for non-international
conflicts, IHL protects against ill treatment and ensures basic fair trial guaran-
tees in all conflicts;129 as explored below, in the human rights context it has
been recognised that extraordinary rendition and secret detention violate both.
Transfer to a situation in which there is a clear risk of such violations cannot
be consistent with the positive obligations to safeguard respect for the Geneva
Conventions, applicable in either type of conflict.
123 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, Art.
12(2), 74 U.N.T.S. 135 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) (here-
inafter ‘GCIII’).
124 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, Art. 45(3), 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950) (hereinafter ‘GCIV’).
125 Id.
126 Art. 48 GCIV: ‘article 49 Geneva Convention IV 1949 states that: ‘Individual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory
of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited,
regardless of their motive.’
127 See J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
The Permissibility on Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq’, Washing-
ton Post, 19 March 2004, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
documents/doj_memo031904.pdf.
128 The ICRC Commentary to Article 49 describes this provision as ‘absolute and allows of
no exceptions.’ For a more detailed analysis of the argument, see Sadat, ‘Ghost Prisoners
and Black Sites’, above, note 12, at 309.
129 See eg Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions and other provisions: J. Pejic, Conflict
Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.),
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, OUP, 2012, p 18.
718 Chapter 10
States are obliged to respect the Geneva conventions and to ‘do everything
in their power’ to ensure that they are respected universally,130 which also
require a positive response from all states parties where such violations come
to light. This is relevant to all states that cooperated or supported the pro-
gramme in whatever form or even that knew of it and failed to take measures
within their power to ensure that it cease. Moreover, aspects of the ERP could
amount to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,131 in which case
states are obliged to ‘search for all persons alleged to have committed, or to
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.’132 Military
and civilian superiors are also obliged to punish subordinates for crimes they
know or have reason to know the subordinates have committed in the past.
A superior can sufficiently discharge this obligation by reporting breaches of
IHL to a competent authority for investigation and prosecution.133
IHL not only fails to provide a legal basis for the secret detention, transfer
and abuse associated with the rendition programme, it also makes provisions
relevant to ensuring justice and accountability in its aftermath.134
10.3.3 Human Rights Law
The practice of ERP is self evidently and straightforwardly a violation of many
human rights, on account not only of its eventual purpose – torture, secret
and arbitrary detention, or other serious violations – but also due to the
procedural arbitrariness that attends the rendition. The following is a brief
overview of affected rights and issues arising.
10.3.3.1 ‘Extraterritorial’ Renditions and Human Rights Obligations
Violations have arisen on the territories of many states around the globe. A
preliminary question raised by the US, relates to the relevance, in human rights
law, of the fact that generally the state driving the rendition programme, and
in some cases other states involved in various forms in supporting it, have
130 Common Article 1, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978 (hereinafter ‘API’)..
131 For a list of grave breaches, see ICRC, ‘Grave breaches specified in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and in additional Protocol I of 1977’, available at: http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jp2a?opendocument
132 For common articles on this see GCI Art. 49, GCII Art. 50, GCIII Art. 129, and GCIV Art.
146.
133 G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (OUP, Oxford 2009).
134 For practice in this respect, see below 10.5 and further Ch 7B.14.
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acted outside their own territories.135 As noted elsewhere in this book, the
US government has asserted that its obligations under human rights treaties
– such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966
(ICCPR), and UN Convention against Torture 1984 (CAT) – do not arise in respect
of the ERP on the basis of its ‘extra-territorial’ nature.136 For example, in line
with its position that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially, the US
responded to the HRC that it was not bound by the ICCPR in respect of ERP.137
However, as explained in Chapter 7, an assessment of the international
legal framework suggests a different interpretation. The state’s obligations
under human rights treaties arise where individuals are within the state’s
territory or where they are subject to its jurisdiction, which can arise where
it controls territory abroad or in certain circumstances where its agents act
abroad.138 It is now the consistent approach across courts and human rights
bodies that if the state exercises its power abroad by taking physical custody
or control of individuals, it is accountable for those actions under its human
rights obligations.139 In an important Grand Chamber judgement of July 2001
the ECtHR reasserted that ‘what is decisive ... is the exercise of physical power and
control over the person in question.’140 In the context of the ERP, the US might
be said not to have controlled black detention sites abroad, but certainly to
have controlled the individuals abducted, transferred detained or tortured
by CIA agents.141
There are many comparable cases involving individuals being forcibly
removed from one state to the jurisdiction of another, where courts have found
their extra-territorial human rights obligations have been held to arise. For
135 See Chapter 7A.2 and 7B.1 ‘Extra-territorial application of IHRL’.
136 Chapter 7B.2, referring to the Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of the U.S.to the
UN Committee on Human Rights For the Committee’s response, see e.g. ‘Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America’, UNHRC, 18 Dec
2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1.
137 Periodic Reports of the USA, id.
138 The UN Committee against Torture (CAT), the Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), and
International Court of Justice (ICJ) have consistently held that the provisions of both the
ICCPR and CAT arise where the state exercises its authority or control on its own territory
or abroad. Chapter 7A2 ‘General Comment no. 31 [80] The nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, UNHRC, 26 May 2004, UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13; ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee
on the United States of America’, UNHRC, 15 September 2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/
CO/3.
139 Uncertainty that crept into ECtHR jurisprudence has not related to detentions abroad, where
governments have accepted that IHRL obligations apply in the course of Bankovic and Ors
v Belgium and Ors, App. 52207/99, (2001)) and Al-Skeini and Ors v United Kingdom, Appl.
No. 55721/07 (2011). See also Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, Appl. No 61498/08
(2010) on transfer.
140 Al-Skeini and Ors v United Kingdom, id. at para. 136.
141 Intelligence agencies are clearly within the state apparatus for purposes of responsibility;
see Chapter 3.
720 Chapter 10
example, the seminal cases of Lopez Burgos & Ors v. Uruguay – in which the
HRC famously described it as ‘unconscionable’ that the state could be permitted
to do abroad what it was prohibited from doing to its own citizens at home
– concerned abductions from Argentine soil.142 The Ocalan, Freda and Sanchez
Ramirez cases before the European Court all concerned individuals suspected
of terrorism being detained and forcibly removed from another state without
due protection of law.143 There is little room for doubt that where an indi-
vidual is subject to the sort of direct and overwhelming power and control
envisaged in detention, interrogation or transfer within the ERP, he or she
would come within the jurisdiction of the state.
10.3.3.2 Positive Obligations to Prevent, Protect and Respond to Human Rights
Violations
As noted above, the ERP unfolded in many states worldwide. In some, the
territorial states may be the instrument of the torture or other violation, as
‘proxy’ for the US or otherwise. In others wrongs may have resulted from joint
operations. In others yet the state’s territory may simply be being ‘used’ by
foreign agents. In each case, the territorial state’s responsibility may well be
engaged on the basis of a failure to meet its positive obligations to secure to
those within its jurisdiction the rights guaranteed under human rights law.
As Chapter 7 indicates, the notion of positive obligations under human
rights law requires that the State take all feasible measures to prevent viola-
tions, and to respond where they arise.144 Responsibility may arise where
there is ‘consent or acquiescence’ by the states in the use of their territory by
private or foreign state actors for human rights violations, but giving such
consent is not however necessary. The test according to IHRL is whether the
state exercised ‘due diligence’ to prevent the violations. The elements of this
test are met where ‘the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of
the existence of a real and immediate risk ... from the criminal acts of a third
party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which,
142 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, UN Doc Supp. No.
40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981) at para. 2.2.
143 Al-Skeini and Ors v United Kingdom, above, note 140, at para. 36, noting that ‘irregular
rendition’ is recognized ‘exception’ to the territoriality principle, citing the O¨calan, Freda
and Sanchez Ramirez cases all of which concerned an applicant being forcibly removed (albeit
to stand trial not torture and arbitrary detention) in another state with the consent of the
territorial state. O¨calan v Turkey, Appl. No. 46221/99, Merits (ECtHR 12 March 2003); Illich
Sanchez Ramirez v France (dec.), Appl No. 28789/95 (ECommHR 24 June 1996); Freda v Italy,
Appl. No. 8916/80, Admissibility Decision (ECommHR 7 October 1980).
144 Osman v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 23452/94, 29 EHRR 245 (1998), at para. 116; Z and Ors
v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 29392/95, 34 EHRR 3 (2002), para. 73;Velasquez Rodriques v
Honduras, above, note 165, at paras. 172-5.
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judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’145 The ‘due
diligence’ obligation also requires that the state must act with ‘exemplary
diligence’ to investigate, prosecute, and provide redress in the event of
breach.146
10.3.3.3 Particular Rights Implicated by Extraordinary Rendition
– Liberty and Security of the Person
Incommunicado and unacknowledged detention are clearly at odds with the
guarantees in respect of the right to liberty under international law.147 Un-
acknowledged detention has been described as a ‘complete negation of the
guarantees of liberty and security of the person … and a most grave violation
of that Article.148 Incommunicado and unacknowledged detention by their
nature entail also that the detainee does not have the benefit of the essential
safeguards, discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, which have been held – by courts
and bodies across human rights systems – to be an integral aspect of the
protection of liberty.149
The failure to register and monitor detainees ‘... allows for serious violations
of rights to occur, and enables those responsible for an act of deprivation of
liberty to conceal their involvement in a crime so as to cover their tracks and
to escape accountability for the fate of a detainee.’150 Access to a lawyer, and
to medical personnel, are among the critical safeguards accepted by human
rights bodies as essential in recent years,151 along with the right to challenge
the lawfulness of detention before a judge, with sufficient fair trial rights to
make such a challenge meaningful.152 The most basic legal principles on
145 Osman, id.; see also Kilic v Turkey, Appl. No. 22492/93 (ECtHR 9 January 1995); Kaya v
Turkey, above, note193. The jurisprudence of various courts and human rights bodies reflect
a similar test: Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, above, paras. 172-5 ; ‘General Recommendation
No. 19, UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Eleventh session, 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19.
146 Chapter 7A.2 See Isayeva and Ors v Russia (n 93) paras 208-13; and Menesheva v Russia, Appl.
No. 59261/00, (ECtHR 9 March 2006), at para. 64.
147 Art. 5 ECHR; Art. 9 ICCPR; Art. 14 ACHR; Art. 6 ACHPR, Chapter 7A.5.3. See eg Öcalan
v. Turkey, id. at § 103, and Cyprus v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, Appl. No. 25781/94, Grand
Chamber (10 May 2001), at § 147.
148 Kurt v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15/1997/799/1002 (ECtHR 25 May 1998) at § 124.
149 See Chapters 7A.5.3 and 4, and 8.B.4. See eg Sabbeh & Others v Egypt, ACHPR, and Joint
Report on Secret Detention 2010.
150 Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, Appl. No. 34561/03 (ECtHR 29 May 2008), at § 114.
151 E.g. ‘Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment’, UNGA, 9 December 1988, UN Doc A/Res/43/173, Principles 16 and 19;
‘Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’, 1977, UN Doc E/5988 rule 37.
152 As noted elsewhere, such protections are guaranteed in all circumstances; See e.g. IACHR
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, HRC GC 29 in Chapter 8.
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lawful detention are patently vitiated by a clandestine programme of abduction
and transfer to secret detention.153
– Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
Where states engage in torture or ill-treatment (TCIDT), alone or with other
states, they are responsible for violation of the absolute prohibition of such
treatment in human rights treaties and customary law.154 Where states fail
to exercise ‘due diligence’ to ensure that these rights are respected, whether
by private actors or foreign states operating on their territory, they also fall
foul of their positive obligations to prevent and protect from such ill-treat-
ment.155
It is beyond doubt that, despite questions arising in the context of the war
on terror in recent years, the prohibition on torture or cruel inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, admitting of no exceptions
or derogations.156 It applies irrespective of a victim’s alleged wrongdoing,157
perceived ‘intelligence value’ or the purported need to extract information
to prevent terrorism.158 As has been seen, courts and bodies maintain a high
threshold for the definition of TCIDT, consistent with the opprobrium associated
with this absolute prohibition.159
There would seem to be little doubt that the interrogation techniques
referred to above would amount to both torture and ill-treatment under human
rights law. In respect of certain CIA ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’,
153 See, e.g., Babar Ahmad and Ors v United Kingdom, above, note 4 (opining in para. 114 that
‘extraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is anathema to
the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention.’)
154 Allegations in respect of rendition include that in some instances or for certain periods
of time U.S. officials directly engaged in torture, while in other cases, other states may have
done so at its behest.
155 Procedural rights and judicial oversight have also been held to constitute essential safe-
guards against torture which must therefore be guaranteed by the state, e.g., Mohammed
Alzery v. Sweden, HRC Communication No. 1416/2005, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005
(2006), 10 November 2006; Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99
(ECtHR 8 July 2004) at § 318.
156 Chapter 7A5.2. See Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Appl. No. 36378/02 (ECtHR
12 April 2005) at § 335.
157 See Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 70/1995/576/662 (ECtHR 15 November 1996)
at § 79, and Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06 (ECtHR 28 February 2008) at § 127.
158 See Gäfgen v. Germany, Grand Chamber, Appl. No. 22978/05 (ECtHR 1 June 2010) at § 107,
where a child’s life may have been at stake but the prohibition was absolute.
159 See Chapter 7A.5.2; ‘Inhuman’ or ‘degrading’ treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity (e.g.Saadi v. Italy, above, note 156; at § 135) while torture has a higher severity
causing very serious and cruel suffering (eg. Akkoç v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 22947/93 and
22948/93 (ECtHR 10 October 2010), at § 115).
159 See e.g., ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism: Addendum: Mission to
the United States of America’, UN General Assembly, November 2007, available at: http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/docs/A.HRC.6.17.Add.3.pdf.
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international human rights bodies have found them to constitute torture and
ill-treatment.160 The UN CAT has expressed its concern in respect of compliance
with the UNCAT, called on the US to ‘rescind any interrogation technique,
including methods involving sexual humiliation, “waterboarding”, “short
shackling” and using dogs to induce fear, that constitutes torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in all places of detention
under its de facto effective control, in order to comply with its obligations
under the Convention.’161
The Committee on the Prevention of Torture has similarly concluded that:
‘interrogation techniques applied in the CIA-run overseas detention facilities
have certainly led to violations of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment. Any doubts that might have existed on this subject were
removed by the publication of a Special Review of CIA counterterrorism de-
tention and interrogation activities covering the period September 2001 to
October 2003, carried out by the Agency’s own Inspector General.162 Despite
being extensively censored, the published version of the Special Review makes
clear the brutality of the methods that were being used when interrogating
terrorist suspects at sites abroad.’163
The system of incommunicado and/or secret detention may itself amount
to torture or inhumane treatment, as several courts and human rights courts
and bodies have recognised. The European Court has specifically recognised
that the extreme fear, anguish and vulnerability arising from the secret and
arbitrary nature of the extraordinary rendition programme gave rise to
torture.164 The UN Joint Experts in their Report on Secret Detention have
noted that secret detention may itself constitute torture.165 The ICRC report
on the 14 high value detainees indicated to similar effect that the extreme
‘distress’ resulting from rendering individuals ‘missing persons’ constitutes
ill-treatment.166 This is consistent with jurisprudence in other contexts, where
for example the UN Human Rights Committee found the threshold of torture
to have been reached in a case where an individual has been detained for three
160 See ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, Addendum’, id.; Annex 7: UN Commit-
tee against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture
to the United States of America, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006, § 17 ‘ICRC Report on
CIA Detainees’, above, note 33, p. 26.
161 Annex 7: UN Committee against Torture, id.
162 CIA OIG Special Review, dated 7 May 2004 but released on 24 August 2009.
163 ‘CPT Report’ on Lithuania Visit, below, note 310.
164 El Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, [GC], No.39630/09, 13 December 2012,
para 202-3.
165 See UN Joint Study(2010), above, note 3, at § 31-35; see also UNGA Res. 148 (2005), 15
December 2005, UN Doc A/RES/60/148 (2005).
166 ‘ICRC Report on CIA Detainees’, above, note 33, pp. 7-8.
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years incommunicado and in a secret location.167 It reflects a much broader
body of human rights law recognising that the denial of safeguards – such
as access to medical examinations, to a lawyer, to contact third parties and
to judicial scrutiny168 – may constitute violations of the positive obligations
in respect of torture or ill-treatment.
Rendition may itself amount to cruel or degrading treatment not only of
the individual involved, but also their family members.169 Human rights
courts and bodies have noted that the disappearance of a close relative with
no information provided to the family, nor an effective investigation, may lead
to anguish amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.170
– Rendition as Enforced Disappearance
Renditions have as their design and effect the removal of the person from the
protection of law, and withholding information from that person and his/her
family. As such, it meets the criteria of enforced disappearance in accordance
with the definition in the Convention on Enforced Disappearance, which refers
to ‘ ... the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.’171
In recent years the ERP has come to be recognised as secret detention
amounting to the enforced disappearance of persons.172 Disappearances may
167 Yussef El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) Communi-
cation No. 440/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990, 23 March 1994 at § 5.4. See also
Velasquez Rodriguez case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
(Ser. C); No. 4 (1988), availble at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm
, at §187.
168 See Chapters 7A4.2 and 5.2.Eg include Akkoc v. Turkey, above, note 158, at § 118; Kurt v.
Turkey, above, note 148, at § 123 and Sabbeh & Ors v Egypt, ACHPR February 2012.
169 ‘ICRC Report on CIA Detainees’ note 33. See, for example, Quinteros v Uruguay (Communica-
tion No 107/1981), HRC, 15 October 1982, at para. 14; Varnava and Ors v Turkey, Grand
Chamber, Appl. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/
90, 16072/90, and 16073/90 (ECtHR. 18 September 2009);, at paras. 200-2; Tanis and Ors
v Turkey, Appl. No. 65899/01 (ECtHR 2 August 2005), at para 219; Cyprus v Turkey, above,
note 147, at paras 155-8; and Kurt v Turkey, above, note 148, at para 134; Avdo and Esma
Palić v Republika Srpska (Decision on Admissibility and Merits), Human Rights Chamber
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case no CH/99/3196 (December 2000), at paras. 79-80.
170 See e.g., Bazorkina v Russia, Appl. No. 69481/01 (ECtHR 27 July 2006); see also ‘ICRC Report’
supra.
171 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
UNGA (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010). See also ‘Report
to the General Assembly on the First Session of the Human Rights Council’, UNHRC, 2006,
UN Doc A/HRC/1/L.10.
172 See e.g., the UN Joint Study (2010), above, note 3, at § 28 noting that “Every instance of
secret detention also amounts to a case of enforced disappearance (para 28)”.
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in turn constitute torture, as recognised by the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee,173 and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
which notes that ‘the very fact of being detained as a disappeared person,
isolated from one’s family for a long period is certainly a violation of the right
to humane conditions of detention and has been represented to the Group
as torture.’174
– ‘Non-refoulement’ to Serious Violations
As discussed fully in Chapter 7, the ‘non-refoulement’ obligation requires that
states refrain from transferring an individual to a state where there is a ‘real’
and ‘foreseeable’ risk of serious rights violations arising.175 Developing
practice suggests that the obligation not to transfer an individual arises where
there is a risk not only of torture or ill-treatment, but also of a violation of
the right to life, of a ‘flagrant denial of justice’, and potentially of other serious
violations of human rights.176 All of these issues arise in respect of the trans-
fer by various states of individuals to CIA black sites, or to third states no-
torious for such violations, with the specific purpose of interrogation and
‘intelligence gathering’.
The obligation not to transfer if there are ‘substantial grounds’ for believing
that a non-derogable right would be violated is itself non-derogable.177 It
cannot be offset against any risk of terrorism or threat to national security,
and is not affected by the alleged conduct of the individual in question.178
Although the US has denied that it is bound by the non-refoulement prohibition,
173 See María del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros et al. v. Uruguay, HRC Communication No. 107/
1981, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990), at 138at §14; see also El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, HRC Communication No. 440/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990, 21 March
1994, at §§ 2.1-2.5; Mojica v. Dominican Republic, HRC Communication No. 449/1991, UN
Doc CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991, 10 August 1994,at § 5.7. In the IACtHR seeeg. Velásquez
Rodríguez Case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am Ct. HR (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), at §187.
174 See UN Doc E/CN.4/1983/14, § 131.
175 Chapter 7A.5.10 on jurisprudence including Chahal v United Kingdom, above, note 156; Saadi
v Italy, above, note 158; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8139/09
(ECtHR. 14 December 2010); and Agiza v Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, UN Doc
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005). See further K. Wouters, ‘Reconciling National Security
and Non-Refoulement: Exceptions, Exclusion, and Diplomatic Assurances’, in N. White et
al., Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (OUP, Oxford 2012), at Ch. 22, p. 579.
176 Chapter 7 (Human Rights); Othman, ibid.; Baysakov and Ors v. Ukraine, Appl. No. 54131/08,
(ECtHR. 18 February 2010).
177 Chapter 7A.5.10 and practice post 9/11 in 7B.10; eg Saadi v. Italy, above, note 158, at § 127.
178 Ibid. See eg. Saadi v Italy, id.; Chahal v UK, above, note 158. Agiza v Sweden, above, note
175, at para 13.8; Aemei v Switzerland, Communication No. 34/1995, CAT, 29 May 1997,
at para 9.8; MBB v Sweden, Communication No. 104/1998, CAT, 5 May 1999, at para 6.4;
Arana v France, Communication No. 63/1997, CAT, 2 June 2000, para 11.5; and Babar Ahmad
and Ors v United Kingdom, above, note 4; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Final
Judgement, Appl. No. 8139/09 (ECtHR 9 May 2012).
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this is at odds with long standing jurisprudence of human rights bodies.179
Human rights courts and bodies have repeatedly expressed concern that the
rendition programme violates the non-refoulement rule.180 In the context of
an ECtHR case concerning transfer of terrorist suspects from the UK to the US,
it was clear that one question courts will want to satisfy themselves in the
future that there is no risk of the individual being subjected to unlawful
rendition.181 The rendition programme has also exposed the unreliability
of diplomatic assurances, discussed in Chapter 7,182 as several of those
rendered to torture were supposedly subject to ‘assurances’ that they would
not be mistreated.183
– Procedural Rights applicable to Transfers
Alongside due process rights in respect of detention, the legal framework
indicates additional procedural rights applicable in respect of transfer,184
safeguarding the non-refoulement right set out above. Human rights treaties
have been interpreted as encompassing basic due process rights in the context
of transfer cases.185 Chapter 7 discusses how the precise parameters of the
procedural rights arising in relation to transfer remain unclear in certain
respects,186 but there appears to be consensus among human rights courts
and bodies that, as a minimum, the individual be given a ‘meaningful’ oppor-
179 See ‘United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture’,
U.S. Department of State, 28 April 2006, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
68554.htm. See also Periodic Reports of the USA, above, note 138, where the U.S. notes
it is bound neither by the ICCPR which it denies gives rise to a non-refoulement obligation,
nor by the explicit non-refoulement obligations under CAT as a result of its reservation to
Art. 3. It has said its policy is not, however, to transfer individuals where it is ‘more likely
than not’ that they will be tortured; see e.g. in: In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation Case
No 1:05-cv-01220 (D.D.C. 2007), at para 6.
180 See Agiza v Sweden, above, note 174; ‘Report of the Committee against Torture Thirty-third
Session (16-26 November 2004) Thirty-fourth Session (2-20 May 2005)’, UNGA, Supplement
No 44 (3 October 2005), UN Doc A/60/44 227.
181 Babar Ahmad and Ors v United Kingdom, above, note 4
182 Chapter 7.B.10
183 Eg. in the Arar case the US has relied on having sought sssurances: Transcript of Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales, Press Conference, Department of Justice http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0609191.html. See also remarks of Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice December 5, 2005, online at http://2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2005/57602.htm. Likewise Sweden claimed that assurances lay behind its decision to
assist in the CIA’s rendition to Egypt of Egyptian asylum seeker Ahmed Agiza in December
2001; see Agiza v. Sweden. See Ch 7A.6 and B.10 on refoulement post 9/11.
184 Chapter 7A5.10.
185 See e.g., Jabari v. Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98 (ECtHR 11 July 2000), at § 40; Shamayev and
Ors v Georgia and Russia, above note 155. For additional protections on the non-expulsion
of foreign nationals see Article 13 ICCPR and Article 1 Protocol 7 ECHR.
186 Ch 7A.5 and B.10, on how rights regimes differ as to fair trial guarantees in transfer
proceedings.
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tunity to challenge detention and transfer.187 In this context there is little
doubt as to the unlawfulness of a system which entirely bypasses the legal
process, allowing no right of challenge and with the specific design of ensuring
that no one, including family or lawyers,188 even know of the abduction and
transfer, never mind having the opportunity to invoke judicial or other demo-
cratic oversight.189
– The Right to Remedy and Reparation
The fundamental nature of the right to a remedy is set out in Chapter 7.190
What does the right entail for victims of the rendition programme? The right
to a remedy embraces the right to restitution, and the state is obliged to
‘whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross
violations of international human rights law ... occurred. Restitution includes,
as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity,
family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of
employment and return of property.’191 Offending states are also obliged
to provide compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage flowing
from breaches.192 In addition, symbolic measures such as recognition of the
wrong, provision of information, and where appropriate apology, can form
part of the measures of reparation that states may be obliged to provide in
the face of serious human rights violations such as those involved in extra-
ordinary rendition.
Where a right to a remedy is not afforded by the state, victims have a right
to pursue their claim through a court of law. In the context of US secret de-
tentions and unlawful interrogation techniques by intelligence agencies, the
HRC found that ‘the State party should ensure that there are effective means
to follow suit against abuses committed by agencies operating outside the
military structure and that appropriate sanctions be imposed on its personnel
who used or approved the use of the now prohibited techniques.’193 An
187 See, e.g., Shamayev and Ors v Georgia and Russia, above, note 156; Agiza v Sweden, para 13.7.
The UN CAT has for its part held that the remedy against refoulement requires ‘an opportun-
ity for effective, independent, and impartial review of the decision to expel or remove.’
188 Arar Complaint, above, note 106, para. 46: Arar alleged that his lawyers were purposely
not informed of his pending transfer and transfer to Syria.
189 Shamayev and Ors v Georgia and Russia, above, note 156 at paras 333-9
190 Chapter 7A.4.2. E.g. ICCPR Art. 2(3)(a) or ECHR Art. 13, inherent in the duty to ‘ensure’
the protection of rights, and a principle of customary law.
191 Eg UNGA ‘Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law’, 16 December 2005, UN Doc A/RES/60/147; Resolution 2005/35 on
the Basic Guidelines and Principles, UNCHR, 19 April 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/35
(‘Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation’), at Principle 19.
192 E and Ors v UK, Appl No. 33218/96 (ECtHR 26 November 2002), at para. 110; Keenan v
UK, Appl. No. 27229/95, 33 EHRR 913, at para. 130.
193 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the United States of America,
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, UNHRC, 18 December 2006.
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integral aspect of the right to reparation is the obligation to investigate and
prosecute those responsible, addressed below.194
– The Right to Truth and Justice and the Duty to Investigate and Prosecute
The rights of victims of serious rights violations to know the ‘truth’ concerning
the violations committed against them has been the subject of growing recog-
nition internationally,195 and is integral to the right of reparation.196 The
extent of secrecy that has continued to surround the ERP, and the official refusal
to disclose information even when it is in the public domain, run counter to
this right. Access to information has consistently been blocked by what has
been criticised as an overreaching approach to national security.197 The public
interest in information concerning the rendition programme has also been
recognised by the Court.198
These rights correspond to the duty on states to respond to violations that
involve serious allegations of criminality by carrying out a prompt, impartial
and thorough investigation.199 The investigation must avoid unwarranted
delays in collecting evidence and initiating investigations, and ensuring pro-
gress within a reasonable time.200 It must be capable of leading to the
identification and prosecution of those responsible and the provision of
effective and transparent remedies for victims.201 This duty has been held
to apply in security sensitive circumstances, including in situations of armed
194 Chapter 7A.4.2. Eg. Keenan v UK, above, note 191, at para 132. Article 13 has been held
to imply obligations to investigate: , Kaya v Turkey, Appl. No. 22535/93 (ECtHR 28 March
2000) (right to life) Aksoy v Turkey, Appl. No. 21987/93, 23 EHRR 533 (1996) (torture); Orhan
v Turkey, Appl. No. 25656/94, (ECtHR 18 June 2002) (disappearance); and Mentes v Turkey,
Appl. No. 23186/94 (ECtHR18 November 1997) (destruction of homes).
195 See e.g., el Masri v Macedonia, para 191; Gomes-Lund et al (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v Brazil
(Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR Series C No 219 (24
November 2010). See survey of jurisprudence in Expert Opinion in the Garzon v Spain case
before the ECHR at www.interights.org/garzon.
196 Chapter 7A.4.2.
197 E.g., the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Ben Emmerson
expressed profound regret at a U.S. court decision that refused freedom of information
requests concerning the involvement of the United Kingdom in the U.S. ERP. ‘UN expert
regrets US court decision preventing oversight of intelligence services’, UN News Centre,
12 April 2012, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41765#.UKH
CuuOe_KA.
198 El Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, paras 191-192.
199 As Chapter 7 notes, the duty is recognised across IHRL and explicit in some provisions
e.g. Article 12 CAT requiring ‘prompt and impartial investigation wherever there is reason-
able ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under
its jurisdiction’, and Article 5 CAT obligates a State Party to extradite or prosecute accused
torturers who are present in any territory under its jurisdiction..
200 Bati and Ors v Turkey, Appl. Nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00 (ECtHR 3 September 2004).
201 Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom, Appl. No 24746/94 (ECtHR 4 May 2001), at para. 109, and
Ch 7A4.2
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conflict.202 Several U.N. sponsored reports, including some addressing
extraordinary rendition specifically, have noted mechanisms to investigate
or oversee security and intelligence agencies ‘should have access to any
information, including sensitive information,’203 and that bodies investigating
human rights abuses should have ‘unhindered’ access to all confidential secret
service materials.204 A European Parliament report of 2012 notes that:
“in no circumstances State secrecy takes priority over inalienable fundamental rights
and that therefore arguments based on state secrecy can never be employed to limit
legal obligations of states to investigate serious human rights violations; considers
that definitions of classified information and State secrecy should not be overly
broad and that abuse of State secrecy and national security constitute a serious
obstacle to democratic scrutiny.205
Where serious violations arise, a thorough investigation must lead to a rigorous
approach to prosecution.206 IHRL recognises a duty to prosecute those respons-
ible,207 including the imposition of proportionate penalties.208 Egregious
crimes must be appropriately prosecuted as crimes that reflect the gravity of
the underlying acts.209 Thus acts of torture should not be prosecuted as ‘abuse
of office’ offences for example, or concerns would arise as to whether these
obligations had been met.210
The human rights law obligation does not necessarily entail the prosecution
of all individuals conceivably tarnished by criminality; however, the scope
of the investigation, and potentially the prosecutions policy, should include
not only the immediate perpetrators of the crimes, but also the intellectual
202 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, Appl. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, 41 EHRR
39 (2005), at paras. 209-13; see also P. Alston, ‘Report to the Human Rights Commission’,
8 March 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/53 1125-6. Ch 7A4.2
203 UN Joint Study, para 292 (d).
204 Report of M Scheinin, Special Rapporteur on Terrorism, ‘Compilation of good practices
on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights
by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight’, para 15.
205 The European Parliament’s Report on alleged transportation and illegal detention of
prisoners in European countries by the CIA: follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP
Committee report,’ Aug 2012.
206 See, for example, Barrios Altos v Peru (Judgment) IACtHR Series C No 7 (14 May 2001).
For analysis of the duty to prosecute and its limits, see F. Guariglia, ‘Los límites de la
impunidad: la sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso Barrios
Altos’ in Nueva Doctrina Penal, 2001/A (Editorial del Puerto, Buenos Aires 2001), at 209-30.
207 See eg Velasquez Rodriques v Honduras, above, note 165; Assanidze v Georgia, Appl. No. 71503/
01, 39 EHRR 653 (2004); Isayeva v Russia, above, note 202, at paras 209-13.
208 Chapter 4.B.2.2 OR 7.a.55. Eg Gafgen v Germany, at para. 123 on the duty to ensure against
‘manifest disproportion between the gravity of the act and the punishment imposed.’
209 Article 4 CAT makes explicit the obligation to ensure that all acts of torture, as well as
attempts to commit torture, be criminalized and punished proportionately.
210 See uncertainty surrounding the Polish investigation, which reports suggest is based on
‘abuse of office’ offfences, 10.4 below.
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authors behind the programme.211 Cases against higher level officials will
tell a broader story, and generally contribute more to clarifying the historical
understanding of the nature of the programme.212 Measures such as statutes
of limitations or amnesties that act as a bar to investigation and prosecution
for the most egregious crimes in international law are generally considered
inconsistent with these obligations.213 Personal or functional immunities
should, likewise, not preclude investigation and prosecution of conduct that
amounted to crimes under international law.214
- Other Rights
The effect of rendition is the undermining of a whole host of other rights,
beyond those most obviously implicated and itemised above.215 These include
freedom of movement, the right to private life,216 family rights,217 freedom
of expression,218 the right to health among other economic and social rights,
and the right to life itself.219 As the UN Joint Study on Secret Detention notes,
211 Barrios Altos, in Guariglia, supra note 215.
212 See Chapter 4.1 and P. Akaban, ‘Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?
A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’ 20 (1998) Human Rights
Quarterly 737 on criminal process, and Chapter 11 on the role of human rights litigation.
213 See Chapter 7A42, and for more detail the survey of practice on amnesty and prescription
in the Expert Opinion Garzon v Spain (ECtHR).
214 Immunity ratione personae should not apply to acts such as torture or crimes under inter-
national law; see eg the famous Pinochet case, 1998 All ER 97 (Pinochet 3) concerned the
torture specifically, and the Lords found that a former head of state was not immune for
the purposes of criminal process. The immunities of sitting heads of state, as an extension
of the immunity of the state itself, is more controversial. See also Arrest Warrant Case
(Congo v Belgium), ECHR
215 Weissbrodt and Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary Rendition’, at 239.
216 See, e.g., allegations against Zubaydah which he had no opportunity to refute; video
recording his suffering; and the gagging order which leaves him without a voice, all
violations of the right to private life. See Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, above, note 29.
217 Both Khalid El Masri and Abu Omar emphasise the impact on family life of their families
having no idea where they were. In the case of El-Masri, his family had no information
of his fate or whereabouts for years, assumed he was not returning and had relocated to
another country. This case demonstrates the devastating impact on the rights of the indi-
vidual and his family.
218 See, e.g., the complete gagging order on all ‘high value detainees,’ including Abu Zubaydah,
highlighted above, eviscerating his right to expression of any type which cannot be justified
as necessary and proportionate limitation.
219 Little information has emerged about deaths in CIA custody though Gul Rahman reportedly
died in November 2002 at a CIA-run prison in Afghanistan known as the Salt Pit after being
shackled to a concrete wall. ‘CIA interrogation probe ends without any charges’, BBC News,
31 Auguist 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19432553 ;
S. Shane, ‘No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A.’, New York Times, 30 August
2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-
in-cia-interrogations.html?pagewanted=all ; See also allegations by rendition victim Mam-
douh Habib of detainees dying through torture at hands of Egyptian interrogators in M.
Habib and J. Collingwood, My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn’t (Scribe Publications
Pty Ltd., 2009).
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it may also violate the right to fair trial as it is used to circumvent the normally
applicable criminal procedure and safeguards.220 Rendition illustrates the
extent of rights violations arising for immediate victims, as well as the range
of the victims affected, going beyond those directly subject to the rendition
to include family members and dependants.221
Likewise, ERP also violates the right to seek asylum from persecution in
other states, or to enjoy such asylum where it has already been granted.222
Where a person has a well-founded fear of persecution and is transferred to
their country of nationality or habitual residence, the Refugee Convention and
Protocol are also violated.223
10.3.4 State Responsibility
As the rules on state responsibility in international law make clear, several
states may be responsible for an international wrong at the same time.224
This is particularly obvious where some states may engage directly in wrong-
doing while others fail in their positive human rights obligations of protection.
Extraordinary renditions and the web of states that have, in various forms,
made possible or contributed to the ERP, raise numerous issues concerning
the nature of multiple states’ responsibility.
10.3.4.1 Responsibility for Organs and Agents
The starting point for an assessment of state responsibility in this context is
the basic rule that the state is responsible for the acts of the organs of the state,
or its agents, as discussed in Chapter 3. Plainly intelligence agencies are part
of the state apparatus and the state is responsible for their wrongful acts
carried out by them, even if it should transpire that they acted beyond their
authority. The same goes for police, customs officers or other state officials
220 UN Joint Study, p. 16-17. Notification of charges, trial without undue delay and the right
to defend oneself are cited specifically. See also the working group on arbitrary detention
which finds secret detention to violate fair trial: Opinions No. 5/2001 (E/CN.4/2002/77/
Add.1), para. 10 (iii) and No. 14/2009 (A/HRC/13/30/Add.1).
221 Abu Omar’s ECHR case is brought by him and his wife, both as victims of the ERP. As
noted above, this is common is cases of disappearance that the family members are treated
as victims.
222 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (adopted 10 December 1948) Art. 14.
223 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force
22 April 1954); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 (adopted 31 January 1967,
entered into force 4 October 1967). Weissbrodt and Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary Rendition’,
above, note 91, at 139-40.
224 ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’,
November 2001, UN Doc Supplement No. 10 A/56/10 67 (hereinafter ‘ILC Articles on State
Responsibility’).
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that may have collaborated in the ERP. In addition states are responsible for
private actors outwith the state infrastructure where they acted under the
‘direction or control’ of the state.225
10.3.4.2 Responsibility of Third States for Aiding and Assisting, Directing, Controlling
or Coercing
State responsibility arises not only where the state is directly involved in
carrying out violations, or where the violations arise on its territory and it
fails to take all feasible measures to prevent the violations. As made clear in
Chapter 3, general international law on state responsibility provides that states
may contribute to, and bear responsibility for, international wrongs in a variety
of ways. This may take the form of ‘aiding and assisting’ other states (Article
16 International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility 2001 (ILC
Articles)), as well as ‘directing or controlling’ their actions (Article 17), or
‘coercing’ them into international wrongs (Article 18).
In light of the fact pattern that has been revealed to date, and allegations
of ‘conspiracy’ and support for the ERP, it seems that most relevant to an
assessment of the involvement of other states with the US rendition programme
is ‘aiding and assisting.’226 Not every form of ‘assistance’ will give rise to
responsibility. As a matter of general international law, a state is responsible
for providing aid or assistance to another state in breach of its international
obligations if it does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the international-
ly wrongful act of that state.227 A ‘close connection’ is then required between
the actions of the states, and a causal link must exist between the state’s conduct
and the wrong.228 While accusations are often lodged in terms of conspiracy,
collusion, or encouragement, the law does not provide for responsibility of
states for incitement, or for conspiracy as such, absent ‘concrete support’.229
The CAT refers to states obligations to criminalise ‘conspiracy’ to commit
225 See Chapter 3 for principles of state responsibility, and discussion on responsibility for
non-state actors including private contractors. These principles would also be relevant to
the private actors employed in the ERP, including aviation companies and private firms.
226 It is not inconceivable that questions may arise regarding the ‘control’ or conceivably even
‘coercion’ of certain states by the U.S., though to the author’s knowledge no such claims
have been made. As regards aiding and assisting, Chapter 3 notes that the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the rules concerning aiding and assisting in the
commission of a wrongful act, as enshrined in Article 16, as part of customary international
law. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ, para. 420.
227 ILC Articles on State Responsibility 16 requiring also that the act would be internationally
wrongful if committed by the accessory state.
228 Except for coercion, it must also be an obligation which is binding on both the aider and
the state aided.
229 ILC Articles on State Responsibility 64. See Chapter 4 and below for individual responsibili-
ty.
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torture, and it has been questioned whether ‘conspiracy’ might provide a more
flexible and appropriate approach to hold to account a broader range of
states.230
10.3.4.3 Broader Obligations in Face of Serious Breach of Peremptory Norm
As noted in previous chapters, it has been recognized increasingly in inter-
national standards and practice that some wrongful acts engage the responsibil-
ity of the state concerned towards several or many states or even towards the
international community as a whole.231 In certain circumstances international
law enshrines obligations on all states to act to prevent and/or respond to
very serious violations of international law. Where a violation amounts to a
breach of jus cogens norms, all states have obligations to ‘cooperate’ to bring
to an end, and not to recognize as lawful, a situation created by a serious
breach, and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. This
is reflected in articles 40 and 41 ILC Articles, and in the jurisprudence of the
ICJ and other courts and tribunals.232
While these broader obligations apply only to a small group of ‘peremptory
norms’ and only in respect of gross, flagrant, systematic, or organized viola-
tions of those norms, there is a strong case that these criteria are satisfied by
the widespread and systematic nature of torture, secret detention and enforced
disappearance intrinsic to the ERP.233 Moreover they complement the parti-
cular positive obligations under IHL and IHRL referred to above.
10.3.5 Individual Criminal Responsibility
Individual criminal responsibility for involvement in ERP can arise under both
international law and domestic law. Under international law, the principle
categories of relevant crimes are war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The ERP could entail war crimes such as torture, enforced disappearance, and
illegal transfer, among others, if the acts are committed ‘in the context of’ or
‘associated with’ an armed conflict, whether international or not of an inter-
230 See eg S Fulton, Cooperating with the enemy of mankind: can states simply turn a blind eye to
torture? International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 16, June 2012, 773-795.
231 ILC Articles on State Responsibility 33; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Reports 32, at para. 33: ‘an essential distinction should
be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.’
232 Chapter 3.
233 See UN Joint Study, above, note 3; ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’, above, note 3;
‘ICRC Report on CIA Detainees’, above, note 37.
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national character, and whether committed against civilians or combatants.234
The same acts, with the requisite mens rea, would also amount to crimes against
humanity if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.235 It is critical that the individual is punished
only to the extent of their conduct and intent, as set out in Chapter 4. While
the requirement that an individual participating in the ERP have knowledge
of the broader criminal enterprise236 may raise issues for lower level parti-
cipants (or indeed high level officials in some states may claim ignorance as
is often done), it is clear that he or she need not have knowledge of the scale
or precise details of the ERP.237
In accordance with forms of responsibility recognized in international law,
an individual may be responsible for directly committing crimes, individually,
jointly, and through other persons,238 or for indirectly participating in their
commission, including by ordering239 or aiding and abetting,240 or by acting
in ‘common purpose’241 or through a ‘joint criminal enterprise’.242 In addi-
tion, superiors, whether civilian or military, may also be held responsible under
the doctrine of superior responsibility if they fail to prevent or punish the
criminal acts of subordinates over whom they have effective control.
A wide range of individuals – members of intelligence agencies, officials
of various governments, and private actors – could be held to account for the
commission of these crimes, for ordering or inducing them, for failing to
prevent or punish them (while under a duty to do so), for ‘aiding and abetting’,
or for acting in ‘common purpose’ or ‘joint criminal enterprise’ with those
directly responsible.
234 In the context of’ and ‘associated with’ mean that the conduct must be ‘closely related to
a surrounding armed conflict in order to constitute a war crime’: ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac
et al (Judgment) IT96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A (22 February 2002), at para. 58.
235 See Chapter 4A11 on The definition of ‘crimes against humanity’: definitions of the terms
widespread, systematic, attack, directed against, and civilian population have been ela-
borated upon by the international criminal tribunals in numerous judgments, though some
e.g. civilian population remain open to questions. See, for example, ICTY cases: Prosecutor
v Kordić, Mario Cerkez (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004), at para. 93;
Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004), at para. 102;
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac et al (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A (12 June
2002), at para. 85.
236 Chapter 4, ICC Elements of Crimes document, Art. 7 para 2.
237 ICC EOC doc, at para. 2, above, making clear that ‘knowledge of all characteristics of the
attack or the precise plan or policy’ is unnecessary.
238 Rome Statute Art. 25(3)(a).
239 Rome Statute Art. 25(3)(b).
240 Rome Statute Art. 25(3)(c).
241 Rome Statute Art. 25(3)(d).
242 ICTY jurisprudence is replete with cases of joint criminal enterprise and has described it
as established in customary law: see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72,
Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise,
¶ 18 (May 21, 2003).
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It flows from the obligation to investigate and prosecute serious crimes,
set out in relation to IHRL above and reflected in international criminal law,
that certain legal norms that purport to preclude accountability for serious
violations or crimes under international law are invalid. Thus, immunities,
amnesties, and statutes of limitations have been held to be invalid in respect
of these crimes.243 These issues may become relevant in states investigations
into the ERP that are currently stalled or extremely slow to progress, and which
have statutes of limitations for certain crimes: if crimes are appropriately
charged, e.g. as torture rather than ‘abuse of office,’ domestic law may not
recognise the bar on prosecution in any event. However if states attempt to
apply such limitations to the ERP they are likely to be challenged as invalid
in face of the nature of the crimes under international law. The same arguments
will arise if immunities are pled in forthcoming cases: when the issue of
immunity arose in the Milan case concerning the abduction of Abu Omar, it
was rejected.244
The ERP also, undoubtedly, violates multiple provisions of domestic criminal
law. While national laws obviously vary, many states have incorporated the
international crimes referred to above in their own systems, particularly
because of widespread domestic incorporation of crimes covered by the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the obligations under Article 4
CAT.245
10.4 APPLYING THE LAW: STATE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN VARIOUS
‘RENDITION’ SCENARIOS
This section questions the extent to which the multiple states and individuals
involved in the ERP might bear responsibility for different aspects of the
programme.
10.4.1 Abduction and Black Site Detention on the State’s Territory
In some cases, territorial states’ organs or agents carried out the arrest, de-
tention, interrogation/torture, or ill-treatment albeit in conjunction with or
at behest of US authorities, for which they have direct responsibility for wrongs
243 See expert opinion in the case Garzón v Spain, available at: www.interights.org/garzon,
which surveys national and international practice.
244 See 10.5.
245 CAT Art. 4 obliges states to criminalize all acts of torture, including any act by any person
which under domestic law constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
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arising.246 An example of an operation that raises such questions is the case
of Abu Omar, the Egyptian national with refugee status in Italy who was
abducted from a street in Milan by CIA officers, apparently with the assistance
of several Italian agents.
In the cases of secret prisons,247 such as those allegedly housed on
Lithuanian, Polish, and Romanian soil, facts continue to come to light raising
questions as to the extent of the involvement of territorial states, in the estab-
lishment, running or facilitating of those sites. It is difficult to conceive of such
prisons existing without some degree of consent and cooperation of ‘host’
states. In any event the legal question is whether, at a minimum, the state knew
or should have known of violations and failed to take reasonable measures to
prevent them. In light of the scale and nature of the secret prison and ERP
operations, and the extent of information as to arbitrary detention and abuse
by the US authorities and the CIA itself, it is difficult to see how states can hide
behind ignorance.
States may seek to hide behind the autonomous functioning of CIA prisons.
A case in point may be the Djiboutian state’s response to a case brought against
it for its role in the ERP currently before the African Commission, in which
it asserts US control over its Camp Lemonier site and lack of knowledge of
US activities.248 In some cases at least, preliminary enquires may support the
view that the CIA was given free reign without close oversight or engagement
by local authorities.249 However, as the framework makes clear, the state
is assumed to exercise jurisdiction throughout its territory,250 and it will be
responsible for violations on its territory to which it turned a blind eye, or
246 El-Masri v Tenet Complaint (providing information about the rendition flight), available
at: http://www.aclu.org/national-security/el-masri-complaint (hereinafter ‘El-Masri v Tenet
Complaint’).
247 See, for example, UN Report paras 112, 114, 120; Abu Zubaydah applications to the ECHR,
available at: http://www.interights.org/abuzubaydah/index.html.
248 Al Asad v Djibouti, above, note 119; the author is one of the applicant’s counsel in the case.
Para 38 of the respondent state’s submissions on admissibility (public document, on file
with author) states: ‘Djibouti has no knowledge of the United States ever violating this
provision [prohibiting detention and violation of human rights] of the Lease Agreement.
The United States has assured Djibouti that it was in full compliance with the Lease
Agreement at all times.’
249 See eg public comments of the chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament’s Committee on
National Security and Defence (CNSD) that U.S. partners were able ‘to carry out activities
without VSD control and to use the place however they liked.’ The CNSD concluded that
it was ‘evident that the SSD did not seek to control the [CIA’s] activities. The SSD did not
monitor and record cargoes brought in and out and did not control the [CIA’s] arrival and
departure ... . In addition, the SSD did not always have the possibility to observe every
person arriving and departing.’ Seimas CNSD Report, below, note 327, p. 6; Abu Zubaydah
v. Lithuania, above, note 29.
250 Ilascu v Moldova and Russian Federation Application 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004); Ivantoc
v Moldova and Russian Fed. Application 23687/05 (ECtHR 15 November 2011); Catan &Ors
v Moldova and Russian Federation, Application 43370/04, 8252/05, 18454/06 (ECtHR, 19
October 2012).
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where it failed to take reasonable measures to know, and to protect. Assertions
of complete lack of knowledge may therefore incriminate, not protect, the state.
10.4.2 Keeping them Airborne: Staging, Stopover, and Logistical Support
As regards the many states accused of providing logistical support to the
renditions programme in the form of, for example, refuelling at airports and
allowing use of airspace,251 slightly more complex issues arise. One question
is whether planes landing on the state’s territory or passing through its air-
space provides sufficient link between the violations and the state for the
‘jurisdictional’ requirement of human rights treaties. Where an individual is
present on the aircraft on the state territory, however briefly, the obligations
of prevention of violations on that territory, and particularly of non-refoule-
ment to violations elsewhere, would however appear to arise, provided know-
ledge of the risk can be proved or inferred.252 Another approach might be
to see the ERP as encompassing on-going violations, part of which took place
within the territory used for refuelling or other purposes.253
In some cases, airports and airspace were used in circumstances where
it was disputed whether the territorial state knew of the nature of the
flights.254 Inherent in its positive obligations to protect, a state has a reason-
able duty of enquiry as to how its territory is to be used and for what purpose.
Moreover, a state’s lack of knowledge would not excuse it from its positive
obligation to take all reasonable measures to investigate, prosecute, and provide
redress in the event of plausible allegations of breach.
Where it is unclear whether detainees were on the flights that came through
the states territory (and therefore fell within its jurisdiction for IHRL purposes),
most relevant may be secondary rules on ‘aiding and assisting’ which do not
require any territorial or physical control nexus. Aiding and assisting would
not arise from the failure to prevent or from providing moral support or
political cover; it is likely to arise, however, from concrete support such as
providing airports, airspace, or other logistical support without which rendition
251 See, e.g., Marty 2011 report, UN Joint Study at 84. Scheinin Report 2009, above note 53,
para 54. J.M. Irujo, ‘La CIA vuela bajo, muy bajo’ El País, 10 October 2010, available at:
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/ reportajes/CIA/vuela/elpepuint/20101010elpdmgrep_4/
Tes. See also ‘Portugal: Evidence of illegal CIA rendition flights surfacing’, Statewatch,
October 2006, alleging that 150 CIA rendition flights landed in Portugal. On 6 Sept 2006,
the Government admitted knowledge of flights passing between Guantanamo and another
destinations.
252 IHRL courts often rely on ‘concordant inferences’ to prove violations where information
lies within the exclusive control of the state. See Zubaydah brief v. Lithuania or Poland.
253 This is consistent with the continuing nature of enforced disappearance; see Convention
for Enforced Disappearance art 8.
254 Scheinin Report 2009, at para 54.
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programme could not have operated as it did, in circumstances where knowl-
edge of a risk of violations is established or can be inferred.
10.4.3 Transnational Intelligence Cooperation
The ERP is an enormous transnational intelligence operation. It has given rise
to difficult questions concerning the responsibility of the state in respect of
certain forms of ‘intelligence cooperation’ with other states, in light of the
nature of the violations involved and the legal obligations set out above.255
It has contributed to a renewed consideration of states’ policies and their
implications, as reflected in for example the UK Consolidated Guidance to
Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing
of Detainees Overseas and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating
to Detainees.256 This may prove to be one of the most significant develop-
ments to arise from the exposure of the ERP. It is worth considering briefly
some forms of cooperation and whether they may give rise to legal responsibil-
ity under current law.
10.4.3.1 Presence at Interrogations and Questioning Detainees?
While the nature and extent of their involvement remains unknown, it appears
that foreign intelligence officials have been present during interrogations in
CIA secret prisons, and have themselves questioned prisoners in the ERP, as
they have in Guantanamo. Evidence suggests that British, Canadian, and
Australian intelligence agents questioned persons held by US, Pakistani, and
other intelligence services during incommunicado detention (e.g. Mohammad,
el Masri).257
In addition to factual questions regarding the role of foreign personnel
are legal questions as to what form of responsibility such presence might give
rise to. In the circumstances, was there a joint operation, or was there sufficient
causal connection between the participation of foreign officials and the wrongs
to amount to ‘aiding and assisting’? Presence certainly limits plausible deniabil-
ity on the nature of the programme, and would appear to imply a level of
255 UN Joint Study, above, note 3; ICJ Eminent Report, above, note 52.
256 Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention
and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence
Relating to Detainees (Consolidated Guidance) 2010.
257 E.g., el Masri alleged a German was present, Mohamed that UK officials were present,
during their interrogation/arbitrary detention Scheinin Report 2009, above note 53, fn. 63:
‘Evidence proves that Australian, British and United States intelligence personnel have
themselves interviewed detainees who were held incommunicado by the Pakistani ISI in
so-called safe houses, where they were being torture”. Many states have sent interrogators
to Guantánamo Bay, see Chapter 8.
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condoning of the conduct that is on its face inconsistent with any obligation
to cooperate to end the wrong. The Special Rapporteur on Terrorism for his
part has described the involvement of foreign officials as amounting to ‘con-
doning’, ‘encouraging’, or ‘even support’ for unlawfulness which, in his view,
constitutes as an ‘internationally wrongful act’.258 He concludes that “the
active or passive participation by States in the interrogation of persons held
by another State constitutes an internationally wrongful act if the State knew
or ought to have known that the person was facing a real risk of torture or
other prohibited treatment, including arbitrary detention.” In this vein, the
Supreme Court of Canada has likewise found that the presence of Canadian
interrogators in Guantanamo fell foul of the Canadian Charter.259
10.4.3.2 Provision of Intelligence?
A secondary form of cooperation is the provision by foreign states of intelli-
gence information that is relied upon to subject individuals to the ERP, or used
during abusive interrogation. Examples of information transmission include
Arar’s case, where the Canadian intelligence agents handed what transpired
to be erroneous information to their US counterparts, leading to Arar’s de-
tention and torture.260 In Binyam Mohamed’s case, the UK government was
found to have ‘facilitated interviews … by or on behalf of the US government
in the knowledge of what had been reported to them in relation to his de-
tention and treatment.’261 Several other cases have been reported of lesser
forms of engagement, such as authoritative sources reporting western govern-
ments providing questions to interrogating governments.262
Where the intelligence contributed directly to the programme, perhaps
without which an individual may not have been identified, located and their
rights violated, this would constitute concrete support. Where the knowledge
of its purpose was or should have been accessible to the state, and its causal
link apparent, allegations of ‘aiding and assisting’ in the commission of an
international wrong would seem well founded.
States must exchange intelligence to fulfil their obligations to protect against
serious crime, including terrorism. The principle of effectiveness demands that
258 Scheinin Report 2009, above note 46, at 20
259 Omar Khadr case, Supreme Court of Canada 2010, found Canadian officials participating
in interrogations was a breach of Charter.
260 Arar Commission; ICJ Report, at 84.
261 R (B Mohamed) v Foreign Secretary [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin) (21 August 2008).
262 Scheinin Report 2009, note 46, at para. 54, fn. 63 states: ‘German and Canadian intelligence
agencies provided questions to Syrian Military Intelligence in the cases of Muhammad
Zammar and Abdullah Almalki. Both detainees were tortured afterwards while in Syrian
custody.’ He concludes that ‘...the active participation through the sending of interrogators
or questions, or even the mere presence of intelligence personnel at an interview with a
person who is being held in places where his rights are violated, can be reasonably under-
stood as implicitly condoning such practices.’
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the law is not interpreted so as to impede such intelligence cooperation. As
such, not every act of intelligence sharing that may ultimately contribute to
a violation can be accountable to the source state. However, the ‘Eminent
Jurists Panel’ suggested that where ‘intelligence and other agencies are system-
atically sharing information with countries and agencies with a known record
of human rights violations it is difficult to resist the argument that States are
complicit, wittingly or unwittingly, in the serious human rights violations
committed by their partners in counter-terrorism.’263
10.4.3.3 Receipt of Intelligence?
Particular complexity surrounds the legal responsibility of states for the receipt
of intelligence information obtained from other states, including from the ERP.
This could implicate many states that rely on intelligence from states engaged
in international wrongs, notably extraction of information under torture.
Article 15 of the Convention against torture makes explicit that information
obtained through torture cannot be used in legal proceedings.264 Less clear
however is the situation in respect of other, operational, uses of such informa-
tion. In some contexts, it has been suggested that a distinction might be drawn
between the admissibility of evidence and reliance on information for other
purposes,265 though whether a sharp distinction is justified is open to ques-
tion. The House of Lords in A&Ors suggested that the principled basis for
the ban to torture evidence was, that the reliance on such evidence in legal
proceedings has the effect of ‘encouraging’ torture.266 So far as this rationale
of prevention applies, the same encouragement, assistance or complicity arises,
whatever the nature of the use to which the information is put.267
Undoubtedly, however, the idea of a ban on receipt of certain intelligence
information raises tensions, including between the duty to obtain information
to protect citizens from violence on the one hand, and the obligations to
prevent the practice on torture on the other.268 (A separate but related ques-
263 ICJ Report, at 85. See also Scheinin Report 2009, above note 46, at 20.
264 Admissibility of torture evidence is specifically proscribed in Art. 15 CAT, as well as part
of the general prohibition on torture in international law. Art. 15 CAT, Chapter 7A5.2.
265 See the A & Ors (torture evidence) case, in Chapter 11 and H. Duffy, ‘Human Rights
Litigation and the “war on terror’”, 90 (2008) International Review of the Red Cross 871. This
has since been upheld in R v Ahmed discussed in Chapter 4.
266 The Lords found that states could not condemn torture while making using for torture
confessions as ‘the effect is to encourage torture’ A & Ors, p. 30.
267 Chapter 4B4. Cf where preservation of the ‘integrity of proceedings’ is given as rationale
for the exclusion of torture evidence.
268 The UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee Report of 2005 describes as ‘for debate’
whether such intelligence should be rejected as a matter of principle. ‘Intelligence and
Security Committee, The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghan-
istan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq’, 2005, para. 32.
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tion is of course whether such information is, in any event, reliable.)269 It
has been described as a ‘debatable’ legal matter whether information that may
be obtained through TCIDT should be rejected as a matter of principle, not
merely in court proceedings, and if so in what circumstances.270 It would
certainly have to be assessed in light of particular facts whether there was
‘concrete support’ as required for aiding and assisting. Particular practical
challenges arise as regards proof of the ‘knowledge’ of a state as to its assist-
ance in the wrong, and the extent of any effective duty to enquire.
It has been suggested by Special Rapporteurs and other expert groups that
receipt of intelligence in such circumstances may amount to complicity or to
aiding and assisting under the rules of state responsibility,271 though out-
standing controversy was highlighted by an English court recently rejecting
this as an expression of current law.272 Where intelligence is sought and
obtained from a state known to engage in serious rights violations, such that
states become ‘consumers of torture’273 or create a ‘market’ for human rights
violations, it has been suggested with some force that the state may contribute
to the occurrence of torture.274 Whether this amounts to aiding and assisting
(as opposed to highlighting the gap between these rules and a looser approach
to ‘complicity’,275) may remain a matter of dispute. The scope of complicity,
and its implications in this context, may well be an area ripe for further
development through evolving law and practice in the counter-terrorism
field.276
269 ISC Report 2005, para. 32, id., ends: ‘There are separate questions as to whether intelligence
obtained under torture is likely to be reliable, and whether principled refusal would deter
those who might use such methods.’ See also Davis, ‘Consign Bush’s “torture memos” to
history’, note28, noting that ‘Torture is counter-productive. Professional interrogators –
Ali Soufan of the FBI, Matthew Alexander of the Air Force and Glenn Carle of the CIA
– have said this clearly.’
270 UK Parliamentary Joint Committee On Human Rights, ‘Nineteenth Report’, 18 May 2006
Supra.
271 Scheinin Report 2009, note 53; UK Joint Committee on Human Rights.
272 In R v Ahmed where the applicant had allegedly been tortured in Uzbekistan and Pakistan,
the Court was asked (and refused) to stay proceedings. Its justifications included that there
was no link between the alleged torture and his trial, including that there was no evidence
of wrong doing by UK authorities. See Chapter 4.B.4.
273 ICJ Eminent Jurists Panel, 2009, para 85.
274 See Scheinin Report 2009, ICJ Report, and UK Joint Committee on Human Rights Report,
above.
275 See eg S Fulton, Cooperating with the enemy of mankind, note 246, arguing that a broader
approach to complicity is required than that covered by aiding and assisting enshrined
in current law, and referring to eg passive acquiescence as part of complicity as understood
under the Torture Convention.
276 Eg Juan Mendez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, identifies this as an area for future
attention. See also Chapter 4B4 on implications for the criminal process.
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In any event, the creation of markets for torture information and reliance
upon it would certainly seem to fall foul of positive obligations to safeguard
against, and to cooperate to stop, egregious violations of international law.277
10.5 THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE FOR EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
The legal framework, considered alongside the facts concerning the ERP,
indicates the commission of a range of crimes under national and international
law, for which a range of states have obligations to investigate, where appro-
priate to prosecute, and to provide victims with reparation. How does inter-
national state practice to date measure up to these obligations? The following
section highlights developments in the pursuit of justice, and illustrates some
of the impediments faced by victims and their advocates.
10.5.1 Investigation and Prosecution in Practice?
The provisions of the legal framework on investigation, accountability and
reparation contrast starkly to the lack of investigation and accountability in
practice. This is most striking in the US, given its leading role in the ERP. While
in its communications to the HRC for example,278 the US has cited provisions
of its domestic law that make relevant prosecutions possible, it has yet to rely
on these laws.279 To date, no indictments have been filed in the US against
CIA agents, other officials, or government contractors for their role in ERP, and
at the time of writing there is little concrete prospect of accountability.280
Under the Bush administration, the CIA Inspector General referred a few
specific incidents to the Department of Justice and federal prosecutors, re-
portedly including incidents involving the use of death threats and torture
277 See Art 1 Geneva Conventions, 10.3.2, so far as applicable, and 10.3.4.4 above regarding
duties in respect of gross violations of peremptory norms. The principle is reflected in IHRL
positive obligations also, even if not treaties are not strictly applicable.
278 ‘Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: United States of America’, UNHRC, 18 December 2006, UN Doc CCPR/
C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 45c30bec9.html.
279 At least two U.S. statutes appear to provide U.S. courts with criminal jurisdiction over ERP.
One statute criminalizes violations of Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions committed
by U.S. personnel abroad. U.S. Code, War Crimes Statute, 18 U.S.C. 2441, available at http://
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_ 00002441----000-.html.
280 See, e.g., S. Ackerman, ‘CIA Exhales: 99 Out of 101 Torture Cases Dropped’, WIRED, 30
June 2011, available at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/cia-exhales-99-out-of-
101-torture-cases-dropped. On accountability for rights violations in the WOT more broadly
see Chapter 7 ‘Justice and Accountability’.
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that resulted in deaths, but prosecutors declined to prosecute in each
instance.281 The two out of 101 cases of suspected detainee abuse that were
reportedly being taken forward ended with the closure of the investigation
by the Attorney-General Holder.282 The extent of impunity is perhaps illus-
trated by the former head of counter-terrorism office in the CIA promoting
his book on the ERP283 by admitting to authorising waterboarding and the
destruction of 92 videotapes of interrogation session,284 prompting the com-
ment that ‘We look forward, and not back, and we don’t put our torturers
on trial. We put them on book tours.’
While they have not gained prominence in practice due to the lack of
accountability in the US, issues such as potentially broad-reaching defences
or immunities that conflict with international law obligations may yet become
contentious if the tide changes on accountability in the war on terror.285
Investigation and accountability obligations arise also in the many other
states alleged to have participated in the CIA programme.286 In some, the
authorities continue to simply deny any role without enquiries or investigation,
but developments in a number of states, suggest momentum towards investiga-
tion and accountability may be gathering. Progress is particularly apparent
in numerous European states accused of involvement in the ERP, impelled by
regional reports such as by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe reports or the European Parliament which have contributed to clari-
fying facts and generating pressure for greater transparency and
accountability.287 Several states have responded by carrying out some form
of investigation, and in a few cases moving towards prosecution. While the
nature and progress of such proceedings is constantly in flux, and opaque
given the extent of secrecy, the following illustrate these developments as well
as some of the challenges and limitations.
– United Kingdom: In the UK, investigations were opened into M16’s role in
unlawful interrogations abroad, including in relation to the UK intelligence
281 See U.S. Office of the Inspector General, ‘CIA OIG Special Review of Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003)’, note 32.
282 See Chapter 7B.14.
283 J. Rodriguez, Hard Measures (Threshold Editions, 2012); P. Taylor, ‘“Vomiting and screaming”
in destroyed waterboarding tapes’, Interview with Jose Rodriguez, BBC Newsnight, 9 May
2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17990955
284 C. Pierce, ‘Waterboards, Drones, and the Drones Who Love Them’, Esquire Politics Blog,
30 April 2012, available at: http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/jose-rodriguez-cia-book-
8484289.
285 Chapter 7 on human rights obligations; Chapter 4 on criminal law principles and practice.
286 These would include e.g., Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, and
Thailand: see generally UN Joint Study, above, note 3.
287 Note 3 above. Regrettably some initiatives have been marred by lack of cooperation by
national authorities; see report by the European Parliament’s Special Rapporteur Helen
Flautre, Report on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in European
countries by the CIA: follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee report,’ DocRef
(2012/2033(INI), and the Parliamentary Resolution of 11 September 2012.
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agencies’ role in the detention and interrogation of Binyam Mohamad.288
These shone a light on the facts, findings for example that “members of
the Security Service provided information to the US authorities about Mr.
Mohamed and supplied questions for the US authorities to put to Mr.
Mohamed.”289 In relation to both, however, the crown prosecution service
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to pursue criminal charges
against any identifiable individual,290 in part due to lack of access to
relevant witnesses and non-cooperation from the US.291 The UK’s failure
to conduct adequate enquiries, investigate and to hold to account have
been criticised, for example by the UN Committee against Torture.292
Demands for information and accountability as to what the UK knew and
when (in light of information that the authorities knew of the ERP from
the outset),293 and its role in the ‘improper treatment of detainees’ post
288 See ‘UK investigations guide into Torture and Rendition’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/jan/12/uk-investigations-torture-rendition-guide, for details on Operation
Hinton. The police investigation lasted two and a half years as detectives attempted to trace
responsibility up the chain of command, but concluded there was insufficient evidence
to press charges. See ‘Joint statement by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Metro-
politanPoliceService’,12January2012http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_statements/joint_
statement_by_the_director_of_public_prosecutions_and_the_metropolitan_police_service
(hereinafter ‘DPP and MPS Joint Statement’). Another inquiry concerned interrogations
at the notorious Baghram facility in Afghanistan See ‘UK investigations guide’, supra note
295, for details on Operation Iden.
289 ‘DPP and MPS Joint Statement’, id.: ‘Having reviewed the further evidence carefully, the
CPS has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to show that: (a) members of the Security
Service provided information to the US authorities about Mr Mohamed and supplied
questions for the US authorities to put to Mr Mohamed while he was being detained
between 2002 and 2004, including at times when Mr Mohamed’s precise whereabouts was
not known to them; (b) that Mr Mohamed was held in Morocco for at least some time
between July 2002 and early 2004. In relation to the interviewing of Mohamad in Pakistan
in 2002 it had already been decided in October 2010 that there was not a realistic prospect
of a conviction for any criminal offences arising out of that conduct.’
290 The CPS concluded that there is insufficient evidence to prove to the standard required
in a criminal court that any identifiable individual provided information to the U.S. author-
ities about Mr Mohamed or supplied questions for the U.S. authorities to put to Mr Mo-
hamed, or was party to doing so, at a time when he or she knew or ought to have known
that there was a real or serious risk that Mr Mohamed would be exposed to ill treatment
amounting to torture. See ‘UK investigations guide’, supra note 288.
291 See ‘DPP and MPS Joint Statement’ referring to the refusal of eye witnesses to speak to
the police or CPS.
292 CAT Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic report of the United Kingdom, 31 May
2013.
293 See. e.g., allegations in I. Cobain, Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture (Portobello Books
Ltd, 2012)., reported on 22/10, that within days of 9/11, the CIA told British intelligence
officers at the British embassy in Washington of its plans to abduct al Qaida suspects and
fly them to secret prisons where they would be interrogated.
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9/11 generally,294 and in identified incidents specifically,295 continue
to grow.
– Italy: The first convictions in this field arose in Italy, where CIA agents and
some of their Italian counterparts were found guilty of aiding and abetting
the kidnapping of Abu Omar.296 As the Italian court could not obtain
an extradition request, still less the presence of the accused CIA officials,297
nine Italians agents and 26 Americans, mostly CIA agents, were however
tried in absentia.298 The Italian prosecution is an example of tenacious
investigative work, but also of the challenges to effective criminal prosecu-
tions: much of the evidence was deemed inadmissible on state secrecy
grounds,299 and some cases were dropped on this basis300 or because
US individuals were considered to have diplomatic immunity from prosecu-
tion.301 The fact that prosecutors were themselves charged with violating
294 In July 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced an inquiry to ‘look at whether
Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees, held by other countries,
that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11’ but the Inquiry was criticized by NGOs
for its lack of independence and its secrecy, and ultimately suspended pending Scotland
Yard police investigations into UK-led rendition of individuals and their families to Libya.
‘Torture Claims: Cameron announces enquiry’, BBC News, 6 July 2010, available at: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 10521326.
295 See ‘DPP and MPS Joint Statement’, above, note 295,on the investigation of two further
cases of rendition of named individuals to Libya and their alleged ill-treatment. It also deals
with ‘the setting up of an advisory panel for scoping other complaints about ill-treatment
by detainees in similar circumstances.’
296 J. Hooper, ‘Italian court finds CIA agents guilty of kidnapping terrorism suspect’, Guardian,
4 November 2009, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/04/cia-guilty-
rendition-abu-omar.
297 The prosecutor asked the Minister of Justice to submit an extradition request to the US
but it declined.
298 Twenty three were convicted, including Robert Seldon Lady, the CIA station chief in Milan
sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Trials in absentia arguably fall short of providing
a suitable rule of law based criminal response, and they individuals would have to be retried
if they ever were to appear in Italy. The scope of charges was also limited as the prosecutor
did not originally pursue charges against Italian nationals;see Messineo, ‘Extraordinary
Renditions’, above, note 14, at 1023 and ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007)’, note 3, at
para. 316. However, further prosecutions look set to unfold, see below.
299 The Constitutional Court ruled that the interests of state security took precedence over
any other interest, and deemed inadmissible much of the evidence on which the case had
been built, including material seized from Italian and American intelligence operatives.
See CoE Rendition Report (12 June 2006), above, note 3, para. 162; R. Donadio, ‘Italian Court
Upends Trial Involving C.I.A. Links’, New York Times, 11 March 2009, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/world/europe/12italy.html?_r=3. Messineo, ‘Extraordinary
Renditions’, above, note 14, at 1039-40.
300 ‘Italy Prevents Trial of Intelligence Agents over Abu Omar Rendition’, Amnesty International,
16 December 2010, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/italy-
prevents-trial-intelligence-agents-rendition-abu-omar-2010-12-16.
301 ‘Open Secret: Mounting Evidence of Europe’s Complicity in Rendition and Secret Detention’,
Amnesty International, November 2010, at 18-20, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/
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state secrets through their investigation was condemned as an ‘intolerable
impediment to the independence of justice’.302 A less broad-reaching
approach to state secrecy appeared to emerge, however, when in 2012 the
Italian Supreme court ordered the re-trial of several high level intelligence
officials (whose cases had been thrown out by the court on state secrecy
grounds).303 It also upheld existing convictions despite US arguments,
via the Italian Ministry of Justice, that the acts or omissions alleged arose
from official duty, and that the US personnel were protected by SOFA
agreements.304
– Canada: The Canadian government convened a commission of enquiry to
explore Mahar Arar’s case,305 which vindicated Mr Arar by clearing him
of any alleged al Qaeda links, and found that Canadian authorities had
provided inaccurate information to the US authorities which, it could
reasonably be inferred, had led to his capture and torture.306 Somewhat
uniquely in practice to date, the government apologised, awarded him
compensation and set in train the implementation of the inquiry’s wide-
ranging recommendations. Mr Arar has, however, had no success in US
courts, where his case has been dismissed on state secrets grounds.307
Progress has also yet to be made in holding to account individuals respons-
ible for wrongdoing.308
– Germany: Attempts to pursue accountability for the case of Khalid el Masri
in Germany got underway with the issuance of arrest warrants for CIA
agents in 2007.309 However, the German Justice Minister announced that,
library/asset/EUR01/023/2010/en/3a3fdac5-08da-4dfc-9f94-afa8b83c6848/eur010232010en.
pdf.
302 Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly, note 3, para. 14.
303 Supreme Court decision, 19 September 2012 in ‘Italy/USA: Supreme Court orders re-trial
of former high-level intelligence officials and upholds all convictions in Abu Omar kid-
napping case’ 21 September 2012. Former head and deputy head and three other high-
ranking officials of the Italian intelligence agency (formerly Servizio per le informazioni
e la sicurezza militare or SISMI), are to be retried.
304 The US also challenged Italian jurisdiction on the basis, inter alia, that the US had primary
jurisdiction to try any criminal acts. Despite this, the convictions were upheld and the
individuals affected, while still in the US, cannot leave the U.S. without fear of arrest and
forfeiture of assets. AI Index: EUR 30/015/2012, 21 September 2012.
305 The Inquiry was established 5 February 2004 under Part I of the Inquiries Act 1985, to
investigate and report on the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar and
to recommend review mechanism for the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
with respect to national security. See Arar Commission, above, note 12.
306 A separate report found that collaboration between the Canadian police and Syrian officials
had resulted in his torture.
307 Arar v Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), paras. 162-3
308 See ‘Message from Maher Arar’, available at: www.maherarar.ca.
309 ‘Germany issues CIA arrest orders’, BBC News, 31 January 2007, available at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/6316369.stm; see also ‘CoE Rendition
Report (7 June 2007)’ note 3 at p. 57 on the limitations in that process including the lack
of progress in identifying the German alleged to have been present.
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as the US had made clear that it would not cooperate, the German author-
ities would therefore not be pursuing a formal request for the extradition
of the 13 CIA agents involved in el-Masri’s abduction.310 Leaked cables
indicate the extent of pressure from the US not to pursue the cases, and
German responsiveness.311 There has been a parliamentary inquiry into
the role of German agents in several cases, including El-Masri’s,312 but
the German government has been criticised for suppressing informa-
tion.313
– Poland: An investigation was launched into the CIA secret prison at Stare
Kiejkuty, Poland, in which rendition victims Abu Zubaydah and Abdal-
Rahim al-Nashiri have been granted victim status.314 The investigation
has been criticised as protracted and untransparent, raising doubts as to
the promptness, thoroughness and effectiveness required by the legal
framework.315 However, reports suggested that the former head of intelli-
gence had been charged in relation to the secret prison, representing a first
opportunity for significant accountability in relation to the secret prison
system,316 though the cloak of secrecy surrounding proceedings has ren-
dered it difficult to assess the true nature and scope of charges and the
real prospect for accountability in Poland.317
310 See, e.g., J. Shawl, ‘US rejects Germany bid for extradition of CIA agents in el-Masri
rendition’, JURIST, 22 September 2007, available at: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/09/
us-rejects-germany-bid-for-extradition.php.
311 ‘Cables Show Germany Caved to Pressure from Washington’, de Spiegel, 12 September 2010,
available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-cia-s-el-masri-abduction-
cables-show-germany-caved-to-pressure-from-washington-a-733860.html.
312 German Bundestag Report, above, note 12.
313 ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June 2007), note 3, ‘A German Constitutional Court decision which
came out on the same day the parliamentary inquiry report, found the German government
to have violated the Constitution by failing to disclose relevant information and failing
to cooperate with the inquiry.’
314 The investigation is brought under Art. 231 of the Polish criminal code. See e.g. UN Joint
Study, above, note 3, at para. 118. See Abu Zubaydah v Poland, INTERIGHTS, note 83.
315 See eg ECHR application, id.
316 See ‘Supreme Court: UK unlawful rendition may have been war crime’, REPRIEVE, 31
October 2012, available at: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_10_31_rahmatullah_
judgement_rendition.
317 See, e.g., ‘List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the third
periodic report of Poland (CCPR/C/POL/6)’, UNHRC, 17 September 2010, UN Doc CCPR/
C/POL/Q/6/Add.1, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/
CCPR.C.POL.6.Q.Add.1_en.doc. Uncertainty remains e.g. as to whether, in light of official
statements, the investigations and prosecutions will be limited to Polish officials and to
the question whether they ‘abused their authority’ in creating an ‘extraterritorial zone’ in
Poland. Based on press reports charges may relate, erroneously, to ‘war crimes’ rather than
e.g. torture or crimes against humanity.
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– In a number of other states, such as Romania318 and Lithuania,319 also
alleged to have housed secret prisons, there have been cursory ‘enquiries,’
followed by decisions not to proceed to prosecution, reflecting the pressure
to respond in some way to allegations while plainly falling short of mean-
ingful attempts towards accountability.320 These processes and other ini-
tiatives, such as the Freedom of Information request referred to above, have
however revealed crucial information on how the CIA operated with close
cooperation of other states, using through false flight plans and other
methods of cover-up.321
– Spain: The Spanish investigations into mistreatment of detainees, including
one case against the so-called ‘Bush 6’ legal advisors whose advice is
alleged to have paved the way for practices of torture and ill-treatment
in detention sites around the world, have been discussed elsewhere.322
An investigation was opened, but suspended, in deference to investigation
318 Confirmation by the PACE of the existence of a Romanian black site in 2007 prompted
a cursory Romanian Senate committee investigation. Fava, ‘Report on the alleged use of
European countries by the CIA’, above, note 6, at para. 157. ‘CoE Rendition Report (7 June
2007)’, above, note 3 at 25-6. European Parliament Temporary Committee, ‘Working
Document No. 9 on certain European countries analysed during the work of the Temporary
Committee’, 26 February 2007, at 44, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/
tempcom/tdip/working_docs/pe382420_en.pdf (citing Romanian Senate decision No. 29/
2005).
319 The first report of a CIA-operated detention site in Lithuania emerged in 2009; an enquiry
was conducted by the Lithuanian Parliament (the Seimas), which reported in January 2010
that there were high levels of cooperation between the CIA and Lithuanian State Security
Department for the establishment of two buildings ‘suitable’ for housing detainees, but
wound up concluding that it could not determine whether it actually held detainees: see
Annex to the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Findings of the Parlia-
mentary Investigation by the Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence Concer-
ning the Alleged Transportation and confinement of Persons Detained by the Central
Intelligence Agency of the United States of America in the Territory of the Republic of
Lithuania (hereinafter ‘Seimas CNSD Report’), available at: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/
w5_show?p_r=6143&p_d=100241&p_k=2. See also on-site visit conducted by the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 14-18 June 2010, available at http://
www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ltu/2011-17-inf-eng.htm (hereinafter ‘CPT Report’); see also
Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania and Poland.
320 Eg. on 14 January 2011, the Romanian Prosecutor closed the pre-trial investigation, claiming:
that “no data on illegal transportation of any persons by [CIA] aircraft was received during
the pre-trial investigation”; Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania,
Resolution on the Termination of the Pre-Trial Investigation. Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania,
above, note 29. The Lithuanian investigation addressed only ‘abuse of official position’
and was also closed within the year. See Amnesty International, ‘Lithuania Must Reopen
CIA Secret Prison Investigation’ (18 January 2011) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/lithuania-must-reopen-cia-secret-prison-investigation-2011-01-18> accessed 3 Nov
2012.
321 See official documents disclosed by the Polish government through FOIA requests in Poland.
‘Explanation of Rendition Flight Records Released by the Polish Air Navigation Services
Agency’ above, note 58.
322 Those concerning Guantanamo were discussed in Chapter 8C and more generally 7B.14.
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by the Justice Department, but the timeliness of such deferral, and whether
it should endure, may be open to question in light of inertia within the
US itself.323
In several of the many other states that were involved in the rendition opera-
tion, in one capacity or another, enquiries have been lodged, investigations
continue to unfold and demands for justice grow.324 In such a dynamic area
of practice, it is perhaps wise to avoid untimely conclusions. Undoubtedly
the lack of accountability is striking, notably in the US, but also elsewhere.325
Pressure to investigate and prosecute continues to mount, though whether
the many ‘investigations’ or ‘enquiries’ underway ultimately represent a
genuine attempt to uncover the truth, as opposed to themselves forming part
of the ‘cover up,’ is open to question. What investigations and enquiries have
undoubtedly done is to prise open information, contributing to building
momentum towards fuller accountability.
They also expose the obstacles and challenges to justice and accountability
(beyond the inevitable challenges of investigating in such an opaque area),
including lack of cooperation from the US authorities, pressure by that state
on others not to investigate, and the lack of political will within certain Euro-
pean states themselves.326 The robust criticism of US non-cooperation or the
OSCE parliament ‘insistence’ that the US improve cooperation with European
investigations, for example, may be indications that indignation around these
obstacles is, like the evidence of it, growing.327 The record remains limited
and it remains to be seen whether momentum towards criminal accountability
continues to grow and bears fruit.
323 Judge Velasco’s decision of 13 April 2011. See Chapter 8.C.8. ‘Justice for Guantanamo?’
324 See eg the 2012 decision of the Finnish Ombudsperson to investigate. For an overview of
developments in Europe see Amnesty International ‘Unlock the Truth’ http://www.unlock
thetruth.org/l/en/ or Reprieve http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/eucomplicity/.
Parliamentary enquiries were completed in Denmark and Portugal, see also Chapter 7B.14
on accountability more broadly.
325 ‘In almost no recent cases have there been any judicial investigations into allegations of
secret detention, and practically no one has been brought to justice.’ ‘UN experts point
to widespread use of secret detention linked to counter-terrorism, UN NEWS Centre, 26
January 2010, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33586#.
UKc6N-Oe_KA. UN Joint Study, above, note 3, p. 5 and para. 291.
326 Thomas Hammamberg then Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights described
“enormous pressure from Washington … [and] instructions from the CIA, with the support of the
White House, are not to give any facts on this. Therefore, it is not easy to investigate....” He refers
also to ‘concealment’ and ‘cover up’ by European states, note 63..
327 On 9 July 2012, a unanimous resolution of the OSCE parliamentary assembly ‘insists that
the United States government cooperates with European investigations.’
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10.5.2 Civil Accountability and Human Rights Litigation
Diverse obstacles have also been visible for victims seeking a remedy or
reparation through civil litigation. As some of these are discussed in Chapter
11, suffice to recall briefly here that various obstacles have impeded victims
claims for damages in respect of the ERP. Prime among them is the broad
reaching approach to the state secrets doctrine, exemplified by the rejection
of claims for damages brought by for example El-Masri,328 Mahar Arar,329
or Binyam Mohamad.330 The Courts have held that the government’s asser-
tion of state secrets privilege required the court to dismiss the entire action,
rather than simply withholding particular pieces of information or otherwise
take measures to accommodate national security concerns while also
recognising the victims’ right to a remedy.331 Petitions seeking leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court have been rejected.332 Other obstacles of relevance
include the courts’ approach to the acceptance of official immunities from civil
suit, and findings that torture and rendition are part of official duties.333
The lack of effective investigations and prosecutions, and the obstacles that
victims have encountered in national level litigation, underline the importance
of international oversight and the availability of remedies outside national
jurisdictions. It is unsurprising, therefore, that victims of rendition are increas-
ingly turning to transnational justice alternatives, and beginning to bring their
cases to human rights supervisory mechanisms.
Due to the extensive roles played by European states in the CIA programme,
the ECtHR is set to play a particularly significant role in determining the extent
to which European states breached their obligations in each of the ways
outlined above. As noted above, a first international judgement334 has been
handed down by the European Court in El Masri v Macedonia condemning
the state of Macedonia for its role in the rendition programme, by detaining
328 See El-Masri v Tenet, 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 532-4 (E.D. Va. 2006).
329 Arar v Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), paras. 162-3
330 Mohamed v Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., above, note 55
331 Id.
332 Id., including third party intervention on international standards by INTERIGHTS, Redress,
International Commission of Jurists, and World Organisation against Torture.
333 As noted in Chapter 8, in the Guantánamo related case of Rasul v Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 660
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rasul I), vacated Rasul v Myers 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008), aff’d Rasul v Myers 563
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam), torture was held by U.S. court to fall within the scope
of the employment of government officials who were as a consequence immune from civil
suit. As explained by the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia: ‘the plaintiffs do
not allege that the defendants acted as rogue officials or employees who implemented a
policy of torture for reasons unrelated to the gathering of intelligence. Therefore, the alleged
tortious conduct was incidental to the defendants’ legitimate employment duties.’ Paras.
658-9.
334 The first case brought to that Court by ERP victims was found inadmissible because Bosnia
was not a party to the ECHR at the time that six detainees were transferred to U.S. custody:
Boumediene and Ors v Bosnia, Appl. No. 38703/06 (ECtHR 18 November 2008).
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at US behest and transferring to the CIA and to Afghanistan. This case is the
tip of the rendition litigation iceberg, with numerous other cases having been
brought to the Court against Lithuania,335 Poland,336 Italy337 and Roma-
nia,338 with others in preparatory stage.
Cases against the US are now pending in the Inter-American system, before
the Inter-american Commission on Human Rights.339 Al Asad v Djibouti was
the first ERP case opened before the African Commission on Human Rights
in respect of an African state’s involvement in the CIA rendition pro-
gramme,340 while another case concerning Kenyan/Ugandan rendition before
the East African Court of Justice,341 and others are unfolding on the domestic
level.342
A number of challenges arise for victims, however, and for the courts
themselves, in these international and regional cases, as they do on the national
level. In addition to normal admissibility challenges relating to time limits
applicable before some courts, and the general requirement of exhausting
domestic remedies, are other challenges of a less common nature.343 Regional
and international courts do not operate a doctrine of states secrets or defer
automatically to states’ own assessments of the need for restrictions on rights
335 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, and Poland, ECHR (pending) www.interights.org.
336 ‘Al-Nashiri v. Poland’, Open Society Foundations, 17 July 2012, available at: http://www.open
societyfoundations.org/litigation/al-nashiri-v-poland ; Abu Zubaydah v Poland, above,
note 29.
337 Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, Appl. No. 44883/09 (ECtHR 22 November 2011).
338 ‘Al-Nashiri v. Romania’, Open Society Foundations, 6 August 2012, available at: http://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/al-nashiri-v-romania.
339 E.g. Khaled El-Masri v United States, P-419-08, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
See too American Civil Liberties Union website, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/el-
masri-v-tenet. Given the U.S. refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court,
those cases will never proceed to judicial determination, though the decisions of the
Commission may play a role in historical clarification and providing a degree of vindication
for the survivors of the programme.
340 See, al Asad v Djibouti, above, note 117.
341 The petitioners accuse the Kenyan government of violating the rule of law by sending a
number of its citizens, who were accused of involvement in the July 2010 Kampala bombing,
to Uganda through extraordinary rendition rather than the normal extradition process.
342 These may proceed to the sub-regional bodies or African Commission and eventually the
African Court on Human and People’s Rights.
343 In some courts there are time limits that normally apply: e.g. under Art 35(1) ECHR limits
admissibility to applications filed within a period of six months from the date on which
the final domestic decision was taken. The particular challenges of these cases, including
limited access to counsel and the trauma suffered by the victims, have tended to give rise
to delays in submission but the Court may be assumed, in light of the ECtHR’s emphasis
on ensuring that remedies are ‘practical and effective’, that a flexible approach will be
adopted to ensure access to justice is not precluded. Multiple challenges for victims to use
domestic remedies in these sorts of cases, though applicants need only exhaust meaningful,
available and effective remedies.
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in the interests of national security,344 and there is no risk of cases not being
considered on national grounds. But there are early indications of states
seeking to have blanket ‘confidentiality’ over cases as a whole, thereby ex-
cluding proceedings and arguments from public view, which the Court will
need to continue to resist, while finding a way of considering documents confi-
dentially where this is necessary and appropriate.345 These cases remain in
their infancy and time will tell whether the court will regulate future cases
consistently with its existing rules and principles in relation to secrecy, confi-
dentiality and publicity, and avoid the unnecessary secrecy that it has criticised
on the national level.
Evidentiary challenges also remain, given the peripatetic, deliberately
disorientating, and clandestine nature of the rendition programme and its
associated cover up. The difficulties that victims inevitably face in cases of
disappearance and detention in one state are multiplied in this context. Addi-
tional novel challenges arise for some victims from the ban on all communica-
tion by the high value detainees referred to above, who cannot therefore give
direct testimony in support of their cases, which are therefore based largely
on public source documents.346 However, the rules of human rights courts
are flexible enough to accommodate these realities within a fair process; for
example legal presumptions and shifting burdens seek to ensure that litigants
have the opportunity can establish their case even in circumstances where the
evidence lies wholly within the grasp of the respondent state.347 Where a
prima facie case can be made against the state, in the circumstances of these
cases, the onus is likely to shift to the state to demonstrate the steps it took
to protect the rights of persons subject to their jurisdiction and to investigate
as credible allegations of abuse came to light.348
International litigation is no panacea and no replacement for effective
national courts. Among its many limitations are the lack of political support
and a relatively weak record of implementation. But in the absence of a
344 Rather, as ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrates, they adopt a more nuanced approach to
national security that seeks to respect genuine national security concerns but retaining the
right to be the ultimate arbiter of the necessary and proportionality of any limitation on
rights.
345 In eg. the cases Al Nashiri v Poland and Abu Zubaydah v Poland, the state has sought broad
confidentiality as regards the case file and hearings, the implications of which remain
uncertain.
346 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, and Abu Zubaydah Poland note 29.
347 See for example, Carabulea v Romania (App no 45661/99) ECtHR 13 July 2010.
348 See, for example, Saadi v Italy (App no 37201/06) ECtHR 28 February 2008 para 129;
Astamirova v Russia (App no 27256/03) ECtHR 26 February 2009 paras 70-81 (applicants
had made out a prima facie case that their family member was abducted by servicemen.
In the light of the Government’s failure to provide relevant documents, the burden of proof
shifted to the Government to disprove the applicants’ allegations. Drawing inferences from
the Government’s failure to produce documents or to provide a plausible explanation for
the events, it was found that Mr. Astamirov had been arrested by state servicemen).
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national remedy, these avenues may finally provide the opportunity for victims
to state their case and obtain a measure of vindication and justice, to clarify
the range of states responsible for the ERP. The ultimate value of these proceed-
ings349 may lie in further impelling national systems to address the violations
themselves, to conduct thorough investigations, hold those responsible to
account and to provide a measure of the recognition and redress that has thus
far proved elusive.
10.6 CONCLUSION
A US driven and internationally supported practice of enforced disappearance
of persons has unfolded in the name of security and counter-terrorism. The
‘extraordinary rendition’ programme may come to epitomise how far certain
states have stooped, and how far others have been willing to cooperate, accom-
modate, support or turn a blind eye, without constraint by the rule of law.
Political dispute surrounds the programme’s effectiveness and implications.
In 2006, then President Bush described it as ‘one of the most successful intelli-
gence efforts in American history.’350 This assessment has been challenged
by others who note, consistent with victim’s testimonies, that the programme
of torture reaped false testimony and doubtful actionable intelligence. As one
US representative put it to the US government:
“We can’t measure the accuracy of this program by saying we’ve gone out and
brought hard and fast cases based on it. You cannot tell me whether any of these
individuals or all of these individuals have lied. You conceded to me that someone
facing extreme anxiety and pressure could yield false information. I add all that
up and I come to one simple conclusion: We can’t tell if this program is working…
[W]e want to get the real terrorists and we don’t know if you are succeeding in
doing that or if you’re unearthing a bunch of lies.”351
The modus operandi of the ERP has certainly curtailed the use of intelligence
gathered as evidence, as the military commissions process described at chapter
8 or other criminal trials at Chapter 4, illustrate. It has further tarnished a much
349 See Chapter 11 on the various roles that human rights litigation can play.
350 President G.W. Bush, ‘President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006’, 17 October
2006, stating that the CIA detention and interrogation ‘program has been one of the most
successful intelligence efforts in American history ... . And the bill I sign today will ensure
that we can continue using this vital tool to protect the American people for years to come.’
(available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/2006
1017-1.html.
351 Representative Artur Davis (D-AL), House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, 14 February 2008, responding to Assistant Attorney
General Steven Bradbury’s description of the CIA’s interrogation program. ‘Tortured Justice:
Using Coerced Evidence to Prosecute Terrorist Suspects’, Human Rights First, 2008.
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damaged US reputation, and may well make it more difficult to achieve such
cooperation in the future.
What is beyond doubt – in light of the legal framework set out in other
chapters of this book and recalled above – is that the ERP involved flagrant
violations of international law. The most basic human rights were flouted
through prolonged, arbitrary, secret detention, involving techniques which
fall foul of the ban on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Arbitrary extra-legal transfer was blind to the rules on refoulement and due
process, making a mockery of the careful crafted norms and jurisprudence
on international cooperation, the improvement of which appeared to be a
priority post 9/11. It violated other obligations owed towards states as well
as to the individual victims. In many ways, then, the ERP is not a scenario that
pushes on legal boundaries or tests the framework as much as constitutes an
alarming violation of it.
Where the ERP may nudge legal boundaries, and therefore lead to the
development or clarification of legal standards, is in relation to the various
forms of state responsibility for the spider’s web of cooperation that planned,
implemented, facilitated, supported or otherwise made possible the ERP. As
the scope of the rendition operation – and the number of states ‘deeply com-
plicit’ in it352 – becomes clearer, so too does the importance of understanding
and clarifying what level of support, what amount of intelligence information,
what sort of cooperative relationships, should be considered to fall foul of
states obligations in the future. Among the issues of state responsibility that
are gaining currency as a result of the illumination of facts around the extra-
dition rendition programme, for example, is the nature of aiding and assisting
in the commission of human rights violations. Increased attention by a broad
range of state and non-state actors, public enquiries, and judicial proceedings,
is serving to give emphasis to – and may potentially clarify – legal standards
in this respect.
Rendition exposes, in extreme form, the implications of the increasingly
central and multifaceted role of intelligence agencies in the ‘war on terror’.353
352 ‘Britain and European governments helped US commit “countless” crimes colluding with
torture’, The Telegraph, 1 September 2011, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/8735518/Britain-and-European-governments-helped-US-
commit-countless-crimes-colluding-with-torture.html .T. Hammarberg, the Council of
Europe’s rights commissioner, accused governments of being ‘deeply complicit’ in illegal
activities carried out by the U.S. over the last 10 years, and noting that “Many of those
crimes have been carefully and deliberately covered up.” Likewise, see ‘CoE Rendition
Report (7 June 2007)’, above, note 3.
353 On the problematic role of intelligence agencies arresting and detaining if they do not have
law enforcement mandates under domestic law, see ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frame-
works and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while
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Those responsible were state agents, or acting under the direction and control
of the state, and clearly come within the state’s responsibility.354 Yet it has
been suggested that the legal framework is ‘lighter’ in respect of the govern-
ance of intelligence agencies than other arms of the state, which may contribute
to a sense of a lack of international regulation, and ultimately impunity.355
One by-product of the ERP has been increased attention dedicated to the need
for greater oversight and accountability of intelligence agencies and agents.356
The ERP has shone a harsh light on the dark side of cooperation, however,
and the need to ensure that state practices in international cooperation do not
‘participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment for any purpose,’ as reflected
in the UK’s ‘Consolidated Guidance’ to Intelligence officers in the field.357
The regulation of cooperation in intelligence matters raises other difficult issues
that raise tensions within the legal framework that need to be grappled with.
These includes the limits on transparency in light of the ‘control principle’
on which much cooperation is predicated and which is often relied upon to
limit disclosure of information that was supplied by another state.
Further debate and developments on law and policy in this area may be
one of the positive developments to emerge from the rendition programme,
bringing greater transparency and accountability into a notoriously im-
countering terrorism, including on their oversight’ (hereinafter ‘Good Practice Report’),
Fourteenth session, 17 May 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/14/46, Practice 28.
354 Most relevant actors were intelligence agents, clearly part of the state apparatus. Where
private actors were also employed, while this may help to shield the state, de facto, from
accountability, so far as the private actors worked under the ‘direction and control’ of the
state, they were clearly covered by the law of agency, and feel within the responsibility
of the state. See Chapter 3 on the issues of state responsibility.
355 G. Staberock, ‘Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism’, in Counter-Terrorism: International Law
and Practice, above, note 174, suggesting that international law is normatively ‘light’ on
the role of intelligence agencies, compared to special detailed rules on lawyers, judges,
prison service, law enforcement and fair trial, yet no comparable guidelines on intelligence
agencies. While it may be doubted that there is any normative void, or even real lack clarity
re legality in this case, it may be true to say as Staberock does that the lack of detailed
provisions contributes to a false perception of exemption from the international legal
oversight (p. 355).
356 Eg the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights’ Framework Principles on
Accountability for Counter-terrorism, March 2013, A/HRC/22/52, emphasise accountability
for intelligence agents and agencies. ICJ Eminent Jurists Report, above, note 49, at 84 with
recommendations as to the role of intelligence services and its separation from policing
functions and the limits of international cooperation. See also UN Special Rapporteur Good
Practice Report, A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010; above, note 341.
357 UK Consolidated Guidance 2010. The Guidance was welcomed by the otherwise critical
CAT report of May 2013.
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penetrable area of international practice. Renewed priority has to be afforded
to enhancing cooperation within a rule of law framework.358
Given the excessive secrecy surrounding the ERP, the extent to which the
facts have been, and continue to be, exposed is noteworthy. Information
concerning the nature of the ERP and those responsible for sustaining it con-
tinues to be uncovered, documented, and made public, making possible both
historical clarification of the facts, and appropriate reflections on lessons for
the future. It may be a reminder to states that their ability to suppress informa-
tion, even with the complex scheme and elaborate cover-up, is time limited.
Likewise, as obstacles to justice for victims continue to emerge, so too do
innovations in pursuit of the truth, justice or reparation to which victims are
entitled. The right of victims of rendition to information, redress and re-
paration, and the obligation to investigate and prosecute, is beyond dispute.
Yet a generalized reluctance to treat them as victims deserving of recognition
and redress – related apparently to lingering perceptions regarding the nature
or activities of those individuals – compounds the original wrong. Payment
of compensation has been rare, and unaccompanied by recognition of respons-
ibility or regret.359 The contrasting approach of the Arar enquiry – where
investigation and clarification were followed by compensation and an un-
qualified apology – provides a model that others may be inspired to follow.
All victims of serious rights violations, not least those associated with ERP,
have the right to reparation, and public acknowledgement of their victimisation
is long overdue. Bringing legal challenges where sensitive information is at
stake is enormously challenging, as practice in this and other chapters
shows.360 The courts – national and where necessary international -have a
crucial role to play in enabling victims to vindicate their rights, but also in
restoring the authority of the state and the rule of law, as discussed in the
next chapter.
As knowledge grows, so too does momentum towards accountability for
a range of actors that drove and facilitated the rendition programme, including
individual criminal responsibility. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 7,
accountability norms are well established, developed through years of global
358 The question of political will is clearly key. As Commissioner Hammerberg noted, accusing
Europe’s governments of blocking investigations into rendition in line with Washington’s
wishes: ‘The message is clear – good relations between the security agencies are deemed
more important than preventing torture and other serious human rights violations.’ ‘Britain
and European governments helped US commit “countless” crimes colluding with torture’.
359 Examples include al-Zery, compensated by the Swedish government, Mamdouh Habib
by the Australian government (reportedly on condition that he not pursue legal proceedings
against them), and Binyam Mohamed by UK authorities; see ‘Compensation to Guantanamo
Detainees “was necessary”’, BBC News, 16 November 2010, available at: http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-11769509.
360 See eg the novel ‘closed material proceedings’ and impediments on courts disclosing
‘sensitive information’ in the UK Justice and Security Act 2013 at Chapter 7B7 and other
challenges in Chapter 11.
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experience in addressing, among other things, state responsibility for enforced
disappearances and torture, and international criminal law. Whether these
norms can be brought to bear to ensure a measure of truth, justice, and
accountability for ERP remains unclear, but may prove a key test of the rule
of law and the extent to which states are determined to learn and move on
from the worst excesses of the war on terror.

11 The Role of the Courts: Human rights
Litigation in the ‘War on Terror’1
Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who
employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and
terrorism.
National Defense Strategy for the United States of America, 2005
On 12 June 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that persons
detained by the US in Guantánamo Bay have the constitutional privilege of
habeas corpus. The recognition that all detainees are entitled to this basic right,
irrespective of their nationality, designation as “enemy combatants,” or offshore
location, was hailed as a victory for the rule of law. Jubilation was somewhat
tempered by the fact that it took six years to decide that detainees are entitled
to a protection that would normally guarantee judicial access within hours,
days, or maybe weeks.2
Whether you see the Boumediene judgment as a historic victory for justice
or a reminder of its woeful failure, it tells a story. It provides graphic illustra-
tion of how far executive violations of human rights have gone in the name
of security, but also of the nature of the judicial response: deferential and
perhaps faltering at first, gradually ceding to a more invigorated role as a
matter of last resort. This judgment is only one part of a burgeoning mass of
litigation worldwide, each component of which tells its own story. Cases vary
vastly in their nature and goals -ranging from challenging unlawful practices
and preventing wrongs to gaining access to information and securing repara-
tion or judicial oversight itself, for example – as they do in their processes
and outcomes. They occur in and reflect the vastly different political and
cultural contexts as well as the diverse legal and constitutional systems from
which they emerge. This chapter will present a necessarily brief survey of some
1 An early version of this chapter was delivered as the Annual Public Lecture in International
Law at the School of Law, London School of Economics, 2007 and published in IRRC 2008.
The author was involved in several of the cases cited as counsel or third party/amicus
curiae intervener.
2 On questions regarding the effectiveness of the remedy in practice see below and Chapter 8.
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of this diverse body of practice of human rights litigation to date on the
national, regional and international levels.3
An enquiry into current litigation practice can serve several purposes. First,
it illustrates some of the key human rights issues arising in the so-called
“global war on terror” discussed in this book,4 as they affected specific indi-
vidual victims. Looking at issues through cases necessarily gives a limited
perspective: a case concerns a particular individual and particular set of facts
as assessed against the particular legal issues within the jurisdiction of the
particular court. The number of affected individuals that make it to court is
a tiny minority. But taken together, the practice of litigation in relation to
international terrorism over the past few years provides a prism that displays
quite vividly some of the key characteristics of the global war on terror, its
objectives, modus operandi, and human impact.
Second, and more critically for the purposes of this chapter, the brief survey
of litigation practice may provide a comparative framework for assessing the
impact and limitations of that litigation itself. What is the role of the courts
in responding to the human rights challenges posed by the war on terror, how
has it been discharged, and to what effect? What role has there been (or should
there be) for the courts as a bulwark against executive overreach? How have
regional and international courts and processes upheld or advanced inter-
national law where national courts have failed to do so? It remains early days
for any such assessment given the lengthy time frames often involved in the
cycle of litigation, but the extent of judicial responses in recent years suggest
that it is timely to enquire into the role of the courts in responding to the war
on terror.
The role the judiciary has played as guardian of human rights post 9/11
has to be considered alongside the impact of post 9/11 practices on the judicial
role. As a preliminary matter, it is therefore worth recalling the extent to which
laws and practices have curtailed the judicial function itself; a recurrent theme
running through many of the human rights concern post 9/11 addressed in
other chapters.5 The most notorious illustrations (addressed more extensively
later) are the divestiture of the right of ‘habeas corpus’ review of the lawfulness
of detention,6 the denial through legislation or practice of the right of access
3 This note focuses on select human rights litigation brought by victims against the state
before national, regional and international courts and bodies. It is noted that cases that
serve human rights ends can and have taken many other forms, from civil cases against
corporations to criminal cases against individuals (see eg. Chapter 10)
4 The underlying issues are addressed more comprehensively in Chapters 7 (Human Rights),
8 (Guantanamo), and 10 (Rendition).
5 See R. Weich, ‘Upsetting Checks and Balances: Congressional Hostility Towards the Courts
in Times of Crisis’, in ‘Report of the American Civil Liberties Union’, November 2001,
available at http://www.aclu.org.
6 This will be addressed in relation to Guantanamo detainees (Chapter 8) or other prisoners
held in Afghanistan and beyond (Chapters 6 and 7.3).
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to courts to seek damages,7 or the lack of judicial oversight of targeted sanc-
tions.8 Examples discussed in Chapter 49 reveal further restrictions in the
area of international cooperation,10 where developments purportedly designed
to streamline extradition have limited the judicial function,11 for example by
limiting the grounds on which cooperation can be refused,12 preventing courts
from looking behind the executive’s assessment of risks in the receiving
state,13 or removing the requirement of minimum evidentiary showings in
extradition proceedings.14 ‘Expedited’ procedures have also led to “emergency
deportations” proceeding even when the outcome of appeal proceedings is
pending, in clear disregard for the judicial process.15
In some scenarios, the interference with the judicial role has been more
dramatic in effect, such as resort to ‘special’ or military courts to judge terrorist
related offences, undermining the cardinal notion of judicial independence
from the executive.16 Attacks on judiciaries where they have shown inde-
pendence have been more common, as given graphic illustration by the Paki-
stani President’s condemnation of the Supreme Court for “working at cross
purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and
extremism” and thwarting intelligence agencies’ activities, by questioning the
7 E.g. Patriot Act 2001 which provided that certain categories of detainees would have no
right to seek relief before US courts; see also broad government claims of state secrets and
national security below or the UK Justice and Security Act 2013 on closed material pro-
ceedings.
8 E.g. for UN terrorism-related sanctions see UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999), paras. 4(a), 4(b)
and 6, which has successively been extended.
9 See Chapter 4B on enhancing cooperation post 9/11 and Chapter 7B on violations of the
rule of non-refoulement.
10 At one extreme, the judicial role has been bypassed entirely through extraordinary rendition,
including where extradition proceedings were pending or had been dismissed, see Chap-
ter 10.
11 Ibid.
12 Some undermine the extent to which judges can look behind the extradition request and
assess human rights concerns that may arise from its nature, motivation, or effect; see
Chapter 4B.
13 See Kiyemba II litigation in US courts, noted in Chapter 8; See also Munaf et al. v Geren,
Secretary of the Army, et al. No.06-1666 (12 June 2008).
14 See e.g. Article 8(3)(c) US-UK Extradition Treaty 31 March 2003); see also Article 8 ‘European
Arrest Warrant’ and case of Lofti Raissi in Chapter 4B.2.
15 E.g. in Conka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I, available at www.echr.coe.int, paras.
82-83, in which the EctHR found that Belgium had violated Article 13 of the Convention
because national law allowed authorities to carry out an expulsion while an appeal was
pending. Within the French system see e.g., Affaire Gebremedhin v. France, no.25389/05,
available at <www.echr.coe.int>, paras. 65-66, UN Committee Against Torture, Decision:
Brada v. France, CAT/C/34/D/195/2002, May 24, 2005, and Human Rights Watch (here
inafter HRW), ‘In the Name of Prevention’, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2007/06/05/name-prevention> accessed on 15 August 2012.’
16 See Chapter 7A ‘Fair Trial’ and discussion of US military commissions in Chapter 8B.4.5.
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government on the practice of forced disappearances.17 Other examples of
harsh criticism of judges for applying human rights law to counterterrorism
appear in other contexts too.18 Needless to say the role of the courts can only
meaningfully be realized where there are courts of sufficient independence,
impartiality and capacity to discharge that function. These challenges are
coupled with a broader range of legal, political and practical obstacles facing
victims in bringing human rights actions in a climate of excessive secrecy and
securitization, some of which have been discussed in previous chapters while
others will be highlighted below.
Despite these impediments to, and limits on, the judicial role, and their
undoubted impact, a vast volume of litigation has been brought by victims
and adjudicated by the courts. In some (but not all) cases, this litigation has
addressed precisely these issues concerning the judicial role – the lawfulness
of measures seeking to curtail judicial engagement – alongside a broad array
of other human rights issues. The following is a selection of cases that have
arisen post-9/11 addressing five groups of issues (which are illustrative of
key characteristics of the war on terror as it affects human rights explored
in other chapters). These issues are: arbitrary detention; extraterritorial applica-
tion of human rights obligations; torture and related safeguards; extraordinary
rendition; and the spreading reach of the “terrorist” label and notions of guilt
by association. After a summary of the cases, the conclusions return to the
question of the role of courts and the impact of human rights litigation in the
war on terror.
11.1 ISSUE 1: ARBITRARY DETENTION
11.1.1 Guantánamo
Probably the most notorious issue, and certainly the one giving rise to the most
voluminous litigation, is the Guantánamo anomaly. The facts related to the
detention of hundreds of enemy aliens by United States personnel in Guantá-
namo Bay are addressed in Chapter 8.
17 President Musharraf took exception to Supreme Court’s requests to the Interior Ministry
for answers on enforced disappearances: see Human Rights Watch, Destroying Legality:
Pakistan’s Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges, 2007, page 19.
18 In the UK, see comments on Lord Bingham in A & Ors in the UK House of Lords below.
Statement by Home Secretary Teresa May to the Conservative party conference, in ‘Tories
promise to scrap HRA,’ Guardian 30 September 2013: “Some judges chose to ignore parlia-
ment so I am sending a very clear message to those judges… Parliament wants the law
on people’s side, the public wants the law on the people’s side…”.
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Detentions at Guantánamo have spurred a litany of litigation in US courts
(as well as beyond),19 focusing mainly on two issues: the right to habeas
corpus and the lawfulness of trial by military commission.20 It is worth recall-
ing the development of these cases in US courts and the curious game of legal
ping-pong that played out between the judicial and political branches in the
years leading up to the 2008 Boumediene judgment referred to earlier.
Round One: In 2004 a series of cases made their way through US courts
challenging the denial of the right of access of detainees to a court to challenge
the designation of the individuals in question as “enemy combatants” and
the lawfulness of their detention.21 This led to two judgments handed down
in June 2004. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that US nationals
had certain constitutional rights, including having “a meaningful opportunity
to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-
maker.”22 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously cautioned on behalf of the
Court that “We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”23
This 2004 case was seen to represent an important marker of executive
accountability, albeit in the limited cases where the detainees are US nationals.
In respect of the right of habeas corpus of the vast majority of detainees
who were non-nationals detained outside the US, in Rasul & Ors v. Bush, the
Supreme Court took a notably distinct and far more cautious approach. It
refrained from addressing the issue as a constitutional rights issue (and indeed
from even recognizing international law despite copious amicus curiae briefs).24
Rather, the Court found, by reference to a statute conferring jurisdiction on
19 See Chapter 8.C.3 on attempts to secure accountability in foreign courts. Another line of
litigation has concerned the role of other states in transferring to, or failing to support
nationals detained in, Guantánamo: see e.g. Boumediene and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Application Nos. 38703/06, 40123/06, 43301/06, 43302/06, 2131/07 and 2141/07 (held
inadmissible in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as the transfer was before
Bosnia ratified the ECHR) or R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598. See also Al Rawi and Ors v The Security Service & Ors [2009]
EWHC 2959 (QB) (18 November 2009) in UK courts (Al Rawi & Ors).
20 Litigation seeking damages for violations in Guantánamo (and elsewhere) has encountered
greater obstacles and borne less fruit than the habeas litigation: see Chapters 7B14 and 10.
21 The first of these cases – Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi as next friend of Yaser
Esam Hamdi, Petitioners v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al. 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
536 decided June 28 2004. Shafiq Rasul, et al., Petitioners v. George W. Bush, President of the
United States, et al. No. 02-5288 (2002), Decided July 30, 2002; Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad
al Odah, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al. 542 U.S. 466 decided June 28 2004. The third
case – Padilla v Rumsfeld 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) U.S – is less relevant as it concerned
a U.S. citizen who was ultimately transferred to the regular criminal justice system within
the U.S., charged with conspiracy and found guilty before a federal court.
22 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ibid.
23 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ibid.
24 Rasul, supra note 21.
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courts, that there was nothing to prevent the courts from exercising jurisdiction
in these cases.
The government responded to these judgments, but not as the plaintiffs
or lawyers might have hoped. As regards US nationals, one had already been
released and the other was transferred to regular courts.25 For the hundreds
of non-nationals detained at Guantánamo, the response was again quite differ-
ent. First the executive introduced the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
and Administrative Review Boards in an apparent attempt to provide a habeas
corpus substitute, despite these being non-judicial mechanisms that lacked
basic procedural rights associated with the right of habeas corpus.26 This
provided cover for congressional follow-up with the Detainee Treatment Act
2005 (DTA), which – in addition to some positive provisions on treatment of
detainees – responded to the judgment by making explicit that there is no right
of habeas corpus for Guantánamo detainees.
Round Two: This led to a second round at the Supreme Court in the form
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.27 The US government claimed that the DTA had
stripped Hamdan of his right to habeas corpus. In its June 2006 judgment,
the Court again refrained from addressing the question whether there was
a constitutional right to habeas corpus that rendered the DTA’s purported
habeas corpus stripping unconstitutional. It found instead that the Act did
not apply to Hamdan anyway, as his case was ongoing at the time the DTA
was adopted.
Having determined that it had jurisdiction, the Court went on to find that
basic due process guarantees contained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, incorporated into US law by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ)28 statute, applied to all detainees. The decision that the military com-
missions were unlawful because they violated these basic provisions was an
important and positive decision in terms of rights protection. It is noteworthy
though that Hamdan is not framed in terms of “individual rights,” but as a
separation of powers issue, addressing whether the President has acted in a
way that exceeded congressional limits.
Nonetheless, there had been a finding by the Supreme Court that the ex-
ecutive’s conduct violated international and domestic law. The US government
again faced the quandary of how to respond to this judicial slight. With the
2006 Military Commission Act, Congress responded in two ways. First, it deter-
mined that the relevant international law – the Geneva Conventions – could
no longer be relied upon as a source of rights in habeas corpus or other civil
proceedings against US personnel. Secondly, it provided that courts would
not have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications (or any other action)
25 See notes on Padilla and Hamdi, in Chapter 8.
26 For an analysis of current review procedures see Chapter 8.
27 Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Petitioner v. Donald H. Rumsfeld & Others, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
28 Uniform Code of Military Justice, UCMJ, 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. ch.47.
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by any person determined to be an enemy combatant or awaiting such deter-
mination, thus extending the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the DTA
beyond Guantánamo to detentions anywhere.29 Rather than a response that
would seek to deal with the problem by bringing policy in line with law, the
law was identified as the problem, and international sources of law and judicial
oversight of them were removed.
Despite several Supreme Court judgments, the basic question whether
constitutional due process and habeas corpus protections apply to non-
nationals detained outside US territory remained unanswered until June 2008.30
With no further possibility of constitutional avoidance, in Boumediene v. Bush31
the issue was finally resolved in the affirmative. The US Supreme Court ruled
that “enemy combatants” held by the US at Guantánamo Bay have the right
under the US Constitution to challenge their detention before regular courts.
The procedures for review of the detainees’ status under the 2005 Detainee
Treatment Act were not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus,
and it therefore declared unconstitutional Section 7 of the 2006 Military Com-
missions Act, which denied habeas corpus to any detained foreign “enemy
combatant”.
The importance of this ruling should not be underestimated. Ultimately
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of habeas corpus as the fundamental
rights issue it is, without artificial distinctions based on nationality or geo-
graphical location as determinative of the existence of rights and obligations.32
It symbolized the willingness of the judiciary to engage and fulfill their demo-
cratic mandate and reinforce the legal and constitutional limits on executive
action.
At the same time, the judgment itself was a close 5:4 decision, with some
strident dissents that graphically demonstrate the extent of the antipathy of
certain judges to step into what they see as issues of security properly for
29 Sec. 7(1) MCA: “(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who
is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination’’.
30 District courts reached different decisions in eg Al Odah and Boumediene and on 20 February
2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 that the Guantánamo detainees have no
constitutional right to habeas corpus in federal court.
31 Lakhdar Boumediene, et al., Petitioners v. George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
32 See however, determinations in other cases where these principles are not followed.
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executive determination.33 Of real concern, of course, is simply the time it
took to reach this decision. Litigation is a time-consuming business, and due
process of law and respect for the judicial function require that it be allowed
to run its course. Undoubtedly, some gains have been made at each stage of
this judicial marathon (as discussed when looking at the question of impact
later). One has to ask, however, whether the judicial process has not been
characterized by undue constitutional avoidance, as well as excessive judicial
deference to the executive and congressional decision-making role, in the
refusal to address the constitutional question at an earlier stage. Unfortunately
the political organs did not repay the democratic compliment when it came
to the judicial suggestion about the need to bring policy into line with law.34
Whether this was a miscalculation as to how the political branches would
respond, or a strict approach to the judicial doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance, is open to question. But the somewhat anomalous result is a decision
six years down the line that the right to habeas corpus applies, theoretically
guaranteeing access to a court within hours or days of arrest and detention.
One must question the extent to which this constitutes a meaningful judicial
response for this sort of emergency remedy.
As regards the impact of the Boumidiene decision on detainees, a few
comments are merited. In many cases, the government’s position vis-a-vis
particular individuals took a surprising volte-face. For example, in some cases
exorbitant allegations were dropped once confronted with the prospect of legal
review35 – a reminder of the importance of procedural safeguards including
access to the court – even before that oversight actually takes effect. Less
positively, reports suggest that individuals were transferred out of Guantanamo
and to other areas where there was no right of habeas, in anticipation of the
Boumidiene decision.36 This manoeuvre to avoid the human rights effects of
litigation is both a troubling circumvention of the role of the courts, and a
testament to the importance of that review from the government’s perspective.
The limited geographic scope of the decision must also be borne in mind.
It applied only to Guantanamo detainees, rather than having established a
broader point of principle as regards the right to habeas of detainees wherever
detained. It quickly became apparent that the hard fought Boumidiene results
33 This was graphically demonstrated by the tone and content of some of the dissents, notably
J. Scalia’s assertion of the “disastrous consequences” of the majority judgment, which he
claimed, “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” Dissenting judgment
of Scalia J, p. 2.
34 E.g. as noted earlier, Congress reacted to the Hamdan judgment by divesting the courts
of jurisdiction and of ‘inconvenient’ sources of law, rather than taking the judicial lead
and bringing policy into line with law.
35 E.g. A case in point is that of Abu Zubaydah, one of a number of people publicly proclaimed
to have been the ‘number three’ in al Qaeda, yet these allegations and indeed those that
alleged membership of al Qaeda, were dropped when he could access a lawyer and the
prospect of legal review materialised. See eg Abu Zubaydah v Poland, in Chapter 10.
36 See Chapters 8 and 10.
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would not necessarily be replicated for US detentions elsewhere in its ‘global
war on terror’. The same day that the US Supreme Court handed down its
judgment in Boumediene it also handed down Munaf v. Geren,37 in which it
acknowledged that persons detained in Iraq also had the right to habeas
corpus, but found that in the Iraqi context it was Iraqi courts that should
exercise jurisdiction, therefore denying the jurisdiction of US courts (and
effectively denying the right) on that basis. The right of habeas corpus con-
tinues to be denied to Guantánamo “alternatives” such as detentions in
Afghanistan, as discussed further below.38
Where there have been habeas proceedings for Guantanamo detainees, their
process and outcome have been telling. In the first few years of habeas review,
in the clear majority of habeas cases the lawfulness of detention was success-
fully challenged.39 The habeas proceedings and results indicated both the
lack of justification for detentions by the executive and the importance of the
judicial review function. However, concern has been voiced that this trend
has been reversed, as a result of criticism by superior courts of the high rate
of successful habeas challenges and the lower courts’ willingness to question
the government’s assessments of fact.40 In al Adahi v Obama of 2010 the
appeals court did not change the test for evaluating evidence (a ‘preponderance
of evidence’ test which neither of the parties contested), but it suggested propio
motu (and obiter) that a more restrictive test requiring ‘some evidence to
support the order’ was appropriate.41 Subsequent decisions have shown a
37 Munaf et Al. v. Geren, Secretary of the Army, et Al. Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit No. 06-1666,. Argued March 25, 2008 – Decided
June 12, 2008.
38 Al Maqaleh et al. v. Gates, Secretary, United States Department of Defense, 605 F.3d 84, (D.C.
Cir. 2010). Argued Jan 7, 2010 – Decided May 21, 2010. In a February 15, 2011 decision
Judge Bates issued a ruling in favor of Mr. al-Maqaleh, allowing him to file his Amended
Petition and to present additional facts and arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction.
See ‘War and Human Rights’ in Chapter 7.
39 A ‘scorecard’ maintained by the Centre for Constitutional Rights as of Sept. 2011, indicated
approximately 75% of success. Human Rights First also holds a table of habeas cases in
the US District Court of DC (March 2011) where 39 of 59 detainees saw their habeas granted.
However, see shift in 2010 discussed below.
40 Some suggest the turning point was Mohamad al Adahi v Obama, Case No. 09-533 (Court
of Appeals, DC Circuit) 3, 13 July 2010. Appeals from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia (No. 1 :05-CV-00280-GK); Seton Hall ‘No Hearing Habeas,’ D.C.
CIRCUIT Restricts Meaningful Review, 1 May 2012 (Seton Hall ‘No Hearing Habeas’
Report); see also Seton Hall press release quoting Professor Mark P. Denbeaux: “Since Al-
Adahi, judges are effectively robo-signing denials and rubber-stamping government allega-
tions. The Supreme Court gaveth and the Appeals Court taketh away.”, available at http://
law.shu.edu/about/news_events/releases.cfm?id=289524 (accessed on October 26, 2013).
41 See Mohamad al Adahi v. Obama, supra note 40, at, p 5: “For years, in habeas proceedings
contesting orders of deportation, the government had to produce only “some evidence to
support the order.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), at 306; Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d
414, at 421 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2004). This may seek to avoid similar criticism or being overturned
on appeal in the future.
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far more deferential approach to the government, with only one successful
case having been decided since 2010.42 This apprach, together with preexistent
procedural concerns regarding admissible evidence and the difficulty of
challenge43 has led some to question whether litigation on this basis provides
any meaningful review at all.44
The judicial engagement of the US courts in protecting the right to judicial
review in detention has undoubtedly been important (just as has the related
judicial role in the criminal process discussed in Chapter 4). Gains have been
made in recognizing the principle of habeas corpus, and if there was any doubt
as to why such judicial oversight is needed it should be promptly dispelled
by regard to the many habeas proceedings which have revealed that there
was little real evidence on which people described as the worst of the world’s
worst were held in arbitrary detention for many years. The experience will
also continue to raise questions as to the nature of the judicial role and due
deference however. It was too little too late for many detainees who we now
know had their most fundamental rights violated for years while the protection
of judicial review was being adjudicated, and less still for those captured or
shipped off to detention in Afghanistan or elsewhere who continue to have
that protection denied to them altogether. Even in respect of Guantanamo
detainees themselves, questions remain as to whether Boumidiene’s hard won
promise of ‘meaningful’ review will be given real effect in future cases.
11.1.2 Baghram
Hundreds of individuals have been detained by the US administration in
Afghanistan since the military intervention of 2001. Many of them were cap-
tured in Afghanistan but substantial numbers having been detained elsewhere
and transferred into Afghan detention centres, where they have been denied
due process rights including review of detention and in some cases been
42 Seton Hall ‘No Hearing Habeas’ Report, supra note 40.
43 The reliance on hearsay, on evidence allegedly obtained under torture was contested
unsuccessfully in al Adahi. It has been described as ‘almost impossible’ for detainees to
question intelligence use by the government. See also Linda Greenhouse, ‘Goodbye to
Gitmo,’ New York Times Opinionator Blog, May 16, 2012, available at http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo/ (accessed on October 26, 2013).
44 See e.g. Seton Hall ‘No Hearing Habeas’ Report, supra note 40; see N. Nesbitt, “Note,
Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence
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subject to torture and ill treatment. As one judge put it (in familiar terms),
they are held in, ‘a ’black hole,’ in a ’law-free zone.’45
The approach of the US Courts in the ‘Baghram litigation’ to date is instruct-
ive. Petitions for habeas relief were brought in April 2009 by a Tunisian and
two Yemenis who alleged that they were captured outside Afghanistan, far
from combat zones, mistakenly identified as terrorists and transferred for
imprisonment to the Baghram Air Base military prison in Afghanistan.46 The
federal district court judge ruled that while habeas did not operate in an area
of war, as these detainees were not captured in an area of war, they had the
right to challenge their detention; by contrast, those others captured in
Afghanistan and held there did not.47 The federal appeals court for the District
of Columbia overturned this decision however, finding that as the site of their
detention was in an ‘active theatre of military combat,’ and in light of ‘prag-
matic obstacles’ stemming from the detention being within the sovereign
territory of another state, detainees held at Baghram, regardless of where they
were captured, have no constitutional right to challenge their detention in a
US court.48 Surprisingly, perhaps, given that the cases raised substantially
the same fundamental issues as the Guantanamo litigation, the Supreme Court
has again recoiled, denying certiorari to review that decision.49
The net effect of these cases is that years after the Guantanamo cycle of
litigation, there still exists a judicially endorsed void into which detainees
captured anywhere in the world can be deposited to avoid judicial oversight.
The black hole is not now an island but an amorphously defined and poten-
tially permanent state of armed conflict of global reach, in which the govern-
ment’s actions, including detention anywhere in the world, are purportedly
not subject to judicial oversight.50 The principle often associated with the
Boumidiene judgment- that all human beings are entitled as a minimal guarantee
to habeas corpus – has not in fact held true.
The District Court decision was however noteworthy in so far as the
judiciary was willing to look past the government’s assessment of armed
45 J. Bates reviewing the lawfulness of the mens’ cases in January 2009. See Editorial, “Back-
ward at Baghram”, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A26. This description resonantes with that
of Guantanamo; see ‘black hole’ and ‘legal limbo’ discussed at Chapter 8.
46 The individuals allege they were captured in Thailand, Pakistan and another location beyond
the Afghan border, all far from hostilities.
47 See Bates, supra note 45.
48 Al-Maqaleh, et al., supra note 38 finding that ‘the Boumediene analysis has no application
beyond territories that are, like Guantanamo, outside the de jure sovereignty of the United
States but are subject to its de facto sovereignty’. It also denies the applicability of GCIV
guarantees. See R. Goodman, Editorial Comment ‘The Detention of Civilians in Armed
Conflict’ 103 AJIL 48-74 (2009).
49 Ibid.
50 See Chapter 6 for the government’s very broad interpretation of armed conflicts, which
the courts have thus far appeared to accept. See e.g. Hamdan’s acceptance of the relevance
of enemy combatants.
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conflict, to the particular circumstances within that conflict, and whether in
reality they precluded the application of certain guarantees or not. Also of
potential future significance is the fact that the Appeals Court, while denying
the right to habeas, acknowledged that its decision may have been different
if the applicants had been transferred into Afghanistan deliberately to preclude
judicial oversight. The applicants set out to prove just that in subsequent
litigation. It remains to be seen whether the courts’ reach may ultimately follow
the government, as it seeks to move further offshore and beyond judicial
oversight, in its war with al Qaeda of global reach.51
11.2.3 Belmarsh (and from there to Control Orders and Other Measures…)
In 2004 parallel cases made their way through the English courts, resulting
in the famous A & Others derogation case before the House of Lords (Belmarsh
judgment).52 The case concerned the detention of non-UK nationals in Bel-
marsh Prison on the basis of their suspected involvement in international
terrorism, pursuant to the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.53
In order to allow such a measure, the UK had derogated from its obligations
in respect of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).
The case raised different issues from those before US courts. The UK Act
itself provided for regular independent review by the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission, which is a court of law, albeit in the context of limited
and controversial rules and procedures.54 The right of habeas corpus was
51 Al-Maqaleh case, supra note 38; Chapters 6 and Chapter 7B6 on allegations of on-going proxy
detentions and interrogations, further offshore and beneath the judicial radar; see eg A.
McCoy, ‘Impunity at Home, Rendition Abroad’, Huffington Post, 14 August 2012, regarding
allegations of US supported Somali run prisons..
52 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, X and another v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (‘A &Ors (Derogation)’).
53 See sections 21 to 32 of the UK’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which:
“allow[s] the detention of those the Secretary of State has certified as threats to national
security and who are suspected of being international terrorists where their removal is
not possible at the present time. These provisions change the current law, which allows
detention with a view to removal only where removal is a realistic option within a reason-
able period of time…”.
54 Controversial rules related, for example, to access to counsel – the use of special advocates –
and to evidence. See e.g. the report of the UK’s Parliamentary Constitutional Affairs Com-
mittee “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the
use of Special Advocates”, Report of Session 2004/5, HC 323-II, available at http://www.
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmconst/323/323ii.pdf.See
also e.g. ‘Ian Macdonald QC resigns from SIAC’, 1 November 2004, available at <http://
www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/news/news_detail.cfm?iNewsID=268. See also Chapter
7B.7.3
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not, as such, in dispute in the UK and the case that made its way to the House
of Lords concerned the lawfulness of the derogation and of the detention itself.
When the matter went before the House of Lords, then the supreme court
of appeal in the UK, the court found that the UK’s derogation from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights to enable it to detain people on national
security grounds, potentially indefinitely, was not valid. The majority deferred
to the government’s assessment of the existence of an “emergency” justifying
derogation. However, they found that the detention of non-nationals could
not be justified as strictly required by that emergency. The judgment notes:
“If derogation is not strictly required in the case of one group [nationals], it
cannot be strictly required in the case of the other group [non-nationals] that
presents the same threat.”55 The court therefore found a violation of the rights
to liberty and to non-discrimination, provided for in law in the UK under
Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.
The positive significance of this decision lies on many different levels. The
first relates to the obvious importance of the strict approach to the protection
of the right to liberty and the need for careful but challenging judicial over-
sight. Beyond that, the case did what much of debate and indeed litigation
elsewhere – including the US litigation referred to earlier – had neglected to
do, in signaling the centrality of the equality issue. This is particularly signi-
ficant in a context of frequent reliance on divisions and distinctions based on
nationality as well as other grounds as a basis for inferior treatment. While
nationality does have some significance in the context of the application of
certain aspects of international humanitarian law (IHL), it is a critical manifesta-
tion of the universality that underpins human rights law that nationals and
non-nationals alike are protected.56 The onus is on the state to demonstrate
that discrimination is justified, which it was unable to do in this case.
The case is also constitutionally significant in its assessment of the proper
judicial role and the limits of due judicial deference. In a powerful passage
Lord Bingham famously rejects the Attorney General’s submissions in this
respect, noting:
55 A &Ors (Derogation), Lord Bingham, para. 132: “The distinction which the government seeks
to draw between these two groups – British nationals and foreign nationals – raises an
issue of discrimination. But, as the distinction is irrational, it goes to the heart of the issue
about proportionality also. It proceeds on the misconception that it is a sufficient answer
to the question whether the derogation is strictly required that the two groups have different
rights in the immigration context. So they do. But the derogation is from the right to liberty.
The right to liberty is the same for each group. If derogation is not strictly required in the
case of one group, it cannot be strictly required in the case of the other group that presents
the same threat.”
56 See e.g. UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 15: The position of aliens
under the Covenant [1986], in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003), at 140. See also Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay. See
Chapter 7A22 and 7B9.
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“I do not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between democratic
institutions and the courts… the function of independent judges… [is] a cardinal
feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The
Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority,
but he is wrong to stigmatize judicial decision-making as in some way undemo-
cratic.”
The case has been lauded as “a powerful statement by the highest court in
the land of what it means to live in a society where the executive is subject
to the rule of law.”57
The case proceeded to Strasbourg,58 and the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
handed down a unanimous decision, significant both for its assessment of
issues relating to derogation, the right to liberty and equality, but also for its
own role in assessing politically sensitive issues such as those at issue in the
case. As a preliminary matter, in a notable inversion of the arguments normally
made by applicants and governments respectively, the UK appeared to be
asking the ECtHR to overrule its own highest court’s determination on the
invalidity of the government’s derogation, and the applicants questioned their
entitlement to do so; the ECtHR rejected this and noted that the government,
like the applicants, was perfectly entitled to question the determinations of
its courts in this context.
As regards the grounds for the detentions in this case, the Court engaged
in close scrutiny, considering each case in detail on its facts to reach an assess-
ment of the true reason for the detention. It found the reason (in all but one
case) not to be ‘pursuant to deportation,’ as the government argued, but in
fact the perceived threat that the individual represented and the prevention
of terrorism. As this was not a lawful ground of detention under the Conven-
tion, derogation was necessary.
As had been done on the national level, the ECtHR showed particular
deference in this case to the national authorities’ determination of the existence
of an emergency justifying derogation. It noted:
“it was for each Government, as the guardian of their own people’s safety, to make
their own assessment on the basis of the facts known to them. Weight must,
therefore, attach to the judgment of the United Kingdom’s executive and Parliament
on this question. In addition, significant weight must be accorded to the views of
57 Speech by Lady Justice Arden, Clifford Chance Lecture 27 Jan 2005, in Max du Plessis
Terrorism and National Security: The Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society, European
Human Rights Law Review, 2007, Issue 4, 327.
58 A and others v. United Kingdom, before the App. No. 3455/05. Eleven of the ‘certified’
individuals applied to the ECtHR as, despite their victory at the national level, the House
of Lords had issued a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ but the offending legislation had not
been struck down and their situation had not changed. See Sangeeta Shah, ’From Westmin-
ster to Strasbourg: A and others v United Kingdom’, Human Rights Law Review (2009) 9
(3): 473-488.
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the national courts, who were better placed to assess the evidence relating to the
existence of an emergency.”59
But while deferential on the existence of an emergency and need for de-
rogation, and noting the appropriateness of the national judiciary’s deference,
the Court was more rigorous in its approach to the necessity of particular
measures taken in response. It rejected the government’s claims of judicial
overreach by the House of Lords in this respect. It noted that, “as the House
of Lords held, the question of proportionality is ultimately a judicial decision,
particularly in a case such as the present where the applicants were deprived
of their fundamental right to liberty over a long period of time.”60 The Court
agreed with the House of Lords that as the measures were limited to non-
nationals, they could not be necessary and proportionate.
The Court also addressed the content of the right to challenge the
lawfulness of detention. The domestic proceedings had been replete with
procedural controversies, from use of special advocates to reliance on secret
evidence.61 While acknowledging the need for restrictions on ‘fully adversarial
proceedings’, the Court considered whether, in all the circumstances of each
case, there was in fact an opportunity to mount a meaningful challenge to
detention.62 This included the extent to which the detainee was given detailed
information concerning the evidence, and was subject to procedural safeguards.
It was necessary to look at the particularities of each case to determine whether
there had been such a meaningful opportunity and sufficient countervailing
protections; the court concluded that detention could be justified in five cases
but not in another four.63 Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s con-
clusions as regards the SIAC proceedings, what emerges is a reinforcement of
an approach which embodies a balance between deference to national author-
ities, notably government and parliament on political assessments, deference
to national courts with primary responsibility for weighing up proportionality,
with a cautious but fairly robust approach to its own oversight role.
59 Ibid, para. 180.
60 Ibid, para 184: “In any event, having regard to the careful way in which the House of Lords
approached the issues, it cannot be said that inadequate weight was given to the views
of the executive or of Parliament.”
61 The process before the Special Immigration Appeals Tribunal (SIAC) has been much
criticized elsewhere, including by the ‘special advocates’ that have sought to work within
it. See eg E. Metcalfe, ‘Secret Evidence’, Justice (2009), available at http://www.justice.org.
uk/data/files/resources/33/Secret-Evidence-10-June-2009.pdf.
62 A &Ors (Derogation) para 220: It noted that “there may be restrictions on the right to a
fully adversarial procedure … There will not be a fair trial, however, unless any difficulties
caused to the defendant by a limitation on his rights are sufficiently counterbalanced by
the procedures followed by the judicial authorities.” Among the pre-requisites was that
the applicant have ‘sufficient information’ to be able to defend himself and to give in-
structions to the special advocates.”
63 Ibid, 212- 224.
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In respect of the Belmarsh litigation in general, the executive’s response
to the judicial process is also worthy of note. The UK government changed
its law and practice in light of the Belmarsh judgment in the House of Lords.
It withdrew the derogation and offending legislation, and adopted new legis-
lation providing, inter alia, for “control orders” rather than imprisonment for
persons suspected of involvement in international terrorism.64
These orders spurred their own controversy and their own litigation.
Challenges to control orders led to judgments which provide, among other
things, an interesting analysis of the stage at which not only physical limits
but also the degree of control over aspects of daily life might amount to
unlawful “detention”.65 The House of Lords found in one case that those
orders that allowed for persons to be confined to specified areas for up to
eighteen hours per day and cut off from contact with the outside world
amounted to detention by any other name, and required derogation from
Article 5 of the ECHR. In other cases, while restrictions on rights, the measures
were not held to amount to detention, and could therefore be restricted where
necessary in the public interest, in accordance with the adaptability of the
human rights framework set out in Chapter 7.66
These cases demonstrated the willingness of the courts to engage, and seek
to grapple with, the difficult issue of what balance is an acceptable one in a
democratic society facing the challenge of international terrorism. Judicial
review of requests to impose or amend control orders did in fact lead to
refusals and amendments in many cases, consistently with the view that review
‘though not always prompt, was thorough and careful.’67 The control orders
system was repealed and recast into its present form of temporary ‘prevention
and investigation measures’.68 While UK policy has rightly been subject to
64 Control orders were preventative measures, intended to protect members of the public
from the risk of terrorism by imposing restraints on those suspected of involvement in
terrorism-related activity. They have now been replaced with Terrorism Prevention and
Investigation Measures (TPIMs). For more on control orders, see Chapter 7B7.2.
65 See e.g. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. JJ and others (FC) (Respondents),
House of Lords, [2007] UKHL 45, decided 31 October 2007; and Secretary of State for the
Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 (no3). In some cases control orders were set aside
as violation of fair trial rights – see eg AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012]
EWCA Civ 42 – while in others they were held to be lawful despite ;e.g. the interference
with right to family life of relocation – CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]
EWHC 1273 (Admin). On control order litigation in Australian courts, see Thomas v. Mowbray
[2007] HCA 33 (High Court of Australia, 2 August 2007), available at <http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/33.html>, where, in a 5 to 2 decision, the High Court
of Australia upheld the Constitutionality of a criminal anti-terror law under which the judge
had issued an interim control order.
66 Ibid. and see Chapter 7A32 for the legal framework..
67 See Independent Reviewer ‘Control Orders in 2011’ above.
68 The PTA 2005 was repealed and replaced by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation
Measures Act 2011, imposing similar but less onerous measures to control orders: see 7B72.
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much criticism, it has certainly been responsive to, and in significant measure
shaped by, the decisions of the courts in this area.
The lawfulness of control orders has been subject to judicial review in
Australia also, though perhaps to less effect.69 A constitutional challenge was
lodged in Thomas v Mowbray, challenging the legislation enshrining the process
for approval of the orders as conferring a ‘non-judicial power’ on a court.70
The courts could not question the validity of the orders on human rights
grounds, as UK courts had, given the lack of a bill of rights or constitutional
framework enabling them to do so.71 On the question before it, the court
upheld the law. The majority found (as other courts have in very different
contexts72) that the judiciary was an appropriate forum for assessing ‘risks’
that emanate from terrorism and measuring the necessity and proportionality
of the response.73 In a notable dissent, a minority rejected the judicial power
of review itself, on the basis that the law in question was so ‘vague and
inappropriate’ as not to be susceptible to meaningful judicial application. As
they could not strike down the law, they refused to be drawn into the judicial
application of it.
The contrast between the UK and Australian litigation is a worthwhile
reminder of the perhaps obvious fact that the constitutional or human rights
legislative framework will often determine the potential of the judicial role.74
In particular, the dissent prompts reflection on the question of whether at a
certain point judicial oversight risks providing a veneer of legitimacy, without
the ability to exercise meaningful judicial review.
69 They were introduced in the Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 and applied to David Hicks
(following the end of his sentence, having been convicted by military commission) and
to Jack Thomas – see Thomas v Mowbray, supra note 65.
70 Ibid.
71 ‘Anti-terrorism control orders in Australia and the United Kingdom: a comparison’, Parlia-
ment of Australia Research Paper, 29 April 2008, no. 28, 2007-08, ISSN 1834-9854, available
at http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-02968.pdf.
72 See e.g. A &Ors (derogation) and ‘Belmarsh’, above.
73 Thomas v Mowbray, in Dezynhaus and Thwaites, ‘The Judiciary in a Time of Terror’, in Law
and Liberty, Lynch Mac Donald and Williams, eds (Annandale, Australia: The Federation
Press, 2007).
74 On Australian control orders and the judicial role see Dezynhaus and Thwaites, ibid. On
the suggestions that Australia has lacked effective judicial scrutiny due to the absence of
a bill of rights, see B. Saul, ‘Criminality and Terrorism’ in Counter-Terrorism: International
Law and Practice, Salinas de Frias, Samuel and White, eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) at p. 166-7.
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11.2 ISSUE 2: LIMITING THE APPLICABILITY OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS: EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION AND ACTION PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
AUTHORIZATION
11.2.1 Extra Territoriality
The rationale behind the Guantánamo anomaly referred to earlier was that,
due to its offshore location, the constitutional human rights obligations that
normally apply on US soil would not apply there. As a constitutional matter,
the fallacy of such distinction seemed to be clarified by the Boumediene and
Munaf cases, but was then brought back into focus in the Baghram cases,
discussed above. As a matter of international human rights law, the proposition
was always straightforwardly wrong.75
The complete control exercised by the US over the part of Cuba where
Guantánamo lies, as well as over the detainees themselves, meant that the US
exercised jurisdiction and control to satisfy the criteria for applicability of
human rights treaties.76 As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
observed when requesting that the US adopt precautionary measures to protect
the detainees (a request ultimately unheeded): “[t]he determination of a state’s
responsibility [for human rights violations] turns not on the individual’s
nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but rather on
whether, under the specific circumstances, that person fell within the state’s
authority and control.”77
While the US position is so stark as to provide an easy target, a narrow
view of extraterritorial application was mirrored in government positions
elsewhere, albeit in slightly less caricatured form. A clear manifestation of this
was the case of Al-Skeini & Ors v. Secretary of State for Defence,78 concerning
the applicability of the ECHR to the conduct of British troops in Iraq. The case
concerned six appellants, the first five of whom had been killed by UK “patrols”
in occupied Basra, for example while eating a family evening meal, during
a raid on a family member’s house or while driving a minibus. The sixth, Baha
Mousa Baha, was tortured and died in UK custody in Iraq. The object of the
litigation was to compel the government to carry out an investigation into
these violations as required by the ECHR, incorporated via the UK Human
Rights Act.
At first the government argued that the ECHR did not apply to its actions
in Iraq. In the course of litigation the government’s position changed (pro-
viding an example of how the process of litigation can itself quite directly
shape policy, and/or articulations of it) and it argued that the ECHR did apply
75 See Chapter 7A21.
76 See decisions of human rights courts and bodies in Chapter 7A21 and 7B.2.
77 See IACHR, Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, supra note 55.
78 Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, 13 June 2007.
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to persons in UK custody in Iraq but not to persons killed or injured on the
streets of Basra.79 When the case made its way to the highest UK court, the
House of Lords, the court accepted the government’s view. It found that while
individuals killed or mistreated within UK “custody” were entitled to the
protection of the ECHR, those on the streets of Basra – including those directly
shot or mistreated by UK soldiers patrolling streets – were not.
The strength of the Lords Al-Skeini judgment lay in its confirmation that
for individuals detained by UK authorities anywhere in the world, the ECHR
and the Human Rights Act giving effect to it in the UK apply. This was a step
forward from the more restrictive approach argued by the authorities of the
US and at an earlier stage of the UK. The House of Lords formalistic distinctions
based on custody would, however, have had the somewhat anomalous result
that an individual’s ability to achieve redress would depend on whether his
abusers were courteous enough to arrest him beforehand, or whether his abuse
occurred inside or outside prison walls.
The litigation may reveal a range of policy concerns that creep into judicial
consideration, including the desire not to impose unrealistic burdens in the
context of a chaotic situation on the ground in Basra. It may also reflect un-
easiness as regards the interplay of IHRL and IHL.80 But in large part, as is
clear from the face of the judgment, the British Court’s narrow approach
reflected the fact that it considered itself bound by a previous decision of the
ECtHR Grand Chamber (in Bankovic v Belgium). In an example of the national
to international judicial dialogue, the UK courts called on Strasbourg to clarify
the important question of the extra-territorial application of the ECHR.81
In a seminal Grand Chamber judgment of July 2011 the ECtHR clarified
that the states human rights obligations under the ECHR may arise where it
controls territory abroad or where its agents act abroad. It stated that, in the
latter case, “what is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and
control over the person in question.”82 The Court underscored the need for a
79 At all stages the Government denied the extraterritorial applicability of the Human Rights
Act (as opposed to the ECHR). The government did not challenge the fact that, if the
Convention and the UK Act were applicable, there existed an obligation to carry out an
investigation.
80 See Chapter 7B.3 ‘War and Human Rights’ on interplay. Questions of jurisdiction and
responsibility (whether rights were in fact violated) have to be distinguished however. The
latter may depend on as assessment of whether the quite different IHL rules on lawful
killing were respected.
81 See Chapter 7A.2.2. The Court had found the aerial bombardment of the Belgrade TV station
not covered by the Convention as it lacked control of the territory of Belgrade, an approach
that was effectively departed from in other cases including Al-Skeini and Ors v United
Kingdom (App no. 55721/07), ECHR 7 July 2011.
82 Al Skeini and Ors, supra note 78, para. 136. Even before the Court decided in the Al-Skeini
case (and since then) it was broadly recognized – including by the UK government in the
Bankovic and Al-Skeini cases and by UK courts (Al-Skeini and Ors v Secretary of State for
Defence for the United Kingdom [2007] UKHL 26) – that individuals detained abroad are
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purposive approach to interpreting human rights conventions to avoid a
‘vacuum’ of legal protection.83 As such, the war in Iraq and subsequent litiga-
tion has led to clarification of legal standards in respect of when states obliga-
tions apply extra-territorially.
Likewise, the Committee against Torture (CAT) has certainly made clear
that the Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment does apply extraterritorially, and has been implicitly critical of both
the UK and US for taking an approach limiting the Convention’s applicability
in Iraq or Afghanistan.84 The CAT has stated, for example, that “[t]he State
party should recognize and ensure that the provisions of the Convention
expressed as applicable to ‘territory under the State party’s jurisdiction’ apply
to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its
authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world.”85
It is increasingly clear that the many operations carried out beyond a state’s
borders in the context of the ‘war on terror’ ‘of global reach’86 undoubtedly
fall within the purview of the IHRL framework. The global ‘war on terror’, and
its myopic approach to national boundaries, has over time lead to clarification
as regards the applicability of human rights norms beyond the state’s territory.
Early reticence by certain human rights bodies to incorporate proactively such
an approach into their everyday work87 has given way to a series of decisions
and reports which have served to underscore the thesis presented years ago,
covered by the detaining states human rights obligations; prior to the Al-Skeini judgment,
this scenario was distinguished from the lethal use of force in non-detention settings. See
also Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom (App no 61498/08) ECtHR 02 March 2010
and others at 7A22.
83 Al-Skeini and Ors, supra note 78, para 142.
84 See e.g. Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United States
of America, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006. See also, Conclusions and recom-
mendations of the Committee against Torture: United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/
3 (10 December 2004).
85 CAT Conclusions, ibid; see also UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee on the United States of America’ (15 September 2006)
UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3.
86 The ‘global’ character of the war against terror has been underlined by the U.S. administra-
tion since 9/11; see Chapter 6B112 ‘The Global War’.
87 Some reports of some human rights bodies and specialists post-9/11 failed to address the
question of extra-territoriality (with the exception of the principle of non-refoulement/
extradition): see e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism
and Human Rights, 22 October 2002, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116; Council of Europe,
Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, adopted by the Committee
of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies; OSCE Charter
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, 7 December 2002. By engaging on issues in eg
Iraq and Afghanistan, the issue has been given greater prominence and developed the
jurisprudence.
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but more relevant now than ever, that the key factor is not where, but whether,
the state exercises its power and responsibility.88
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties has potentially
important implications for accountability in the war on terror, a large part
of which is being executed extraterritorially. It is critically important to clarify-
ing the lack of legal voids in the war on terror. A purposive approach, focused
on ensuring rights protection rather than strict territorial limits certainly finds
support in the spirit of the human rights instruments and their interpretation
in this area post 9/11. It is also critical in giving effect to the victims’ right
to a remedy. In defence of a restrictive approach to the scope of application
of treaties, governments have on occasion argued that states continue to be
bound normatively by customary law and IHL in any event, therefore there
is no void created by non-applicability of treaty obligations. But, the Al-Skeini
case is a reminder that the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties
is critically important in practice where this provides the only way of accessing
a court of law and ultimately of securing a remedy.89
11.2.2 Applicability of HR treaties and their relationship with Security Council
Resolutions?
Just as Al-Skeini raised questions about the applicability of human rights treaty
obligations extraterritorially, subsequent cases provoked questions about the
impact of such obligations where the state acts under a Security Council
resolution. In R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence,
decided on 12 December 2007,90 a cautious and arguably restrictive approach
to human rights protection was again apparent on the domestic level, which
led to an important ECtHR judgment.
The case concerned Mr. Al-Jedda, a British national, detained by British
troops (acting as part of a UN force) in Iraq, allegedly on the basis of his
association with and recruitment for a terrorist group involved in attacks in
Iraq. He challenged his detention before British courts on the grounds that
it contravened the prohibition on arbitrary detention.91 The first question the
House of Lords addressed on appeal was whether the appellant’s allegedly
wrongful detention was attributable to the state, as opposed to the United
88 See IACHR, Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, supra note 55; see also early extra-
territoriality cases at Chapter 7B.2
89 In the UK, human rights protections are part of domestic law. The lack of an enforcement
mechanism for IHL violations, and the fact that neither the US nor the UK have made the
declaration required for individual petitions under CAT are both relevant to the significance
of the applicability of the ECHR.
90 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent)
judgment of 12 December 2007, [2007] UKHL 58.
91 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5.
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Nations, as a result of Security Council resolutions authorizing the Multi-
national Force in Iraq. The Lords, and the ECtHR in turn when the case pro-
ceeded internationally, determined that the relevant question of fact was
whether the UK, or the UN, exercised ‘effective control’ over the conduct in
question.92 The court had no difficulty in distinguishing this mission from
previous (controversial) cases where states actions had been held attributable
to international organisations,93 on the basis that the allegedly wrongful
conduct was de facto within the control of the UK.94 The courts refused to
accept attempts to hide under the organizational umbrella to shield them from
any responsibility or accountability for human rights violations.
The House of Lords was then faced with the more difficult question of
whether the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights
were qualified by those that arise under the UN Charter, particularly under
relevant binding Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII. The House
of Lords found that as the detention of individuals like Mr. Al-Jedda had been
authorized by Security Council resolution, in light of Art 103 of the Charter
these resolutions prevailed over any conflicting treaty obligations.95 It con-
cluded that the authority to detain was not therefore subject to human rights
treaty obligations. While cautiously deferential to the Council’s authority, the
judgment sought to mitigate the effects of this by noting that the authorities
must still “…ensure that the detainee’s rights under Article 5 [the right to
liberty under the European Convention] are not infringed to any greater extent
than is inherent in such detention.”96
This judgment was described as having potentially ‘disastrous results for
international human rights law if applied in the future’.97 If it were to be
understood as exempting the whole range of activity carried out pursuant to
Security Council resolutions from human rights obligations (or indeed those
under IHL), the result could be a serious protection gap, particularly in light
92 As the Lords noted, the UK had never claimed before the case that the UN exercised control
over these operations.
93 The majority distinguished the admissibility decision of the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights in Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway
(Application Nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, May 2, 2007), which attributed the acts of KFOR
to the United Nations and not to the individual countries that contributed forces to that
mission.
94 A purposive approach is apparent in ECtHR decisions interpreted to avoid any ‘vacuum’
of legal protection. The alternative view that responsibility lay exclusively with the UN
would have put the issue beyond the jurisdiction of any court or human rights forum.
95 Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence (Opinion of Lord Bingham), supra note 90, at para.
36. See Chapter 7B1
96 Ibid.
97 Tomuschat, “Case note: R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence.
Human Rights in a multi-level system of governance and the internment of suspected
terrorists”. Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 9 , at 403.
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of Council activism post 9/11 discussed in Chapter 7B.98 But the House of
Lords judgment was not the last word and the issue proceeded to the ECtHR,
which judgment was handed down on 7 July 2011.99
Unlike its domestic counterpart, the ECtHR accepted the applicants’ argu-
ment that a distinction should be drawn between clear obligations under
Security Council resolutions, and other activities that might be authorized by,
or indeed broadly carried out pursuant to, such resolutions. It found that as
the Security Council resolutions did not oblige the state to detain, and there
was a ‘presumption’ of compatibility of legal regimes allowing for harmonious
interpretation.100 As a result, the UN resolutions should, and could, be inter-
preted consistently with human rights obligations.101 The case is not uncon-
troversial on various grounds (including its failure to grapple fully with IHL
and the interplay with IHRL),102 and it certainly falls short of clarifying how
any genuine conflict that could not be ‘harmonised’ away might be dealt with
by the Court.103 The case is, however, one of a number in which courts have
interpreted human treaties to avoid gaps in protection or accountability, while
avoiding the sort of normative conflicts often invoked by states to escape
human rights responsibility in the war on terror.104
11.3 ISSUE 3: LITIGATING TORTURE PROTECTION: REFOULEMENT AND THE USE
OF TORTURE EVIDENCE
Practices of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (TCIDT) have
come to light in recent years with increasing regularity and, as discussed in
Chapter 7, have regrettably been coupled with attempts to redefine torture
98 Lord Bingham noted that while the United Kingdom had the authority to detain the
appellant pursuant to Security Council resolutions, despite conflict with human rights treaty
obligations, it must still “…ensure that the detainee’s rights under Article 5 [of the European
Convention] are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention.”
99 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08, [2011] ECtHR.
100 Ibid, para. 102
101 Ibid, para. 109: ‘in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security
Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental
principles of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council
Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony
with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations.’
102 As noted in Chapter 7, the Court’s myopic approach to IHL has been criticised: J Pejic,
‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment: the oversight of international
humanitarian law’, ICRC Resource Centre, 30 September 2011.Volume 93 Number 883
103 See interrelationship of legal regimes in Chapter 7B.4 The ‘War’ and Human Rights’.
104 On the interpretation of human rights treaties to avoid ‘vacuums’ of protection, see e.g.
Al Skeini above and Chapter 7A Conclusion. On potential conflicts with obligations pursuant
to peace and security see also 7B1
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according to obscenely high thresholds of barbarity,105 to “justify” it, inter
alia as a matter of “executive privilege”, or to undermine procedural safeguards
associated with it. While much of this practice has been US focused, this section
highlights a couple of cases from the other side of the Atlantic that fall into
the last category and illustrate attempts to erode, indirectly, the prohibition.
11.3.1 Deportation to Torture or Ill treatment
One of the most voluminous areas of litigation post 9/11 for international
courts and human rights bodies relates to the transfer of persons suspected
of being in some way prejudicial to national security from one state’s control
to another where there is a real risk that they will be subject to torture and
ill-treatment. A series of cases that made their way to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), provoking firm responses from governments and at
times the public outcry, are worthy of note.
The first set of cases of note are Ramzy v. Netherlands106 and Saadi v.
Italy,107 related to the deportation of individuals to states where, the appli-
cants allege, there is a real risk of them being subject to torture and ill treat-
ment. When the Ramzy case appeared before the Court, the Dutch government’s
case related, as many in Strasbourg do, to the difficult and not uncontroversial
question of whether there was a real and personal risk to Mr Ramzy in Algeria.
But several other governments, led by the UK, changed the face of the case
by taking the unusual step of presenting a third-party intervention.108 They
argued that in light of the growth of “Islamist extremist terrorism” the Court
should re-examine the relationship between protection from ill treatment and
“national security” interests. In effect, they argued that, through introducing
a “balancing” test, national security could justify exposing persons to real and
imminent risk of torture if those individuals were deemed by the government
to represent a risk. Numerous international NGOs intervened, based on the
absolute nature of the non-refoulement rule (the ban on forcible return), and
the standard for assessing risk.109
105 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, on ‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sns. 2340-
2340ª’.
106 Ramzy v. the Netherlands, Application no 25424/05, pending. <http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/
press/2005/oct/applicationlodgedramzyvnetherlands.htm>.
107 Saadi v. Italy (Appl. No. 37201/06), ECtHR, Judgment of 28 February 2008.
108 The intervention was presented by the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, and
the UK. See the ‘refining’ and limiting of the UK government’s position to cruel and
inhuman treatment in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Thirty Second
report: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/278/27808.
htm>.
109 For the intervention in the Ramzy case submitted on behalf of several international NGOs,
see <www.interights.org>.
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When the case of Saadi v Italy case then came before the court addressing
similar issues – Mr Saadi claimed that he would be at risk of torture and ill-
treatment in Tunisia, where mistreatment of alleged terrorists is well-docu-
mented – the UK government again seized its opportunity to argue in favour
of the “balancing” test on the same terms as it had in Ramzy. The Saadi case
leapfrogged the Ramzy case and the Grand Chamber of the Court handed down
judgment on 28 February 2008.
In a unanimous judgment, the European Court remained resolute in up-
holding the approach established by its earlier decisions and followed by other
international courts and bodies. The judgment reaffirmed that the prohibition
on transfer of individuals to countries where they face a real risk of torture
or other ill treatment is part of the absolute prohibition on torture. The Court
was emphatic in recognizing the difficulties states face in countering terrorism,
but categorical in its rebuke of the notion that there are exceptions to the
absolute nature of the prohibition of torture or ill-treatment or any room for
balancing: “States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their
communities from terrorist violence. It cannot therefore underestimate the scale
of the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community.
That must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3 [of
the European Convention, prohibiting torture and other ill treatment].”
Although unsuccessful, the very fact that governments made these inter-
ventions, despite the odds of success being seriously stacked against them (in
light of clear and on-point jurisprudence from the Court itself,110 quite apart
from any of the principles at stake), is telling. It may reveal a shift in the
approach to rights protection by certain states at least, and a questioning and
undermining of even the most sacrosanct human rights protections.
Both governments and courts alike have at times been drawn into using
the deceptively attractive notion of striking a ‘balance’ between protecting
human security and the rights of those suspected (in the broadest sense) of
terrorism. Yet properly understood, balancing is appropriate language in the
context of some rights but not in relation to the absolute right to be free from
torture.111 Such a balancing approach is present in the Canadian Supreme
Court’s decision in the Suresh case,112 which met with firm criticism from
international bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and CAT.113 The
110 See, most notably, Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application no. 22414/93, ECtHR, Judgment
of 15 November 1996.
111 See Ch. 7A52 for the legal framework and 7.B.6 ‘Torture and inhuman treatment’ in counter-
terrorism practice.
112 Manickavasagam Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Attorney General
of Canada, 2002, SCC1 File no. 27790, January 11, 2002. Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United
Kingdom, Application no. 8139/09, ECtHR, 17 January 2012. Though ultimately the Court
rejected the possibility of transferring the individual.
113 Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Canada. 07/07/2005,
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (Thirty-fourth session, 2-20 May 2005).
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resolute rejection of this approach by the European Court in the cases
addressed above, and others that followed shortly thereafter, is an example
of the important role of the courts in reaffirming fundamental principles, in
this case the absolute prohibition of torture or ill treatment and transferring
an individual to the risk of such practices.114
Although in these and numerous other cases, the ECtHR is firm on the
founding principles at stake – in this case regarding the absolute nature of
the prohibition115 – it is more flexible in its approach to the application of
those principles in particular situations. One controversial example is the
question of whether ‘diplomatic assurances’ – received from the receiving state
to the effect that individuals sent there will not be subjected to abuse – can
be relied upon in an evaluation of risk, and to what effect.116 Courts and
bodies have taken different approaches as discussed in Chapter 7B and though
there is strong authority in support of the view that where violations are
systematic, assurances should not be used, the Othman judgment of 2012
exemplifies a more flexible approach requiring the state (and in turn the ECHR
in oversight function) to weigh up the reliability of assurances in the particular
situation in light of a complex array of factors.117 While there is no com-
promise on the absolute ban, there is considerable flexibility on determining
whether there is a risk of such TCIDT in the first place.118 It remains to be
seen whether such flexibility and accommodation ultimately amounts to a way
of circumventing the protection in practice.
The Othman case was also significant in other ways, with the Court not
only reiterated the principle of the absolute ban on transfer to torture but
114 See Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, supra note 114 and Babar Ahmed & Others
v UK, Applications nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, ECtHR,
24 September 2012. In the latter case the Court found that individuals could be transferred
to the U.S. as there was no established risk of a violation of Art 3.
115 Othman, supra note 114, para. 185 “Article 3 is absolute and it is not possible to weigh the
risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion”. Babar Ahmad and
others v. The United Kingdom, supra note 114.
116 See e.g. Chapter 7A5.10 and B.10. Eg UNCAT, Conclusions and recommendations of the
Committee against Torture: U.S.A., Thirty-sixth session, 1-19 May 2006; UNCAT, Agiza
v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005). UN
Human Rights Committee, Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, 10
November 2006.
117 Othman (Abu Qatada) v The United Kingdom, supra note 114, at 187-189, asking “whether
assurances provide, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant
will be protected against the risk of ill-treatment. The weight to be given to assurances
from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the
material time (see Saadi, at § 148)”. The factors are set out at paras 188-9 of the judgment.
118 The increasing openness to reliance on diplomatic assurances which is subject to consider-
able criticism; see e.g. Amnesty International, <http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2012/01/echr-on-diplomatic-assurances.html>. See e.g. the suggested high threshold
in the interpretation of what amounts to TCIDT in the counter-terrorism extradition or
deportation context, in Babar Ahmad and Others v UK, supra note 114.
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progressively developing the scope of the non-refoulement rule. It found that
the absolute ban on transfer also applied to transfer to a ‘flagrant denial of
justice,’ including (but not limited to) the risk of reliance on evidence obtained
through torture in criminal proceedings. While the precise content of the
flagrant denial of justice norm will continue to evolve case by case, this contri-
bution to developing or clarifying the refoulement rule through litigation may
be one positive by-product of war on terror litigation.
11.3.2 A & Ors – admissibility of torture evidence
A second issue related to safeguards against torture, which has arisen in
several states in the context of the fight against international terrorism in recent
years, is the reliance on, and admissibility of, evidence obtained through
torture and ill treatment.
In the UK again, the issue played out in the case of A and Others v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department (No. 2).119 The case concerned the admissibil-
ity, before the UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission, of evidence that
may have been obtained through torture by foreign states. The UK government
advanced the argument – anomalous perhaps, yet accepted by the Court of
Appeal – that evidence obtained through torture at the hand of a UK official
would be inadmissible, whereas evidence obtained through torture at the hand
of foreign officials, for whom the UK is not responsible, is admissible.
In its judgment of 8 December 2005, the House of Lords rejected this
rationale, finding that torture is torture no matter who does it, and that such
evidence can never be admitted in legal proceedings. It also noted the link
between the safeguards against torture and the incidence of torture, finding
that the state “cannot condemn torture while making use of the mute con-
fession obtained through torture, because the effect is to encourage torture”.120
The judgment is again a strong reassertion of principle, seeing the admiss-
ibility of evidence not only as linked to fair trial issues but as an inherent
aspect of the positive obligations around the torture prohibition itself. In other
respects it is worth flagging that the judgment is somewhat more limited. First,
while clear on the principle of inadmissibility, it is less clear – and the court
was more cautious – on how the rule would operate in practice. The court
found that evidence is inadmissible where the tribunal had “established” on
a balance of probabilities that it had been obtained under torture. If that is
not “established” – as presumably happens not infrequently in view of the
opacity and uncertainty surrounding intelligence – but there remained a real
119 A v.SSHD (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71.
120 Ibid, p. 30 citing McNally J.
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risk that such was the case, the court found that evidence could be admitted
but afforded less weight.121
Second, the court focused on the issue of admissibility in ‘proceedings’,
but in so doing indicated what may be an overly sweeping inclination to accept
the lawfulness of the use of torture evidence for other purposes, such as arrest,
search or detention. Without grappling with the difficult legal issues this raises,
the Court’s judgment has been cited in support of the proposition that reliance
on, solicit or trade in evidence obtained through torture for purposes outside
the courtroom is not covered by the prohibition.122
This decision was followed by a seriesof other decisions in recent years
on the national, regional and international levels which have affirmed the
prohibition on the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture. These
include ECHR decision in Othman v UK referred to above and others123, the
African Commission HPR decision in Sabbeh & Ors v Egypt, or the Committee
against Torture’s decision in Ktiti v Morocco.124 As in the A&Ors case above,
some uncertainty around the edges of the prohibition, as regards whether
evidence might be admitted exceptionally but afforded less weight for
example,125 may over time come to undermine the rule, but there has been
a powerful reassertion of principle by courts and bodies across the regional
and international spectra in respect of this issue.
11.4 ISSUE 4: DAMAGES LITIGATION FOR RENDITION VICTIMS
The practice of “extraordinary rendition” – kidnapping and transfer of indi-
viduals without any process of law to secret detention and torture – is
addressed in detail in Chapter 10. The extraordinary rendition programme
(ERP) plainly involves the most serious violations of international norms
discussed in preceding chapters, including the right to remedy and repara-
tion.126
121 In contrast to the majority finding, see the test proposed by Lord Bingham, according to
which evidence should be regarded as inadmissible if the executive had been unable to
show that it was not obtained by torture (A v. SSHD (No. 2), paras. 54-56). This has been
criticised in the CAT Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic report of the U.K.,
31 May 2013.
122 While cited in this way in UK courts, as noted in Chapter 10, the issue has been differently
considered by UN special rapporteur and other experts who suggest that creating a ‘market’
for torture, like admitting such evidence in proceedings, falls foul of the prohibition. See
also Chapter 3 on state responsibility e.g. for aiding and assisting violations.
123 See also e.g. El Haski v Belgium, Chapter 7.
124 CAT, Communication No. 419/2010, Yousri Ktiti v Morocco, 5 July 2011, CAT/C/46/D/419/
2010.
125 Ibid; see also arguments advanced in el Haski, Chapter 7.
126 See Chapter 7.B14 ‘Justice and Accountability’ and Chapter 10.
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As foreshadowed in Chapter 10, rendition litigation poses particular
challenges for litigators, which can euphemistically be grouped as “access”
issues of various types: access to victims, to evidence and to courts. First and
most obviously, the cases often concern disappeared persons. Despite the
excellent monitoring work done by NGOs, journalists and investigators, we
often do not know who or where the victims are, at least not at the point when
they most need protection. While jurisdictions vary, the ability to bring “public
interest” cases without identified victims is extremely limited. Secondly, access
to information or evidence is inevitably extremely challenging, given the
clandestine nature of operations, but made even harder by what has been
described as a ‘systematic cover-up’ to preclude such access.127 The third
group of access issues relate to effective access to courts. In the rare situation
where a person emerges and is willing to put his or her head above the parapet
again despite past abuses, various legal obstacles have presented themselves
and often led to the cases being thrown out, as discussed briefly below.
Among the grounds that have led to cases being thrown out in US courts
is the doctrine of ‘state secrecy’.128 A case in point, discussed in Chapter 10,
is that of Khalid el-Masri, the German citizen arrested by Macedonia border
officials in December 2003, apparently because he has the same name as the
alleged mentor of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell and on suspicion that his pass-
port was a forgery.129 After over a year of interrogation and torture at several
international locations, during which time he was prevented from communi-
cating with anyone outside the detention facility, including his family and
the German government, it became apparent to his captors that his passport
was genuine and that he had nothing to do with the other el-Masri. He was
finally set free but given no apology, help in re-establishing his life or offer
of compensation. When questioned in Germany over the el-Masri affair and
refusing to comment, the US Defense Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated: “I
believe this will be handled in the proper courts here in Germany and if
necessary in American courts as well”.
When a suit was brought before a US court, the government invoked the
so-called “state secrets” privilege, which applies in US law when there is a
‘reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interests of national security, should not be divulged.’130 The
government argued that the “entire aim of the case is to establish state secrets,”
and the case was dismissed in its entirety by the US District Court, affirmed
127 See Marty reports e.g. Information Memorandum II, above, available at <http://assembly.
coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060124_Jdoc032006_E.pdf.>.
128 The state secrets privilege applies in US law when there is a ‘reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interests of national
security, should not be divulged’ United States v Reynolds 345 US 1, 10 (1953).
129 Information on the case is available at <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/29868res
20070524.html>.
130 United States v Reynolds, supra note 128.
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by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.131 It ruled that the pro-
tection against disclosure was absolute, including against in camera or even
ex parte inspection, and rejected any role for the Court in balancing of the need
for confidentiality against el-Masri’s need for the information and right to a
remedy.132 In October 2007, the Supreme Court decided, without giving
reasons, to refuse to review the case.133
The same approach has been adopted in several other cases since then.
One case brought by Binyam Mohamed and four others against Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc, a Company accused of providing false flight plans and other
logistical support for the CIA rendition flights.134 Although this time in a
narrow decision,135 the Court held that the Obama administration’s assertion
of state secrets privilege required that the court dismiss the case in its
entirety,136 and the Supreme Court again denied certiorari.137
Canadian Maher Arar’s case followed a comparable pattern.138 Although
a Canadian investigation exonerated Arar of all wrongdoing and found he
had been tortured at US hands, his case before US courts was dismissed on
state secrets grounds. The DC Circuit’s decision en banc to dismiss the case
has been said to reveal an interesting difference of view between the majority
which suggested that the ‘separation of powers’ doctrine required such defer-
ence to the executive, and a strong dissenting decision which suggested, on
the contrary, that it is because of the separation of powers that courts must
uphold the law and challenge the executive in situations such as this.139 As
Judge Guido Calabresi wrote in his dissent “I believe that when the history
131 El-Masri v United States, No. 06-1667, March 2, 2007 (U.S. Ct. Appeals 4th. Cir.), at 305.
132 El-Masri v United States, supra note 131, at 312. 310 dismissal as his claims and the Govern-
ment’s defenses could not be fairly litigated without disclosure of secrets absolutely pro-
tected by the state secrets privilege. In the district court: El Masri v Tenet, Case 1:05-cv-01417-
TSE-TRJ.
133 In the Supreme Court: El Masri v United States Case No. 06-1613. For details of the petition
lodged before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/safefree/elmasri_iachr_20080409.pdf; see below ECtHR decision 2012.
134 Mohamed v Jeppesen Dataplan Inc 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir 2010) (en banc) <http://www.ca9.
uscourts.gov/ datastore/opinions/2010/09/08/08-15693.pdf>.
135 Eg: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on January 23, 2012 confirmed
the dismissal of Jose Padilla’s civil suit against Rumsfeld and others for their role in his
unlawful detention. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina ruled on
February 17, 2011 that an American citizen designated an “enemy combatant” by the
executive branch and tortured by government officials could not bring suit to vindicate
his constitutional rights. See legal documents on <http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
padilla-v-rumsfeld-legal-documents>.
136 Mohamed v Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., supra note 134.
137 See Supreme Court website: <http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/051611
zor.pdf>. The Court declined without reasons to review the Court of Appeals decision.
138 On November 2, 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals en banc affirmed the district
court’s decision dismissing the case. On June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Mr. Arar’s
petition for certiorari. For relevant documents see <http://ccrjustice.org/arar>.
139 See Judge Guido Calabresi’s dissent in the Arar case, which was decided one of four.
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of this distinguished court is written, today’s majority decision will be viewed
with dismay.”140 The Appeals Court upheld and the Supreme Court once
again refused, despite the constitutional implications for human rights and
the judicial function, to consider the case.141
These are not proceedings in which courts settled on (or even considered)
excluding particular documents, evidence or sources, holding parts of the
hearing in camera, or taking other special measures. There has been no con-
sideration of underlying material, difficult balancing of competing concerns,
but rather the wholesale vacation of proceedings alleging government mis-
conduct, on the basis of the government’s own assessment that those proceed-
ings might per se damage national security.142 There is no apparent considera-
tion of the rights of victims in the decision to dismiss the case,143 and no
further avenue for redress. Rendition victims are effectively left, once again,
beyond the protection of the law.
State secrecy is not the only impediment to judicial review or access to
civil accountability for rendition victims in US courts, should any of them ever
get past the state secrets barrier. A further problem that has arisen in relation
to claims for relief by victims of torture has been functional immunities. For
example in the case of Shafiq Rasul before the US courts, in which several
former Guantanamo detainees sued Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and others
for alleged torture at Guantanamo Bay, the Courts accepted the government’s
argument that torture could come within the scope of employment and as a
consequence afforded immunity from civil suit.144 In this way the court not
only precluded access to justice, but lent respectability to the government’s
notion that torture can be part of the official functions of a state official, at
least in the context of counter-terrorism.145
While the US courts approach to these issues has been particularly extreme,
they are not the only courts dealing with the handling of claims of national
security in the face of victims’ claims for justice or reparation or accountability.
140 Ibid.
141 See ‘Arar v. Ashcroft et al: Synopsis’, Center for Constitutional Rights, available at <http://
ccrjustice.org/arar>.
142 E.g. In el Masri, the US Court of Appeals held that the information was subject to the
privilege on the sole basis of reviewing a confidential government affidavit, without
response from El-Masri and without inspecting the privileged information itself. El-Masri
v United States, supra note 131, at 305.
143 See Mohamed v Jeppesen Dataplan Inc, INTERIGHTS <http://www.interights.org/mohamed/
index.htm> accessed 12 March 2011, including third party intervention on international
standards by INTERIGHTS, Redress, International Commission of Jurists, and World
Organization against Torture.
144 Rasul v Myers 512 F.3d 644, 660 (DC Cir 2008) (Rasul I), vacated Rasul v Myers 129 SCt 763
(2008), aff’d Rasul v Myers 563 F.3d 527 (DC Cir 2009) (per curiam).
145 Cf Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, 2 November 2012 on immunities in
another (non-war on terror) context against former Somali General Mohamed Ali Samantar
rejecting the absolute deference to the executive branch in determining immunity for “official
acts.”
790 Chapter 11
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe report on secret prisons
criticizes six European states for undue resort to state secrecy or national
security to impede investigations.146 The Italian experience in the criminal
case concerning the Abu Omar abduction in Milan exemplified a broad invoca-
tion of state secrets and the role of the courts in grappling, not always consist-
ently, with how to balance such concerns in the public interest. The state
secrets doctrine was originally invoked to seek the striking out of a rendition
investigation in the criminal case. The Constitutional Court allowed the case
to continue but struck out certain documents on the basis of their secrecy, and
severely limited the scope of criminal prosecutions.147 However, a few years
later, Italy’s Court of Cassation reversed part of the decision thereby ensuring
that the prosecution of five senior Italian secret service agents can proceed,
despite state secrets claims.148
In the UK there is no state secrets doctrine that would bar litigation, but
there too concerns about an overreaching approach to national security
emerge.149 The introduction of a ‘closed material proceeding’ for civil cases
involving classified information raise doubts about the impact on the judicial
process, and also illustrate the ancillary negative effects that litigation can have.
In the case brought by Bisher Al-Rawi and five other former Guantanamo Bay
detainees against the UK government for its role in their overseas torture, the
government asked the court to recognise a common-law rule such that all
classified information would be heard in a ‘closed material proceeding to which
the plaintiffs would not have access’,150 other than through a ‘special advo-
cate’, who at that moment is no longer allowed to have contact with the
plaintiff.151 The divisional court held that it is open to a court to order such
a procedure152 But the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and the
146 Marty Report, 11 June 2007, doc. 11302, at p. 1: criticizes the US, Poland, Russia, Romania,
Macedonia. Italy, Germany for using national security and states secrets to impede justice.
147 See Abu Omar in Dick Marty, ‘Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers
of detainees involving Council of Europe member states’, Report, 12 June 2006, Doc. 10957,
Council of Europe, at para 162; See also “Italian Court Upends Trial Involving CIA Links”,
New York Times, 11 March 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/world/
europe/12italy.html?_r=3.
148 See Chapter 10.
149 Such concerns have been held to justify the refusal to allow the disclosure of information
or documents despite the impact on human rights E.g. Binyam Mohamad v. Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 152.
150 A ‘closed material procedure’ is a procedure in which a party is permitted to rely on
pleadings and evidence without disclosing it to the other(s), and the court may hear the
party and consider evidence without one of the parties. See Al Rawi & Ors, supra note 19,
Justice and Security Act 2013 (c. 18) UK, and Bank Mellat (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Treasury
(Respondent) (No. 1) [2013] UKSC 38 (‘Bank Mellat’).
151 Al Rawi & Ors, supra note 19, para 2.
152 Al Rawi & Ors. supra note 19.
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Supreme Court upheld the reversal.153 The Supreme Court ruled that courts
could not order a “closed material procedure,” allowing the government to
rely on secret material in closed sessions of the court without statutory author-
ity. Just as has been seen in the habeas litigation, cases can act as a catalyst
for better and for worse in terms of rights protection. In this case it prompted
the executive to seek such statutory authority, and the Justice and Security
Act incorporates a broad procedure for closed civil proceedings in national
security cases to which only one party has access to the court or to the evid-
ence, and potentially also closed judgments that can be seen only by one of
the parties.154 Such procedures, and the government’s inclination to over-use
of what should be exceptional procedures, has been widely criticised, including
by the Supreme Court.155
Developing practice towards justice and accountability in respect of ren-
ditions, set out at Chapter 10, are likely to spawn a more developed body of
practice in the years to come. One encouraging example of a decision that
served to clarify the true nature of rendition, confronting the government’s
dismissal assertions that it was simply a deportation of an unlawful alien, was
the case of Khalid Mahmood Rashid before the Supreme Court of South
Africa.156
In the first few years after victims of the ERP emerged, attention focused
on national courts (in a range of states including the US, UK and Egypt), often
to no effect.157 Where rendition cases have failed in domestic courts, notably
in the US, or where states have failed to investigate and hold individuals to
account as they are required by human rights law to do but as few European
states have yet to do,158 victims have pursued justice elsewhere, using a range
of transnational litigation possibilities.159 Such regional and international
153 Al Rawi and Ors v Security Service & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 482 (04 May 2010), para 70. On
13 July, in the case of Al Rawi and others v. The Security Services and others. See Amnesty
Annual Report 2012: United Kingdom, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/
uk/report-2012 (accessed on October 26, 2013).
154 See Justice and Security Bill 2013 in Chapter 7B.
155 See Bank Mellat, supra note 150.
156 Jeebhia & Others v Minister for Home Affairs & Anr. 2009 (5) SA 54, in the Supreme Court
of South Africa. See Max du Plessis, ‘Removals, Terrorism and Human Rights – Reflections
on Rashid’, (2009) 25 SAJHR. The applicant had been rendered from South Africa to
Pakistan.
157 Habib was awarded an undisclosed sum of money from the Australian government,
reportedly in exchange for not pursuing legal action. See Egypt Independent ‘Ex-Gitmo
Australian sues Former Egyptian officials’ AFP April 15, 2011, available at <http://
www.egyptindependent.com/news/ex-gitmo-australian-sues-former-egyptian-officials>.
158 See in Chapter 10 and stinging criticisms from international human rights experts and
bodies. See Ch 10 for detailed examples of what states have and have not done and the
range of forms of responsibility by states..
159 Criminal court responses, including initiatives investigating and potentially prosecuting
US agents and officials in foreign courts is not addressed here; see e.g. Ch 8 on the role
of Spanish and other courts.
792 Chapter 11
cases have begun in earnest in recent years. As noted in Chapter 10, the first
judgment was handed down in the el Masri v Macedonia case,160 while inter-
national proceedings are now pending before most human rights fora, in-
cluding the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,161 the African
Commission on Human Rights,162 and, in particular volume, the ECtHR163
among others.164 Given the extent of the obstacles in the domestic context,
these regional or international bodies may represent a unique opportunity
for victims to have their case heard and ultimately to secure some vindication
of their rights.
11.5 ISSUE 5: LITIGATING ‘TERRORIST’ LISTING AND LABELING
The terrorism label has been applied liberally since 9/11, without clarity as
to its scope (the term being undefined or ill-defined), often without due pro-
cess, and with serious consequences for those thus branded or others associated
with them.
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon are the various
terrorism “lists” established at the national, regional and (under the Security
Council’s watchful eye) international level. While systems and safeguards vary,
key human rights concerns emerge from the lack of transparency around the
reasons for inclusion on them, and the lack of meaningful opportunity to
challenge such inclusion.165 Litigation has had a crucial role to play in calling
governments – and to some degree, at least indirectly, the Security Council –
to account and to provide a degree of judicial oversight to this potentially
arbitrary practice.
Significant success, with wide ranging impact, was had by litigants before
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 2006 the Court held that individuals
160 El Masri v The Former Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09 ECtHR, 13 December
2012.
161 Khaled El-Masri v United States P-419-08, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(2008). See too American Civil Liberties Union website <http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/el-masri-v-tenet>.
162 See INTERIGHTS, ‘al-Asad v Djibouti’ <http://www.interights.org/al-Asad/index.htm>.
163 These include El-Masri’s detention by Macedonian border officials, Abu Zubaydah’s torture
at a secret site in Lithuania, Abu Omar’s abduction in Italy, al Nashiri’s detention at the
Polish and Romanian secret detention site; El-Masri v Macedonia (App no 39630/09) ECtHR
8 October 2010; Nasr and Ghali v. Italy <www.interights.org/zubaydah>; al Nashiri v Poland
and Romania, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/al-nashiri-v-romania>.
164 E.g. for HRC comments on the El-Masri case see Consideration of Reports Submitted By
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant Concluding Observations Of The Human
Committee, The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia 17 April 2008 HRC, Ninety-second
session New York, 17 March – 4 April 2008.
165 See Chapter 7B.1 ‘Security v Human Rights Post 9/11’ or and Chapter 7B.8 ‘Listing and
Delisting’.
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associated with a banned organization had the right to reasons for their listing,
to effective judicial protection and to be heard.166 Though disputed by the
respondent state, the ECJ confirmed that while the common EU position which
had led to the listing in the first place could not be reviewed by the Court,
the decision to include a particular organization on the list could. This robust
approach was maintained by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ in respect of
listings authorized by the Security Council in the seminal Kadi decision where
the ECJ rejected the argument that it could not review the lawfulness of EU
sanctions on the basis that they were intended to give effect to SC resolu-
tions.167 The ECJ found that the EU decision to give effect to the SC resolution’s
sanctions list, without affording individuals the opportunity to challenge, was
inconsistent with fundamental rights of judicial oversight and struck it
down.168 The Court recognized the need for the judiciary to ‘accommodate
on the one hand legitimate security concerns… and, on the other hand, the
need to accord the individual a sufficient measure of procedural justice.”169
The Kadi case provoked controversy and acclaim in perhaps equal measure
for its wide-reaching implications, effectively introducing a measure of judicial
review (albeit indirect) of measures taken pursuant to Chapter VII obliga-
tions.170 A further indirect outcome of the litigation has been the improve-
ment in the delisting procedures,171 including the establishment of an
ombudsperson to recommend delisting under 1267 sanctions regime. Although
her appointment may have been an attempt to avoid further judicial oversight
by having an ‘alternative’ mechanism, without judicial powers, she has recom-
166 Case T.228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, v Council of the European Union,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Judgment Of The Court Of First Instance
(Second Chamber) 12 December 2006.
167 Kadi and Yusef were unsuccessful challenges at first instance, 29 Case T.306/01 Yusuf and
Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533, (‘Yusuf’),
paragraph 73, and Case T.315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, (‘Kadi’).
The challenges were won on appeal: Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, judgment of Grand
Chamber 3 September 2008, at <http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&
Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-402/05>. The Court refers to the standards of the ECtHR
judgment in A & Others v United Kingdom cited earlier to conclude that the applicant was
not in a position to mount an effective challenge.
168 It provided certain benchmarks for ensuring meaningful opportunity to challenge. See paras
342-344.
169 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission Case T-85/09 [2010] ECR 00 para 134. Kadi v
Commission 30 Sept 2010, in Allan Rosas, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Issues
of Judicial Control’, in: A-M Salinas de Frías, KHL Samuel and ND White, eds., Counter-
Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012), at p. 99
170 See Chapter 7B.1, ‘Security v Human Rights Post 9/11’ and Ch 7.B.8 ‘Listing and Delisting’.
Note the discussion on Art 103 and the pre-eminence afforded to obligations under Chap-
ter 7 over other obligations under the Charter. This decision appears to require EU states
to meet their human rights obligations even where it may conflict with the obligations under
SC resolutions by considering the two as separate regimes. For those in favor and against
see Rosas in de Frias Samuel and White, supra note 169, at p. 99-100.
171 Kadi also lead to enhancing the ‘de-listing’ procedure, See Ch 7B.1.
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mended and brought about significant delistings in practice,172 and enhanced
transparency considerably.173 The due process deficit of sanctions regimes
remained stark,174 however, and when the Kadi case came back before the
Court a second time the ECJ had not changed its position that the sanctions
orders were invalid, despite certain improvements and the existence of the
Ombudsperson’s position.175
The rationale of the Kadi case has been followed on numerous occasions
since then,176 as similar issues have come before human rights courts and
bodies. For example, the case of Sayadi & Vinck before the Human Rights
Committee “exposed the problems of wrong listings and the glaring deficiency
of the delisting procedure” for the 1267 sanctions regime.177 The Belgian
couple alleged to have provided financial and other assistance to individuals
associated with Al-Qaeda were added to the 1267 sanctions list in 2003 at the
Belgian government’s behest, but when the Belgian government requested
delisting (in one case following a court order) the request was declined. The
matter then went before the HRC, which found Belgium responsible for the
action that lead to them being on the list.178
Most recently, in Nada v Switzerland, the European Court of Human
Rights179 found that Switzerland had violated a listed applicant’s rights under
Article 8 (respect for private and family life and for the home).180 The Court
found that, despite the Council resolution imposing sanctions on the indi-
viduals in question, there were steps the state could have taken to avoid or
minimize the violations arising from Council-imposed sanctions and by failing
172 Chapter ‘Fair process and the Security Council’, a case for the Office of the Ombudsperson’,
K. Prost, in Frias, White and Samuel, Counter-terrorism, note 177.
173 See Chapter 7B.1 ‘Security v Human Rights’.
174 The ombudsperson applies only to the 1267 sanctions list, relevant to counter-terrorism
but note that although 1267 has been subject of most debate, other lists have no ombuds-
person and less accountability.
175 See Kadi, C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, ECJ, Appeal Judgment, 18 July 2013.
On the nature, scope and questionable legitimacy of some of those measures see Chapter
7B.1 and 7.
176 Cases have also been lodged before the European Court of Justice eg Case T-306/01,
Abdirisak Aden and Others v. Council and Commission, 16 February 2002, OJ C 44, pp 27-8;
Case T-318/01, Omar Mohammed Othman v. Council and Commission, 6763/02, 27 February
2002.
177 H. Keller and A. Fischer, ‘The UN Anti-terror Sanctions Regime Under Pressure’, 9:2
H.R.L.Rev. (2009) 257 at 260.
178 Sayadi v. Belgium, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Dec.
29, 2008) The HRC communication following a judicial decision in their favor from the
Brussels Court of First Instance and two unsuccessful delisting requests by the Belgian
government on their behalf; ibid.
179 Nada v Switzerland, Application no. 10593/08, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment, 12
September 2012.
180 For the majority, the state had discretion in the implementation of the resolution, but this
was controversial – see Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska
at para. 5 – but not germane to the findings.
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to do so the state had infringed on rights in a manner that was not necessary
and proportionate.181 It was suggested that Switzerland could have ‘adapted’
the sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual situation182 thereby miti-
gating the effects on the applicant. Building on the ECJ case, it found that the
state could and should have provided mechanisms for review of the
measures183 and the failure to do was an unlawful denial of the right to a
remedy.184
Domestic courts have also given insight into the shape of this domestic
judicial review, and have on numerous occasions ordered the delisting, or
measures to bring about delisting.185 In 2008 for example the UK Court of
Appeal upheld a decision of the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission
requiring the removal of an Iranian opposition group from its blacklist of terror
organizations.186 The case illustrates the willingness of the courts, assessing
in detail the facts and evidence available, to challenge the Secretary of State’s
determination that the organization was concerned in terrorism. The Court
was satisfied that the organization was no longer engaged in violence, and
it confirmed that proscription could not be justified on the basis that an organ-
ization had been engaged in violence and might at a future date reacquire
the capacity and intent to so engage.
Another national decision that showed the national courts willingness to
reject measures despite their having been authorized by the Security Council
is Abdelrazik v Canada187 where a Canadian court found the refusal to allow
the applicant to return to Canada a violation of his rights under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One judge was so forthcoming in his rebuke
of the UN listing regime as to describe ‘the 1267 Committee regime as a denial
of basic legal remedies and untenable under the principles of human rights’,
which he described as ‘a situation for a listed person not unlike that of Josef K
in Kafka’s The Trial…”.188 This and other cases provides an example of courts
181 E.g. the state could have informed other states and the Security Council’s Sanctions Commit-
tee that it had closed an investigation years previously concluding that there was no
reasonable suspicion against the applicant.
182 Nada, supra note 179, para. 196.
183 Ibid, para. 212: “…. there was nothing in the Security Council resolutions to prevent the
Swiss authorities from introducing mechanisms to verify the measures taken at national
level pursuant to those resolutions.”
184 The Court criticized the fact that “the applicant did not have any effective means of obtain-
ing the removal of his name from the list … and therefore no remedy …” in violation of
Article 13 of the ECHR. Ibid, para 213. As noted in Ch7.B.1, it is unclear what will happen
if domestic courts find that such a right would in fact conflict with obligations under SC
resolutions.
185 On the latter, see Sayadi case discussed earlier where Belgian courts ordered the government
to seek delisting at UN level.
186 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and Others, Judgment,
7 May 2008 Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ.
187 Abdelrazik v Canada, 2009 FC 580, (Federal Court of Canada).
188 Ibid, para. 51 and 53; see Rosas, supra note 169, at p. 100.
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questioning the necessity of measures, willingness to enter into merits and
exposes flimsiness in the basis for listing of individuals or groups or the
inadequacies of the listing and delisting system.189
The terrorism label can have other far-reaching consequences beyond
listing, not only for the alleged terrorists themselves, but for others associated
with them.190 Many manifestations are seen throughout this book. A case
already explored is the case of Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, which upheld
the notion that providing humanitarian support and education on IHL could
constitute ‘material support for terrorism’ – an example of courts applying
anomalous laws reaping anomalous results.191
Another unusual illustration is found in a case litigated in the ECtHR on
behalf of the family of killed Chechen leader Maskhadov.192 Laws in the
Russian Federation that were applied in this case stipulate that if persons
deemed to be terrorists are killed by the state in the course of counter-terrorist
operations, their bodies will not be returned to their families. This draconian
measure targets families who are deeply affected by being unable to duly
observe a mourning period, pay their last respects and bury their family
member in accordance with Islamic religious requirements, which according
to their religious tradition may ultimately lead to the deceased being denied
access to heaven. While there is no meaningful relationship between the
prevention of terrorism and such a measure, it is justified by reference to the
deterrence of terrorism. This case, which has been declared admissible by the
ECtHR, provides an example of the blanket use of the “terrorist” label to justify
otherwise unacceptable special forms of treatment, and to punish those “asso-
ciated” with persons accused of ill-defined acts of terrorism.
A positive example of courts curbing the creeping effect of the notion of
guilt by association arose in an Australian case of Haneef v. Minister for Immigra-
tion and Citizenship (Federal Court of Australia).193 The case concerned Moha-
med Haneef, whose visa was revoked by Australian authorities on the grounds
that he was the second cousin of one of the men who had crashed a car into
Glasgow airport’s terminal building, had stayed in the same hostel and, on
leaving the country, had left him his mobile phone.
189 The principles to emerge from the courts’ consideration of these cases are set out in Chapter
7B.1 ‘Security v Human Rights.’
190 See Chapter 4 on human rights issues also arising from attempts to criminalize membership
of or association with listed groups or organizations. Criminal responsibility must be
individual, not collective or objective. See SC Res. 1390 (2002), 16 January 2002, UN Doc.
S/RES/1390 (2002), which modifies the sanctions regime originally imposed in SC Resolu-
tions 1267 (1999).
191 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. __ (2010) in Chapter 7B5 and Chapter 4.
192 Kusama Yazedovna Maskhadova and Others v. Russia, Application No. 18071/05, Judgment
of 6 June 2013 (Final on 10 July 2013). The author is counsel with colleagues at INTERIGHTS
on behalf of the family of deceased Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov.
193 Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273, Federal Court Of
Australia, Spender J., 21 August 2007.
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In the Australian courts the authorities argued that any form of “asso-
ciation” (family or other) with persons accused of this sort of criminal activity
was enough to fail the “character test” laid down in Australian immigration
law. The courts rejected this contention and provided a fitting rebuke to the
spreading notion of guilt by association and the dangers of it. One judge
questioned whether he might also fall within the category of persons having
associated with terrorists, given his former professional association as a
barrister (answered yes). He held that, for the law to apply, the “association”
must itself be of a criminal rather than of a family or innocent nature. The
need to tighten up the approach to ‘association’ was upheld on appeal.194
Ultimately Mr. Haneef was granted damages, and an enquiry into his case
has been launched.195
Examples abound of the misplaced resort to the rhetoric of terrorism and
the ‘war on terror’ in the context of a broad range of human rights litigation.
Take the observations of the government of Botswana in a case before the
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights:
“We wish to recall here the bombings that occurred in London, Madrid and the
2001 events in NY and more recently Egypt. It is against this background that
Botswana reminds the Commission that the declaration of Mr Good as a prohibited
immigrant was made ‘in the interests of peace, stability and national security’. (…)
We have given examples of traumatic results that occur once there is a lapse in
dealing with national security issues (…) If the President visualizes a threat to
national security, it is wrong for him to wait for the threat to materialize into a
national disaster. It is right to state that decisions whether something is or is not
in the interest of national security are not a matter for any organ other than the
executive.”196
194 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Haneef, [2007] FCAFC 203, Federal Court of
Australia – Full Court Decisions, 21 December 2007. In an appeal regarding cancellation
of a visa that had been issued to Dr. Haneef permitting him to come to Australia and to
work as a doctor. The Full Court has agreed with the lower court that a narrower interpreta-
tion of “association” than that applied by the government should be taken and have some
bearing upon the person’s character. The Court therefore dismissed the Minister’s appeal.
195 In December 2010, Haneef returned to Australia to seek damages for loss of income,
interruption of his professional work, and emotional distress. He was awarded compensation
from the Australian government for labeling him a terrorist suspect. On 13 March 2008,
an inquiry headed by former NSW Supreme Court Justice, the Hon. John Clarke SC was
established into the ’arrest, detention, charging, prosecution and release’ of Dr. Haneef.
See http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Pages/AustralianGovernmentresponsetoClarke
InquiryintotheCaseofDrMohamedHaneefDecember2008.aspx.
196 Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, Decision on the merits May 2010 (47th Ordinary
Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 12 – 26 May
2010), Communication 313-05. The government cites the decision of the Supreme Court
of Botswana, the highest judicial authority in Botswana, in Kenneth Good v Attorney General
Civil Appeal No. 28/2005. The author is one of Professor Good’s counsel in the case on
behalf of Interights; brief available at <www.interights.org/good>. The High Court judgment
of Botswana is even more illuminating in this regard, referring directly to the importance
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One might assume that this case concerned terrorism. In fact it concerned a
professor deported for criticizing presidential succession in Botswana. The
facts could not be much further removed from the terrorism context. Yet this
case exemplifies the phenomenon discussed in Chapter 7 of the extent to which
national security, the global terrorist threat and the exceptionalism of the war
on terror are being relied upon to set aside human rights in contexts that have
nothing conceivably to do with international terrorism.
11.6 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS AND IMPACT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
The war on terror has been a trying time for the courts. Judicial independence
has been compromised, whether through expansion of military or special
terrorism courts, or less directly through pressure and criticism of judges
overstepping their role in security related cases. Practical and political
challenges facing victims seeking to develop and present a case in a climate
of secrecy, couple with legal challenges through changes in laws in the terror-
ism context, or the limited scope for review in the constitutional order itself,
which remove or curtail judicial oversight. The judicial role has been variously
stigmatized as ‘undemocratic’ or even as a strategy of the weak. In this context,
and absent a national remedy, be it political and/or judicial, the availability
of remedies outside national jurisdictions have proved increasingly significant
as the only avenue towards a measure of justice and accountability. Inter-
national litigation processes are replete with their own limitations and
challenges,197 though in some ways their rules are designed to ensure that
it is possible for victims to challenge action by the state even in security-related
contexts in which violations often arise in practice.198 Clearly, international
litigation is no panacea and no replacement for effective national courts; indeed
of avoiding the troubles of terrorism in a post 9/11 world through careful application of
law.
197 These include excessive delays, varying but relatively poor record of implementation, and
jurisdictional limitations that mean cases can be brought only against those states that ratify
particular treaties or accept the body’s jurisdiction, and in respect of wrongs within that
court or body’s jurisdiction. The individual has to be within the jurisdiction or effective
control limiting the ability to adjudicate claims against states for ‘aiding and assisting’
violations by other states abroad. The first rendition case brought to that Court by ERP
victims was found inadmissible because Bosnia was not a party to the ECHR at the time
that six detainees were transferred to U.S. custody: Boumediene and Ors v Bosnia, Appl.
No. 38703/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 November 2008).
198 Legal presumptions and shifting burdens are designed to ensure that litigants can establish
their case e.g. where a prima facie case is established but further evidence lies predominant-
ly within the grasp of the respondent state; see for example, Carabulea v Romania (App
no 45661/99) ECtHR 13 July 2010; Saadi v Italy (App no 37201/06) ECtHR 28 February 2008
para 129; Astamirova v Russia (App no 27256/03) ECtHR 26 February 2009 paras 70-81.
Courts also assess the genuine need for restrictions on national security grounds.
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the objective of such litigation is very often, ultimately, to impel the national
process.
In recent years, across diverse systems, there has been a burgeoning of
human rights litigation on the national and international levels. As rights have
been systematically violated and political solutions have proved elusive, it
has been to the courts that victims have turned to give effect to their legal
rights. Litigation pursues many goals, for the litigants and towards broader
social, legal, political or institutional change, some of which may be achieved
by the mere prospect of litigation, others in the course of it, while some will
only be achieved long after judgment is rendered. While caution is due in
trying to draw conclusions from such wide-ranging practice, pursuing different
goals and addressing different issues in diverse legal systems and cultures,
it is submitted that human rights litigation has had an important impact in
the counter-terrorism field in recent years on a range of levels.
Impact may, of course, be positive and negative. If the courts have such
a ‘light’ review function that they do not address the substance of the wrong,
or meaningfully appraise the facts, the existence of judicial review may run
the risk of providing an underserved veneer of legitimacy to governmental
conduct, without rigorous judicial consideration or offering real protection.
This may be seen most clearly in the cowed approach of the habeas courts in
the US in recent years, which have been criticized for creating the impression
of judicial review, thereby validating to a degree the detention regime, while
failing to provide meaningful review in practice.199 There were shadows of
such concern in the dissent in the Australian courts’ control orders case for
example200 and criticisms of the cowed approach of the habeas courts in the
US in recent years prompt similar questions.201
Likewise, inevitably judges may err in their approach to the law, succumb
to pressures referred to, or interpret laws so exceptionally in exceptional
circumstances that they erode or set back the protection of human rights for
others for years to come. As the President of the Israeli Supreme Court J. Barak
has noted:
“a mistake by the judiciary in times of war and terrorism is worse than a mistake
of the legislature and the executive in times of war and terrorism. The reason is
that the judiciary’s mistakes will remain with the democracy when the threat of
199 Al Adahi v Obama above, supra note 40.
200 Thomas v Mowbray, supra note 65, dissent of J. Kirby
201 Al Adahi v Obama, supra note 40, and subsequent alleged refusal to engage with or
challenge the facts. questioning whether the role of the courts is always meaningful or may
give false sense of legitimacy to a process.
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terrorism passes, and will be entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet
for the development of new and problematic laws.”202
For victims too, litigation may be ineffective or counter-productive, simply
generating unfulfilled expectations,203 or contributing to the further
stigmatization and potential re-victimisation in the politically charged debate
on the human rights of ‘terrorists’.204
Despite this, and despite the areas where justice for victims remains elusive,
it is suggested that the practice of human rights litigation has reinforced the
critical role for the courts in human rights protection in recent years. The
following are some of the ways in which litigation may have had, or in some
cases may yet have, a positive effect.
First and most obviously, litigation has had a very real effect on indi-
viduals’ lives, including cessation or prevention of violations, for example by
securing oversight of conditions in detention, preventing transfer to violations
or seeking a stay of execution pending consideration of the individuals
case.205 The very fact of judicial oversight is a deterrent to abuse,206 just
as the mere prospect of litigation has forced governments to drop unfounded
and unaccountable accusations made against individuals in the heat of the
political moment.207
In this respect, simply taking a human rights violation to court may assist
in the framing of an issue as a matter of law, not only politics. As such it
reasserts the principle of legality and the rule of law in the highly politicized
discourse around terrorism and security. Critically, the cases explored indicate,
to varying degrees, the existence of a check on executive action, and the
prospect of government accountability. This is seen in reminders that “a state
of war is not a blank check for the President” or by the willingness of courts
in cases such as Belmarsh or Haneef to subject the determination of what was
necessary for national security to close scrutiny. As a rebuke to the executive
202 Aharon Barak, “The Supreme Court and the Problem of Terrorism”, in Judgments of the
Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the Law, Jan. 2005. See <http://
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Fighting+Terrorism+
within+the+Law+2-Jan-2005.htm#barak>.
203 E.g. this may emerge from unprincipled approaches to denying compensation to victims
(eg McCann v UK or Makhadov v Russia) above, or through slow (or no) implementation.
204 On e.g. political backlash towards ‘terrorist’ applicants asserting their human rights that
has afflicted some coverage and debate around certain ECHR cases in recent years (see
for e.g., Othman v UK, supra note 114).
205 See e.g. Interights and EIPR (on behalf of Sabbeh et al) v Egypt, the Taba Bombings case where
Egypt agreed to suspend the death penaty pending IACommHR proceedings, which
ultimately found there had been no fair trial. A retrial is pending.
206 This is reflected in judicial review of detention being treated in international law as a
safeguard inherent in the prohibition on torture itself.
207 As noted above, allegations against Abu Zubaydah the ‘number three’ in al Qaeda, yet
these were dropped: see e.g. Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania and v Poland, ECHR applications
at www.interights.org/zubaydah.
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when it has failed in its role as primary protector of rights, this can be critical
in reasserting the democratic credentials of the system, which are often lost
through the illegitimacy of the conduct impugned. It is in the face of political
pressure and public outcry, as has characterized the political debate around
terrorism in many states, that a dispassionate judicial response is most needed.
Litigation can also serve as a catalyst to change law or practice. In some
cases, such as the changes in law and policy following the Belmarsh judgment,
this flows directly from the judgment condemning the violation.208 In others,
it is difficult to tell to what extent, if at all, the irritant effect of litigation
contributed to shifts in practice, such as the return of UK nationals from Guan-
tánamo following unsuccessful litigation seeking to obligate the state to inter-
vene on their behalf.209 Courts may serve as democracy alerters. The interplay
between judicial and political branches is such that a signal from the former
can be a catalyst to a more proactive approach by the latter. Ultimately, the
result may be legislation with a positive or negative human rights impact, as
seen in response to the litigation on the UK’s ‘closed material proceedings’ or
the right to habeas of Guantanamo detainees, which ultimately prompted
rights-unfriendly legislation. Exposing the deficit forces the debate and con-
sideration that is part of the democratic process. Courts can only provide the
spectre of further review if the measures adopted go beyond the legal frame-
work.210 The course of litigation can also be significant in simply exposing
the true nature of particular policies and practices, and may lead states to
clarify their own policies or articulation of them as litigation unfolds.211
Litigation may also prompt or support the work of other complementary
independent entities. In one UK case for example victims sought to use litiga-
tion to seek to compel the government to conduct an inquiry, ultimately
without success.212 In another German case, however, the court found that
the rights of parliamentarians had been violated by the government’s ‘sweeping
invocation’ of state interests as a basis to refuse to answer questions of a
parliamentary inquiry.213 Unfortunately (and somewhat ironically), delays
208 Some other systems allow courts themselves to strike down legislation.
209 R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2003] UKHRR 76.
210 See e.g. Al-Skeini case, supra note 78, in which the UK government shifted its position in
the course of litigation, as regards the applicability of the ECHR to individuals detained
by UK officials in Iraq and allegedly tortured in detention.
211 See e.g. Al-Skeini case, supra note 78, in which the UK government shifted its position as
regards the applicability of the ECHR to individuals detained by UK officials in Iraq and
allegedly tortured in detention.
212 See, e.g., ‘High Court Challenge over Iraqi Civilian Deaths’, The Guardian, 28 July 2004,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1270930,00.html, where the
families of Iraqi civilians allegedly killed by British troops challenged the UK Government’s
refusal to order independent inquiries into the deaths.
213 A German Constitutional Court decision which came out on the same day the parliamentary
inquiry report, found the German government to have violated the Constitution by failing
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in rendering judgment limited any concrete impact on parliamentary access
to the information in question, though the impact of the decision may be felt
in the future. A different example of the catalytic effect of litigation on other
processes lies in the establishment and extension of the of the office of Om-
budsperson with powers to review the al-Qaeda Security Council sanctions
lists and ‘recommend’ delisting.214
As discussed in Chapter 1, judgments may themselves develop or clarify
the law through jurisprudence, for the better protection of human rights, as
seen in several if the issues addressed above, such as in relation to the scope
of refoulement obligations, extra-territorial application of human rights, or the
nature of safeguards against torture. Or, as is often the case in the context of
the war on terror, they may simply serve to reinforce established principles
that have increasingly been cast in doubt, as in the Saadi judgment.215 The
challenge in many of the cases highlighted has been to hold ground rather
than to advance the protection of human rights as such; in other words, to
win back gains that were accepted years ago, once thought secure but rendered
vulnerable in the course of the war on terror.
Persuasive inter-judicial messages can also be sent transnationally, as seen,
for example, in the unusually robust judicial rebukes by the English Court
of Appeals, of the US government’s refusal to allow disclosure of information
in the Binyam Mohamad case,216 or of Guantánamo Bay detentions in the
Abbasi case.217 Litigation also opens legal systems to the cross-fertilization
of international and comparative perspectives through amicus interventions,
as seen the unprecedented level and nature of interventions before the Supreme
Court in the Guantánamo litigation for example.218
to disclose relevant information and failing to cooperate with the inquiry: http://www.
bverfg.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-084en.html.
214 The Office of the Ombudsperson was created by SC Res. 1904, adopted on 17 December
2009, and its mandate was extended by Res. 1989, adopted on 17 June 2011. On the proced-
ure and its positive effects, as well as limitations which fall far short of the requirements
of human rights law, see Chapter 7B7, ‘Listing and De-listing’, below. Note other sanctions
(not relevant to this study’s focus on terrorism) lists have no such built-in process and less
accountability.
215 This works both ways and can also weaken or confuse the framework of rights protection,
as is suggested may have been the outcome of the Al-Skeini case for example.
216 The Appeals Court in Mohamand case: “we did not consider that a democracy governed
by the rule of law would expect a court in another democracy to suppress a summary of
the evidence contained in reports by its own officials or officials of another State where
the evidence was relevant to allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, politically embarrassing though it might be.”
217 R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 19, where
the English Court of Appeal criticized the system of Guantanamo detentions in unusually
strident terms. See also e.g. the indirect call from UK courts to the ECtHR to clarify the law
on extra-territoriality in Al-Skeini.
218 Amicus interventions appeared from such diverse quarters as the British House of Lords
or Israeli military lawyers.
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Moreover, practice in this area facilitates critical assessment of questions
regarding the proper rule for the third arm of state on the protection of the
rule of law and individual rights. Judicial deference has unsurprisingly been
the order of the day, but to differing degrees and effect. One may ask whether
the US Supreme Court could and should have decided whether detainees have
the basic right to habeas corpus when the matter first came before it in 2004.
At what price in terms of judicial efficiency in the administration of justice
– and protection of individuals – came the virtue of judicial restraint? But so
far as jurisprudence reflects and deliberates on the thorny issue of the role
of courts in determining such matters, and on the relationship between political
branches and the judiciary, it may ultimately contribute to and enrich our
understanding of the separation of powers and the democratic judicial function.
In many other cases too, the judiciary has been deferential, resisting ques-
tioning the executive’s determination of the existence of ‘threats,’ as exemplified
by the finding that the existence of an ‘emergency’ or of ‘terrorist threats’ is
in principle susceptible to judicial oversight, in practice the Courts have
generally refused for example to question executive assessment.219 However,
when particular practices have come under scrutiny, the courts in diverse
systems have often and increasingly proved themselves willing – in some cases
promptly, in other cases after painstaking process – to criticize the legitimacy,
necessity or proportionality of particular measures.220 These processes have
served to realign the balance between security and human rights, as well as
between the executive and the judiciary’s democratic functions.221 It has been
suggested that litigation of this type provides the ‘potential for judges to
educate the public about the real meaning of democracy’.222
Another level on which human rights litigation has had an impact is in
securing access to information and in prizing open facts, sometimes in the
face of a wall of state secrecy. The right to truth is increasingly accepted in
international law, recently described by the European Court in the first extra-
ordinary rendition case to be handed down (el Masri v Macedonia) as attaching
to the individual and to society more broadly.223 Litigation may have this
as its goal. This has been the case for example in UK cases pursuing access
to military files,224 or confirmation of what the government knew about
219 They have shown reluctance to make determinations that may impact on security, in
deference to the political arms better positioning to assess security needs. See for example
A&Ors, earlier on the existence of an emergency. Note L.Hoffman’s dissent in the House
of Lords that the nation was not under threat from al Qaeda. See Chapter 7B.3 ‘Derogation
and emergency post 9/11’. See also Thomas v Mowbray in Australian courts, supra note 70.
220 See discussion under Arbitrary Detention, Control orders, and Listing and Labeling, earlier.
221 See e.g. careful and difficult ‘balancing’ by the judiciary in cases concerning access to secret
evidence.
222 Max Du Plessis, EHRLR, supra note 164.
223 El Masri v Macedonia, supra note 168.
224 J. Aston, ‘Lawyers in Basra death case win access to files’, The Independent, 4 October 2007.
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operations abroad,225 and compelling the government to share information
with the public226 or with a criminal defendant.227 Particularly noteworthy
is the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) litigation in several states228 includ-
ing the US which has had a measure of success,229 and in Romania and
Poland for example, which have revealed crucial information on how the CIA
operated in close cooperation with other states, including through false flight
plans and cover-ups.230 Canadian litigation where the government was com-
pelled to produce information or evidence in relation to proceedings in another
state may be another example.231 In many other cases this unearthing of in-
formation may be a by-product of legal cases, but particularly critical in
counter-terrorism where victims may face a wall of secrecy, or indeed ‘con-
certed cover-ups’ as has been reported in relation to rendition. At a minimum
litigation draws out government’s positions – as seen, for example, in the shift
in positions of the UK government in the course of the Al-Skeini case – as they
engage as parties and adjust their positions in the course of litigation.
Attacks on the role of the judiciary, whether in the extreme form of punish-
ing judges that find against the government and replacing them with more
compliant variants, or the more nuanced pressure on governments not to
225 Cases of Omar Awadh Omar, Habib Sulieman Njoroge and Yahya Suleiman Mbuthia v
Secretary of State in the High Court of England and Wales, [2012] EWHC 1737 (Admin),
The plaintiffs were rendered from Uganda to Kenya, but the court upheld the UK govern-
ment’s right not to require its security services to disclose national security information.
226 Binyam Mohamed v Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 30 July 2009, revised judgment
and on 16 October 2009, the High Court held that seven retracted paragraphs of their initial
judgment containing summaries CIA documents relating to Binyam’s ‘treatment’should
be made public. On the 10th of February 2010, the Court of Appeal dismissed David
Miliband’s appeal and ordered the publication of seven paragraphs that the Foreign
Secretary had sought to suppress.
227 In the Mohamed case UK courts required the government to provide Mohamed with
information that may have been relevant to any eventual trial by military commission
planned at the time by the US.
228 See e.g. Romanian FOIA request that elicited important information on rendition flights
and the covering up through false flights plans and other means.
229 See e.g. Associated Press v. United States Department of Defense, 498 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D.N.Y.,
2007) and Center for National Security Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(cert denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004)).
230 See e.g. official documents disclosed by the Polish government through FOIA requests in
Poland. ‘Explanation of Rendition Flight Records Released by the Polish Air Navigation
Services Agency’. OSJI and HFHR, at http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/pdf/
PDF%20126%20[Flight%20data.%20Poland%20FOI%20-%20HFHR%20explanatory%20
document].pdf.
231 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28,23 May 2008; the Canadian Supreme Court ruled
that the government had violated Canada’s Constitution and its international obligations
by transmitting to U.S. officials information resulting from Canadian officials’ interviews
of Omar Kadhr at the Guantánamo Bay detention centre. The Court took the unusual step
of ordering Canadian officials to allow Mr. Kadhr access to records of his interrogations
with Canadian agents for use in preparing his defense before the Guantánamo Military
Commission.
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interfere in political or democratic processes despite their effect on human
rights, are bad for the rule of law. But with them has come a reassertion of
the essential role of the courts, and the importance of judicial independence,
in times of crisis or emergency. Likewise one might say that the extent to which
judicial review has been denied or curtailed, has led to a reassessment and
an outpouring of recognition for the critical nature of judicial review, for the
individuals affected and for the rule of law. It may ultimately be the case that
the practices and the challenges of the war on terror lead to a reinforcement
of the role of the judiciary in times of crisis and emergency.
Ultimately the impact of strategic litigation on human rights issues gen-
erally lies in its gradual contribution to social change. This level of impact
eludes measurement. There has, for example, been a shift in public opinion
(national and international) on Guantanamo, that preceded the policy shift,
and it may be that litigation may have been an important contributor to that.
What is undoubtedly true is that litigation has to be understood not in isolation
but as one small piece of a much bigger and more complex puzzle. If it con-
tributes to historical clarification of facts and responsibility, plays a role in
enhancing our understanding of wrongs and enriching the democratic debate
it may, if we are receptive to learn, contribute to guarantees of non-repetition
in the future.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, real cases serve to tell the victims’
stories. They provide often graphic illustrations of what euphemisms such
as “extraordinary rendition” and “enhanced interrogation techniques” mean
to human beings like you or I. Judgments validate those stories and ex-
periences. They provide a vehicle for recognition of wrongdoing and ‘repara-
tion’ – long recognized as fundamental yet drastically neglected as too contro-
versial in the terrorism context.232 One of the essential characteristics of the
war on terror has been the attempt to put certain people beyond the reach
of the law. Litigation can be a tool, as one English judge put it, not for trans-
ferring power from the executive to the judiciary, but for transferring power
from the executive to the individual.233 If any particular case can bring an
individual back into the legal framework, and reassert the individual as a
rights bearer and human being, then perhaps that is impact enough.
232 See Chapter 7A on the diverse forms of remedy and reparation, including recognition. In
other contexts we hear ‘victims cannot be forgotten,’ yet the stigmatization and the simplistic
dehumanization of individuals into ‘goodies and baddies’ post 9/11 has meant that they
are – even those erroneously – categorized as associated with terrorism.
233 Dame Mary Arden has stated that “the decision in the A case should not be misinterpreted
as a transfer of power from the executive to the judiciary. The position is that the judiciary
now has the important task of reviewing executive action against the benchmark of human
rights. Thus, the transfer of power is not to the judiciary but to the individual”, (2005) 121
L.Q.R. at pp. 623-624 in A. T. H. Smith, ‘Balancing Liberty and Security? A Legal Analysis
of United Kingdom Anti-Terrorist Legislation’, Eur J Crim Policy Res (2007) 13: 73-83.

12 Conclusion
It is of course acknowledged that international law is not an exact
science, but it surely does not have to appear as bizarre as some of its
practitioners have made it appear in recent months?
Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale (Parliamentary Debates,
Hansard, 17 March 2003)
Any sacrifice of freedom or the rule of law within States – or any genera-
tion of new tensions between States in the name of anti-terrorism – is
to hand the terrorists a victory that no act of theirs alone could possibly
bring.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Statement to the Security
Council ministerial meeting on terrorism, 20 January 2003)
Since 9/11 the agenda of the international community has been shaped, and
perhaps dominated, by the fight against terrorism. Preceding chapters have
explored in detail particular areas of the relevant international legal framework,
alongside particular responses to international terrorism post 9/11. This
concluding chapter considers the legal framework and practice as a whole,
reflecting on certain overarching characteristics of the war on terror and its
approach to international legality. It then considers the legal framework itself,
and the extent to which the experience of terrorism and counter terrorism have
indicated – as some have asserted – gaps and inadequacies in the law, or led
to a transformative shift in the international legal order. It suggests that there
are no gaping holes in that framework, while highlighting pockets of legal
development, tensions and areas where the law may yet be subject to develop-
ment. The chapter ends by questioning the longer term implications of the
war on terror for the rule of law.
12.1 9/11: TRAGEDY, OPPORTUNITY AND THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ RESPONSE
September 11 was an international tragedy. It was a crime under international
law and, as the Security Council promptly determined, a threat to international
peace and security. It was followed by widespread, perhaps unprecedented,
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expressions of international solidarity with the United States. The Security
Council expressed its willingness to act, and for the first time in history, NATO
asserted the right of collective self defence. States and institutions committed
their shared determination to cooperating more effectively to combat terrorism
and to hold to account those responsible.
It is tempting to speculate that September 11 represented a moment of
unique opportunity: for the reassertion of international order over the chaos
that the attacks represented; for the consolidation of accountability norms and
mechanisms, bolstered by improved multilateral enforcement and enhanced
international cooperation in criminal justice; for collective international action
to uphold international law and protect international peace and security,
improving the credibility and effectiveness of the collective security system.
The ‘war on terror’, however, unfolded differently. Large scale and long
term military interventions unfolded in Afghanistan and Iraq, which then gave
way to a geographically limitless war on al-Qaeda and associated terrorist
networks worldwide. There was overwhelming and uncritical international
support for the Afghan intervention in the unique post 9/11 moment.1 How-
ever the resort to self defence was the precursor to a stretching, beyond plaus-
ible elasticity, of the notion of self defence to cover pre-emptive action. This
was glimpsed in US justifications of the Iraq intervention,2 published as policy
in the United States National Security Strategy,3 and its on-going practical
effect made glaringly clear through burgeoning drone strikes that by the
eleventh anniversary of 9/11 were reported to have taken more lives than the
9/11 attacks themselves.4 Meanwhile the UN collective security system has
largely been undermined. The notorious invocation of a broad reaching ‘war’
paradigm has had profound and wide-reaching implications. It has purported
to justify exceptional rules – the exclusion of normal standards of protection
for detainees or criminal suspects for example, resort to special courts and
legal regimes, as well as lethal targeting of persons that would otherwise be
labelled extra-judicial executions – inflating and distorting the perceived
relevance (and content) of IHL, while marginalizing the relevance of human
1 See Chapter 5B.1 on questions as to the lawfulness of the use of force, and whether the
legal prerequisites of necessity and proportionality of self defence had been met in relation
to the objectives of the campaign, in Afghanistan. Chapter 6 notes differing understandings
of the objectives in Afghan among participating nations, and specific issues of compliance
with IHL. On the acceptance of self defence against non-state actors, see also 12.3.2 below.
2 As Chapter 5B.1. explains, US justifications included reference to self defence while the
UK relied on other legal bases.
3 There have been several such US National Security Strategies since 9/11, discussed in
Chapter 5. The 2002 strategy was notably explicit in the promotion of a doctrine of pre-
emption, which was subsequently deemphasised, though a broad preemptive approach
to self defence remains as a matter of policy and in practice: see Chapter 4B.2. Cf the
approach of the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12-13
December 2003, p. 4.
4 See Chapter 6B.2.2.
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rights protections for all. More insidiously, it has framed the fight against
terrorism as a conflict against an ‘enemy’ to be vanquished, at times apparently
at any cost, rather than individuals and groups against whom the full force
of the law should be brought to bear.
Alongside the banners of an uncertain ‘war’ against an ill-defined enemy,
and of a ‘self defence’ that is no longer purely defensive, flies the ambiguous
banner of ‘terrorism’ and ‘associated’ activities. Myriad practices have emerged
across the globe, and old practices have continued with a renewed sense of
legitimacy, in the name of terrorism prevention, many of which have fallen
foul of or jeopardised international standards of protection.
The Security Council’s novel ‘quasi legislative’ role provided the impulse
for much of this ‘counter-terrorist’ activity, imposing a broad mandate on states
to take measures against terrorism without providing clarity as to the ‘terror-
ism’ targeted, without emphasising the need for consistency with IHRL and
IHL and without effective oversight.5 Amorphous definitions of terrorism,
jarring with principles of legality and certainty, have been used to detain
political opponents, proscribe dissent, subvert legitimate free speech, or as
a basis to prosecute human rights defenders, indigenous leaders, humanitarian
organsiations, labour organisers, women’s groups, poets, artists and others
presumably far removed from the international terrorism the international
community resolved to combat in the aftermath of 9/11.6 The impact of the
use of undefined and malleable terms such as ‘terrorist’ and states that ‘har-
bour or support’ them as the basis for wide-ranging prescriptions, has been
multiplied over time by expansive approaches to those ‘associated’ with,
providing various forms of ‘material support’ or ‘encouragement’ for terrorism.
The Security Council coupled its quasi legislative role with a ratcheting
up of targeted sanctions against individuals and groups, with profound impact
on individuals, communities and arguably on the Council’s own reputation.7
The ‘draconian’ lack of due process that has been said to characterize the
Council’s approach is reflected in national measures such as sanctions, ex-
pulsions and other ‘preventative’ orders of varying types which have infringed
a wide range of rights without providing reasons or a meaningful opportunity
to challenge.8
5 See e.g. SC Res1373, mandating a host of measures aimed at, for example, preventing
terrorism, criminalising it, cutting off funds to terrorists and denying them refugee status.
The resolution, identifying terrorism as a threat to international peace and security, con-
tinues in force despite vocal opposition, discussed at Chapter 7B.1.2.
6 See Chapters 4B.2.1 and 7B.5 on the breadth of criminal laws and prosecutions for terrorism
and ‘associated’ offences.
7 Chapter 7B.1.2 for the ‘executive’ and ‘legislative’ roles of the Council.
8 See eg Chapter 7B.7. 7B.8 and 7B.10 for various examples of the denial or limitation of the
right to challenge orders that lead to detention, deportation or sanctions which have been
criticized as ‘draconian’; see also 12.3 below on ‘arbitrariness.’
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Despite the commitment in the wake of 9/11 to a multi-faceted counter-
terrorism campaign that would utilise ‘every instrument of law enforcement’9
to ensure that ‘justice’ was done,10 at least in the first few years following
9/11, there was not an enormous, coordinated international criminal law
enforcement initiative.11 The prospect of international jurisdiction was side-
lined shortly after 9/11, in apparent deference to national courts, yet national
prosecutions were limited and convictions scarce.12 Failures of international
cooperation, including as a result of the United States refusal to share intelli-
gence with foreign courts, has further hampered prosecutions and processes,
both for terrorism and counter-terrorism crimes.13 Paradoxically, criminal
prosecutions for terrorism related offences have been impeded in multiple
ways by the unlawfulness of states’ responses, rendering evidence inadmissible
or of dubious reliability, impeding extradition or mutual legal assistance and
with it access to evidence and to suspects,14 or casting doubt on the legitimacy
of criminal processes.15
A shifting criminal law paradigm over time – towards an emphasis on
the preventive role of criminal law – has spawned new criminal laws, em-
bracing an ever broader range of conduct that inter alia supports, facilitates
or contributes to acts of terrorism. Alongside these laws, are expansive powers
of investigation, novel criminal jurisdictions, adapted criminal procedures and
initiatives to enhance and streamline international cooperation.16 While devel-
opments have in some respects bolstered the normative and institutional
framework for enforcing criminal law against terrorism, so far as they them-
selves fall short of basic principles of criminal law, such as individual respons-
ibility, legality and due process, they in turn threaten to undermine rather
than strengthen the rule of law framework.
9 In late September 2001, President Bush stated: ‘We will direct every resource at our com-
mand, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the disruption
and defeat of the global terror network.’ J. Harris, ‘President Outlines War on Terrorism,
Demands Bin Laden be Turned Over’, Washington Post, 21 September 2001.
10 Bush, ibid. See, e.g., SC Res. 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001),
para. 3, where the Security Council ‘[c]alls on all States to work together urgently to bring
to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks’. See also e.g.,
the UK Prime Minister describing the UK’s role as to ‘construct a consensus behind a broad
agenda of justice and security’. T. Blair, Speech in Sedgefield constituency, 5 March 2004.
The Security Council, for its part, underscored the justice objective in the immediate wake
of 9/11 and has reiterated it repeatedly since then.
11 See Chapter 4B.1.1.
12 Chapter 4B.1.3 on national versus international models of justice post 9/11.
13 See illustrations of non-cooperation, or hampering criminal processes, in Chapters 4 and 10.
14 See obligations of non-cooperation, including non-refoulement, in Chapter 7A.5.10.
15 Examples are provided in Chapter 4B.4 ‘The Strained Relationship between Human Rights,
International Cooperation and Criminal Justice’.
16 Chapter 4B.2.3 ‘Modified Procedures and Principles of Criminal Law.’
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The vast majority of ‘war on terror’ detainees have not been charged with
criminal offences at all,17 but held in ‘despotic’ detention regimes,18 epitom-
ised by Guantanamo Bay or CIA secret detention, but reflected much more
broadly across multiple states practices. Fundamental questions arise recurrent-
ly as to the lawfulness of detention on preventative, security or intelligence
gathering grounds, as well as the erosion of procedural safeguards.19 As
judicial and other forms of oversight have expanded their reach, such as
through the hard fought habeas litigation of Guantanamo detainees, individuals
have been moved further beneath the potential radar of protection, either into
US overseas detention where they are denied basic due process rights, or into
the captivity of other states for detention by proxy.20
The persistent prevalence of torture as a feature of the war on terror, as
well as attempts to ‘justify’ it, to ‘balance’ it against national security interests
or to erode its safeguards, illustrate how established values have been ques-
tioned, and basic standards have been jettisoned, in the name of intelligence
gathering in the war on terror.21 Notably the rendition programme’s policy
of enforced disappearance of persons, carefully coordinated across the globe
through networks of willing individuals, private actors and state partners
engaged in the denial of law’s protection and a subsequent systematic cover-
up,22 illustrates the ‘dark side’ of international cooperation and the multi-
plicity of actors whose responsibility is engaged in the war on terror.23 The
obsessive pursuit of unfettered ‘intelligence gathering,’ reflected in the driving
role afforded to intelligence agencies, and the reduction of individuals to mere
objects of ‘intelligence value’ has been described as setting human rights back
to a pre-Kantian era in which individuals could be conceived of as mere means
to an end.24 Far from the acts of isolated pariah states, the war on terror
17 Chapter 7B.7 ‘Restricting Liberty in Liberty’s Name’ and Chapter 8 on Guantanamo Bay.
18 ‘What makes the result a despotic regime is the sense that the detaining authority is
presumed to be authorized to detain, yet gains that authority based on its claims about
an individual but in the absence of a trial and conviction.’ J. Resnik, ‘War, Terror, and the
Federal Courts, Ten Years After 9/11 Conference’, Association of American Law Schools,
Section on Federal Courts program, 2012 AALS Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 7
January 2012.
19 Arbitrary detention of alleged terrorist suspects remains commonplace in many sites and
many states around the world. See Chapter 7B.7 and the limited gains in relation to habeas
in Guantanamo (Chapter 8), which have not applied elsewhere, as evidenced by Baghram
litigation, for example (Chapters 7B.3 and 11).
20 See eg Chapter 10.2 for an example of allegations of other states detaining unlawfully at
the behest of the US, long after the CIA detention centres are reportedly closed.
21 See Chapter 7A.5.2 and 7B.6.
22 See eg Council of Europe Commissioner Marty’s findings of ‘systematic cover up’ by
European states, of the rendition programme, in Chapter 10.2.
23 Chapter 10 for the legal framework, including state and individual responsibility, and its
application to rendition.
24 M. Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah, et. al. (eds.), International Human Rights
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p 600.
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reveals systematic and recurrent use of torture, complicity in torture, and
turning a blind eye to torture, giving rise to the responsibility of many states,
in many forms.25
It is perhaps the ultimate paradox of the ‘war on terror’ that the horrend
ous acts of lawlessness witnessed on 11 September 2001 have been relied upon
to justify repeated violations and further disregard for the international rule
of law. Yet in the face of clear state and individual responsibility, as well as
the countless lives that have been destroyed in the course of the long war on
terrorism, reparation and accountability remain elusive.
Reaction to the War on Terror
In light of the foregoing, it may be difficult to see the ‘war on terror’ as other
than an opportunity squandered and the ‘catastrophe’ for the rule of law
foretold by some in the aftermath of 9/11.26 Practice is, however, varied, it
has evolved over time, and it remains very much in flux. A significant part
of this practice is the extent of the reaction to the nature or excesses of the
‘war on terror’, albeit perhaps belated and, as yet, insufficient. Evidence has
emerged over time of an approach which recognises the need for a shift back
to a rule of law approach to countering terrorism, and the importance of
strengthening rather than discarding the international legal framework.
First, are the indications of egregious violations of human rights and
humanitarian law prompting an increasingly resolute reaction from the inter-
national community. Perhaps as plausible deniability of the existence and
gravity of such violations has faded, criticism of specific practices has become
more robust from states, international mechanisms and commentators. This
is most striking perhaps in the context of the anomaly of Guantanamo Bay
discussed in Chapter 8, where condemnation has become particularly strident
over time, from states, international bodies and many other sources, some of
them not normally known for human rights advocacy.27 Condemnation of
the extraordinary rendition programme discussed in Chapter 10 also continues
to mount with the exposure of facts as to its nature and scope, contributing
momentum towards a reluctant but steady reckoning as regards the respons-
ibility of multiple states, and leaving a notable dearth of defenders of the
programme or its tactics.28 Practice has developed more recently, and reactions
continue to emerge, in relation to widespread targeted drone killings of alleged
terrorists.29 While there may be little apparent support or acceptance, explicit
or implicit, for the legitimacy of the practice, reactions have been distinctly
25 Chapter 3 on forms of responsibility and 7 and 10 for examples.
26 See A. Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law,
EJIL 2001.
27 See Chapter 8.C.
28 See Chapter 10.
29 See Chapter 6B.2.2.
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muted. At time of writing, expressions of concern regarding the legality of
such strikes were gathering pace, however, both within the US and inter-
nationally.30
A number of states have backed up their condemnation of war on terror
violations of human rights and IHL with indications of their unwillingness or
inability to cooperate, to avoid conflict with their international obligations.31
Conditioning cooperation in criminal, military or intelligence matters on
compliance with basic international law norms, for example, is one of the
critical ways in which international legal obligations in this field can be given
effect. What remains uncertain is whether condemnation will also be supported
by action to hold to account those responsible.32
The shift of approach is perhaps most evident in the increasing emphasis
given to the complementary nature of the obligations of combating terrorism
and protecting human security, on the one hand, with respect for rule of law,
democracy and human rights, on the other. This was epitomised in the 2006
UN Global Strategy which, like many other declarations and resolutions,
describes human rights and security as ‘not conflicting goals, but comple-
mentary and mutually reinforcing’.33 This sentiment is amply reflected in
international, regional and national level discourse by states since, epitomised
perhaps in President Obama’s famous statement that living our values ‘does
not make us weaker, it makes us stronger.’34
On the part of the Security Council, among others, apparent blindness to
human rights concerns in the glare of security imperatives post-9/11 has given
way to consistent reiteration of the complementarity of effective counter-
terrorism strategies and respect for the rule of law, of which human rights
and international humanitarian law are integral components.35 Thus is
reflected in institutional developments, national and international, that reflect
the need to ensure effective counter-terrorism measures are consistent with
international law, notably in the Security Council counter-terrorism committee’s
volte face to embrace, albeit tardily and reluctantly, a human rights dimension
30 Many initiatives are underway questioning the legal limits of such practices; some are
referred to in Chapter 6.
31 See Chapter 7A.5.10 for the legal framework and B.14 for practice post 9/11; see also Chapter
4B on criminal cooperation.
32 For challenges, and developments, see eg Chapters 4B.5, 7B.14, 8C.3 or 10.5.
33 UN Doc. A/60/825, 2006. The global strategy is reflected in the approach across regional
bodies, see e.g. ACHPR, Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights in the Fight against
Terrorism, adopted at its 37th session, 2005. For more detail see Chapter 7B.1
34 ‘That is why I have ordered the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, and
will seek swift and certain justice for captured terrorists – because living our values doesn’t
make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger.’ B. Obama, ‘Remarks of
President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery, Address to Joint Session of Congress’,
24 February 2009.
35 See Chapter 7B.
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as an inherent aspect of its security agenda, echoing the integrated approach
of other regional and international political organisations.36
A significant dimension of this shift is the emerging recognition of the full
practical implications, and the counter-productivity, of much counter-terrorist
activity in the post-9/11 context. On one level, this is seen in the acknowledg-
ment of how abusive practices adopted in the name of preventing terrorism
have served as a catalyst or sustaining influence for further terrorism. This
is reflected for example in the assertion from the US President who, like others,
has himself described Guantanamo as “probably the number one recruitment
tool” for fledging terrorists.37 More recently, drone killings have also been
described as having “replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice
for militants.”38 The difficulty in securing suspects or evidence, issues of
admissibility or abuse of process challenges in criminal trials, illustrated in
chapter 4, are increasingly recognized as ways in which discarding the rule
of law has hampered its subsequent enforcement through criminal justice.39
The re-emergence of the international commitment to address ‘conditions
conducive to terrorism,’ enshrined in the global strategy and reflected in
international and national statements,40 are also relevant here, suggesting
a more holistic approach that recognizes the inter-relationship between the
human rights and development agendas, on the one hand, and that of terrorism
prevention on the other.
There may also be a reaction to the military emphasis of the “war on
terror,” both from within the US administration that championed the ‘war on
terror’ and beyond. The concept of a “war” on terror or terrorism, once offered
as a panacea by the US but rejected categorically by others, is now shunned
both inside and outside the US administration.41 While it holds fast to its
assertion of a war on al Qaeda and ‘associates,’ this appears to have been
rejected by other states.42 Overwhelming and uncritical international support
36 See further below 12.3.3 highlighting areas of legal (including institutional) development
and Chapter 7B.1.
37 Eg. B. Obama, ‘News Conference by the President’, South Court Auditorium, Eisenhower
Executive Office Building, 22 December 2012; J. Napolitano, ‘Guantanamo became a re-
cruiting tool for terrorism: Napolitano’, AFP News, 6 November 2009; Admiral M. Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ‘Military Chief: Gitmo “Needs to Be Closed”’, ABC News,
24 May 2009, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/05/military-chief/
last visited on 18 April 2013, and others at Chapter 8, note 14.
38 E.g. P. Alston, ‘Press Statement’, UNAMA Press Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 15 May
2008, available at: http://unama.unmissions, and Chapter 8 id.
39 Chapter 4B.4.
40 See Chapter 7B.1 on the global strategy, which is also reflected regionally. See eg "Why
terrorism? Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism" (Strasbourg,
2007). President Obama’s National Defence University speech, 23 May 2013, reflects the





for the Afghan intervention43 contrasted starkly to strident and vocal inter-
national opposition to the Iraq war, or to the lack of support for the US
assertion of the right to use self defence against terrorists worldwide.44 The
shift of reaction may well reflect shifting policies, that have strained legal
principles and other states support or tolerance too far, but there is also greater
recognition of the limitations and the dangers of a military-focused response
to international terrorism.45 In turn, the shift towards an invigorated role for
criminal law, including an exploration of its preventive potential,46 holds real
promise of a shift towards a rule of law framework.
A critical component of the ‘reaction’ to the war on terror over time has
been judicial, as challenges to the acts of other branches have been adjudi-
cated.47 While the judicial voice has perhaps been muffled or unduly defer-
ential to the executive in many cases post 9/11, there is a vast body of practice
in which the courts have asserted their role in reining government action back
within the limits of the law, and ensuring a measure of oversight and
accountability. The impact has been widereaching, including impelling legis-
lative and policy change, reasserting and strengthening legal standards, as
well as the broader rule of law implications of reasserting the principles of
accountability and oversight.48 While the post-9/11 legal landscape has un-
doubtedly been bleak, whether it amounts to the ‘catastrophic’ situation for
the rule of law is questionable, and may require consideration through a longer
time lens.49
12.2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The focus of this study has been on identifying the current state of the inter-
national legal framework on terrorism and counter-terrorism, against which
the lawfulness of practice falls to be assessed. In identifying the legal frame-
work, preceding chapters have set out the multi-dimensional legal infra-
structure of terrorism and counter terrorism. Each of chapters 2-7 identified
multiple primary and secondary norms, mechanisms and principles from
numerous areas of law that are engaged in the fight against ‘international
43 See Chapter 5B.1 on the acceptance of self defence against non state actors, and further
below on legal development.
44 Chapter 5B.2; see 6B.2.2 on IHL issues arising.
45 See eg SC Res. 1963 (2010), fourth preambular paragraph..
46 Chapter 4B.1.2 ‘Terrorism Trials’.
47 This national and international litigation has been notably prolific in relation to the adjudica-
tion of human rights issues, which is the focus of Chapter 11, and to some extent IHL.
Criminal law is addressed through the criminal process in Chapter 4. In other areas such
as the use of force, the scope for adjudication is inevitably more limited.
48 Chapter 11.
49 See further below, 12.4. A. Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories
of International Law, EJIL 2001.
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terrorism,’ which together form the applicable legal framework. The case
studies in chapters 8-10 then looked across that framework and illustrated
how diverse areas of law co-apply and intersect. The practice highlighted has
illustrated both the extent of non compliance with and obfuscation of the legal
framework, as well as on occasion tensions or controversies within the frame-
work itself.50
This study highlights the extent to which one phenomenon, international
terrorism, is addressed through a multiplicity of areas of law, and myriad
overlapping sources of law. The framework on terrorism and counter-terrorism
has naturally included an overlapping and multidimensional group of treaties,
including bilateral, regional and multilateral terrorism conventions, extradition
treaties, human rights and IHL conventions, which bind parties to them, some
of which constitute the broader reaching norm-making treaties with signi-
ficance beyond the parties to them. In many places the obligations referred
to reflect also customary international norms, identified through state practice
and opinio juris, as well as through the role that the many other sources –
international organisations, treaties, judicial decisions, the work of expert
bodies inter alia – play as identifiers of customary international rules in this
field. A number of the norms identified have also been consider to enjoy
special jus cogens status, with implications both for the normative significance
and opprobrium attach to the rules, and their resistance to change. While
obligations inevitably vary, much of the legal framework on which the analysis
in preceding chapters is based is therefore shaped around core, well established
international norms, binding on all states.
This framework is fleshed out by reference to other sources. Judicial de-
cisions of many national, regional and international courts have also been
relied upon in various ways: they themselves provide examples of state
practice, they impel such practice (as states and governments implement or
respond to decisions and judgments), and they themselves shape the legal
framework, through the application and development of the law.51 ‘General
principles of law’ have been drawn on to complete the legal framework,
particularly in areas of uncertainty.52
Security Council resolutions have assumed special significance, bolstering
the more traditional sources of international law with binding proscriptions
50 See e.g. Chapter 10 on issues arising regarding aiding and assisting and complicity in
international law.
51 For developments in the legal framework post 9/11 see 12.3.2. below.
52 These are included as a source of law in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. As noted in Chapter
1, these may be particularly important where there are perceived gaps, weaknesses or areas
of uncertainty, and the principles of note in this study have included the presumption of
innocence, nullum crimen sine lege, legality and proportionality. On proportionality, as
a general principle, see “The Proportionality Principle, Counter-terrorism Laws and Human
Rights: A German-Australian Comparison” City University of Hong Kong Law Review
Volume 2:1; [2010] UNSWLRS 35.
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in the post 9/11 world, with follow up and oversight from the Council’s
Counter-terrorism Committee.53 The General Assembly has lent its imprimatur
of universality to many of the obligations in this field, while the framework
is considerably illuminated through soft law standards which, while not
binding and inherently divergent in their roles and weights, assist as tools
in the interpretation of binding standards, and potentially herald areas of
future legal development.54 The myriad activity in this field includes declara-
tions and resolutions of international or regional bodies, the work of the
International Law Commission, General Comments by human rights bodies
including the HRC and CAT, the significant detailed work of UN entities and
experts such as numerous special rapporteurs or working groups, and the
‘softer’ expert groups’ recommendations ranging from high level summit
outcomes55 to detailed principles and standards on specific issues of law.56
Many of the soft law sources relied upon have also been given close judicial
consideration, thus firming up the soft law standards in the course of the legal
dynamics of the international system.57The result is a detailed and growing
body of law, which must be understood by reference to many branches of
international law and multiple, overlapping and reinforcing sources, yet which
is at its core based on basic principles of law.58
53 Resolutions are referred to for different legal purposes: Chapter 2 and 7 discuss broad
reaching obligations on state imposed through eg SC 1373 among others, whereas other
resolutions effectively impose sanctions on individuals and create obligations for states
in this respect. By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 5B.3 resolutions have been relied upon
not for imposing obligations but providing a legal basis for the right to resort to force.
54 Soft law standards have also assumed significant roles in identifying practices, impelling
legal debate by states, providing an expert view of legal obligations and assessments of
the lawfulness of practices in a timely manner.
55 Eg The high level International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid,
2005 looking at causes of terrorism as well as democratic responses may be an example.
56 As noted in Chapter 1, a broad range of sources can be referred to as ‘soft law’ standards,
and recognition is due of their differing degrees of authority and weight. Among those
particularly relied upon include ground-breaking reports of Special Rapporteurs, UN
working groups or regional bodies such as the Council of Europe, while regard is also had
to e.g. the ICJ Eminent Jurists report; the Chatham House Principles on the Use of Force
in Self Defence; the Leiden Principles on Counter-terrorism; Principles on the Right to
Information and National Security; the Declaration of the Madrid Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism and Security.
57 E.g. the ILC Articles on State Responsibility have been cited as relevant to human rights
obligations in this area in national and international jurisprudence; see eg the A and Others
case on admissible evidence (Chapter 11). See also the Ahmed case before English courts
where reports of the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights and of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights were closely analysed, though ultimately not
followed (see Chapter 4B.4 and Chapter 10). Thie reflects what may a trend on the part
of judges national and international to have regard to broader non binding but authoritative
comparative and soft law standards.
58 See ‘legal principles’ in Chapter 1. Note that much of the controversy in this area since
9/11 has related to the denial of the basic principle of legality, or other underlying principles
of law, though there have also been areas of complexity.
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12.2.1 No Gaping Holes in the International Legal Framework
A common feature of discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 has related to the
inadequacy of the international framework. Suggestions have emerged re-
currently of normative gaps, or the ill-equipped, quaint or outmoded nature
of the international legal order, as exposed by the challenges of international
terrorism. The law examined in some detail in preceding chapters essentially
belies this analysis. Inevitably as explored further below, in a dynamic area
of practice, there are times where the law may not be clear, and areas where
the law may be developing or where it would benefit from such develop-
ment.59 The suggestion that the war on terror practices discussed in this thesis
occur in a normative void, however, or that what appear to be violations are
in fact a manifestation of deficiencies in the legal framework itself, are not
compelling.
Allegations of gaps, uncertainties and inadequacies in the law may of
course reflect resistance to being constrained by the law, rather than the
absence of applicable law. They may also stem, in large part, from the failure
to consider, in its entirety, the full detailed and multi-dimensional range of
norms, principles and processes that make up the legal framework.
One of the most noted ‘gaps’ in the international legal order in this area
relates to the lack of a comprehensive terrorism convention. Yet while this
has had significant implications in terms of the malleability and susceptibility
of the terrorism label to abuse, and in terms of cooperation, it does not betray
a significant normative gap, as explored in chapter 2. Sectoral conventions,
ratification and implementation of which have been greatly strengthened post
9/11, cover many areas of terrorism. The rules regarding ‘terrorism’ in Chap-
ter 2 must be understood not only by reference to specific terrorism related
rules, but also by reference to: those existing norms in the criminal law field
that provide individual accountability for serious crimes under international
law and reflect the obligation of cooperation in the investigation and response
to international crimes (Chapter 4); IHL where a specific form of terrorism in
armed conflict exists and other norms prohibit the conduct we commonly refer
to as terrorism, when arising in armed conflict (Chapter 6), norms governing
whether a state can be held responsible for a range of acts and omissions
(Chapter 3); obligations on states to protect the life and security of persons
within their jurisdiction, which mandate state action against terrorism (Chap-
ter 7); and to the law on friendly relations between states and the use of force
(Chapter 5) that imposes obligations on states to prevent the use of their territ-
ory by terrorists and provides for (and limits) the possibility of resort to force
to address the terrorist threat. The legal framework, significantly bolstered
by the Security Council’s quasi legislative role in this field, enables states to
59 See examples at 12.2.3 below.
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take necessary measures to combat terrorism, and imposes wide-ranging
obligations on them to do so.
A famous refrain of the war on terror has been the claim that the fight
against terrorism is “a new kind of war,” “not envisaged when the Geneva
Convention was signed in 1949,” and rendering ‘quaint’ or ‘obsolete’ the terms
of IHL in favour of “a new paradigm” of conflict. IHL provides a definition
of armed conflict and its application must be considered in light of concrete
scenarios, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Mali or beyond. The refusal of
the international community of states to embrace a global conflict with al
Qaeda and associates groups, explained in preceding chapters, does not,
however, reveal the inadequacy of that framework, but rather disagreement
as to its content, purpose and the desirability of legal change to embrace a
more nebulous concept of geographically limitless armed conflict with loosely
defined groups or associates. While the debate on whether or not there can
be or is a war with al Qaeda or others reveals substantial differences of view,
notably on either side of the Atlantic, caution is due not to equate the existence
of such differences with unsettled law, still less with gaps in the legal frame-
work.
IHL makes provision for much of the allegedly virgin territory of the war
on terror in its substantive provisions as well. Notably, novel resort to an
allegedly unprecedented category of ‘enemy combatants’ belies the existence
of long-standing rules on unprivileged belligerency, and on the targeting or
treatment upon detention, of persons who take up arms and engage in conflict.
While such rules are at times controversial and their implications in particular
situations subject to dispute, the framework does not support the notion that
the law is silent.
The rules on the use of force between states provide other examples where
the adequacy of the legal framework has been questioned and, as noted below,
where there may have been some movement in state practice and opinion,
and of customary international law. Where the collective system proves insuffi-
cient, international law recognises the right of states to use force unilaterally
in their own defence, while deliberately strictly limiting the circumstances in
which such exceptional measures are permitted, to avoid unraveling the
fundamental nature of the prohibition. If the international legal framework
does not enable states to use force at times when the state determines it should
do so, this may be indicative of the framework working, not the reverse.
International human rights law, marginalised in much political discourse
around the ‘war on terrorism,’ and at times dismissed as ill-equipped to
address the challenges of international terrorism, provides a detailed body
of law, derived from decades of experience in responding to terrorism from
Colombia to Chechnya, Ireland to Israel, Somalia to Sri Lanka and beyond.
It has been further developed and consolidated in response to the legal and
political challenges of the counter-terrorism post 9/11. IHRL does not
straightjacket states in the fight against terrorism, but obliges effective counter-
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terrorism and adjusts and accommodates in multiple ways to the challenges
posed by terrorism, national security concerns, emergency or armed conflict.60
It also provides limits to its flexibility, however, constraining responses within
a broad rule of law framework that requires that restrictions on rights be
governed by law, no more than is genuinely necessary, and subject to judicial
oversight. The insistence that certain standards – prohibiting ill-treatment or
extra-judicial executions for example – be maintained at all times shows not
the naivety, rigidity or inadequacy of the framework but the determination
by the international community that certain responses, whatever the challenges,
are beyond the pale of international legitimacy.
It is suggested that a holistic look at the framework, in light of all applic-
able law, reveals a fairly comprehensive framework of rule and principles ripe
for application in concrete situations. While there are no gaping holes in the
legal framework there may inevitably be areas where the law has changed
post 9/11 and undoubtedly areas of controversy where such legal change may
unfold in the future.
12.2.2 Legal change post 9/11? A ‘Grotian’ moment, or pockets of legal devel-
opment?
In the wake of 9/11, alongside the emphasis by politicians on the unparalleled
threat and unprecedented challenges, were rapid suggestions of a
transformative paradigm shift in the international legal order. Some have
suggested that 9/11 was a ‘Grotian’ moment of international legal transforma-
tion, while others spotted ‘turning points’ and defining ‘constitutional’
moments.61 As a dynamic instrument that evolves largely through practice,
international law is always in a state of flux. The intensity of international
responses to terrorism post 9/11 make this an area ripe for evolution. How-
ever, as has been noted: “[i]t is always easy, at times of great international
turmoil, to spot a turning point that is not there.”62
Custom develops through shifting general practice of states and opinio juris.
Change is generally slow and requires a certain consistency of practice. Parti-
cular difficulties may attach to identifying customary international norms in
a rapidly evolving area, particularly one as politically fraught as that of the
‘war on terror’ post 9/11. Care must undoubtedly be taken not to read pre-
cipitously into divergent practice and poor compliance an unraveling of legal
60 The interpretation of IHL alongside IHRL in genuine armed conflict situations ensures a
legal framework that adjusts to the realities of particular situations, while ensuring that
deviation from generally applicable rules is no more than is justified by those exigencies.
61 See Michael P. Scharf, "Seizing the “Grotian moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary




norms themselves. Divergence of views does not itself change the law, still
less where those views, or the practice giving effect to them, is found only
in one or two states, even hegemonic ones.
The war on terror practices and the reactions to them discussed in this
thesis suggest that, despite the enormity of the attacks and their political
repercussions, 9/11 may not have had the anticipated transformative or
paradigm-shifting effect on the legal order. Rather, it may reveal isolated
pockets wherein there is some claim to legal shift, others where there is sur-
prisingly little movement, and a more substantial number of areas where
established legal principles have been reasserted, clarified or developed
through the interpretation and application of the law in the course of the war
on terror.
The most noteworthy way in which the framework has not developed post
9/11 is in relation to the definition of terrorism itself. Post 9/11, the conclusion
of a global definition and convention seemed inevitable. Yet, as explained in
Chapter 2, no general terrorism convention has been agreed despite the priority
afforded to combating terrorism on the international agenda. Over time, greater
clarity around the term may have emerged through guidance from the United
Nations provided parameters of a definition, but this contrasts with the
plethora of national level definitions adopted, and in any event it does not
purport to provide a legally binding definition of terrorism.63 Variations in
the elements of national and international terrorism definitions suggest that
this is an area of considerable diversity, rather than consistency, of practice,
giving strong reason to doubt the suggestion that a definition of terrorism,
still less the crime of terrorism, has emerged under customary international
law.
By contrast, perhaps the strongest claim to normative shift lies in relation
to the use of force against non-state actors. As Chapter 5 explores, the over-
whelming support for the use of force in self defence against al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, apparently without attribution of its acts to the state, is often
cited as evidence of legal shift towards the right to self defence being triggered
by non-state actors. While this development in the law may have been sup-
ported by other practice, international resolutions, state practice and ex-
pressions of support in relation to Afghanistan provided the clearest evidence
of, and a decisive contribution to, the recognition of a shift in customary
international law. The support for the possibility that an armed attack can be
carried out by a non-state actor, sufficient to trigger the right to self defence
(if the other conditions for self defence such as necessity and proportionality
are met), is however quite distinct from some of the assertions of the right
63 See Chapter 2. SCRes 1566 and U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, U.N. Doc. No. A/59/565 (2 December
2004), neither of which purport to provide a legally binding definition.
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to use of force preemptively against terrorists, on a potentially worldwide
basis, which has not garnered support.
In certain other areas where a paradigm shift been claimed, there would
appear to be a similar lack of widespread practice in support. In respect of
the underlying issue of the existence or not of a conflict against al Qaeda and
associates globally, the claim to acceptance of a shifting paradigm of conflict
must be questioned, in light of the resounding international rejection as set
out in chapter 6. While the post 9/11 context may have clarified certain issues
of IHL, and perhaps obscured others, there is little indication of a radical shift
in international legal standards.
9/11 has prompted greater activity, political and normative, than perhaps
any other single event, and the impact on the legal framework is undeniable.
Most notably, the burgeoning of terrorism laws on the domestic level has
transformed at least national legal frameworks. On the international level,
however, what has emerged may be described as smaller pockets of legal
development.
Normative development has taken many forms and developed in many
directions. Most obviously, there are some examples of new or revised inter-
state agreements, such as those on international cooperation,64 terrorist fi-
nancing or nuclear terrorism.65 As noted in relation to the ‘reactions’ to the
war on terror above, in many areas there have been reassertions of rules and
principles of the legal framework, and with them, in some cases, the develop-
ment or elaboration of those norms. This was illustrated repeatedly in the
chapters concerning human rights and the role of the courts where, in the face
of alarming claims such as purported ‘justifications’ for torture, the reaction
has generally not been a wavering approach to standards but a strong
reassertion of the absolute nature of the torture prohibition.66 Practices of
arbitrary or secret detention, explored in the case studies on Guantanamo Bay
or rendition, may ultimately have led not to the acceptance of those practices
but to an underlining of their unacceptability and the elaboration of safe-
guards.67 The abundant judicial practice in the counter-terrorism context may
have had an important role in this process, in some cases lending weight to
normative strengthening by contributing to evolving international customary
64 See Chapter 4B.3.
65 See Chapter 2.1.
66 See Chapter 11. Examples may include eg jurisprudence on the extra-territorial scope of
state responsibility for human rights violations (eg Al Skeine & Ors v UK, ECHR), or the
nature of states positive obligations on detention (eg Sabbeh &Ors v. Egypt, ACHPR) or the
cases before the European Court of Justice, among other courts and bodies, on the inter-
relationship of the legal framework on sanctions or peace and security and human rights
(eg Kadi and other cases).
67 This is seen eg. in the development of the jurisprudence on non-refoulement (to arbitrary
detention or flagrant denial of justice for example) or the reassertion of safeguards against
torture set out in Chapter 7 as well as thorough other soft law initiatives.
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law,68 or supporting the argument for arbitrary detention as a jus cogens
wrong.69
While evolving jurisprudence may ultimately have strengthened protection
in some areas, or eroded it in others, it has certainly contributed to a more
elaborate framework of law through interpretation and application of treaty
obligations in the counter-terrorism context in recent years.70 In addition,
new ‘soft law’ has proliferated in a range of areas from the financing of terror-
ism71 to human rights standards72, once again providing a more detailed
– albeit non-binding – frameworks.
To understand changes in the legal framework one must also look beyond
normative development as such, to ways in which the norms have been
accepted and implemented and the system strengthened. Perhaps more signi-
ficant than new conventions is the increased number of ratifications of existing
sectoral anti-terrorism conventions, which contributes to providing a far more
comprehensive normative framework for cooperation against international
terrorism than existed before 9/11. The framework has likewise been strength-
ened through enhanced implementation, including improved modalities of
cooperation as discussed in Chapter 4.
In turn, the enhanced ratification and implementation are supported by
institutional and capacity building developments. Nationally, examples may
include the establishment of focal points for international cooperation or
domestic reform in some states to ensure a framework of accountability for
intelligence agencies. Internationally, the notable shift of approach by the
Security Council counter-terrorism committee and other regional and inter-
national political organisations towards embracing a human rights dimension
as an inherent aspect of its security agenda, and the new or enhanced inter-
national and regional entities dedicated to strengthening the prevention of
terrorism within the rule of law, have the potential to bolster the international
68 See e.g. R. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and
New Debates, European Journal of International Law, Volume 21, Issue 1, Pp. 173-204
describing the acceptance of the jurprudence of the internaitonal criminal tribunals as
“slowly begun to be elevated into norms of customary international law,” and noting that
“the debate over whether consistent state practice and opinio juris are the only building
blocks of customary international law is over, because clearly, for better or for worse, they
no longer are.”
69 See Chapter 7A.5.3 on the repeated reference in the counter-terrorism context in recent
years as to the prohibition of arbitrary detention constituting a jus cogens norm by e.g.
the working group arbitrary detention, special rapporteurs and commentators.
70 Chapter 11 explores the role of the courts, though other examples are found in Chapters
7B, 8 and 10.
71 See eg International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation – the FATF Recommendations, 2012.
72 Examples include the ‘Principles on National Security and the Right to Information
(Tshwane Principles)’ (2012) or the ‘Framework Principles’ for securing accountability in
the context of State counter-terrorism’ by the Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human
Rights, A/HRC/22/52 (2013).
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infrastructure in this area.73 Rather than a radical shift in the legal order, these
may evidence a decisive move towards making obligations vis a vis countering
terrorism a reality.
12.2.3 Areas of tension and possible future development?
While there may not be gaping holes or seismic shifts in the legal framework,
it would be naive not to recognize that the war on terror practice has exposed
tensions and challenges for the legal framework. While it goes beyond the
scope of this study to speculate on where normative development will come
from over time, the following are among the areas where the law may well
evolve informed by the on-going global fight against terrorism.
One such area where future attention is inevitable is in relation to the
legality of the use of drones, robotic or other weapons systems that have
proliferated in recent years, as highlighted throughout the study, in particular
in Chapter 6. Considerable international attention is being set on questions
around the inherent lawfulness of particular modern weapons systems and,
perhaps more productively, on how existing rules and principles should be
applied in the evolving landscape.
As has been noted, the extent to which the legal framework can or should
accommodate targeted killings outside of armed conflict must be seriously
doubted, not least given the nature of the right to life and the jus cogens nature
of the prohibition on extra-judicial executions. Proposals for new conventions
between states allowing for such killings on their territory would not remedy
the unlawfulness under human rights law or IHL,74 just as suggestions for
judicially endorsed lethal ‘warrants’ or other safeguards, for example, could
have no plausible traction within a framework of international law.75 Undoub-
tedly, the right to life has been under serious attack in recent years and it
remains to be seen to what extent calls for fuller international attention to legal
standards may lead to an unraveling of a fundamental prohibition or a
reassertion of fundamental principles.
A related question which the war on terror has highlighted, and where
evolving practice may influence standards in important respects, is in relation
to whether and in what circumstances there is an obligation under IHL (or
73 E.g. Examples may include the dedicated Special Rapporteur on terrorism and human
rights,the UN Implementation Task Force to give effect to the UN Global Counter-terrorism
Strategy’s commitment, and potentially the CTC Technical Assistance team or Task Force
on Money Laundering. .
74 See “US Draft National Security Strategy 2013”, at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/sites/
default/files/file/news/National%20Security%20Strategy%202013%20(Final%20Draft).pdf.
75 See e.g. President Obama, National Defense University speech, 23 May 2013 on the dis-
cussion of safeguards on drone killings outside areas of “hostilities”; it is unclear e.g. how
such areas of hostilities would be defined.
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under IHRL read in light of IHL in armed conflict) to capture rather than kill
persons taking part in hostilities.76 Another specific area which may be ripe
for clarification, as suggested by the ICRC, is in relation to the minimal
standards applicable in NIAC, which may be clarified through the ICRC ela-
boration of minimal standards, or through practice.77
On this issue, as on others, as the question of co-application and interplay
of legal regimes (as between IHL and IHRL or peace and security and human
rights and IHL) continues to be given effect, including by the increasingly role
of human rights bodies in giving effect to these concurrent obligations, the
complex issue of interplay deserves to be further clarified.78
Much of the controversy in the war on terror, as addressed further below,
has stemmed from an overreaching approach to armed conflict and the applic-
ability of IHL, or selectivity in its application. While the idea of a perpetual
global war with al Qaeda and others may have few supporters,79definitional
and classification challenges around the nature of the parties to a non-inter-
national armed conflict look set to continue, particularly as lines between
organised criminality and conflict will continue to be blurred in practice in
particular situations from Mali to Mexico and beyond.
Terrorism and the multi-actored, coordinated nature of aspects of counter-
terrorism have brought into sharp focus areas of controversy concerning the
law of state responsibility. Among the issues raised by international coopera-
tion in unlawful war on terror practices is whether and how the legal frame-
work embraces, or might embrace, the responsibility of states for ‘complicity’
in international wrongs through forms of cooperation that may fall short of
the concrete support and knowledge required of ‘aiding and assisting’.80
Practice is unfolding in relation to responsibility for the receipt of intelligence
obtained through serious human rights violations, for example, or the uncertain
implications for the ability of states to try an individual whose rights have
76 Ch 7 B.3, War and Human Rights and Chapter 6B.2.2 Drone Killings, which both highlight
developments in practice, evolving US positions and reactions, judicial developments,
critique from within the UN and experts and the ICRC Guidance on DPH, all of which
may come to influence legal development and support an obligation to capture rather than
kill wherever feasible.
77 See Chapter 6B. See also 7B.3 on interplay between IHL and IHRL, noting that perceived
gaps may be addressed through an adequate approach to applying IHRL mindful of the
realities of conflict.
78 As noted above the question of whether there is an obligation under IHL (or under IHRL
read in light of IHL in armed conflict) to capture rather than kill and if so in what circum-
stances has been discussed in Chapter 7B.3.
79 See Chapter 6B.1 on the position of other states. While the US’ assertion of a conflict with
al Qaeda and associates continues, see President Obama’s recognition of the need to shift
from a perpetual war paradigm in the National Defense University speech, 23 May 2013.
80 See Chapter 10.
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been violated by other states.81 Controversies also attend the high threshold
for the test for attribution and the challenges it poses in particular contexts,
whether in terms of state responsibility for terrorism, or for abusive acts of
private security companies in the counter terrorism context, as discussed in
Chapter 3. It remains to be seen whether criticism of the current framework,
or its consideration in light of post 9/11 practice, may ultimately impel future
legal development in this field.
While the human rights framework in the counterterrorism context is
elaborate, the war on terror has also illuminated certain areas of that body
of law that may deserve greater clarity as regards states obligations in the
context of counter-terrorism. Examples may include the due process rights
applicable to inter-state transfers, where human rights systems adopt differing
approaches,82 the extra-territorial reach of human rights obligations in relation
to privacy which remain underexplored,83 or the guarantees regarding data
protection, where the law remains skeletal.84
In these area, as in others, the law is a dynamic tool which will continue
to respond to rapidly unfolding practice. Differences of view as to how that
development should unfold, and proposals for change, are an inevitable and
healthy part of any legal system. In no credible system of law, however, can
they provide a pretext for non-compliance with those aspects of legal frame-
work which subjects dispute, still less for the blanket subjugation of inter-
national law to domestic interests.
12.3 THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY: SOME ESSENTIAL
CHARACTERISTICS
While there may be a detailed legal framework governing terrorism and
counter-terrorism, the practice of counter-terrorism in recent years reveals
certain recurrent approaches to that framework that are worthy of reflection.
Highlighted in turn below, these might be described as: i) selectivity, and a
fragmented approach to the framework; ii) exceptionalism and its insidious
creeping reach; c) a ‘purposive’ interpretation of the law and the undermining
of its authority and binding force; and d) arbitrariness and lack of process.
It is suggested that these approaches are manifestations of an overarching
characteristic which is the erosion of the principle of legality itself. They are
81 Eg. The abuse of process claism that arise increasingly in practice: Chapter 4B.5. For
examples of this ‘shared responsibility’ of states and issues arising in the context of ren-
dition, see Chapter 10.
82 Chapter 7A.5.10(iii).
83 In the context of revelations of massive surveillance, e.g., the US asserts that privacy
protections do not apply, while the extra-territorial scope of human rights obligations in
this context is uncertain and has not been explored by human rights bodies.
84 See Chapter 7.A.5.7 and B.13.
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the antithesis of the principles – among them clarity, fairness, due process and
accountability – that underpin a ‘rule of law’ approach to addressing inter-
national terrorism.
12.3.1 Selectivity and Fragmentation
A recurrent feature of the relationship between the ‘war on terror’ and inter-
national law has been selectivity – in respect of which law applies, to whom
and for whose protection. Selectivity is the antithesis of universality, and is
itself a slight on the legality principle.
Selectivity has been most obviously manifest in the resistance to the role
and relevance of international law as a constraint on all states. In its most
caricatured form, such double standards were seen in the first US National
Security Strategy after 9/11 wherein international law was mentioned only
once, as a vehicle by which ‘rogue states’ were defined, yet was entirely absent
from the lengthy exposition of the US policies – such as the doctrine of pre-
emptive force – itself of, at best, dubious legality. While the language of rogue
states has gone, allegations of double standards linger. State Department
reports, condemning arbitrary detention, torture or impunity by particular
states, juxtapose starkly alongside the travesties of the ‘war on terror’.
Likewise, it is noteworthy that since September 11 states have not infre-
quently invoked international law as directly or indirectly providing a pretext
for taking action against other states or individuals. Examples include refer-
ences to non-compliance with Security Council resolutions on Iraq, the failure
by Afghanistan to surrender bin Laden, or Pakistan’s failure to prevent terror-
ists being active on its territory. The emphasis given to human rights violations
by the Taleban or Saddam Hussein regimes provide less direct examples. Yet
ironically these ‘enforcement missions’ have often themselves violated the
international standards in whose service they purported to act.85 The message
appears to be that while international law is important for other states, it
cannot constrain the exercise of the United States’ unique power.
A selective approach to international law is apparent also in the scope of
persons protected by the law. In its extreme form, this was manifest in the
suggestion that some states, or some people, were so ‘evil’ or dangerous that
they are rendered beyond the protection of law.86 Another example cited in
previous chapters is the stark contrast between the emerging recognition of
85 On the rejection of a right to use force to ‘enforce’ violations by other states, see Chapter
5. Chapter 9 notes the reference to the rights of victims in justifying the killing of Bin laden.
The notion of the innocence of victims should not be relevant to the right to reparations
and to accountability.
86 See e.g. statement by then legal adviser John Yoo that some people are beyond the legal
framework, header to Chapter 8, or President Bush’s 2002 ‘axis of evil’ speech, Chapter 5.
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the rights of ‘innocent’ victims of terrorism to compensation, and the vanishing-
ly slim record of reparation to victims of counter-terrorism, even those
emerging from simple mistaken identities.87 The creation of categories of
deserving and suspect victims is anomalous to the notion of universal human
rights in general, and to basic customary principles of reparation in particular.
A more specific contrast emerges from the decision that the most senior
officer charged with torture at Abu Ghraib could not be prosecuted on due
process grounds (given the failure to read him his rights), while individuals
secretly detained and torture for years are prosecuted despite this, before
military commissions with limited due process and where they will be subject
to the death penalty if convicted.88 While rights should be denied to no-one,
the selectivity in the reverence of defence rights is striking. The misplaced
emphasis placed on the relevance of ‘nationality’ in respect of core rights, as
in relation to drone killings or detention rights, is perhaps another example
of a selectivity of protection that has no basis in the legal framework and
further erodes the inalienability of basic rights and the universality of inter-
national legal protection.89
In short, a perception emerges of international law that protects ‘us’ but
not ‘them’, and constrains ‘them’ but not ‘us’. The impact on the universality
and legitimacy of international law, and the credibility of offending states to
invoke international law and to call others to account by its standards, is
profound.
Another form of selectivity arises in the ‘pick and choose’ approach by
which only particular areas of law, or particular rules therein, are acknowl-
edged as applicable. A fragmented or atomised approach to the law has been
a common feature of international legal discourse since 9/11 – and risks
presenting a misleading portrait of the normative framework, suggesting gaps,
anomalies and inconsistencies where they may in fact not exist.
Much US policy in this area relies on IHL, in line with the putative ‘war’
paradigm, and an expansive approach to self defence, with an emphatic
blindness to the role of IHRL. In the context of justifying its positions on tar-
geted killings, or its asserted right to detain people that may pose a threat,
the policy reasons why the US would cite jus ad bellum or IHL and ignore IHRL
87 Chapter 7.B.14. Chapters 8 on Guantanamo and Chapter 10 on extraordinary rendition
both contain examples of mistaken identities involving no culpability whatever on the part
of the victim of unlawful detention or torture.
88 Chapter 8.B.4.4
89 See eg Justice Department White Paper, 2013, on targeting US citizens and surrounding
debate. See also Why citizenship should not be the main focus of targeted killing’J Hafetz,
al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331073748511377.html.
On controversy concerning UK orders stripping of citizenship before drone attacks and
unlawful detention, see “British terror suspects quietly stripped of citizenship… then killed
by drones” Independent,
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are plain. There can, however, be no legal justification for a blanket rejection
of the relevance of human rights law.
Another example might be the blindness of the Security Council to the
full range of international obligations when it mandated measures pursuant
to peace and security post 9/11, though as noted above the fragmented
approach has been rejected since. In the implementation of these obligations,
states have on occasion sought to deny the relevance of other obligations under
human rights, refugee law or IHL.90 Conversely, a similar critique may be
leveled at the blind application of IHRL by the ECtHR, without due reference
to the relevance of IHL in genuine armed conflict situations.91
In addition to the selective regard for certain areas of law, and neglect of
others, is the lack of internal consistency; where for example IHL has been
invoked to displace IHRL, IHL has itself in turn been applied selectively. An
example highlighted relates to targeted killing of suspected al-Qaeda operat-
ives, where IHL standards are invoked to justify targeting which would be
unlawful outside armed conflict, but not accepted as applicable to protect
similarly situated persons in the event that they are detained. The claim that
detainees are dangerous criminals rather than POWs has been made to question
the appropriateness of affording them the protection of IHL, while a claim that
they are ‘combatants’ had been made to justify the non-application of criminal
law and human rights guarantees.
Finally, a fragmented approach is evident also in the failure to have due
regard to underlying legal principles, focusing instead on ‘uncertainty’ around
what are presented as inadequate or outmoded ‘technical’ legal rules. The
debate on the status or rights of prisoners was one example, where the dis-
cussion revolved unduly around particular provisions concerning classification
of detainees, while largely ignoring fundamental principles such as equality,
humanity and non-arbitrariness,92 and the fact that basic rights apply to all
persons irrespective of status.
12.3.2 Exceptionalism and its creeping reach
An exceptionalist approach to international law has taken many forms in the
fight against international terrorism, purporting to justify exceptions to norm-
ally applicable legal regimes, norms or processes. A certain degree of ex-
90 On the difficult issues of interplay arising, see Chapter 7B.3.
91 Chapter 7 discussion – see e.g., the al Jedda case in relation to ECtHR’s approach to applicable
law in Iraq.
92 See eg the emphasis on non-arbitrariness in the UN Secretary General’s definition of the
rule of law, which include “equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." Report of the Secretary-General:
The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” (2004)).
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ceptionalism is anticipated in the legal framework itself, in that the law adjusts
to exceptional circumstances. Thus for example the framework of IHRL allows
for derogation from certain human rights provisions, the limitation of
enumerated rights on ‘national security’ or ‘public order’ grounds, and for
adjustment through the co-applicability of IHRL and IHL in time of armed
conflict. Curiously perhaps, the derogation exception in human rights law,
which allows for broad but not limitless suspension of certain rights, has
hardly been relied upon by states in the war on terror.93 Instead, as noted
above the practice of some states shows a broader reaching challenge to the
applicability of IHRL entirely.
The designation of the ‘war on terror,’ later referred to as a global conflict
with al-Qaeda or associated groups, represented an attempt to create an
overarching exception to normally applicable rules and criteria.94 In the
context of a putative conflict waged against an unclear opponent, on a ‘global
battlefield’ with no identifiable geographic or temporal limits, the exception
is vast and indeterminate.95 An uncertain range of persons suspected of an
uncertain range of forms of associations with the uncertain phenomenon of
terrorism are brought within the exception and subject to exceptional rules
on targeting or detentions under IHL that are intended for a much narrower,
definable and specific situation of armed conflict under international law.
The restrictive approach to the territorial scope of human rights provisions,
and denial of the applicability of obligations when the state acts outside its
own territory (despite human rights jurisprudence to the contrary), is another
manifestation of an exceptional approach that seeks to exclude the applicability
of aspects of the human rights framework.96
The Security Council’s determination that ‘terrorism’ itself constitutes a
threat to international peace and security, adopted in a broad brush rather
than differentiated, context specific manner, may be seen as a further mani-
festation of an exceptionalist approach to the phenomenon of terrorism.97
An exceptionalist approach is seen recurrently in criminal law, where
exceptional laws, penalties or procedures are brought to bear in ‘terrorism’
cases that mirror the development of a ‘law of the enemy’ approach to criminal
law.98 Chapter 4 illustrates how even core principles on which the criminal
justice process depends, such as the presumption of innocence or the right
to trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, have been jettisoned
by numerous states around the world in the course of terrorism trials.
93 Chapter 7B.4. The notable exception was the UK which derogated in respect of detentions
within the UK under article 5.
94 On inter-relationship with IHRL, see Chapter 7B.3.
95 Chapter 6.B.1.1.
96 Chapters 7A.2.2 for the legal framework, and 7B.2 for issues arising post 9/11; see cases
in Chapter 11.
97 Chapter 5 on such threats, and Chapter 7.B.1.
98 Eg Chapter 4 and Chapter 7B3.
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Exceptions have a tendency to expand and to normalize, as the war on
terror amply illustrates. While exceptions should be strictly construed, a
persistent and insidious feature of the post-9/11 landscape has been the
creeping reach of exceptional justifications. They have crept downwards, taking
root in the way a range of issues are approached until the exception becomes
embedded in the norm. They have also crept outwards embracing an ever
more diverse and broader range of actors, facts and circumstances, until the
situations embraced are not (or are no longer) exceptional, and may bear little
relation to the original justification.
One manifestation of this phenomenon is seen in the ever expanding forms
of ‘association’ with and ‘support’ for terrorism. Thus an indeterminate range
of individuals and activities, including even activities acknowledged as per
se innocent, can be swept within an exceptional international framework
intended for, or justified by reference to, the ‘worst of the worst’.99 The extent
to which malleable terrorism laws, aimed at upholding the rule of law, have
become a weapon to suppress political dissent, social organisation, even
attempts at humanitarian or educational support, often providing a new
legitimacy to old autocracy, is borne out by the practice reflected in previous
chapters. ‘Mission creep’ whereby rules or approaches from the terrorism
context are employed for other purposes is illustrated in preceding chapters,
including increased surveillance powers or security controls, justified by
security threats then employed far beyond them, bypassing normally applicable
frameworks of protection and process.100
Likewise, self defence is an exception to the prohibition on the use of force.
It has not, however, been construed narrowly, as exceptions should be, but
extremely expansively. While self defence in Afghanistan was considered
justified in light of the exceptional prevailing circumstances of the 9/11 attacks
and imminent threat of further attacks, self defence has since been stretched
to purportedly justify force far beyond those sort of exceptional circumstances.
The extent to which terrorism poses an exceptional threat is increasingly
subject to debate as the struggle against terrorism unfolds, and some assert
that the menace of al-Qaeda or others diminishes.101 9/11 may well have
been an exceptional moment in history for many reasons, but it may be
doubted whether the acts of al-Qaeda, associated groups or acts of terrorism
99 Chapter 4B2 on examples of criminalising even well intentioned ‘material support’ for those
considered terrorists; the best known example from the jurisprudence of US courts is Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. (2010).
100 See e.g. F. N. Baldwin Jr. and D. R. Koslosky, ‘Mission Creep in National Security Law’,
14 (2012) W. Va. L. Rev. 669.
101 See e.g. Chapter 5 on the nature of the threat, its immediacy and source(s). Official US
indications in early 2013 suggest that US soil has never been safer; see e.g. State of the Union
address of 2013, President Obama acknowledged the need to pursue the "remnants" of al
Qaeda, National Security Strategy 2013, and 23 may 2013 speech. Different considerations
clearly apply in different states.
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more broadly would meet the same criteria. Yet 9/11 casts a very long shadow
that colours the approach to quite distinct, myriad acts and threats of inter-
national terrorism since then.102 There is a risk of broad ranging, disparate
acts and threats being treated as emanating from one source, and being brought
within the exceptional category in respect of which exceptional treatment is
sought.103
The justification of exceptional approaches to certain types of cases because
of the label that attaches to them, rather than on a case by case basis as justified
by the application of clear, foreseeable law to particular facts, risks under-
mining international legal responses to terrorism.
12.3.3 ‘Purposive’ Legal Interpretation and Undermining the Authority of
Law
War on terror practice has also raised questions as regards the interpretation,
or the manipulation, of international law.104 International law and practice
provide interpretative principles which assist in the application of the law,
particularly in novel contexts.105 What has euphemistically been referred to
as the ‘purposive interpretation’ of the law by states or their legal advisers,
in line with the policy of the day, has been a feature of the post 9/11 land-
scape. The most notorious example was ‘the torture memos’ from the US Justice
Department, which redefined torture and provided justifications for it that
have been lambasted as spurious, untenable interpretations of the law.106
102 See e.g. the discussion of the ‘continuing’ threats and attacks in chapter 5.
103 See discussion of this phenomenon, in the justification for resort to self defence against
terrorists worldwide, in Chapter 5.
104 For analysis on the types of legal advice given in the war on terror, see the following: P.
Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values, supra note 51.
See P. Margulies, ‘Foreward: Risk, Deliberation, and Professional Responsibility’, 1 (2005)
J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 357, 360; D. Cole, The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable
(The New Press: New York City, 2009); J. Lavitt, ‘The Crime of Conviction of John Choon
Yoo: The Actual Criminality in the OLC During the Bush Administration’, 62 (2010) Me.
L. Rev. 155; M. P. Scharf, ‘The Torture Lawyers’, 20 (2010) Duke J. Comp. & In’’l L. 389;
J. Cooper Alexander, ‘John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World’, 100 (2012)
Calif. L. Rev. 331; A. H. Garrison, ‘The Role of the OLC in Providing Legal Advise to the
Commander-in-Chief After September 11th: The Choices Made by the Bush Administration
Office of Legal Counsel’, J. of the Nat’l Assoc. of the Administrative L. Judiciary, Fall 2012.
105 Art 69, VCLT. Human courts have developed specific principles of relevance, including
an evolutive approach to law as a living instrument, the principle of effectiveness, a
purposive and contextual interpretation, and finally a holistic approach in line with broader
international law. See Chapter 7A.6.
106 Chapter 7B; see generally P. Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American
Values (Palgrave MacMillan: New York City, 2009).
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Another example in another but related field was the controversial, ‘evolving’
advice of the UK Attorney General on the lawfulness of the Iraq invasion.107
International practice recognizes the legitimate role of the ‘purposive’
interpretation of law, to ascertain the underlying purposes of the law and to
give effect to it, which inevitably involves political and value judgment and
embodies considerable flexibility.108 On many of the issues explored, there
will inevitably be a range of plausible interpretations as to the law, the pur-
poses it serves and how to ensure its effectiveness. Within the legal framework,
there is natural inherent flexibility, and this will inevitably be exploited to some
degree by states and policy makers. War on terror practice raises the question
as to where the line is drawn, however, between interpretations of law, and
its enslavement to politics. Stretching ‘interpretation’ and legal opinion beyond
plausible limits can only undermine the role of legal advisers and potentially
the credibility of the law itself.
Other examples emerge in the war on terror as to the marginalization of
that legal advice that was not consistent with policy objectives.109 Where the
law could not be made compliant, one troubling approach was to suggest,
as was done at the outset of the war on terror, that international law would
be respected ‘so far as consistent’ with the domestic agenda.110 The implicit
refusal to adhere to the law when it is not perceived to be in the national
interest is inconsistent with basic international legal principles111 and in-
evitably undermines the binding authority of the law.
12.3.4 Arbitrariness
A persistent characteristic that has emerged from the treatment of international
law in the ‘war on terror’ is arbitrariness and the lack of due process. Pro-
107 See Chapter 5.
108 For one example of various interpretative approaches in the human rights context see
Murillo v Costa Rica, Chapter 7. See e.g. P. Margulies, ‘Foreward: Risk, Deliberation, and
Professional Responsibility’, 1 (2005) J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 357. On the promotion of a
‘purposive’ interpretation in the context of Iraq, see M. Byers, A decade of Forceful Measures
against Iraq, EJIL 13 2002 21-41.
109 See eg evidence to the Iraq Inquiry in the UK, Chapter 5.
110 See eg Memo from Alberto Gonzales to President Bush, ‘Application of the Geneva Conven-
tion on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban’, 25 January 2002,
or Former US President Bush, Memorandum, ‘Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees’, 7 February 2002. It refers to being “a strong supporter of Geneva and its
principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,
in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.’ Note that the language of “support-
ing” international law, but implicitly not being constrained by it, is also reflected in the
2013 Draft National Security Strategy.
111 A state cannot justify non-compliance with international law by reference to its domestic
law is one of the most basic principles of the international order.
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tecting against arbitrariness is at the core of the rule of law.112 Yet quite
different manifestations of the promotion of unfettered executive discretion
in matters of security emerge from across the spectrum of responses to 9/11.
Meanwhile, as exceptional categories have drifted and expanded, as noted
above, so have protections and safeguards shrunk.
The suggestion that matters such as the status of detainees and lawfulness
of detention were exclusively ‘military’ matters not susceptible to judicial
determination (rejected by the US Supreme Court), or the refusal to meet the
obligation under IHL to have a competent tribunal determine detainees’ status,
provided early illustrations. The exclusion, or marginalisation, of the role of
judicial oversight has however taken many forms, from the denial of access
to a court for habeas corpus, to summary extradition procedures, to replace-
ment of regular impartial and independent courts with ad hoc tribunals, to
restrictions on the fair trial guarantees that make the judicial process meaning-
ful or the removal of international law as a source of law for the courts in
terrorism related cases.113
A rather different manifestation of the unstructured exercise of broad-
reaching powers, without safeguards or oversight, is seen in the essential
unilateralism that has characterized the use of military force in response to
terrorism since 9/11. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most
graphically the National Security Strategy advanced by the US,114 may reflect
the refusal of certain militarily powerful states to be beholden to a collective
security system that they do not control. The European Security strategy by
contrast, while corresponding quite closely to its American counterpart in the
assessment of risks and threats, emphasises multilateralist responses within
a framework of collective security.115
While there has been a shift towards the ‘individualisation’ of international
obligations through Security Council sanctions imposed directly on individuals,
rather than the traditional approach of acting through states, there has not
been a corresponding shift to ensure the right of individuals to challenge the
Council’s decisions. The lack of any fair process prompted the establishment
of the Ombudsperson on delisting, and calls for further reform of the Council
to ensure the rights of individuals and greater accountability of the Council,
112 See Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and
post-conflict societies” (2004), UN Doc. S/2004/616.
113 See e.g. Chapter 11.
114 See Chapter 5.B.4; this was most striking in the 2002 National Security Strategy and a shift
of tone and approach was evident in subsequent strategies. In practice and policies, how-
ever, a broad reaching assertion of the right to use force unilaterally when the US deter-
mines it is necessary remains.
115 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy’ approved by the
European Council 12 December 2003 and drafted under EU High Representative Javier
Solana, and ‘Internal Security Strategy for the European Union “Towards a European
Security Model,” approved 23 February 2010.
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but the deficit remains.116 On the national level too, measures including sanc-
tions, expulsions and other ‘preventative’ orders of varying types have
infringed a wide range of rights, without providing basic information or a
meaningful opportunity for challenge to those affected.117 A critical dimension
of the role of the courts discussed in Chapter 11 has indeed been to reclaim
and reassert that very role, and its democratic credentials, and to impose
process and oversight in this environment of widespread arbitrariness.118
12.3.5 Secrecy, the Refusal to Look Back and the lack of Accountability119
Access to information enables public scrutiny of government action, safeguards
democratic participation and guards against future abuse.120 Yet in many
ways the war on terror has been, and remains, an exercise in clandestinity.
This is epitomized by the extent of secrecy surrounding the rendition practice,
designed and implemented to ensure that no information came to light, and
followed by a concerted and systematic cover up.121 However it comes in
many other guises. These include the protracted refusal for many years to
reveal information as to who was detained at Guantanamo and why.122 While
that has ceded, wide-reaching gagging orders on numerous detainees continue,
precluding any information about the detainees, however innocuous, from
reaching the public eye.123 The censoring of the military commission process
for references to detainee abuse,124 prosecutions and disproportionate penal-
ties imposed on journalists and whistleblowers,125 or the invocation of state
secrecy to completely block ab initio access to justice for victims of torture or
secret arbitrary detention exemplify a defensive and absolutist approach to
116 See Chapter 7B.8 on the development of the Ombudsperson to counter the procedural
arbitrariness and the national, regional and international cases in Chapter 11.
117 See e.g. Chapter 7.B.7, though curtailing due process runs across many of the issues raised
in Chapter 7.
118 In Chapter 11, see e.g. Lord Bingham’s classic expression of the democratic role of the courts
in A&Ors.
119 President Obama stated that he is interested in looking forward, not backwards, discussed
in e.g. Chapter 7.B.14.
120 See e.g. National Security Principles and the Right to Information, (Thwane Principles, 2012).
121 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Secret detentions and
illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report’,
7 June 2007, Chapter 10.
122 This protracted refusal spanned many years but has now been lifted; see Chapter 8.
123 See the case of Abu Zubaydah (Abu Zubaydah v Poland, ECtHR application 26 March 2013)
highlighted in Chapters 10 and 8..
124 Chapter 8B.4.5
125 On the prosecution of Bradley Manning ‘whistleblower’ on war crimes in Iraq, nominated
for the Nobel Prize but prosecuted by the U.S., see http://www.bradleymanning.org. See
also Chapter 7 on freedom of expression.
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secrecy, at odds with the careful balancing enshrined in the legal frame-
work.126
An overreaching approach to national security and state secrecy, evident
across the practice of several states, obscures the legitimate role for protection
of national security information, creates distrust, delegitimizes counter-terrorist
efforts and impedes the rights to truth, justice and accountability.
Closely linked to the fortress approach to information and secrecy outlined
above is the lack of reparation, and of accountability, that continues to
characterise the war on terror. Reparation is a basic principle of international
law.127 It serves multiple restorative purposes – for the wronged, for society
to learn from the past and to ensure non-repetition, and for the rule of law
that requires reassertion in the face of egregious wrongs.128
The imperative of accountability, and its significance on multiple levels,
is also firmly reflected in the international law and practice set out in this
study.129 Accountability is recognized as one of the cornerstone principles
of the ‘rule of law’.130 The priority the international community has afforded
to it has led to the elaborate system of international criminal justice, with its
national and international elements, set out in Chapter 4.
“Justice,” as invoked in the ‘war on terror’ however, assumes peculiar form.
It was hailed for example when Osama bin Laden was shot to death,131 and
mounted on the sign for ‘Camp Justice’ in Guantanamo which houses the
controversial military commissions. Yet justice is notably absent for the crimes
committed in the name of counter-terrorism and for their many victims.The
resistance to accountability in relation to crimes committed in the name of
the war on terror, and the unwillingness thus far to look back, learn, account
and repair, is a striking characteristic of the war on terror to date. It poses
a challenge to the credibility of the framework of international law, and to
the prospects of moving to a rule of law approach to countering terrorism
in the future.
126 Chapter 7B.14, 10 and 11 on state secrets, or the A&Ors v UK case for one of many examples
of judicial reasoning on the balance between protecting genuine national security informa-
tion while protecting human rights in Chapter 7.B.7 and 11.
127 Chapters 3 and 7A.4.2.
128 See Chapter 7 on reparation, and the illustration of rendition in Chapter 10. The UN rule
of law initiative website gives priority to justice and accountability and reparation as
dimensions of the rule of law, see http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3
129 Chapter 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10; Secretary General 2004 Report of the Secretary-General: The rule
of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” (2004), UN Doc. S/2004/
616) and UN Rule of Law website, ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 See Chapter “The Killing of Osama bin Laden: Justice Done?”
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12.4 CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND INTER-
NATIONAL LEGALITY
The overview of the framework of international law provided in these chapters
suggests that the applicable law contains no gaping holes. It is not inherently
outmoded or ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of international terrorism.
It is not excessively complex, nor inaccessible, still less irrational. It is not blind
to, but responds to accommodate, in various ways, security challenges of the
type epitomised by 9/11. The law has not undergone revolutionary change,
but it has gradually evolved since 9/11 and will continue to do so. While there
are areas for legitimate disagreement as to its interpretation, areas where the
law may be unclear and legal development desirable and/or underway, what
9/11 exposed – and the ‘war on terror’ confirmed – was not so much the
inadequacy of law but the fragility of respect for it, and the pressing challenge
of enforcement.
The approaches to the law, through the selectivity, exceptionalism, legal
distortion, arbitrariness and lack of accountability outlined above, are the
antithesis of the core rule of law principles upon which the system is based.
Systematic violations of core norms shake the foundations of the legal order.
As we grow accustomed over time to widespread violations of legal norms,
and exceptional approaches, the risk of desensitisation, normalization and
acceptance of the inevitability of such an approach grows. In a ‘war on terror’
in which one debates the legitimacy of extreme violations such as waterboard-
ing, targeted killing or indefinite detention without charge or trial, ‘softer’
responses in the form of inhuman treatment, denial of basic fair trial rights,
the quashing of political dissent or the right to privacy, for example, appear
almost trivial. The distortion of law and respect for it so far as politically
convenient ultimately jeopardize the universality, integrity and the authority
of the legal order.
The extent of the corrosive effect and the long-term impact of the ‘war on
terror’ on legality, remains to be seen. Much depends on how the international
community continues to address the fundamental challenges that terrorism
and counter-terrorism currently pose.
A key challenge to be faced in the road ahead is plainly to ensure that the
scourge of terrorism be addressed, and that this is done effectively. The preven-
tion, investigation and prosecution of serious acts of violence are themselves
obligations under international law. While there may be growing divergence
of view as to the true nature of the global terrorist threat and its priority for
the international community as compared to other challenges,132 images of
132 Official reports give vastly different views on this. Some official reports suggest al Qaeda
and associated groups are greatly depleted, or that American soil has never been safer (Draft
2013 National Security Strategy). Understanding the nature of the threat is essential to the
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terror attacks around the globe from Bali to Baghdad, or Madrid to Mogadishu,
pay chilling testament to the need to meet the challenge of terrorism preven-
tion. This sits alongside the need to critically assess, on an on-going basis, the
real nature of existing threats and the effectiveness of strategies to address
them.
The focus on prevention, including by addressing the causes and contri-
buting factors to terrorism, is consistent with the implementation of the UN
global strategy. The effectiveness of particular strategies of prevention, while
essentially a political matter, is also linked to lawfulness.133 Measures that
in fact propagate further terrorism, or that impede crucial counter-terrorism
initiatives, cannot be justified as legitimate restrictions on rights in the name
of terrorism prevention. The counter-productivity of signature features of the
war on terror, notably Guantanamo, Extraordinary Rendition or drone strikes,
has been noted.134 One of the war on terror paradoxes is that international
cooperation and criminal justice action against international terrorism has been
hampered by abusive practices themselves taken in the name of ‘counter-
terrorism.’ Practice set out in this book indicates the pragmatic as well as
principled importance of countering terrorism in accordance with the rule of
law.
The challenge ultimately is to ensure that this effective counter-terrorism
strategy unfolds in a way that restores, rather than further undermines, the
rule of law. Promoting respect for international law is essential to ensuring
that the ‘war on terror’ does not score a devastating own goal by eroding
permanently the rule of law and ‘deliver a victory to terrorists that no act of
theirs could achieve’.135 Ultimately, the characteristics referred to above must
be addressed, and the principle of legality – the clarity and coherence of law,
its universality and the principle of due process inherent therein – must be
reasserted.
Confidence must be restored in the capacity, relevance and credibility of
international law, as providing an essential legal framework which, while
imperfect, is equipped to address the normative consequences of 9/11 and
its aftermath. International law is perhaps more present in political discourse
since the ‘war on terror’ than before, but lingering perception of the
‘bizarre’136 or inept nature of international law should be countered. In areas
where the law is unclear, the challenge of clarifying the normative framework,
while remaining true to its essential norms and principles, should be met. The
application of the legal framework and the necessity, appropriateness and proportionality
of responses.
133 See Chapter 7A on the necessity and proportionality requirement; measures that are not
effective to achieve their legitimate aim they pursue cannot constitute necessary and
proportionate restrictions on rights. Some rights can never be restricted.
134 See ‘Reactions’ at Ch.12.1 above.
135 Former Secretary General Annan’s quote cited at the outset of the chapter.
136 See statement by Baroness Hale cited at the outset of the chapter.
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proliferation of responses to terrorism raises the challenge of ensuring that
the on-going development and interpretation of the law is coherent rather than
fragmented. Proposals for normative change, which in any vibrant system of
law will inevitably follow developing practice, should therefore be encouraged
so far as they pursue and are constrained by the principles of the rule of law.
Differences of view on the law and proposals for legal change must, however,
be distinguished from the erroneous view that there is currently no effective
system of law. The distinction between the law as it is, and the law as some
would wish it to be, must be reasserted.
Second, essential to reasserting the principle of legality is underlining the
universality of law, demonstrating that core rules of international law apply
to all states, for the ultimate protection of all persons. The continued recovery
of the central role of international human rights law, and clarification of its
universal application, whenever (including in times of crisis or conflict), wherever
(whether at home or abroad) and in relation to whomever the state exercises
its authority or control over will contribute to this process. The perceived
universality of the international system depends on the law applying to, and
constraining, the more powerful as well as the less. The harm done through
selectivity and perceived double standards is readily evident in frequent
statements by states, underming the authority of the U.S. (or its supporters)
to opine on or criticize violations by other states in light of ‘war on terror’
crimes.
The law is safeguarded by its application according to procedural principles
and effective oversight. Addressing the challenges facing the undermining
or marginalising of role of courts and legal mechanisms, national and inter-
national, in the area of national security is clear. Ensuring the procedural
fairness of sanctions or other measures taken against individuals, whatever
their provenance, is essential. As regards collective security mechanisms, there
is plainly a new imperative around the old debate on reform of the Security
Council, and the need for systems that command international respect and
more effectively enforce the rule of law, while ensuring essential restraint on
the otherwise unfettered exercise of power of any one state. The perceived
arbitrariness of international law should be countered by strengthening the
infrastructure of mechanisms to give effect to it. This includes ensuring the
standing, authority and resources of mechanisms charged with ensuring
compliance with human rights in counter-terrorism.
A critical question is what impact the experience of the war on terror will
have on shifting policies and practices, in terms of what states do directly and
on their cooperation relationships with others. Repudiation of unlawful prac-
tices of the past is important and there are positive examples in the practice
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explored in this book.137 The war on terror has graphically illustrated the
dark side of international cooperation, and there are indications of reform and
of a more cautious or questioning approach by states to ensure that they do
not become complicit in such wrongs in the future, though the extent of this
remains open to question. The willingness of states to conditioning cooperation
in criminal, military or intelligence matters on compliance with basic inter-
national law norms, and to demonstrate the priority afforded to such compli-
ance, may prove critically important.
States’ reactions have been explored throughout the thesis. Robust responses
have rejected some fo the worst excesses, as highlighted in relation to Guanta-
namo, and resisted lasting erosion of legal standards, though in relation to
targeted killings the willingness to defend the legal framework is less readily
apparent and the implications as yet unclear. The emerging emphasis that has
been given to the role and responsibilities of third states in the face of serious
violations of international law, and the positive obligations to act individually
or collectively, are of potentially critical importance to a rule of law approach.
As seen from the legal framework highlighted in various chapters, such
responsibility is reflected in established and developing law and practice on
state responsibility, human rights, humanitarian law and international criminal
law. It remains to be seen whether it can impel states to take more seriously
their positive obligations of cooperation to end or to prevent the sort of
egregious wrongs that epitomize the low points of the war on terror.
A critical challenge is to ensure accountability in accordance with law. The
concept of the rule of law is ‘deeply linked to the principle of justice, involving
an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of
rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs.’138 The denial of justice
to victims of egregious violations of terrorism or in apparent response thereto
should be replaced with an approach that gives effect to their legal rights. The
impunity currently afforded to the multiplicity of individuals responsible for
egregious crimes should be replaced with full and fair accountability within
the established framework of international law. The willingness and ability
of the international community to consistently hold to account states, and
individuals, who have violated fundamental international norms, whether
through grave acts of ‘terrorism’ or in the name of counter terrorism, is crucial
to the rule of law approach.
The commitment to learn lessons and to grapple with the need to repair,
to restore and to account, is far from certain. The disregard of the international
137 These include Obama’s repudiation of torture upon taking office, or new UK Consolidated
Guidance on intelligence relationships making clear that intelligence agencies should not
cooperate with torture abroad. See Chapters 7B5 and 10. See also ‘reactions’ to the war
on terror at 12.1 above.
138 ‘What is the Rule of Law’? UN Rule of Law website, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?
article_id=3.
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framework during the ‘war on terror’ may be allowed to stand – with few
implications for wrong-doing nations and without individual accountability –
and to further erode the essential legitimacy of the law, and of those that
purport to enforce it. Or, it may yet be that the excesses of the ‘war on terror’,
and the alacrity with which legal standards were jettisoned in the name of
security, will serve as an alarming reminder of the dangers of a ‘fast and loose’
approach to international law. It will be the extent of the international com-
munity’s commitment to clarify and strengthen international law, not only
by reiterating standards but by ensuring that they are respected, that will
define where the pendulum stops, and the ultimate impact of the ‘war on
terror’ on the international rule of law.

Samenvatting
DE ‘OORLOG TEGEN TERRORISME’ EN HET INTERNATIONAALRECHTELIJK RAAMWERK
Inleiding
Sinds de tragische gebeurtenissen van 11 september 2001 (‘9/11’) is de agenda
van de internationale gemeenschap gevormd, of misschien zelfs gedomineerd,
door de strijd tegen het internationale terrorisme. Terrorisme en maatregelen
ter bestrijding daarvan zijn geen nieuwe fenomenen, en bestonden lang voor
2001. Deze fenomenen hebben altijd de nodige uitdagingen met zich gebracht.
Toch is in de praktijk van terrorismebestrijding sinds 9/11 de nadruk conse-
quent gelegd op het buitengewone karakter van de dreiging, op de unieke
kenmerken van de uitdagingen,1 en op de ontoereikendheid van het bestaande
internationale recht. In dat licht richt deze studie zich op het identificeren en
evalueren van de relevante internationale rechtsregels die van toepassing zijn
op terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding in het post-9/11 tijdperk.
In de massale en wereldwijde anti-terrorisme campagne vanaf 9/11 – ook
wel bekend onder de naam ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’2 – is een praktijk ontstaan
met vele dimensies en op vele niveaus, zowel lokaal, nationaal als internatio-
naal. Terwijl de ‘wereldwijde oorlog tegen het terrorisme’ unilateraal geleid
werd door de Verenigde Staten, heeft deze universele manifestaties en reper-
cussies gehad. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt deze praktijk en evalueert de juri-
dische vraagstukken die zich voordoen bij de toepassing van het juridische
raamwerk op de praktijk. Het identificeert gebieden waar de praktijk verder
is gegaan dan de flexibele standaarden uit dat raamwerk. Meer in zijn alge-
meenheid wordt in dit proefschrift zorg uitgesproken over de implicaties op
langere termijn van deze praktijk op het bestaande raamwerk, en op respect
voor internationaal recht in meer algemene zin.
1 Zie bijvoorbeeld the State of the Union Address van de Amerikaanse president Bush op
29 januari 2002.
2 Toespraak van President George W. Bush op een gezamenlijke sessie van het Congres en
zich richtend tot het Amerikaanse volk, 20 september 2001, te lezen op: http://archive.org/
details/gwb2001-09-20.flac16. Het feit dat dit geen conflict in de juridische zin van het woord
betreft wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 6 van het proefschrift.
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Doel van het proefschrift
Het voornaamste onderzoeksdoel van dit proefschrift is het identificeren van
het bestaande internationaalrechtelijke raamwerk dat van toepassing is op
terrorisme en maatregelen ter bestrijding van terrorisme. De rechtmatigheid
van de praktijk van na 9/11 zal worden beoordeeld in het licht van dit multi-
dimensionale kader. De vraag is in hoeverre het bestaande raamwerk voldoen-
de handvaten biedt om internationaal terrorisme en de antwoorden daarop
te reguleren en of het de internationale gemeenschap in de gelegenheid stelt
om de uitdagingen die internationaal terrorisme stelt het hoofd te bieden. Het
proefschrift analyseert punten waarop het recht onduidelijk is en gebieden
waar het recht in ontwikkeling is of lijkt te zijn als reactie op veranderende
werkelijkheden.
Een tweede vraag die in dit proefschrift wordt behandeld is in hoeverre
de normen en mechanismen van het internationale rechtssysteem gerespecteerd
zijn gebleven of juist geschonden in de praktijk van de bestrijding van terroris-
me in het tijdperk na 9/11. Het antwoord op deze vraag wordt gevonden door
een studie van verschillende voorbeelden op meerdere niveaus, waaronder
internationale en nationale voorbeelden en de praktijk van zowel de wetgever,
de uitvoerende macht, alsmede de rechterlijke macht. Hierbij wordt met name
gekeken naar de statenpraktijk die betrekking heeft op terrorismebestrijding,
maar ook de praktijk waar het gaat om remedies voor fouten begaan tijdens
terrorismebestrijding. In de analyse van concrete voorbeelden zal worden
gezocht naar meer algemene karakteristieken die gedistilleerd kunnen worden
uit de praktijk in zijn geheel.
Een derde groep vragen die voortvloeit uit de analyse van het bestaande
raamwerk en de contemporaine praktijk betreft de implicaties van de ‘oorlog
tegen terrorisme’ op langere termijn. Het proefschrift heeft niet de ambitie
om op gedetailleerd niveau de staat en ontwikkeling van het internationaal
gewoonterecht op basis van geïdentificeerde statenpraktijk en opinio juris weer
te geven. Maar in het licht van de geanalyseerde voorbeelden geeft het wel
een evaluatie van hoe het bestaande raamwerk geëvolueerd is door en in de
praktijk. In dit kader worden ook de meer algemene implicaties voor het
respect voor het internationaal recht en de staat van de internationale rechts-
orde besproken.
Juridisch raamwerk
Deze studie geeft weer hoe één bepaald fenomeen, internationaal terrorisme,
te maken heeft en gereguleerd wordt door een veelvoud aan rechtsgebieden,
en een overdaad aan overlappende rechtsbronnen. Elk van de hoofdstukken
2 t/m 7 onderscheidt verscheidene primaire en secundaire normen, rechts-
beginselen en mechanismen vanuit verschillende rechtsgebieden welke tezamen
het toepasselijke juridische raamwerk vormen in de strijd tegen internationaal
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terrorisme. De hoofdstukken 8 t/m 10 laten vervolgens via case studies zien
hoe de verschillende rechtsgebieden zich onderling verhouden en tegelijkertijd
van toepassing kunnen zijn in bepaalde situaties.
Het aldus in kaart gebrachte juridische raamwerk bestaat vanzelfsprekend
uit meerdere en overlappende verdragen, waaronder regionale en multinationa-
le terrorismeverdragen, uitleveringsverdragen, diplomatieke verdragen en
verdragen op het terrein van de mensenrechten en het internationaal humani-
tair recht. Deze verdragen zijn bindend voor de staten die partij bij het verdrag
zijn maar kunnen soms verdergaande betekenis hebben voor de ontwikkeling
van algemene normen. Vaak zullen de verplichtingen die in dit proefschrift
besproken worden ook de status van internationaal gewoonterecht hebben,
en in sommige gevallen zelfs behoren tot de selecte groep van regels met erga
omnes werking of jus cogens status. Deze laatste kenmerken hebben gevolgen
voor de normatieve waarde en de juridische status die aan deze regels wordt
toegekend, de resistentie van deze regels tegen verandering en de gevolgen
van schending. Alhoewel de reikwijdte en de juridische status van de verplich-
tingen dus verschilt, is het merendeel van de regels die dit proefschrift identifi-
ceert als behorend tot het relevante juridisch raamwerk bindend voor alle
staten.
Het raamwerk wordt nader vorm gegeven door andere rechtsbronnen.
Met name rechterlijke beslissingen van nationale, regionale en internationale
hoven die bepaalde terrorisme bestrijdingsmaatregelen beoordelen, spelen een
belangrijke rol in de analyse. Deze uitspraken kunnen gezien worden als
statenpraktijk. Daarnaast sporen zij ook aan tot statenpraktijk in die zin dat
zij overheden aanmoedigen tot bepaald gedrag, bijvoorbeeld het implementeren
van of reageren op een bepaalde uitspraak. Bovendien kunnen deze uitspraken
het recht verder ontwikkelen. Algemene rechtsbeginselen zijn ook een relevante
rechtsbron gebleken om het juridisch raamwerk aan te vullen, in het bijzonder
op punten van onduidelijkheid. Daarnaast hebben Veiligheidsraadresoluties
een speciale betekenis gekregen in de wereld na 9/11, alsmede de hieruit
voortvloeiende praktijk onder toezicht van het Terrorismebestijdingscomité
(Counter Terrorism Comittee). De exponentiele groeit van ‘soft law’ kan ook
niet onvermeld blijven. Deze normen geven verdere inhoud aan internationale
regels en bieden een aanwijzing hoe die regels dienen te worden geïnterpre-
teerd en toegepast in concrete situaties waarin terrorisme wordt bestreden.
Zij verduidelijken het juridisch raamwerk, ontwikkelen dit verder of geven
aan welke punten rijp zijn voor verdere juridische ontwikkeling. Veel van deze
‘soft law’ bronnen zijn aangehaald in rechterlijke beslissingen hetgeen hun
status verder heeft verstevigd.
Het proefschrift zet het gedetailleerde en zich nog ontwikkelende recht
betreffende internationaal terrorisme uiteen, onder verwijzing naar de vele
relevante rechtsgebieden van het internationaal recht en de verscheidene,
overlappende en elkaar onderling versterkende rechtsbronnen, die in de kern
gebaseerd zijn op fundamentele rechtsbeginselen. Het is een flexibel raamwerk,
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dat zich op verschillende manieren kan aanpassen aan noodsituaties, en ruimte
laat voor veiligheidseisen bij de rechtshandhaving en andere uitdagingen die
terrorisme stelt. Alhoewel het raamwerk niet voorziet in speciaal beleid, hoeft
het niet per se als inadequaat te worden aangemerkt. Beweringen dat er leemtes
en onduidelijkheden in het raamwerk bestaan of dat dit ontoereikend is,
kunnen ook duiden op een gebrek aan bereidheid om het raamwerk te respec-
teren en in die zin een reflectie zijn van de keus om bepaalde beleidsprioritei-
ten boven het recht te stellen.
In andere gevallen kunnen deze beweringen het gevolg zijn van de nalatig-
heid om het raamwerk in al zijn detail en gelaagdheid qua normen, beginselen
en processen volledig in beschouwing te nemen. Het proefschrift toont aan
hoezeer alle aspecten van het raamwerk onderling verbonden zijn en als
onderdeel van een geheel geïnterpreteerd dienen te worden, waarbij elk
rechtsgebied en iedere specifieke norm van internationaal recht begrepen dient
te worden in het licht van de kernbeginselen waar zij uit voortvloeien en dat
in onderlinge samenhang met elkaar.
De complexe en dynamische verhouding tussen de rechtsgebieden en tussen
de verschillende rechtsbronnen zoals hierboven uiteengezet, heeft praktische
consequenties en kan aanleiding zijn voor spanningen, zoals onderzocht in
dit proefschrift. Dit betreft bijvoorbeeld de interactie tussen mensenrechten
en internationaal humanitair recht, of de verhouding tussen Veiligheidsraad-
resoluties en mensenrechten. Zoals dit proefschrift aantoont, werd de ‘oorlog
tegen terrorisme’ gekenmerkt door een selectieve toepassing van bepaalde
rechtsgebieden of normen van het raamwerk, bijvoorbeeld een sterke nadruk
op het recht dat van toepassing is in tijden van gewapend conflict, ten nadele
van andere toepasselijke normen, en in het bijzonder fundamentele mensen-
rechten alsmede de onderliggende beginselen van het internationaal humanitair
recht zelf. Het proefschrift geeft de verscheidene manieren weer waarop een
dergelijke gefragmenteerde en selectieve benadering van het raamwerk geleid
heeft tot beweringen betreffende het bestaan van juridische leemtes of beruchte
claims dat sommige mensen niet door het recht beschermd dienen te worden,
omdat zij in een lacune zouden vallen die in feite niet bestaat als het raamwerk
als een geïntegreerd geheel wordt opgevat.3
Het overzicht van het raamwerk van internationaal recht in deze hoofdstuk-
ken suggereert dat het toepasselijke recht geen gapende lacunes bevat. Het
geldende internationale recht is niet inherent gedateerd of onvoldoende geëqui-
peerd om de uitdagingen van het internationaal terrorisme aan te gaan. Het
is ook niet uitzonderlijk complex of moeilijk toegankelijk, en zeker niet irratio-
neel. Het is niet blind voor de veiligheidseisen en uitdagingen zoals die gesteld
worden door een aanval zoals 9/11. Na deze aanval is het recht niet drastisch
veranderd, maar het heeft zich geleidelijk aan verder ontwikkeld en zal dit
3 Zie bijvoorbeeld hoofdstuk 8 over Guantanamo Bay.
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blijven doen. Alhoewel er punten zijn waarop legitiem verschil van inzicht
kan bestaan betreffende de juiste interpretatie, waar het recht onduidelijk is
of verdere juridische ontwikkeling gewenst of onderweg, is het ook zo dat
9/11 heeft duidelijk gemaakt – en dit is bevestigd door de ‘oorlog tegen terro-
risme’ – dat het recht niet zozeer inadequaat is, maar dat respect voor dit recht
fragiel is, en de naleving ervan een uitdaging.
De praktijk in de ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’
De praktijk van na 9/11 zoals onderzocht in dit proefschrift doet zich voor
op verschillende niveaus (internationaal, regionaal en nationaal), waarbij een
grote pluraliteit van actoren betrokken is (wetgever, rechterlijke en uitvoerende
macht, veiligheidsdiensten, private actoren en andere) en in een veelvoud van
vormen (wetten, beleid en praktijk, gedrag, aanwijzingen en controle van
staten, medeplichtigheid of steun, daden en nalaten). Alhoewel op sommige
punten de invloed, aard en reikwijdte van de praktijk van de VS een grotere
nadruk en aandacht voor die staat rechtvaardigt, zijn terrorisme, terrorisme-
bestrijding en de uitdagingen die zich daarbij voordoen universele fenomenen.
Deze studie is derhalve ook universeel gericht. Het gaat uit van universele
normen en praktijken, maar ook regionale en sub-regionale standaarden, en
voorbeelden van nationale terrorismebestrijding in diverse staten verspreid
over de wereld, van Afghanistan tot Algerije, van Bahrein tot Bali en van
Colombia tot Tsjetsjenië. In feite kijkt het naar alle diverse praktijken die
worden uitgevoerd in de naam van terrorismebestrijding maar waarbij persis-
tente vragen gesteld kunnen worden betreffende het respect voor het raam-
werk.
Een veelvoud aan praktijken die het juridisch raamwerk onder druk zetten
wordt onderzocht. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan de grootschalige en lang-
durige militaire interventies in Afghanistan en Irak, die de deur openzetten
naar een wereldwijde oorlog tegen Al-Qaeda en geassocieerde terroristische
netwerken zonder geografische begrenzing. De praktijk die voortvloeide uit
het beruchte beroep op een breed begrip van het ‘oorlog’-paradigma wordt
onderzocht. Dit beroep had ten doel om uitzonderingsmaatregelen te rechtvaar-
digen, zoals het buiten spel zetten van de normale standaarden voor de be-
scherming van gedetineerden of verdachten, het oprichten van speciale recht-
banken en het instellen van speciale rechtsregimes, alsmede het gericht doden
van individuen hetgeen buiten het oorlog-paradigma als buitengerechtelijke
executie moet worden aangemerkt. Dit beroep heeft ook een misleidend effect
gehad op de gepercipieerde relevantie en inhoud van het internationaal huma-
nitair recht, waarbij de relevantie van mensenrechtenbescherming zoals deze
voor ieder individu dient te bestaan gemarginaliseerd werd. De oorlogsretoriek
heeft terrorismebestrijding gekarakteriseerd als een conflict tegen een vijand
die vernietigd dient te worden, ten koste van alles, en niet als een situatie
waarin via het recht tegen bepaalde individuen en groeperingen diende te
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worden opgetreden. Eén van de specifieke onderwerpen die onderzocht wordt
is de rechtmatigheid van het beleid om individuen gericht te doden, een
praktijk die in recente jaren is opgebloeid en waarbij vragen kunnen worden
gesteld naar de onderlinge verhouding tussen gevangenneming en doden in
het licht van het toepasselijk juridisch regime.4
Naast het gebruik van termen en concepten als ‘oorlog’ tegen een niet
duidelijk geïdentificeerde vijand, en zelfverdediging die niet langer exclusief
defensief van aard is, verdient ook de ambiguïteit van het gebruik van het
terrorisme-label en gerelateerde activiteiten aandacht. Een veelvoud aan
praktijken is over de hele wereld ontstaan, en oude soms dubieuze praktijken
zijn gecontinueerd met een hernieuwde legitimiteit, in de naam van terrorisme-
preventie. Deze praktijken voldeden vaak niet aan internationale beschermings-
standaarden. Praktijken die zich hebben voorgedaan in de naam van terroris-
mepreventie omvatten het verbieden van organisaties, het uitbannen van
groepen, het inperken van de vrijheid van meningsuiting, het verbieden van
demonstraties en publicaties, het onthouden van het recht om de doden te
begraven, het opzijzetten van aansprakelijkheidsprocessen met een beroep op
immuniteit, en inbreuken op het recht op privacy. Deze praktijken worden
onderzocht in het licht van de balans die inherent is aan het juridisch raam-
werk welke mensenrechten beschermt maar daarbij ook ruimte laat voor
legitieme nationale veiligheidsoverwegingen.
De hardnekkige aanwezigheid van marteling als een kenmerk van de oorlog
tegen terrorisme, alsmede pogingen om dit te rechtvaardigen en af te wegen
tegen nationale veiligheidsbelangen of de poging om relevante bepalingen
uit te hollen geven aan hoe absolute rechten en waarden in twijfel zijn getrok-
ken, en hoe basale standaarden zijn aangetast onder het mom van de noodzaak
om veiligheidsinformatie te verzamelen die noodzakelijk is voor de oorlog
tegen terrorisme.
Het rendition-beleid van de CIA is één van de schaduwkanten van inter-
nationale samenwerking en geeft goed weer hoe een veelvoud aan actoren
verantwoordelijkheid draagt voor de oorlog tegen terrorisme. Dit beleid van
gedwongen verdwijning van personen werd geleid door de CIA, maar was
nauwgezet afgestemd met netwerken van individuen, private actoren en
statelijke partners over de hele wereld, waarbij individuen systematisch aan
de bescherming van het recht werden onttrokken hetgeen vervolgens even
systematisch werd toegedekt. De oorlog tegen het terrorisme wordt gekenmerkt
door een systematische en herhaaldelijk wederkerend gebruik van marteling,
medeplichtigheid aan marteling, wegkijken wanneer marteling plaatsvindt.
Hierbij waren niet louter een paar geïsoleerde pariastaten betrokken. Deze
feiten geven aanleiding tot gecompliceerde vragen aangaande staatsaansprake-
lijkheid.
4 Zie hoofdstuk 7B.3, hoofdstuk 6B.2.2, en hoofdstuk 9.
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Het in de tijd verschuivende strafrechtparadigma – waarbij meer nadruk
werd gelegd op een preventieve rol voor het strafrecht – heeft geleid tot
nieuwe strafwetten die betrekking hadden op een zich uitbreidend scala aan
handelingen, waaronder het steunen, faciliteren van of bijdragen aan daden
van terrorisme. Naast deze wetten, zijn ook de onderzoeksbevoegdheden en
strafrechtsmachtsgronden uitgebreid, en zijn de strafrechtprocedures aangepast
en andere initiatieven ontplooid om de internationale samenwerking te
versterken en te stroomlijnen.5 Terwijl deze ontwikkelingen in sommige
opzichten het normatieve en institutionele raamwerk hebben verstevigd om
via het strafrecht tegen terrorisme op te treden, hebben bepaalde maatregelen
het algehele rechtssysteem eerder ondermijnd omdat zij zich niet goed
verhielden met algemene beginselen van het strafrecht waaronder het beginsel
van individuele aansprakelijkheid, legaliteit en het recht op een eerlijk proces.
De internationale praktijk wordt ook onderzocht via de praktijk van inter-
nationale organisaties, waarbij met name de nadruk wordt gelegd op de
praktijk van de VN Veiligheidsraad en diens uitoefening van wetgevende en
quasi-rechterlijke rollen in het post- 9/11 tijdperk.6 De toegenomen inzet van
gerichte sancties tegen individuen en groepen heeft een enorme impact gehad
op deze individuen en hun omgeving, en wellicht ook op de reputatie van
de Veiligheidsraad zelf. Het draconische gebrek aan eerlijke en transparante
procedures die de benadering van de Veiligheidsraad typeren wordt weerspie-
geld in nationale maatregelen, zoals sancties, uitzettingen en verschillende
andere maatregelen, die een inbreuk hebben gemaakt op een wijd scala aan
rechten zonder basale informatie te verstrekken of een betekenisvolle mogelijk-
heid om deze maatregelen aan te vechten.7
De studie naar de praktijk bekijkt niet alleen maatregelen die genomen
zijn in reactie op terrorisme, maar beschouwt ook andere praktijken die een
reactie vormen op de aard of excessen van de oorlog tegen terrorisme. Hierbij
is met name aandacht voor de derde vraag die hierboven is gesteld, namelijk
de implicaties op langere termijn van de oorlog tegen terrorisme, en de vraag
of deze zal uitmonden in blijvende erosie van bestaande standaarden en respect
voor het recht meer in zijn algemeenheid.
Dit proefschrift traceert de evoluties in hoe staten zich opstellen ten aanzien
van de ergste excessen van de oorlog tegen terrorisme. Het suggereert dat
er een beweging kan worden waargenomen terug naar een situatie waarin
een erkenning bestaat van het feit dat terrorismebestrijding dient plaats te
vinden met respect voor bestaande rechtsregels en waarbij het standpunt is
dat het bestaande rechtsregime dient te worden verstevigd in plaats van
ondermijnd of genegeerd. Deze beweging is het meest duidelijk op papier,
waarbij thans meer nadruk wordt gelegd op enerzijds de complementaire aard
5 Zie hoofdstuk 4B.2.3.
6 Zie bijvoorbeeld hoofdstuk 7B.3
7 Zie bijvoorbeeld hoofdstuk 7B.7, 7B.8 en 7B.10 voor voorbeelden, en 12.3.
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van de verplichting om terrorisme te bestrijden en mensen te beschermen en
anderzijds respect voor het recht, democratie en met name mensenrechten.
Dit kwam duidelijk naar voren in de 2006 UN Global Strategy, die – zoals vele
andere declaraties en resoluties – mensenrechten en veiligheid beschreef als
doelen die niet strijdig met elkaar, maar complementair en elkaar versterkend
zijn.8 De aanvankelijke veronachtzaming van mensenrechten door de Veilig-
heidsraad ten faveure van veiligheidsoverwegingen heeft plaats gemaakt voor
een erkenning dat respect voor het recht, voor mensenrechten en internationaal
humanitair recht integrale onderdelen zijn van effectieve terrorismebestrijdings-
strategieën.9 Deze beweging wordt ook weerspiegeld in institutionele ontwik-
kelingen op nationaal en internationaal niveau, waarbij zorg bestaat voor de
noodzaak om effectieve terrorismebestrijdingsmaatregelen consistent te houden
met internationaal recht.10
Een belangrijke dimensie van de beweging terug naar een grotere mate
van rechtsstatelijkheid is de opkomende erkenning dat veel terrorismebestrij-
dingsmaatregelen in het post 9/11 tijdperk een contra-productief effect hebben
gehad. Onrechtmatige praktijken gevoerd in de naam van terrorismepreventie
hebben vaak een katalyserend effect gehad op nieuwe daden van terrorisme.
Zelfs de president de VS heeft dit erkend. Hij beschreef bijvoorbeeld Guanta-
namo Bay als een toprekruteringsmechanisme voor nieuwe terroristen.11 Meer
recent zijn de drone aanvallen aangemerkt als zodanig.12 De moeilijkheden
om verdachten gevangen te nemen en bijkomende bewijsproblemen, kwesties
van ontvankelijkheid en andere procedurele problemen in strafzaken, zoals
beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, worden in toenemende mate aangemerkt als wijzen
waarop het negeren van het recht heeft geleid tot minder succesvolle terroris-
mebestrijding via het strafrecht.13 De hernieuwde aandacht van de
internationale gemeenschap voor omstandigheden die vruchtbaar zijn voor
terrorisme, zoals uiteengezet in de Global Strategy en weergegeven in
8 VN Doc. A/60/825, insert DATE. De Global Strategy is weerspiegeld in benaderingen van
regionale lichamen, zoals bijvoorbeeld ACHPR, Resolution on the Protection of Human
Rights in the Fight against Terrorism, aangenomen op de 37e sessie, 2005, en OVSE
Consolidated Strategy 2012. Zie ook hoofdstuk 7B.1.
9 Zie VN Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1373 (2001) (is that correct illustration for the point you
make?)en hoofdstuk 7B.
10 Zie bijvoorbeeld hoofdstuk 7B.1.
11 E.g. B. Obama, ‘News Conference by the President’, South Court Auditorium, Eisenhower
Executive Off ice Building, 22 December 2012, beschikbaar op:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/22/news-conference-president laatst
bezocht op 18 April 2013 and Chapter 7B.1.
12 E.g. P. Alston, ‘Press Statement’, UNAMA Press Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 15 May
2008, beschikbaar op: http://unama.unmissions. Zie ook hoofdstuk 8 met betrekking tot
Guantanamo.
13 Zie hoofdstuk 4B.4.
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internationale en nationale verklaringen,14 suggereren ook dat er een meer
holistische benadering komt die erkent dat er een relatie bestaat tussen
mensenrechten en het recht op ontwikkeling enerzijds en terrorismepreventie
anderzijds.
De reacties van staten op grove mensenrechtenschendingen en schendingen
van het internationaal humanitair recht laten ook zien dat de internationale
gemeenschap zich steeds prominenter uitspreekt en duidelijk standpunten
inneemt ten aanzien van bepaalde kwesties. Het meest sprekende voorbeeld
is wellicht Guantanamo Bay, zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 8, waar de veroor-
deling bijzonder krachtig is geworden, komend van staten, internationale
lichamen, en vele anderen, waarbij nog kan worden opgemerkt dat niet al deze
actoren allemaal even bekend staan als uitgesproken voorvechters van de
mensenrechten.15 De veroordeling van het rendition-programma, zoals bespro-
ken in hoofdstuk 10, neemt ook steeds sterkere vormen aan. De feiten die
daarbij aan het licht worden gebracht zijn zeer ernstig en dragen bij aan het
in kaart brengen van de aansprakelijkheid van verschillende andere staten
dan de VS. Het is waarneembaar dat steeds minder staten dit programma of
deze tactieken willen verdedigen.16 In scherp contrast hiermee, moet geconsta-
teerd worden dat het systematische gericht doden niet op even krachtige wijze
aan de kaak wordt gesteld. Maar ook hier blijven wel reacties opkomen, en
er is zeker weinig steun of acceptatie, impliciet of expliciet, voor de drone
aanvallen buiten situaties van gewapend conflict.17
Een aantal staten hebben hun bezorgdheid of protest tegen deze praktijken
kracht bijgezet in de vorm van een weigering om mee te werken aan deze
praktijken omdat dit strijd met hun eigen verplichtingen onder het internatio-
nale recht zou opleveren.18 Het is niet zeker of de veroordeling van deze
praktijken, zo deze al bestaat, ook zal leiden tot acties waarbij zij die direct
verantwoordelijk zijn aansprakelijk worden gehouden of waarbij genoeg-
doening wordt verleend aan de slachtoffers van onrechtmatige handelingen
die in het kader van de ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’ zijn begaan.
Er is ook opkomende erkenning van de beperkingen en gevaren van een
te eenzijdige militair gericht antwoord op internationaal terrorisme.19 De
overdadige en kritiekloze steun voor de interventie in Afghanistan20 staat
14 Zie de genoemde Global Strategy en bijv. “Why terrorism? Addressing the Conditions Con-
ducive to the Spread of Terrorism" (Straatsburg, 2007) en de toespraak van President Obama,
23 mei 2013, waar de nadruk wordt gelegd op het belang van een alomvattende aanpak
waarbij ook percepties van onrecht en armoede worden aangepakt.
15 Zie hoofdstuk 8C.
16 Zie hoofdstuk 10.
17 Zie hoofdstuk 6B.2.2.
18 Zie hoofdstuk 7A.5.10 voor het juridisch raamwerk en B.14 voor praktijk van na 9/11; zie
ook hoofdstuk 4B over strafrechtelijke samenwerking.
19 Hoofdstuk 5. Zie ook Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1963 (2010), 4e paragraaf van de preambule.
20 Zie hoofdstuk 5B.1.
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in sterk contrast met de luide en krachtige internationale oppositie tegen de
oorlog in Irak, en het gebrek aan steun voor de stelling van de VS dat een
recht op zelfverdediging tegen terroristen waar ook ter wereld bestaat.21
Daarentegen hebben de ontwikkelingen en het gebruik van strafrecht, en het
onderzoeken van het preventieve potentieel van dit rechtsgebied, geleid tot
een beter ontwikkeld raamwerk en een gedeelde wereldwijde praktijk.22 De
groeiende erkenning van de rol en het belang van het strafrecht bevat een reële
belofte voor een ommezwaai naar meer rechtsstatelijkheid in de strijd tegen
terrorisme.
Een essentieel onderdeel van de reactie op de ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’
komt vanuit de rechterlijke hoek die daden van andere delen van de staat heeft
berecht.23 Alhoewel de stem van de rechter niet altijd even luid was, en deze
bij tijd en wijle veel ruimte heeft gelaten aan de uitvoerende macht, is er toch
ook een ruime praktijk ontstaan waarin rechtbanken en hoven wel degelijk
een duidelijke rol op zich hebben genomen om het optreden van de overheid
terug te brengen binnen de grenzen van het recht, en om een mate van toezicht
en aansprakelijkheid te waarborgen. De impact hiervan is veelomvattend
geweest. Het heeft geleid tot verandering in wetgeving en beleid, en het heeft
bestaande standaarden herbevestigd en aangesterkt. Hierdoor zijn de beginse-
len van aansprakelijkheid en toezicht bekrachtigd.24 Deze reacties op de ‘oor-
log tegen terrorisme’ door verschillende normatieve actoren verzachten de
blijvende negatieve impact van de praktijk. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat,
alhoewel het juridisch landschap na 9/11 een desolaat aanblik gaf, niet zonder
meer gesteld kan worden dat de ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’ geleid heeft tot een
catastrofale situatie vanuit rechtsstatelijk perspectief zoals door sommigen wel
is voorspeld.25
Overzicht van de hoofdstukken en conclusies
Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen. Het eerste deel geeft een schets van
preliminaire juridische vraagstukken betreffende internationaal terrorisme en
internationale aansprakelijkheid voor terrorisme. Het tweede, meer inhoudelijke
deel, onderzoekt de rechtmatigheid van bepaalde reacties op het internationale
terrorisme. Hierbij wordt gekeken naar antwoorden via het strafrecht en het
recht op geweldgebruik tussen staten, maar ook het recht dat bepaalt hoe
bestrijdingsmaatregelen moeten worden uitgevoerd, waaronder hoofdstukken
21 Zie hoofdstuk 5.
22 Zie hoofdstuk 4B.1.2.
23 Zie hoofdstuk 11.
24 Ibid.
25 See A. Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law,
EJIL 2001.
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over mensenrechten en internationaal humanitair recht zoals dat toepasselijk
is tijdens gewapend conflict.
De politieke betekenis van het terrorisme-label sinds 9/11 staat buiten kijf
en wordt door de gehele studie heen onderzocht. In het eerste deel van hoofd-
stuk 2 wordt echter aangevangen met een betoog aangaande de juridische
betekenis van terrorisme als een zelfstandig concept in het internationale recht.
Het behandelt het welbekende gebrek aan een universele definitie, en beschrijft
internationale en regionale ontwikkelingen (voor en na 9/11) die bijdragen
aan een meer generieke definitie van terrorisme, en de proliferatie van verdra-
gen die op specifieke vormen van terrorisme betrekking hebben. Alhoewel
het bestaan van een algemeen aanvaarde definitie van terrorisme onder verdra-
genrecht of internationaal gewoonterecht op dit moment twijfelachtig is,
introduceert dit hoofdstuk de veelvoud aan internationale rechtsnormen die
een verbod op terrorisme bevatten en de daarmee verbonden verplichtingen.
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt aansprakelijkheid onder internationaal recht. Het
gaat allereerst in op de aansprakelijkheid van staten voor daden van internatio-
naal terrorisme, en de gronden op basis waarvan daden van private actoren,
zoals individuen, netwerken en organisaties, zoals Al-Qaeda en geassocieerde
groepen, aan een staat toegerekend kunnen worden (zoals aan Afghanistan
na 9/11). In dit hoofdstuk wordt de suggestie gedaan dat onder de huidige
standaarden, toerekening vaak moeilijk is als er geen duidelijk aanwijzingen
bestaan dat een staat controle heeft over concrete handelingen. Hierbij wordt
een onderscheid gemaakt tussen toerekening in de context van specifieke
terroristische aanvallen en toerekening in de context van aansprakelijkheid
voor andere onrechtmatige daden. Voor elk van deze scenario’s worden de
consequenties van aansprakelijkheid zoals deze voortvloeien uit het internatio-
nale recht uiteen gezet. Het hoofdstuk gaat ook in op de mate waarin indi-
viduen en organisaties – de zogenaamde niet-statelijke entiteiten, zoals Al-
Qaeda, of individuele leden en gelieerde organisaties26 – aansprakelijk kunnen
worden gesteld onder het internationale recht en in hoeverre het recht op dit
punt in ontwikkeling is. Het laatste deel gaat in op kwesties van staatsaanspra-
kelijkheid die kunnen opkomen in het kader van onrechtmatige terrorisme-
bestrijdingsmaatregelen. Hierbij wordt met name ingegaan op vraagstukken
betreffende gedeelde aansprakelijkheid van staten in situaties waar staten
handelen via of in samenwerking met andere staten. Daarnaast worden de
controverses rond staatsaansprakelijkheid voor private aannemers besproken
en de beweringen betreffende leemtes in het juridische raamwerk in deze
context worden in twijfel getrokken. Het hoofdstuk behandelt ook het recht,
of in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden de verantwoordelijkheid, van andere
staten om op te treden tegen onrechtmatigheden die voortvloeien uit daden
van terrorisme of juist uit terrorismebestrijdingsmaatregelen.
26 Zie hoofdstuk 6.
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In deel twee, analyseert hoofdstuk 4 het internationale terrorisme en reacties
daartegen via het strafrecht. Alhoewel internationaal terrorisme als zodanig
niet als misdrijf onder verdragenrecht of internationaal gewoonterecht moet
worden aangemerkt, beschrijft deel A verscheidene andere misdrijven die
gepleegd kunnen worden door daden van internationaal terrorisme. Het zet
de relevante rechtsbeginselen van strafrecht uiteen die bepalen wie aansprake-
lijk kan worden gehouden en het onderzoekt welke hoven of tribunalen
rechtsmacht kunnen uitoefenen en in welke omstandigheden. Bovendien
worden in dit deel het recht en de mechanismen besproken die van belang
zijn voor implementatie en handhaving van internationaal strafrecht, met name
verantwoordelijkheden in het kader van de internationale samenwerking.
Hoofdstuk 4, deel B analyseert de toepassing van het strafrechtmodel in
de praktijk sinds september 2001. Hierbij is aandacht voor het gebrek aan
optreden via het strafrecht in de nadagen van 9/11, en de geleidelijke transfor-
matie van wetten en praktijken op dit punt in de loop van de tijd. In dit deel
worden normatieve ontwikkelingen getraceerd, die een trend laten zien naar
een meer preventieve rol voor het strafrecht en exceptionele benaderingen
van het strafrecht en strafprocedure ten aanzien van terrorisme in recente jaren.
Voorbeelden hiervan zijn de expansie van aan terrorisme gerelateerde misdrij-
ven en aansprakelijkheidsvormen, aangepaste beginselen en procedures in
het strafrechtelijk onderzoek en de vervolging van terrorisme en innovaties
in internationale samenwerking. Deze voorbeelden worden gerelateerd aan
juridische verplichtingen op het gebied van de mensenrechten en er wordt
bezien wat de implicaties van deze voorbeelden zijn voor het strafproces zelf.
Tot slot, alhoewel de nadruk van het hoofdstuk ligt op internationaal terroris-
me, kijkt dit hoofdstuk ook naar de relevantie van het internationaal strafrecht
paradigma en onderzoekt het in hoeverre internationale misdrijven gepleegd
worden in de naam van terrorismebestrijding. In deze context valt op dat er
weinig praktijk is waarbij individuen aansprakelijk worden gehouden onder
het internationaal strafrecht voor misdrijven die gepleegd zijn in de context
van de oorlog tegen het terrorisme.
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de buitengewone omstandigheden waarin het
gebruik van geweld gerechtvaardigd is als antwoord op internationaal terroris-
me, in het kader van zelfverdedigingsacties of volgend op een autorisatie van
de Veiligheidsraad onder hoofdstuk VII van het VN Handvest. Alhoewel andere
rechtvaardigingsgronden ook kort genoemd worden, gaat de aandacht vooral
uit naar die gronden waar een beroep op gedaan is in diverse contexten sinds
9/11, en in het bijzonder het beroep op een uitgebreid recht op zelfverdediging
tegen terrorisme. In dit licht gaat het hoofdstuk in op de reikwijdte en
begrenzingen van het recht op zelfverdediging en de rol van de Veiligheids-
raad in deze context bij het autoriseren van geweldgebruik in het belang van
de internationale vrede en veiligheid. Hoofdstuk 5, deel B analyseert dit
juridische raamwerk in het licht van daadwerkelijk optreden met geweld in
het post 9/11 tijdperk. De rechtmatigheid van geweldgebruik bij de interventies
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van Afghanistan en Irak wordt beoordeeld alsmede de openstaande claim dat
er een recht bestaat om wereldwijd geweld te gebruiken in de context van
acties waarbij beweerdelijke leden van al-Qaeda en geassocieerde groepen
gericht worden gedood. Hierbij wordt de stelling ingenomen dat een dergelijke
expansieve benadering van het recht op zelfverdediging zich niet verhoudt
met het bestaande juridische raamwerk.
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de relevantie, de reikwijdte en aard van het inter-
nationaal humanitair recht zoals van toepassing in tijden gewapend conflict
en onderzoekt wanneer en in hoeverre dit van toepassing is op de strijd tegen
het internationale terrorisme. Het beoordeelt de juridische status van het
gewapende conflict en analyseert de sleutelnormen die van toepassing zijn,
met name de normen die bepalen welke doelen legitiem zijn, welke methoden
en middelen zijn toegestaan, welke humanitaire bescherming geldt en wat
de verantwoordelijkheid is van staten die partij zijn bij de Verdragen van
Genève om ervoor te zorgen dat de standaarden van het internationaal huma-
nitair recht worden nageleefd.
In het licht van dit overkoepelende juridisch raamwerk, onderzoekt deel
B van hoofdstuk 6 de kwestie die het juridisch debat heeft overheerst, en in
feite geblokkeerd, sinds het begin van de zogenaamde ‘oorlog tegen terroris-
me’, en wel de vraag of er een wereldwijde oorlog met Al-Qaeda en geasso-
cieerde groeperingen is of kan bestaan. Secundair hieraan, gaat dit deel in op
de vraag hoe de conflicten die bestaan hebben sinds 9/11 moeten worden
gekwalificeerd. Het behandelt ook bepaalde kwesties zoals expansieve doelen-
selecties, en andere vraagstukken betreffende methoden en middelen van
oorlogvoering en humanitaire bescherming in het licht van bestaand internatio-
naal humanitair recht, waaronder de behandeling van vijandelijke strijders,
detentie tijdens gewapend conflict en drone-aanvallen.
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzoekt de relevantie van mensenrechten op de oorlog
tegen terrorisme. Het bespreekt waar, wanneer en ten aanzien van wie het
mensenrechtenraamwerk van toepassing is. Hierbij wordt de nadruk gelegd
op de inherente flexibiliteit van mensenrechten en de manieren waarop ruimte
kan worden geschapen voor veiligheidsbelangen en andere uitdagingen die
het terrorisme stelt. Vervolgens komen specifieke rechten aan de orde die van
belang zijn in de context van terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding. Hoofdstuk 7,
deel B behandelt een aantal voorbeelden van specifieke vragen die opkomen
bij de toepassing van dit juridische raamwerk in het post 9/11 tijdperk. Drie
veelomvattende kwesties worden besproken die direct betrekking hebben op
de relevantie en de toepasselijkheid van het raamwerk en de onderlinge
verhouding met andere regimes. Het betreft hier de verhouding tussen veilig-
heid en mensenrechten, de extraterritoriale werking van mensenrechten en
de toepasselijkheid van mensenrechten op de oorlog tegen Al-Qaeda (en, waar
gepast, de verhouding met het internationaal humanitair recht). Dit hoofdstuk
gaat ook in op specifieke praktijken van na 9/11 die de mensenrechten direct
schenden of het raamwerk onder druk zetten. Voorbeelden betreffen verstrek-
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kende anti-terrorisme wetgeving en de implicaties hiervan voor het legaliteits-
beginsel, profileringspraktijken in het licht van het gelijkheidsbeginsel, de
implicatie van het op sanctielijsten plaatsen en verwijderen van terrorisme-
verdachten, de erosie van het recht op privacy, de veelvormige schendingen
van het verbod op marteling en onmenselijke behandeling. Meer algemene
vragen betreffen de marginalisering van mensenrechten en mechanismen in
de onmiddellijke nadagen van 9/11, en de vraag of er thans een meer promi-
nente en centrale rol voor mensenrechten is weggelegd in de voortdurende
oorlog tegen het terrorisme.
In deel 3, worden een aantal case studies behandeld die illustreren hoe
diverse rechtsgebieden en regimes tegelijk van toepassing zijn en deels samen-
vallen, en hoe deze co-existentie in de praktijk uitwerkt inzake bepaalde
controversiële feitelijke scenario’s. De case studies geven ook de mate weer
waarin het juridische raamwerk niet is nageleefd, alsmede de punten waarop
onenigheid of controverses bestaan over het raamwerk zelf. Hoofdstuk 8 betreft
de detentie in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, die symbool is komen te staan voor
het arbitraire karakter van de oorlog tegen terrorisme. Deze case study biedt
de mogelijkheid om dieper in te gaan op de juridische kwesties die behandeld
zijn in hoofdstukken 6 en 7. Het bekijkt ook de onderlinge verhouding tussen
deze kwesties. Het gaat in op de rechtmatige gronden die bestaan voor de
detentie van de gevangenen en de procedurele basisrechten die zij zouden
moeten genieten volgens het mensenrechtenrecht en het internationaal humani-
tair recht, alsmede ook kwesties die voortvloeien uit hun berechting door
militaire commissies. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met de vraag wat de implicaties
zijn van de Guantanamo Bay anomalie: voor de VS en voor andere staten,
en voor vragen van rechtsstatelijkheid meer in het algemeen.
Hoofdstuk 9 presenteert de tweede case study betreffende de standrechtelijke
executie van Osama bin Laden, en de gepastheid vanuit juridisch perspectief
van de prompte bewering nadien dat het recht had gezegevierd. In dit hoofd-
stuk wordt de rechtmatigheid van de actie beschouwd, op basis van de be-
schikbare feiten en daarbij in ogenschouw nemend de relevante rechtsgebieden,
waaronder het jus ad bellum, jus in bello en de aard van het recht op leven zoals
dit bestaat in het mensenrechtenregime. Internationaalrechtelijke kwesties die
voortvloeien uit het dumpen van het lijk in de Arabische zee worden ook
besproken,
Hoofdstuk 10 gaat dieper in op de praktijk van buitengewone rendition,
geleid door de CIA maar mogelijk gemaakt door een complex netwerk met
andere staten en private actoren. Meer dan enig andere praktijk komen hierbij
kwesties van gedeelde aansprakelijkheid aan de orde. Het hoofdstuk beziet
welke staten aansprakelijk zijn voor welke vormen van participatie in het
programma, en welke onduidelijkheden en spanningen hierbij bestaan. Het
gaat in op pogingen om de praktijk aan de kaak te stellen, en ook wat de
implicaties van het rendition-programma zijn en van de straffeloosheid die dit
programma heeft omgeven tot nu toe.
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Hoofdstuk 11 kijkt naar de rol van hoven, waarbij de aandacht met name
uitgaat naar mensenrechtenhoven die het leeuwendeel van rechtszaken op
internationaal niveau hebben behandeld. Het hoofdstuk geeft weer welke
begrenzingen aan de hoven zijn gesteld en op verschillende manieren sinds
9/11. Desondanks zijn er belangrijke uitspraken gedaan die een rechterlijk
antwoord vormen op de oorlog tegen terrorisme, Het hoofdstuk analyseert
de rol en impact van deze mensenrechtenzaken in een gebied waar transparan-
tie, aansprakelijkheid en genoegdoening voor slachtoffers van de ‘oorlog tegen
terrorisme’ nauwelijks aanwezig zijn.
Het laatste hoofdstuk zet de conclusies van het onderzoek uiteen betreffen-
de het juridische raamwerk. Het geeft de overkoepelende karakteristieke
kenmerken weer van de praktijken in de oorlog tegen terrorisme, en biedt
een evaluatie van de implicaties hiervan op langere termijn. Karakteristieke
kenmerken omvatten onder meer een zeer selectieve en fragmentarische
benadering van rechtsregimes, exceptionalisme, en doelgerichte interpretaties
die het recht ondergeschikt maken aan beleid en die de autoriteit van het recht
ondermijnen. De kenmerken omvatten tevens arbitraire en geheime benaderin-
gen en een gebrek aan behoorlijke procedures, en uiteindelijk de weigering
of het verzet om terug te kijken en te garanderen dat beginselen van aansprake-
lijkheid en genoegdoening die in de kern van internationaal recht liggen
gerespecteerd worden. De genoemde selectiviteit, het exceptionalisme, juri-
dische distorsies, arbitraire benaderingen en gebrek aan aansprakelijkheid zoals
beschreven in het proefschrift zijn de antithesis van fundamentele rechtsbegin-
selen waarop het rechtssysteem is gebaseerd.
Op basis van de uitgebreide analyses van het recht en de praktijk wordt
desalniettemin gesteld dat er weinig basis bestaat voor de conclusie dat er
gapende leemtes in het juridische raamwerk bestaan. Bovendien hebben geen
grote transformaties plaats gevonden, zoals aan het begin van de ‘oorlog tegen
terrorisme’ door sommigen aangekondigd. Wel bestaan er bepaalde gebieden
van onzekerheid of spanning, en onderdelen waar het recht zich heeft ontwik-
keld.
Door het bestaande juridische raamwerk en de praktijk sinds 9/11 nauw-
keurig te onderzoeken, biedt het proefschrift tot slot ook de mogelijkheid om
vraagtekens te zetten bij de implicaties op langere termijn van de oorlog tegen
het terrorisme, en de gevolgen ervan voor het internationale recht. Systemati-
sche schendingen van fundamentele normen hebben de internationale rechts-
orde op zijn fundamenten doen schudden. Nu we gewend zijn geraakt aan
deze wijdverbreide schendingen, en buitengewone benaderingen, bestaat er
een risico van ongevoeligheid, normalisering en acceptatie van de onvermijde-
lijkheid van een dergelijke benadering. In een ‘oorlog tegen terrorisme’ waarin
de legitimiteit van extreme schendingen, zoals waterboarding, bepaalde doel-
gerichte uitschakelingen of detentie voor onbepaalde duur zonder aanklacht,
nog bediscussieerd dient te worden, worden ‘zachtere’ antwoorden zoals
onmenselijke behandeling, het ontkennen van een basaal recht op een eerlijke
858 Samenvatting
procedure, het de grond indrukken van politieke afwijkende opinies of een
inbreuk op het recht op privacy, welhaast triviaal. De distorsie van het recht
en het respect daarvoor als dat politiek gezien uitkomt vormen een groot
gevaar voor de universaliteit, integriteit en autoriteit van de internationale
rechtsorde.
Aan de andere kant kan het zo zijn dat de excessen van de ‘oorlog tegen
terrorisme’ en het gemak waarmee juridische standaarden weren opgeofferd
in de naam van veiligheid uiteindelijk zullen dienen als alarmerende herinne-
ringen van de gevaren van het ontwijken of het ondermijnen van internationaal
recht. Er bestaat wel steun voor de visie dat lessen getrokken zijn en aanpassin-
gen gemaakt in de praktijk zoals hierboven beschreven. Op andere gebieden
is het nog onzeker of voldoende bereidheid bestaat om het juridisch raamwerk
in de toekomst te implementeren. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn met name de
huidige onvolmaakte staat van aansprakelijkheidsprocessen en het onthouden
van genoegdoening aan slachtoffers van terrorismebestrijding. Deze kunnen
beschouwd worden als uitdagingen die de internationale gemeenschap zal
moeten aangaan om de papieren beloften gestalte te geven dat de ‘oorlog tegen
terrorisme’ die zo omgeven was van illegale praktijken ten einde is en dat
deze heeft plaatsgemaakt voor een benadering gestoeld op effectiviteit en
respect voor het recht.
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